India - Second Power Transmission Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 3006 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: SECOND POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT (CREDIT 242-IN) June 3, 1980 FILE CoilD Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: SECOND POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT (CREDIT 242-IN) Table of Contents Page No. Preface (i) Project Performance Audit Basic Data Sheet (ii) Highlights (iii) Project Performance Audit Memorandum I. Project Summary 1 II. Main Issues 4 Forecast vs. Actual Growth of Electricity Generation 4 Project Justification 5 Institutional Objectives and Lending Strategy 6 III. Conclusions 9 Appendix: Comments from Government 10 Attachment- Project Completion Report 1. Introduction 11 2. Project Preparation and Appraisal 12 3. Project Implementation and Costs 13 4. Operating and Financial Performance of 16 Beneficiary SEBs 5. Project Justification 17 6. Bank Performance 17 7. Conclusions and Lessons to be learned 18 Annexes: 1. Schedule of Disbursements 19 2. Forecast Income Statement and Capital Base of 20 Beneficiary SEBs for FY1978 Maps  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: SECOND POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT (CREDIT 242-IN) PREFACE This report presents a performance audit of the Second Power Trans- mission Project in India, for which a credit of US$75 million was signed on May 3, 1971. The credit became effective on July 29, 1971, and was closed on March 3, 1977, when the undisbursed balance of about US$2 million was cancelled. The Project Performance Audit Report consists of a Project Perfor- mance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Depart- ment (OED) and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared by the South Asia Regional Office. A project completion mission visited India briefly in January, 1978, and information gathered during that visit has been taken into account in writing the PCR. OED has reviewed the Appraisal Report and other documents in IDA files and discussed the project with IDA staff. The audit finds that the PCR covers adequately the project's salient features, with the exception of the demand forecast and the project justification, and the PPAM generally agrees with the conclusions. In addition to summarising the objectives and results of the project, therefore, the PPAM expands upon the discussion of these two features; it also takes up the issue of the project's limited institutional objectives, it makes some observations on the degree of success encountered in reaching these objectives and it examines the type of lending strategy adopted, namely a sector-type credit in support of a program. Following normal OED procedures, a draft copy of this report was sent to the Government for comment. Those comments which were received have been taken into account in finalizing the report and are reproduced as an Appendix to the PPAM.  (it) PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET IrDIAt SECOND PONER TRANSHISSION PROJECT (CREDI 242-TN) 9IT PROJECT DATA Its Appraisal Actual or Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 126 126 /1 Overrun (Underrun) (M) 0 Credit Amount (US$ million) 75.0 75.0 Disbursed ) 72.9 Cancelled )Sept. 30, 1979 2.1 11paidto ) Outatanding to ) 72.9 Date for Completion of Physical Components 3/75 3/77 (est.) Proportion Completed by Appraisal Target Date (Z) n.a. Proportion of Tiae Overrun (Z) 51 Incrmental Financial Rate of Return (2) n.a. n.a. L Financial Performance unsatisfactory Institutional Performance unsatisfactory CalAetive Estiated and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) FT 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 (1) Appraisal Estimaste 5.0 20.0 53.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 (ii) Actual - 6.1 23.7 46.3 72.8 72.9 (ii) as of (i) - 31 45 62 97 97 OTHER PROJECT DATA Itsm Origin.l Actual or Plan Revisions Current Estimate First Meation in Files or Timetable 1/69 Government's-Application 10/69 Negotiations 3/71 Board Approval 4/27/71 Credit Agreement Date 5/03/71 ffectiveness Date 8/02/71 7/29/71 Closing Date 9/30/75 3/31/77 5/04/77 Borrower Goverrment of India Executing Agency Nine State Else. Boards and a Genera- tion Board Fiscal Tear of Borrower Apr. 1 - March 31 Follow-on Project Name Third Power Transmission Project Credit Number Cr. 377-IN Amount (US$ million) 85.0 Credit Agreement Date 5/09/73 MISSION DATA Month/Tear Duration of No. of Date of ission Persons Report Appraisal 12/70 3 2 4/12/71 Supervision 1 12/72 3 2 - Supervision 2 12/73 3 2 - Supervision 3 4/74 3 2 8/01/74 Supervision 4 6/75 2 1 8/12/75 Supervision 5 8/76 3 2 9/10/76 Supervision 6 4/77 3 3 4/22/77 Completion 1/78 3 2 Currency Exchange Rate Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Indian Rupes (R) Year: Appraisal Tear Average Exchange Rate US$1 - R 7.5 Intervening Tears Average US$1 - R 8.8 Completion YeTar Average US$1 - R 8.8 / Project scope increased for same cost. The analysis of project costs in the the PCR (para. 3.11) is for equipment and materials only. in line with the Appraisal Report. L Since the project was a minor part of the national network program no return could be calculated at appraisal or on completion.  (iii) PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT INDIA: SECOND POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT (CREDIT 242-IN) HIGHLIGHTS Credit 242-IN was the second in a series of four lending operations to help finance the purchase of equipment for India's large program of exten- sions to the high-voltage power transmission network. By reason mainly of competitive bid prices and rupee devaluation, equipment costs were less than anticipated and it was possible to undertake additional works under the program and still leave a small undisbursed balance. Partly for this reason, the project had a time overrun of 18 months. The project was successful in assisting the nine beneficiary State Electricity Boards (SEBs) to extend their transmission systems and in con- sequence, although demand grew more slowly than expected at appraisal, to meet their growing power requirements over the extended project period. The degree of utilization of generating capacity in the nine SEBs has exceeded the appraisal forecast (PPAM paras. 8-12). The institutional objectives of the credit, principally the rehabil- itation of the finances of the SEBs which actually executed the project, were modestly pitched, in the belief that any possible solution to these problems would be long-term in nature, and the results actually achieved by the time of project completion were small. In retrospect, the approach in this and subsequent projects may have been too cautious and it was certainly hampered by the lack of any direct contractual or working relationships between IDA and the SEBs (PPAM paras. 13-19). Some points of special interest are: - the use of cut-off dates for placing procurement orders, to speed up disbursements (PPAM para. 3 and PCR paras. 3.01, 7.03); - IDA's supervision was mainly effective in procurement matters (PPAM para. 5 and PCR paras. 6.01, 7.01); - IDA's limited influence on the State Electricity Boards (PPAM paras. 2,7 and PCR para. 7.02); - problems of the State Electricity Boards' finances (PPAM para. 6 and PCR paras. 4.02, 6.02); - the project's modest institutional objectives and the success encountered in meeting those objectives (PPAM paras. 13-17); and - the lending strategy (a sector-type credit in support of a program) (PPAM paras. 2, 12, 18-19).  