Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 3485 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NICARAGUA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 532-NI) June 8, 1981 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NICARAGUA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 532-NI) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Preface .......................................................... i Project Performance Audit Basic Data Sheet ............................ ii Highlights .............................................................. v PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION ............................... .............. 1 II. OVERVIEW .................................... ............ 2 Project Objectives ........................................... 2 Project Content .............................................. 2 Costs and Financing .................................. 3 Physical and Educational Implementation ................ 3 III. PROJECT BACKGROUND . 5......................... ....... 5 Sector Setting oo . ....................................... 5 Project Formulation .................................... 5 IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING .............................. 8 Costs ...... ................ ......................... 8 Disbursements .................................. 9 V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION .................................. 10 Implementation Schedule .............................. 10 Project Management ..............................10 Physical Implementation ............................... 11 VI. PROJECT OPERATING OUTCOMES ............................... . 13 Introduction ............................................... 13 Use of Physical Facilities ................................. 14 Enrollments ................................................... 15 Curricula ..................................................... 16 School Administration ...................................... 17 Internal Efficiency ........................................ 19 External Productivity ...................................... 20 Supervisory Services ....................................... 20 Education Finances/Operating Costs .......................... 21 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without IFC authorization. TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) Page No. VII. BANK'S PERFORMANCE ...................................... . 21 VIII. CONCLUSIONS ............................................... 22 Annexes 1. List of Places Visited 2. Comparison of Originally Estimated Costs and Actual Costs 3. Compliance with Covenants 4. Comparison of Student Places and Enrollment Originally Planned for and Actually Made Available and Actual Enrollment 5. Comparison of Originally Estimated and Actual Unit Areas and Costs 6. Estimated and Actual Implementation and Disbursements PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NICARAGUA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 532-NI) PREFACE This is a performance audit report on the Nicaragua First Education Project for which a loan was approved in February 1968. The Loan Agreement (532-NI), signed in April 1968, provided the amount of US$4.0 million. The loan was fully disbursed and closed in May 1978. The audit report consists of a Project Completion Report (PCR), dated June 30, 1980 (final revision May 27, 1981) prepared by the Bank-s Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office following a mission visit in Feb- ruary/March 1980 and a Highlights resume prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) which underlines some important elements of the project experience. This PCR was revised in minor respects after discussion with OED. The audit is based on a review of the PCR, the Appraisal Report No. PE26a dated March 17, 1971, the Loan Agreement dated April 10, 1968, the Bank-s files relating to this project and the Minutes of the Board discussions on the occasion of approval. Bank staff connected with the project have been interviewed; however no field mission was undertaken by OED in connection with this audit. As is customary in the preparation of performance audit reports, the draft report was sent to the representatives of the Borrower on February 26, 1981 for their comment. No reply has been received from the Borrower. On the basis of the limited review detailed above, OED finds no reason to disagree with the analysis and conclusions of the PCR and has, therefore, not prepared the usual Project Performance Audit Memorandum. However, in view of the difficulty of forming any definitive impressions of project impact at this stage, this project should be reviewed in five years time. - ii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET NICARAGUA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 532-NI) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Estimate Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 8.0 10.2 overrun (%) - 28% Loan Amount (US$ million) 4.0 Disbursed 4.0 4.0 Cancelled - Repaid (to June 30, 1980) 0.4 Outstanding (US$ million) - 3.6 Date Physical Components Completed 6/72 (50 mos.) 3/78 (120 mos.) Proportion Completed by Above Date - 99 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 140 Institutional Performance Good Fair Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ Millions) CY 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 (i) Appraisal Estimate 0.03 0.90 2.35 3.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 (ii) Actual - 0.01 0.20 0.73 1.38 2.40 3.07 3.42 3.91 4.00 (iii) (ii) as % of (i) - 1 8 21 34 60 77 86 98 100 OTHER PROJECT DATA Actual or Item Original Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files 10/01/64 Government's Application - 08/66 Negotiations 11/27/67 - 11/30/67 Board Approval 02/27/68 Loan Agreement Date 04/10/68 Effectiveness Date 04/30/68 - 06/25/68 Closing Date 06/30/73 12/31/74; 12/31/75; 05/26/78 12/31/76; 12/31/77; 03/31/78 Borrower Republic of Nicaragua Executing Agency Ministry of Education Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31 Follow-on Project Names Earthquake Reconstruction Second Education Loan/Credit No. 389-NI 1244-NI Amount (US$ million) 20.0 (2.0 education 11.0 component) Loan/Credit Agreement Date 06/06/73 06/15/76 - iii - MISSION DATA Month/ No. of No. of Man- Date of Item Sent by Year Weeks Persons weeks Report Identification UNESCO/Bank 06/65 5 4 20 09/65 Post Identification Bank 02/66 1 2 2 02/66 Post Identification Bank/UNESCO 05/66 0.5 2 1 05/10/66 Preparation UNESCO 07-08/66 4 4 16 09/01/66 Appraisal Bank 11-12/66 3.5 5 17.5 01/11/66 Post Appraisal Bank 08/67 0.5 2 1 - Total 57.5 Supervision I Bank 11/68 0.5 2 1 12/24/68 Supervision II Bank 05/69 1.0 1 1 06/12/69 Supervision III Bank 06/69 1.0 1 1 06/23/69 Supervision IV Bank 07/69 o.5La 1/a 0./ - Supervision V Bank 12/69 1.0 1 1 01/06/70 Supervision VI Bank 01/70 1.0 1 1 02/24/70 Supervision VII Bank 07/70 1.0 2 2 07/30/70 Supervision VIII Bank 11/70 2.0 2 4 02/09/71 Supervision IX Bank 06/71 1.0 2 2 06/30/71 Supervision X Bank 12/71 1.5 2 3 02/28/72 Supervision XI Bank 03/72 0.2/c 1 0.2 - Supervision XII Bank 07/72 o.4L 1 0.4 07/12/72 Supervision XIII Bank 02/73 1.0.oe 2 2.0 03/13/73 Supervision XIV Bank 06/73 0.5 1 0.5 07/20/73 Supervision XV Bank 12/73 1.0 2 2.0 03/15/74 Supervision XVI Bank 10/74 1.o/f 1 1.0 01/10/75 Supervision XVII Bank 04/75 0.2 1 0.2 04/30/75 Supervision XVIII Bank 05/75 0.6 1 0.6 06/26/75 Supervision XIX Bank 08/76 2.0 1 2.0 10/13/76 Supervision XX Bank 03/77 1.2 1 1.2 04/21/77 Supervision XXI Bank 05/77 0.4 1 0.4 07/07/77 Supervision XXII Bank 08/77 0.2 1 0.2 09/20/77 Supervision XXIII Bank 04/78 0.2 1 0.2 05/22/78 Total 27.4/g Completion Bank 02/80 2.0 2 3.0 06/30/80 /a Estimate. Combined with economic mission. 7b Back-to-Office Report. /c 1 day (assistance with equipment lists). 7- 2 days on Loan 532-NI. 7T Combined mission (532-NI + Earthquake reconstruction reconnaissance). /f From this point on, missions spent time on other tasks; the figures given here are estimates of the time devoted to this project. /g 13.2 Architect manweeks, 11.2 Educator manweeks, 3.0 Economist manweeks. - iv - CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Cordoba ( $) Exchange Rates: Appraisal Year (1966) US$1.00 = t$ 7.00 Intervening Years Average US$1.00 = ($ 7.00 Completion Year (1978) US$1.00 = ($ 7.00 Current US$1.00 = 0$ 10.00 ALLOCATION OF LOAN PROCEEDS Original Actual Category Allocation Disbursements I. A. Civil Works (a) Preparation and Site Development 160,000.00 8,344.75 (b) Construction of School Buildings 1,910,000.00 2,600,659.79 (c) Construction of Student Hotels and Staff Housing 250,000.00 277,108.36 (d) Architectural Consulting Services 100,000.00 151,748.71 Sub-total 2,420,000.00 3,037,861.61 B. Furniture 390,000.00 314,748.80 2. Institutional Equipment 740,000.00 647,389.59 3. Unallocated 450,000.00 -- Total 4,000,000.00 4,000,000.00 - v - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT NICARAGUA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 532-NI) HIGHLIGHTS The First Education Project in Nicaragua -- Loan 532-NI -- approved in February 1968, provided a loan of US$4.0 million to expand and improve secondary education and primary teacher training in Nicaragua by: (a) con- structing and equipping two new primary teacher training schools and nine new general secondary schools; (b) extending and equipping seven general secondary schools and one primary teacher training school and (c) equipping two addi- tional secondary schools. The loan proceeds were fully disbursed by May 26, 1978. The project has been implemented with a time overrun of nearly six years and with the following minor changes which were agreed during implemen- tation: (a) substituting one existing teacher training school (at San Marcos) in place of the original one (at Esteli) and the renovation of one existing secondary school; and (b) addition of a new general secondary school at Madriz (Somoto). These changes did not alter the overall project objectives; however, their processing and their implementation took additional time and resulted in higher costs. The project, as implemented, assisted in introducing new concepts and practices including a full-time secondary school staff, student guidance services in secondary schools, an improved student evaluation system and more relevant curricula for secondary education and teacher training. Physical implementation of the project was generally successful. School sites were satisfactorily chosen, building designs were austere and economical but very functional, and equipment and furniture were generally satisfactory in quality (PCR, paras. 5.06-5.10, 5.19, 5.20); nonetheless, there was some problem of coordinating equipment and furniture procurement with the completion of construction. Some damage to the project schools resulted from (a) the earthquake of 1972 (PCR, paras. 5.18, 5.20) and (b) the civil disturbances of 1979; however, the Second Education Project (Loan 1244-NI) is providing some assistance in rehabilitating damaged schools and at the time of the completion mission visit the majority of project schools showed evidence of reasonable maintenance and care (PCR, para. 5.21). Nicaragua is experiencing a shortage of secondary school places arising from the events of 1972 and 1979 noted above and from the vigorous popular demand for secondary education following these events (PCR, para. - vi - 6.07). The project secondary schools have resorted to the multi-shift system to cater to larger numbers of students well in excess of appraisal estimates. These schools also offer a variety of career choices to students, a revised curriculum of practical studies in the basic cycle and academic and vocational studies at the upper secondary level (PCR, para. 6.08). The new curriculum for primary teacher training extends the program by one year and provides a higher level of instruction and, despite the fact that some adjustments to the curriculum have had to be made by the project teacher training schools to meet their particular circumstances, the new curriculum is expected to contribute to the improvement of teaching (PCR, paras. 