Tanzania - Dar Es Salaam Port Engineering Project

Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. P-2668-TA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR THE DAR ES SALAM PORT ENGINEERING PROJECT December 5, 1979 This document kms a resricted distribution and may We used by recipients only in the performance of their offical duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank autborization.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Tanzanian Shilling (TSh.) US$1.00 = TShs. 8.30 1.0 TSh. = US$0.12 (As the Tanzania Shilling is officially valued in relation to a basket of currencies, the US Dollar/Tanzania Shilling exchange rate is subject to change. Conversions in this report were made at US$1.00 to TShs. 8.30 which is close to the 1979 average exchange rate.) WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) 1 square kilometer (sq km) = 0.386 square miles (sq mi) GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS EAC - East African Community EAHC - East African Harbours Corporation MCT - Ministry of Communications and Transport MFP - Ministry of Finance and Planning MOW - Ministry of Works NMC - National Milling Corporation ODA - Overseas Development Administration (UK) TANZAM - Tanzania/Zambia TAZARA - Tanzania-Zambia Railway Line TCSL - Tanzania Coastal Shipping Line, Ltd. TRA - Tanzania Harbours Authority TRC - Tanzania Railway Corporation ZTRS - Zambia-Tanzania Road Services FISCAL YEAR Government : July 1 - June 30 Tanzania Harbours Authority: July 1 - June 30  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TANZANIA DAR ES SALAAM PORT ENGINEERING PROJECT CREDIT AND PROJECT SUMMARY BORROWER: United Republic of Tanzania BENEFICIARY: Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA) AMOUNT: US$2.5 million equivalent TERMS: Repayable in 10 years including 2 years of grace and carrying a service charge of 3/4 of 1% per annum. The credit would be refinanced under any subsequent credit or loan the Bank Group may provide to implement a proposed Harbours Project at Dar es Salaam. RELENDING TERMS: The proceeds of the credit would be onlent to the Tanzania Harbours Authority for 10 years including 2 years of grace at an interest rate of 7.95% per annum. The exchange risk would be assumed fully by THA. PROJECT The proposed credit is intended to finance the detailed DESCRIPTION: engineering designs and the preparation and evaluation of tenders required for Civil Works under a proposed Harbours Project in order to firm up the cost estimates for the Project. The engineering credit would finance: (a) a feasibility study of the location of a bulk grain silo; (b) preliminary and final engineering designs, cost estimates and tender documents for a bulk grain silo (with a ship unloader, conveyor system and elevator) and an import storage warehouse; (c) final engineering designs, cost estimates and tender documents for (i) deepening and straightening of the entrance channel, (ii) a container facility, (iii) the replacement of the petroleum jetty, and (iv) a harbour tug berth; and (d) assistance to THA in prequalification of interested civil works contractors and in the evaluation of civil works tenders. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  - ii - The risk involved in the proposed engineering project is minimal as the same consultants who carried out satis- factorily the updating study of the port of Dar es Salaam had been selected for the engineering services and as no major delay is anticipated. ESTIMATED COSTS: 1/ Local Foreign Total ------(US$ million)------ Engineering Consultants: Home Office - 1.38 1.38 Overseas (Tanzania) .30 .21 .51 Sub-Contracts - .21 .21 Support, subsistence and transport .15 .20 .35 Subtotal .45 2.00 2.45 Price contingencies .05 .30 .35 Physical contingencies - .20 .20 Total Engineering Cost Net of Taxes and Duties .50 2.50 3.00 FINANCING PLAN: The proposed credit would finance the foreign exchange component of the engineering services; the remaining US$.5 million in local costs would be financed by THA. ESTIMATED DISBURSEMENTS: IDA Fiscal Year 1980 1981 1982 -----(US$ million)----- Annual .4 1.9 .2 Cumulative .4 2.3 2.5 RATE OF RETURN: Not applicable 1/ The proj,ect is exempted from identifiable taxes and duties.  INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR THE DAR ES SALAAM PORT ENGINEERING PROJECT 1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed credit of US$2.5 million equivalent to the United Republic of Tanzania to help finance the detailed engineering designs and the preparation and evalua- tion of tenders for civil works required for a proposed Harbours Project. The credit would carry a service charge of 3/4 of 1% per annum and would be repayable in 10 years including 2 years of grace. The proceeds of the credit would be onlent to the Tanzania Harbours Authority under a subsidiary loan agreement which would be on terms and conditions acceptable to the Association including an interest rate of 7.95% per annum and repayment in 10 years including 2 years of grace. The exchange risk would be assumed fully by THA. The Credit would be refinanced under any subsequent credit or loan the Bank Group may provide to implement a proposed Harbours Project at Dar es Salaam. PART I - THE ECONOMY 2. A Basic Economic Mission visited Tanzania in August 1976. The Basic Economic Report was distributed in December 1977 (Report No. 1616-TA). A new Country Economic Memorandum will be issued later in this fiscal year. A summary of social and economic data is in Annex I. Profile of the Economy 3. Tanzania is one of the 30 least developed countries in the world with a per capita income in 1978 of US$230. The economy is still heavily dependent on agriculture: 90% of the labor force is engaged in agriculture and approximately 50% of GDP and two-thirds of total exports are derived from agricultural production. The industrial sector is still small, producing about 10% of GDP, approximately the same percentage as 11 years ago. The service sector produces about 40% of GDP. Overall population density is low, though a few areas are considered overpopulated. Population growth is estimated at 3.0% per annum with both fertility and mortality at relatively high levels. 6 4. Since the Arusha Declaration in 1967 Tanzania has pursued a socialist development strategy. Banking, insurance, and most large-scale enterprises in manufacturing, plantation agriculture, transportation, and wholesale trade are under state control. There is extensive state intervention in economic activity, including import licensing, foreign exchange controls, price control, the reservation of some activities to the state or cooperative sector, and detailed Government investment planning. The second major feature of Tanzania's development strategy is its strong emphasis on rural development and social programs to benefit the poor and reduce inequalities in income distribution. This is reflected in ambitious programs for the provision of rural water supplies and health services and in the decision to achieve universal entry into primary education beginning in 1977.  -2- Long Term Economic Trends 5. In the decade 1968-78 real GDP at factor cost grew at an annual average rate of 4.8%, or about 1.8% per annum per capita. While economic growth was severely disrupted by the economic crisis following the failure of rains and large increases in import prices in 1973 and 1974, the economy has recovered well with annual growth at 5 to 6% for 1976 through 1978. During this decade the service sector grew the fastest - 6.3% p.a., followed by the industrial sector - 4.0% p.a. and then agriculture - 3.9% p.a. 6. The Government has a good record of domestic resource mobilization. Between 1967-68 and 1977-78 the share of recurrent revenues rose from 15.1% to 19.3% of GDP. However, most of this increase occurred before 1975-1976. Since then revenue has been increasing at a rate below the GDP growth rate (in 1974/75 revenue was 22% of GDP). This increase was achieved through a combination of highly progressive direct taxes and proportional or moderately progressive indirect taxes. Except during the economic crisis in 1974-75, the rate of national savings has also been high: gross national savings fluctuated at around 16-17% of GNP from the mid-1960s through 1973, fell to half that level during the crisis years and recovered to the pre-crisis level in 1976 and 1977. These are high levels of savings for a country at Tanzania's income level. 7. Some progress has also been made in achieving the Government's objective of a more equitable income distribution. Between 1969 and 1975 the average urban rural gap remained approximately constant, halting the trend towards an increasing gap in the early 1960s. It is likely that the gap has been slightly reduced since 1976 due to continued recovery of agricultural production and higher producer prices. However, regional income differentials in rural areas have tended to widen slightly. Within the formal urban sector there has been a dramatic narrowing of the post-tax income differential between the highest-paid government officials and minimum wage earners from 50 to 1 in 1961 to 8 to 1 in 1975. However, a large informal sector has emerged comprising large numbers of unemployed and underemployed workers with earnings significantly below the official urban minimum wage. The policies of wage restraint and higher producer prices pursued since 1975 should have a bene- ficial impact on almost all dimensions of income distribution, and the basic needs oriented programs in rural water and health and in universal primary education (para. 4 above) are resulting in a significant redirection in public expenditures toward the rural poor. 8. Despite this impressive overall record of development, some pro- blems have begun to manifest themselves in recent years. Exports have failed to