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM INDIA: SECOND POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT (CREDIT 242-IN) I. PROJECT SUMMARY 1. Credit 242-IN, for US$75 million, was signed on May 3, 1971, became effective on July 29, 1971 and was closed on March 31, 1977. The credit was made to the Government of India (GOI) to help finance extensions of the high voltage transmission network, as part of a program aiming at eventual inter- connection of all the local systems into a national grid. Interconnection was expected to permit a more efficient use of generating capacity at the national level and thus hold the rate of installation of new generating plant below the rate of increase in demand. IDA funds were to be disbursed only against the purchase of equipment, whether imported or produced locally. No final design, construction, construction supervision, or training was to be financed. 2. As in the case of an earlier loan and two subsequent creditsl, Credit 242-IN differed from the usual run of public utility lending in some significant respects. It was, in effect, a sector-type credit in support of a program, nationwide in scope, but carried out by a number of individual State Electricity Boards (SEBs), with whom IDA had no direct contractual relation- ship. The credit was not on-lent to the SEBs. Instead, it formed part of the overall financing available for GOI's budget, which included GOI loans to the various State governments, and the States in turn made loans to their SEBs; thus, IDA funds were not identifiable in the SEBs' finances nor did they perceptibly increase the level of SEB resourcesa2/. The principal advantage to SEBs of Bank/IDA assistance was the likelihood of lower bid-prices through international competition and certain fiscal concessions to Indian suppliers who won contracts under international bidding. 1/ First Transmission Project (Loan 416-IN), 1965; Third Transmission Project (Credit 377-IN), 1973; Fourth Transmission Project (Credit 604-IN), 1975. 2/ The "arm's length" relationship betwen IDA and the SEBs under the pro- ject was explicitly recognized in the Appraisal Report for Credit 242-IN, which stated: "IDA's influence on the sector is limited because it can be exerted only through the GO1. Borrowings such as the proposed Credit form part of the overall finance available to the COI for its annual budget, which includes loans to the State Governments. The budgets of the State Governments include loans to the respective SEBs for their development schemes. This pattern of lending is a substitute for the relending of the credit by GOI to the State Governments and to the SEBs. Thus the role of an IDA credit is marginal at the level of the SEBs." - 2 - 3. The main problem arising from physical execution of the project was the slow draw-down of the Credit. Applying lessons from the earlier Loan 416-IN, it was agreed at the outset that all equipment financed under the project was to be subject to international bidding and there was to be a cut-off date for placing contracts if they were to qualify for IDA disburse- ments. These requirements probably had some effect in speeding up procure- ment, compared with Loan 416-IN (where there had been a time overrun of 2-1/2 years, but an under-disbursement of US$20 million); nevertheless, there were still some delays (PCR para. 3.05). Because of the rupee devaluation and keen competition in bidding, savings arose which were used to finance more of the transmission program. Sub-projects were also amended, as SEBs modified their work programs. For these reasons, the cut-off date and the closing date were extended from time to time, in all by 18 months; even so, there remained an undisbursed balance of some US$ 2 million, which was cancelled. The final costs of equipment and materials for the project, as shown in the PCR (para. 3.11), were within the appraisal forecasts.. 4. No economic or incremental financial rate of return was calculated at appraisal and indeed the economic benefits of the different components of the project are not separately quantifiable. However, although demand grew more slowly than projected at appraisal, the project's physical justification was eventually confirmed by the actual rate of growth of power demand, coupled with shortfalls in expanding generating capacity, and the degree of capacity utilization experienced in the beneficiary SEBs (PPAM paras. 8-12 and PCR paras. 5.01-5.02). 5. IDA's supervision effort was almost entirely limited to procurement matters and to monitoring SEB accounts. Procurement for a US$75 million project spread over nine SEBs, with whom IDA dealt only indirectly through the Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC), inevitably generated a considerable volume of paperwork; the prompt and meticulous attention devoted to this certainly enabled procurement to proceed without major problems. IDA's super- vision teams (often combining supervision with appraisal of fresh projects) basically dealt with the CWPC office and not with the SEBs. Supervision reports were scanty and it must be concluded that project staff acquired little first-hand knowledge of, for example, the quality of equipment or construction. The intensity of supervision was in fact considerably less than average for a public utility project, and IDA apparently accepted from the outset that staff constraints would not permit otherwise. Full field super- vision for a project so dispersed would no doubt have required many more than the two or three projects staff available for the whole Indian power sector and, with the very limited influence which IDA had at SEB level (para. 7), a greater input might well have had diminishing returns at some point. Never- theless, some increase in staff available would have been worthwhile. 1/ The Appraisal Report concentrated on equipment and materials costs rather than total costs (i.e. including the cost of local civil and engineering works and engineering design). A rough estimate of final total costs is given in the Basic Data Sheet. -3 - 6. Apart from the slow draw-down of the Credit, it was not the physical execution of the project which attracted IDA's concern so much as an important secondary objective addressed by the whole series of transmission projects -- namely, to improve the financial performance of the SEBs. These institutions presented a picture of low rates of return (even on unrevalued fixed assets), inadequate tariffs, excessive debt and large accumulations of unpaid interest owed to the parent State governments. Improved performance was hampered by two constraints. First, the Electricity (Supply) Act, which regulated accounts and finances, incorporated concepts which are inconsistent with generally accepted principles of public utility finance. For example, surplus revenues were to be appropriated in the first place to depreciation, then to interest to the State Government and thirdly, if available, to debt repayment, but all these appropriations were optional. There was no clear obligation of the SEBs to cover such costs or financial obligations through their tariffs. Secondly, tariffs were de facto controlled by State governments, so that their level and structure tended to be influenced by wider concerns than those of the SEB as a utility -- for example, competition with other States to attract industry, the development of agriculture (with a rural electrification policy imposed on SEBs, including concessionary rates to farmers), and a desire to minimize any outflow of the States' resources by way of federal income tax on the profits of SEBsl/. To make a start on some of these problems, the Credit agreement called for collection by GOI of data on the effect of rural electrification on each SEB's finances, consultation between GOI and the States about disposal of the unpaid interest balances owed to the parent State governments, and continuation of the rate of return undertakings in force under Loan 416-IN, namely that each SEB would earn, by agreed target years, 9-1/2% on historically valued net fixed assets (PCR para. 4.01).!. 