Morocco - Doukkala Irrigation Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 4236 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO - DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN-1201-MOR) December 22, 1982 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. ABBREVIATIONS CMV - Centre de Mise en Valeur (Local Development Center) CNCA - Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (National Agricultural Credit Bank) IRNA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (National Institute for Agricultural Research) MARA - Ministe're de l'Agriculture et de la R6forme Agraire (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform) OED - Operations Evaluation Department ORMVAD - Office de Mise en Valeur du Doukkala (Regional Office for Development of the Doukkala) PCR - Project Completion Report USAID - United States Agency for International Development FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 AGRICULTURAL CROPPING YEAR October 1 - September 30 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Dirham (DH) Currency Exchange Rate: Appraisal Year Average US$1.00 = 3.87 DH Rate During Project Period: 1976 US$1.00 = 3.87 DH 1977 US$1.00 = 4.57 DH 1978 US$1.00 = 4.05 DH 1979 US$1.00 = 3.87 DH 1980 US$1.00 = 3.78 DH 1981 (Completion Year) US$1.00 = 5.00 DH Average (for Completion Studies) US$1.00 = 4.28 DH FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO - DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN-1201-MOR) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface .......................................................... Basic Data Sheet ...................................................ii Highlights ....................................................... iii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. ST4MARY ................... ***........................ 1 The Project and its Objectives ............................ 1 Project Preparation and Design ........................... 1 Project Implementation .................. .............. 2 Project Results ........................................... 3 II. MAIN ISSUES .............**................................... 4 A. Irrigation Layout/Land Consolidation ............... 4 B. Project Design Implication for Management and Production ................................... 5 C. Adoption Rate by Farmers and Sprinkler Irrigation... 6 D. Post-project'Maintenance ........................... 6 E. Rate of Return Analysis Issues ..................... 7 Attachment 1 Borrower Comments ............................... 9 Attachment 2 Comments Provided by USAID ......................... 11 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Summary and Lessons Learned .............................. 15 II. Background ................ ......... ................... 21 III. Project Objectives, Components and Issues ................ 23 IV. Project Implementation ........................ 24 V. Agricultural Development ................................. 36 VI. Organization and Management .............................. 43 VII. Economic Evaluation .............................. 54 Annexes I-XII Maps: IBRD 11853R: Development of the Oum-er-Rbia Basin IBRD 16256: Social and Economic Infrastructure IBRD 16255: Project Development Works This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not other4ise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO - DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN 1201-MOR) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the Doukkala I Irrigation Project in Morocco for which Loan 1201-MOR in the amount of US$30 million was approved on February 3, 1976. The loan was not fully disbursed and was closed in February 1982 in an amount of US$27.3 million after a delay of eight months. The audit consists of a memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and a project completion report (PCR) dated June 4, 1982. The completion report was prepared by the Europe, Middle East and North Africa Regional Office, partly on the basis of a visit to Morocco. The audit is based on a review of the Appraisal Report (915a-MOR) dated January 9, 1976, the President's Report (P-1746-MOR) of January 21, 1976, the Loan Agreement dated February 27, 1976, and the PCR together with a review of correspondence with the Borrower and internal Bank memoranda on project issues as contained in Bank files and interviews with Bank staff who have been associated with the project. The draft report was sent to the Borrower for comment on Octo- ber 13. The draft report was also discussed with USAID representatives. Comments received from the Borrower and USAID are attached to the audit memorandm. USAID has indicated that they are planning an impact evaluation of this project in 1989. The possibility of a joint impact evaluation will be considered at that time. The audit finds the PCR comprehensive and accurate with respect to the project's principal achievements and shortcomings. The audit memorandum summarizes the project's salient design and performance features, and elabo- rates on five issues of importance in the project and of relevance to future agricultural projects to be financed by the Bank.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET MOROCCO - DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN 1201-MOR) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Actual as Z of Item Estimate Estimated Actual Appraisal Estimate Total Project Costs (US$ million) 94.4 85.0 90 Loan Amount (US$ million) 30.0 27.3 91 Co-financing (USAID loan) 13.0 10.1 78 Board Approval Date 02/03/76 02/03/76 Loan Agreement Date -- 02/27/76 Effectiveness Date 05/28/76 07/20/76 Physical Components Completed Date 12/30/79 11/30/80 124 -a Proportion Completed by above Date - 80 Closing Date 06/30/81 06/30/9 100 Economic Rate of Return (%) 11.4 20.5- Financial Performance -- Good Institutional Performance - Good Agricultural Performance -- Good Direct Beneficiaries n.a./ 15,600 CUMULATIVE DISBURSEMENTS FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 Appraisal Estimate (US$ million) 0.5 4.0 8.0 15.0 23.9 30.0 -- Actual (US$ million) -- -- 6.8 9.7 17.5 24.8 27.3 Actual as percentage of Estimate - - 85 88 76 83 91 Date of Final Disbursement: 02/09/82 MISSION DATA Date No. of Manweeks Specializations of Performance Types of Mission (Month/Year) Persons in Field Mission Memberdd /e Trend/ Problem Appraisal 04/75 4 112 a, e, eg. - - -- Supervision I 06/76 1 3 eg 2 3 T, M Supervision II 10/76 3 9 - 2 2 T, M Supervision 111 12/76 3 9 -- 2 3 T, M Supervision IV 03/77 4 12 a, eg. 2 1 T, M Supervision V 08/77 2 4 a, eg. 1 2 F Supervision VI 02/78 1 4 e.g. 1 2 P Supervision VII 06/78 2 12 a, eg. 1 2 F, P Supervision VIII 12/78 1 6 eg 1 2 - Supervision IX 11/79 2 6 eg 1 2 F Supervision X 06/80 2 6 e, eg. 2 1 F, 0 Supervision XI 05/81 1 3 eg 1 1 F Completion 12/81 2 22 e, eg. -- -- Total 208 mandays or 42 manweeks /b OTHER PROJECT DATA Borrower Kingdom of Morocco Executing Agencies a) Regional Agricultural and Development Office, Doukkala b) National Electricity Office Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Follow-on Parallel Project Doukkala II - Loan No. 1416-MOR Loan Amount US$41 million Loan Agreement Date June 16, 1977 /a Calculated from date of board approval. Tb See PPAM, paras. 25-27. Te Appraisal estimated 3,200 farm units against an outcome of 7,754, however, there is no information on the number of anticipated land holdings in the former or estimates of expected joint ownership. /d a - Agronomist; e - Economist; eg - Engineer. Te 1 = Probler-free; 2 - moderate problems; 3 - major problems. 7? 1 - Improving; 2 - Stationary; 3 - Deteriorating. M - Managerial; T - Technical; P - Political; F - Financial; 0 = Other. /h 5 Mandays - I manweek (for consistency in OED records). The PCR uses a 7/1 ratio. 7T1 Construction of the power supply component.  - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT MOROCCO - DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN 1201-MOR) HIGHLIGHTS There are approximately 7.7 million hectares of arable land in Morocco; 850,000 hectares under irrigation of which 59% is equipped with modern facilities. The Doukkala I Irrigation Project sought to further irrigation development in a downstream area by capitalizing on previous investments in major dam and canal works, on prior and ongoing studies and on an existing satisfactory organizational infrastructure. Appraised in 1976, the project, costing US$85 million for which a loan of US$30 million was approved by the Bank, and a loan of US$13 million by USAID, created enhanced production on 15,820 hectares, involving 15,600 direct farmer beneficiaries on 11,216 newly consolidated land holdings, by assisting land consolidation work and by the provision of a modern sprinkler irrigation system. The project was well designed and well executed to take maximum advantage of prevailing local circumstances and resources; it fitted well within an overall strategy for developing the irrigation potential of Morocco. Procurement and logistical problems caused some unanticipated delays in the early stages of the project; nevertheless, all major investments were completed within the original gross schedule. While the early delays adversely affected the time stage at which individual farms entered the new production cycle, this has been offset by levels of production above those anticipated at appraisal for first-year farmers. While the actual crop mix/rotation for differing sets of farms has changed from those anticipated, the per unit area yield/value in the first years of irrigation has, in most cases, at least equalled but generally exceeded those anticipated as being reached at full development - after several more years. Consequently, the project will have a good economic rate of return well above the conservative 11.4% forecast in the Appraisal Report. Technical designs of features within project components were, with minor exceptions, extremely satisfactory. This is particularly true of components with high technical-low social content; those few (and relatively small) components with a high social content proved less amenable to techni- cal blueprints and consequently less successful within the project's imple- mentation time-frame. The unique irrigation layout system used by Morocco in modern irrigation projects warrants study by other countries where it might advantageously be introduced in situations where irregular and small land holding sizes are the norm or where land consolidation is desirable simul- taneously with the development of irrigation (PPAM, paras. 14-16). The major lesson of this project is that its success came about by an interaction of various factors: extremely satisfactory design and apprais- al; managerially integrated farm services, and staff continuity; and an - iv - excellent dialogue between Bank staff and the executing agency coupled with timely, competent and frequent supervision (PPAM, paras. 4, 17, 18-19, 13 and 8). Nevertheless, two weaknesses are apparent: (i) substantial administra- tive delays occurred in processing disbursement claims (PPAM, para. 7); and (ii) post-project maintenance issues have not been resolved despite consider- able attention to them during both project preparation and implementation (PPAM, paras. 13, 23-24, and PCR, para. 1.12). Other points of interest are: - The decision promoted by the appraisal team and adopted by the Bank to split implementation of original plans into a mix of parallel and sequentially phased projects proved to be sensible (PPAM, para. 3). - The project provided an example of a situation in which the sprink- ler irrigation system (the latters' suitability for small farmers has been the subject of much debate) is the correct tool both technically and socially (PPAM, paras. 20-22). - Design of the irrigation system towards maximizing its operating efficiency in relation to local conditions (PCR, paras. 1.16(iii), 6.7 and 6.10). - Prior investigation and resolution of land tenure issues (PPAM, para. 4 and PCR, paras. 1.16(iv), and 4.2-4.6). - 1 - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM MOROCCO - DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (LOAN 1201-MOR) I. SUMMARY The Project and its Objectives 1. The Doukkala Irrigation Project forms part of overall development efforts towards effectively using water drawn from Oum-er-Rbia. This project together with the on-going Doukkala II Project (Loan 1416-MOR, 1977) is the last investment package intended to fully utilize all water resources diverted into an existing "low-service" canal from the Im-Fout reservoir. The two projects combined will irrigate 32,000 hectares, of which this project has completed 15,400 hectares. The Doukkala I Project provided: (a) the installation of a sprinkler irrigation system for the 15,400 hectares; (b) the construction of farm feeder roads and the improvement of major classified roads; (c) the construction of infrastructure for agricultural support services and village centers; (d) the construction of electric power lines and telephonic communi- cation facilities; and (e) assistance to an on-going land consolidation program. 2. The principal objective was a substantial increase in crops pro- duction; double wheat production, a sevenfold increase in maize output, to introduce and grow substantial quantities of sugar beet, cotton, vegetables and fodder crops. Benefits would accrue to present land holders on newly consolidated holdings (64% below 10 hectares). The wheat and beet production, in particular, would assist substitution for imported cereals and sugar. Project Preparation and Design 3. Project preparation was carried out with assistance from consultants and the FAO/IBRD Co-operative Program, and within the macro-frame of a Water Master Plan for the Oum-er-Rbia Basin, prepared in 1973-74. As originally proposed the project envisaged three major components; development of all 32,000 hectares in Doukkala, the expansion and modernization of irrigation in Beni-Amir area (about 190 kilometers to the east) and the financing of a dam at Sidi Cheho; appraisal (May 1975) however only covered the Doukkala and Beni-Amir areas with preliminary estimated costs of US$280 million including - 2 - foreign exchange content of US$134 million. Of these figures US$230 million and US$112 million respectively were attributable to Doukkala. Based on macro financial considerations and on sound technical judgements the Bank arranged for the financing of Beni-Amir by the Arab Fund and decided to split the Doukkala investments into two tranches (projects) and for Doukkala I arranged co-financing with USAID. 4. Internal project design features were also prepared and appraised extremely satisfactorily. Design ensured that land consolidation (land tenure arrangements) was proceeding satisfactorily prior to investment in on-ground irrigation facilities; that sensible arrangements for programming and disci- plining water distribution were in place, and the design made full use of a satisfactory existing organization (ORMVAD)1/ as the implementing agency. Preparation of technical design features were sound and logically programmed for implementation. As indicated the most important social implication - the relationship of farmers to the land was satisfactorily covered, however, appraisal was less adept in handling other components with strong social content (e.g. village infrastructure and windbreaks), possibly because, in this project, these components were of a minor nature, nor did appraisal fully appreciate Government procedures in accounting and procurements. Project Implementation 5. Appraisal estimated the construction phase to be complete by December 1979 with a project closing date of June 1981. Final construc- tion took place in November 1980 but final disbursement did not occur until February 1982, but the Closing Date was not officially extended.2/ 6. The eight-month delay in final works completion is associated partly with some early weak contractor performance and partly with early procurement problems; the audit endorses the implicit criticism in the PCR (para. 4.18) that Bank procedures, at that time, tended to unnecessarily limit local procurement procedures and/or caused an unnecessarily large number of procurement details to be reviewed by Bank staff.3/ 1/ Office de Mise en Valeur du Doukkala (Regional Office for the Develop- ment of the Doukkala). 2/ By end FY81 disbursements stood at US$24.3 million (see basic data sheet); by February 1982 they had reached US$27.3 million. For a more in-depth discussion of disbursements after the Closing Date see PPAR, Ethiopia - Addis Ababa Dairy Development Project (Credit 269-ET), OED Report No. 4001, dated June 23, 1982. 3/ See also PPAR, Tunisia - First Fisheries Project (Credit 270-TUN), OED Report No. 3753, dated December 31, 1981 (paras. 3.05-3.11). - 3 - 7. Throughout the project implementation period, disbursements consis- tently lagged behind the volume forecast at appraisal; this was despite investment expenditures occurring very close to anticipated dates. The delays were outside Bank staff control and occurred in the disbursement claim proces- sing chain between the executing authority, its parent Ministry (MARA).1/ and Government Treasury. 8. A strong feature during project implementation has been the excel- lent dialogue and rapport between Bank staff and the executing agency. The Bank mounted three missions during the first six months and missions at roughly six-month intervals thereafter. Mission composition was technically strong and also there was good staff continuity between missions - in summary Bank support through mission work was an important contributing factor in project outcome. 9. There were no remarked design changes during implementation, though some minor components were either not fully carried out or not funded under the project as anticipated. Final costs at US$85 million were 10% below those estimated, but allowing for exchange rate variations, the project would have had a very small overrun had all originally anticipated works been carried out. Reduced costs were reflected in the final disbursement amount (US$27.3 million) being below the loan agreement (US$30 million). Project Results 10. Judged on the basis of improved productivity this is a very suc- cessful project. Although increased productivity did not come on stream for some farmers as early as expected, farmers have adapted to the new tech- nologies very quickly, resulting in yields, during the first year of full irrigation over the project area, equalling or exceeding those anticipated at full development several years later. The executing authority (ORMVAD) has sensibly adjusted the indicative cropping pattern used by appraisal to reflect advantageous exploitation of successes; consequently current activity and planning deletes cotton from the production plan (this was included with reservations by appraisal), reduces the wheat area by about 33%, increases the sugar beet area by 11%, quadruples the area under vegetables and substantially increases the area under fodder crops. 11. The altered mix of crops increases the potential for double crop- ping, and on the assumption of raising cropping intensity from 133% to 146% plus higher yield levels, the PCR estimates an economic rate of return of 20.5% compared with the 11.6% calculated at appraisal. The audit accepts that yield levels are above those anticipated and that a 146% cropping intensity is possible; however selected underlying assumptions are discussed in paragraphs 25-27. 1/ Ministere de 1-Agriculture et de la R6forme Agraire (Ministry of Agri- culture and Agrarian Reform). 12. The land consolidation work resulted in 7,754 farm units, sub- stantially more than anticipated from available data at the time of appraisal (3,200); the farm units!/ represent 11,216 land holdings and, taking into account co-owners, some 15,600 beneficiaries are involved. Although direct benefits from production are not equally distributed due to variations in holding size (93% of the farm units have 62% of the land, while 0.5% units occupy 10%) the employment opportunities created by the project (over 4,100 manyears) provide some compensating opportunity to those on the smaller parcels. 13. Government's executing agency (ORMVAD) is commended for its key role in carrying out the project. An important element in the organization's success has been continuity in senior management and staffing generally. The only serious weakness is apparent in the maintenance program, and the audit endorses the findings in the PCR (para. 6.6); correction of this deficiency is fundamental to the long-term outcome in crop production. II. MAIN ISSUES A. Irrigation Layout/Land Consolidation 14. An interesting feature of modern irrigation projects in Morocco is the layout system used. It is mentioned here because it could advantageously be examined by other countries for possible wider adoption in other parts of the world. The system is unique and incorporates three important comple- mentary features; it combines the engineer's desire for equitable and effi- cient water distribution with the agriculturalist's need to include annual and seasonal crop diversity in planning production; simultaneously and impor- tantly, the layout system accommodates wide variations in individual land ownership patterns in a manner which does not detract from the very small land holders ability to maximize water use through modern agronomic prac- tices, i.e. limitations in the size of individual land holdings are not obstacles to the adoption of modern technology or unit area yield levels. 15. While the system demands that the farming community abide by a preplanned cropping rotation for the major crops on annually fixed and defined percentages of each farm unit and therefore reduces an individual's freedom of choice over the crop mix to be planted, the offsetting equal opportunity created for each unit land area, irrespective of size, is demon- strably attractive to the farming community in this project. 16. Thus, apart from the productive advantages of the layout system, it additionally greatly assists in removing one of the most common constraints to land consolidation programs - the reluctance of farmers to give up one parcel of land in exchange for another. 1/ "Farm units" designate areas managed as single units within the irrigation layout. - 5 - B. Project Design Implication for Management and Production 17. The project provides a good example of a project design which is conducive to good management, i.e. the design is such that it allows management a real opportunity to be effective. In macro terms, the design assured management of firm Government commitment and support; in technical terms, the design ensured correct technologies as basic tools for management; and at the farm level, the design assured farmers of genuine integration in the provisions of services promoting production. 18. While the actual investments under this project had a heavy bias in irrigation engineering aspects, the long-term purpose of increased producti- vity was kept at the forefront in planning at all levels. Thus, design did not deal with just one aspect (water for irrigation) of farmer needs, but integrated all the key productive services required by farmers under one principal management structure. In this integration of productive services, the project design used similar principles to those employed in the more successful of the Bank-supported area development projects under rainfed conditions (e.g., in Nigeria and Malawl/). The project set defined para- meters around a production area (in this case indirectly through irrigation criteria), and supplied managerially integrated services in addressing land tenure (land security needs), inputs in the form of water (for irrigation); coordination and/or programming of necessary supplies (fertilizers, seeds, etc.), and the provision of advisory services in agronomic matters and for technical aspects of water utilization.