keep pace with the growth of the rest of the economy. The overall export index is down almost one-third since 1966. This poor performance in exports is due to the poor growth rate of agricultural cash crops. While agricul- tural output has increased impressively in recent years (10.9% in 1976 and 8.2% in 1977), most of this growth has been in the hard-to-measure subsistence sector, while the monetary sector has lagged well behind. Over the last decade subsistence growth has averaged 5.1% per annum while monetary sector growth  has been only 2.3% per annum. This has led to a severe retardation of growth of exports of agricultural products. This failure of export growth has led to increasing dependency on foreign loans and grants to pay for imports. 9. A second problem that is becoming more serious is the deceleration of the growth of domestic revenues. While still at a high ratio to GDP compared to most other developing countries, government revenues have been growing more slowly than GDP in recent years. At the same time recurrent expenditures have been higher than budgeted. As a result, public sector savings have been well below expectations and the Government has had to rely more upon borrowing (both foreign and local) and external aid for financing development than was planned. Recent Economic Developments 10. During 1975-77 the Government followed a program agreed to at the time of the first Program Loan (No. 1063-TA) in late 1974. This program included redirecting investment to more productive sectors, higher agricul- tural producer prices, constraints on wages and salaries, price and tax increases to restrain consumption and tight control of imports. These poli- cies, aided by the boom in coffee prices, succeeded in keeping government spending under control with low levels of borrowing from the banking system and led to a balance of payments surplus of almost US$150 million in 1977. Food production increased and government stocks of most foodgrains reached record levels. In 1978 the Government was able to ease import restrictions and begin to import the spares and raw materials needed by industry, which had been running below capacity. 11. Unfortunately the price of coffee, Tanzania's major export, began to fall at the same time that imports were liberalized. Also, in October, 1978 war broke out with Uganda and the resulting imports of military equipment and domestic mobilization put an increasing strain on the balance of payments and the domestic budget. Consequently the current account showed a deficit of more than US$450 million in 1978 and the overall balance of payments was almost US$300 million in deficit. As a result, reserves were drawn down and the country was forced to delay payment of about US$60 million in import bills. 12. The situation has deteriorated further in 1979 and the Government's economic policies are facing a major challenge. The overall balance of payments is expected to be almost US$200 million in deficit and as a result arrears are expected to be about US$200 million by the end of the year. At the same time the domestic budget deficit has ballooned. The recurrent budget is expected to show a deficit of almost 1 billion shillings for 1978/79 and government borrowing from the banking system is expected to be more than 3 billion shillings, a major component in an almost 35% increase in the money supply. Import licenses have been reduced by almost 40% from the 1978 level in real terms (following a 10% devaluation in January of 1979). The Government has been able to arrange for almost US$75 million in funds from the IMF from its first credit tranche, the Trust Fund and the Export Compensatory Fund, but negotiations for further assistance from the IMF have so far been unsuccessful. The 1979/80 budget calls for a reduction in the level of recurrent expenditure  -4- and borrowing from the banking system of 1.67 billion shillings, but through the first quarter of this fiscal year borrowing was already 1.4 billion shillings. A major problem is lack of budgetary discipline as spending agencies have been able to exceed their budgetary allocations with the Treasury continuing to honor their checks. The Government urgently needs to develop a comprehensive program to deal with the current crisis, as it did in 1974. The Bank has offered to help the Government in developing such a program. 13. Tanzania continues to attract large amounts of foreign assistance on concessional terms. Because of the very concessional terms on which aid has been given to Tanzania and the Government's reluctance in the past to use higher cost commercial loans and supplier's credits, the overall debt service ratio has historically been low (less than 10%). However, the recent balance of payments crisis has forced the Government to utilize such loans recently and as a result the debt service ratio is estimated at 12% in 1979 and 15% in 1980. We expect it will remain in the range of 15-20% throughout the 1980's. In 1978 the Bank held 12% of Tanzania's external debt (for the Bank Group, it was 28%) and received 37% of Tanzania's debt service (40% for the Bank Group). We are projecting this debt service share to fall to about 21% in 1980 and to remain around 25% for the coming decade. 