7. It is clear, however, from IDA's lack of a contractual relationship with the SEBs, the lack of any perceptible impact of IDA disbursements on SEB resources (para. 2), and the fact that the Credit represented only 3% of the total planned investment of the nine SEBs during the project construction period, that IDA's influence at SEB level was minimal or non-existent. Even GOI agencies in the sector appear to have little authority and must work through attempted persuasion and exhortation. Amendment of the Electric- ity (Supply) Act would have greatly facilitated reform but this would have 1/ Most States have chosen to increase effective tariffs by having excise taxes or duties on electricity billed, thereby increasing State revenues from electricity without subjecting associated income to potential income taxes. 2/ The 9-1/2% rate of return applied in these projects derived from the report of a GOI Committee, published in 1964; it represented: 6% for interest, 3% towards capital construction and 1/2% for reserves. The Appraisal Report refers to a rate of return of 11% but this inincluded a 1-1/2% duty on electricity sales; since this did not benefit the SEBs, the effective rate of return aimed at was 9-1/2%. required considerable study followed by consultation with all the States and was rejected by GOI as counterproductive at the time. The project's institutional objectives were correspondingly modest and the results unremark- able; none of the nine SEBs was able to achieve its rate of return target on time (PCR para. 4.01) and subsequent Credits have had to modify those targets!. II. MAIN ISSUES Forecast vs. Actual Growth of Electricity Generation 8. A very brief discussion of the actual growth of all-India electri- city generation is in para. 5.01 of the PCR. While the general conclusion of the PCR is correct, namely that actual growth was below the appraisal forecast but ultimately did reach the forecast level, no supporting statistics are shown and there is no mention of the particular experience of the nine SEBs covered by the project. The relevant data were, therefore, collected during the audit and are shown in the following table: Actual Electricity Generation and Growth Rates FY1970 and FYs 1974-1979 FY1970 FY1974 FY1975 FY1976 FY1977 FY1978 FY1979 Generation (GWH) All India 57,988 66,689 70,191 79,231 88,333 91,206 97,376 Nine SEBs 21,783 30,832 31,627 35,493 42,741 n.a n.a. Growth Rate (%) All India - 3.6 5.3 12.9 11.5 3.3 6.8 Nine SEBs - 9.1 2.6 12.2 20.4 n.a. n.a Sources: Staff appraisal Report for the Second Singrauli Thermal Power Project and "Public Electricity Supply All India Statistics" (Government of India). 9. At the time of appraisal, all-India electricity generation was forecast to grow at about 13% p.a. over the four-year period FY1970-FY1974. Of course, the growth rates of individual SEBs were expected to vary from the all-India average and were projected individually for the nine SEBs covered by the project, but the resulting forecast of the average growth rate for the nine SEBs together, at 14% p.a., was in line with the all-India average. Actual all-India electricity generation increased at a little less than 1/ Six SEBs have met the target later than scheduled (with delays of one to five years) though one subsequently fell below it again; the other three have not yet complied. (See PCR paras. 4.01-4.02). - 5 - 4% p.a. over the period and although the growth rate increased after FY1974, the appraisal forecast of generation for FY1974 was only reached in about FY1978 or FY1979. The actual increase in electricity generation for the nine SEBs was also below the appraisal forecast but much faster than the all-India average, i.e. about 9% p.a. for the period to FY1974, so that the FY1974 appraisal forecast of generation for the nine SEBs together was attained sooner, in FY1976. The principal reasons for the lower growth of generation than forecast, according to the PCR, were the failure to meet targets for the commissioning of new plant, the failure of two monsoons, leading to lower output from the hydroelectric stations, and the general impact on the economy of the oil crisis. Project Justification 10. It is not possible to justify a transmission project of the type associated with Credit 242-IN in isolation from other investments in the power sector. The project represented only part of the investment in transmission and distribution by each of the nine SEBs during the course of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (FY1970-FY1974); this investment, in turn, was only part of the longer-term development of the nine SEBs and an even smaller part of the nationwide development of transmission and distribution which was being undertaken by fifteen SEBs. As a further complication, the facilities constructed in the project would be used, inter alia, to transmit and dis- tribute energy generated by new generating plant also outside the scope of the project. 11. For these reasons, the benefits of the components of the project were not separately quantifiable and therefore no economic or incremental financial rate of return was calculated at appraisal. Instead, the Appraisal Report pointed out that, while demand and generation in all-India was expected to grow at 13% p.a., planned installed capacity would increase at only about 9% p.a., due in large measure to the growth of individual SEB transmission systems and interconnection between these systems. In consequence, a more effective utilization of generating capacity would be achieved and the project was regarded as a necessary part of this overall development. In the words of the Appraisal Report, "the Project would make a significant contribution to the growth of the networks of state and national transmission, and would assist, therefore, in holding the rate of installation of new plant down to the 9% quoted above. The Project is thus an essential element in the growth of a complex national power system." However, while the Appraisal Report clearly anticipated an increase in generating plant utilization at the all- India level, the individual forecasts of installed generating capacity and electricity generation for the nine SEBs covered by the project imply a decline!/. 