(or conservation). In brief, the design permits management to provide a composite farm management service, and enables management to react constructively, comprehensively, and flexibly to on-farm felt needs or changing circumstances. For example it was the integrated but flexible nature, inherent in project design which allowed the advantageous rapid switch away from cotton; a change which may well have not been possible (or as rapidly and effectively handled) had there been a promotion authority responsible for cotton production, another for sugar beet and yet a third responsible for organizing the delivery of irrigation water. 19. In the context of the above, managerially integrated farm services, this audit takes a mildly different view from that given in the PCR where it stresses the need for purity in agricultural advisory extension service activities in this situation (PCR, paras. 1.16 (xi) and 6.22). Many aspects of agricultural information can be conveyed as a by-product or as an integral part of the information gathering process, or when arranging logistics, for 1/ PPAR, Nigeria--Gusau, Funtua and Gombe Agricultural Development Projects (Loans 1099, 1092 and 1164-UNI), OED Report No. 3975 dated June 16, 1982; Malawi--Lilongwe Land Development Program Phase I (Credit 113-MAI), Phase II (Credit 244-MAI) and Phase III (Credit 550-MAI), OED Reports respectively No. 751 dated May 23, 1975, 1597 dated May 17, 1977, and 3414 dated April 7, 1981. - 6 - the supply of various farm inputs. As this project has illustrated, produc- tion gains can be obtained with a well informed agricultural staff carrying out duties beyond those of a purely informative nature. While this does not detract from the need for the provision of programmed advice, the argument for pure and separate advisory work has more validity when circumstances in a country make the integrated approach at the local level impractical. However, the integrated approach does require that the balance between advisory and non-advisory functions of extension personnel be kept under review, and the audit endorses the implicit concerns, in the PCR, that programmed advice should be given more attention in the future. C. Adoption Rate by Farmers and Sprinkler Irrigation 20. A striking feature of this project has been a very rapid adaptation of farmers to the new opportunity, and the rapid adoption of techniques within it. Undoubtedly a principal reason is the total contrast between the pre--and post-project situations, i.e., between farming under semi-arid conditions to farming with an assured water supply where prior practices are clearly in- appropriate even to the most conservative elements in society. But this does not explain the rapid adoption of all the techniques called for by the new situation. 21. The integrated provision of agricultural support services has been one important factor. Similarly, the irrigation layout system (including the crop discipline) has been another in facilitating and encouraging the process of change. Underlying these essentials has been the sprinkler irrigation system which provided a more flexible tool than conventional surface irriga- tion in enabling the farmer to handle those crops of which they had some prior experience, e.g., wheat and vegetables where surface irrigation requires the farmer to employ fairly sophisticated techniques for internal water distribu- tion within each field or plot, and which requires a considerable amount of labor to effect. 22. The comparative costs of surface and sprinkler irrigation systems, and the latters' suitability for small farmers has been the subject of much debate. This project provided an example of a situation in which the sprink- ler system is the correct tool both technically and socially. D. Post-project Maintenance 23. Project design addressed maintenance questions in the post-project period and assigned responsibility for maintenance of major works and equip- ment to Government agencies. While the evidence suggests that current main- tenance is reasonably adequate, it also suggests that this aspect receives low priority in the allocation of resources, and despite Bank missions drawing the matter to the attention of the Moroccan authorities it remains the cause of some concern. - 7 - 24. At the farm and community levels, appraisal envisaged the creation of farm groupings to take responsibility for maintenance of minor works and equipment. The project has been unsuccessful in promoting this type of grass-root institutions and there is no evidence which indicates organized or programmed maintenance at this level. However, the Bank-s regional staff and the horoccan authorities are attempting to address this type of problem more specifically through a proposed project addressing "Small and Medium Scale Irrigation" scheduled for 1983. E. Rate of Return Analysis Issues"/ 25. The following two paragraphs draw attention to possible water and marketing constraints which could adversely affect the economic rate of return. They are mentioned, however, mainly because the first rein- forces the attention needed for post-project maintenance, and both have planning implications for the Doukkala I and II projects' ultimate productive output. 26. There may be unanticipated water contraints (not assumed in the analysis). (a) In macro-terms, pre-appraisal studies indicated the possibility of seasonal water contraints one year in five. (b) As all farmers in Doukkala I fully adopt a 146% cropping intensity and assuming .Doukkala II farmers adopt the same pattern, gross water requirement will become very close to maximum availability even at very efficient use standards. As indicated in the PCR (para. 6.12) there are inefficiencies in current water use at the farm level and, while conceding this is likely to improve, nevertheless extremely high standards covering all 15,600 users may be an optimistic assumption. 27. The altered cropping model assumed in the PCR relies heavily on vegetable production, and the audit is not fully satisfied that adequate marketing arrangements can be in place by the time full projected production comes on stream. Gross vegetable production from the project is now assumed to reach over 200,000 tons/annum (a 370% increase from appraisal estimate) and, dependent on the farm size/budget, it represents between 50% and 65% of net farm incomes from crops. Vegetable marketing, both for export and local consumption, is currently of concern to, and under examination by, Bank staff and the Moroccan authorities. Pending the outcome of these examina- tions, the audit considers it unwise to accept that the level of vegetable production assumed will find a ready market and therefore a more conservative approach to economic rate of return calculations would be appropriate. This concern with marketing would also apply to planning aspects of the parallel Doukkala II project. 1/ USAID concurs with the views expressed in this report and further elaborates upon this in their comments (Attachment 2).  PORM NO. 788 T (1-74) ICONTROL No,E-51-J183 IDATEs December 2. 1982 ORIGINAL LANGUAGES rn4(Mrng -9- Attachment 1 Page 1 ATTN: Mr. Shiv S. Kapur, Operations Evaluation Department SUBJECT: Doukkala I Project, IBRD Loan 1201-MOR REFERENCE: IBRD Project Performance Audit Report Note from Mr. Shiv Kapur of October 13, 1982 I thank you for sending your report, but inform you that your department is represented in El Jadida by Mr. Sajib, to whom I have forwarded it. I can, however, state that as far as I am concerned, the report does not give rise to any comments of substance. As regards the heading "Roads Paved," however, your report does not either give an assessment of the methods and procedures followed or mention the impact of this infrastructure on the economic life of the region. This work was nevertheless done by a Bank staff member during one of his visits in collaboration with our El Jadida Office. 1/ I would appreciate it if you would make specific mention of this aspect in your final report. Agadir, November 23, 1982 /s/ M. H. Jebli Provincial Director of Infrastructure-Agadir 1/ See Explanatory Note attached. - 10 - Attachment 1 Page 2 Explanatory Note 1. As far as the audit, after consultation with Bank staff, is able to ascertain the reference to Bank staff having done work on the impact of rural roads, is really only discussions which took place on this subject during the completion mission. The Moroccan Directorate of Infrastructure rural roads section handed material such as vehicle counts to the comple- tion mission. However, no separate study about rural roads impact has been made. 2. It is true that the road component is only mentioned in the PCR and not further elaborated upon. 3. However, this project might be included as a case study in a special rural roads study that OED is planning to undertake at some future date. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON. D.C. 20523 Attachmnt 2 Page 1 - 11 - NOV 24 1982 Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director, Operations Evaluation Department The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433 Subject: Morocco: World Bank Loan 1201-MOR, A.I.D. Loan 608-T-044, Doukkala-Zemamra Sprinkler Irrigation Dear Mr. Kapur: Thank you for giving A.I.D. the opportunity to comment upon the Bank's October 5, 1982 draft Project Performance Audit Report for this project. We concur in the basic findings and find it a most thorough and useful appraisal of the project. There are two points in the report that we wish to comment upon: (1) procurement of the A.I.D.-financed sprinkler irrigation equipment, (2) the rate of return analysis. Concerning the procurement of A.I.D.-financed equipment, p. 2 of the Summary and Lessons Learned refers to "delayed delivery of mobile sprinkler equipment, the latter reportedly occassioned by problems involving USAID procurement procedures and the supplier of the equipment." We believe that two quotations from A.I.D.'s Project Evaluation Summary of June 26, 1980, appropriately amplify this point and might usefully .be drawn upon by the Bank: "Although the late contracting for some of the imported equipment might have been cause for delay in the construction target date, for instance the delivery of the hydrants and subsequent installation, this did not turn out to be the determining factor in the 10-month delay in construction completion date. The prime reason for the delay in construction completion was the delay in installation of the underground piping, financed by the IBRD and over which AID had little or no control, and completion of which was necessary before completion of installation of all the hydrants could be effected. All in all, missing the target date for completion of construction by 10 months for a project of this magnitude and complexity is not considered too bad." "Leasons Learned. All engineering components of the project were designed and specified by a French engineering firm (SCET) whose services were contracted by ORMVAD in conjunction with the larger IBRD loan, and naturally, all designs and material specifications were ReyV - 12 - Attachment 2 Page 2 modelled after European standards. The greatest problem and greatest delays were in "Americanizing" these designs and.specifications to allow for U.S. contracting and equipment procurement after target dates had been established under the assumption that the original French-influenced designs and specifications could be readily utilized with only minor modification. That assumption turned out to be incorrect and major modications were necessary. The lesson to be learned: Where AID funds and U.S. equipment are involved, U.S. engineering and contracting concepts should be involved from the earliest possible moment." We concur with that view, and for a similar future project we further would recommend that a French or other European engineering design firm be required to joint venture or subcontract with a United States engineering firm for the technical design and preparation of tenders for equipment essentially limited to United States-source procurement. Concerning the rate of return analysis, we concur with the view expressed in pp. 11-12, Chapter II, of the Bank's draft report, to wit: "...the audit considers it unwise to accept that the level of vegetable production assumed will find a ready market and therefore a more conservative approach to economic rate of return calculations would be appropriate." We note that AID's recent impact evaluation of a very similar irrigation project in Morocco, the Lower Moulouya Irrigation Project, produced an internal rate of return of 10.5 percent based on quite conservative data and assumptions concerning crop production per hectare and crop market values. By comparison, the projected 20.5 percent economic rate of return, based on a 50-year period, described on p. 43, Chapter VII, of the Bank's draft report, seems quite optimistic. We note that delay in completion of the new Zemamra sugar beet factory prevented production of that high value crop in the ZO, Z2, and Z3 Sectors of the project during the 1981-82 cropping year, and that sugar beets were therefore grown on only 1,203 hectares in the Z1 Sector. Partly for that reason, AID has decided to defer impact evaluation of this project until 1989 when full production is expected to have been achieved and good data concerning actual crop market values, and particularly for high value crops, can be expected to be available. We have attached for your information a copy of A.I.D.'s Project Evaluation Summary of June 26, 1980, prepared by our mission at Rabat. Please do not hesitate to contact us if any further comment or information is required. Sincerely, Selig A. Taubenblatt Director, Office of Project Development Bureau for Near East Attachment: a/s - 13 - KINGDOM OF MOROCCO DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (Loan 1201- MOR) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT June 4, 1982  - 15 - KINGDOM OF MOROCCO COMPLETION REPORT OF THE DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT I. SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED Summary 1.1 Background. The Doukkala I Irrigation Project was appraised in 1976, and a US$30.0 million loan for the project was signed in 1976. In addition, the Borrower contracted a US$13.0 million loan from USAID to assist in financing part of the project. The project was successfully completed in December 1980. US$27.3 million have been disbursed and US$2.7 million have been cancelled under the Bank's loan. Disbursements under the USAID loan totaled US$ 10.1 million. 1.2 The project area is situated just South West of the Oum-er-Rbia River basin in a semi-arid zone characterized by low and variable annual rainfall, light winds, irregular topography and shallow soils. Because of these conditions, the sprinkler method was chosen for irrigation of the project area. The project was formulated with the assistance of the FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program using the results of extensive preparation studies and partial detailed design prepared by consultants. Together with the Doukkala II project (1416-MOR), the present project is the last investment package that will be able to fully utilize all water resources that can be mobilized through the existing "Low Service" Main Canal diverting water from the Im-Fout reservoir on the Oum-er-Rbia river. 1.3 Formulation. At appraisal, the project included (i) construction of a sprinkler irrigation system for 15,400 ha; (ii) improvement of major classified roads; (iii) construction of infrastructure for the agricultural support services and for village centers; (iv) bilharzia control; and (v) technical assistance and studies. The major issue at appraisal was the recovery of the costs of operation, maintenance and capital through water charges and a betterment levy. Responsibility for project construction and management rested with (i) the Regional Agricultural Development Office of Doukkala (ORMVAD) for the irrigation, drainage, and farm road systems, and the village infrastructure; (ii) the Highways Directorate for the classified roads; (iii) the Ministry of Education for the schools; and (iv) the Ministry of Public Health for bilharzia control. 1.4 Design and Scope. There were no engineering design changes made during the project period. The design parameters which were applied for construction were those included in the feasibility studies and agreed upon at appraisal. However, the area actually equipped was slightly larger (103%) than expected at appraisal. An area of about 420 ha, which was part of a larger area covered by the feasibility studies and found suitable for sprinkler irrigation development, was added by Government, apparently for social reasons since the area was densely populated and intensively farmed. - 16 - 1.5 Construction Targets. Actual construction achievements were close to the proposals made at appraisal, except for: (i) equipping of new village centers. Only two out of the seven projected villages were equipped with water supply, public lighting, and access roads. ORMVAD decided to cut out the other villages included in the appraisal program because only 2% of the lots had been occupied by farmers. Most farmers do not yet have enough savings or income to finance the construction of houses or stables. Furthermore, they have not yet obtained land titles required as guarantee for credit from CNCA; (ii) planting of windbreaks. About 2,000 ha were planted. However, farmers have always been opposed to this program arguing that windbreak trees harbor sparrows and extend roots that are harmful to crops; and (iii) strengthening the Zemamra Agricultural Research Station. No investment was made or improvement introduced to increase efficiency of this station. 1.6 Construction Period. Construction of the irrigation system was completed in December 1980, as stipulated in the Loan Agreement. However, the implementation period could have been shorter if long delays had not occurred during the laying of small diameter pipes in the Z0, Z2, and Z3 sectors . These delays reflected the managerial and financial difficulties of a local contractor and delayed delivery of mobile sprinkler equiment, the latter reportedly occasioned by problems involving USAID procurement procedures and the supplier of the equipment. 1/ 1.7 Land Consolidation and Distribution. Land consolidation has succeeded in (i) establishing more viable holdings and nearly eliminating fragmentation; (ii) allocating to each family an irrigated plot; and (iii) providing for 70% of the holders a parcel of land for housing in one of the new village centers (the remaining 30% will continue to live in traditional villages). Land consolidation was successfully integrated with the layout of the irrigation distribution system and was completed before the start of irrigation. Farm size distribution is characterized by the predominance of small farms. The average farm size is 2 ha and 75% of farm units are below this average. An area of 456 ha of state land was distributed to 82 landless workers who were grouped into two Agrarian Reform Cooperatives. 1.8 Procurement. Goods and services for the project were procured under 68 contracts of which 54 were financed by the Bank. The value of contracts which went to ICB represented 84% of the value of all the project contracts. The Bank prior review limit of US$80,000 for all project works led to a review of 48 contracts or 99.2% of the value of the contracts. A review limit of US$1,000,000 would have reduced the number of contracts reviewed to only 19 while still covering 84% of total contract value. 1.9 Costs. Actual project costs were 10% below appraisal estimates in dollar terms, but if allowance is made for works not completed and exchange rate variations, actual costs were about 1% above appraisal estimates. While the total cost of the irrigation systems matches that foreseen at appraisal, two items turned out to be much more expensive than anticipated: civil works for the pumping station and for drainage. 1/ For further amplification see USAID comments attached to the PPAM. - 17 - 1.10 Agricultural Development. Agricultural development has made an excellent start and currently well exceeds appraisal expectations. First irrigation took place in August 1977 in the Z1 sector (4,420 ha) and in November 1980 in the other sectors (11,400 ha). In 1980-81, all crops including wheat were irrigated, the cropping intensity was high (119%) and most yields exceeded the appraisal targets. All crops foreseen at appraisal have been introduced except cotton which is progressively being abandoned by farmers in the Doukkala area. Sugar beets, benefiting from the high priority accorded by Government to their development, had the highest yield (57 t/ha) ever recorded in Morocco on such a large area (1,300 ha). The area cultivated with vegetables was 300% larger than expected at appraisal for full development. Forage crops have been widely introduced, although development of livestock has been quite slow. The very successful performance in agricultural production can be mainly attributed to (i) the predominance of small farms, in which cropping intensity is very high; (ii) the heavy use of fertilizers and improved seed varieties; and (iii) the tight control imposed on farmers by ORMVAD and the "Local Development Committee" to respect crop rotations and cropping work schedules. According to new projections prepared by ORMVAD, cropping intensity will be 146% at full development instead of 133% as foreseen at appraisal. Major changes that are now foreseen in the cropping pattern, as compared to the appraisal projections, are the introduction of winter vegetable crops and fruit trees, the expansion of summer vegetables, the reduction in cereal acreage and the elimination of cotton. The new projections seem reasonable in view of the results achieved in 1980-81. Full development for cereals, industrial crops and vegetables is expected to be reached in 1984. Full development for forage crops will not be achieved in 1988, as expected by ORMVAD, unless a more intensive extension effort is made to promote livestock activities in the project area. Full development for tree crops (citrus and quince) is projected for 1991. 1.11 Institutional Aspects. ORMVAD's performance in executing the project has been highly successful. This is mainly due to the exceptional stability, and continuity among project management as well as its high professional calibre of project management. The enthusiasm and the quality of ORMVAD's staff has been highlighted several times by Bank staff who have visited the project. The project coordination committee was established, but was largely inoperative, although informal inter-agency contacts were often used to resolve problems of coordination. As recommended at appraisal the ORMVAD organization was restructured and strengthened for the implementation of the project. All central and field units have been staffed satisfactorily, except the central division for operation and maintenance. 