14. Tanzania's development will require resources in excess of domestic savings and external capital made available solely to finance the foreign exchange costs of projects. Given the Government's efforts to mobilize domestic resources and in view of our support for its increased emphasis on local cost intensive rural investments, the Bank Group will continue to finance a high proportion of total costs including, in appropriate cases, a portion of local costs. East African Community (EAC) 15. The recent developments in the East African Community were outlined in a report to the Executive Directors dated December 19, 1977 (R77-312). Dr. Victor Umbricht, the independent mediator appointed by the Partner States, has visited East Africa on numerous occasions and has now prepared reports to the Partner States on the results of his fact-finding work on the EAC Corpora- tions and the General Services, and the methodology adopted in appraising the assets and liabilities. The next phase of the mediator's work will be to make recommendations on the allocation of these assets and liabilities. The mediator's report and recommendations on the future structure of the East African Development Bank (EADB) have been accepted in principle by the Partner States and the revised EADB Charter along with the Treaty to enact the new Charter have been submitted to the three Governments for signature. 16. The de facto breakup of the Community has had some impact on Tanzania's budget as new national entities take over the services formerly provided by the EAC Corporations. A major development related to the EAC difficulties was the closure of the border with Kenya. Kenya was a major trading partner of Tanzania and considerable adjustments have had to be made in locating new suppliers for some items and developing alternative outlets for some manufactured goods and agricultural products.  - 5 - PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN TANZANIA 1/ 17. Tanzania joined the Bank, IDA and IFC in 1962. Beginning with an IDA credit for education in 1962, 38 IDA credits and 19 Bank loans, of which two on Third Window terms, amounting to US$747.0 million have so far been approved for Tanzania. In addition, Tanzania has been a beneficiary of 10 loans totalling US$244.8 million which have been extended for the development of the common services and development bank operated regionally by Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda through their association in the East African Community. IFC investments in Tanzania, totalling US$4.7 million, were made to the Kilombero Sugar Company in 1960 and 1964. This Company encountered financial difficulties and in 1969 IFC and other investors sold their interest in the Company to the Government. A new IFC investment of US$1.7 million in soap manufacturing in Mbeya was approved by the Executive Directors on June 8, 1978 and an investment of US$1.5 million in metal product manufacturing was approved on May 10, 1979. Annex II contains summary statements of Bank loans, IDA credits and Ik'C investments to Tanzania and the East African Community organizations as of September 30, 1979 and notes on the execution of ongoing projects. 18. To support Tanzania's overall development strategy Bank Group lend- ing operations are increasingly focusing on the rural sector and directly productive projects. While up to the end of FY 1972 Bank Group operations were directed mainly to infrastructure, the overwhelming majority of the operations approved since FY73 have been for directly productive projects. Furthermore, a number of recent Bank Group supported infrastructure projects have been closely linked with specific productive activities. For example, the Urban Water Supply Project (Loan No. 1354-TA) approved in January 1976, will support the Industrial Complex in Morogoro (Loans No. 1385-T-TA and 1386-TA) and the Morogoro Textile Project (Loan No. 1607-TA and Credit Noe 833-TA). Directly productive projects recently approved include the Second Cashewnut Development Project (Credit No. 801-TA), the Tobacco Handling Project (Credit No. 802-TA), the Mwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development Project (Credit No. 803-TA), the Mufindi Pulp and Paper Project (Loan No. 1650-TA and Credit No. 875-TA) and the Tanganyika Development Finance Company Limited (TDFL) Project (Loan No. 1745-TA). In addition, a Tourism Rehabilitation Project (Credit No. 860-TA), a Sixth Education Project (Credit No. 861-TA) and a Fifth Highway Project (Credit No. 876-TA) were approved by the Board in FY79. A fourth line of credit to the Tanzania Investment Bank (Loan No. 1750-TA) was also approved on July 24, 1979. Projects which have been ap- praised include a Second Urban Water Supply Project, a line of credit to the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB), a Pyrethrum Project, a Coconut Project, a Tea Processing Project, an Education Project and a Foodgrain Storage and Milling Project. A rural development project in Mara, a small scale industries project, an urban project, a harbours project, a railway project, and an agricultural services project are also under preparation. 