1/ The Appraisal Report data show an increase in installed generating capacity for the nine SEBs together of 19% p.a. to FY1974 compared with a growth in electricity generation of about 14% p.a. - 6 - 12. In retrospect, although conclusive quantification is not possible, the project's physical achievements appear to have been well justified. Generation grew less rapidly than expected but did reach the forecast level before the end of the extended project period (para. 9). Utilization of installed generating capacity fell slightly in the period FY1974-1977 compared with FY1970 at both the all-India level and in the nine SEBs but in the latter case it was significantly higher than the appraisal forecast for FY1974 and would certainly have been lower without the projectI/. Finally, transmission investment is still regarded as a constraint in power sector development in India and further investment in transmission, ultimately to enable full integration of the regional systems, is judged to be necessary2.. Institutional Objectives and Lending Strategy 13. In reviewing the preparation and appraisal of Credit 242-IN, the question arises as to why IDA embarked on a fairly substantial investment of funds with such modest institutional objectives and with virtually no influence over the SEBs. The objectives essentially did no more than repeat the rate covenants already in force under the prior loan; indeed, they may be regarded as even more modest in the sense that Loan 416-IN anticipated that each SEB would reach the rate of return target in the period FY1969-FY1976 whereas Credit 242-IN extended the time allowed for achieving the target to the period FY1973-FY1977. At the same time, the Appraisal Report acknowledged that "the role of an IDA credit is marginal at the level of the SEBs". Finally, IDA's management had expressed serious concern about the finances of the SEBs prior to making the credit. A project had been appraised more than a year earlier - in late 1969 - but had been deferred while IDA was reviewing policy on domestic preference and while GOI was considering international bidding philosophy (PCR para. 2.02). During this time, a continuous but not wholly conclusive dialogue had taken place between 001 and IDA concerning the institutional improvements which were needed and practicable. 14. By the time the project to be supported by Credit 242-IN was pre- sented to the Board, it appears that IDA had come to accept that institutional improvements could only come about over the longer term. According to the Appraisal Report: "The credit now proposed is visualized as the first of a series of similar credits which seek to obtain institutional improvements gradually. Its purpose is to induce the first steps along this path". It was 1/ Actual growth in installed capacity for the nine SEBs together was of the order of 9% to 10% p.a. in the period FY1970-FY1977. It is emphasized that statistics on generating plant utilisation must be interpreted with care and may sometimes be misleading since they are influenced signifi- cantly by many factors apart from development of the transmission system. The technical qualifications are not discussed here as the results are intended only to be suggestive. 2/ Appraisal Report for the Second Singrauli Thermal Power Project and India: Economic Issues in the Power Sector (World Bank Report No. 2335-IN, April 26, 1979). - 7 - believed that the credit would strengthen the hand of CWPC in pressing for reforms and that there were already encouraging signs of growing awareness by the SEBs of the importance of modern financial management of the sector. 15. Tz reach a judgment on the degree of success of IDA's "gradualist" approach, it would be necessary to look carefully at the experience under the projects subsequent to Credit 242-IN as well as the experience under Credit 242-IN itselfl/. Such a task is clearly well beyond the scope of this audit so that only certain preliminary observations can be made here. 16. On the positive side, it appears that a measure of institutional progress has occurred. The Indian authorities, recognizing that all aspects of the sector must be reviewed both at the State and Central levels, have established a high-level Committee, known as the Rajadhyaksha Committee, to examine and make recommendations on power planning, project formulation and implementation, operation and maintenance, finance, financial management and tariffs, rural electrification, and research and developmentZl. State govern- ments have begun to subsidize SEBs for losses imposed by State rural elec- trification policy. Tariff studies based on marginal cost pricing have been undertaken in most States, although the implementation of the studies is entirely at the discretion of the States concerned. The Electricity (Supply) Act has been amended, with IDA's advice, and now is in a more satisfactory form, although implementation is still lagging and there is as yet no require- ment to revalue fixed assets3/. Some States have written off, albeit pro- visionally, the overdue interest owed by their SEBs. The Central Electricity Authority (which absorbed CWPC) has been strengthened-/. GOI now does make additional resources available to beneficiaries in the amount of 70% of Bank- group financing provided for their projects. Finally, the rates of return achieved by most SEBs, while not entirely satisfactory, have shown a gradual improvement up to FY1977 (PCR para. 4.01). 17. On the other hand, there are signs of deterioration in the financial position of the SEBs since FY1977. While the financial results in the PCR suggest that the number of SEBs achieving their targets increased from three 1/ See para. 2. Since India Power Transmission IV (Credit 604-IN) is a continuation of India Power Transmission III (Credit 377-IN) and cost overruns under Credit 377-IN are being financed under Credit 604-IN, the Region will write a joint PCR on the two projects. The PCR is not expected before the end of 1981. 2/ The Committee is due to complete its deliberations in 2-3 months (see Appendix). 3/ Implementation will be based upon the findings of the Rajadhyaksha Committee. 4/ GOI has commented that "the Central Government, through its Department of Power and the Central Electricity Authority have been monitoring the implementation of the schemes taken up under the transmission project closely by establishing periodical dialogues and review meetings with the State electricity boards" (see Appendix). -8- in FY1977 to four and five in FYs 1978 and 1979 respectively (para. 4.02), the rate of return performance of five of the nine SEBs deteriorated compared with FY1977.1/. The deterioration stems from a number of causes, the principal one being that tariffs have not kept pace with increases in operating costs. In addition, the availability of plant was unsatisfactory, due to its poor physical condition, which in turn was partly due to poor maintenance; there was a loss of cheaper hydro-power, because of low rainfall; and there were major accretions of new plant, which inflated the rate base. Some SEBs are still not able to cover interest and depreciation from revenues. This tariff inadequacy suggests that a rate of return target decided as long ago as 19642/ and calculated on historic costs is no longer meaningful under present infla- tionary conditions. Indeed, one must ask whether a uniform rate of return target was ever appropriate for all SEBs, given their widely differing circum- stances. Last, but not least, financial management in many SEBs is believed to be still poorl/. 18. In the light of these preliminary observations, it is certainly not obvious that the institutional achievements so far have been commensurate with the amount of lending by the Bank group in the four transmission projects (US$380 million), although it must be recognized that Bank group financing represents a very small percentage of the capital expenditures of the SEBs. As a related question, it is proper to ask whether a different lending strategy might have been more successful. Rather than adopting the sector- type credit in support of a program, a more traditional approach would have been to divide the transmission program into a series of individual projects, one for each beneficiary, which would have offered more scope for direct institutional impact. 