1.12 Operation and Maintenance. The 0 & M Division suffers from a lack of adequate recognition and priority accorded to problems of maintenance. This is reflected in a serious shortage of staff at the headquarters level and a lack of budgetary funds to meet maintenance needs. Nevertheless, at the field level, the productivity per employee is much higher than in other large perimeters of North Africa. This is attributable to the quality of the design of the irrigation system and the responsibility granted to farmers for operating the system inside the irrigation blocks. Overall conveyance efficiency between the headworks and the hydrants was estimated at 70% in 1980-81 and is expected to increase to at least 77% once repairs - 18 - have been made to correct water seepage losses in the pipe distribution systems that were reportedly high at some locations following inadequate execution of the placement of pipes. Water use in the first full year of irrigation was high and approached the appraisal target for full development. 1.13 Input Supply and Extension. The four project CMVs have been well staffed with input suppliers and extension agents. The actual density of extension agents at present is one agent for 278 farmers and 565 ha. Input supply as managed by ORMVAD is undoubtedly an efficient vehicle for extension messages and has surely been a key factor in the favorable agricultural development experienced in the new irrigated sectors. However, most of the effort of extension agents is directed to distributing inputs to farmers, closely monitoring the cultivation of sugar beets, collecting statistics and enforcing the Investment Code regulations. Little time is left for real extension work. 1.14 Cost Recovery. The basic water charges of 0.029DH/m3 established in 1969 were increased to 0.054DH/m3 (+ 86%) in June 1980. The additional pumping charges were set up for the project at 0.044DH/m3 at the same date. This represents a retreat since the actual energy pumping costs (0.058DH/m3 in 1979-80) have been higher than the new established rate. However, the decree instituting the pumping charge indexes this charge to the cost of energy. The collection rate of water charges was 89% in 1980 and is reportedly higher than in most of the other large irrigation perimeters in Morocco. In addition, a substantial increase of the betterment levy has been proposed by MARA (DH4,588/ha instead of DH1,500). As a consequence of the predominance of farms of less than 5 ha in the project area, only 26% of the project area is liable for payment of the betterment levy. The current level of water charges and the betterment levy, applied according to.the Investment Code, is expected to cover 100% of Operation and Maintenance Charges and 14% of the investment costs. The above mentioned increase of the betterment levy would result in the recovery of 100% of O&M charges and only 16% of the investment costs. 1.15 Economic Evaluation. The economic rate of return of the project is expected to be 20.5% compared to 11.4% envisaged at appraisal, the improvement being the result of higher cropping intensities and higher yields for most annual crops, the 1980-81 yields having in most cases already exceeded appraisal targets for full development. Annual net incremental project benefits measured in 1981 prices are expected to reach DH94 million at full production of crops in 1984, DH108 million at full production of livestock in 1988, and DHI16 million when fruit trees come into full production in 1991. Sugar beet and wheat production are expected to yield net benefits from import substitution amounting respectively to US$8.0 million and US$2.3 million in foreign exchange in 1981. The high cropping intensity being achieved will have a favorable effect on underemployment. The total economic cost of the project in 1981 prices (excluding roads costing DH16 million) was about DH229 million. - 19 - Major Lessons Learned and Recommendations 1.16 Major lessons which can be learned from the project for improving the design of future irrigation projects are that it is desirable. (i) to have executing agencies, like ORMVAD and the other Irrigation Authorities in Morocco, responsible for the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation and drainage systems as well as for agricultural development (Chapter VI); (ii) to have the same consulting firm prepare the Master Plan, carry out feasibility studies and detailed design and assist in supervision of construction works (para. 6.26); (iii) to direct the design of the irrigation system toward maximizing its operating efficiency in relation to local conditions (paras. 6.7, 6.10); (iv) to assess in advance all the physical, social, and legal implications of land consolidation that need to be effectively handled for successful implementation of the program; and to assure that land consolidation is completed before the start of construction (paras. 4.2 to 4.6); (v) to carefully assess the chances of execution during the construction period of the project components which require prior assent of farmers (paras. 4.10 to 4.12); (vi) to consider giving the responsibility for coordination of project execution at the local level to the agency responsible for the execution of the major part of the project; and to support this agency with a project policy coordinating committee at the national level chaired by the project agency's parent ministry directorate (para. 6.1); (vii) to give, to the extent possible, responsibility to farmers for operating and maintaining the irrigation infrastructure, this responsibility being provided within a well-designed system of guidance, incentives to good performance and penalties for irresponsibility (paras. 6.8 to 6.10); (viii) to assure that farmers can have the required guarantee for obtaining bank credit, whenever the project includes on-farm investments (para. 4.11); (ix) to obtain a specific commitment from the borrower Government in the loan agreement to allocate the funds and to provide the technical staff needed for efficient maintenance of the irrigation system (paras. 6.13 to 6.15); - 20 - (x) to encourage local contractor-importers of project equipment to call on technicians from the foreign manufacturer to participate in installation and start-up of equipment and to provide training to local staff in operation and maintenance; and (xi) to ensure that extension agents activities are not distracted by administrative obligations related to credit, input supply and marketing (paras. 6.22 and 6.24). - 21 - II. BACKGROUND 2.1 The project is part of the Doukkala Perimeter which lies just South-West of the Oum-er-Rbia River Basin. The Oum-er-Rbia is the second largest river in Morocco and has long served as the source of the development of modern irrigation in the regions of Doukkala near El Jadida, and Tadla near Beni Mellal. Six multipurpose dams have been constructed on this river and its tributaries. Among them, the Im-Fout dam, constructed in 1944, and the El Massira dam, completed in 1980, provide for irrigation of the Doukkala Perimeter. In order to optimize the allocation of water between competing demands, a Water Master Plan for the Oum-er-Rbia Basin was prepared in 1973-74 by consultants (SCET International) with the assistance of the FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program. The plan recommended for Doukkala to: (i) completion of all development possible based on the existing hydraulic infrastructure, by completing the irrigation of the downstream Doukkala perimeter (about 60,000 ha) which is supplied by the existing downstream canal; and (ii) preparation for the irrigation of an additional 40,000 ha, to be supplied by a proposed upstream canal. The present project (15,400 ha) is part of the downstream perimeter, which also includes four already irrigated areas (Faregh, Sidi SmaYl, Sidi Bennour, and Boulaouine, totalling 28,000 ha) and the Tnine Gharbia area which is being developed under the Doukkala II Project (16,600 ha), financed by the Bank (Loan 1431-MOR) and expected to be completed in 1984. 2.2 The project area is located 70 km south of El Jadida and extends about 4 km along the main road (RP 8) to Safi. The climate is semi-arid, characterized by hot, dry summers and relatively short, cool winters. The rainfall shows great variation from year to year and averages 360 mm, limits dry farming to wheat, maize and legumes and results in very low yields. Before the project, farms were small and highly fragmented and farmers lived in small traditional villages ("Douars") scattered over the countryside. The project area was densely populated (95 inhabitants per km2) and most of the population underemployed. Soils are suitable for a large variety of irrigated crops;however, they are too shallow to permit the land levelling necessary for gravity irrigation. Sprinkler irrigation was thus proposed during project prepraration. Wind velocity is sufficiently low (often less than 4 m/s) to permit this type of irrigation. 2.3 Prior to the present project, the Bank group financed four agricultural projects in Morocco, all for development of irrigation. The first was the Sidi Slimane Rehabilitation Project (FY 65) which comprised the repair and improvement of certain hydraulic structures and has been completed. The second was the Sebou I (FY 69) which provided for the construction of the Idriss I Dam, the irrigation of 38,300 ha and the improvement of irrigation on 5,000 ha and of rainfed agriculture on 26,700 ha. This project has also been completed. The third is the Sebou II Irrigation Project (FY74) which provided for agro-industrial facilities and flood protection works. This project was amended in FY 80 to delete most of the flood protection works and to provide infrastructure and equipment for a National Sugarcane Center and several extension centers. It is now nearing completion. The fourth one is the Souss Groundwater Project (FY75) for the development of sprinkler irrigation on 6,000 ha and the improvement of gravity irrigation on 1,000 ha. It too is nearing - 22 - completion. Since the present project became effective, the Bank group has financed the Doukkala II Project (FY77) referred to in para. 2.1 for the development of sprinkler irrigation on the last 16,400 ha of the "low service" perimeter. Besides the irrigation projects, the Bank has financed four agricultural credit projects; four agricultural development projects focusing on rainfed agriculture in the Meknes (FY75), Fes-Karia-Tissa (FY79), Loukkos (FY80), and Central Middle Atlas (FY82) areas, a Vegetable Production and Marketing Project (FY80), and a Forestry Project (FY82). Four performance audits have been completed on Morocco agriculture projects covering the first three agricultural credit projects executed by CNCA and the Sebou I project. 2.4 The Government's policy in the agricultural sector has consistently favored investments in the irrigation subsector. These investments have exceeded 60% of total investment in agriculture since 1965. After focusing on the development of water resources through the construction of dams and headworks during the 1970s, the priority is now being given to equipping irrigation perimeters for which the water resources have already been developed. This policy has been supported by comprehensive and effective legislation included in the 1969 "Code des Investissements Agricoles" which provides a valuable framework for promotion of the rational use of agricultural resources within the irrigated perimeters. Of particular interest are the following provisions of the Code: (i) recovery from medium and large farmers of full operation and maintenance costs and up to 40% of investments costs (however, in practice, the recovery of 40% of investment costs is impeded by an exemption of the first 5 ha of farms of 20 ha or less from the betterment levy and by provisions of the 1969 Code stipulating the exact amount of the levy which have not been increased to allow for inflation); (ii) the obligation imposed on farmers to assure a rational use of water and to respect the crop rotation scheme established for each perimeter; (iii) the limitation of land fragmentation by the imposition of a minimum of 5 ha for each holding resulting from a subdivision; (iv) provision of arrangements necessary for implementation of land consolidation; (v) provision of arrangements necessary for collection of water charges; and (vi) draft of guidelines for organizing the technical and financial assistance provided by the Government for the development of animal husbandry, fruit trees, high yield varieties of wheat, forage crops, and farm mechanization. - 23 - III. PROJECT OBJECTIVES, COMPONENTS AND ISSUES 3.1 The present project, together with the Doukkala II project, is the last investment package to fully utilize all water resources that can be made available through the existing downstream main canal which diverts water from the Im Fout reservoir. Feasibility studies for the whole project area and final design for the Z1 sector (about 4,500 ha) were completed prior to appraisal. The appraisal included all the components proposed in the feasibility studies except the agro-industry components for the construction of three processing plants for sugar, milk and tomato. The financing of these facilities was under consideration by private companies at the time of appraisal. 3.2 The project objectives are (i) to reduce underemployment in the highly populated project area and improve rural income by increasing the production of wheat and maize and by introducing highly productive crops, mainly sugar beet, cotton, tomato and forages for livestock; and (ii) to improve the standard of living of project beneficiaries, most of them small farmers, through the construction of roads and schools, and the equipment of village centers. At appraisal, the project provided for sprinkler irrigation of 15,400 ha divided into four independent sectors (ZO, Z1, Z2, and Z3). It included the following major components: (i) land consolidation and preparation; (ii)the construction of new irrigation systems including the enlargement and the equipment of the existing main supply canal, the construction of a feeder canal for the ZO sector, installation of hydromechanical equipment, the construction and the equipment of four pumping stations (one for each sector) with their equalizing reservoirs, and the installation of a sprinkler water distribution system, (iii) the construction of main drainage channels; (iv) the improvement of classified roads; (v) the construction of a new project field office, development centers and houses for extension, operation, maintenance, and agricultural research services; (vi) the provision of village infrastructure; (vii) the strengthening of the technical Departments of the Doukkala Regional Agricultural Development Office (ORMVAD) 1/ to manage the project with the assistance of consultants; (viii) the control of Bilharzia in the Doukkala region; and (ix) preparation of feasibility studies for the Dechra El Oued dam and for marketing of vegetables in the Massa region. 3.3 The major issue at appraisal was cost recovery .. In this respect, the Government as borrower was requested to cause ORMVAD to collect water charges from the start of irrigation and to review the level of charges thereafter with the objective of recovering, over the life of the project, through these charges and the betterment levy the actual cost of operation and maintenance and a reasonable proportion of the actual capital costs, taking into account beneficiaries' incentives and capacity to pay. An understanding was reached during negotiations that the proportion of capital costs to be so recovered should be 40%, less the amount represented by the exemptions from the betterment levy provided for in the Investment Code for the first five hectares of all properties under 20 ha. 1/ ORMVAD = Office R4gional de Mise en Valeur Agricole des Doukkala. - 24 - IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION Area Equipped for Irrigation 4.1 The actual net area equipped for sprinkler irrigation under the project is 15,822 ha, representing 103% of the 15,400 ha appraisal objective. It includes four sectors: Z1 (4,420 ha), ZO (6,208 ha), Z2 (2,737 ha), and Z3 (2,500 ha), each sector being served separately by its own pumping station. The pumping stations pump canal water into the four sprinkler pipe networks. Although no mention is made in the supervision reports of the additional 422 ha, ORMVAD decided on the basis of the recommendations of the detailed design studies to extend the project area by including part of an additional area proposed in the feasibility studies. The area is a small sector located downstream of the Z1 and Z2 sectors and characterized by a high density of small holdings. Land Consolidation, Distribution and Ownership 4.2 Land consolidation is a very long process that involves several technical and legal procedures. Four years were necessary for ORMVAD to consolidate the remaining unconsolidated area after appraisal. However, as a result of considerable experience in this field, ORMVAD succeeded in carrying out this land consolidation ahead of the schedule for construction of irrigation works. This explains why land consolidation has caused no delay either in the completion of works or in the start of irrigation. 4.3 Land consolidation in the project area has been carried out quite effectively and ORMVAD has succeeded in: (i) establishing more viable family holdings by nearly eliminating fragmentation and prohibiting future subdivisions; and (ii) allocating to each family, in addition to cultivated land, a plot designed for housing within new village centers, and located around the traditional "Douars" at a reasonable distance from the cultivated land. As elsewhere in the irrigated areas in Morocco, land consolidation has been successfully integrated into the layout of the distribution system. The layout adopted for the project area is known as "trame B" and has been successively used for more than 20 years in Morocco for both gravity and sprinkler irrigation (the layout is illustrated in Annex VIII). The adoption of this concept has facilitated the consolidation of very small holdings which are predominant. 4.4 The particular characteristics of the "trame B" layout approach are as follows: (i) the areas of individual service units are about 16 ha; (ii) the tertiary conduits where hydrants are placed are about 550 meters apart; (iii) the farms are strips lying parallel to the tertiary conduits. The boundaries of crop strips run perpendicular to the farm boundaries; (iv) quarternary conduits are semi-permanent aluminium pipes. They are supplied with water by the outlets of the hydrants. Their spacing is regular and depends on the length of the furrows or border strips as determined by soil permeability and slope. This length generally varies between 100 and 200 meters; (v) plowing can be done collectively, in parallel to the tertiary conduits; and (vi) cultivation is done parallel to the tertiary canals. - 25 - 4.5 A gross area of 19,546 ha were consolidated. It includes 516 ha of state land which were distributed to 82 landless workers who have been organized into two Agrarian Reform Cooperatives. Prior to the project, the area included 11,139 holdings and 35,407 plots (with an average of 3.17 plots per holding). A comparison of land tenure before and after consolidation is shown in the following table: Table 1 Total Land Owners Area and Co-owners Holdings Farm Units Plots (ha)(N) (Nb) (Nb) TNb7 1. Before Land Consolidation - Gross area 19,546 15,477 11,134 n.a. 35,407 2. After Land Consolidation - Gross area 19,546 15,559 /1 11,215 /2 - 18,588 /2 - Net equipped area 15,820 15,559 11,215 7,754 10,783 - Area allotted for housing 1,209 7,805 7,805 - 7,805 - Area for other use 2,517 /3 3. Area Under Joint Ownership 5,115 5,749 1,406 - - 1/ Includes 82 new allotees of Agrarian Reform plots. 27 Includes 82 plots of state land distributed under Agrarian Reform Law. 3/ Includes the area expropriated and used for right of way, the part of the consolidated holdings out of the equipped perimeter and a small area distributed to the communes for community use. - 26 - 4.6 The above table shows that: (i) Land fragmentation has been substantially reduced by land consolidation. The number of cultivated plots has declined from 35,407 to 10,783, almost tripling the average size of plots (from 0,56 to 1,47 ha lack); (ii) The average size of holdings is so small that after consolidation many holdings have in practice been grouped into single joint farms. This usually occurs in situations where owners are absentee or otherwise lacking interest or unable to work their land and arrange for neighboring farmers to use it. On average, each farm includes 1.5 holdings; (iii) joint ownership is common in the project area. About 22% of the project holdings covering 26% of the gross project area, are under joint ownership by about 5,750 joint holders. On average each of these holdings is owned by 4 co-owners. This has two opposite consequences. First the availability of a high rate of family labor results in a high cropping intensity and water use. On the other hand, there is a high risk of conflict between co-owners which resulted in some cases in delayed or ineffective utilization of the land at the start of irrigation. Although all subdivision of holdings to units of less than 5 ha is prohibited in the "Code des Investissements", the risk of informal subdivisions exists; and (iv) in the case of 70% of holders, the 0.15 ha of their land reserved for housing has normally been provided as a plot located in a new village center, while the remaining 30% own such small holdings that subdivision for housing is not feasible. Instead, they have been allocated irrigated plots located close to the "Douars" where they live as before. 4.7 Farm size distribution after consolidation is characterized by the predominance of small farms: 75% of farm units are less than 2 ha, and only 0.5% are more than 20 ha. Appraisal target figures are basically different from the actual distribution, because they were based on partial results of land consolidation on 60% of the project area. The number of farm units is actually 7,754 representing 240% of the 3,200 units expected at appraisal; the average farm size is actually 2 ha instead of the 4.8 ha foreseen at appraisal. Table 2 Completion Target (at Appraisal) Actual Results Farm Average Farm Average Range of Size Units Area Size Units Area Size (ha) (T) T%7 (ha) Tha TT 7T 0 - 2 43 13 1.4 75 32 0.90 2 - 5 35 31 4.3 18 30 3.35 5 - 10 14 25 8.8 5 18 6.85 10 - 20 4 10 12.2 1.5 10 13.35 Above 20 4 21 23.9 0.5 10 31.70 Total 100 100 4.8 100 100 2.05 Total Number of Farm Units (3,200) (7,754) Total Area (ha) (15,400) (15,820) - 27 - Construction Works 4.8 The major works necessary for immediate and efficient use of water for irrigation were successfully carried out according to the appraisal expectations. Most of the irrigation, drainage and road systems were built as foreseen at appraisal. No major engineering design change was made during implementation. The components which were not completed as expected are those related to land clearing, windbreaks, village infrastructure and the strengthening of the research services. On the other hand, ORMVAD took the initiative, which was supported by the Bank, to install radio-telecommunication systems instead of the telephone system as foreseen at appraisal. 