Liberia - Second Highway Project

Document of rhCOPY The World Bank FC FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 2557 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT LIBERIA SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 907-LBR/CREDIT 395-LBR) June 22, 1979 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT LIBERIA SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 907-LBR/CREDIT 395-LBR) Table of Contents Page No. PREFACE ii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET iii PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM (HIGHLIGHTS) iv-v ATTACHMENT: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT I. Introduction 1 II. Project Appraisal 1 III. Project Implementation and Cost 6 IV. Institutional Development 12 V. Economic Reevaluation 12 VI. The Role of the Bank Group 15 VII. Conclusions 16 Tables 1. Expected and Actual Project Implementation and Costs 18 2. Expected and Actual Schedule of Disbursements 19 3. Withdrawal of the Proceeds of the Loan and Credit 20 4. Economic Reevaluation of the Road Maintenance Program 21 5. Economic Reevaluation of the Monrovia Bypass Construction (8.2 mi) 22 Chart Organization of the Ministry of Public Works, 1976 23 Maps This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  - ii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT LIBERIA SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 9C7-LBR/CREDIT 395-LBR) Preface This report presents a performance audit of the Liberia Second Highway Project for which Loan 907-LBR for US$3 million and Credit 395-LBR for US$2.6 million were fully disbursed in September 1978 and August 1975, respectively. It consists of a memorandum (Highlights), prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), and a Project Completion Report (PCR), prepared by the Bank's Western Africa Regional Office. OED has reviewed the PCR against the Appraisal and President's Reports and has found that it covers in a comprehensive and critical manner the issues arising from the implementation experience of the project. Com- ments made by OED on an earlier draft of the PCR are reflected in the present version. On the basis of this limited review process, OED accepts the analy- sis and conclusions of the PCR, which are summarized in the memorandum. Projects staff collected data for the PCR during the final supervi- sion mission of March 1977 and the appraisal mission for the Fourth Highway Project in July 1977. Nc visit was made by OED staff to Liberia. The Minis- try of Public Works submitted to the Bank a draft PCR in July 1978, which was useful in the preparation of the Bank's PCR. Although there were no dif- ferences of substance between the Bank's PCR and the Ministry's draft PCR, Projects staff considered the draft was incomplete regarding analysis of some subjects, such as the performance of the Borrower, the Bank, the consultants, and the contractors as well as the economic reevaluation. The Ministry's draft PCR was not finalized and is not included in this report, although it has been seen in OED. In the normal course, the draft of this report was sent to the Government; no further comments were received.  - iii - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET LIBERIA SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 907-LBR/CREDIT 395-LBR) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ million) 14.14 18.86 Overrun (%) 33 Loan Amount (US$ million) 3.00 Credit Amount (US$ million) 2.60 Loan/Credit Amount (US$ million) 5.60 Disbursed ) 5.60 Repaid ) 11 Borrower's Obligation ) 4/3U/7 6.26 /1 Prcject Completion Date 6/30/77 10/78 Proportion Completed by Project Completion Late (%) 93 J 100 Proportion of Time Overrun (%) - 33 Economic Rate of Return (%) Maintenance Program 32 39 /3 Monrovia Eypass 42 51 Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US$ million) FY74 FY75 FY76 FY77 FY78 FY79 Estimated 1.8 4.4 5.1 5.6 5.6 5.6 Actual .4 2.1 4.2 5.2 5.5 5.6 % Actual/Estimated 22 53 82 93 98 100 OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Current Estimate First Timetable - - 7/08/71 Gegotiations 6/15/73 4/16/73 4/18-26/73 Board Approval 5/01/73 5/22/73 5/24/73 Loan and Credit Agreement Dates 6/73 - 6/13/73 Effectiveness Dates 9/13173 11/73 12/28/73 Loan Closing Date 12/31/77 6/30/78 & 9/78 12/31/78 Credit Closing Date 12/31/77 - 8/75 Borrower Republic of Liberia Executing Agency Ministry of Public Works Ftc.. Year of Borrower 6/1 - //31 Follow-on Project Name Third Highway Project Loan Number Loan 1156 Amount (US$ million) 27.5 Loan Agreement Date 8/28/75 MISSION DATA Month/ No. of No. of Date of Item Year Weeks Persons Manweeks Report Preparation (3 missions) 1971/72 3 4 n.a. 1971/72 Appraisal 10-11/72 n.a. 2 n.a. 5/07/73 Supervision T 6-7/73 1 2 2 8/10/73 Supervision II 2,74 1 2 2 3/29/74 Supervision III 9/74 1 2 2 10/30/74 Supervision IV 11-12/74 3 2 6 1/03/75 Supervision V 12/75 1 2 2 2/10/76 Supervision VI 6/76 1 1 1 8/04/76 Supervision VII 12/76 1 2 2 1/12/77 Supervision VIII 3/77 1 1 1 3/18/77 COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Liberian dollar (Lib $) Year: Appraisal, Intervening, and Completion Years Averages US$1 = Lib $1 Ll Including exchange adjustment of USS77,000 Lz Amount disbursed by June 30, 1977. /3 Calculated on the basis of different methodology Lnan at appraisal so the Economic Rates of Return are not strictly comparable.  - iv - PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM (HIGHLIGHTS) LIBERIA SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 907-LBR/CREDIT 395-LBR) 1. The Liberia Second Highway Project was to support a program for better maintenance of the road network, improved access to the port of Monrovia, and studies of roads to potentially productive areas of the country. Financing was provided by the Government and several external donors, including the Bank Group. The latter, through Loan 907-LBR and Credit 395-LBR, supported: technical assistance for reorganization and strengthening of road maintenance operations; workshop construction and equipment; detailed engineering, construction, and construction supervi- sion of the Monrovia Bypass (8.2 mi); a study of the Liberian contract- ing industry; and road preinvestment studies (168 mi). The plan for the other external donors, which was later revised (see para. 4), was for: USAID to finance road maintenance equipment and spare parts; the Federal Republic of Germany to provide training for road maintenance personnel; and UNDP to finance the services of a Program Coordinator in the Ministry of Public Works. (PCR, para. 2.01). 2. Except for a few individual items, implementation of the pro- ject proceeded generally following the appraisal plan. As part of the Government's Highway Maintenance and Development Program (1974-78), im- provements were made in the headquarters maintenance organization and central workshops, in the use and maintenance of equipment, and in the execution of maintenance operations (PCR, paras. 3.04-3.08 and 4.01-4.02). Also the maintenance budget was more than tripled between 1972 and 1978 (PCR, paras. 3.09 and 7.07), demonstrating the Government's strong com- mitment to the work involved. However, it turned out that sufficient time was not provided in the appraisal plan to deal adequately with changes and improvements required in: (a) planning, organization, and execution of district maintenance operations; (b) improvements in dis- trict workshops; (c) personnel training; (d) maintenance of bituminous surfaced roads; and (e) control of some diversion of maintenance equip- ment (PCR, paras. 4.02, 7.03, and 7.04).1/ This clearly indicates that the appraisal was optimistic in assuming an effective maintenance organi- zation could be established in the four year project period (PCR, paras. 3.07 and 7.02). A step-by-step approach over a longer period would have been more appropriate. The remaining project components, civil works and studies, were executed satisfactorily (PCR, paras. 3.10-3.16). 3. A feature which contributed to the successful implementation of this project was the employment of a qualified Liberian to succeed the original expatriate Program Coordinator financed by UNDP. He not only effectively coordinated execution of the various project components fi- nanced by several sources but also provided advice on implementation of 1/ Many of these matters are being addressed in connection with the ongoing Fourth Highway Project (Loan 1573-LBR of June 1978 for US$13.8 million). - v - the project as well as other aspects of the Highway Maintenance and Devel- opment Program (PCR, paras. 