6.09, 6.14, 6.18). Other points of special interest are: (a) the useful aid coordination discussions during project genera- tion -- between the Bank and two other agencies (IDB and USAID) assisting education in Nicaragua -- relative to the selection of project items for sponsorship (PCR, para. 3.12); and (b) improved management performance of the project unit in the latter phase of project implementation and especially in the implementation of the Second Education Project -- Loan 1224-NI (PCR, para. 5.05). NICARAGUA Loan 532-NI First Education Project Completion Report June 30, 1980 (Revised May 27, 1981) Projects Department Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office NICARAGUA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT: LOAN 532-NI COMPLETION REPORT I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 In accordance with terms of reference, dated February 6, 1980, a mission visited Nicaragua from February 18 to March 1, 1980 to carry out a completion review of the First Education Project (Loan 532-NI). The mission was expected to compare the objectives, assumptions and implementation plans of the project, as conceived during project appraisal in the Loan Agreement with the actual results achieved to date. From this review and comparison the mission was expected also to derive lessons and recommendations for the development and implementation of other education projects, insofar as they were identifiable during the mission. 1.02 A series of extraordinary circumstances extended the implementation period for the project--a major earthquake, economic imbalance and discon- tinuity of project management staff. Thus the project required almost ten years to reach completion. In so protracted an implementation period educa- tional objectives and social pressures will ineluctably change, inducing significant distortions in the assumptions on which the project was initially based. Moreover, the project was completed during civil unrest which made the visit of a Bank completion mission impracticable for almost a year. The further disturbances in Nicaragua in 1979, the year following project comple- tion, have affected many of the project institutions, distorting still further the anticipated outcomes. 1.03 In these circumstances the mission opted for an indepth study, based on statistical charts prepared by project unit staff, of thirteen of the twenty-two project items (representative of type of school and extent of assistance provided) and extensive visits to project institutions, visiting eighteen of the schools. Despite the problems associated with the replacement of school principals following the disturbance of September 1979, the preoccu- pation of the Government teachers and students with the upcoming and much publicized literacy campaign which distracted them from normal school activi- ties, the mission was able to obtain from personal observation and on-site discussions, a well documented insight into the present status of, and likely trends in, secondary education in Nicaragua. In the field, collaboration with the Borrower was further enhanced by participatory meetings and by joint visits to project institutions. This report therefore takes into full account the perception of the Borrower with regard to project implementation and outcomes. 1.04 Key places visited during the mission are listed in Annex 1. - 2 - OVERVIEW PROJECT OBJECTIVES 2.01 The project aimed to deal with secondary school deficiencies in Nicaragua which resulted in a lack of qualified manpower at the intermediate level severely hindering development in all sectors of the economy. More specifically the problems addressed were lack of sufficient educational facilities, overcrowding of schools, poor quality of education imparted by the existing schools, and an imbalance of specializations offered by such schools in relation to the needs of the labor market. The project was expected to assist the government to meet the demand for middle-level personnel for the public and private sector including qualified primary school teachers and assure an adequate number of entrants into the universities to be trained to fill high-level positions. Additionally, it was expected to promote qualita- tive improvements in secondary education through the provision of functional teaching spaces and modern equipment, reducing congestion in existing secondary schools and resulting in a more economic use of teachers and materials by replacing small units with larger ones. A more diversified program of secon- dary studies was expected to give a wider choice to pupils completing the basic cycle. The project also envisioned the improvement of the quality of instruc- tion by requiring better qualified and full-time staff, an improved curriculum, and an increase in the workload (from 30 to 35 periods of 40 minutes per week). PROJECT CONTENT 2.02 The project as approved consisted of the following components: (a) construction, furnishing and equipping of: 1. two new primary teacher training schools, 2. nine new general secondary schools. (b) extension, furnishing and equipping of: 1. one existing primary teacher training school, 2. seven existing general secondary schools, and (c) equipping of two existing general secondary schools. 2.03 It was expected that the Project would provide 11,540 student places, 3,440 of which would be replacement of existing unsuitable facilities, total enrollments in the 21 project schools would rise by 8,100 student places, from 10,500 to 18,600 by 1972, and estimated annual output at full operational stage would be 2,730 of which 1,470 would be from general secondary courses, 665 from commercial courses, and 595 from teacher training courses. It was also expected that in regard to the training of teachers for primary schools, 1,505 new places would make it possible to extend the teacher training course from 2 to 3 years and substantially improve the curriculum. Provision for training secondary school teachers was not included in the project since the action already taken by the Schools of Education of the National and Central American Universities ensured the availability of qualified teachers in sufficient numbers. -3- COSTS AND FINANCING 2.04 At appraisal, the total project cost was estimated at US$8.03 million distributed as follows: US$ Million C$ Million Building costs 5.70 39.902 Sites and Services 0.28 1.966 Professional fees 0.22 1.564 Equipment costs 0.92 6.449 Furniture costs 0.91 6.350 Total 8.03 56.231 2.05 The total project cost finally amounted to US$10.2 million (Annex 2) due to increases in the cost of labor, materials and services during the protracted implementation period (9-1/2 years) and some alterations/additions to the project components. Consequently the Bank's participation in financing eventually represented 39% of the project costs compared to approximately 50% at appraisal. The entire loan amount of US$4.0 million was disbursed by May 26, 1978. PHYSICAL AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 2.06 The project was executed, as provided in the Loan Agreement, by a special project unit within the Ministry of Education. Due to poor management, financial problems and the earthquake of December 1972, which caused disruptions in all the facets of activity, completion took 9-1/2 years instead of 4 years as originally planned. The loan closing date was extended five times, to March 31, 1978. The total project cost increased by US$2.2 million (27% of the appraisal estimate of US$8.0 million). 2.07 Project Revisions: During implementation the following changes in project components were agreed: (a) the extension to the existing teacher training school at Esteli was deleted, and replaced by the extension of the existing teacher training school at San Marcos (Bank letter of August 27,1969); (b) the construction and equipping of a new general secondary school at Granada was replaced by the remodelling and equipping of an existing school in the same town (Bank letter of April 10, 1970); (c) a new general secondary school at Madriz (Somoto) was added to the project (Bank cable of November 19, 1974, and subsequent corres- pondence dated November 27, and December 30, 1974); and (d) to use a multilateral school in Managua, constructed under the Earthquake Reconstruction Credit (389-NI), to accommodate the students from the Ramirez Goyena school which was destroyed by the earthquake. The Ramirez Goyena school had been equipped from the proceeds of Loan 532-NI (Bank letter of November 2, 1977). 2.08 Upon completion of the project in early 1978, the buildings and equipment provided were of satisfactory quality and generally suitable for the purposes for which they were designed and provided (para. 5.10, 5.19 and 5.20). The loan covenants on the whole were satisfactorily complied with (Annex 3). 2.09 The recent major physical damage to a number of schools, damage and serious losses of apparatus, equipment and teaching materials in almost every institution caused by the civil disturbances of 1979 have adversely affected the content and quality of education in the project schools (paras. 6.03 and 6.05). Seen in conjunction with the multi-shift system adopted in most project institutions and exacerbated by the present lack of school places, the quality of education must be considered, at least at present and in the short term, at risk (para. 6.07). Total student places actually provided (Annex 4) increased to 16,995 (15,540 planned at appraisal). Total enrollment (Annex 4) in 1977 was 30,231 or 62% above the appraisal targets, 18,670 of this number made possible by the use of the multi-shift system. 2.10 In physical terms the country has benefitted by the construction of 20 new or extended, well designed and constructed secondary institutions, pro- viding for many thousands of students opportunities to pursue their studies in a sound learning environment. The gain has for the moment been partly lost due to the recent excessive increase in enrollments, the unsatisfactory state of some of the buildings and the shortages of equipment and teaching/ learning materials. However, present measures planned by the government, with the possible aid of external agencies, are aimed at redressing the situation. 2.11 In June 1971 a reform prescribing a common curriculum in the basic and diversified cycles was legalized by the government in accordance with the provisions of the loan agreement. The multi-shift system, allied to staffing constraints and the defective condition of the physical facilities, has resulted in programs and timetables which have been tailored to the circum- stances of each school creating problems for students transferring from one school to another (paras. 6.08 and 6.09). The government should take measures to bring about a standardization of curricula for general secondary schools and the teacher training schools. 2.12 The administration of project schools, in the context of current changes in key personnel, is of variable quality (para. 6.10). The govern- ment should be encouraged to pursue vigorously a policy for the development of an effective supervision system (para. 6.19). 2.13 The project has pioneered such concepts as full-time teaching staff, orientation and guidance services, a less rigid approach to school examina- tions and new teaching techniques. While much yet remains to be done in those areas, standards of excellence have been set (and sometimes achieved), and it seems likely that educational planners, teacher educators and school administra- tors will pursue similar goals. The government's proposals to improve its education supervisory services should help substantially in consolidating these achievements. Finally, if the present administration implements plans to make up the deficit of practical subjects teachers, a major advance in the development of diversified secondary education will ensue. - 5 - III. PROJECT BACKGROUND SECTOR SETTING 3.01 At the time of appraisal the formal education system consisted of (i) primary schooling (six grades); (ii) secondary schooling (five grades); and (iii) higher education. Private institutions accounted for 16% of primary, 36% of secondary and 30% of higher education enrollments. Only 67% of the 7-13 age group was enrolled in primary education and 18% of the 14-18 a2e group in secondary education in 1969. 