19. A difficulty with the traditional approach is that it would have meant a piecemeal and fragmented involvement in a sector undergoing very rapid expansion. It would also have required greatly increased staff input for the same volume of simultaneous lending. Furthermore, it would possibly have lost the centralized procurement expertise and coordination of CWPC and it might have been inappropriate for a program aimed at building up a national power grid. The transmission program had high priority for IDA at that time, because it seemed to be the sub-sector where investment was urgently needed, and also because the local manufacture of transmission equipment had advanced to the stage where international competitive bidding could be fully intro- duced. Accordingly, the sector-type approach must have appeared to be the most 1/ According to data prepared in connection with the Second Singrauli Thermal Power Project, most SEBs are implementing programs to restore their rates of return to the 9-1/2% level. 2/ See para. 6. 3/ In viewing the rate of return performance of SEBs, it is important to bear in mind that the excise taxes or duties which are levied on electricity sales in eight of the nine States cause the total return on assets to be substantially higher in some cases than the return to the SEBs themselves. For example, the return including State duties in the case of Gujarat and Haryana is 4%-5% higher than the return after taxes. - 9 - expedient way for IDA to make a timely and meaningful investment in the sector, to help implant sound procurement policies, and at least to make a start on institutional improvements, even though the way ahead would not be easy in view of the problem of GOI/State relationships. the absence of real autonomy of SEBs, inadequate legislation and insufficient data, and the differing views of the States, GOI and IDA as to solutions. The decision to make the sector type credit was, therefore, probably justified at the time. III. CONCLUSIONS 20. The project was technically well conceived and prepared and executed without serious problems (except for slow disbursements and a time overrun). It also proved possible to finance more works from the Credit than originally estimated. IDA's input was appropriate and helpful as regards procurement, but slow in achieving institutional improvements. The hoped-for rehabilitation of SEB finances has proved elusive, in part due to the lack of any direct contractual or working relationship between IDA and the SEBs, the small percentage of the total program financed by IDA, staff constraints and some reluctance on the part of GOI agencies to change too quickly. These agencies may understandably have been unwilling to risk too rapid or too ambitious a program of change in a complex and politically sensitive area. Whatever the reasons, the gradual step-by-step approach may have been too halting and too cautious. Even the Appraisal Report doubted whether the rate covenants were very meaningfull/ and they have become even less so over time (apart from the question of non-compliance). 21. The problems of the Indian power sector are complex and even tenta- tive conclusions are difficult to reach in one project audit. Moreover, as the sector develops, national generation authorities and Regional Boards, with better prospects of institutional efficiency, will play an increasingly important role. Nevertheless, the SEBs are still the "grass roots" institu- tions in the sector and their proper development will continue to call for greater autonomy from State government, better asset utilization, better planning and better management. For the future, if the Bank group is to play an effective part in the rehabilitation of the SEBs, a more direct relation- ship with them will be essential, e.g., by direct lending, separate project agreements, specific on-lending arrangements and/or linking relevant disburse- ments to SEBs performance2/. 1/ Appraisal Report, para. 1.04. 2/ The Government does not "consider it necessary that there should inevi- tably be any further direct relationship between the Bank and the State electricity boards" in these terms. Furthermore, according to Govern- ment, "in pursuance of the dialogue with the Bank, series of steps have been taken to monitor the progress of works as also to improve the managerial, financial and economic viability of the electricity boards in the country. The Rajadhyaksha Committee on Power has been given comprehensive terms of reference and is due to complete its deliberations in another 2-3 months. We do not therefore believe that any lack of direct relationship between the Bank and the State electricity boards has affected adversely the power sector in any way" (see Appendix).  - 10 - WORLD BANK / INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION Appendix OFFICE MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. iv S. p r, D DATE: April 15, 1980 FROM: Y.V.ddy S SUBJECT: OED Report on Second Power Transmission Project We have received the following comments from GOI on OED report on Second Power Transmission Project. While Bank's involvement in the power sector as a whole has been increasing rapidly, the involvement under the transmission sector is somewhat limited. As compared to the Plan allocations for transmission and distribution since 1971 of Rs.3,000 crores, the IDA assistance to the transmission sector has been of only about a tenth of this. In pursuance of the dialogue with the Bank, series of steps have been taken to monitor the progress of works as also to improve the managerial, financial and economic viability of the electricity boards in the country. The Rajadhyaksha Committee on Power has been given comprehensive terms of reference and is due to complete its deliberations in another 2-3 months. We do not therefore believe that any lack of direct relationship between the Bank and the State electricity boards has affected adversely the power sector in any way. All major sectoral issues have come up for discussion from time to time during the course of appraisal and negotiations for various generation, transmission and rural electrification projects. We do not, therefore, consider it necessary that there should inevitably be any further direct relationship between the Bank and the State electricity boards in terms of direct lending, separate project agreements, specific on-lending arrangements, etc. Also any such direct on-lending will not be in keeping with the structure for devolution of funds to State governments which is periodically agreed upon in terms of the recommenda- tions of the Finance Commission and the further deliberations of the National Development Council. The Central Government, through its Department of Power and the Central Electricity Authority have been monitoring the implementation of the schemes taken up under the transmission project closely by establishing periodical dialogues and review meetings with the State electricity boards. We would certainly welcome any further supervision input by the Bank in this behalf but this would perhaps inevitably require augmentation of staff strength on the Bank side.  ATTACHMENT INDIA: SECOND POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT (CREDIT 242-IN) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT 1. INTRODUCTION 1.01 The project was the second of a series of lending operations for power transmission projects, the objectives of which are (i) to finance high voltage transmission facilities which would complete the interconnection of networks within the States and permit transfers of power between the State systems and (ii) to improve the earnings of the State Electricity Board (SEBs), bring about uniformity of accounting and introduce commercial soundness. The Government of India (GOI) was the borrower. Transmission lines, substations and associated equipment within the transmission development program of specified States were agreed with GOI and the Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC) and appraised as the project. 