1/ This section is essentially the same as that of the President's Report on the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) Projected dated July 12, 1979.  19. Although the comparatively high undisbursed proportion of loans and credits, detailed in Annex II, is in large part a result of the recent approval of many of these projects, it also reflects the fact that overall project implementation has been slower than was projected. It is clear in retrospect that both the Bank Group and Tanzania have been optimistic re- garding Tanzania's absorptive capacity. The causes of the difficulties in implementation are varied. Some stem from the scarcity of suitably trained and experienced manpower, some reflect the problems in identifying agronomic input packages appropriate to the needs of smallholder farmers while others result from the strains associated with attempting a "frontal attack" on poverty. These problems have been compounded by frequent and drastic ad- ministrative changes, which -- though potentially the source of long-term benefits -- have certainly disrupted orderly execution of projects and made parts of earlier project concepts obsolete. Also, the Uganda war (para. 11) has had some impact on project implementation. In the early stages of the war, there was some diversion of equipment and manpower; however these problems have largely been solved. The problem over the medium term are the financial implications of the war. If general economic problems resulting from the war are not resolved, the availability of adequate local funds could become a major constraint to implementation. In general, difficulties have been most severe in agriculture, particularly in the smallholder rural sector. As our lending program has increasingly concentrated on this sector, these problems have become correspondingly more apparent and severe. By contrast, the "modern" sector projects have tended to fare better: the Tanzania Investment Bank, Mwanza Textile, Morogoro Industrial Estate and Cashewnut Processing Projects, for example, are proceeding well. 20. As the Bank Group's lending program has expanded, increasing attention has been given to measures designed to improve project implementa- tion. A course was conducted in Dar es Salaam in 1973 and again in 1978 on Bank Group procurement with the relevant Government officials. A special project implementation unit was set up in the Ministry of Agriculture and 11 Agricultural Development Services staff have been assigned to Bank Group financed projects in agriculture and rural development. The need to establish a close and continuous working level dialogue between responsible Tanzanian officials and Bank Group staff on implementation problems was one of the prime reasons for the expansion of the Resident Mission to two professionals in October 1976. In February 1977 a regular Government/Bank Group review of project implementation was established. Monthly discussions on Bank Group program chaired by the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MFP) and attended by Bank Group staff and officials from implementing agencies deal in detail with individual problem projects and problems which are affecting project imple- mentation across a number of sectors. As a result of these efforts, there has been a noticeable improvement in project implementation. Actions agreed to during the reviews have been completed relatively fast and coordination and communication between the MFP and the various ministries and agencies res- ponsible for project implementation has improved markedly.  21. The Government has become increasingly conscious of the importance of effective implementation. In addition to fully supporting the project implementation review system, MFP has set up a unit to oversee project per- formance. Furthermore, there have been more consistent responses to Bank suggestions and a willingness to openly discuss project problems raised by Bank Staff. As a consequence, the disbursement records of Bank Group financed projects have improved somewhat over the last two years, and a recent analysis indicated that the Tanzanian disbursement performance is about equal to the Bank-wide average. While there is still a potential for further significant improvements, the Government is implementing its investment program, including Bank Group and other foreign aided projects, more effectively than in the