3.02 Deficiencies within the primary school system included incomplete school facilities, erratic enrollments, high dropout and repetition rates and insufficient and inadequately trained teachers. At the secondary level similar defects were apparent as well as the poor physical condition of most schools, the lack of equipment and teaching aids, and the system of part-time teacher appointments, most of them poorly qualified both academically and profession- ally. In general, teaching methods were seen to be traditional and with emphasis on memorization as distinct from student interaction or problem-solving. 3.03 The justification for the project was based on the need to divers- ify and upgrade the quality of the academically oriented secondary schools (specifically in the fields of commercial subjects, science and industrial arts) and make them more cost effective and efficient to produce potential candidates for a labor force of a higher productivity level. The anticipated expansion of secondary education (including the expansion under the proposed project) was expected to raise the annual output of the secondary schools to 4,820 by 1973 (from 2,474 in 1966), of which around 3,000 would enter the labor force as compared to 1,600 in 1966, the rest going to higher education courses. This output would bring in about 20,000 entrants to the labor market over the period 1968-1973 which is comparable to the requirements (21,300) determined by the Planning Office of the National Economic Council in 1966. PROJECT FORMULATION 3.04 The Bank's earliest association with the Republic of Nicaragua dates from its first project, Loan 45-NI in 1951, in support of a highways develop- ment project. By 1963, 13 Bank-IDA supported projects, for a total loan of US$35.8 million, had been signed, in the areas of power, ports, roads, agriculture and water supplies, but it was not until June 1964 that the possibility of Bank collaboration in the education sector was informally discussed with the Minister of Education. The President of the Republic and the Ministers of Education and Planning expressed interest in Bank cooperation in this sector, and assistance from a UNESCO project identification mission. Correspondence between the Bank, UNESCO and the Government of Nicaragua in November/December 1964 confirmed interest in pursuing this possibility and a formal request from the Nicaraguan Minister of Education to UNESCO for an identification mission was dated February 18, 1965. 3.05 After some clarification of uncertainty regarding the state of education planning in Nicaragua, and therefore the viability of an early identification exercise, an identification mission was fielded on June 13, 1965. 3.06 The identification mission in its September 1965 report listed nine priority components, of which seven were considered to meet Bank financing criteria: secondary general, secondary agricultural, secondary industrial schools; the University School of Educational Sciences; the School of Agricul- ture; the National Nursing School; and the Ministry of Education. The two excluded items were primary education and university expansion. At that time, the financing of primary education was not included in the policy of the Bank. The National and Central American Universities had already taken measures to satisfy the demand for secondary school teachers by 1973. In reviewing the items, the Bank deleted the National Nursing School and Ministry of Education. 3.07 In February 1966, the Bank sent a Reconnaissance mission which recommended for inclusion in a possible Bank-financed project, the following components: three small agricultural secondary schools; a new technical institute; the conversion of an existing vocational institute to an adult trade and apprenticeship training center; the replacement/expansion of secondary general schools (600 classrooms) and the addition of science/workshop facilities to existing secondary schools (50 units) and the expansion of the National School of Agriculture. The University School of Educational Sciences was excluded on the grounds that it did not at the time fit into lending criteria. On March 18, 1966, the Minister of Education endorsed the proposed project. 3.08 On April 5, 1966, the Bank advised the Government that (a) a change in Bank policy would now permit consideration of a university component; and (b) the agricultural schools proposed for inclusion in the project should be considered after discussions with a forthcoming UNDP/FAO mission to Nicaragua. 3.09 Three events subsequently affected project generation and, even- tually, project composition. The first of these occurred prior to the Project Preparation Mission (PPM) of July 1966, and subsequent to the UNDP/FAO mission. After reviewing the status and lack of a coherent plan for the development of agricultural education, the FAO expressed doubts as to the viability of the agricultural schools component. On the basis of these findings, the Bank offered to include in the project agricultural streams in some of the general secondary schools. This offer, communicated to the Government in a letter dated May 19, 1966, appears never to have drawn an official response. 3.10 The terms of reference of the UNESCO PPM (July 1966), as revised by the Bank, included therefore the following items: (i) construction and equipping of secondary schools; (ii) laboratory and workshop extensions to existing secondary schools; (iii) "either in new or expanded schools, construc- tion and equipment for a limited number of second cycle, agriculturally- oriented streams as in the Bank's letter of May 19, 1966, to the Minister of Education"; (iv) construction and equipping of a new Technical Institute in Managua at the upper secondary level and the conversion of the present post- secondary Technical Institute into an adult education, trades training and apprenticeship center. The mission was also to "advise the National University of Nicaragua on the preparation for inclusion in the loan request of the construction and equipping... within the Ruben Dario University site in Managua (of facilities for) the School of Education; (science) laboratories and a student residence". - 7 - 3.11 The preparation mission was in Nicaragua between July 8-August 6, 1966. In effect, despite problems of teacher strikes, the unsettled state of the country following the President's death (August 1966), the language difficulties experienced by members of the mission, difficulty in obtaining sufficient competent counterparts within the University of Nicaragua in formulating the component, PPM completed the preparation of the project, estimated at US$15 million. Specifically, it included the following components: (a) University of Nicaragua expansion, (b) a new Technical Institute, (c) two new primary teacher training schools and an extension to an existing one, and an expansion of a secondary school to provide a teacher training section, (d) expansion of three existing secondary schools to provide agricultural sections, (e) 10 new and the expansion of 4 existing general secondary schools, and (f) related project management. The official Request letter, dated August 24, 1966, confirmed the above content. 3.12 Aid coordination discussions were held by the Bank with both IDB and USAID. Subsequent to the report of the PPM, between August-November 1966, discussions between IDB and the Bank culminated in a consensus that, subject to satisfactory assurances regarding the adequate supply of qualified secondary teachers for the project secondary schools, the financing of the University of Nicaragua campus in Managua would be left to IDB. A meeting was held with USAID, at which USAID's negative experience in assisting technical education in Nicaragua was discussed. 3.13 The terms of reference of the Project Appraisal Mission (November 14, 1966) omitted the university component, and substituted agricultural sections in general secondary schools for agricultural schools; the Technical Institute was however retained. The Appraisal Mission was in the field between November 22-December 15, 1966. 3.14 The Appraisal Mission encountered two main difficulties in project formulation. The government did not manifest great interest in the Bank's proposal to include agricultural streams in secondary schools, moreover, the mission had doubts about the viability of these schools. As regards the Technical Institute, the mission took the view that the proposed craft level courses would duplicate the work of existing establishments and would fail to respond to the country's need for technician-level training. On March 22, 1967, after the return of the mission to headquarters, the Bank notified the government that both these components had been dropped from the project, since "the state of preparation was such that we could not give them full consid- eration for financial assistance at this stage." The Bank offered to consider them for inclusion in a later project. 3.15 Other changes in proposed project composition made during appraisal concerned (i) the financing of equipment only for two secondary schools, one of which was already under construction, involving retroactive financing, and the other deemed to possess adequate existing premises, subject to minor improvements being made; (ii) changes in the number of boarding places to be contructed at one secondary and two teacher training institutions. The project composition as proposed after appraisal received the approval of the Government on August 31, 1967. - 8 - 3.16 The Bank yielded on a number of matters during negotiations but there are no available records or reports of the meeting. The government accepted the loan conditions on January 12, 1968; the Executive Directors approved the loan on February 27, 1968; the Loan Agreement was signed on April 10, 1968, and became effective on June 25, 1968 after a two-month delay (para. 5.04). 3.17 The First Education Project in Nicaragua was among the earliest of the Bank's involvements in this sector, and it is understandable that in the 1966-68 period, the gestation phase of the project, lending strategies and guidelines were as yet in their early stage of formulation. To this may be attributed the hesitancies and policy changes which marked the identification and preparation stages of the project (paras. 3.08-3.15). The growing flexi- bility of approach, in an effort to meet priority needs as discerned by the Borrower, which has characterized later education projects, had not yet materialized, and a certain rigidity in the conceptualization of project composition is apparent in the one under review. IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING COSTS 4.01 The final project costs (Annex 2) as compared to estimates at the time of the loan agreement, are summarized below in US$ thousands by category of expenditures. Comparison of unit areas and costs per student place at appraisal and as completed are shown in Annex 6. Appraisal Appraisal Estimates Estimates (includ. Actual Category (Base Costs) contingencies) Costs % Difference (1) (2) (3) [(3)-(2)] + (2) Construction and Site Development 4.69 5.98 7.26 +21% Furniture and Equipment 1.45 1.83 2.62 +43% Professional fees 0.22 0.22 0.32 +45% Total Costs 6.36 8.03 10.20 27% - 9 - 4.02 A comparison of the construction costs of projects contracted for and completed before or immediately following the earthquake of 1972 with those finished at a much later date reveals the following: (a) the cost of 8 project items falling under the first category and constructed before the earthquake averaged 7% lower than the appraisal estimate; (b) the cost of 10 project items falling under the latter category and constructed after the earthquake averaged 44% above the appraisal estimate; and (c) all the above 18 project items are substantially similar in size and description to the facilities envisioned at appraisal. The 2 project items not included in this comparison are the Escuela Normal at San Marcos which was added to the project during imple- mentation and the Instituto at Somoto which replaced the original component at Esteli. 