3.03, 7.01 and 7.06). 4. The project took sixteen months more than expected and produced a cost overrun of 33%. The delay was related to review of the consultant's proposals regarding road maintenance organization and operations, construc- tion of the workshops and the Monrovia Bypass, acquisition of equipment, provision of training, and execution of certain studies (PCR, paras. 3.04, 3.06, 3.08, 3.10, and 3.12-3.15). Additional expenditures on workshop con- struction and equipment and on the training program as well as procurement of more road maintenance equipment were responsible for the higher actual project cost (US$18.86 million) over the appraisal estimate (US$14.14 mil- lion). Accordingly, the original project financing plan was partially revised. USAID provided the largest share of financing, US$8.00 million (versus US$4.40 million planned), followed by: the Bank Group, US$5.60 million; the Government, US$3.02 million (versus US$2.10 million); the Federal Republic of Germany, US$2.10 million (versus US$1.90 million); and UNDP, US$0.14 million (PCR, paras. 1.02 and 3.19 and Table 1). 5. The reestimated economic rate of return for the road maintenance program is 39%, compared with the 320/ appraisal estimate,1/ and for the up- grading of the Monrovia Bypass is 51%, against 42% at appraisal. The im- proved returns resulted because higher vehicle operating cost savings in both cases and higher traffic volumes as well in the latter case more than offset the unfavorable effects of the delays in completion and increases in costs (PCR, paras. 5.04 and 5.07 and Tables 4 and 5). Other points of particular interest may be the: - importance of ensuring, when major changes are made in road design standards, that the entire package of changes is internal- ly consistent (PCR, paras. 3.10 and 6.02); - need for determining that consultants selected for preinvest- ment studies have sufficient capabilities in engineering assess- ments and economic analyses to carry out the work efficiently (PCR, paras. 3.13 and 7.09). - importance of specifying, in the terms of reference for feasibil- ity studies, that all major traffic generating sources in the public and private sectors should be investigated to determine the full economic justification of the road involved (PCR, paras. 3.14, 6.03, and 7.08); and - lack of specific recommendations in the contracting industry study, relating to the supply of road construction materials, and subse- quent difficulties on road contracts (PCR, paras. 3.16 and 7.10). 1/ Not strictly comparable, however, because the two calculations were based on different methodologies. ATTACHMENT September 29, 1978 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LIBERIA SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT (LOAN 907/CREDIT 395-LBR) I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 As part of its overall review of Liberia's development problems and potential, the administration which took office in 1972 emphasized improving transport as a vital component in future development strategy. A five-year program for highway maintenance and development was prepared, based primarily on two investigations: (i) a study of highway organization and maintenance, financed by UNDP with the Bank acting as executing agency and carried out by consultants SAUTI (Italy) in 1971; and (ii) a feasibility study of the Monrovia Port access roads conducted by Stanley Consultants (US) and financed under the Monrovia Port Project. In October 1972, the Government convened a meeting for coordinating highway aid, the main purposes of which were: (i) to brief potential donors on the five-year program and its financing require- ments, and (ii) to seek commitments or indications of interest in financing the program. 1.02 The purpose of the Second Highway Project (Loan 907/Credit 395-LBR), designed after the meeting, was to improve the condition of the Liberian highway network, which was inadequate to support the country's economic devel- opment, through: (i) road maintenance; and (ii) upgrading the selected primary roads. The project consisted of: (i) reorganization and improvement of road maintenance operations over about a four-year period; (ii) upgrading the Monrovia Bypass; and (iii) studies. The total cost of the project was estimated at about US$14.1 million, with a foreign exchange cost of about US$11.9 mil- lion. The IBRD/IDA share was to be US$5.6 million or 40%; the contribution of other external donors was set at US$6.4 million or 45%, while the partici- pation of the Government was estimated at US$2.1 million or 15%. 1.03 The project was the third Bank Group operation in Liberia's transport sector. A First Highway Project (Loan 368-LBR, US$4.25 million, 1964) consisted of construction of about 62 mi of new roads, of which about 27 miles were to be paved, and the procurement of road maintenance equipment, spare parts, and workshop facilities. The project was completed in June 1969. The Monrovia Port Project (Loan 917-LBR, US$3.6 million, 1969) financed dredging the port of Monrovia and providing management assistance to the Port Administration and the National Port Authority. The project was completed in 1973. 1.04 The information used in compiling this report was obtained from pro- ject files, site inspections, and records available or obtained at the Bank's request in Liberia. The Programming and Planning Division of the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) prepared in July 1978 a draft Project Completion Report (PCR). This draft report was made available to the Bank. MPW's effort was appreciated and the draft report provided some useful information in preparing Bank's PCR. Understandably, being in draft form, it was incomplete in respect of analysis of some subjects, such as, the performance of the Borrowers, the Bank, and the con- sultants and contractors employed in the project and some of the data required checking and amplification in order to complete the economic re-evaluation. The draft report was not finalized and thus is not attached to this report. - 2 - II. PROJECT APPRAISAL A. Description 2.01 The project consisted of: (a) technical assistance to the MPW to coordinate the various activities of the Government's Highway Maintenance and De- velopment Program; (b) technical assistance to MPW to assist in: (i) its reorganization, (ii) improvement of highway maintenance operations, and (iii) training of maintenance personnel; (c) purchase of highway maintenance equipment and spare parts; (d) construction of, and equipment for, workshop facilities; (e) detailed engineering and construction of the Monrovia Bypass (8.2 mi), including supervision of construction; and (f) the following studies: (i) promotion of the Liberian contracting industry; (ii) detailed engineering for access roads to the port of Monrovia, including the UN Drive and the Mesurado River Bridge, and for the Totota-Ganta Road (83 mi); (iii) completion of the feasibility study and preparation of detailed engineering for the Paynesville-Robertsfield and Paynesville-Totota Road (70 mi); and (iv) feasibility study of the Monrovia-Mount Coffee Dam Road (15 mi). Technical Assistance for Program Coordination 2.02 Faced with an increasing program of technical and capital aid in the highway subsector, MPW felt the need to improve the coordination of the various project activities. The first item was to provide MPW with a Program Coordinator. This item was to be funded by UNDP. Technical Assistance to MPW 2.03 Reorganization of MPW and Highway Maintenance Operations. In 1971, consultants SAUTI prepared a study financed by UNDP on highway organi- zation and maintenance. MPW accepted their proposals for reorganization into four bureaus (see Chart), and one project component was to provide technical aid to accomplish this task. The main feature of the reorganization was the creation of a separate Construction Bureau, leaving the Operations Bureau mainly responsible for road maintenance. The major project activities were to build up a new Highway Maintenance Division within the Operations Bureau, and to reinforce the Planning and Programming Bureau with staff experienced in transport economics and traffic engineering. - 3 - 2.04 Technical assistance to MPW to develop and carry out the highway maintenance program was estimated to require 325 man-months of consultants' services over a period of about four years. Three experts were to be assigned to the Highway Maintenance Division to plan and supervise maintenance operations. Another group of three experts was to be associated with the Mobile Equipment Division to organize the Central and District workshops. One expert was to establish cost accounting and data processing systems within the Bureau of Administrative Services. A transport planner was to be assigned to the Planning and Programming Division at various times over the four year period to prepare a comprehensive highway development program for the coming decade, in conjunction with a team of Liberian engineers and economists. The experts were to train counterpart staff, and the Government was to assign sufficient numbers of counterparts with adequate education and experience. 