past. PART III - THE TRANSPORT SECTOR Background 22. Tanzania, with a population of about 17 million, has a land area of about 945,000 sq km. Less than 10% of the population lives in towns, but the urban population is increasing much faster than the national population growth rate (para. 3). Poor road conditions and lack of adequate transport seriously constrain the country's economic growth, especially the marketing of agricul- tural products and the delivery of agricultural inputs. To facilitate rural development and to improve overall efficiency, the Government in 1972 decen- tralized various administrative activities, giving the country's 25 adminis- trative regions (20 on the mainland) substantial power to control the planning and budgeting of resources in their respective jurisdictions. While the development of adequate transport services is critical to the success of the regional efforts only limited progress has been made in improving the transport infrastructure, reflecting, among other things, severe staff constraints and limited financial resources. The Transport System 23. Tanzania's transport system comprises roads (about 45,000 km), two railway systems (totalling 3,570 km of track), three main ocean ports and some minor ocean and lake ports, two international airports and over 50 smaller airfields. A pipeline conveys crude oil between Dar es Salaam and Zambia; in addition, one of the railways, and a major road, were built mainly to carry Zambian traffic. Since the collapse of the East African Community (EAC) in 1977, Tanzania has become wholly responsible for management of its transport system. 24. Highways. Of the total road network in Tanzania only 7% is paved; 93% is gravel or earth. In addition, as only about 900 km of the gravel roads have been engineered, most of the gravel or earth roads typically become impassable during the wet season. Roads classified as trunk roads (9,316 km) link the mainland's 20 regional capitals and connect Tanzania with neighboring countries; they vary in standard from two-lane paved roads to unimproved earth  - 8 - tracks. Roads classified as secondary roads (7,694 km) link other centers of economic activity with the trunk road network while those classified as regional and district roads (about 28,000 km) form the balance of the system. The 9,316 km trunk road system includes about 2,100 km of secondary roads and regional roads recently reclassified to trunk roads. 25. Railways. Two railway systems serve Tanzania: The Tanzania Railway Corporation (TRC) and the Tanzania-Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA). TRC was established as a corporate entity in 1977 to operate that part of the East African Railway Corporation (EARC) located within Tanzanian territory. Although not all the issues involved in this transfer have been resolved, TRC now manages and operates the 2,600 km, 1.0 m gauge railway in central and northern Tanzania. Linking Dar es Salaam and Tanga with Arusha, Mwanza, Dodoma, Tabora and Kigoma, the TRC railway is particularly important for long-distance transport internally as well as for transit traffic to and from some of its neighbors, particularly Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. TRC's opera- tions and services are presently unsatisfactory because of low availability of locomotives and wagons and lack of workshop facilities, as well as the deteriorated condition of equipment and track. Large investments are required and the Canadian Government along with a number of other bilateral agencies have agreed to provide substantial financial assistance. Also, a project is being prepared for possible Bank Group financing (para. 18). 26. TAZARA, financed by the Peoples Republic of China and owned jointly by Tanzania and Zambia, commenced operations in 1976 and consists of 1.067 m gauge track extending 970 km from Dar es Salaam to the Zambian border and continuing another 890 km into Zambia. The principal traffic at present is, and for some years will continue to be, Zambian exports of copper and Zambian imports. Future growth of Tanzanian traffic on the line will depend on development of the country's southern regions. TAZARA operations have experienced increasing difficulties; maintenance of locomotives, turn-around time of wagons, and coordination with the port of Dar es Salaam are presently poor. The Government is currently making efforts to improve this situation. In addition a number of bridges in Zambian territory have recently been destroyed in military actions related to the civil war in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; these are now being repaired. 27. Ports. Dar es Salaam is Tanzania's principal sea port, Tanga and Mtwara are the other major ports. Dar es Salaam is located in a natural harbour on the East African seaboard of the Indian Ocean. In addition to handling the bulk of Tanzania's traffic, this port has traditionally handled transit traffic for the eastern part of Zaire, and the landlocked countries of Burundi and Rwanda. In recent years it has also become a major port for Zambia's seaborne imports and exports, particularly since the opening of TAZARA in 1976. 