4.03 The increased construction costs which began to take effect in 1973 were due to sharp wage increases (as much as 45%) and shortage of materials, labor and professional services due to the need to meet the enormous volume of reconstruction work after the earthquake. Redesigning of building structures to comply with the new anti-seismic regulations was another reason for the increased costs (in the case of Instituto Nacional Managua No. 2, the renego- tiated contract resulted in a 68% cost increase). Some 75% of the increase in the cost of professional services was due to revision in the plans of the Escuela Normal at Jinotepe as a result of changes in the site (para. 5.09). 4.04 The increased cost of furniture and equipment is attributable mainly to delayed procurement. DISBURSEKENTS 4.05 For the first two years, no amount was disbursed from the loan due to the absence of any procurement activity (the first construction was started October 1970). The chronic lack of government counterpart funds caused long delays in payments to contractors and retarded disbursement of funds. 4.06 The loan amount of US$4.0 million was fully disbursed by May 26, 1978. The Basic Data Sheet compares actual disbursements with the originally esti- mated disbursement schedule. The disbursement percentage in respect of the civil works and furniture categories was modified from the original 45% of total expendi- tures to 37% in 1974 and finally 21% in October 1975 due to the cost increase. The actual allocations of loan proceeds are shown in the Basic Data Sheet. - 10 - V. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE 5.01 The Loan Agreement was signed on April 10, 1968, and became effective on June 25, 1968 (para. 5.04). At appraisal, the project's physical facilities were expected to be completed in four years or by June 30, 1972. Actual imple- mentation (Annex 6) took 10 years or 140% longer than was originally envisioned. The loan closing date, fixed at June 30, 1973, was postponed five times to March 31, 1978. The loan account was finally closed on May 26, 1978, when the final disbursement was made. 5.02 Implementation of the project was planned in three phases for comple- tion by 1972 with six schools built in phase I, six in phase II and seven in phase III. Implementation of one school in phase I (Granada) slipped to phase II. The construction of the Instituto Nacional at Somoto, a new project item, was added to phase III in 1973. By December 1972 (six months after the original completion date), however, only five schools had been completed and phase II contracts just awarded. Two more schools were completed in 1973, four in 1974, five in 1975, three in 1976 and the last in early 1978. 5.03 A combination of various factors contributed to the delays in project implementation. The underlying factor for the poor performance during the initial 4 years of implementation was the ineffectiveness of project management (para. 5.05). Additionally, the earthquake of December 1972 caused at least a six-month stoppage of activity during which period some retrenching and review of problems was undertaken. The disruption the disaster caused on the normal processes of government, the resulting scarcity of labor and materials due to the heavy volume of reconstruction work and the escalation of prices placed a heavy burden on the project unit already saddled by a chronic lack of govern- ment counterpart funds. PROJECT MANAGEMENT 5.04 A condition for loan effectiveness was the appointment of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) Director with support staff for administration, procurement and accounts in the Ministry of Education, and a full time project architect with additional staff from the Building Construction Department of the Ministry of Public Works. The nominated Project Unit Director, accepted by the Bank prior to the signing of the loan, was replaced and this necessitated a postponement of the effectiveness date from April 30, 1968 to June 25, 1968 when a candidate acceptable to the Bank was appointed. Project management suffered from three changes in the post of project director and two in the post of project architect. The PIU was not fully equipped (and properly housed) until February 1969 or seven months after loan effectiveness. 5.05 Project management performance is generally characterized as unsatis- factory arising from: (a) the often reported lack of managerial skills of the PIU directors; (b) lack of cooperation between the PIU and some education officials for the resolution of which stronger ministerial support was needed than was provided; (c) lack of clear directives as to the responsibilities of the management; and (d) non-integration of the project architect with the PIU (the project architect continued to be under the supervision of the - 11 - Building Construction Department) who, as a result, was unable to devote his full time to the project as he was expected to do under the Loan Agreement. These deficiencies were, at the last stages of the project, corrected and the performance of the PIU, which is now managing the follow up project (Loan 1244-NI), is a considerable improvement. PHYSICAL IMPLEMENTATION 5.06 Sites: The sites of the new schools were generally well selected and met the necessary criteria of accessibility and technical suitability. By October 1968, all school sites, except for one (Escuela Normal at Jinotepe), had been acquired. 5.07 The site of the Escuela Normal at Jinotepe was changed three times. The first site was found unsuitable for technical reasons. The second, acceptable to the Bank, was offered by the owners as a donation provided work was initiated without delay. Continuous delays in finalization of plans resulted in the withdrawal of the offer of donation and due to shortage of funds, an6ther site for the school was not acquired until 1976. Already completed plans had to be revised to fit the new site. This school was the last to be completed at a cost of 116% above appraisal estimates due to the accumulated delays. 5.08 Planning/Design: The National Construction Department started the preparation of architectural briefs early enough in July 1968. It was only in January 1969, however, that the architectural program for Phase I construction was completed and sent to the Bank for approval. The delay was attributed to lack of facilities and manpower to carry out this work earlier (paras. 5.04 and 5.05). 5.09 Fourteen architectural consultant firms were prequalified in October 1969, nine of which were later selected, along procedures set out in the Bank guidelines, to prepare the school construction plans. An engineering consul- tant firm was contracted to prepare the engineering survey of the school sites. Architectural designs for all schools were prepared by these consultant firms with the exception of the remodelling of the Granada school which was prepared by the Public Works Department when no private firm could be commis- sioned at the fee proposed for the work. 5.10 In general, designs of the schools were well conceived. Space standards for the different facilities, lighting and ventilation provisions meet generally accepted Bank standards. The buildings were designed as simple accommodation blocks using materials and finishes of satisfactory quality. The constructions are structurally sound, and despite some deficiencies in main- tenance the first completed schools withstood the earthquake and all have withstood reasonably well the destruction and vandalism perpetrated during the 1979 uprising. 5.11 The earthquake brought about the formulation of a revised building code incorporating new anti-seismic ordinances which further prolonged imple- mentation as this required some redesigning of the already prepared plans for phase II schools. Construction costs as a result increased by about 15% (increased costs result solely from structural upgrading). - 12 - 5.12 The catastrophe caused a heavy demand for architectural services. The cost of professional services increased and the project suffered as the additional volume of work further reduced the output of the architectural consultants working to terminate the plans for the project. 5.13 Tendering/Construction: Prequalification of contractors and tendering of the projects were undertaken in accordance with procedures as set out in the Loan Agreement. Overall, the performance of civil works contractors was satisfactory where workmanship was concerned. The delays in completing the projects within the time contracted were due to reported delays in payments because of the lack of counterpart funds. 5.14 After the earthquake, there arose a critical shortage of building materials, skilled labor and qualified contractors in the wake of the heavy volume of priority civil reconstruction work. Consequently, completion of the remaining projects dragged, further aggravated by increases in the costs of materials and services and straining the already inadequate counterpart funds for the project. 5.15 Equipment Lists: A provisional list submitted to the Bank in November 1967 was to serve as basis for the final equipment requirements. The final lists and specifications were to be prepared with the help of specialist teachers contracted by the PIU. 5.16 Difficulties in recruiting specialists (in different areas of exper- tise) delayed progress in preparing the equipment lists. Completion of lists and specifications of each equipment category depended on the avail- ability of each specialist. Initial equipment lists and specifications were sent for Bank approval in August 1969 and final lists completed in August 1971. The Bank approved the final equipment bid documents (after repeated requests to the PIU for these documents) in March 1972. 5.17 Equipment Procurement Procedures: Equipment procurement was under- taken through international competitive bidding along procedures suggested by the Bank. Equipment procurement (originally scheduled in three phases to correspond to civil works implementation) was reset to two phases due to initial delays in the completion of the tender documents. Initial bids were received in July 1972 and the first contract awards were approved by the Bank in November 1972. Construction of Phase I schools was completed before the procurement of equipment was achieved, hence the equipment was not available for student use. 5.18 The planned synchronization of equipment procurement with construc- tion of schools never materialized after the earthquake due to problems mainly associated with project management. Equipment procurement continued through 1976 eventually being completed earlier than the civil works components of the project. 5.19 Due to losses incurred during the civil unrest of 1979, it is now impossible to ascertain the quality and sufficiency of the equipment finally delivered. The equipment which was not looted and vandalized (installed/heavy laboratory equipment) indicates, however, that the quality of equipment procured was generally satisfactory. - 13 - 5.20 Furniture Procurement: Furniture appropriate for the project was identified/designed by an architectural consultant commissioned by the PIU along procedures as set out in the Loan Agreement. The consultant's contract which had originally been limited to furniture for Phase I schools was later extended to include the succeeding phases upon insistence by the PIU. Initial furniture lists were received by the Bank in August 1970. Tenders were called in accordance with procedures as set out in the Loan Agreement and initial awards approved in July 1971. Furniture procurement fell into the same difficulties as equipment procurement. In some schools, procurement was completed more than two years after completion of construction. On the evidence of what remained, it is clear that there was a degree of standard- ization of furniture. 5.21 Maintenance of Project Facilities: Of the 15 schools visited by the mission, five schools (all out of Managua) are reasonably well maintained or at least indicate some degree of maintenance. The rest exhibit a low level of upkeep which aggravate the normal wear expected of the buildings and equipment and have resulted in the malfunctioning of the utilities, inadequate security, defacement and misuse. Most of these schools were looted and vandalized (paras. 6.03 and 6.05) during the civil unrest of 1979 as evidenced by broken doors, windows, defaced walls, stolen lamps, hardware, etc. One school (Instituto Nacional, Esteli) was bombed and had the roof burned out. Another (Instituto Nacional, Rivas) is currently being used as a hospital (until construction of the new hospital is completed in 1981). Repair of all project schools has been undertaken under the Second Education Project - Loan 1244-NI. The Government assured the mission that sufficient funds for maintenance would be appropriated to keep these schools in optimum operation. VI. PROJECT OPERATING OUTCOMES INTRODUCTION 6.01 Nicaragua has only recently emerged from the successive traumas of a major earthquake, followed by a protracted period of civil unrest which engulfed all elements of society and disrupted more normal activities. Educa- tion was one of the earliest, and one of the most severely affected casualties of both the natural disaster and the civil unrest. Since the first group of completed project schools survived the earthquake, they became reception centers for displaced students or were occupied by refugees, relief organizations, or government agencies. During the period of unrest some schools were bombed or strafed; almost all were vandalized and pillaged. Schools were again used as refugee centers, or emergency treatment centers or hospitals. It will be readily recognized that at the restoration of order the schools were in no condition to offer a normal education program. - 14 - 6.02 The Ministry of Education, in setting its new objectives and pri- orities, has decisions and prescribed action programs which in the short term are expected to delay the normalization process in the schools. Among these are the replacement of all school principals and some teachers; the determination that primary and secondary education shall remain free and open to all requesting admission; and that reconstruction projects, and in particular the national literacy campaign, shall be priority activities for students and teachers. The impact on the schools of deficient physical facilities and of the government's measures is assessed in succeeding para- graphs. USE OF PHYSICAL FACILITIES 6.03 Significant damage to school buildings has occurred. One school (Rivas) is still being used as a hospital and the students have been accommo- dated in vastly inferior and overcrowded premises, sharing facilities for practical craft work with a primary school. Two other schools (Esteli and Masaya) suffered major structural damage, in particular to the two shop areas. One school in Managua (Ramirez Goyena) for which the project provided equipment only, was destroyed by the earthquake. The students are now being accommodated in a multilateral school constructed under Credit 389-NI. There are other instances of damage to walls, doors, fittings and ceilings; repairs are being undertaken from resources provided under Loan 1244-NI and from national funds. 6.04 Two of the three teacher training schools initially included in the project were designed to include boarding facilities. The Esteli Teacher Training School was subsequently eliminated from the project by mutual consent of the Borrower and the Bank and in its place extensions (but not boarding) to an existing teacher training school (San Marcos) were included. The present position as regards boarding is as follows: (a) boarding accommodation (not a project component) exists at the San Marcos training school but is presently very underutilized due to the lack of enrollment (less than 50% of the 500 residential places are currently occupied); (b) the residential facilities constructed under the project at Jinotepe, for 200 male students, are not being used for this purpose but are occupied by the regional branch of the National University, sharing some facilities, e.g. the library, with the school. The reasons for the change are variously given as (i) the late completion of the teacher training school (1978) and subsequent events pre- empted the introduction of boarding; (ii) the government is considering a rationalization of teacher training with the possible discontinuation of either Jinotepe or San Marcos as teacher training centers; and (iii) lack of resources to fund the intern fellowships. 6.05 In respect of furniture, apparatus and equipment, losses are even more serious and have been sustained in varying degrees by all eighteen schools visited by the mission. They range from hand tools, electronic equipment, typewriters, calculating machines, kitchen equipment, science apparatus and supplies, sports equipment and musical instruments to the total pillage of practical craft rooms, some of which have been stripped of all equipment, while in others, what could not be removed has been maliciously damaged, so that shells of gas cookers, nonfunctioning refrigerators, lathes - 15 - without motors and empty science rooms are all that remain. In this context, the present administration had earlier informed the Bank that because of its precarious financial base, it hoped to obtain replacement equipment without charge from donor countries and hence preferred not to include the costs of replacing equipment in the amended Loan 1244-NI. Donations of equipment have started to arrive in Nicaragua. 6.06 Other problems have affected the schools. The mission noted instances where science and electronic equipment remained in storage several years after delivery, because workbenches were never provided; where woodwork and metalwork lathes and machinery remain to be installed or connected; where the lack of three-phase current impedes the use of machines; and where home economics equipment cannot be used for lack of basic services. In this respect, the project school at Ocotal is an extreme example. The project included the provision of equipment only for this school. The equipment was delivered some three years ago, but remains crated since the required practical areas have never been constructed. The equipment could be transferred to the other project schools where losses had been incurred and where the practical teaching areas do exist. Finally, staffing deficiencies in the practical subjects (para. 6.15) and shortages of consumable materials (para. 6.22) compound the problem of providing practically oriented education, not least because in the presently crowded school workday (para. 6.11) these are the subjects most susceptible to timetable cuts. ENROLLMENTS 6.07 A side letter to the Loan Agreement dated April 10, 1968, and entitled Educational Objectives, gave expression, inter alia, to the govern- ment's intention to "establish and maintain for the educational institutions included in the project, an enrollment structure along the lines set forth in Annex A hereto...." That enrollment pattern, in summary, provided for class groups of 40 at lower secondary level, 35 at diversified level, and overall enrollment of 28,560 (11,200 in the lower, and 17,360 in the diversified cycles). However, it was agreed that "this is not intended to exclude greater utilization of facilities than indicated in said Annex A, by using them on a shift basis, or by some other method, if this be necessary." This latter clause has been given the widest interpretation in recent years, culminating in the decision of the present administration that schools must admit all students, of whatever age, who seek enrollment. Thus, of a sample of 16 project secondary schools, only one operated a single shift; 6 had two shifts, and 9 three shifts, the latter group working from about 6:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. Enrollments have predictably followed the same pattern; in 15 of the schools, enrollments, at 26,066 were more than twice the 12,445 envisaged at the time of appraisal. This situation in itself might be considered an economic use of scarce physical resources. It might be deemed, however, less advantageous in the context of staff constraints, both numerical and qualita- tive. One teacher of home economics mentioned that as the only specialist in this discipline she had from time to time classes in excess of 100. To this problem should be added that of teaching areas. Often space constraints have resulted in numerous instances of class sizes at times well in excess of 40; - 16 - the mission noted, in a sample check of 8 schools, 74 classes of 40-49, 61 between 50-59; 25 between 60-69 and 5 instances of classes of 70 or more students. Distance between school and home, transport constraints and students' outside commitments to family or work induce principals to enroll students in the shift most convenient to them, with consequent distortions in shift enrollments and classroom availability. Hence practical workshops, libraries, corridors and verandahs are frequently commissioned into service as teaching areas, while classrooms intended for 40 or less students are required to accommodate much larger groups. Teachers and principals recognize the problems and try to achieve acceptable teaching levels and student performance, but it is all too evident that these conditions, allied to other distractions (paras. 6.02 and 6.16) are for the moment at least negatively affecting educational quality. This must, however, not be taken to imply that the situation described above is universal, or permanent, or that there are not well run schools, with motivated staff and students, which have so far resolved these problems as to be providing sound education in an acceptable learning environment. Enrollment has exceeded the appraisal objective of 18,600 in all project schools by more than 50%. One reason is the fact that project schools, in spite of the damage caused during the civil unrest, are just about the only facilities now opera- tional in the country. Most of the old schools which were destroyed during the earthquake have not been replaced, and this has resulted in a reduction in the absolute number of available student places. No data were available to the mission to illustrate the actual shortage in student places. The other is that the public has lately awakened to the realization that education is the means to lift them out of their economic level, and strive to provide an education for their children. This, and the government policy of not refusing admission to any student, has led to the overcrowding of the available facil- ities. CURRICULA 6.08 (a) Secondary Schools. The educational objectives for the project general secondary schools, as appraised, included (a) the revision of curricula for the lower secondary cycle to include an expanded and more practically oriented science content and an exploratory, pre-vocational component (indus- trial arts, home economics, and commerce); and (b) the diversification of the upper secondary cycle by the inclusion of options in sciences, arts, and commercial studies (secretarial, commercial and accountancy). As has already been shown (paras. 