1.02 The first transmission project (Loan 416-IN) which was made in 1965 involved all the SEBe at that time (15); the second which is the subject of this report involved nine SEBes - Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Baryana, Mharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. It also included the equipment costs associated with the 220 kV transmission lines to convey power from the Beas hydroelectric project to three of these States - Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan. 1.03 The work covered by the second transmission power project was inco- plate at the Closing Date of March 31, 1977, and US$72.935 million was disbursed leaving US$2.065 million to be cancelled. Previous Bank Involvement in the Power Sector 1.04 At the time of the second power transmission project the Bank had made eight Loans to India for power projects amounting to US$155 million net of cancellation, and IDA had made four Credits totalling US$77 million net 6f cancellation. Only one of these (Loan 416-IN) was for transmission and distribution, the others were all for generation projects. The Power Sector 1.05 The Indian power sector is complex because electricity supply is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Central Government and the State Government. At the time the project was appraised the principal agencies in the industry, apart from the State Electricity Boards (SEBa) which are res- ponsible for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity within each State and for the control of private sector licensed electricity supply undertakings, were the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) and the power wing of the Central Water and Power Commission (CWPC). Additionally, the Atomic Energy Commission has been responsible for nuclear power generation. It comes under the Department of Atomic Energy which is answerable directly to the Prime Minister. - 12 - 1.06 The CEA which was created in 1950 was, in theory, responsible for developing a national policy for power development and for coordinating the activities of the various planning agencies in electricity supply. govever, with no staff and no clear and accepted function it was largely Inoperative until, in connection with the Third Power Transmission Project (Credit 377-IN of May 1973), GOI agreed to its reactivation. In October 1974 the functions of the CWPC were split and the power function was trans- ferred to the CEA reporting to the newly established Ministry of Energy. 1.07 In addition to its general responsibilities for national power policies, CIA was, thenceforth, responsible for the formulation of plans for power development, training of personnel, interconnected systems operation, research and development. It was also responsible for coordination of power planning country-wide to ensure that all projects carried out by the two Central Power Corporations (the National Thermal Power Corporaton and the National Rydro Power Corporation), which were established in 1975, and the SEBs fit into the overall national program and the investments are made so as to be put to optimum use. 1.08 Although CEA was ultimately the coordinating authority for the project, this function came under the power wing of CWPC during most of the project implementation period and references throughout this report are to CWPC. 2. PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL Origin 2.01 The power sector of the Indian economy was, in 1970, large and growing fast and it was considered sound and necessary to t9prove the trans- mission and distribution system to enable optimum use of the existing and planed generating facilities. After a long period of involvement in financing the expansion of generating facilities, the Bank decided to move into the field of financing the expansion of transmission and distribution facilities and, as mentioned in paragraph 1.01, the project under review is the second of this type. Preparation. Appraisal, Neotiations and Approval 2.02 An earlier project which was to be designated the second power trans- mission project had been appraised late in 1969 but the processing of the Credit was deferred while the Association was reviewing policy on domestic preference and its concern about the more effective management of the SEs, and while GOI was considering International bidding philosophy. The project as defined in the Appraisal Report, was agreed in consultation with CWPC and the beneficiary SEE during the appraisal, which was carried out in Deceber 1970, and was determined after a detailed examination of the SEBs construction programs and commissioning dates. - 13 - Project Description 2.03 The project, as appraised, comprised about 4,500 circuit km of trans- mission lines operating at voltages between 66 kV and 220 kV and about 110 substations with an aggregate capacity of some 3,500 MVA. Covenants 2.04 The principal issue during negotiations was the need for improving the financial position of the beneficiary SEBs. It was agreed that the finan- cial improvements introduced by the conditions of Loan 416-IN should be continued. These improvements comprised, principally, rate of return targets which had to be achieved in specified years for each SEB between 1969 and 1976. It was subsequently agreed (in Loan 416-IN before the new Credit was made) that the targets were unrealistic and the Bank agreed to modifications. The revised rate of return targets, which were continued under Credit 242-IN, and the rate actually achieved are set out in paragraph 4.01. 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS Loan Effectiveness 3.01 Apart from the standard conditions of effectiveness it was agreed that the Borrower (GOI) would obtain from each of the beneficiary SEls and, the Beas Construction Board, in a manner acceptable to the Association, an agreement to fulfil all the functions specified in Section 3.03 of the Credit Agreement. Also, because of the problems (see para. 3.05) associated with procurement in the case of Loan 416-IN a covenant was introduced stipulating that no withdrawal from the Credit would be made with respect to contracts for the purchase of goods and services awarded more than eighteen months after the signing of the Agreement. The Credit was declared effective on July 29, 1971 just over two months after the Agreement was signed. Revision to Scope of Project 3.02 The scope of the Project as described in paragraph 2.03 was based on the appraisal carried out by the Association in December 1970. The Credit Agreement, which was signed on the 3rd May 1971 carried a similar description. 