28. Shipping. The Tanzania Coastal Shipping Line, Ltd. (TCSL), estab- lished in 1971, is a parastatal corporation with a monopoly of carrying freight and passengers between various coastal and island ports south of Dar es Salaam. Traffic between Dar es Salaam, Mtwara and Lindi is highly seasonal with heavy traffic in the rainy season when alternative road transport is unreliable, circuitous, and costly. Until an improved coastal road including  - 9 - a costly bridge over the Rufiji River can be built (which appears unlikely for many years), the TCSL will play an important role in transport to and from southeastern Tanzania. 29. Some transport services are also provided by TRC on Lake Victoria between Mwanza, Bukoba and Musoma ports. On Lake Tanganyika, Burundi-owned ships transport considerable cargo-between Bujumbura and Kigoma, the western terminus of TRC. 30. Air Transport. With its vast distances, difficult terrain and limited road network, domestic air service is particularly important in Tanzania. Of the more than 50 designated airfields, only a few are built to standards high enough to permit operation of jet aircraft; many of the remainder are dirt and grass strips used only occasionally. International airports are located in Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro; Mtwara, Tabora, Dodoma, Mwanza and Zanzibar also have paved runways. The national air transport company, Air Tanzania, was established in 1977 following termination of operations of the East African Airways Corporation to service a wide network of domestic routes. Using Fokker E-27 aircraft, Twin-Otters and two Boeing 737s, the airline provides services to major centers within the country and limited services between Tanzania and certain neighboring countries. Air Tanzania performance has improved markedly during this year. No regular air service is available between Tanzania and Kenya; all road, rail and air traffic between the two countries was suspended in February 1977 (para. 16 above). 31. Pipeline. A pipeline financed by the Italian Government and operated by the TANZAM Oil Pipeline Company was completed in 1968 from Dar es Salaam to Ndola in Zambia. Initially the 1,705 km line (900 km in Tanzania) of 20.3 cm pipe carried gasoline to Zambia, but following construction of a refinery at Ndola, the line now transports crude oil. Its design capacity exceeds 700,000 tons p.a., and traffic flow has generally been at about that level. Transport Planning and Coordination 32. The Ministry of Works (MOW) is responsible for planning major highway investments while the Ministry of Communications and Transport (MCT) oversees planning for other transport modes. The regional authorities have responsibility for planning, implementing and maintaining local roads. MFP has the principal responsibility for financing transport investments and preparing investment programs based on proposals from MOW, MCT, and the regions (after preliminary review by the Office of the Prime Minister). As transport planning capability is weak in all the ministries involved and since data for planning are not systematically collected, little meaningful transport planning has taken place in Tanzania. To begin to address this problem, Bank Group staff have been advising both MCT and MOW on preparation of a project- specific national transport plan which would define priorities and programs for investments in the sector. Thus far, neither Ministry has been able to commit significant resources to this exercise and MCT is recommending that a National Transport Study covering all modes of transport should be undertaken by consultants with assistance from the Bank Group. This proposal is now being reviewed by the Bank.  - 10 - 33. Coordination of investments within the transport sector is weak, largely because of the lack of planning capability. A major cause of this problem was the dissolution of the East African Community. During its existence, air transport, ports, and a portion of the rail system operated under cooperative statutory institutions of the Community, with planning and coordination at the Community level. Since these transport elements are now operating under new agencies established by the Tanzania Government, there have been significant problems in reestablishing the necessary management and operational systems. While these problems have not led to serious misinvest- ments, there is a growing need to give transport investment coordination more attention in view of Tanzania's overall resource constraints and the high costs of the priority investments required in transport services. Coordina- tion of investments among transport and non-transport sectors has also been limited. For example, in