2.05 Training of Maintenance Personnel. In order to train MPW highway maintenance staff (about 300 employees) over four to five years, programs financed by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would be expanded, and the five experts already in the field would be supplemented by three others. The Liberian Government would provide classrooms and dormitories to accommodate about 60 trainees per year. The FRG had already made an initial commitment of about US$700,000 equivalent to finance the costs of the expanded training program. Additional funding of about US$1.2 million equivalent was required in mid-1974 to complete the program; at the time of appraisal, it was expected that the FRG would favorably consider a request from the Government of Liberia to provide such assistance. The request was made and accepted. Purchase of Highway Maintenance Equipment and Spare Parts 2.06 The project provided for the purchase of new maintenance equipment and spare parts for existing equipment which could be economically repaired. Equipment needs were to be estimated by the consultants engaged for road maintenance and reviewed by the Government. USAID was to finance the purchase of new equipment, spare parts for reconditioning existing US-manufactured equipment (about 85% of the repairable fleet), radio-communications sets, and traffic counters. A formal agreement between USAID and the Government to this effect was signed in February 1973. Construction of Workshops and Procurement of Equipment 2.07 Of the six existing workshops, two built with FRG financial assistance were being used for training purposes; the other four required improvements and equipment: the Central Equipment Workshop in Monrovia and three others located at Plibo, Wemsoe and Tapeta. Two additional workshops were to be built and equipped at Robertsport and Vcinjama. In addition, two existing service stations were to be modernized, and two new ones constructed at Zwedru and Ganta. 4- Upgrading of the Monrovia Bypass (8.2 mi) 2.08 The Monrovia Bypass connects the Kakata Highway east of the capital with UN Drive at the port of Monrovia (Map IBRD 10291R1). The Bypass was origi- nally planned in 1963 to be built as a four-lane divided highway with a design speed of 60 mph; however, only rough grading and major drainage structures were completed and laterite surfacing was later added on two lanes. The Bypass was in poor condition and traffic had to detour through the already congested city streets of Monrovia. Under the Monrovia Port Project, Stanley Consultants studied the feasibility of constructing a bridge on the Mesurado River in order to provide better access to the port. The study recommended paving the existing two lanes of the Bypass, providing it with a bituminous concrete surface, 22 ft wide on a roadway 42 ft wide. The project provided for the detailed engineering required to pave the existing two lanes as well as for the actual construction work. Studies 2.09. Study for Promoting the Liberian Contracting Industry. During negotiations of the Loan/Credit, the Liberian delegation expressed the Government's wish to have more local participation in construction works financed by external lending agencies. It was, therefore, agreed to include in the project a study of the Liberian contracting industry and of the steps required to promote increased capacity and competitiveness of the industry, in particular for road works. 2.10 Feasibility Studies and Detailed Engineering.The project provided for detailed engineering and preparation of bidding documents for: (i) improving to four-lane standard the section of UN Drive nearest to Monrovia; (ii) reconstructing the other two-lane sections of UN Drive; and (iii) constructing a new two-lane bridge across the Mesurado River at Johnson Street. 2.11 In addition, the project included detailed engineering of the Totota-Ganta Road (83 mi), based upon the outcome of a feasibility study financed by the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM, UK) expected by mid-1973. 2.12 The highway maintenance study identified about 70 mi of paved roads from Paynesville (a suburb of Monrovia) to Robertsfield and to Totota, which had deteriorated beyond normal maintenance. The project included consulting services to define their exact rehabilitation needs as well as detailed engineering and preparation of bidding documents. A feasibility study of a Monrovia suburban road, Mount Coffee Dam Road (15 mi), was also included in the project. B. Cost Estimates and Financing 2.13 At appraisal total project costs, including contingencies, were estimated as follows: - 5 - Source of Foreign Cost Cost (US$'000) IBRD/IDA Financing Local Foreign Total Financing (US$'000) A. Program Coordinator UNDP 53 127 180 0 B. Highway Maintenance Program (a) Consulting services for reorganization and strengthening of mainte- nance operations and selection of trainees IBRD/IDA 300 2,120 2,420 2,120 (b) Training of maintenance personnel FRG 300 1,900 2,200 0 (c) Highway maintenance equipment and spare parts USAID 350 4,300 4,650 0 (d) Construction and equip- ment of workshop facilities IBRD/IDA 67 370 437 370 Subtotal B 1,017 8,690 9,707 2,490 C. Upgrading of Monrovia Bypass Detailed engineering, con- struction, and supervision of construction IBRD/IDA 1,000 2,000 3,000 2,000 D. Study of Contracting Industry IBRD/IDA 15 130 145 130 E. Feasibility Studies and Detailed Engineering IBRD/IDA 130 980 1,110 980 Total 2,215 11,927 14,142 5,600 2.14 The original project financing plan consisted of: (i) Bank Group lending to the Government of Liberia in the amount of US$5.6 million (Loan: US$3.0 million; Credit: US$2.6 million); (ii) USAID Loan of US$4.4 million; (iii) FRG Loan of US$1.9 million; and (iv) UNDP Grant of US$0.14 million. The Government's participation was estimated at US$2.1 million. - 6 - 2.15 The cost estimates for highway maintenance equipment and spare parts were based on market prices (net of taxes and duties) in Monrovia. Cost estimates for construction of the Monrovia Bypass were based on Stanley Consultant's feasibility study of June 1972. The cost of consulting services was based on previous experience with Bank-financed contracts in West Africa. III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COST A. Conditions for Loan/Credit Effectiveness and Compliance 3.01 There were three conditions for Loan/Credit effectiveness: (a) that the USAID Loan Agreement had, or would concurrently with this Agreement, become fully effective; (b) that the consultants' contracts for technical assistance for reorganization of MPW and detailed engineering of the Monrovia Bypass had been signed by all parties; and (c) that the UNDP Project Document had, or would concurrently with this Agreement, become fully effective. 