4.9 Land Clearing. The project included at appraisal subsoiling and destoning of about 4,000 ha. Only about 400 ha have actually been cleared. In fact, the scope of the land subsoiling was not precisely known at appraisal. An area of 3,200 ha located north of route CT 1307 was determined to contain mainly class IV lands with light textured soils of limited depth and underlain by an induraited calcareous layer. It was proposed at appraisal that pedological maps covering this area be revised to determine the exact scope of land preparation. Pursuant to this, ORMVAD, with the help of its consultants, identified an area of only 406 ha where the calcareous layer was at an average depth of 30 cm and where subsoiling and destoning was considered to be necessary. 4.10 Windbreaks. All the efforts made by ORMVAD to introduce windbreaks in the project area have failed to meet the project target which was to plant windbreaks throughout the whole project area. More than 200,000 windbreak trees (165,000 cypress and 36,000 poplars) for about 2,000 ha have been planted by a private contractor in the Z1 sector without the participation of farmers. In addition to the contractor's failure to fulfill the contract provision to regularly irrigate the plants, farmers did not show any willingness to maintain them. ORMVAD then decided to distribute plants free of charge to those farmers who agreed to plant them themselves. 80,000 plants were distributed under this formula. Again, very few farmers have taken care of them and most farmers have abandoned them. Two reasons were given by ORMVAD officials as well as by farmers during their meeting with the mission, namely: (i) that farmers firmly believe that windbreaks are a preferred place for sparrows to install their nests. These sparrows have always been considered dangerous by farmers because they attack wheat fields during the maturation period and extract grains from the ears ; (ii) that the extension of the roots of windbreak trees would compete with and hamper the development of crops along a band of soil parallel to the trees. This would affect the land capability and thus the production potential particularly in farms which are very small; and (iii) that farmers do not see the necessity to have - 28 - windbreaks in such an irrigated area. They argue that on-farm sprinkler irrigation is not affected by wind because they have different lengths of pipes allowing a correct coverage of land whatever is the velocity of wind. Present evidence suggest that the farmers are probably right. Anyway, it was probehip overly optimistic to expect the introduction of windbreaks on a large scale at an early stage of project development. Farmers in Doukkala are not at all used to tree culture of any kind. Most of the trees existing in the project area are planted by Government along the main roads (eucalyptus or acacia) and more rarely inside the traditional villages. Windbreaks are missing in most of the recent modern irrigation perimeters in the North African countries. The only areas where the development of windbreaks has been successfully initiated and re-inforced by farmers themselves for decades are the private irrigated areas with highly productive fruit trees, such as in Souss in Morocco, Cap Bon in Tunisia and Mitidja in Algeria. The only farmers in the project area who are not reluctant to plant windbreaks are those who have planted new fruit trees (in only 5 ha) with the assistance of ORMVAD. 4.11 Village Infrastructure.. Following land consolidation, areas for 25 new village centers comprising a total of 7,805 lots were delimited around the existing traditional villages (Douars). The project provided for equipping seven of these villages with water, electricity, roads and schools. Only two villages (Oulad Dali et Laouissat), located in the Z, sector and comprising 670 lots, have been equipped. Construction of houses has been reported on only very few lots (2%) in these two villages and almost none in the other villages. The settlement of new villages has al-wg7r gone very slowly elsewhere in Morocco. However, similar villages in the Doukkala area, equipped before 1970, are rarely more than 25% occupied. Farmers have given many reasons for the low use of their construction lots. The main reason is that irrigation is so new that the incomes are not yet sufficient to finance the construction of houses or stables. The second reason is that most farmers have not yet obtained their land title according to the new layout following land consolidation. Land title is the only guarantee accepted by CNCA, for extending medium or long term credit such as for housing. Thirdly, joint holding makes it difficult to decide which of the joint holders will have the priority to use the lot. The joint holders generally live together in the "Douars" but aspire to live separately in the new villages. 4.12 This raises four general points to which special attention should be given in the context of similar projects in the future. The first point is that when the full realization of certain components of an agriculture project requires the participation of farmers, careful and comprehensive social surveys should be carried out at the design stage to assess all the possible constraints for the completion of the components. Risks might not be eliminated, but they should be substantially reduced by this step. The second point is that construction of houses and other buildings in new irrigated perimeters is often such a long process that it is unrealistic to think that it can take place during the project construction period. Third, before including any on-farm investment components in a project, it should be assured that farmers have the required guarantees, e.g. the land title, to obtain the credit. In projects similar to the present one, where - 29 - land consolidation has to be carried out just before or during the project period, it is very rare that farmers can obtain the.land title during this period. Alternative guarantees must be negotiated to obtain the agreement of the credit institution to extend medium or long term credit. The fourth point is that in most cases the basic infrastructure such as the supply of domestic water, public lighting and construction of internal roads in new villages has not always been the determining factor in attracting farmers to these villages. Farmers in the Souss Project area (Loan 1203-MOR) started to construct houses and stables in villages not yet equipped just because they obtained the necessary credit for stable construction from CNCA. 4.13 Agricultural Research. The project provided for the strengthening of the Agricultural Research Station of Zemamra through the construction of new buildings, the procurement of equipment, vehicles and animals and the recruitment of staff. Actually no effort has been made by the National Agricultural Research Department either to complete these activities or to improve the work performed by this station. Furthermore, the Department has failed to support the effort made by the ORMVAD extension staff to identify and correct weaknesses in the farming system in the Doukkala area. This reflects in fact the difficulties encountered by the Ministry of Agriculture until 1980 in reorganizing the Research subsector in the whole country. Since then a semi-autonomous National Institute for Agronomic Research (INRA) has been established and the Research subsector is being reorganized with the assistance of the Bank. It might have been more efficient for the project to have ORMVAD responsible for strengthening, under the supervision of the Agricultural Research Department, of its own applied research station (located in Had Ouled Frej) which is more oriented towards meeting the needs of extension staff of this Office. 4.14 Bilharzia Control. Although available loan funds were not used for the purpose, the Ministry of Public Health has succeeded in establishing an efficient organization in El Jadida highly qualified for controlling bilharzia in the province of El Jadida. As indicated in the appraisal report, no danger of bilharzia exists in the project area since the piped irrigation distribution system keeps the water from direct contact with the atmosphere. Thus the control program has been rather oriented towards detection of any colonies of vector snails and diagnostic surveys of bilharzia among the human population in the adjacent gravity irrigated areas of Sidi Bennour, Sidi SmaYl and Faregh. To date no bilharzia has been detected in the province except a few isolated cases among foreign visitors. Project Construction Period and Delays 4.15 The major part of project construction took place between 1976 and 1980. Works for the enlargement of the main supply canal were started in 1975. The other works were started in 1976 and were completed in 1978 for the Zl sector and during the fourth quarter of 1980 for the Z0, Z2, Z3 sectors, about one year behind appraisal schedule but on the same date as the completion date specified in the Loan Agreement. Despite the budget restrictions prevailing in Morocco in 1978, Government provided the required funds to carry out project works as planned by ORMVAD. One main factor, however, caused serious delay in project construction: the delay in the installation of small diameter pipes. - 30 - 4.16 The contract for the supply and the laying of small diameter pipes in the Z0, Z2, Z3 sectors (11,400 ha) was awarded after ICB to a well-known and highly regarded Moroccan contractor in April 1977. Works were expected to be completed in October 1978. They were actually completed in December 1980, 26 months behind schedule as a result of the contractor's illness and subsequent financial problems. The delay in the laying of small diameter pipes slowed down the installation and the construction of concrete structures of hydrants by another contractor. It should be noted that neither ORMVAD nor their consultants had wanted to award the contract to this contractor whose experience had been mainly in earthmoving works and construction of roads, although he had also laid pipes in the Souss Project. However, this contractor's bid was so much lower than the second lowest bidder's (by 23%) that the Ministry of Finance insisted on its being awarded to him, and the Bank concurred with the decision. While, in retrospect, the reluctance of ORMVAD to award the contract to this contractor appears to have been justified, the lesson which emerges is that suitable prequalification would have been desirable in the bidding process. Costs and Procurement 4.17 The total cost of the project at completion was US$85.0 million compared with US$94.4 million at appraisal (see Annex II), implying an overall underrun of 10%. This is because: (i) some of the project works originally included have not been or have been only partially completed (see para. 4.8); and (ii) the average weighted exchange rate of the US dollar during project implementation was 11% higher than at appraisal (4.28 DH instead of 3.87 DH). However, if allowance is made for project works initially included in the project and not carried out and for exchange rate variations, the actual project cost would have had a slight overrun of 1%. While the total actual cost of the irrigation network matches that foreseen at appraisal, only two items turned out to be more expensive than anticipated: pumping station civil works (220%) and drainage network (153%). Not only do the costs for these items seem to have been underestimated, but their construction took place one to two years later than scheduled at appraisal. 4.18 Goods and services for the project were procured in 68 contracts of which 54 contracts were financed by the Bank loan (see Annex XII) and the others by the USAID loan. The loan agreement provides that: (i) contracts for major civil works and equipment would be grouped to the extent practicable into 12 contracts that should be tendered on the basis of ICB; (ii) contracts for the civil works including construction of village infrastructure, buildings, telephone lines and windbreaks (totalling US$ 3.6 million) may be awarded in accordance with Government procedures; (iii) individual purchases of equipment not exceeding US$80,000 would also be procured with applicable local procedures up to US$700,000; and (iv) the Bank should review all procurement decisions for contracts estimated to cost US$80,000 or more. The breakdown of the contract size, the procurement procedure, and the type of goods and services is as follows. - 31 - Table 3 Total Value of Contracts Nb of Contracts in Range (US$ million) /2 in Range I C B L F Total C. Works C. Works Contract Price Range ICB LP /1 Total /Studies Total /Studies Equip Total Value (1) ---(US$ milon----/ 5.0 1 - 1 .3 - 8.3 - - - 8.2 (13) 2.0 - 5.0 9 1 /3 10 33.9 - 33.9 2.3 - 2.3 36.2 (57) 1.0 - 2.0 4 1 5 6.5 - 6.5 1.7 - 1.7 8.2 (13) 0.08 - 1.00 9 20 29 3.2 0.8 4.0 5.0 0.9 5.9 9.9 (16) 0.08 /4 3 6 9 1.95 0.05 0.2 0.23 0.07 0.3 0.5 (0.11) TOTAL (2) 26 28 54 52.05 0.85 52.9 9.23 0.97 10.2 63.1 (100) (48) (52) (100) (84) (16) (100) /1 LP Local procedure including contracts awarded through LCB, limiting tendering or negociated contracts. /2 Using the average exchange rate of 1USt = 4.28 DH. /3 Including a contract negociated with the Public Electric Power Company (ONE) for power lines works. /4 The amount of 0.08 million is the limit in the Loan Agreement for prior review by the Bank. /5 All contracts for studies were awarded according to the Bank guidelines. The above table shows that: (a) The total value of contracts which went to ICB is USt52.9 million representing 84% of the total value of all awarded contracts and 80% of the value of contracts expected to go to ICB at appraisal. The contracts which went to ICB are those for enlargement of the main canal, construction of the feeder canal, laying of buried pipes, construction of the reservoirs, of the drainage network and of part of the roads, and purchase of the electro-mechanical equipment. (b) The contracts which were awarded according to local procedures (LP) concern civil works for buildings and village infrastructure as expected at appraisal, but also other project items originally envisaged to go to ICB which under close examination were not suitable for ICB, such as road construction, rehabilitation works, and some equipement. These items had a total value of USt4.8 million and covered about half of the contracts for roads and minor contracts for land clearing, placement of hydrants, supply of some equipment for the main canals, radio-telecommunication equipment, and electric power lines. LP for these civil works and equipment was justified by the scattered nature of the works or the small size of the equipment packages. As for part of the road works, LP was accepted by the Bank because the Road Directorate - 32 - demonstrated that no foreign contractors had ever been attracted by these types of works. This was confirmed by the fact that all bidders for all project civil works were local (see para. d). (c) The limit in the loan agreement (US$80,000) for prior review by the Bank resulted in the Bank reviewing 83% of the contracts and 99.3% of the value of the contracts. An increase in the prior review from US$0.08 million to US$1.0 million would have resulted in a reduction of the percentage value of contracts so covered from 99.3% to 84% but it would also have reduced the prior review from 45 contracts to 19 contracts, saving very substantial time in tendering procedures and Bank review time resulting in faster project execution without, however, affecting procurement procedures adversely. It is recommended that this be considered in future projects in Morocco especially when project agencies are as experienced in procurement matters as ORMVAD or the Roads Directorate. When this is not the case, the review of contracts of less than US$1.0 million equivalent can be limited to contract awarding. (d) As noted, no foreign contractors have bid for any of the project civil works even those .of high value like the supply and laying of large diameter pipes which amounted to USt8.3 million. This has also been the case in most of Bank-financed agricultural projects in Morocco. Consequently, as proposed in the Sebou I PCR, it is reasonable to raise the limit for ICB to at least US$1.0 million for civil works for future projects of this type in Morocco. 4.19 The breakdown of all the project contracts (including the contracts financed by USAID) into major homogeneous items is as follows: - 33 - Table 4 Value Average Value of Nb of Average Implemented Works Category Contracts Total per Contract Delay Per Year (US$ million)---- (%) /1 --(USt million)-- 1. CIVIL WORKS a. Underground pipes 10 31.3 3.1 146 9.7 b. Earthmoving works (drainage, land preparation, canal enlargement) 7 11.7 1.7 87 2.9 c. Roads (asphalt, gravel roads) 12 7.3 0.6 100 /2 1.4 d. Building construction - Specialized works (pumping station, water towers) 3 5.8 1.9 208 0.7 - Ordinary works (offices, houses, warehouses) 14 2.3 0.2 133 0.5 2. EQUIPMENT a. Irrigation equipment 8 14.8 1.9 115 3.3 b. Operation & maintenance equipment 4 0.7 0.2 n.a. n.a. 3. POWER & TELECOMMUNICATION 3 2.7 0.9 100 1.3 4. CONSULTANTS 7 4.2 0.6 100 1.0 5. ALL PROJECT COMPONENTS 68 80.8 1.2 - /1 Weighted average % between the actual time taken to complete and the contractual time. /2 Although no specific data were available, no delay has been reported for road construction and rehabilitation works. - 34 - The above table shows that: (a) More than half of the contracts (36) were necessary for only three major items: underground pipes, roads, and ordinary buildings. The main reasons given by the executing agencies for not having grouped these works into a smaller number of contracts are that: (i) the budget funds provided by the Ministry of Finance for the expenditures committed and spent each year are limited; (ii) awarding larger contracts could have resulted in longer delays in implementation. The management and financial capability of the bidders -all local- is limited and prevents them from fulfilling the provisions of larger contracts. On the other hand, experience in Morocco has shown that larger contracts would have not attracted foreign firms either; (iii) works for ordinary buildings have been grouped in numerous contracts, taking into account the nature of works (houses, offices, water supply reservoirs, etc.) and their dispersion throughout the project area; and (iv) contracts for supply and placement of pipes have been divided in large and small diameter pipes to adapt works to the local market where potential manufacturers and layers are different for each type of pipe. (b) The average amount of a contract is US$1.2 million, and the range is from US$0.2 million for ordinary buildings and for operation and maintenance equipment to US$3.1 million for pipes. (c) The delayI has been the highest for pipes and specialized building construction works which have had the highest average contract amount and for ordinary building construction works. The delay in construction of ordinary buildings is due to the scarcity of qualified contractors who would agree to bid for construction of ordinary buildings such as offices, houses or warehouses scattered throughout the countryside, distant from the big cities. These contractors themselves often perform the masonary work, but subcontract with a multitude of other entrepreneurs for the finishing works, i.e. electricity, plumbing, woodwork, tiling, painting, etc. This requires a level of adequate coordination that they generally do not have. (d) It is worth noting that there was no delay in implementation of road and power and telecommunication works or in consultant services. (e) The investment rate, expressed in the average value of implemented works per year, shows that among civil works those for construction of buildings were the slowest (US$0.5 million per year for offices, houses, and warehouses, and US$O.7 million for pumping stations and water towers), and that pipe laying and earthmoving works were the fastest (US$9.7 million and US$17.2 million respectively). As weighted % between the actual and the contractual time for execution of all contracts for a given group of items. - 35 - Disbursements 4.20 A total amount of US$27.3 million (91%) was disbursed out the US30.0 million Bank loan. The amount disbursed at the June 30, 1981 closing date specified in the Loan Agreement was US$24.8 million. At that time, the Government requested and the Bank agreed to continue to disburse against withdrawal requests for works executed prior to the closing date, without extending this date. The delays in proceeding with the withdrawal requests are largely attributable to staff changes in the Ministry of Finance as a result of which several requests sent by ORMVAD in the past were lost within the Ministry. A loan balance of US$2.7 million has been cancelled. A comparison of projected and actual disbursements by category is shown below. Table 5 Allocation of the Procceds of the Loan Category Item Planned Actual ----(US$ million)---- I Civil Works 20.8 22.1 II Equipment 1.6 0.9 III Power facilities 1.7 1.8 IV Consultants' services 2.2 2.5 V Unallocated 3.7 - Total 30.0 27.3 Cancelled 2.7 A comparison of the actual disbursement schedule and that projected at appraisal is shown in Annex V (a). A comparison between the present project loan disbursement profile with loan disbursement profiles for other agricultural and irrigation projects in Morocco and EMENA is included in Annex V (b). - 36 - V. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 5.1 Summary. Agricultural development has made a very good start and has so far well exceeded appraisal expectations. During the first year after project completion (1980-81) all crops including wheat were irrigated, the cropping intensity was high (119%) and most of the yields reached or exceeded the appraisal target. All crops foreseen at appraisal have been introduced except cotton. Sugar beet, deriving advantage from the high priority given by Government to its development, has already had the highest yield per ha ever recorded in Morocco on such a large area (57 tons). Forage crops have been widely introduced and development of livestock has been quite slow. According to the new ORMVAD projections, cropping intensity will be 146% at full development compared with appraisal estimate of 133%. Full development is expected to be in 1984 for cereals, industrial crops and vegetables, 1988 for livestock, and 1991 for fruit trees. Full development is unlikely to be achieved in 1988 for forage drops unless major constraints hindering livestock development are solved. dropping Pattern, Land Use and Yields 5.2 First irrigation took place in August 1977 in the Z1 sector (4,420 ha) and in November 1980 in the remaining sectors (11,400 ha). Cropping intensity of 119% achieved for the whole project area during the last cropping season was very high and was based on an intensity of 112% in 21 and 121% in the other sectors on average. On the basis of experience acquired, land capacity studies, and national production objectives, ORMVAD has set up new crop production objectives and established new crop rotation plans for the project, consistent with the layout of the water distribution system (trame B) and with water availability. The plans vary from one-year rotation for very small-scale farms (less than 0.5 ha), to five or six-year rotation for larger-scale farms (more than 2 ha). These plans have been distributed to the extension agents and the Local Development Committee (Commission Locale de Mise en Valeur) established according to the provisions of the Investment Code to monitor the achievment of production objectives in the project area. In light of experience to date, certain major changes from appraisal assumptions regarding cropping patterns have already taken place and these changes are likely to be kept in the future. A comparison between present and future cropping patterns, yields and production is summarized in the following table: - 37 - Table 6 Cropping Year Projection at 1980/1981 Full Development (Actual) (Appraisal Estimate) (Current Estimate) Crops Area Yield Area Yield Area Yield (ha) Tt/ha) (ha) (t/ha) (ha) (t/ha) Cereals Wheat 6,416 3.2 6,360 3.0 4,092 4.0 Barley 230 1.8 - - - - Maize 3,319 3.1 3,970 2.5 2,009 4.5 Sub-total 9,965 10,330 6,101 Pulses 505 2.1 Industrial Crops Sugar beet 1,203 57 2,900 45 3,266 60 Cotton - - 1,360 1.5 - - Sub-total 1,203 4,260 3,266 Vegetables Summer veget. 