6.03, 6.04, 6.05), the lack of physical facilities, shortages of specialist teachers and shortened timetables stemming from the multi-shift system, resulted in the dropping or curtailment of courses in one or more of the above-mentioned subjects. The situation is especially acute in respect of the diversified cycle. Of the twelve project schools designed to include commercial studies, only six are in fact providing these courses, one is currently phasing out commercial courses for lack of adequately qualified staff and operating funds, and the remaining five have impaired physical facilities and equipment and lack the staff to service such studies. Enroll- ments in commercial tracks in the six institutions offering these courses vastly exceed appraisal projections, standing currently at 3,816 (including evening courses) as compared with the projected 665 for all project schools, which were simply not designed to accommodate this unforeseen demand. With respect to employment prospects for graduates of the courses, while the situation in Managua appears tenable, prospects for other graduating students are at the present limited (para. 6.18). - 17 - 6.09 (b) Primary Teacher Training Schools. Notwithstanding Decree No. 59 of 29 June 1971 which defined the content of primary teacher training courses, the teacher training schools appear in practice to have no common curriculum. While in general there are no differences of substance, the timetable arrange- ments show sufficient diversity as to create problems for students transferring from one school to another. The undesirability of these divergences is recog- nized by principals, and meetings are scheduled in an effort to reach a consensus on this matter. There is common ground, too, on the need to restruc- ture programs so as to spread observation periods and teaching practice over the three-year course (it is currently mainly concentrated in the final semester). Subject to changes of this nature, the curriculum may be considered reasonable though it is not being completely implemented because of a lack of teachers and equipment for certain practical courses. SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION 6.10 School Principals. In the wake of the civil unrest, all school principals were replaced in October-November 1979. The new appointees were selected at the local level. Inevitably, therefore, some are highly qualified and experienced teachers/administrators who have quickly come to grips with local problems, school organization and timetable planning, and who already know their staff well. Others have been less successful in these respects. There were individual instances of concentration on educational planning and interpreting new national goals which may have distracted the school from adopt- ing some of the necessary day-to-day measures. Some project schools were being run satisfactorily (1974-1978) and one, Maestro Gabriel in Managua, may be cited as a model for effective administration. The mission discussed with the Vice Minister of Education the desirability of short training courses for principals in school administration, a suggestion which the latter undertook to consider. 6.11 The School Day. The 35 teaching periods per week in operation in the general secondary schools when the project was approved, and on which the schedule of accommodation was based, was reduced to 30 weekly periods about December 1969 because of staffing and financial constraints. After the 1972 earthquake, a shift system was introduced into a timetable of 20/23 periods per week with the lower secondary meeting in the mornings and upper secondary in the afternoons. By October 1974, with Bank encouragement, the government proposed a phased reversion to the 35-period week, but subsequent enrollment pressures culminated in an extension of the workday and a subsequent curtail- ment of weekly teaching periods per class. Schools today appear free to organize their timetable in accordance with locally prevailing conditions; the mission observed that space, time and staffing constraints gave rise to (i) a wide diversity between schools relative to instructional time (from 22-32 periods per week in the lower cycle and 23-33 in the upper cycle); and (ii) a lack of consistency in the same school as regards the weekly periods allocated within the same cycle. With respect to the teacher training schools, those which offer the lower secondary cycle show similar disparities (29-36 weekly periods); in the diversified cycle the average weekly teaching timetable is 40 periods. - 18 - 6.12 Internal Organization. The larger schools are administered by a principal and 2 vice-principals. A guidance service is well established though a few schools still lack such personnel. Overall responsibility for school discipline is vested in a corps of "inspectors" while decentralized supervision is achieved in most instances by a Head of Department (Jefe de Area) system. Parental involvement in disciplinary matters is well coordinated in the more structured schools though parents are rarely consulted in respect of course choices for their children where these choices exist. 6.13 The school examination system which, according to the side letter of April 10, 1968, was to be reviewed, appears to have been largely replaced by a cumulative record evaluation procedure, to which about 75% of the final score is allocated; a mainly multiple choice test constitutes the remaining 25%. Student accumulative achievement records are computed from class and homework, together with the results of a class test set, administered and scored by the class teacher under the joint supervision of Heads of Department and the Guidance Department. Formal classes for preparing students to re-sit examina- tions which they have failed, have recently been banned by the Ministry of Education in order to avoid possible abuses by teachers who were being paid overtime for such teaching. In some schools the system has been replaced by voluntary classes given by teachers; in others, failed students form economic- sized groups and then enlist the services of an outside teacher for remedial instruction. With respect to the graduation examination, the government, in order to promote its literacy campaign, has suspended all final school examina- tions and has decreed that diplomas shall be awarded on the results of the student's cumulative record together with his participation in the campaign. Graduating teachers' certificates will similarly only be conferred after the conclusion in October 1980 of the literacy campaign and an assessment of the student's involvement therein. 6.14 The Teaching Force. The side letter already referred to (para. 6.07) attests to the government's intention to (a) increase the number of full-time teachers; and (b) improve the qualifications of teachers in project schools. A survey of some 360 teachers revealed that (i) about 56% were employed between 30-40 hours weekly and a further 18% worked a 20-29 hour period week, although there was wide variation between schools, with the smaller institutions predictably employing more part-time teachers; and (ii) about 46% were either university graduates or qualified primary school teachers completing university professional studies; 25% were qualified primary teachers and the remaining 29% either technical staff (music, physical education, practical arts) or unqualified secondary school graduates. In the present circumstances this situation can be deemed generally satisfactory. In comparison, at appraisal 43% of the teaching force were qualified primary school teachers. Trained professional teachers were not of a high academic level and their professional training had shortcomings. 6.15 Nonetheless, it was apparent to the mission that schools are expe- riencing considerable difficulties with the practical and science courses. The dearth of machinery, equipment and consumable materials, in large part resulting from theft and vandalism during the period of unrest (para. 6.05), is compounded by the shortage of practical subjects teachers. While a number - 19 - of schools have been able to recruit technician-level or technical secondary graduates to teach these courses, the mission encountered several instances where classes in home economics, woodwork, metalwork, electricity, commerce, biology, technical drawing and agriculture had never been held, or had been discontinued for lack of teaching staff, where science apparatus equipment and machinery remained in boxes several years after delivery, and where practical areas were being used as classrooms or storage space. One principal observed to the mission that there was science equipment in storage, the very names of which were unknown to his staff. The mission recommended to the Vice Minister that underutilized excellent facilities at the Technical College constructed under Credit 389-NI and/or a well equipped nonproject technical school in Granada be used for short emergency technical teacher training courses, a suggestion which he undertook to consider. 6.16 The Students. It would be unrealistic to attempt an assessment of the attitudes, aptitudes and performance of the student body on the basis of the students' present concern with reconstruction and literacy programs which permeate the whole country at this time. While the mission observed many instances of orderly and well organized schools, and of attempts to create a suitable teaching atmosphere amid requests for teachers and students to attend preparatory workshops for the literacy campaign, there were yet many examples of schools where student discipline appeared to be a problem. What the mission was able to deduce from discussions with principals, staff and students was that (a) in the months following the insurrection there had been serious discipline problems in many schools, but that in most cases these were now eased; (b) during the same period attendance at schools had fluctuated widely; (c) academic performance levels were significantly lower than in more normal years, the students realizing that concentration on, and effective participation in reconstruction activities would assure their promotion/gradua- tion at the end of the school year. The mission discussed this issue with the Vice Minister of Education, in particular, in the context of the Minister's published order that schools were to function normally; the Vice Minister undertook to look into the situation. INTERNAL EFFICIENCY 6.17 It has been shown (para 6.07) that overcrowded classrooms and excessively large teaching groups reduce the quality of education and that a serious dearth of apparatus, machinery and equipment and of qualified technical teachers (paras. 