3.02 , The conditions were met, and the Loan/Credit were declared effective December 28, 1973, six months after signature. B. Technical Assistance of Program Coordination 3.03 For the first two years of the project, an expatriate Program Coordinator was provided, financed by the UNDP with the Bank as executing agency. After the expiration of the Program Coordinator's contract in April 1976, UNDP funds were no longer available and the Government assumed responsi- bility by assigning a qualified Liberian to the post. The successful comple- tion of this project and the smooth progress of subsequent highway projects derive in no small part from his devotion and skills. C. Technical Assistance to MPW Improvement of Highway Maintenance Operations 3.04 The four-year program January 1974-April 1978 got off to a slow start, partly because of delays in providing new equipment (para. 3.08) and partly because it proved necessary to review in depth the proposals in the consultants' Inception Report. Once these difficulties were overcome, progress became more rapid. Consultants SAUTI who had carried out the original study of highway organization and maintenance were selected to provide technical assistance to MPW. - 7 - 3.05 The consultants completed an inventory of main and secondary roads providing a basis for defining the tasks and the work load involved in routine and periodic maintenance. The structure of the newly formed Highway Mainte- nance Division (Chart) at MPW headquarters and the tasks to be performed were defined. The organization of the central workshop was improved, but progress was slower in establishing district workshops and making their operations efficient. As the new equipment arrived, it was distributed to the districts and the consultants embarked on a program of on-the-job training for machine operators and mechanics. Training of Maintenance Personnel 3.06 The training program was co-financed by the Government and FRG. Delays in start-up were caused partly by the consultants' (Bruchmann, FRG) slowness in acquiring training material, and partly by delays in completion of school buildings and dormitories financed by local funds. The training program began in March 1975, one year later than planned. The training center is located at Camp Mechlin, about 70 miles from Monrovia, near Buchanan. The classrooms, teaching equipment, and workshop facilities are good. The opportunities for practical training are enhanced by the fact that the project manager has also been the district engineer for Grand Bassa County. The first output from the Training Unit came in 1977 when 40 equipment operators and mechanics completed training and were sent to the districts and to MPW headquarters. Improved efficiency was noticeable immediately. 3.07 FRG aid for this project component was supposed to end in November 1978, when it was hoped that it would be possible to turn over the staffing and operation of the training unit as a fully operating unit to the Liberian Government. It is now clear that this timing was overly optimistic, and FRG has agreed to continue aid at a reduced level by providing counterpart staff to assist in management and teaching. It remains to be seen whether this reduced aid is sufficient for the successful operation of the school. D. Purchase of Highway Equipment and Construction of Workshops 3.08 Equipment and spare parts for road maintenance were to be provided under USAID financing. The Bank financed the building and equipping of the district workshops (para. 2.07). It became apparent in late 1974 that, mainly because of increased needs, the appropriations for road maintenance equipment were not adequate. Heavy equipment was ordered under the original appropriation of US$4.4 million and, in 1975, the Liberian Government sought and obtained from USAID an additional US$3.6 million to acquire additional equipment and spare parts. Furthermore, there was an overrun of some US$0.5 million on the foreign component of those items of the project financed from the Bank funds, mainly because of increases in prices of the workshop construction and equipment. The Government agreed to finance this extra cost. Procurement of workshop equipment and tools was completed by late 1976, some 12 months later than was originally planned due to delayed shipments from suppliers. - 8- Road Maintenance Budget 3.09 Annual expenditures for all MPW's operations (administration, technical services, force account construction and road maintenance) are financed from the general budget, consisting of the recurrent budget and the development budget. Expenditures for recurrent maintenance increased from US$1.9 million in 1972 to about US$2.6 million in 1975. The funding of highway maintenance improved substantially in 1976, when the total expenditure on recurrent road maintenance reached about US$5.3 million, as shown in the following table: Government Expenditures for Highways, 1972-78 (in US$'000) Fiscal Recurrent Maintenance Expenditures Total Maintenance Year Personnel Operations Total Expenditures /a 1972 899 973 1,872 2,983 1973 620 /b 716 1,336 2,951 1974 310 lb 1,822 2,132 3,185 1975 358 2,246 2,604 8,019 1976 428 4,882 5,310 10,974 1977/78 n.a. n.a. 6,700 /c n.a. /a Including foreign assistance and capital expenditures. /b Reduction in recurrent operations due to transfer of staff to General Service Administration. /c Since the fiscal year was changed from January 1 - June 30, it is not possible to show separate figures for 1977. Source: Ministry of Public Works, Planning and Programming Bureau, July 1977. The expenditure in 1976 was adequate for routine and periodic maintenance (MPW is in charge of about 3,400 mi of roads), with some to spare for restoring earth and gravel roads to a level at which they can be kept in adequate condition by routine maintenance. In 1977/78, /1 US$6.7 million was spent for recurrent maintenance. This should have been adequate for current needs, if efficiently dispersed for the purpose intended. Road maintenance funds will be better monitored from 1977/78 since separate accounting for road maintenance operations was set up in MPW. The main limitation now arises from organizing and executing, rather than funding, road maintenance. E. Detailed Engineering and Construction of the,Monrovia Bypass 3.10 The construction of the Monrovia Bypass (8.2 mi) was undertaken by contractor Societa Lavori Porto della Torre (Italy) under supervision of Stanley Consultants. The consultants completed detailed engineering in 1/ Fiscal year changed to July 1 - June 30. - 9 - February 1974. Works started after some delay in October 1974 and were completed in April 1976, six months behind schedule. The delay was due to contractor's diversion of equipment from the project to another contract in Monrovia and to poor site organization. The consultants performed well. The construction work was reasonably well done and the only technical comment concerns sight distances on the overpass. In the change of plans from a divided highway to a two-lane single carriageway the sight distances were not revised from those appropriate for overtaking on a one-way road to those suitable for bridge approaches on a road carrying traffic in both directions. Sight distances are rather dangerously short. A comparison of the appraisal estimate of cost and final contract price including supervision, is given below: US$ Appraisal estimate of cost 2,500,000 Final contract price 2,584,000 Overrun (3%) 84,000 3.11 The contractor exceeded the extended contract period by 44 days and received the final contract prices less US$44,000 (44 x US$1,000) liqui- dated damage. F. Studies Detailed Engineering of UN Drive and of Totota-Ganta Road 3.12 Detailed engineering for reconstruction of UN Drive (5.4 mi) including Mesurado River Bridge was carried out by Stanley Consultants and of Totota-Ganta Road (83 mi) by Ove Arup (UK) consultants; the studies were satisfactorily completed with some delay in late 1975. Construction is now underway financed under the Third Highway Project (Loan 1156-LBR). Feasibility Studies and Detailed Engineering for the Paynesville-Robertsfield and Paynesville-Totota Roads 3.13 The project provided for completion of feasibility studies and preparation of detailed engineering of the Paynesville-Robertsfield (28 mi) and Paynesville-Totota (71 mi) Roads. Originally the appraisal report envi- saged only 70 mi in total; however, it was later realized that the full length of the roads would need rehabilitation. The feasibility studies carried out by consultants Davies-Techsult (Sierra Leone) were started in November 1974 and the final reports were submitted in September 1976. The engineering assessments and the economic analysis needed improvement. Action to remedy these deficiencies was taken during Bank supervision missions in 1976 and 1977 in the form of comments and guidance. MPW carried out an additional traffic census in 1977, showing a steady increase in traffic. The consul- tants prepared a supplementary economic assessment in March 1977. The detailed engineering was completed in September 1977. At this stage, it became apparent that the engineering proposals involving complete reconstruc- tion of the pavement on both roads were excessive and that estimated costs were consequently much higher than originally anticipated. With assistance - 10 - from Bank missions, MPW arranged for the consultants to undertake in situ measurements of the pavement strength and and axle loads of the vehicles on both roads. The consultants made up in large part for their earlier deficien- cies by the dispatch with which they engaged the necessary expert staff and carried out these surveys. The work was completed in February 1978 and showed that on the Paynesville-Totota Road, pavement reconstruction was required on about 20 mi while the remaining 51 mi of pavement could be restored to an adequate condition by patching and overlaying. On the Paynesville-Robertsfield Road, about 16-1/2 mi of pavement required reconstruction while the remain- ing 11-1/2 mi could be brought to adequate condition by patching and overlaying. Arrangements have been made to finance the necessary works as part of the Fourth Highway Project (Loan 1573-LBR), with cofinancing from the Kuwait Fund for the work on the Paynesville-Robertsfield road. Feasibility Study of the Mount Coffee Dam Road 3.14 The feasibility study of the Mount Coffee Dam Road (15 mi) by Davies Techsult, assisted by Stanley Consultants, was started in May 1974 and the final report was submitted in January 1976. Following terms of reference, the feasibility study was based mainly on an extrapolation of existing trends in traffic flow. The consultants also incorporated some factors related to the generated traffic. As a result, only the first four miles were shown as justifying major improvement to paved standard; thereafter only minor improve- ments were proposed. On this basis, the proposed civil works were only of low priority and there was no case for proceeding with final design and de- tailed engineering for the whole road. However, it is likely that the area served by the road has future potential for development, housing, market gardening and possibly, given the easy access to the dock area, for lig1: industry; consequently, by applying value added benefits technique the road improvement might be justified. The Bank therefore proposed to MPW that they consult with other Government departments concerned with land use and devel- opment in the area to determine what influence plans for development of the area might have on the need to improve the road over its full length. Study to Promote the Liberian Contracting Industry 3.15 The study of the domestic contracting industry undertaken by the International Executive Services Corps (IESC) was completed in July 1977. The draft final report concluded that the present capacity of domestic contracting for highway work was limited to two small firms engaged in constructing feeder roads; that these firms were hampered by lack of capacity, particularly in maintaining their equipment and in managing their financial affairs; that there were considerable opportunities for domestic contracting in the highway field, particularly in feeder road construction and in subcontracting for components of major road works; and that both technical and financial aid would be necessary to build up the domestic industry. Subsequently, the Bank and the Government cooperated in preparing an aide-memoire incorporating draft terms of reference for advisors to MPW and to domestic commercial banks to assist in developing the domestic highway contracting industry. Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance is preparing a guarantee scheme for commercial banks involved with domestic contractors. Because of funding constraints, assist- ance to the domestic contracting industry was not included in the Fourth Highway - 11 - Project and other means of finance are currently being sought, possibly through an IDF operation. 3.16 The review prepared by IESC provided useful data but came short in presenting some specific recommendations as it did not cover the supply of materials to the road construction industry. Lack of reliable supply of crushed stone has caused difficulties on current road contracts. This is an undertaking suitable for domestic contractors and arrangements should be made to include it in any technical aid scheme to the domestic contracting industry. G. Covenants of the Loan/Credit and Compliance 3.17 The main Covenants called for the Borrower to: (a) assign sufficient qualified counterpart staff to the project for training by the consultants; (b) ensure that maintenance expenditures would be increased and maintained at a level consistent with the requirements of its Highway Maintenance and Development Program; and (c) take all such steps, including providing additional staff and equipment, to ensure that the dimensions, weights and axle-loads of vehicles using its highways would not exceed limits consistent with its traffic legislation. (d) formulate a program satisfactory to the Association to attract engineers to the civil service in sufficient numbers. 3.18 In the course of project execution the Borrower fulfilled most of the obligations from the covenants of the Loan/Credit. Sufficient counterpart staff was assigned for training (para. 3.06) and road maintenance expenditures were increased (para. 3.09) to a satisfactory level. However, improvement in vehicle load control is still needed. This is expected to be remedied through the acquisition of four weigh bridges. in 1979. A number of additional civil engineers were employed by MPW in 1974. The main limitation now involves building up their experience. Project Cost and Loan/Credit Disbursement 3.19 Actual total cost of the project was increased about 33% to US$18.86 million, mainly due to the purchase of additional road maintenance equipment financed by a supplemental USAID loan; tctal USAID cofinancing was US$8.0 million. Some additional cost increase occurred in construction of workshops and purchase of workshop equipment, and in the training program of road maintenance personnel. Total contribution of the FRG was US$2.1 million equivalent, of UNDP US$0.14 million and of Liberian Government US$3.02 million. IBRD/IDA-financed project items had an overrun of about 6% (Table 1). - 12 - 3.20 Because of the slow start of project implementation, the disbursement schedule was behind the appraisal estimate (Table 2). However, in FY76 and FY77 actual disbursements came close to being on schedule. The Loan and Credit were fully disbursed by September 1978. Withdrawal of proceeds of the Loan/Credit by category is presented in Table 3. IV. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 4.01 The section of MPW responsible for road maintenance was reorganized with the help of consultants SAUTI, and a new Highway Maintenance Division at MPW headquarters was created. The central workshop was also reorganized, but progress was slower in building up district workshops and making their operations efficient. In addition, the Planning and Programming Bureau was assisted under the project; however, the Bureau was reorganized and strengthened under the Third Highway Project. 4.02 There is ample evidence from highway maintenance projects in other countries that a period considerably longer than four years is required to build up a fully effective highway maintenance organization. In this context, progress has been reasonably good. The headquarters organization has been built up, and although it still leans heavily on the help of expatriate staff, it is reasonably effective. Skills in the use and maintenance of equipment have been improved. There is evidence of this in the improved condition of many main and secondary roads and in the improved utilization of machinery. However, MPW still needs some assistance to maintain efficiently bituminous surface roads. Outstanding deficiencies are in the operation of the district workshops and in the overall planning and execution of road maintenance at the district level which are not being effectively carried out. One difficulty lies in the pressures on district engineers to divert their resources to other uses. In extending the consultants' services under the Fourth Highway Project, arrangements have been made for the consul- tants to concentrate more effort on building up the efficiency of district workshops and on improving the overall efficiency of road maintenance organi- zations at district levels. V. ECONOMIC REEVALUATION 5.01 The project was designed to meet the high priority requirements of Liberia's transport sector -- better maintenance of roads and upgrading of an inadequate road network. The access to the port of Monrovia was improved and road studies to potentially productive areas of the country were carried out. The need for better