2,334 27 1,360 40 3,266 40 Winter veget. 1,732 12.5 - - 2,422 30 Sub-total 4)066 1,360 5,688 Forage Crops Alfalfa 887 67 3,430 60 2,408 70 Berseem 1,220 58 830 25 2,852 60 Others 889 40 320 20 2,100 50 Sub-total 2,996 4P580 7,360 Fruit Trees 5 - /1 - - 772 30.0 Total Cropped Area 18)740 20,530 23,187 Total Equipped Area 15,820 15,820 15,820 Cropping Intensity 119 133 146 /1 Young trees, not yet under production. - 38 - 5.3 The above table shows that: (i) Total land use was already achieved in the first full year of irrigation; (ii) All crops foreseen at appraisal have been introduced except cotton. In addition, fruit trees (citrus and quince) were introduced by ORMVAD, and winter vegetables were cropped by farmers on a large area of 1,732 ha in 1980/81; these crops are expected to be extended to 772 ha and 2,422 ha respectively; (iii) Sugar beet was grown on only 1,203 ha. This is because cropping of sugar beet has been authorized only in the Zl sector as a result of the limited capacity of the existing Sidi Bennour sugar factory. The new sugar factory of Zemamra is being constructed and is expected to be completed by June 1982; (iv) The projection of agricultural production at full development as updated by ORMVAD is quite different from that foreseen at appraisal. The total cropped area would be 13% higher than expected at appraisal (23,187 ha instead of 20,530 ha). The major changes in the cropping pattern would be the introduction of winter vegetables and fruit trees, and the expansion of summer vegetables and forage crops, a reduction in cereals acreage and the elimination of cotton; and (v) except for vegetables, all yields were already higher, during the first full year of irrigation, than expected at appraisal at full development. This is notably the case for sugar beet for which the yield reached 57 t/ha, the highest yield ever recorded in Morocco for sugar beet on such a large area. 5.4 The very successful performance in agricultural crop production can be attributed to. (i) the very tight control imposed on farmers by ORMVAD and the Local Development Committee 1/ to ensure respect of the crop rotations and the cropping schedules; (ii) the predominance of small-scale farms, for which the cropping intensity has been recorded at very high levels. An analysis of land use during 1980-81 in one of the six agricultural extension zones of the Z1 sector covering 671 ha and 265 farmers shows that the cropping intensity is the highest (165%) on farms of less than 0.5 ha, declining (to 124%) for farms ranging between 10 and 20 ha before rising again (to 147%) for the larger farms. The same variation trend has been noticed for sugar beet yields, which in 1980-81 averaged 59.5 t/ha for farms of less than 1 ha, then declined for medium-sized farms before rising to 67.0 t/ha for farms exceeding 20 ha (see Annex VI); (iii) the efficiency of input supply services, handled by ORMVAD, for cereals, maize, sugar beet, and forage crops; (iv) the large use of improved seed varieties for most of the major crops; (v) the weather conditions during the 1980-81 cropping season characterized by a lower annual rainfall than normal (144 mm compared to an average of 320 mm). This encouraged farmers to use the right amount of water required by the crops (and even to exaggerate in the ZO sector: see para. 6.12). This was particularly remarkable in the case of wheat which most farmers usually hesitate to irrigate; and (vi) The sprinkler method of irrigation that farmers have rapidly adopted and which has contributed to a more efficient use of water than in the gravity irrigated areas (see Annex VII). 1/ According to the "Code des Investissements Agricoles", a Local Development Committee is established in each irrigated perimeter to advise on and monitor the construction programs, the use of irrigation facilities and the enforcement of the Code's provisions regarding the obligation imposed on farmers to develop irrigated crops. - 39 - Crop Performance 5.5 Sugar beets have been the most successfully established crop in the project area as well as in the whole Doukkala region. This is reflected in the constant pressure from farmers to obtain the required authorization from ORMVAD to expand their sugar beet acreage. This is especially of high returns obtained from cultivation of this crop: good farm gate prices and high responsiveness to modern inputs. Sugar beets benefit from the high priority that has been given to them for more than two decades by the Ministry of Agriculture. In the project area, most of the efforts of the ORMVAD extension agents go to supervising sugar beet production and marketing (see para. 6.22). In addition, the Sidi Bennour sugar plant has a dynamic team that provides technical assistance to extension agents and farmers. In this regard, the technical package for sugar beet production has been closely controlled and continuously improved. Seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides are provided by ORMVAD, and are distributed in the right amount required for effective cropping and high yields. The two most recent innovations are: the introduction of monogerm varieties and the mechanization of harvesting, which are expected to result in a substantial increase in net crop income by decreasing the costly labor requirements. Monogerm varieties have produced high yields in particular in the areas under sprinkler irrigation. 5.6 Wheat is obviously the most traditional crop and its cultivation has been mastered by farmers in the area. The most noticeable performance achieved is the generalization in 1980-81 of the use of high yielding seed varieties and of the irrigation of wheat by all the project farmers. These varieties were indeed highly productive because farmers were urged by ORMVAD to use the exact amount of required fertilizers and water. On the other hand, irrigation of wheat has undoubtedly been encouraged by the drought conditions and facilitated by sprinkler irrigation which does not require any prior land preparation in contrast with surface irrigation. 5.7 Maize is also a traditional crop in the project area. It is mainly utilized for human consumption and accessorily for animal feeding. It remains the second largest crop in the project area, although it is projected by ORMVAD to drop to last place among annual crops at full development. The problem with maize is that farmers are reluctant to use new hybrid variety seeds, supplied by ORMVAD. These varieties are all imported and are less resistant than the local varieties to crop diseases, in particular, the sesamia desease, for which the treatment with available chemicals is still expensive and relatively inefficient. 5.8 Forage Crops. Farmers have adopted alfalfa and berseem and succeeded with the prescribed cropping techniques. This has been facilitated by the availability in the market of high yielding varieties introduced in the project area by ORMVAD in particular for alfalfa (moappa, africana) and by the subsidy by Government of 50% of the seed prices. Other forage crops, mainly sorghum and maize, have been widely introduced, but yields are still lower than those of alfalfa and berseem. It is worth - 40 - noting that forage crops have been developed effectively even though the development of livestock has been relatively slow (see para. 5.11). The drought conditions throughout Morocco, during the 1981 cropping year resulted in a rise in demand outside the irrigated areas and a rise in the price of forage on the market and thus in a large acreage in the project area. During this year production prices of alfalfa have doubled and those of hay and straw more than tripled. 5.9 Cotton. The SAR projections included an area of 1,360 ha in cotton at full development, representing 9% of the project area. However, no cotton has been actually cultivated or is expected to be cultivated in the future in the project area. The development of this crop is decreasing in the other Doukkala irrigated perimeter. The area planted with cotton declined sharply from 3,500 ha a decade ago to about 600 ha last year. Yields also declined to 8.7 qx/ha in 1979 and 9.2 qx/ha in 1980, compared to an appraisal target for the project area of 15 qx/ha. Although it was not clearly specified in the appraisal report, the project feasibility studies highlighted the uncertainties about the place of cotton in the project area and therefore proposed.that cotton should not exceed 5% of the total area. The reasons for the decline of cotton cultivation and production in the Doukkala area are: (i) labor requirements are very high, in particular for harvesting; (ii) at least 6 routine and strict spray applications are needed to maintain control of pests and diseases, mainly the pink bollworm (Platyed goosypiella); (iii) losses have always been high in early autumn when first rains prevent cotton bolls from opening normally, reducing yields of fiber-grains and affecting the quality of fibers; (iv) the cropping cycle is long, and the period for harvesting (Ottober, November) coincides with period for sowing of several of the other major crops, to which farmers give the first priority (wheat and sugar beets); (v) sowings are often delayed due to the prevailing weather still relatively cool in March; and (vi) input and production prices have adversely affected the producers' income. Between 1972 and 1980 while input prices have increased by 500% production prices have increased by 250% only. In view of the preceding, ORMVAD decided to exclude cotton from the project production objectives. 5.10 Winter and Summer Vegetables. The development of vegetables has exceeded all expectations. The area cultivated in vegetables in 1980-81 was 300% larger than expected at appraisal for full development. This rapid expansion has been made at the expense of yields which can be substantially increased. However, farmers have consistently insisted during their discussions with the mission that their efforts for the development of tomato, which is one of the main summer vegetables, will be seriously hindered if a tomato processing factory is not established, as planned by ORMVAD, in Doukkala in the near future. So far, there is little hope that such a factory will be established in the project area because of the marketing and export problems which are being encountered in Morocco for tomato (see para 6.25). - 41 - Livestock Development 5.11 Despite the intense development of fodder crops, livestock development has been very slow in the Zl sector which has been irrigated since 1978. The substantial increase in milk production prices (from 0.95 DH/l in 1976 to 1.35 DH/1 in 1981) and the construction of seven milk collection centers under the project, and of a new milk factory near El Jadida were not sufficient to encourage a strong start-up of livestock development. Except for 100 pure breed cows, most cows are local (76%); the others are cross breed cows (23%). The development of livestock has been slow for the following reasons: (i) ORMVAD has not organized its livestock services in an effective way to promote livestock in the project area (see para. 6.24); and (ii) farmers encounter serious difficulties for building stables, or any other buildings, within the new village centers (see para. 4.11). Farmers are not allowed to build stables or houses in their plots. These facilities are to be grouped in the new village centers or in the "Douars". 5.12 However, ORMVAD has now decided to give a high priority to strengthening the extension activity required for the development of the livestock sub-sector and accordingly has prepared a development program for the next eight years, based on the projected production of fodder crops. This program is consistent with the basic orientation at appraisal and would result in: (i) the development of milk production in farms exceeding 5 ha, by increasing the number of pure breed cows from 110 to about 2,400 by 1988. This will require the purchase of about 1,000 pure bred in-calf heifers during this period; (ii) improving local dairy cattle productivity through cross breeding. Cross breeding cows would be increased from 23% to 100% of the non-pure breed herd; (iii) animal performance of pure and cross-breed cows in milk and meat production would be substantially improved. Irrigation Adoption Rates 5.13 At appraisal, full development was projected for 1989, ten years after project completion, assuming that average project yields would be achieved within 6 years after completion. The SAR estimated that the cropping intensity would reach 133% at full development. Experience to date shows that the irrigation adoption rate has progressed faster than expected. Cropping intensity was 119% in 1981, the first year during which all the project sectors were put under irrigation. All crops have been irrigated including wheat which farmers often refuse to irrigate. Irrigation of wheat became necessary since rainfall during 1981 was much lower than during an average year. It is likely that irrigation of wheat will continue in the future, however, since most of the farmers are now convinced that with only 5 or 6 applications of water, production rises substantially. 5.14 According to the new ORMVAD projections, cropping intensity would be 146% at full development. Full development would be reached in 1984 for cereals, industrial crops and vegetables, in 1988 for forage crops and livestock, and in 1991 for fruit trees. Objectives for cereal and industrial crops are likely to be reached in 1984 because of the effective organization of input supply services by ORMVAD and input companies - 42 - (SONACOS, FERTIMA), the guaranteed market outlets and prices and the increasing adoption of modern cropping techniques by farmers. Because the sale of green forage (alfalfa, besseem, etc) can be envisaged only during exceptional drought years, the development of forage production will follow the development of livestock. It is unlikely that full development of livestock and so of forage production will be achieved in 1988 unless a solution is found for the construction of stables in the new villages (see para. 4.11) or farmers are allowed to build their stables in their cultivated land, which is currently forbidden. - 43 - VI. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT Coordination between Project Executing Agencies 6.1 The establishment of the Project Coordination Committee chaired by the Governor of El Jadida and including local representatives of all Government agencies involved in project implementation, was a condition of effectiveness of the Bank loan. Following its establishment, the committee was convened only during the first year of implementation. Project implementation would have been improved if the Committee had been more active. The Committee could have taken action to ensure effective realization of the project components for the strengthening of the Zemamra Agriculture Research Station and the construction of primary schools within the new village centers, under the responsibility of the National Agricultural Research Institute (INRA) and the Ministry of Education respectively. On the basis of experience with recent projects in Morocco, the coordination of the project activities would have been more effective if the committee had been organized at the national level and chaired by the Director of Rural Construction in MARA who is responsible for coordinating the activities of all ORMVAs in Morocco. Organization for Project Implementation 6.2 As expected at appraisal, ORMVAD was made the primary executing agency with responsibility for the construction, operation and maintenance of the irrigation, drainage and village infrastructure works, and for agricultural development. Consultants assisted the Office in detailed design, procurement and supervision of works. They were phased out towards the end of the project as national staff gradually took over all supervision of works for the Doukkala II project, currently being implemented. 6.3 ORMVAD's performance in executing the project was highly satisfactory. This was mainly due to the stability, continuity, and professional quality of project management throughout the project period. Unlike many of the public departments and agencies in Morocco, the Office has benefited from having the same director and almost all the same key staff since the initiation of the project in 1976. The enthusiasm and the quality of this staff have been highlighted several times by the Bank staff who visited the project area. Key managers of construction of works, operation and maintenance are "g6nie rural" graduates with .knowledge of both agriculture and engineering. 6.4 As recommended at appraisal, the Office organization was restructured and strengthened for the implementation of the project. Four field subdivisions were established for construction, for operation and maintenance, for agricultural development, and for livestock. Since project completion, the subdivision for construction has shifted its responsibilities towards supervising construction activities of the Doukkala II project. In addition, four development centers (CMV = Centre de Mise en Valeur), one in each irrigation sector, were established prior to the start of irrigation: in 1978 in the Z1 sector and in 1980 in the - 46. - other sectors. All the new positions were staffed on time. Six engineers and agriculturalists, and 15 technicians were assigned at the Office headquarters and 15 engineers, agriculturalists and veterinarians, and as many as 80 technicians at the CMVs. In view of budget constraints and in order to enhance its operational efficiency, the Office succeeded in meeting its staff needs for the project by transferring experienced staff from other overstaffed existing field services. Only the key managerial positions at the head of the field subdivisions have been filled by recruiting new university graduates. The following chapters summarize the achievements of ORMVAD in organizing and handling the project related activities. Supervision of Construction 6.5 The ORMVAD Construction Division was successful in building up a capable engineering staff. Part of this staff has been assigned since the completion of works to manage operation and maintenance activities. The remaining staff has been transferred to the supervision of the Doukkala II project construction works. The Division also succeeded in providing qualified local staff in support of the consultants in charge of the detailed design, preparation of tender documents and supervision of works. Operation, Maintenance and Water Management a. Operation of the Distribution System 6.6 In contrast to ORMVAD's other divisions, the Division of Operation and Maintenance suffers from a lack of adequate attention translated into a serious shortage of staff at the headquarters level and insufficient budgetary funds to meet maintenance needs. This reflects the low priority given to the aspects of maintenance as compared to construction. This attitude might raise some difficulties if this priority is not increased and these constraints are not addressed in the future. The irrigation and drainage networks might as a result deteriorate and adversely affect the operation of the irrigation system and the efficiency of water use. The shortage of central staff has made it difficult to analyze adequately the considerable data available at the field level, regarding water use, the operating efficiency of field staff, and the operating condition of the networks. The inadequacy of budgetary funds has also created temporary shortages of spare parts for the maintenance of the electro-mechanical and other irrigation equipment (hydrants, meters), and supplies and materials for the maintenance of pipes and concrete structures. The low priority for maintenance is also reflected in the inadequate level of routine surveillance of operational equipment such as pumps. 6.7 On the other hand, the 0 & M field subdivision is well organized and adequately and not overly staffed. It includes two offices, one for the Z, and ZO adjacent sectors (10,628 ha) and one for the Z2 and Z3 adjacent sectors (5,237 ha). It has a staff of about 52 people including 22 ditchriders. Compared with other irrigation projects, the 0 & M project staffing and 0 & M costs are as follows. - 45 - Table 7 Nb of Ha per Turnouts /3 O&M Costs per 0 & M Ha per per 1,000 m3 Water Employee Ditchrider Ditchrider Delivered ----(us )---- - Morocco: Doukkala I (SPI /1) 305 718 68 15.8 - 5.1 /4 - Tunisia: Lower Medjerda (SI /2) 66 302 12 17.20 - Algeria: Bas-Cheliff (SI) 43 125 10 22.10 - Jordan: Jordan Valley (12% SPI, 88% SI) 18 n.a. 13 30.20 - U.S.A.: California (SI) four districts 448 963 67 3.50 /1 SPI = sprinkler irrigation 7 SI = surface irrigation /3 Hydrants for SPI 7_ The second number does not include the energy costs. The above table shows that the managerial productivity per employee is much higher in the Doukkala I area than in other large irrigation perimeters in North Africa or in Jordan. This can be attributed to three major facts: the quality of design of the irrigation system, the responsibility granted to farmers for operating and managing inside the blocks, and the budgetary constraints. First, the design of the irrigation system has been carefully oriented towards minimizing operation and maintenance costs in staff and in equipment and improving water distribution. The most salient features of this design are that: (i) automatic downstream control of the main canal and the Z0 sector feeder canal enables "on demand" water supply to the pumping stations; (ii) operation of the pumping stations is automatically controlled by the water level in elevated tanks or by pressure in the discharge pipes; (iii) there is direct hydraulic transmission of demand of water between the hydrants and the elevated tanks; and (iv) all the pumping stations, the compensation reservoir, and the 0 & M field offices have two-way radio for direct communication with the 0 &M subdivision and the ORMVAD headquarters. In addition, 0 & M supervisors have mobile two-way radio units in their vehicles. The communications network enables rapid information feeback and response to changing water supply and demand conditions in the project area. Second, operation of the system downstream of the hydrants allows water allocation by farmers themselves under ORMVAD guidelines without any operational interference by the Office except in case of litigation. Farmers were given initial mobile sprinkler equipment and are responsible for its repair or replacement as needed. Third, the budgetary constraints which have been experienced since 1978, resulted in a reduction of recruitment of new staff by ORMVAD. - 46 - b. On-Farm Distribution 6.8 While no water measurement devices have been installed in the Z1 sector, hydrants in the other sectors have been equipped with about 1,600 water meters of which only 60% are reportedly in working order, at present; the others have been either broken or stolen. While, according to some ORMVAD officials, farmers were responsible for damaging the meters, other officials is well as farmers have argued that meters deteriorated because they had been installed long before irrigation started, at a time when they were not under the control of farmers. This can be confirmed by the fact that since the start-up of irrigation no additional meters have reportedly been deteriorated. Moreover, farmers started asking for new meters in places where they are missing. In the areas where metering is not occurring, water charges are calculated on the basis of the amount of water delivered by the pumping stations. This means that farms without meters are penalized since they are charged with water losses in the distribution system, which are estimated at about 14% (see para. 6.11). 