6.05 and 6.06) has distorted school timetables in the area of practical arts. Yet understandably enough, these factors appear to have weighed but lightly on dropout rates which, though very heavy in the period immediately following the civil unrest (figures quoted included 25% of regis- tered students who failed to attend; 35% dropout between October 1979 and March 1980 as compared with an annual average in previous years of 4%), were variously said to be accounted for by students being retained in the armed forces or joining reconstruction "brigades" or by multiple registrations. It will bear repeating that until the country returns to normalcy it is difficult to make judgments about retention rate trends. Conversely, promotion rates are likely to improve in the immediate future, in the view of some principals, because idealism and student participation in school organization will encour- age motivation towards learning, but essentially because of the new government - 20 - decrees regarding the literacy campaign, the use of cumulative assessments and the suspension of formal examinations (para 6.13). These anticipated promotion rates should not, however, be confused with absolute performance standards which are commonly adjudged to be lower than in previous years. Finally, and perhaps for similar reasons, repetition is of acceptable propor- tions (typical examples are 8 out of 345, 11 out of 195, 28 out of 254 in the lower range, 8%-12.6% in the diversified courses). EXTERNAL PRODUCTIVITY 6.18 Among the more immediate problems is the employment of graduates from the project and other schools. In the side letter of April 10, 1968 the government agreed to "assure that the output of graduates from the second cycle of secondary education matches, to the extent possible, the estimated needs of our economy from each of the various types of secondary education"; the Appraisal Report (para 3.08) indicated that "need for newly trained accountants and secretaries up to 1974 was some 3,050, and for teachers 850 per year over the 1966-1974 period." Together these two statements postulate the need to match the school output of graduates in arts, sciences, education and commerce with market demand. While the unsettled state of the country for the past several years and the lack of tracer studies made it impossible for the mission to review project outcomes under this head, the following picture emerged from extensive discussions in the areas visited: (i) while hitherto graduates from the teacher training schools had experienced lengthy delays in finding employment, the present administration's recent creation of 500 new teaching posts and its declared long-term recruitment policies appear to ensure jobs for all graduating teachers; (ii) graduates, both academic and commercial in Managua, in general, find acceptably compatible employment; and (iii) employment prospects in the interior are more difficult whether the problems stem from aborted industrial development resulting from past events or overoptimistic assumptions, prolonged unemployment among school graduates is common. A number, varying from 5% to 50%, depending on the proximity of a local university, where costs are more affordable, seek to continue their studies (two local universities have recently been founded, one in Jinotepe, within the teacher training campus, and the other in Leon), though many dropped out after the foundation year; some small number enter teacher training or agricultural institutes; a few obtain local employment in offices and banks; for the remainder there is presently little available except casual or seasonal jobs in local agriculture (coffee, cotton, lumber). It would seem prudent to review employment prospects in the interior as a basis for future education development planning. SUPERVISORY SERVICES 6.19 School supervision has in the past been notoriously lax. While the teacher training institutions appear to have fared slightly better in this respect with one or two visits from the Ministry of Education officials per year, and occasional seminars on curriculum and teaching methods have been conducted in schools, supervisory visits to secondary schools by Ministry officials are even less. The present administration is conscious of this gap in services and is developing proposals within its education decentralization plans, to remedy this situation. In substance, there will be four administra- tive levels: national, regional, departmental and district (circuito); at - 21 - each level a corps of school inspectors will assume responsibility for the day-to-day supervision of local schools. Authority to appoint key staff at each level has now been granted and action has been initiated to implement this proposal. EDUCATION FINANCES/OPERATING COSTS 6.20 Prior to the advent of the present administration, students paid an average of V 75.00 per month (at that time equivalent to about US$10.00) from which income the secondary schools met the recurrent costs of consumable materials, and, to the extent possible, minor repairs. Fees having now been abolished, there is concern among principals that the government may find it difficult to meet these expenditures; indeed, the present interim monthly allocation to schools of V 5,000 is seen by them as quite insufficient for their needs, particularly in the context of increased enrollments. For its part the government is presently assessing operational needs on the basis of questionnaires completed by the schools. While the administration is in earnest in accepting the implications of free education, it is premature to judge the extent to which it will be able to meet these obligations. The government's proposal is that, on the basis of the information received from the schools, a permanent fund will be established to meet the schools' recur- rent costs. Depending on individual circumstances, the schools will be divided into three categories, and monthly transfers to the schools will amount to 0 5,000, 0 3,000, or 0 2,000 respectively. The mission was unable to obtain any firm information as to (a) the total anticipated cost of, and (b) the financial basis for these transfers; it was informed that in past years the schools had raised about V 12 million annually from fees which under the present administration would no longer be levied. Meanwhile, neither the schools nor the Ministry of Education was able to provide the mission with the information necessary to compute operational or unit students costs. 6.21 In 1979 the total education budget of the Ministry of Education amounted to 0 445.0 million (US$44.5 million at the present rate of exchange of V 10.00 = US$1.00) made up as follows: Ordinary Budget: 0 202 million; Supplementary Budget: 0 7.0 million, both to meet current expenditures; Budget for Capital Expenditures: 0 236.0 million. The mission learned that financial constraints would probably result in a cut of V 150 million from the capital budget and that consequently the approved budget would be reduced to 4 295 million. VII. BANK'S PERFORMANCE 7.01 Overall, the Bank may be deemed to have developed a helpful and supportive role throughout the implementation process, not least in an under- standing of the problems which beset the Borrower and which adversely affected the execution of the project. Relationships with government agencies appear to have been cordial and cooperative. The Bank completed a total of 23 super- vision missions covering 27.4 man/weeks. The composition of the missions was realistic as regards the specializations of participating staff, and the missions were well spaced. One criticism might be the lack of continuity of mission personnel during the early critical phase of project implementation. - 22 - 7.02 Nicaragua is a small country, and the project institutions are for the most part easily accessible. Even allowing for the periodic unsettled state of the country, some missions might have shown a more dynamic interest in verifying through field visits progress in both physical and operational implementation of the project. It is, however, relevant to note that (i) the performance of most missions can be rated highly; and (ii) some supervision missions were of very short duration which undoubtedly accounts for their limited field activities, while others were staffed by new and inexperienced Bank members. VIII. CONCLUSIONS 8.01 The vicissitudes through which this project passed invite an under- standing and sympathetic evaluation of project outcomes. Moreover, the implementation time scale, at least in part a function of those vicissitudes, serves to recall the fact that education is an evolving process, and that objectives will change with new situations and differing perceptions. For all these reasons, any rigidly conceived evaluation, based solely on original project assumptions, will do less than justice to the benefits conferred by the loan. 8.02 The Completion Mission found that the educational objectives origi- nally set had generally been satisfactorily attained upon conclusion of the project in early 1978. The special covenants of the Loan Agreement (Annex 3) were adequately complied with except in the provision of qualified teachers in adequate numbers (para. 5.01 b) where they were needed to teach the practical subjects (para. 6.15). In physical terms, the country has benefitted by the construction of 20 new or extended, well designed and constructed secondary institutions, which, upon redress of the present parlous state of the facili- ties (paras. 6.03, 6.04 and 6.05) should again become models of quality education. The project had been unable to fully realize the qualitative improvements in the secondary education system, partly due to shortcomings in project implementation (para. 6.06), but mainly because of circumstances (natural disasters and national upheavals) which aggravated the enrollment congestion in secondary schools (paras. 6.03 and 6.07), produced adaptations in the school curricula and timetables (paras. 6.09 and 6.11), lack of teaching staff for the practical courses (para. 6.15). The quality of the teaching force may on the other hand be considered satisfactory (para. 6.14) although school administration is, at least temporarily, of variable quality (para. 6.10). In quantitative terms, the 20 new and expanded schools have made available 16,475 places (15,450 at appraisal) with the addition of the school at Somoto contributing to half of the increase over the appraisal figure (Annex 4). The absolute number of student places available for secondary education in the country has on the other hand decreased because of only partial replacement of old schools destroyed by the earthquake. Enroll- ment of project schools in 1977 (Annex 4) at 30,231 was 60% above the appraisal target of 18,670. The absence of well documented data and the present preoccu- pation of students (para. 6.16) with reconstruction and literacy programs make - 23 - it impossible at this time to assess the output of project schools against appraisal objectives, although employment prospects for school graduates are difficult in rural areas as compared with appraisal assumptions (para. 6.18). 8.03 From a review of project implementation, the mission draws the following lessons: (a) In cases where a project unit is established, full authority over implementation of the project particularly in the infrastructure aspects, should rest within the project unit which should be provided with clear channels of communication with, and the administrative backing of, government entities involved in the project. (b) In projects of this nature, in a country of little regional diversity as Nicaragua, which consist of essentially similar facil- ities, the standardization, not only of equipment and furniture provided, but also, the design of buildings to facilitate planning and execution and permit an effective cost control should be considered. 8.04 Judged by what might have been, had natural disasters and national upheavals not beset the country, and what the future portends, the project might be considered to have been quite worthwhile; its implementation failures born of inexperience, financial constraints and natural disaster can be remedied, while its potential impact could be considerable. In this context, the mission recommends that this project be included in the OED's "second look program" for completed projects. - 24 - ANNEX 1 NICARAGUA First Education Project (Loan 532-NI) LIST OF PLACES VISITED SCHOOLS VISITED A-1 Managua, Escuela Normal Central A-3 Managua, Instituto Nacional No. 1 - Comercio A-4 Managua, Instituto Nacional No. 2 - Rene Schick A-5 Managua, Instituto Nacional Maestro Gabriel A-6 Leon, Instituto Nacional Maximo Jerez A-7 Granada, Instituto Nacional de Oriente A-8 Masatepe, Instituto Nacional Anastacio Somoza A-9 Esteli, Instituto Nacional de Esteli A-10 Boaco, Instituto Nacional Vicente de Paul A-11 Masaya, Instituto Nacional Manuel Coronel Matus B-1 San Marcos, Escuela Normal Salvador Somoza B-4 Matagalpa, Instituto Nacional Eliseo Picardo B-5 Juigalpa, Instituto Nacional Josefa Aguerri B-6 Rivas, Instituto Nacional Rosendo Lopez B-7 Jinotepe, Instituto Nacional Juan J. Rodriguez B-8 El Viejo, Instituto Nacional de El Viejo C-1 Managua, Instituto Nacional Ramirez Goyena Somoto, Instituto Nacional de Somoto - 25 - ANNEX 2 NICARAGUA - TIRT ECAXTION PROJET (Loan 241) OKPARISON OF ORIGIUALLY ESTIMATED OSTS AND ACTUAL WSTS Costs in Cordobas (thousands) GNSTRUCTION ý SITE DEV. W URNITURE & EQUIPMET PMFESSION\L FEES TOTAL PROJECT ITEN Å tai al Et A al Et ctual rai Et ctual hel. hci al aia Eat. a Lreiga I at..lml a .Ec, Ic, ot % xl. Ic. t% Excl. In Coct. Excl. Incl. couatl Ei.l Xnl % - t Conti Contin t nf Conting Conting Cnn iff o Dif Contin _ Di. 1.