maintenance to prevent further deterioration of roads was clear. Without the improvements there would have been steadily rising costs for transport and for road rehabilitation. The savings in vehicle operating costs released scarce internal resources for use elsewhere. Free competition - 13 - in the trucking industry means that reduced transport costs could be passed on to Liberian producers and consumers. These elements could all combine to help develop the Liberian economy. In that respect, the project made a posi- tive contribution. An economic reevaluation of the project's major components is presented below. Highway Maintenance Program 5.02 The objective of the maintenance program (1974-1978) was to eliminate the backlog of deferred maintenance and to ensure that, in the future, roads could be maintained efficiently and to adequate standards. The improved organization of road maintenance resulted primarily in more effective use of manpower and equipment. Technical assistance for the reorganization of work- shops and improvement of workshop facilities reduced the time required for equipment repairs. The benefits of the program were: (i) reduction in vehicle operating costs and avoidance of future increases; (ii) reduction in the cost of regular and periodic road maintenance; and (iii) savings achieved by delaying investments in reconstruction or upgrading of some primary roads. As in the appraisal report, the latter category of savings has not been quantified. Benefits actually started to accrue in the second year of the program (1975) and increased steadily thereafter. Details on the coverage of the program and the type and length of the road system maintained are given in Table 4. 5.03 The maintenance program was originally evaluated as a comprehen- sive package, irrespective of the source of financing. As in the appraisal, the reevaluation compares vehicle operating costs and road maintenance costs with and without the project, both expressed as functions of traffic volumes. Inputs of traffic and growth rates, vehicle operating costs, road maintenance costs, and capital investments in the appraisal report are based on the SAUTI study. In the economic reevaluation, data collected by supervision missions and those supplied by the Planning and Programming Bureau (MPW) were also used (new traffic counts in 1977 and 1978, updated vehicle operating costs, etc.) in addition to the consultant's report. 5.04 Calculation of the economic rate of return (ERR) in the appraisal report was based on economic life of the maintenance program of eight years, using a weighted average life of the equipment. The traffic volumes and projections used in the appraisal analysis had a narrow data base. The estimates of vehicle operating costs were also approximate since few vehicle owners kept good records. On the basis of available information, the appraisal report estimated that the program would yield an ERR of 32%, and with unfavor- able development 16%. It was difficult to follow the analysis presented in the appraisal report due to insufficient explanation. Reevaluation was based on: actual capital and operating costs during the program, new (incomplete) traffic counts carried out by MPW, actual output of the maintenance program on 1,700 mi, and updated vehicle operating costs. The analysis was carried out in 1977 prices, and duration of economic life of the program was taken as in the appraisal report. Under the amended inputs in'the economic analysis, the ERR of the program is 39%, justifying the program and investments made. In the sensi- tivity analysis, assuming a possible reduction in benefits of 20%, the ERR would still be satisfactory at 14% (Table 4). - 14 - Upgrading of the Monrovia Bypass (8.2 mi) 5.05 The port access road, UN Drive, and the Mesurado River Bridge together carried daily traffic levels of over 20,000 vehicles per day (vpd) in 1972. Traffic comprises large petroleum tankers, trucks which distribute Liberia's imported consumer goods and transport its agricultural products for export, and vehicles which carry passengers between the capital's commercial and residential areas and the port. The Monrovia Bypass provided another access to the port. Upgrading the Bypass not only reduced transport costs to traffic normally using it, but more importantly, partly reduced congestion on Monrovia's streets and other port access roads. Traffic on the Bypass devel- oped faster than expected, ranging between 5,000-8,000 vpd in early 1978 (Table 5), calling for further upgrading to four-lane standards by 1982, at least for the western part (4.3 mi) of the Bypass. 5.06 In the appraisal report, benefits from upgrading the existing bypass included: (i) savings in vehicle operating costs to traffic already using the Bypass; and (ii) savings in vehicle operating cost to traffic which would be diverted from the congested Monrovia streets to the improved Bypass. Passenger time savings in the project are important because they involve businessmen and vehicle operators whose time has a relatively high economic cost, but these savings were not quantified in the analysis due to lack of adequate data. The economic life of the investment was assumed to be 20 years, and calculation of the ERR took into account further upgrading to four lanes by 1985 of the western end of the Bypass where traffic is heaviest. On the above assumptions, the ERR at appraisal was 42%. 5.07 Taking the methodology used in the appraisal report, on the basis of actual cost of the upgrading (about 3% higher than originally estimated), taking into account faster traffic development (6-7% per year instead of 5% used originally) and assuming further upgrading to four lanes of the western part by 1982, the recalculated ERR is 51%. If the annual traffic growth were 5% the ERR would be about 39% (Table 5). The ERR excluding the further upgrading was not calculated (as in the appraisal report) since the existing two-lane road would not accommodate the rapidly growing high traffic volume (will have over 10,000 vpd in five years). The conclusion is that improvement of the Monrovia Bypass was a worthwhile investment. Other Project Elements 5.08 The studies under the project included: (i) detailed engineering for the access road to the port of Monrovia (UN Drive) and the Mesurado River Bridge; (ii) survey and detailed engineering for rehabilitation of about 70 mi of paved roads; (iii) detailed engineering for the Totota-Ganta Road; (iv) feasibility studies of the Monrovia-Mount Coffee Road; and (v) a study to promote the Liberian contracting industry. The studies showed that all works, except those in item (iv),were well justified. The port access road (UN Drive) and construction of the Mesurado River Bridge have an estimated ERR of 22% and 16% respectively. The improvement of about 70 mi of paved roads, later increased to 99 mi, yielded an ERR of 21%. The upgrading of the - 15 - Totota-Ganta Road has an ERR of 38%. Only the upgrading of the Monrovia- Mount Coffee Road, on the basis of savings in vehicle operating costs alone, is not justified. The study of the contracting industry provided a great deal of useful data for determining steps to be taken to increase the capacity and competitiveness of domestic contractors. VI. THE ROLE OF THE BANK GROUP 6.01 The Bank's performance is judged on the basis of how efficiently the civil engineering works financed under the project were executed, and the extent to which the project assisted in building up the efficiency of Liberian institutions. 6.02 On the civil works (detailed engineering and construction of the Monrovia Bypass), Bank influence was successfully applied in the decision to construct a two-lane single carriageway, since traffic forecasts did not justify to build immediately the four-lane dual carriageway originally intended by the Government. The Bank may have been remiss in failing to note during subsequent supervision missions that the consultant had neglected to revise the sight distances on the Mesurado River Bridge approaches. However, this is a detail for which one would normally rely entirely on the consultant. 6.03 The detailed engineering for UN Drive, for the Mesurado River Bridge, and for the Totota-Ganta Road was completed without the need for any special guidance from the Bank. The feasibility study for the Mount Coffee Dam Road had some weaknesses. The main justification for improving this road lay in the potential for development of the area served. The Bank could have made it clear in the consultant's terms of reference. 