3.03 In November 1972, IDA was asked by CWPC to include in the project an additional program of works estimated at about US$8.85 million. This proSram was described as a "buffer" program which was to be financed by savings in the Credit resulting partly from competitive prices obtained and partly due to an adjustment in the Rupee/Dollar exchange rate. The "buffer" program was approved by IDA in February 1973, following detailed discussions during negotiations for Power Transmission Project III (Credit 377-IN). - 14 - 3.04 The project as finally implemented consisted of about 3,725 circuit km of transmission lines operating at voltages between 66 kV and 220 kV and more than 220 sub-stations with an aggregate capacity of about 6,760 MVA besides additional facilities for establishment of communication systems, etc. Imleasa.tation 3.05 The project had a very slow start, the major problem being slow procurement, principally because of the time taken by GOIin the settlement of requests from local contractors for renegotiation of firm price contracts for towers and conductors and because of the effects of the international economic situation, at that time, on raw materials and labor. To add to the problem, the low standard of bid documentation and the degree of refinement needed before these could be cleared by the Association caused further delays. There were also delays in CWPC's evaluation of bids after receipt. As a consequence of all this, and the additional works included in the Project (see para. 3.09), the covenant stipulating no withdrawal from the credit in respect of contracts for goods and services awarded more than eighteen months after signing of the Credit Agreement had to be amended with an 18-month extension of the cut-off date - from November 3, 1972 to April 30, 1974. This in turn necessitated successive postponements of the Closing Date from September 30, 1975 to a final date of March 31, 1977. 3.06 Another problem was the consistent failure of all the beneficiary SEBe to meet their targets of financial performance. Ravised targets have since been set which they are now meeting. This problem is dealt with in greater detail in chapter 4 of this report. 3.07 The project, as subsequently smended, was not fully completed, and by the Cleding Date of March 31, 1977, disbursements amounted to US$72.935 million and US$2.065 million of the Credit was cancelled. Actual and estimated disbursements are shown in Annex 1. Procurement 3.08 Credit Agreement 242-IN was signed on May 3, 1971. In May 1971, IDA provided CWPC with guidelines on the preparation of bidding documents to ensure that foreign and local bidders compete on a common basis. During a mission about this time discussions were held on the draft "General Conditions of Contract" and "Instructions to Bidders". It was agreed at this time that CWPC should formulate model technical specifications for a number of items common to the different beneficiaries. These were subsequently discussed with CWPC and approved in September 1971. Bidding documents were made available to the participating SEe by CWPC in October 1971. 3.09 By March 31, 1972, the SEBa had issued bid notices for equipment valued at approximately US$52 million, and in May 1972 CWPC furnished copies of the bidding documents to IDA for clearance. It was noted at this time that some of the participating SEBes had altered their programmes, and a mission - 15 - which visited India during June - July 1972 discussed these chau,es and modi- fied programs. CWPC formally provided details of the modified programs and their justification on July 5, 1972 and IDA. notified acceptance of the modified programs on July 24, 1972. Because of these events and the additional works included in the Project (see para. 3.03), the cut-off date for award of con- tracts was postponed to April 30, 1974. 3.10 As many as 268 contracts were placed by April 24, 1974. The alloca- tion of these between the beneficiaries is shown below: - Beneficiary No. of Contracts Beneficiary No. of Contracts Andhra Pradesh SEB 32 Punjab SEB 30 Bihar SEB 24 Rajasthan SEB 22 Gujarat SEB 7 Uttar Pradesh SEB 56 Bariyana SEB 30 West Bengal SEB 28 Maharashtra SEB 26 Bess Construction Board 13 Project Costs 3.11 The estimated costs of equipment and materials for the project are shown briefly in the following table. The table shows a comparison of costs based on the project as appraised and costs actually incurred. The same exchange rate as was applicable at the time of appraisal is used for com- parison purposes when converting actual expenditureA to US dollars, Original Actual Rs US$ Ra US$ Millions Millions Million Millions 1. Conductors and Groundwire 159.72 21.30 108.54 14.47 2. Towers 90.47 12.06 65.05 8.67 3. Insulators 18.81 2.51 20.08 2.67 4. Transformers 82.40 10.99 105.38 14.05 5. Switchgear 61.40 8.19 101.61 13.54 6. Capacitors 13.10 1.75 10.00 1.33 7. Load Despatch Equipment 107.70 14.36 67.39 8.98 8. Controls and Relay Panels 18.50 2.46 42.04 5.60 9. Power Cables 4.00 0.53 3.74 0.49 10. Misc. Equipment 6.40 0.85 16.68 2.22 Total 562.50 75.00 540.51 72.02 - 16 - 4. OPERATING AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF BENEFICIARY SEB& 4.01 The obligations given by SEBs and their respective State Governments in connection with the first power transmission project (Loan 416-IN), that each SE would achieve rate of return performance targets of 9h5 on historic costs (excluding 1h% for duty on energy sales payable to the State Government) by specified times, were continued. The following table shows the year in which each of beneficiary SEBe of Credit 242-IN was expected to achieve their targets together with their actual achievements. Rate of Rate of Return Return Target 9.5% Achievement (%) FY70 to be achieved FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 by: Andhra Pradesh SEB 7.4 1973 7.7 9.0 9.5 9.5 1/ Biar SEB 2.0 1975 7.0 8.1 7.5 (0.7)f/ Gujarat SEB 7.0 1974 7.9 9.7 9.5 9.5 T/ Baraysna SEB 8.0 1974 7.2 6.4 7.2 10.0 Ahaashtra SEB 8.7 1974 10.0 13.0 15.3 14.2 Puijab SEB 7.7 1974 7.4 8.2 9.5 9.5 Rajasthan SEB 4.9 1977 8.7 9.2 7.9 6.6 1/ Uttar Pradesh SEB 5.1 1975 4.6 5.8 3.0 1/ 3.1 1/ Vest Bengal SEB 8.5 1975 6.0 9.5 7.2 1/ 7.7 1/ 1/ Estimates. 4.02 The table shows that three of the nine SEB's had achieved their targets by 1977, four were expected to do so in 1978 and five in 1979. Although SEBs have all increased their earnings since 1970, the progress which each has made has been unsatisfactory. This is attributable to: (a) the failure to make timely increases in tariffs to cover inflationary increases in costs, to cover the servicing of its debts and to provide internally generated funds to help to finance future construction; (b) the implementation by SESs of Federal and State poli- cies for rural electrification which could be econo- mically justified, but are not financially viable in the short and medium terms, and are involving SEBes in heavy losses from massive low yielding investments; - 17 - (c) a-liocre financial management, inadequate planning of financial operations, and the unsuitability of the accounting as a basis for conducting a sound and efficient public utility operation; and (d) excessive staffing which is represented by a low consumer/ employee ratio of about 8 to 1. 4.03 Income statements for the beneficiary SEB for 711978, excluding Gujarat where relevant information is not available, are shown in Annex 2. 1/ 5. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION 5.01 A number of factors, principally the failure (through poor planning) to meet targets for commissioning new plant, failure of two monsoons during this period and the general effects on the economy of the oil crisis of the early 1970s, led to a lower growth rate of power generation than forecast during the early 1970's; target growth rates averaging 13% per annum, which were forecast at the time of appraisal, were much higher than 5% actually achieved during the period 1969/70 - 1973/74. However, the growth rate resumed its usual trend of around 13% per annum after 1974/75 and the Project, as amended, was ultimately justified by the growth in demand. 