6.9 Irrigation within the blocks is organized by farmers themselves who take turns in the use of mobile laterals (see layout in Annex VIII). Contrary to the recommendations of the SAR, farmers have not been organized in water users' associations although farmers of each block selected among themselves a representative to whom ORMVAD formally delivered the mobile equipment to be used by all the block members. The result is that the rotation of the laterals between farmers is not always performed as advised by ORMVAD. This often happens between neighboring small and large farmers. In such cases ORMVAD intervenes to mediate conflicts. ORMVAD has drawn the conclusion that in order to avoid such problems in future projects, farmers will be grouped, during land consolidation, to the extent practicable according to their family or tribal kinship. 6.10 Water is automatically distributed on a demand basis. Neither the delivery time, nor the delivery turns are thus restrained by administrative considerations. A result of this is that water use at night is more common in the project area than in any of the other surface irrigated areas in Doukkala. During the 1979-80 cropping season, more than 30% of the water delivered from the Z1 pumping station was delivered at night. Experience in Doukkala has clearly demonstrated that irrigation at night is more common in the sprinkler than in the surface irrigated areas. c. Water Use 6.11 The overall efficiency of the conveyance system between the headworks and the farm hydrants is estimated at 70% for the 1980-81 cropping year, an average level of performance by world standards. Measurements of delivered water are made at the dam, the outlets from the main canal and the operative volumetric meters . The overall conveyance efficiency comprises 81% efficiency for the main canal (which is only about 10% lined) and 86% efficiency for the buried pressure system financed under the project. The latter performance is relatively low. Seepage losses during 1980/81 were reportedly high and were often caused by pipe sagging following inadequate execution of installation works by contractors. This damage was being repaired by contractors during the one-year waranty period. After these corrections have been made, the efficiency of the buried pressure system is expected to increase to 95% and that of the overall system to 77%, a satisfactory level. 6.12 Water use was very high in 1980-81, reflecting the start of agricultural development in the full project area. The table below gives an indication of the increase in water use intensity. - 47 - Table 8 Land Use Water Use /1 Cropping Per Ha Per Ha Cropping Year Equipped Cropped Intensity Total Equipped Cropped Ma)7 (ha) (% (million (m3 /ha) (m3/ha) m3) 1977/78 4,420 3,369 76 13.9 3,100 4,100 1978/79 4,420 4,015 91 18.0 4,100 4,500 1979/80 4,420 4,273 97 22.0 5,000 5,100 1980/81 15,820 18,740 119 140.6 8,900 7,500 /1 Water delivered at the pumping stations. The table shows that: (i) average water use per cropped hectare increased by 83%. This was an essential factor which contributed to increasing yields of all crops (see para. 5.3); (ii) average water use per equipped hectare almost tripled in three years, reflecting the substantial increase of the cropping intensity (57%) and of the water use per cropped hectare; (iii) the especially sharp increase in water use per hectare in 1980/81 was due to the irrigation for the first time of all wheat cropped fields and to the increase in crop water requirements which resulted from the drought; and (iv) total water use during 1980/81 is very high and represents 92% of the water use expected at full development at appraisal. Water use in Z2, Z3, and in particular in ZO largely exceeded the crop requirements. No specific reason has been given for this by ORMVAD. However, it is likely that farmers of these sectors exaggerated the use of water thinking that they would not be charged since water charges are deducted from sugar beet revenues and since they were not allowed to plant sugar beets in 1980/81 (see para. 6.18). d. Maintenance 6.13 ORMVAD is responsible for repair and maintenance of the irrigation, drainage and unclassified road systems. Farmers are responsible for repair and replacement of sprinkler mobile equipment. Budgetary allocations have been inadequate to meet the needs of proper maintenance, and ORMVAD has had no choice but to focus on essential maintenance works in the Zl sector; reported deteriorations in the ZO, Z2, and Z3 systems were repaired last year by the contractors during the contractual warranty period. The allocation of adequate sums in the future will be a key factor for protecting the project investment from deterioration. Maintenance of unclassified project roads, which are essential for transportation of sugar beets, needs to be given special attention in the future. A solution would be either to transfer the management of these roads to the Highways Department or to authorize - 48 - ORMVAD to sign a long-term maintenance contract with this Department or with a private road construction enterprise. The maintenance of unclassified roads has been a serious problem all over Morocco because MARA has emphasized construction to the detriment of repair and maintenance is often either non-existant or inadequate. 6.14 Maintenance of sprinkler mobile equipment in Z1, which has been irrigated since 1978, seems to be inadequate. Because much of the equipment is under joint ownership, conflicts sometimes arise when agreement between the owners for repairs or replacement is not reached. According to the contract with ORMVAD, the two project suppliers of mobile equipment have opened two equipment and spare part stores, one in El Jadida and the other in Zemamra. However, farmers complain about the inadequacy of after-sale services, characterized by frequent interruption of stocks and provision of replacement equipment with other specifications than those of the existing equipment and by excessively high prices. The Office should try to assure a proper supply of equipment, by closely monitoring the suppliers, by directly selling the equipment through its 0 & M Office, or preferably by encouraging competition from other suppliers. 6.15 One incident is of particular interest both for maintenance and for equipment installation practices. To cope with malfunctioning of pumps (financed by USAID), ORMVAD called in a technical expert from the American manufacturer. He found a correctible manufacturing flaw in several pumps, but he also showed that (i) one pump shaft had been bent as a result of improper installation by the local importing agency (no manufacturer's technician was present at installation); (ii) the packing on some 20 pumps was unacceptably dirty as a result of no routine preventive maintenance whatever despite several thousand hours of initial operation ; (iii) local maintenance staff had not been trained in pump maintenance and had not received the French language version of the manufacturer's maintenance guidelines; and (iv) stocks of standard frequently needed spare parts were inadequate. This episode illustrates the need (i) for more attention to maintenance concepts as well as its implementation and (ii) to ensure that the participation of manufacturer's technicians in equipment installation, start-up, and maintenance training is clearly provided for when foreign equipment is imported and installed by local commercial agents who are not sufficiently technically qualified. Cost Recovery 6.16 The loan agreement requires prompt billing and collection of water charges and the betterment levy. It also provides for a periodic review of water charges with the objective to recover the actual operation and maintenance costs of the project and up to 40% of the actual capital cost. According to the Investment Code costs are recovered through (i) a fixed betterment levy which amounts to 1,500 DH per ha. A total exmption is granted for farmers of 5 ha or less, a 5 ha exemption for farms of 5-20 ha, and full payment is required for farms over 20 ha; (ii) a basic water charge on a volumetric basis. A minimum of 3,000 m3/ha is debited to each farmer to encourage use of the irrigation system; and (iii) a supplementary water charge to cover energy costs for pumping. Payment of the betterment levy is due beginning the fourth year after completion, either in a lump sum or in annual installments over 17 years at 4% interest. The applied basic water charge increases linearly to reach full base rate in the fifth year after completion. Water charges should be paid annually according to the Code. - 49 - 6.17 The basic water charge of 0.029 DH/m3 established in 1969 was increased to 0.054 DH/m3 in June 1980 and was planned to be applied gradually over a three-year period. The new rate will thus be fully due in 1983. An additional pumping charge was set up for the project area at a fixed rate of 0.044 DH/m3. This represents a retreat since the new rate is lower than the actual energy pumping costs (0.056 DH/m3 in 1979-80). However, the decree instituting the pumping charges indexes these charges to the cost of energy in accordance with certain parameters to compensate for the effect of inflation. 6.18 As elsewhere in Morocco water charges and the costs of other supply services are deducted from industrial crop revenues, prior to the payment to farmers. Since most of the farmers in the Z1 sector have cultivated sugar beets and obtained excellent yields and revenues, the collection of water charges has been high. Recent information regarding amounts invoiced and actually paid indicates that the recovery rate of water charges is satisfactory; it increased from 78% in 1978 to 89% in 1980 and is reported to be higher than in most of other modern perimeters in Morocco (Gharb 30%, Souss and Tadla-60-70%). 6.19 MARA drafted in 1980 a decree to increase about threefold (to 4,588DH/ha) the land betterment levy. This decree is still being under consideration. Given the predominance of small farms, of less than 5 ha, and the exemptions provided for by the Investment Code, the owners of only 4,115 ha (or 26% of the project area) are required to pay the betterment levy. This lowers the recovery of investment costs. Current level of water charges and betterment levy, applied according to the Investment Code, are expected to cover 100% of 0 & M charges and 14% of investment costs. It is likely that cost recovery will remain a major issue in future bank-financed irrigation projects in Morocco. Extension, Input Supply and Services 6.20 The CMVs are the basic organization at the field level where development activities for crops and livestock are integrated. Each CMV includes at least a manager, a bookkeeper, an input supply agent and several extension agents. The actual density of extension agents at present is one agent for 278 farmers and 565 ha. The two project Agrarian Reform cooperatives receive assistance separately from the cooperative managers seconded by the Office. 6.21 The dynamism of ORMVAD staff in organizing and managing the supply services has surely been a key factor for the good agricultural development experienced in the new irrigated sectors. For commercial and basic crops for which ORMVAD supplies the inputs (sugar beets, wheat, maize, and forage crops), ORMVAD determines the varieties of seeds on the basis of recent results of research and experimentation, determines the type and quantity per ha of seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, and decides on the period at which the inputs should be picked up and then used by farmers. A considerable amount of inputs transits each year through ORMVAD's warehouses: in 1980/81, about 3,200 t of seeds and 8,500 t of fertilizers were distributed. Farm machinery services provided by ORMVAD to farmers are declining due to their inadequate operating efficiency, as has been the - 50 - case in all Development Offices in Morocco. In 1980 only 10% of the land preparation of sugar beet fields was carried out by ORMVAD's farm machinery equipment, the rest being performed by owners and private contractors. 6.22 Input supply, extension, and other administrative activities were thoroughly discussed by the mission with the extension agents and other staff of the Z1 sector CMV. The major conclusion that can be drawn is that most of the effort of extension agents is directed to distributing inputs to farmers, monitoring the cultivation of sugar beets, collecting agricultural statistics, and enforcing Investment Code regulations. The significance of these functions can be summarized as follows: (i) extension agents are responsible for all steps necessary for an adequate distribution of the inputs available at the CMV. This means that they must carry out a survey to plan input requirements for each crop prior to its cropping period, then inform farmers when inputs are delivered to the CMV, set a schedule and organize farmers in groups for pick-up of input from the CMV, and supervise the use of distributed inputs. Futhermore, since 1980 one or two extension agents of each CMV have been assigned full time for a period of about three months to assist in handling input distribution; (ii) regarding the industrial crops, and sugar beets in particular, the extension agents are fully mobilized for monitoring of all production and marketing operations from the distribution of inputs to the supervision of harvesting and delivery of the production to the plant. During the harvesting period each extension agent devotes 20 to 35 consecutive calendar days for this work. The extension agents of the Z1 sector estimate that about 40% of their time is devoted to sugar beet related activities and only about 25% of their time to real extension work; (iii) regarding the enforcing of regulations and collection of statistics, extension agents are responsible, according to the Investment Code, for closely controlling and ensuring success in the extension of the crop rotation scheme determined.by ORMVAD. In this respect, they keep up to date all information on plowed, sowed, treated and harvested land for each of the major crops and report to headquarters weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annually; and (iv) extension agents are also responsible for supervising all works necessary for the success of special programs such as the planting of fruit trees in the area, the distribution of windbreak plants, the introduction of sugar beet monogerm seeds, and the preparation of demonstration plots of maize or sugar beet. 6.23 It is clear that in order to obtain the benefits of irrigation under this system, the farmers give up to a considerable degree their freedom to choose what crops they will grow, in what proportions, and with what technology. However, within the prescribed crop rotations, they have a number of choices, for example, of specific summer and winter vegetables. Yet it must be recognized that the very success of the "Trame B" system in the Doukkala area -- the high irrigation and cropping rates, the economies of scale in land preparation, the efficiency of water use, the respect of input norms, and the resultant high yields -- is heavily dependent on the elements of control and discipline. The "Trame B" system is in a way analagous to the most cost effective manner by management, with the major difference that all the returns in the "Trame B" system go to the farmers. It remains to be seen in the future whether farmer self-discipline and new technology can permit a progressive relaxation of ORMVAD control while maintaining or increasing efficiency and yields. - 51 - 6.24 Extension for livestock development is almost non-existent. All the activities of the Livestock Division staff are devoted to the sanitary control of herds. The Livestock Division is, however, being reorganized in a way to give more emphasis to extension work as well as to long term planning needed to ensure realistic livestock development objectives that are satisfactorily integrated with forage cropping plans and with farmers' capacities to supply on-farm sugar beet residues and purchase remaining needs for concentrates. Despite this, the combination of (i) efficient input supply services, (ii) clear production objectives based on detailed rotation plans, (iii) a singular concept of the distribution system at the farm level ("trame B") facilitating the planning, the control by extension agents, and the execution by farmers of the crop rotation schemes, and (iv) a highly disciplined system of crop management and cultivation supervision by ORMVAD, in the perimeter; have contributed to the satisfactory start of agricultural development in the project area. However, ORMVAD officials are willing to reorganize their extension system. They have discussed with the mission the possibility of conducting an experiment in the Zl sector consisting of separating the 6 extension agents into two groups: a group of three would be fully devoted to extension tasks and the other group to the other administrative and organizational tasks. ORMVAD intends to focus in the future on training of the extension agents. Marketing 6.25 No marketing problems were reported by ORMVAD officials or by farmers except for tomatoes (discussed below). In addition to the seven milk collection centers constructed under the project, a Central Milk Plant was built in 1980 near El Jadida with a nominal capacity of 40,000 1 per day, which matches the milk production foreseen at full development by all Doukkala perimeters in aggregate. A new sugar mill with a capacity of 4,000 t per day and 350,000 t per year is being constructed in Zemamra. The mill is expected to be operational by June 1982, in time to meet processing needs of sugar beet production in the project area, in particular in the ZO, Z2, and Z3 sectors where farmers were authorized this year to plant sugar beets. The construction of a new tomato processing plant has been a major issue raised by farmers who agree that their efforts to develop tomato production have been hampered by very low farmgate prices. The building of a new plant has been considered by private entrepreneurs for years but ORMVAD is pessimistic that this project will materialize since marketing and export of fresh and canned tomatoes is still not adequately organized and managed in Morocco (the Vegetable Production and Marketing Project, Ln 1757-MOR, is attempting to improve this marketing system). Consultants 6.26 Consultants provided valuable assistance to ORMVAD for the detailed designs and the supervision of works of the irrigation, drainage, and road systems. Five consultants were hired: three engineers in electromechanics, rural engineering and civil works and two assistant engineers. It is worth noting that the same consulting firm prepared the Oum-er-Rbia Master Plan, carried out feasibility studies and detailed design and assisted in supervision of construction of works. - 52 - Audit 6.27 The loan agreement provided that: (i) ORMVAD yearly accounts and financial statements should be audited by independent auditors acceptable to the Bank; and (ii) ORMVAD should furnish to the Bank certified copies of the audited financial statements and the auditors' reports. There was a default since no such reports were received by the Bank. However the Bank was given the 1979 and 1980 financial statements for ORMVAD certified by the accounts officer. The officer has his office on the ORMVAD, reviews the contracts, makes all ORMVAD payments, and keeps ORMVAD's accounts. He reports to the Ministry of Finance on ORMVAD commitments and expenditures and overall execution of the offices capital and current accounts budgets. The Government refers to this system as an "a priori" audit. In this and other projects using an "a priori" auditing system of financial management, the intention has been to obtain certification of, and comments on the annual financial statements by a senior Finance Ministry official, considering that this would meet the spirit and substance of the audit convenant. Annex XI includes an annex of the July 23, 1980 supervision report covering the question of audit for all agricultural projects in Morocco. Performance of the Bank 6.28 The project did not encounter any major problems during its preparation, appraisal and implementation. This relative success is mainly due to Morocco's long experience with the design of modern irrigated perimeters and the use of the Trame B land consolidation system which has proved to be very well adapted to the Doukkala conditions (paras. 4.3 and 4.4). It is also the result of a competent management within ORMVAD and the unusual continuity at the highest positions of the project management. In this context, the Bank has enjoyed excellent cooperation and succeeded in establishing a constructive dialogue with the Project authorities. In addition, project implementation was monitored closely by the Bank which fielded about 12 supervision missions in the five-year implementation period. The staff involved were of senior level encompassing a full range of expertise including one agronomist, one irrigation engineer and one economist (see Basic Data C, Page ii). 6.29 Beside this project implementation success, when reviewing the appraisal assumptions in retrospect, it appears that these were conservative in at least two respects: (a) the preliminary project design and the appraisal were based on a cadastral survey limited to a small portion of the project area. This partial study indicated that only few smallholders existed in the project area. But at implementation it turned out that land ownership is more predominantly held by small farmers. This difference could have had serious consequences for the design and cost of the project on-farm works, but it did not in fact have any major effect on the project because of the versatility of the adopted Trame B system. The successful handling of the land consolidation aspects (paras. 