6.04 The feasibility study and detailed engineering of the Paynesville- Robertsfield and the Paynesville-Totota Roads should have considered a number of alternatives. The Bank must accept partial responsibility for (i) accept- ing the selection of a consultant who needed more than average supervision, and (ii) failing to insist until very late that the consultant should consider pavement strengthening as an adequate and cheaper alternative to reconstruc- tion over part of both roads. Both shortcomings have been remedied (para. 3.13). A beneficial result was that a West African consultant acquired experience which will be useful for future works in the region. Modern pavement evaluation techniques were introduced for the first time in Liberia, thus providing MPW with experience in how to tackle similar works. 6.05 The technical assistance to improve the planning and execution of road maintenance did not proceed as well as was anticipated at the time of appraisal. It seems likely that both the Bank and MPW were over-optimistic in this regard. The Bank's intervention resulted in the successful reorgani- zation of MPW headquarters, building up the new Highway Maintenance Division and improving cooperation between MPW's highway maintenance consultants and the training school financed under aid from the FRG. It was less successful in setting up means to effectively plan and execute road maintenance operations in the field, which required a longer effort and is being continued under the Fourth Highway Project. - 16 - VII. CONCLUSIONS 7.01 The value of having a Program Coordinator within the Ministry of Public Works to coordinate the planning and execution of projects -f-inanced by various sources has been demonstrated. Much depends on the Program Coor- dinator's personality, training and experience. In this case, the Liberian engineer who filled the position for the second half of the project provided a valuable link between MPW, the Bank, and other aid agencies. 7.02 The expectation that four years of consultants' services would be adequate to establish MPW's road maintenance organization as a fully effective agency proved to be optimistic. Because of delays, mainly in procuring equipment and constructing workshops, the program did not become fully operational until the last two years of the consultancy. Good progress has since been made in building up local capability to maintain and operate road maintenance machinery and to organize the Highway Maintenance Division at MPW headquarters. Only toward the end of the program did the consultants start to come to grips with the planning and execution of road maintenance at district level. 7.03 Delays also hampered the development of the training center financed by the FRG. The center became fully operational only in the last 18 months of the project. By the conclusion of the project, the basic technical training provided by the center, coupled with the on-the-job training undertaken by the maintenance consultants, had started to build up a corps of well-trained mechanics and equipment operators in MPW. 7.04 MPW still needs assistance to maintain efficiently bituminous- surfaced roads. This will be followed up in the continuation of the main- tenance program under the Fourth Highway Project. 7.05 At the time this project was prepared, Liberia's main road system was inadequate, and the Government wished to concentrate first on improving main roads in and around Monrovia. Since then, emphasis has begun and should continue to shift to providing all-weather main roads which serve areas of agricultural development. 7.06 As executing agency, MPW has performed well. Their Program Coordi- nator greatly helped project implementation. Once initial delays were over- come, the rate of disbursement conformed fairly closely to appraisal estimates (Table 2). 7.07 Toward the end of the project, the Government considerably in- creased appropriations for road maintenance. They are now at a level where-- if all the funds are effectively used for the purpose intended--there are ample funds for routine maintenance, with some to spare for rehabilitation. However, it is difficult to ensure that funds and resources allotted for road maintenance will be used for this purpose. Separate accounting for road maintenance operations installed in MPW in 1977/78 will help better monitoring of road maintenance funds. - 17 - 7.08 The feasibility study of the Mount Coffee Dam Road did not suffi- ciently consider the possibility of traffic generated by road zone development. However, it probably needed more than usual initiative for the consultant to take into consideration a factor not specifically detailed in the terms of reference. 7.09 The feasibility studies and detailed engineering prepared by Davies Techsult for the Paynesville-Robertsfield and Paynesville-Totota Roads was not satisfactory and needed additional input. Some allowance must be made for a desire to encourage a West African Consultant. Since MPW proposed that Edward Davies be employed to supervise the rehabilitation works on these two roads, the Bank insisted that the firm either associate with an international consultant who could provide staff with adequate experience, or that the firm itself employ such experienced staff. 7.10 IESC provided a useful report describing the problems of developing the domestic highway construction industry. The report had some weaknesses in proposing solutions, as it did not cover the supply of road construction materials. LIBERIA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LOAN 907/CRED1T 395-LBR - SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT Expected and Actual Project Implementation and Cost-/ Cost Estimated % of Project Item Executed by Contract Completion Date Aasal C Actual Foreign Completion Sindprete cua stiae- Cornalt Cost on Exchange on by expected Pr c ICompletion Completion Completion Date A. Highway Maintenance Program 1. Reorganization and improvement SAUTI of maintenance operation 12/22/73 Jan. 78 Jan. 78 2.050 2.350 2.608 2.105 100 2. Construction of workshop facilities and equipment procurement 2/74 Dec. 75 Oct. 78 0.367 0.623 0.908 0.658 402' B. Upgrading Monrovia By-Pass 1. Detailed engineering Stanley 6/1/73 Jan. 74 Feb. 74 0.070 0.068 0.068 0.052 95 2. Construction Lavori Porto Della Torre 8/74 Sept. 75 April76 2.270 2.320 2.3241 1.499 90 3. Construction supervision Stanley 1/15/74 Sept. 75 May 76 0.160 0.192 0.192 0.125 90 C. Feasibility Studies and Detailed Engineering 1. Feasibility study of Stanley 6 Mount Coffee Dam Road Davies-Techault 5/6/74 Dec. 74 Jan. 76 0.020 0.056 0.056 0.050 50 2. Feasibility study and detailed engineering for Paynesville-Robertsfiela and Paynesville-Totota Roads Davies-Techoult 9/74 Oct. 75 Feb. 78 0.227 0.327 0.327 0.288 20 3. Detailed engineering for UN Drive) 4. Detailed engineering for Mesurado) Stanley 1/16/74 Jan. 76 Dec. 75 0.408 0.578 0.675 0.586 100 River Bridge 5. Detailed engineering for Totota- Ganta road Ove Arup 4/10/74 Jan. 75 Dec. 75 0.975 0.285 0.285 0.251 60 D. Study of Liberian Contracting IESC 9/76 April 77 July 77 0.115 0.115 0.075 0.070 80 Industry Contingencies 1.150 TOTAL 7.112 6.914 7.518 5.684 1/ In addition, cofinancing as follows: USAID US$8.0 million for equipment; Federal Republic of Germany US$2.1 million for training; UNDP US$0.14 million for technical aid. Total Government participation in the project was US$3.02 million. 