5.02 It is difficult to allocate the benefits of India's power sector development program among its various components, indeed it is Impossible to do so on a reasonable basis. There is therefore no acceptable basis for estimsting the return on the sub projects in the program covered by the Project. The Project was necessary to meet India's growing power requirements during the construction period. 6. BANK PERFORMANCE 6.01 The Bank Group, through the first power transmission proj$ct (Loan 416-IN) and this project established a very good supervision relation- ship with the procurement section of CWPC and assisted CWPC in the formulation of standardized procedures for precurement for this and succeeding power transmission projects. 6.02 An important area in which the Bank hoped to have some influence through this Credit was in the financial operations of the SEBs, and in this area the objectives were only partially realized. The SEBs were to be respon- sible for running their own operations subject only to broad instructions and guidance in policy matters from State Government. In practice, the SEBs have been very much under the control of the State Governments, rather along the 1/ The rate of return achievements for FY1978 shown in the table in para, 4,01 are based upon more recent information than that contained in Annex 2 and this accounts for the differences. - 18 - Ines of the Public Works Departments in which most of them have their origins. One symptom of this dependence and at the same time a factor which helps main- tain it, is the chronic financial weakness of most of the SEBs. A continuation in the Credit Agreement of the rate of return covenants in Loan 416-IN was intended to help in improving the financial operations of the recipient SIBs. Covensats 6.03 The principal covenant was the rate of return covenant which required that each SE would achieve a rate of return of 9hZ by specified times. The table setting out the targets and actual achievements is shown in paragraph 4.01 of this report. 7. CONCWSIOKS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 7.01 The Project is, in affect, part of India's ongoing transmission development program and the only real lesson to be learned is the Imposeib- lity of adequately supervising the work, which consists of sub-projects scattered all over India, with a small staff based in Washington, other than the procurement aspects. A better arrangement for more effective supervision of this type of project and a closer working relationship with the SEe should be developed. 7.02 The Credit was made to 001 with the SEBs as beneficiaries. The absence of a close working relationship with the SEe has deaied the opportu- nties for affecting institutional improvements. The importance of more direct iavolvement of the SEBes in projects of this nature, through adequate project agreements is clearly indicated. 7.03 Another lesson is the limited effectlyaness of a covenant establishing a cut-off date for placement of contracts as a device for keeping the project on schedule. For a number of reasons (see para. 3.05) the cut-off date had to be extended by 18 months which in turn resulted in a postponement of the Claolng Date by a similar period. South Asia Regional Office August 14, 1978 -19- ANNEX 1 INDIA SECOND POWER TRANSMISSION PROJECT Credit 242-IN Schedule of Disbursements Accumulated Disbursements Actual IDA US1,00,s Disbursements as Fiscal Year Actual Appraisal percentage of and Quarter Disbursements Estimate Appraisal Estimate 1972/73 March 31, 1973 34 2,000 1.7 June 30, 1973 34 5,000 0.7 1973/74 September 30, 1973 230 8,000 2.9 December 31, 1973 487 11,000 4.4 March 31, 1974 1,498 15,000 10.0 June 30, 1974 6,076 20,000 30.0 1974/75 September 30, 1974 7,435 27,000 27.5 December 31, 1974 10,400 35s000 29.7 March 31, 1975 16,154 45,000 35.9 June 30, 1975 23,717 53,000 44.7 1975/76 September 30, 1975 27,652 58,000 47.7 December 31, 1975 29,353 63,000 46.6 March 31, 1976 40,500 67,000 60.4 June 30, 1976 46,300 75,000 61.7 1976/77 September 30, 1976 49,900 75,000 66.5 December 31, 1976 55,600 75,000 74.1 March 31, 1977 67,000 75,000 89.3 June 30, 1977 72,790 75,000 97.0 June 1978 sacD. nUafhs182 Mm PnoUe * aart 242-rp forecat m= Statfemnt at cantal ast of 9~t0etary SE for k T 197 (h aSmlliSas of Sup.es) Snara * Uttar sc 15ggSgk IIgg, Ra a itarstahhtra I 1 2a29tbM ra-a emo Reye~u satta of Eletrletty 1,276 906 460 1,992 520 678 1.941 741 Other Operatin lev*u 106 40 60 84) 65 3 106 17 covernmeat aE substdy 1/ 140 ) 172 106 - 50 total Incoe 1,382 1,086 320 2,076 757 817 2,047 n08 ExKendtture Fuel 303 182 110 411 102 35 *700 170 rower Purchased 42 367 29 270 14 239 25 152 Depreciation 216 116 68 217 97 97 280 68 Other Operatig and maintenauce 442 a1 192 674 250 241 782 259 Total Eeänditure 1,003 878 399 1,572 463 612 1,787 649 OPCrAtIMLu Income 379 20a 121 504 294 205 260 159 Capital Das 0 (average of beginntag and end of year) Fixed -Asets ta service 5,543 4,392 2,801 7,212 4,132 3,776 11,249 2,237 (l6ss consumers contribution) Intangible A9sets 5 8 5 44 15 2 54 13 vorking Capital 131 1z7 35 226 61 86 251 97 Total 5,699 4,527 2,861 7.482 4,208 3,864 11,554 2,347 Accoumlated Deprociation 1,359 888 506 1,358 646 664 1,648 461 Chnsumere Security Depocita 253 80 90 290 100 71 200 46 Toal -,612 968 596 1,648 746 735 1,848 507 CaPita Sast 4,087 3,559 2,265 5,834 3,462 3,129 9,706 . 1.840 Averaea tanital lama 3,691 3,100 1,941 5,197 3,092 2,650 8,658 1,665 lage of tecurn 2/ 10.32 6.7n 6.21 9.7% 9.5% 7.7Z 3.0 9.5% (Operating itm to Average C&påtal Sas*) 1. Ixeludes ME Sub9idy froM Anhra tradesh Coverames: dag i reopect of 1977/78. A~ount has not yet been detemied. 2. The rate of returni achievements for FY1978 shown in the table in para. 4.01 differ from those in this Annex and are based upon nore recent information. June, 1978 -:]5dhpOr NJoda o_. INDIA Bhuj V Mehmedabad POWER TRANSMISSION 3[ PROJECT SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF GUJARAT Nadiad kAND MAHARASHTRA POWER SYSTEMS LGRFOR GEOGAPHLCAL LOCAT1N 0F MAJOR SUBSTATIONS SEE MAP JamnagarO LI ES EXIRmd PAnanO p0 _GondaDhuvar G-,r r--------J - Paad-Dhandhuka B ..ach _Dhas ---Bhamag.rU'a Ward Gh.lwad NU re CLUAR) IgatpunYwa mrvt VaiarnaNa.ik - Bhusawa BarvaAmher-ah Chahýgan puch.,. Khaverkheda Chola r_ Pa SaaeteKaya0 vurD-ragaa pta[urn - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ý DhrviKla -nrmu P-ll p. 1 LEGEND: Cana =Kandagadmh A issiNLIE EXI[ST ING POOE chm,,hwad Phrm122D KV - em m n 132 KV -- -- Batgarh UNDCR .. CN TT UC C Kard B atraRod Lonad LINES &SUBSTATIONS iN RED ARE INCLUDED IN PROPOSED PROJECTO MRH1 970 BD23  INDIA POWER TRANSMISSION U PROJECT SCHEMATIC 2IAGRAM OF BIHAR & WEST BENGAL Malda Gandak (Balrfknajar) POWER SYSTEMS a FOR GEOGRAPH1CAL LOCAT10N OF MAJOR SUSTAT ON SEE MAP ToO K-- Farakk, Ch-- - - - -apr- G.kan G a Bhar i Ba m (M a h) Sultwnganj T. D.VC - B e -ldag -T teha T. D.V.C. IDTo V CKrisnaga To D. VC e-m ToTUoP4- Sanaldi • Ranaghat ENERGIZED AT 132 KV To DNV.C. To D.V.C. , oD , -Chandål A d-sptagra- - Band -aapur 'l o nssa+ ---Purha -- RrshraAsokenaga Adityapur_,B,u RajkharswanDabugr Kendpos-a- Lilonah T.RX 0, - -lkerab -w ToOnsa wlooma i i i --- ---,| |LEGEND: (DVC) TRANSMIS-I-NLNES EXLTNG PRPOE UNE -CNTR., DVC - DAMODAR VALLE CORPORATION 132 KV - - INCLUDED .N PROPOSED PROJECT 66 KV z IBRD-2836 MARCH 1970  INDIA POWER TRANSMISSION [ PROJECT SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF ANDHRA PRADESH POWER SYSTEM a11hkund - L~~~~~ -- rml a agnam/ 4-'- 0-4 M- 1aav I - IhL L r g s J rANMIdEE.hammDamSLoRwer ESOleru KotagdeN---S DO ST n h. a aae e sw e es aaes eees esso s we132s XV SIaSGunada DREE [mmr I E R TandSO IhDSEEAdSESIm aguruna0 MARCH 197Tadepalh3