4.2 to 4.6) was also instrumental in this respect. - 53 - (b) in retrospect, the estimated projections of crop yields at full development were very conservative. As shown in Table 6, except for summer vegetables, yields achieved at the first year of full irrigation were substantially higher than those estimated at appraisal for full development. It is now expected that yields will be even higher at full development particularly when prescribed cultural and irrigation practices are fully adopted. These higher yields and the unexpectedly rapid rate of adoption of irrigation are the principal factors contributing to the expected doubling of the economic rate of return of the project over that estimated at appraisal (para. 7.09). - 54 - VII. ECONOMIC EVALUATION Project Benefits 7.1 Production. The SAR assumed that without the project, production in the project area would continue to be limited to dry-land cultivation of wheat, maize, and pulses (string beans) and production of milk and meat based on grazing, all at low and stagnant levels of yield and output. That assumption still seems reasonable and is retained in the present report. 7.2 With the project, the SAR envisaged (i) a production pattern based entirely on irrigation and including all the "without-project" crops and animal products save pulses, plus a diversification into sugar beets, cotton, summer vegetables, alfalfa, berseem, and other miscellaneous forage crops; (ii) achievement of full production in 1989; (iii) an increase in cropping intensity from 83% to 133%; and (iv) achievement of relatively high yields, including substantial increases for the "without project" crops. By comparison with the SAR projections, ORMVAD now envisages (i) a somewhat modified cropping pattern (described in Section V); (ii) achievement of full production five years earlier in 1984 for annual crops, one year earlier in 1988 for livestock, and in 1991 for fruit trees, which were not proposed at appraisal; (iii) a higher cropping intensity of 146%; and (iv) yields exceeding SAR projections by substantial amounts (ranging up to 100%) for all crops except summer vegetables (see table after para. 5.2). On the other hand, the availability of irrigation water in the full project area was delayed by one year from the SAR schedule of November 1979 to November 1980. The sharp upward revision in projected yields of crops at full development is extrapolated from yields actually achieved in the first full year of irrigation, 1980-81, which exceeded most SAR projections for full development even though prescribed cultivation and irrigation practices had not yet been fully adopted by the farmers. 7.3 As a result of the new projection of higher cropping intensity and higher yields, overall production at full development is now envisaged to be substantially greater than foreseen at appraisal, although it is expected to be lower for certain crops as a result of shifts in the cropping pattern. The following table compares production "without the project" and at full development under the SAR and PCR projections. The table shows major increases in production at full development as foreseen in the PCR by comparison to the SAR for sugar beets, summer and winter vegetables, forage crops, milk, and fruit, offset by relatively minor reductions in other outputs. All of the sugar beet production has an assured market in the regional mills. Projected forage production is expected to be virtually all consumed on farm or sold within the perimeter. No problem is foreseen for the marketing locally and in nearby urban areas of the projected production of milk, meat, cereals, vegetables, and fruit. - 55 - Production in Tons -------------- Total ------------ --------- Incremental --------- Without SAR PCR SAR- PCR- Project Full Devel. Full Devel. W.0. Proj. W.O. Proj. PCR-SAR Year 1989 Year 1984 Wheat 9,600 19,080 16,368 9,480 6,768 (-2,712) Barley - - Maize 1,200 9,925 9,040 8,725 7,840 (-825) Pulses (string beans) 1,280 - - - - - Sugar beets - 130,500 195,960 130,500 195,960 65,460 Cotton - 2,040 - 2,040 - (-2,040) Summer Vegetables - 54,500 130,646 54,500 130,646 76,246 Winter Vegetables - - 72,660 - 72,660 72,660 Alfalfa (green) - 205,800 168,560 205,800 168,560 (-37,240) Berseem (green) - 20,750 171,120 20,750 171,120 150,370 Barley, Maize, Sorghum (gr) - 6,400 105,000 6,400 105,000 98,600 Sub-total, green forage 232,950 444,680 232,950 444,680 211,730 Year 1989 Year 1984 Milk 2,500 18,000 24,270 15,500 21,700 6,270 Meat 700 2,000 1,743 1,300 1,043 (-257) Year 1991 Citrus - - 18,540 - 18,540 18,540 Quince - - 3,080 - 3,080 3,080 7.4 Prices. For comercially traded commodities, the SAR based its economic analysis on 1980 international prices from the Bank's series, expressed in constant 1975 US dollars and adjusted to farmgate values. Other prices were based on mission estimates. The PCR uses actual farmgate prices experienced in 1980 and 1981 and the Bank's forecasts of prices of internationally traded commodities, all adjusted to a 1981 farmgate basis. - 56 - 7.5 Value of Production. The SAR projected a total net value of project production at full development in 1989 (after deduction of the value of "without project" production) of DH43.1 million in constant 1975 farmgate prices. An approximate adjustment of 78% for local inflation 1975-1981 gives a rough proxy for the value of 1989 production in 1981 prices, esimated at DH76.6 million. The PCR projection of the net value of project production for the three stages of full development (also net of the value of "without project" production) is summarized below: Total Annual Net Value of Stage of Full Development Project Production (DH million in 1981 prices) Annual Crops in 1984 94.1 Crops + Livestock in 1988 108.0 Crops + Livestock + Fruit Trees in 1991 116.0 The PCR projections thus represent an increase in the net value of project production that exceeds SAR projections for 1989 by about 22% at full development of annual crops in 1984, and by about 51% once fruit trees reach full development in 1991. 7.6 Benefits in the form of a reduction of underemployment and of the seasonality of employment, which were foreseen at appraisal, but which are difficult to quantify, have been realized since the start of irrigation in Z-1 sector in 1978 and in the other sectors in 1981. These benefits are partly reflected in the increase in average cropping intensity from 76% in 1978 to 112% in Z-1 in 1981 and 119% in the Project Area as a whole in 1981. Since the PCR does not envisage a relative increase in mechanization by comparison with SAR projections, it can be inferred that the increase cropping intensity at full development foreseen in the PCR (146% vs. 133%) should represent an incremental reduction of under-employment vis-A-vis prospects at the time of the SAR. 7.7 At full development of annual crops in 1984, benefits from import substitution, net of estimated foreign exchange costs of production, are expected to amount to about US$8.0 million from sugar beet production and US$2.3 million from production of wheat and corn. The increased production and income of Project farmers are stimulating the development of trucking and other service industries in the region, thereby generating substantial secondary economic benefits. Project Costs 7.8 The total economic cost of the Project (excluding roads, but including private investment in fruit trees and livestock) was about DH229 million in 1981 prices. Total road costs were about DH16 millions in 1981 prices. Economic cost figures were derived from actual expenditures by deducting taxes and adjusting for local and international inflation. At full development in 1984, annual costs of operation and maintenance of the irrigation network are expected to be about DH2.2 million and related energy costs DH9.5 million, all in 1981 prices. The replacement costs initial investment items were calculated on the basis of the same useful life for each major category as was adopted in the SAR. These periods are considered reasonable. The economic cost of labor has been shadow priced at 0.53 for unskilled (and family) labor, at 0.71 for semi-skilled labor, and at 0.86 for skilled labor. - 57 - Economic Analysis 7.9 On the basis of the project costs and benefits discussed above, and a period of 50 years, the economic rate of return of the project is 20.5% (compared to 11.4% estimated at appraisal). The main reasons for the improved rate of return may be recapitulated as (i) the cropping intensity under irrigation, which is now expected to increase more rapidly and reach a higher level at full development than was envisaged at appraisal, (ii) the much higher yields in agricultural production per hectare, which in 1980-81 largely exceeded the appraisal target for full development, and (iii) the substantially earlier achievement of full development. The switching value which would reduce the ERR to 10% is a reduction of project benefits by 50%, as a result of some combination of a shortfall in expected yields or unfavorable trends in prices of inputs or outputs. Farm Incomes 7.10 The SAR included four farm models defined as follows: a) 2 ha: cereals, forage, livestock, cotton, summer vegetables; b) 5 ha: cereals, forage, livestock, sugar beets; c) 5 ha: cereals, forage, livestock, cotton, summer vegetables, sugar beets; d) 25 ha: cereals, forage, livestock, sugar beets. During project implementation it became clear to ORMVAD that the number of very small farms was much greater than assumed during appraisal on the basis of partial'results of land consolidation (para. 4.7). As a result, ORMVAD proposed and the PCR includes five farm models, redefined to reflect the land tenure situation more realistically as follows: a) 0.5 ha: wheat, sugar beets, summer vegetables, forage, family livestock; b) 1.0 ha: the same products as model (a) plus winter vegetables; c) 2.0 ha: the same products as model (b) plus maize; d) 5.0 ha: the same products as model (c) plus citrus trees and commercial livestock; e) 25.0 ha: the same products as model (d) plus quince trees. 7.11 The table below shows the estimated financial return expected for each farm model, before and after taxes. The SAR figures for the "without project" case and for full development have been adjusted upward by 78% to allow for domestic inflation between 1975 and 1981 and permit a rough approximate comparison with the PCR models. The table shows that (i) for farm models of 2 ha, 5 ha, and 25 ha, the SAR net income projections at full production range from nearly 400% to over 600% of the estimated "without project" income; (ii) for these same farm models, PCR projections are more than 200% above those of the SAR; (iii) net income per hectare is - 58 - highest (US$2,230/ha) for the 1 ha model and lowest (US$1,592/ha) for the 25 ha model, reflecting difference in cropping patterns and intensities; (iv) the net income per capita projected by the PCR for the 5 ha and 25 ha farm models, measured in dollar equivalents, is respectively US$1,720, a strong middle-income level, and US$6,980, a clearly upper-income level which is 17 times the "without project" level; and (v) the net income projected by the PCR for the 0.5 ha and 1 ha farm models is equivalent, respectively, to.US$975 and US$2,230, which at 5.7 persons per family unit represents US$171 and US$391 per capita, compared to the Bank's 1981 absolute rural poverty level for Morocco of US$222 per capita.!/ By contrast, per capita income in the "without project" case is only US$96 for the 2 ha farm model and US$193 for 5 ha, still below the absolute poverty level. As noted in the discussion of project benefits, the main source of the improvement projected by the PCR over SAR estimates of net income at full production is the sharp upward revision in expected yields of most crops. Another contributing factor is the current expectation of greater cropping intensity. The PCR farm models are presented in detail at Annex X. Net Cash Return to Farm Models (DH of 1981) 0.5 ha 1.0 ha 2.0 ha 5.0 ha 5.0 ha 25 ha Return Before Taxes - Without Project - - 2,590 5,220 5,220 14,400 - SAR Full Development - - 9,300 23,400 20,900 80,000 - PCR Full Development 5,066 10,784 19,359 51,440 - 213,797 Return After Taxes - Without Project - - 2,370 4,770 4,770 12,100 - SAR Full Development - - 8,850 22,500 20,000 74,000 - PCR Full Development 5,000 10,652 19,095 50,902 - 206,956 - SAR Full Dev. as % of "Without Project" - - 375% 471% 422% 613% - PCR Full Dev. as % of "Without Project" - - 806% 1,068% - 1,710% - PCR Full Dev. as % of SAR Full Dev. - - 216% 226% - 280% (US$ of 1981) a/ Return Before Taxes - Without Project - - 498 1,002 1,002 2,770 - SAR Full Development - - 1,790 4,500 4,020 15,400 - PCR Full Development 975 2,230 3,670 9,790 39,800 - PCR Full Dev. per capita b/ 171 391 626 1,720 - 6,980 - PCR Full Dev. per hectare 1,950 2,230 1,835 1,958 - 1,592 a/ US$ 1.00 = DH 5.20 b/ 5.7 persons per farm unit family. 1/ The Morocco poverty level is derived in part from 1971 census data and should therefore be regarded as very approximative. - .5 - ANN'X I KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOlJKKAI.A I IRRIGATION PROJECT (Lo 1201-MOR) Appraisal and Final Cost Estimates and Contracts Appraisal Estimates Actual Actual as Contracts % of Appraisal Nverage Amount Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Estimates Nb par Contract ------ (DH'000 equivalent)---- -----(DH'000 equivalent)------ -------1011'000)-------- -9. IRRIGATION NETWORK 1. Loo consonitton 0I 0 0 4,608 0 4 608 W- -. Civil Works Con"ls 13,323 7,017 20,340 11,785 8,156 19,941 98 3 b,A? Pomping station civil works 2,R27 1,524 4,351 1,903 7,612 9,915 (al 217 2 4,757 W.ter towers 7,655 4,122 11,777 9,069 6,303 15,372 46 1 15,372 ITnderground pipes 73,228 38,866 112,094 77,366 56, 102 133,468 (*) 119 10 13,347 Land preparation 4,740 4,740 9,480 467 324 791 8 1 791 Fqrm road, 2,896 2,897 5,793 2,526 1,755 4,201 74 WinLsre,ak 1,024 0 3,024 758 526 1,284 42 4 8,828 Drainage network 9,017 8,618 17,635 17,551 12,196 29,747 169 Project buildings 691 372 1,063 1,209 847 2,066 14 2 1,033 Sub-total (1) 117,401 68,156 185,557 122,644 93,821 216,465 117 24 8,864 1. Equipment 1y romechanical 0 0 0 976 2,277 3,253 0 2 1,512 Electromecl-nical 6,445 14,374 20,819 14,507 3,111 17,618 (*) 89 3 5,873 Mobile sprinklers 10,223 22,853 33,076 10,603 16,613 27,216 (u) * 82 2 13,608 1lydrants 3,299 7,696 10,995 6,626 8,718 15,344 (u) 140 1 19,344 Operation and maintenance 1,004 2,344 3,348 1,187 1,803 2,990 (u) 89 4 749 Sub-tbtal (2) 20,971 47,267 68,238 33,899 32,922 66,421 97 12 5,535 4. Power Network Sub-total (3) 5,134 7,701 12,835 j1L9 6,604 11,006 86 2 5,503 NUR-rOTAL (A) 143,506 123,124 266,630 160,945 132,947 293,892 110 38 B. AGRICULrURAI, MANAGEMENT 1. CMV and Research Station 3,645 2,045 5,690 3,501 2,433 5,934 104 8 742 2. Milk Collection Centers 288 577 865 1,011 809 1,820 210 4 455 SU8-TOTAL (B) 3,933 5 6,555 43,242 g 118 12 646 C. EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES SUB-TOTAL (C) 1,355 3,161 4,516 16 61 87 1/ 2 n/a - D. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT SUB-TOTAL (D) 14,911 0 1800 0 11,00 79 E. INFRASTRUCTURE 1. Roads 19,064 18,024 37,088 15,516 10,783 26,299 71 10 2,630 2. Telecommunications 99 138 237 144 336 480 202 1 480 SUB-TOTAL (E) 19,163 18,162 37,325 15,660 JJJ119 26,779 72 11 F. VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE 1. Water Supply 2,342 1,290 3,632 - - - - 0 0 2. Electricty 841 1,264 2,105 - - - - 0 0 3. Pavement 605 606 1,211 435 302 737 35 1 737 4. Schools 3,519 1,935 5,454 - - - - 0 0 SUB-TOTAL (F) 7,307 5,095 12,402 435 302 737 6 1 737 - 60 - ANNEX 1T KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (Ln 1201-MOR) Appraisal and Final Cost Estimates (1 = 4.28 DH) Appraisal Estimates Actual Actual as % of Appraisal Item Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Estimates ----(US$'000 equivalent)-----(US'00 equivalent)- A. IRRIGATION NETWORK 1. Land Consolidation - - - 1,077 0 1,077 - 2. Civil Works Canals 3,336 1,807 5,143 2,753 1,906 4,659 90 Pumping stations civil works 729 392 1,121 444 1,779 2,223 200 Water towers 1,973 1,062 3,035 2,119 1,473 3,592 120 Underground pipes 18,971 10,016 28,987 18,076 13,108 31,184 107 Land Preparation 1,221 1,222 2,443 109 76 185 8 Farm Roads 746 747 1,493 590 410 1,000 67 Windbreaks 779 0 779 177 123 300 39 Drainage Network 2,324 2,221 4,545 4,100 2,850 6,950 153 Project Buildings 178 96 274 285 198 483 67 Sub-total (1) 30,257 17,563 47,820 28,653 21,923 50,576 106 3. Equipment Hydromechanical 0 0 0 228 532 760 - Electromechanical 1,662 3,704 5,366 3,389 727 4,116 76 Mobile sprinklers 2,634 5,890 8,524 2,477 3,882 6,359 75 Hydrants 849 1,984 2,833 1,548 2,037 3,585 129 Operational maintenance 259 604 863 278 421 699 81 Sub total (2) 5,404 12,182 17,586 7,920 7,599 15,519 89 4. Power Network Sub-total (3) 1,323 9 85 3,308 1,028 1,543 2,571 78 SUB-TOTAL (A) 36,984 31,730 68,714 37,601 31,065 68,666 100 B. AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT 1. CMV and Research Station 939 527 1,466 818 568 1,386 95 2. Milk Collection Centers 74 149 223 326 99 425 190 SUB-TOTAL (B) 676 1,689 1,144 667 1,811 107 C. EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES SUB-TOTAL (C) 349 815 1,164 0 14 20 2 D. AGRICULTURAL CREDIT SUB-TOTAL (D) 3,843 0 3,843 2,757 0 2,757 72 E. INFRASTRUCTURE 1. Roads 4,914 4,645 9,559 3,625 2,520 6,145 64 2. Telecommunications 25 36 61 33 79 112 184 SUB-TOTAL (E) 4 4,681 9,620 3 2,599 6,257 65 F. VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE 1. Water Supply 604 332 936 - - - - 2. Electricity 216 326 542 - - - - 3. Pavement 156 156 312 101 71 172 55 4. Schools 909 497 1,406 - - - SUB-TOTAL (F) 1,885 1,311 3,196 101 71 172 55 G. ADMINISTRATION 1. Government Engineering 1,850 0 1,850 150 0 150 8 2. Local Consultants 290 0 290 920 2,616 3,536 131 3. Engineering Consultants 702 1,697 2,399 4. Tadla Feasibility Study 168 4L4 582 363 0 363 52 5. Bilharzia Control Program 213 482 695 - - - 6. Vegetable Marketing Study 101 287 388 52 147 199 51 SUB-TOTAL (G) 3,324 2,880 6,204 1,485 2,763 4,248 68 GRAND TOTAL 52,337 42,093 94,430 47,829 37,179 85,008 90 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (Ln 1201-MOR) Land Consolidation Farm Size Distribution Completion Target (at Appraisal) Actual Results Range of Size Farm Units Area Average Farm Units Area Average (ha) (ha) (%) (ha) (%) Size (ha) (ha) (%) (ha) (%) Size (ha) 0 - 0,5 1,958 25 685 4 0.35 0,5 - 1 1,989 26 1,624 10 0.80 1 - 1,5 1,049 14 1,431 9 1.35 1,5 - 2 762 10 1,369 9 1.80 (0 - 2) 1,370 43 1,960 13 1.4 (5,758) ( 75) ( 5,109) ( 32) (0.90) 2 - 5 1,130 35 4,850 31 4.3 1,414 18 4,738 30 3.35 5 - 10 440 14 3,850 25 8.8 417 5 2,858 18 6.85 10 - 20 124 4 1,490 10 12.2 115 1.5 1,534 10 13.35 Above 20 136 4 3,250 21 23.9 50 0.5 1,583 10 31.70 TOTAL 3,200 100 15,400 100 4.8 7,754 100 15,822 100 2.05 ANNEX IV (a) - 62 - KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (Ln 1201-MOR) Land Use, Yields and Production Without Project Year 1978 Year 1979 Area Yield Production Area Yield Production Area Yield Production Crops (ha) (%) (t/ha) (c) (ha) (Z) (t/ha) (t) (ha) (2) (t/ha) (t) CEREALS Wheat 9,600 61 1.0 9,600 946 21 1.5 1,419 935 21 3.0 1,870 Barley - - - - - - - - - - - - Maize 1,500 9 0.8 1,200 821 19 1.8 1,478 500 11 1.2 600 Sub-total 11A0 70 1.0 10,800 1 767 40 1.6 2 897 32 1.7 2,470 PULSES to 0.8 1,280 190 4 1.6 304 112 3 1.5 168 INDUSTRIAL CROPS Sugar beet - - - - 586 13 47.2 27,660 851 19 48.5 41,274 Cotton - - - - - - - - - - - Sub-total - - - - 586 13 47.2 27,66 851 19 48.5 41,27 VEGETABLES Sumer vegetables - - - - 278 6 10 2,780 915 21 31 26,365 Winter vegetables - - - - 261 6 2.5 6,525 133 3 20 2,660 Sub-total - - - - 539 12 12.5 9, 24 25 29,025 FORAGES Alfalfa - - - - 287 7 20 5,740 400 9 60 24,000 Berseem - - - - - - - - 125 3 70 8,750 Maize, sorgham - - - - - - - - 44 1 30 1,320 Other - - - - - - - - - - - - Sub-total - - - - 287 7 20 54669 13 50.9 34,070 FRUIT TREES - - Z - TOTAL CROPPED AREA 12,700 80 /1 - - 3,369 - - - 4.015 - - AREA UNDER IRRIGATION 0 - - - 4,420 - - - 4,420 - - CROPPING INTENSITY - - - - - 76 - - - 91 - /1 Cropping intensity in total project area of 15,400 ha in SAR. KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (Ln 1201-MOR) Land Use, Yields and Production (continued) With Project With Project Year 1980 Year 1981 (Appraisal Estimate) (Estimated Actual) Area Yield Production Area Yield Production Area Yield Production Area Yield Production Crops (ha) (%) (t/ha) (t) (ha) (%) (t/ha) (t) (ha) (%) (t/ha) (t) (ha) (%) (t/ha) (t) CEREALS Wheat 999 23 2.5 2,479 6,416 40 3.2 20,531 6,360 41 3.0 19,080 4,092 26 4.0 16,368 Barley - - - - 230 1 1.8 414 - - - - - - - - Maize 671 15 2.0 1,342 3,319 21 3.1 10,611 3,970 26 2.5 9,925 2,009 13 4.5 9,040 Sub-total 1 38 2.3 3,821 9,965 62 3.2 31,556 10,330 67 2.8 6,101 39 4.2 25,408 PULSES 80 2 1.5 120 505 3 2.1 -- INDUSTRIAL CROPS Sugar beet 1,113 25 52 57,876 1,203 8 57 68,571 2,900 19 45 130,500 3,266 21 60 195,960 Cotton - - - - - - - - 1,360 9 1.5 2,040 - - - - Sub-total 1113 25 52 5 1,203 8 57 6 4,260 28 31.1 125 3,266 21 60 195 VEGETABLES Summer vegetables 421 10 30 12,630 2,334 15 27 63,075 1,360 9 40 54,400 3,266 21 40 130,646 Winter vegetables 313 7 21 6,573 1,732 11 12.5 21,801 - - - - 2,422 15 30 72,660 Sub-total 734 17 26.2 19,203 4 26 20.9 84,876 1,36 9 40 5,440 5,688 36 35.7 203,306 FORAGES Alfalfa 354 8 60 21,240 887 6 67 59,590 3,430 22 60 205,800 2,408 15 70 168,560 Berseem 240 5 70 16,800 1,220 8 58 70,880 830 5 25 20,750 2,852 18 60 171,120 Maize, sorgham 82 2 36 2,952 889 6 40 35,560 - - - - 2,100 13 50 105,000 Other - - - - - - - - 320 2 20 6,400 - - - - Sub-total 676 15 60.6 4 2,996 20 55.4 166,030 4,580 29 50.9 232,950 7,360 46 60.4 444,680 FRUIT TREES - - - - - - - - - - - - 772 4 30 21,600 TOTAL CROPPED AREA 4,273 - - - 18,740 - - - 20,530 - - - 23,187 AREA UNDER IRRIGATION 4,420 - - - 15,820 - - - 15,400 - - - 15,820 CROPPING INTENSITY OF 146 AREA UNDER IRRIGATION - 97 - - - 119 - - - 133 - - 64 - ANNEX V (a) KINGDOM OF MOROCCO DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT Comparison of Project Completion Report (Accumulated Disbursements) Appraisal Actual as % IBRD Fiscal Year and Actual Estimate Appraisal of Quarter -----(US$ million)----- Estimate 1976 March 31, 1976 - 0 June 30, 1976 - 0.5 1977 September 30, 1976 - 1.0 December 31, 1976 - 2.0 March 31, 1977 - 3.0 June 30, 1977 - 4.0 1978 September 30, 1977 1.5 5.0 30 December 31, 1977 - 6.0 - March 31, 1978 5.8 7.0 83 June 30, 1978 6.8 8.0 85 1979 September 30, 1978 - 9.0 - December 31, 1978 9.7 11.0 88 March 31, 1979 - 13.0 - June 30, 1979 - 15.0 - 1980 September 30, 1979 14.5 17.0 85 December 31, 1979 - 19.0 - March 31, 1980 - 21.0 - June 30, 1980 17.5 23.0 76 1981 September 30, 1980 - 26.0 - December 31, 1980 - 29.0 March 31, 1981 - 30.0 - June 30, 1981 24.8 - 83 1982 September 30, 1981 - 91 December 31, 1981 27.3 91 r----, .. - r . .. ,1 - ··-·1>I - -- .- f INCI)0 OOC T t DOUi LA: 1 IRRGAIO PROJECTI (LnT12P -MOR) i 1¥ m ni n w r - i n I4 - L -t -- r fl f - - 1 - tTT T 3T - 1 Ii- - -'jl i ~- - . -.- - r.1- i - - -4 _ _ _ _ Tv; VEv IiATi4i77,~ii }I' i A 4 _ 4I- - 1 -'1 i 11 -FI | - - - t - 1 1r L rr r +r-{ r vi--H RRT _76__ 19_ 7_ __9..78___79__ _9_ .. 19i_ __. 7r . _______________________ ____________ _____________ ___________________________ _____________:H1 I1 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPOR - DOUKKALA jiRRIGATIONL'ROJECT (Ln 2l1Ó Sugar b Cropping - - -.- --- :I.eld Intens__tFarm-Size-to-Cropping-Intensi Yil - -VIntnsit (t/ha). (%) Sgar beet Yiéld in 1980 - In:the zne 2 of the Z sector covering 70 ha and 2 5 farmers) - Ij †- - - - - -- - - - - -- T -_ rJ r - T ; - - - 71 -I - - - - - - - - - -r1 -- 7 - -1- - 14- 55 110 0-0. 