2/ Contractor being assessed liquidated damages of US$44,000. ./ Mainly due to delay of three field workshop buildings, which were completed tn October 1)78, and due to late delivery of workshop equipment (completed in December 1976). - 19 - Table 2 LIBERIA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LOAN 907/CREDIT 395-LBR - SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT Expected and Actual Schedule of Disbursements IBRD FISCAL ACCUMULATED DISBURSEMENTS ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS YEAR AND US$'000 EQUIVALENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF SEMESTER APPRAISAL ESTIMATE APPRAISAL ACTUAL TOTAL ESTIMATE DISBURSEMENTS 1974 1st 300 0 0 2nd 1,840 356 19 1975 1st 2,500 1,467 59 2nd 4,350 2,078 48 1976 1st 4,650 3,165* 68 2nd 5,050 4,205 83 1977 1st 5,300 4,593 87 2nd 5,6oo 5,216 93 1978 1st 5,600 100 Credit 395 - fully disbursed August 31, 1975 - 20 - Table 3 LIBERIA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LOAN 907/CREDIT 395-LBR - SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT Withdrawal of the Proceeds of the Credit and of the Loan (in US dollars) Category Plannedl_/ Actual I. Consultant Services a) for road maintenance operations 1,750,000 2,156,609 b) for detailed engineering and supervision of Monrovia Bypass 150,000 157,265 c) for feasibility studies and de- tailed engineering (Totota-Ganta, Paynesville-Robertsfield and Paynes- ville-Totota Roads, UN Drive, Mount Coffee Dam Road, and Mesurado River Bridge) 800,000 1,171,395 d) for Liberian contracting industry study 100,000 21,945 II. Equipment 300,000 594,141 III. Civil Works 1,500,000 1,498,64b (Upgrading of Monrovia Bypass) IV. Unallocated 1,000,000 - Total 5,600,000 5,600,000 1/ As in Development Credit Agreement, June 13, 1973. - 21 - Table 8 LIBERIA PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT LOAN 907/CREDIT 395-LBR - SECOND HIGHWAY PROJECT Economic Reevaluation of the Road Maintenance Program (Appraisal and Updated Information) 1. A. Actual Costs (in US$'000, 1977 prices) 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 a) capital cost! 880 5,323 3,648 1,314 L1l - b) recurrent cost2/ 222 646 3,28 2 ,900_ 5,500 Total 1,102 L 6,930 6,214 6,341 ,,5C Total (in 1977 prices) 1,332 7,222 7,623 6,214 5,707 6,ooc Appraisal Estimate (in 1972 prices) 3,690 8,810 2,990 2,810 1,720 2,D1 it4. vehicle Operating Ccsts (USi/mile) Condition Good Fair Poor UnDaved roads PCUi 20.29 23.60 26.92 !i. Road Network Included in onw Prcgram (in miles) Actual Appraisal Actual Appraisal Paved 230 230 Primary roads 1,175 n.a. Laterite 1,470 2,900 Secondary roads 525 n.a. Total 1,700 3,130 1,7OOz- IV. Traffic on the Road Network included in the Program (unpaved roads only) 1977/78 counts Weighted average Weighted average Daily traffic vpd mile vpd PCU Re-evaluation Appraisal (1977/78) (n.a.) 20 - 50 584 28 46 217 vpd 156 vpd 50 - 100 65 61 102 100 - 200 235 1L0 233 200 - 400 430 290 484 above 400 156 903 1,506 1,47C 11. Total Savings in Vehicle Operating Costs on the Unpaved Network2/(in US$'000, 1977 prices) 1974 19756/ 1976- 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Difference with and without the project case 0 2,975 6,171 9,696 10,180 10,689 11,228 11,785 12,374 VI. Economic Rate of Return a) Re-evaluated economic return for the program: 39% Appraisal economic return: 32% b) Assuming benefits: -20% ER is 14% Appraisal low estimate: 16% 1/ Tncludes: IDRD/TJSAID investments in equipment, spare parts and workshop; FRG assistance in trainini. 2/ It is assumed that without the project DPW annual road maintenance expenditures would be US$1.6 million mainly for administration and expenditures on maintenance of paved roads; recurrent cost is additional spent on unpaved roads; in 1980-82 annual recurrent costs were estimated at US$6.0 million (1977 prices). 3/ Paved roads were assumed to be maintained even without the project; savings in passenger car unit were used as equation; 2 pcu = small truck and mini-bus; 3 pcu = large truck and bus. 8/ All primary roads were included in the program and about 65% of laterite secondary roads. 5/ Savings in voc from 1,470 miles of unpaved roads only; with the project the unpaved network improved from pocr/fair to good condition. 6/ One-third of benefits only. 7/ Two-thirds o' benefits only. - 22 - TabLe 5 LIBERIA PROJECT COMPLETION REPCRT LOAN 907/CHFDIT 395-LBR - SECOND HTGFWAY PROJECT Economic Reevaluation of the Monrovia Bypass Construction (8.2 mileA) (Appraisal and Updated Information) I. Construction Costs (Economic Cost) A. Actual and appraisal cost of construction Actual construction period: mid-1974 - mid-1976 Apraisal construction period: end-1973 - end-1974 Actual cost including supervision: US$2,516,000 Appraisal cost: US$1,900,000 Inflated to 1977 prices: '974 1975 1976 1,211,000 1,578,000 L44,0o r.st estimate of West Section (I.3 miles) widening to fo-r lanes in 1985 Re-evaluate- Appraisa- us$6,650,00o0 US$4,400,000 TI. Vehicle Operating Costs Savingsi / and Traffic Composition1 (USO/mile) Re-evaluated A raisal West Section (4.3 mi) East Section (3.9 mi) (8.2 miles) Traffic Savings voc Resulting Traffic Savings voc Resulting Resulting Composition vehicle/mile savirgs/mile Composition vehicle/mile savirgs/nile saving*mile Vehicle Type (%) (Jsi) (USO) (7) (USO) (USi) (USO) Passenger cars 33 (28) 14.93 4.92 43 14.93 ;.41 0.8 Taxis 31 (27) 6.08 1.88 13 6.08 C.79 0.7 Pick-ups 16 (15) 12.22 1.95 17 12.22 1.17 1.1 Buses 8 ( 6) 15.53 1.24 8 15.53 1.2'. 0.4 Small trucks 11 (22) 22.52 2.47 17 22.52 3.82 2.5 Medium trucks 1 ( 2) 28.81 0.2,3 2 28.81 0.57 >.4 100 00) 12.7 100 11.90 5.9 III. Actual and Re-estimated Traffic Projection1 (vpd) West Section East Section Normal Diverted Total Normal Diverted Total 1975 (Appraisal Report) 3,100 3,500 6,600 1,700 2,300 1,000 1976 3,255 3,675 6,930 1,785 2,415 4,200 1978 3,664 1,137 7,801 2,163 2,927 5,090 1982 4,629 5,227 9,856 2,837 3,838 6,675 1990 7,378 8,3131 15,709 4,521 6,118 10,639 IV. Total Savings in voc2' (US$'000, 1977 prices) West Section 1,272 2,028 3,631 East Section 6,9 1,079 1,934 V. Economic Rate of Return A. Re-evaluated economic return Construction of Monrovia Bypass (8.2 mi): 51% Sensitivity (traffic growth 5%/year): 39% B. Appraisal estimates Construction of Monrovia Bypass: L2% Sensitivity: n.a. 1/ Assumed construction period 1982-83. 2/ Difference in voc between earth and paved road; in 1977 prices. 3/ Traffic composition based on 1978 counts; data in parenthesis from Appraisal Report. An average traffic growth of 6% per year was estimated on the basis of 1976-78 growth; Appraisal used 5%/year. 5/ Savings in voc include those from normal and diverted traffic extended over 20-year economic life. ORGANT7ATION OF THF, MINISTRY OF PIBLIC WORKS, 1976 MINISTEl OF PUBLIC WOHKS fLL. DLPUI Y MINISIL L 1 I-OH NISTER FOR ADMINISI ItAl 01N TCHNICA SERVICES bil CIMAL OPEHATION CONSTRUCTI TECHNICAL PLANNNG & JY01 CB HEA0 BUEAU SERVICES BUREAU PROGAMMING c0IIDINAI-i BIUHEAL) r IC_HFAFflAT] DIAJVi1I SCH AlALEA-- SECHEARIAT ..-SECHETAHIAT ¯N ENG(-INEEHING :IIANCL CONSLTANTS ISCIN FLl f PTNG -& ECONOMIC ACCOUNIS Il1161WAY OFFCE ACI1I PLANNING MAIN fENANCE CO.OftIINATOH HUD(. _f PHYSIC AL D)A 17A HANK 12 DIS lHIC ICOAU PLANNING -~~~~~ - - - -NGN E SC NST U TO & INNG pl-HSONNLL -- ~¯¯¯ ¯ _LVIL [ SOLS EST ENINEEHING .lILDING HESLAHC LAB. CUNS1 1UCTION ___._ ._ CUS l 0DIAl. EUI'MENT _...F ------~Bu - - - - U il m -, --, WoDt OK LulUIL)1G Pl (OCU ME N I LoUP IE L I - - LSKIW'ICN CECHNICAl. IECIINICAL A SSIS AN ASSISI AN J C(HiUdAl A01 11010 1 Y C /L C/&1-B INIH(A IIUHEAUCÄ( IIN_i_ _(.¯ WVoh1,1 llmib 1830  IBRD 13313 SA 4 ÅREnA S L IBE R l A FOURTH HIGHWAY PROJECT 5ERA SE tVlt /w ? NrGeER A 3 ~ Uu ArT~ C OC E A N Y.ngr Rerostruction under 4th Highway Projet - - - - Construction under 3rd Highway Project S. . . re etm di, undr 3rd Highway Projeut, detiled engineerng 7 construction under 2nd Highway Project ... uC.... Preinuenment studies under 2nd Highway Project .Koene B Ped highways ------MDry weather roads \ ý ...... Rends ender uunstrrudein Kolouno L 0 F A 4 international irport' K0 nei ntil 1°el bb Wo. H.rbrs 0*COUNTY F.ebu Z o - - - - - Cunty boundaries Goremau -- - international boundarles B. l. Mbalomo ul Su .1 MeehiurMr ~ GRAND CAPE Guin.rrr'/ 'Gu,n MOUNT COUNTY ,b. Ben.Ie'Il SpvÅ Bul o Blnum r,OB.rdur~ B" _JG b.r B end,o, 0 Curnu pulki Kol ' Norn BEn • [Guohopo) amboo b 0r N n B. e" Gb-mo p ubgoCle .s eBombom ~Hend, / (G b } NIMBA MO'NTSÉRRADO K -"C UNT -- COUNTY -n5uh Gbrr Y.I COUNT Y 0 pun- Tobd.. Sch W.n b GRAND ,uTnunr ~ rocBASSA COUNTY 7GRAND GEDEH COUNTY ~ouNewC s K.bli p'n To- 7l l..n Rivc... N.r..K OSINT COUNTY . -lroe r'.ul eIO ETR Greenvì___ llpk S9 rut n B l llCOUNTY Y Grand Ces Gera.. i .KilOE RS  IBRD 10291R] 10130 O45" S I ERRA G U I NEA MARCH 1975 LEONEr' ' ~ L IBERIA A I IVORY THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT MONROVIA"COA MONROVIA 0 0, Port Access Roads and Mount Coffee Dam Road 441 10*3b 30" CONSTRUCTION UNDER PROPOSED PROJECT T... .. .. .. .. . ... ... . DETAILED ENGINEERING UNDER OJEC S t. p R -PROPOSED PROJECT CONSTRUCTION UNDER SECOND o SWAMPY AREA MAIN ROADS SECONDARY ROADS -6"30 e oo4 psRAILROADS g 6*30' K Tow New Georgia Logan Town BONG MINE RPASS Bar nes9v ileI Free Port of Monrovia Bushrod LIBERIAN REFINING C NDU RIAL A RK EXISTING BRIDGE 0ed 2, r PROJET LIMITS/ t wATa T ,. PROPOSED Kio'tr Mambo BRDG 24wa Point A /a EXECUTIVEi s/n MANSION TUSMAN Cos 0~~ 2 G/ 00 Mile.. ,, s - o hsopd o i.l o p, 1 00 10' 4 " 0' 10 PRO -WECT