- 2 3 3/2 1 2 3 3/2 1 2 3 3/2 1 2 3 3/2 A-1 Managua 2319 2701 2802.9 4 483 548 643.0 17 110 110 108.6 -1 2912 3359 3554.5 5.8 E.N. Central A-2 Jinotepe 2155 2630 4332.6 65 605 720 1942.5 170 102 102 557.5 447 2862 3452 6832.6 7.9 E.N. .D. Roose elt A-3 Mana_aua -- 3806 4437 3028.0 32 874 9 4 5_ 181 l -- -9 4861 5609 4680.3 6 I.N. No. i Come cio A-4 Managua 3806 4437 7929.1 79 874 991 1391.0 0 181 181 205.3 13 4861 5609 9525.4 69.8 I.N. No. 2 Rene Schick A-5 Managua 3806 4437 4182.1 6 874 991 1489.5 50 181 181 176.2 -3 4861 5609 5847.8 4.3 I.N. Maest.Gabr el 1 _ A-6 Leon ¯¯¯ ¯ 1 3 592 162.1 7 719 852 957.3 12 101 1 14. 39 . ¯463 3 - I.N. Maximo Jer z A-7 Granada 1866 2277 1947.6 1 713 842 890.3 6 88 88 101.0 15 2667 3207 2938.9 -84 I.N. de Oriente A-8 Masatepe 798 975 1287.2 32 325 382 516.1 35 38 38 46.5 22 1161 1395 1849.8 32.6 I.N. Anaet. Soe m .a A-9 Estell 1411 1956 1346.7 31 543 730 738.9 ¯ 67 - 6 7 3.7 10 2021 2753 2159.¯ .21.6 I.N. de Estell A-10 Boaco 1136 1573 1 ~3¯ 25 4Z 567.6 71¯ 4 54 _3&T 9 ¯0 5 2 TW 77 10 I.N. Vitcente de Paul A-11 Ma*aya 1018 1242 2118.0 70 378 447 786.0 76 48 48 53.8 12 1444 1737 2957.8 70. I MM Co MG - ___ B-1 San Hareoe u174 22 1415.1 711 362.8 -49 94 94 7785 : 2493 3387 1856. 2 E.N. Salv. Somo a B-2 Bluefielda 1416 3208 3308.1 3 531 1181 716.7 39 67 67 44 4 9 4 I.N. Crist. Col n B-3 Chinandega 1541 1963 1808.9- 648 798 1043.6 7 4 1 2263 2835 2927.3 3,3 1.8 Joqul Esoto B-4 tol 411 568 994.85 123 16.5 251.4 52 19 19 2¯6 3 553 752 1272¯7 279¯2 I.N. Eliseo Pic. rdo 1047 1450 2785.1 2 433 581 885.8 52 50 50 67.6 35 1530 2081 3738.579.6 I.N. Josefa Agu rri B-6 Rivas 1010 1288 1083.2 16 246 303 488.3 61 48 48 55.1 1304 1626.6 0.8 I.N. Rosendo Lo ez B-7 Jinotepe 1010 1233 2678.9 17 246 290 1168.2 3 42 48 71.1 8 1304 1 3918. 9.4 1.N. Juan J. Rocri$uez B-8 El Viejo 269 342 1049 7207 200 243 4. 13 .5 482 598 1580. 2 I.N. de El Viej< Somoto / - - 2922. - 893.6 6 .789 - 7 T.N. de Samnoto C-1 Managua - 22 279 2.38-4 -- .4 2i . i, I.N. Ramtrez Gol na - - - C-2 Ocotal - - - 220 302 380.7 26 - - - 220 302 380. 261 I.N. Nueva Sego ia TOTAL COST _ 32822 41891 50819 21 10134 12776 18338.1 44 1564 1564 222_8 42 4452) 56231 71385. 27 4688.9 5984.5 7259.9 21 1447.7 1825.1 619.7 44 223.4 223.4 318.3 42 6360 8033 10197. 27 1/ nriinallv at Isteli. 3/ Exchange Rate - Original US$1.0o - 7 Cordobas 2/ Not included in original document. Completion US$1.00 - 7 Cordobas - 26 - ANNEX 3 Page 1 NICARAGUA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (Loan 532-NI) COMPLIANCE WITH COVENANTS COVENANT COMPLIANCE (a) LOAN AGREEMENT 5.01(a) carry out the project with due Partial compliance: shortages diligence and efficiency provide facil- of counterpart funds during ities, services and other resources project execution. required for the project. 5.01(b) cause the educational insti- Partial compliance. Some class tutions to be operated so as to promote sizes excessive. Shortage of the education objectives of the bor- practical subjects teachers. rowers and to be provided with qualified teachers in adequate numbers. 5.01(c) provide promptly as needed all For staffing see 5.01(b). funds, facilities and other resources Operating funds previously from required for the effective utilization, school fees, and adequate. staffing, equipping and operation of Present administration making the project institutions and make budgetary allocations for budgetary allocations or other arrange- this purpose. (Reasonable ments for the purpose. compliance). 5.01(d) establishment and staffing of Generally complied with. Project Unit with key personnel accep- Intermittent delays in filling table to Bank. vacant posts. Bank in most cases provided with opportunities to review appointments. 5.01(e) employ qualified and experienced Generally complied with. consultants, acceptable to borrower and Bank, upon terms and conditions satis- factory to borrower and Bank. 5.01(f) employ contractors satisfactory Generally complied with. to borrower and Bank, under contracts satisfactory to borrower and Bank. 5.01(g) promptly furnish for approval of Complied with after long delays the Bank plans, specifications, contracts and numerous requests by the and work schedules for construction, and Bank for submission of these master lists of equipment and furniture. documents. - 27 - ANNEX 3 Page 2 COVENANT COMPLIANCE 5.02 adequately maintain buildings and Limited compliance partially equipment, make all necessary repairs the result of economic diffi- and provide funds, facilities and culties in meeting heavy costs services for this purpose. of damage to buildings and equipment during earthquake and hostilities. Efforts being made, with Bank assistance, to repair buildings. Replacement plans for lost/damaged equipment inadequate. 5.03 maintain records adequate to Compliance in respect to records, identify goods financed out of loan though some lost after earthquake. proceeds to record progress of project Non-compliance in regard to quar- and furnish to the Bank all such infor- terly progress reports. mation as the Bank shall reasonably request. 5.09 acquisition of project sites. Complied with. One school site (Jinotepe), however, was changed 3 times and only finally acquired eight years after the loan effec- tiveness date. (b) SIDE LETTERS (i) Administration, Supervision and Architectural Services Para 1 Project Unit support staff. Generally complied with. Para 2 full time staff. Generally complied with but charac- terized by numerous changes in staff and periods of vacancy par- ticularly in the post of the project architect and accountant. Para 3 responsibilities of Generally complied with. Project Director. Para 4 responsibilities for tender Generally complied with. documents and awards. Para 5 supervisory responsibilities Generally complied with. for architectural and engi- neering services. Para 6 responsibilities for design Generally complied with. construction and supervision of civil works. - 28 - ANNEX 3 Page 3 COMPLIANCE (ii) Educational Objectives Para 1 gradual appointment of full- About 70% compliance. Teacher time teachers: only qualified shortages and timetable con- full-time school principals straints result in some part- and teachers in project time and some unqualified institutions. staff being employed in most schools. Para 2 training courses for school Substantial compliance except principals and staff. in area of practical subjects. Para 3 school inspectorate: increase Non-compliance to date but in numbers and frequency of plans initiated to meet this school visits. requirement. Para 4 examination system to be Substantial compliance. improved to reduce repetition and drop-outs. Para 5 increased budgetary allocation 1980 Budget complies with over- to education in general and all increase; detailed breakdown in particular to secondary of educational expenditures by education. level of school not available. Para 6 increased financial allocation Present administration studying for teaching materials, equip- school needs; interim allocation ment and maintenance. made to schools for these pur- poses. Budgetary constraints may delay full implementation. NICARAGUA ANNEX 4 Loan 532-NI Comparison of Student Places and Enrollment Originally Planned For and Actually Made Available and Actual Enrollment Student Places Student Enrollment Project Item Planned for Percentage At Appraisal At Completion Percentage (Appraisal) Completed Difference (1968) (1977) Difference NEW/EXPANDED SCHOOLS A-1 Managua E.N. Central 805 1000 24.2 805 1098 36.4 A-2 Jinotepe E.N. F. Roosevelt 560 640 14.3 560 924 65.0 A-3 Managua I.N. No. 1 Comercio 1455 1600 10.0 1455 3336 29.3 A-4 Managua I.N. No. 2 Rene Schick 1455 1560 7.2 1455 1569 7.8 A-5 Managua I.N. Maestro Gabriel 1455 1560 7.2 1455 3856 65 A-6 Leon I.N. Maximo Jerez 1040 1200 15.4 1040 1002 - 3.7 A-7 Granada I.N. de Oriente 1000 1000 - 1000 1396 39.6 A-8 Masatepe I.N. Anastacio Somoza 350 420 20.0 350 627 79.1 A-9 Esteli I.N. de Esteli 690 700 1.4 690 1052 52.5 A-10 Boaco I.N. Vicente de Paul 350 440 25.7 350 723 106.6 A-11 Masaya I.N. M. Coronel Matus 480 480 0 480 1803 275.6 B-1 San Marcos E.N. Salvador Somoza 455 560 23.1 455 559 22.9 B-2 Bluefields I.N. Cristobal Colon 725 725 - 725 1240 71 B-3 Chinandega I.N. Joaquin Escoto 1120 1120 - 1120 1450 29.5 B-4 Matagalpa I.N. Eliaeo Picardo 810 810 - 810 1708 110.9 B-5 Juigalpa I.N. Josefa Aguerri 730 730 - 730 1100 50.7 B-6 Rivas I.N. Rosendo Lopez 810 810 - 810 1433 76.9 B-7 Jinotepe I.N. Juan J. Rodriguez 810 810 - 810 1270 56.8 B-8 El Viejo I.N. de El Viejo 350 350 - 350 590 68.6 Somoto I.N. de Somoto - 480 - - 477 - Sub-Total 15450 16475 6.6 15450 27213 76-1 SCHOOLS PROVIDED FQUIPMENT ONLY C-1 Managua I.N. Ramirez Goyena 2910 2910 - 2910 2530 - 13.0 C-2 Ocotal I.N. Nueva Segovia 310 310 310 488 57.4 Sub-Total 3220 3220 - 3220 3018 - 6.3 Total for Project 18670 19695 61. 18670 3231 62.4 - 30 - NICARAGUA-Loan 532-NI ANNEX 5 COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED & ACTUAL UNIT AREAS & UNIT COSTS GROSS AREAS COSTS PER STUDENT PLACE OR LIVING UNIT. PER STUD. PLACE IN US$ (thousands) OR LIVING UNIT BUILDINGS EQUIPMENT TOTAL M2 & SITE DEV. .& FURNITURE Orig. Arig.2/ 3/ Orig./ 3/ Orig.2/ 3/ Est. jActual Est. Actual Est. Actual Est. Actual 1. ACADEMIC & COMMUNAL FACILITIES k-1 Lanagua E.N.-_-Cnt 4.7 h.68 2.88 ..42 0.60 0.78 .48 4 k-2 Jinotepe Roosewl 8.75 5.88 3.85 5.12 1.08 3.04 4.93 8.16 k-3 Managua I.N. 1 -.12 4.47 2.62 2.05 0.60 1.00 3.22 3.05 k-4 Managua I.N. 2 4.12 4.59 2.62 5.36 0.60 0.94 3.22 6.30 k-5 Managua M. Ga-bre 14.12 4.55 7.62 2.8IV 0.60 1.01 3.22 3.85 k-6 Leon 4.62 4.56 2.04 2.00 0.69 0.89 2.73 _ 2.89 k-7-Granada .. ---- 4-750 .1.87 1--5 0.L - 2..58 -p-84 k-8 Masatepe- -5-., - LIT -2.28-. 2.99- -0-.34 1 -;0 -3,21, -k 19 - k-q[ Rteli LJL-Estel, .4#. 64- -.3 4 2-1 -1 -5.- 1.'9 n7 8 -30- k-1(oBoAco- .-- -5-P0 -.A __ 3.80 0. __1 _L32 jk-16 %-11Masaya _.4.-79-- 5.L .212- 41 -Ql9-- 1.64 .2..491 - 05-- B-1.San Marcos ** ** __3._5 -.69 0.94 0.80 4.29 3.42 B-2 Bluefields * 1.95 3.08 0.73 0.99 2.68 4.07 B-3 Chinandeg_a ** ** 1.38 1.61 0.58 0.93 1.96 2.54 B-h Matag41pa3.6 3.57 0.51 1.23 0.12 0.31 0.66-- 1.54 B-5-Juigalpa ___ Q 1.43 _182 0.59-- 1.21 2.02 5.03 B-6 Rivas 4.64* 4 1_542 1.34 0.30 0.60 1.55 1.94 B-7Jino-teaRdxigue ** -.25 3. 1 0.30 1.44 1.55 4.86 B-8_El_Yiejo . . ** -- .77 3.00 oL.7 1.42 1.34 4. 42 C-LManagua. -1,yer ro - - - - 0_ 0.08 0.09_ 0._ 8 C-2 Q.l.- . - - _ - __ l 12 0.71 1.23 Somoto _ L5.6 - 6.9 - 1.86 -.25 2. $TUDENTS' BOARDING FACILITIES A-2 Jinotepe Roosevel IncLinl in Incl.inl 1.65 - Incl.in] B-1 San Marcos ** ** - IncLin1 " B-2_Bluefields _ _ ** " 1.48 --i "t- _- 3 STAFF HOUSING A-P Jinnten" Tnrl.in 2 - B-1 Sen Marco; - 189 ",4 02 - - B-2Bluefi lds-- --*A-- -*" **data on existing areas 1/ Excluding 2/ Excluded Contingencies. 3/ Current Exchange Pate not available. Prof.Fees. us$1.00 = 7 Cordobas US$1.00 = 7 * Includes existing areas in corDutation. - 31 - Annex 6 NICARAGUA Loan 532-NI Estimated and Actual Implementation and Disbursements Calendar year 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Semester 1 2 12 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 us$ million CIVIL WORKS Survey and Preparation of Sites Programming 4.0 Preliminary Design Final Design . ONE" 3.0 Working Drawings and R 1 Contract .Documents Tender Period mm / 2. 2.0 Construction E EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE Preparation of Master Lists.and Wender .Decuments Tender Period - ma- Delivery and Installation , Date of Original Actual Effectiveness Closing Date Closing Date June 25, 1968 June 30, 1973 March 31, 1978 ------------- Planned Implementation Actual Implementation Planned Disbursements Actual Disbursements
Groupe de la Banque mondiale · Project Performance Assessment Report
Nicaragua - Education Project
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Project Performance Assessment Report
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Nicaragua
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Banque mondiale