0 102 20 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT Comparative Water Use per Hectare in the Doukkala Perimeters (Surface ans Sprinkler Irrigation) SURFACE IRRIGATION SPRINKLER IRRIGATION FAREGH SIDI SMAIL SIDI BENNOUR BOULAOUENE ZEMAMRA (Z1) ZEMAMRA (Zl-Z2-Z3) YEAR (8,470 ha) (8,820 ha) (9,700 ha) (11,000 ha) (4,420 ha) (11,400 ha) m3 m3/ha m3 m3/ha m3 m3/ha m3 m3/ha m3 m3/ha m3 m3/ha 1969 21,788,820 2,270 10,351,154 1,170 - - - - - - - - 1970 22,600,000 2,670 19,982,232 2,270 - - 6,500,000 5,910 - - - - 1971 20,250,000 2,400 13,118,084 1,490 7,672,752 790 5,500,000 5,000 - - - - 1972 18,100,000 2,140 19,118,754 2,170 8,454,104 870 7,000,000 6,360 - - - - 1973 28,011,084 3,310 28,715,272 3,260 19,326,746 1,990 8,511,000 7,740 - - - - 1974 30,410,978 3,590 24,114,132 2,730 21,859,065 2,250 5,241,977 4,770 - - - - 1975 34,644,818 4,090 38,077,522 4,320 43,244,126 4,460 9,795,430 8,900 - - - - 1976 26,079,732 3,080 32,818,240 3,720 36,476,444 3,760 8,467,580 7,700 - - - - 1977 31,182,272 3,680 33,042,276 3,750 36,739,788 3,790 9,065,220 8,240 - - - - 1978 31,296,514 3,690 35,660,344 4,040 32,301,072 3,330 6,468,494 5,880 13,859,616 3,140 - - 1979 38,508,093 4,550 40,647,134 4,610 45,437,909 4,680 9,098,091 8,270 18,035,987 4,080 - - 1980 42,826,210 5,060 44,877,384 5,090 53,813,160 5,550 10,194,294 9,270 22,031,863 4,990 - - 1981 - - - - - - 19,005,596 11,820 33,782,959 7,640 106,741,080 9,360 M- - 68 - ANNEX VIII KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRICATION PROJECT (Ln 1201-MOR) "Trame B" Irrigation Layout PROPERTYO rR\oEnvioF A< . OPErY OF C 7<I STertiary Hydrant 13 Conduit with twa 12 e Outlets Flyin LineGat ed 18 18 10 Hydrant Sprinkler 9 Pattern Ouanrenary 5 Positions of Pipe or Field 4 Flying Line Utch 3 2 Open Drain WinrIbreak ////// e13.89 HA/»/ .,,{NET) þ1 :t 0 04 v 4 3 144 o 144 3 14 ll 623 om 4 *.f out aton.. OI,,mn s 1n 0 1tes World anak I6713 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT (Ln 1201-MOR) Economic Analysis: Summary Table of Economic Costs and Benefits (DH millions of 1981) ----------------------- Irrigation Costs ---------------------- Without - Gross Net Operation & Orchard Livestock Total Net Project Project Net Incremental Incremental Investments Maintenance Energy Replacement Total Investment Investment Costs Benefits Benefits Benefits Benefits 1976 27.2 0 0 0 27.2 0 0 27.2 11.7 11.7 0 (-) 27.2 1977 54.7 0 0 0 54.7 0 0 54.7 8.0 11.7 (-) 3.7 (-) 58.4 1978 40.3 0.70 0.92 0 41.9 0 0.15 42.0 9.3 11.7 (-) 2.4 (.) 44.4 1979 40.4 0.81 1.15 0 42.4 0 0.22 42.6 14.4 14.0 0.4 (-) 42.2 1980 32.9 0.64 1.36 0 34.9 0 0.45 35.3 26.8 14.2 12.6 (-) 22.7 1981 19.7 1.04 8.68 0 29.4 0.26 0.62 30.3 49.6 13.9 35.7 5.4 1982 0 1.44 8.99 0 10.4 0.65 0.77 11.8 64.5 13.8 50.7 38.9 1983 0 1.82 9.30 0.1 11.2 1.30 1.01 13.5 84.1 13.9 70.2 56.7 1984 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 1.74 1.20 14.6 108.1 14.0 94.1 79.5 1985 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0.34 1.30 13.0 108.8 12.5 96.3 83.3 1986 0 2.24 9.50 4.1 15.8 0 1.34 17.1 112.5 12.7 99.8 82.7 1987 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 1.45 13.1 116.5 12.8 103.7 90.6 1988 0 2.24 9.50 37.4 49.1 0 1.30 50.4 120.9 12.9 108.0 57.6 1989 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 122.2 12.9 109.3 97.6 a, 1990 0 2.24 9.50 24.1 35.8 0 0 35.8 129.7 15.0 114.7 78.9 1991-92 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 1993 0 2.24 9.50 26.3 38.0 0 0 38.0 131.0 15.0 116.0 78.0 1994 0 2.24 9.50 4.1 15.8 0 0 15.8 131.0 15.0 116.0 100.2 1995-97 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 1998 0 2.24 9.50 44.3 56.0 0 0 56.0 131.0 15.0 116.0 60.0 1999-2001 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 2002 0 2.24 9.50 28.2 39.9 0 0 39.9 131.0 15.0 116.0 76.1 2003 0 2.24 9.50 4.4 16.1 0 0 16.1 131.0 15.0 116.0 99.9 2004-2007 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 2008 0 2.24 9.50 78.6 90.3 0 0 90.3 131.0 15.0 116.0 25.7 2009 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 2010 0 2.24 9.50 4.1 15.8 0 0 15.8 131.0 15.0 116.0 100.2 2011-13 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 2014 0 2.24 9.50 24.1 35.8 0 0 35.8 131.0 15.0 116.0 78.9 2015-17 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 2018 0 2.24 9.50 48.4 60.1 0 0 60.1 131.0 15.0 116.0 55.9 2019-22 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 2023 0 2.24 9.50 26.3 38.0 0 0 38.0 131.0 15.0 116.0 78.0 2024-25 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3 2026 0 ?.24 9.50 28.2 39.9 0 0 39.9 131.0 15.0 116.0 77.0 2027 0 2.24 9.50 0 11.7 0 0 11.7 131.0 15.0 116.0 104.3  - - - n -N n i ri Eucu m-Oo C 0 0004 O0 at oý i oj oO'OI J J0 11 Cnn oo lO fiol oO.-" fl''0 0 - n C J ou" -oj -o 0-, 5 o4 000|I 0'f e' ' ''- ' -40 - SI '0- - - -t '- O ' 00"- 0-"oa 0 o0 0 0 01 fO\ 0 010 -0 0 N N - O O 00 01 r- a0''s O 0 0000··- ·- - 0010 - -- E 0 0' C --' N 0 - f 30Q- N Z- 0 f. - SO O 0 --' -I .00 2 0- tr' 0 00 caO t N0 'Df -' 000' 0 r0 00 o < O † 000 0 0 s sa oo 00 m 0 oto-fN i. N - - 0O 0 0r.'C4 C O 0 0000000" •• - •• flfl 0 1 . 0 ,0000 - O Q w N .-' 104 -- - oo ; N 4 m .. N r O 0 sr- ro er 0 u o n 7r  PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT Farm Budgets at Full Development Farm Type 1-0.5 ha Farm Type 11-1.0ha Farm Type 1II-2.Oha Farm Type IV-5.Oha Farm Type V-25 ha ----- Unit Rates Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Yield Price No. of Head Return No. of Head Return No. of Head Return No. of Head Return No. of Head Return (o)(DH) (DH (H)TH Livestock Gross Return Cross Bred Milk Cows 2,000 1/hd 1.39 DH/I 1 2,780 1 2,780 2 5,560 3 8,340 Males (and Slaughtered) 270 kg/hd 6,000 DH/t .0.52 (0.24) 389 0.67 (0.32) 518 0.9 (0.4) 648 1.8 (0.8) 1,296 Heiffers (and Slaughtered) 315 kg/hd 6,000 DH/t 0.68 (0.16) 302 0.93 (0.26) 491 1.3 (0.4) 756 2.4 (0.6) 1,134 Sub-total 2.20 (0.40) 3,471 2.60 (0.58) 3,790 4.2 (0.8) 6,964 7.2 (1.4) 10,770 Pure Bred Milk Cows 3,000 t/hd 1.39 DH/l 1 3,000 14 42,000 Males (and Slaughtered) 150 kg/hd 6,000 DH/t 0.35 (0.35) 315 5 (5 ) 4,500 Heiffers (and Slaughtered) 400 kg/hd 6,000 DH/t 0.57 (0.04) 96 8 (2.8) 6,720 Sub-total 1.92 (0.39) 3,411 27 (7.8) 53,220 Total Gross Return, Livestock 3,471 3,790 6,964 9.12 (1.89) 14,181 53,220 Expenses Costs (DH) Costs (DH) Costs (DH) Costs (DH) Costs (DH) Fodder Crops 552 563 1,395 3,143 18,700 Concentrates, Purchased 875 1,000 1,750 3,500 17,500 Concentrates, On-Farm (Beet Residues) Sub-total 1,427 1,563 3,145 6,643 36,200 Net Return (DH) Net Return (DH) Net Return (DH) Net Return (DH) Net Return(DH) Net Return, Livestock 2,044 2,227 3,819 7,538 17,020 Net Return, Human Consumption Crops 3,022 8,557 15,540 43,902 196,777 Total Net Return Before Taxes and Depreciation 5,066 10,784 19,359 51,440 213,797 MO PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT Farm Budgets at Full Development (cont'd) Farm Type 1-0.5 ha Farm Type II-1.Oha Farm Type III-2.Oha Farm Type IV-5.Oha Farm Type V-7Ta ------ Unit Rates ----- (DIi) (DH) (DH) (DH) (DH) Total Net Return Before Taxes and Depreciation 5,066 10,784 19,359 51,440 213,797 Taxes Rate Betterment Levy 138.7 DH/ha 3,468 Agricultural Income Tax 66 132 264 538 3,373 Sub-total 66 132 264 538 6,841 Total Net Return After Taxes 5,000 10,652 19,095 50,902 206,956 Depreciation Cost Life (Yrs) Depreciation Mobile Sprinklers 2,330 (DH/ha) 8 291 (DH/ha) 146 291 582 1,455 7,275 Stables for Pure Breds 3,000 (DH/ha) 30 100 (DH/hd) 192 2,700 6,900 (DR/ha) 30 230 (DH/ha) 191 Fruit Trees, Citrus 7,300 (DH/ha) 30 243 (DH/ha) 505 Fruit Trees, Quince 5,800 (DH/ha) 30 193 (DH/ha) 401 Sub-total 146 291 582 1,838 10,881 Total Return After Depreciation 4,854 10,361 18,513 49,064 196,075 Total Return Per Hectare Before Taxes 10,132 (100%) 10,784 (106%) 9,680 (96%) 10,288 (102%) 8,552 (84%) After Taxes 10,000 (100%) 10,652 (107%) 9,548 (95%) 10,180 (101%) 8,278 (83%) After Depreciation 9,708 (100%) 10,361 (107%) 9,256 (95%) 9,813 (101%) 7,843 (81%) Aver. Amor- 70% of Cost Period Int. tizing & Int. Cost of Servicing Credit /1 (DH/ha) (YrsT (T (OH/ha) Mobile Sprinklers 1,631 5 8.5 395 198 395 790 1,975 9,875 Pure Bred Cows 4,200 5 8.5 1,018 509 7,126 Stables 2,100 5 8.5 509 509 7,126 Fruit Trees, Citrus (Farm IV) 4,830 5 8.5 1,171 972 Fruit Trees, Quince (Farm V) 4,585 5 8.5 1,112 4,626 Total 198 395 790 3,965 28,755 As % of Net Return After Taxes 4% 4% 4% 8% 14%' 1/ It should be noted that much of the credit servicing occurs before full development when net returns are lower. For Farm Types IV and V there is likely to be some phasing of the different credit-financed investments so that the annual servicing cost is likely to be less than shown in most years. - 75 - ANNEX XI Page 1 KINGDOM OF MOROCCO DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT AUDIT I. Doukkala I The ORMVAD Financial Management System. The audit function should be viewed in the context of the overall financial management system applied to ORMVAD. Whereas ORMVAD has substantial autonomy in the physical execu- tion of the activities under its responsibility, the Ministry of Finance tightly controls all ORMVAD financial commitments and actually makes all ORMVAD payments and keeps ORMVAD's accounts. The Government refers to this system as an "a priori" audit. It functions through two key officials of the Ministry of Finance who are thus independent of ORMVAD and the Ministry of Agriculture: (i) an accounts officer ("agent comptable"), whose office is on the ORMVAD premises, and (ii) his immediate superior, a financial con- troller ("contr8leur financier"), located in the Ministry of Finance in Rabat. The financial controller reviews all proposed contracts for consistency with the purposes and funding availability provided for in the ORMVAD budget and must countersign contracts before they can take effect. The accounts officer is a member of the committee in charge of selection of bidders, and once contracts are being implemented, lie makes payments on behalf of ORMVAD after he has verified that bills presented are consistent with the contratt and with the purposes of the budget and the availability of released funds under the budget. He thus provides a further review independent of ORMVAD of the appropriateness of contracts and has the power and duty to refuse payment for expenditures if he finds inconsistencies in approved contracts. The accounts officer sends to the financial controller weekly reports on ORMVAD cash balances and monthly reports on payments on each capital contract and on receipts, commitments, and expenditures of the capital and current account budgets. On the basis of these reports and his own periodic site visits, the financial controller makes his recommendations to Finance Ministry management on the timing and amount of periodic releases of capital budget funds to ORMVAD. - 76 - ANNEX XI Page 2 The "a posteriori" aspects of the ORMVAD financial management system consist of the following: The accounts officer draws up end-of-year financial statements similar to the weekly and monthly reports mentioned above, which he signs and submits to the financial controller. ORMVAD prepares an annual report containing a narrative statement of the year's activities usually covering studies and execution of works, operation of the irrigation network, agricultural and livestock production, administra- tion, financing, and planning as well as a set of the accounts officer's annual financial statements. This annual report is also sent to the financial controller, who briefs the Minister of Finance on the year's activity of ORMVAD and the financial statements, which are then discussed and approved at a meeting of the Board of Directors of ORMVAD, of which the Ministers of Finance and Agriculture are members. Thus in summary, ORMVAD does not undergo an annual audit of its operations and accounts on a sampling basis by a private independent auditing firm. Rather, ORMVAD's operations are under constant monitoring by the Ministry of Finance, and ORMVAD's payments and accounts are managed by the Ministry of Finance, which is tantamount to a comprehensive day-to- day audit. Kingdom of Morocco Doukkala Irrigation Project Project Completion Report Bank Financed Contracts Contract Amount Item Method of Contractor/ Implementation Time Period Original Revised Actual Expenditures Procurement Country Contracted Actual ----------(DH)--------- (DH) (Z) ------------ Months-------- Category I: Civil Works (Disbursement: 41%TE) Recalibrage Canal ICB LOFTI & SATGO 12 18 5,972,338 6,535,108 109 Principal No 7(28/75) Maroc Construction 1 centre ICB TRIBICH ALLAL 7 7 479,947 de collecte de lait BEN MOHAMED 95,989 /1 105,354 110 (CMV321)(50/75) Maroc Recalibrage Canal Prin- ICB HADJA OMAR 18 25 6,631,895 6,023,178 91 cipal Nos. 8 et 9 (62/75) Maroc Conduites enterr4es Fl ICB S.N.C.E 15 25 15,322,913 17,158,597 112 (1/76) Maroc Conduites enterrges F2 ICB COMAMETO & ELECAM 15 27 9,307,734 14,097,553 151 (2/76) Maroc-France Construction de 4 reser- ICB GTMA (1) 12 16 9,414,085 voirs sur tour (15/76DKE) Maroc (2) 12 16 Avenant No 1 (15/76) (3) 12 26 12,478,320 (Revision) (4) 12 23 Avenant No 2 (15/76) 12,584,280 15,372,134 122 (Revision finale des prix) Construction de routes ICB principales RS 123,PK 15 Hadj Ali Chleuh 1,125,360 1,091,370 97 PK 27,(15/76EJ) Maroc Construction de routes principales,CT1305- ICB Hadj Ali Chleuh 899,760 942,464 105 PK27-37,(26/76) Maroc Construction CMV 322- LCB SAKIF TAHAR 12 13 1,752,026 1,740,478 99 324 (31/76) Maroc Electrification CMV 321 LCB ENTREPRISE LAHLOU 3 18 85,450 61,041 71 (37/76) Maroc Travaux d'61argissement des chemins tertiaires ICB Hadj Ali Chleuh 2,801,550 3,147,567 112 1307 & 1351 Maroc (2ibme tranche)(48/76) /1 Partie du contrat A 6tre financ6e par BIRD. Contract Amount Item Method of Contractor/ Implementation Time Period Original Revised Actual Expenditures Procurement Country Contracted Actual ----------(DH)--------- (DH) (%) ------------ Months-------- Category I: Civil Works (Disbursement: 41%TE) Construction de EZZAOUINE MOHAMED 5 centres de collecte LCB & ABOU EL FARAJ 7 7 397,559 481,459 121 de lait (57/76) Maroc Sous centre Zemamra LCB SAKIF TAHAR 7 10 857,959 846,623 99 (1ère tranche)(85/76) Maroc Construction CMV 321 LCB TAHAR+BOUCHAIE 7 10 878,449 811,277 92 (86/76) Maroc Défoncement et LCB LOFTI 7 18 772,500 790,882 102 épierrage(87/76) Maroc Canal adducteur (2/77) ICB E.M.T. il 14 4,800,943 Secteur ZO Maroc Avenant no 1 (2/77)(Revision) 5,428,155 Avenant no 2 Revision finale des prix)(2/77) 5,979,775 7,382,263 123 Pose de conduites d'eau ICB SNCE 17 25 30,565,054 lot No. 2 (4/77) Maroc Avenant No 1 (Revision 32,514,518 35,402,954 109 des prix) (4/77) Pose de conduites d'eau ICB HADJ OMAR 17 46 19,205,307 (5/77) Maroc Avenant no 1 (5/77)(Revision) 21,443,190 20,709,222 97 Avenant no 2 (5/77)(délai d'exécution) n/a Pose de conduites d'eau ICB SOCEA 18 18 17,195,474 (large diam.) (6/77) Maroc Avenant no 1 (6/77) 18,201,352 19,278,208 106 Pose de conduites d'eau ICB HADJ OMAR 18 42 15,771,048 15,211,048 16,864,202 111 (7/77) Maroc Travaux d'ouverture de plateforme et cons- truction de chaussée LCB Hadj Ali Chleuh 2,998,200 3,046,910 102 du CT 1376 et antennes Maroc longeant le canal principal (15/77EJ) Contract Amount Item Method of Contractor/ Implementation Time Period Original Revised Actual Expenditures Procurement Country Contracted Actual ----------(DH)--------- (DH) (%) ------------ Months-------- Category 1: Civil Works (Disbursement: 41%TE) Construction mur de LCB EZZOUINE & FARAJ 4 4 314,450 319,772 102 cloture CMV 321et324 Maroc (16/77DKE) Travaux d'élargisse- ment et de recharge- ment de la chaussée LCB ENAIRA 7,813,650 7,279,827 93 entre les PK 143 + Maroc 000 et 173 + 000 (16/77EJ) Sous centre Zemamra LCB SAKIF TAHAR 8 9 1,091,591 1,219,713 112 (2ième tranche) (20/77) Maroc Construction CMV 325 et LCB Tahar+Bouchaib 10 12 1,746,895 1,888,003 108 extension CMV 320 (22/77) Maroc Construction de routes principales,RS123PKo- ICB Hadj Ali Chleuh 2,480,120 2,948,462 119 PK15-CT 1334PKo-PK9 Maroc (23/77) AFP CMV 321, 322, 324, LCB E.M.C.G. 9 10 379,650 364,319 96 325 (26/77) Maroc Construction de 4 ICB Baibrov-Omar 8 3 371,822 325,148 87 réservoirs de 50m3 Maroc aux CMV (27/77) Construction de ICB Ezzouine &Abou 7 10 524,765 de 2 centres de col- El Faraj 262,383 /l 957,656 365 lecte de lait (32/77) Maroc Electrification CMV LCB Lakahraba 6 10 445,630 424,315 95 > 322 324 et 325,(41/77) Maroc Fourniture de Bitume LCB Seblima 10 10 2,999,573 2,999,573 100 (EJ41/77) Maroc Voiries de 2 VRFF ICB kouhi Mohamed 34 30 528,000 736,800 140 (42/77) Maroc /l Partie du contrat à être financée par BIRD Contract Amount Item Method of Contractor/ Implementation Time Period Original Revised Actual Expenditures Procurement Country Contracted Actual ----------(DH) (DH) (%) ------------ Months-------- Category I: Civil Works (Disbursement; 41%TE) Assainissement Z2 et Z3 ICB EMT 30 29 8,601,075 0 (48/77) Maroc Avenant no 1 (48/77)(Revision) 9,244,332 12,991,395 141 Assainissement ZO ICB STAIP & SEGEC 30 29 7,042,510 8,051,316 114 (49/77) Maroc Travaux de rechargement ICB Hadj Ali Chleuh 3,095,205 3,146,615 102 et d'élargisment(PK41- Maroc PK68)RS126 (20/78) Assainissement piste- ICB SATCO & STAM 37 29 9,915,354 brise-vent Zl(24/78) Maroc Avenant no 1 marché (24/78) 14,974,932 14,269,767 95 Fourniture de liants hydrocarbones pour revêtement des NEG Seblima 732,490 769,600 105 Routes Principales Maroc (39/78) Installation et raccord bornes Sector ZO LCB SET 2,932,925 3,176,787 108 (51/78) Maroc Installation et raccord 4,459,823 bornes Sector Z2 and LCB ELECAM 2,929,298 /l 3,241,826 111 Z3 (52/78) Maroc Travaux d'ouverture de plateforme et construction de chaussées neuves de Ct 1352 du PKO + 000 au PK4 + 857 Voie de service Cl du PkO +000 au PK 1 + 602 Voie de service Dl du PKO +000 au PK 0 + 841 Hadj Ali Chleuh 965,200 926,153 96 (2/80) LCB Maroc /I Partie du contrat à être financée par BIRD. Implementation Time Period Contract Amount Item Method of Contractor/ Contracted Actual Original kevised Actual Expenditures Procurement Country (%) ----------(DH)--------- (DH) (%) ------------Months-------- Category II: Equipment (Disbursement: 100%FE or 70%LF) Mat6riel hydrom6canique NEG. SNCE 7 in process 1,795,530 2,504,433 139 lots 7 a 9 Maroc (3/76) Mat4riel 6lectro- m6canique Zl ICB Forges Bazas 21 20 3,175,395 3,199,395 3,640,398 114 (14/76) Somatel/Maroc Mat4riel de filtration ZI (16/76) ICB Ste Perrier 11 15 217,200 207,722 96 France Fourniture et pose de bacs refrig4rants LCB ALFA-LAVAL 4 11 275,075 275,0750 100 (33/76) Maroc-Su6de Mat6riel hydrom6canique NEG. SNCF 10 13 748,899 748,900 100 canal ZO (8/77) Maroc Fourniture de radio- communications LCB SAMTEL 6 in process 180,000 /1 479,679 266 (79/77) Maroc 0> 00 /1 D'aprfs le march4 les montants suivants devraient 6tre pay4s comme suit: Doukkala I= 180,OOODH Doukkala II = 580,OOODH Contract Amount Item Method of Contractor/ Implementation Time Period Original Revised Actual Expenditures Procurement Country Contracted Actual ----------(DH)--------- (Di) (%) -----------------Month Category IIIt Equipment (Power) (Disbursement: 60%TE) Ligne haute tension et transformeurs NEG. O.N.E. 30 30 9,755,625 9,755,625 100 (37/75) Maroc Ligne 22 KV station Z3 NEG. O.N.E. 24 24 4,000,000 Wl,W2 et 4 (81/76) Maroc 1,250,000 /1 1,250,000 100 /1 Partie du contrat A 6tre financ4e par BIRD 'U Contract Amount Item Method of Contractor/ Implementation Time Period Original Revised Actual Fxpenditures Procurement Country Contracted Actual ----------(DH)--------- (DH) (%) ------------Months-------- Category IV: Consultants (Disbursement: 74%TE) Consultant SCET (68/75) ICB SCET 13,668,635 13,971,720 102 Avenant no 1 France Délai d'execution (68/75) n/a Avenant no 2 Etude canevas hydraulique n/a (68/75) Avenant no 3 Etude des modifications à apporter au réseau de canalisations et au matériel mobile d'irrigation des secteurs ZO-Z2-Z3 n/a (68/75) Amélioration des caractéristiques géométriques de la RP 8 du PK 143 + 000 100 LCB SMAFT 120,500 120,500 100 au PK 173 + 000 Maroc (39/76EJ) Consultant pour ICB SCET 1,116,650 850,117 76 Souss-Massa (67/76) France/Maroc Essais et supervision NEG. Laboratoire Public 199,770 195,270 98 de routes (EJ/3/76) Maroc Intervention de NEG LPEE 180,000 pa 179,993 100 laboratoire Maroc (60/78EJ) Travaux topographiques LCB 443,000 664,867 150 et études routières (35/77EJ) u BRD 11853R(PCR) 9 7 ¯¯ 5¯ FBERUARY 1982 Mohammredia Casablanca KINGDOM OF MOROCCO DOUKKALA IRRIGATION PROJECT A T L A N T C G Development of the Oum Er R'Bia Basin E1emmour J d Existing irrigation areas El Jad.do Berrech,d Project areas O C E A N / ACO Future extensions -33° Existing dams DAOURAT Osettat Khemfr Potential dam sites 33- FAREGH Oued Zem IMIZDIFANE 0 El Hydro power plants SIDI SMIL 0Oud.e SIISAlKhounbga 0 - -- - -- Tunnel BOULAOUANE Min irrigation Z EM AMRA ~~~M-FOUTGn|r Q| Cns ZMMAL ADECH-RA EL OUsD ii~-Rivers SID] BENNOUR B A TNINE RHARBI -, ZlAAadia 51DI CHEHO 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 KILOMETERS Safi BENI MOUSSA AFUE AITTh,s map has ba-t ~srpared by the C OU RWTrld antk s stafft esocely for the convenience of the readers of the report to which it is at-ched A|T AADEL The denomat>ons osed and the E N odanes shown on this map \ t d nottply. on the hart f the World Bank and fts affiftet, esy judgment on the legal status of any termtory or ay endorsemeht or acceptance of sch bound,es This PCR map is based on IBRD 11853R, January 1976, only minor changes hove been made to bring map up to current stanodeards. LALLA TAKERKOUST 9°,8 7°  IBRD 16255 (PCR) lofuESyulu ToI oi,51 )uou1RL 6 w 1b ir 4 -ro d o Toa URPuJ-Y 1982 - CROC KINGDOM OF MOROCCO DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT PROJECT DEVELOPMENT WORKS -T Si -AJ --1, PROJET D'RR/GATION DOUKKALA I 5|D| SMAL. c1121 1° TRA VA UX D'AMENAGEMENT DU PROJET i~ cT 1348 0 2 4 6 8 l0 KILWM~TERS Zmged uhe we y xPerimete baundaroes Sectar bSundaries SID BENOU 1ties des setr/er Co T j,å4 M-m ~ao 1 (enfa,ged) Feeder cocol (20 sector) konsruted) RC oc oddreur oc/i 201 _Lrge diameter pipes Cadu,es grnd amet SP5,2, Collector drans aed depesns -E- da,ID-sBee et doos Pc sinog (a,oeds Sana- d prn page Classified r ad ( strcnstrue) Rouies raseds (dsres - - - Class,fied roads (renfrced) Tn- RrmRoa/es class1es Feeder raods Pistes esc,Iassées RS 23 Classfied roads Routes rlassees Commune headquarters C1,ef-e de commune . /  IBRD 16256 (PCR) / ædd to E Jod o lo l Jadda3EER9AR 1982 MOROCCO KINGDOM OF MAOROCCO DOUKKALA I IRRIGATION PROJECT SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE 2 C, A1N3¯) PROJET D'IRRIGA TION DOUKKALA I SID| SMAI /NFRASTRUCTURE SOCIO- ECONOM/QUE 24 MAURITANIA M i is fr Pec Sorea 32!||,°"|s"3 " |gD e IH-aa Zone du proe "32°22"22,,°d"3 9 32, '2'22, - -- -~ - Per-meter boundries uL,-Is dupenetre raccep22nce 33wchbu3322r2s - - - - Sector boundories 3 2Z- Z O" tes de, sectes z 0 FINANCED NOT FINANCED UNDER PROJECT UNDER PROJECT FINANCEMENT HORS-F9IANCEMFNT PROJET PROJET _ Development center CMV Centre de miste en, veur A Z Milk collection center Centre de colecte de /,,t Project villge center UREF v//age E Eaulpped o ~Eqw,pe - To be eqipped & n profet Sugar factory ASucre,e Prnry school A2 SID] BENNOUR Eco/e pnma/re Local cred,t office Corsse locale de credt ogrcole \ S -26 __Regional credit office 1350Cse regiono/e de credt ogricole ZEMAMRA Agrarian reform cooperative Cooper,e reforme ograre ) - -- Subdiv-son headquarters Sie4e de subdvision Commure headquarters Chef- eu de commune 0 Ex-ng village Tnme Rhob,c Voge existont N Cr ,34 RS123 CIassf,ed road Route classäe K ILO.MErTER S To Sa/ ro Sft toYous,-i Tb M-rr-ec