the high potential agriculture areas in south- western Tanzania the benefits realized by Tanzania from heavy transport investments in the TANZAM corridor have been limited. The Government is now giving priority to the development of this area. Previous Bank Group Lending in Transport 34. The Bank Group has supported extensively the development of the transport sector in Tanzania. At the national level, investments have been made in highways and trucking. Highway lending includes five projects totalling $76.7 million: the first project financed construction of a total of 860 km of roads, the second project assisted in the construction of the TANZAM Highway, and the third project focused on road construction in Southern Tanzania and betterment of feeder roads. All were completed successfully. The fourth and fifth projects are still under implementation and are aimed at improving trunk road maintenance capacity throughout the country. The Trucking Project, which is also under implementation, is directed at the development of efficient trucking services through direct investment in a number of public trucking companies, training and the financing of increased spare parts inventories. In addition, a number of rural development and agricultural projects include road construction components. 35. Bank Group assistance to Tanzania for ports and railways was provided in the past within the framework of the East African Community. Loans amount- ing to US$166 million were made to the East African Railways and Harbours Administration and its successors the East African Railways Corporation (EARC) and East African Harbours Corporation (EAHC); these projects benefitted all three Partner States. In Tanzania, the projects have assisted the develop- ment of EARC's northern and central lines and financed a large portion of the development of Dar es Salaam Port. The specific investments in harbours include four projects: Loan 110-EA (1955 - US$24.0 million) was made to the East African High Commission to meet part of the costs to be incurred during 1954-57 by the East African Railways and Harbours Administration in its development program. Among other things, this loan financed the completion of deep-water berths at Mombasa and at Dar es Salaam and a new lighterage wharf at Tanga. The project works were satisfactorily completed in 1957. Loan 428-EA (1965 - US$38.0 million) was made to the East African Common Services  - 11 - Authority to finance part of the foreign exchange cost of the development program of the East African Railways and Harbours Administration during 1965-67. This loan helped finance completion of two new deep-water berths at Mombasa and one new deep-water berth at Dar es Salaam. The project works were successfully completed in 1971. Loan 638-EA (1969 - US$35.0 million) was made to the East African Harbours Corporation to help finance its 1969-72 develop- ment program, specifically the construction of two new deep-water berths and a dry bulk wharf at Mombasa, as well as the completion and/or construction of five new deep-water berths and a single buoy tanker terminal at Dar es Salaam, in addition to modernization of existing facilities at both ports. While this project was completed in 1977, both this loan and the subsequent Loan No. 865-EA were affected by the political problems which the EAC experienced throughout the seventies. Loan 865-EA (1972 - US$26.5 million) was made to the East African Harbours Corporation to help finance its 1972-76 development program, specifically the construction of three deep-water berths and modern- ization at Dar es Salaam, the construction of back-of-port facilities and a tug berth, and modernization of other facilities at Mombasa, and improvement of lighterage facilities at Tanga. The physical implementation of this Project was satisfactorily completed in 1978 and despite some delay in con- struction, the final costs remained within acceptable limits. Bank Group Strategy in the Ports Subsector 36. The Bank Group's strategy in the ports subsector is to support the Government's program for its development in order to ensure that Tanzania as well as landlocked neighboring countries have an efficient outlet to the sea. The Bank Group recognizes the importance of Dar es Salaam Port in Tanzania's transport system and its vital role as a regional port serving Zambia, Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. Bank Group involvement is intended to ensure that Dar es Salaam Port continues to keep abreast of technical trends and improves its efficiency in order to keep up with the growth of shipping, container traffic, and bulk grain shipments. To achieve this, the Bank Group is focusing on ensuring that THA's requirements for both technical assistance and the devel- opment of Tanzanian personnel will be met. While THA has employed many of the staff of the former EAHC (which had a reputation of an efficient organization in the East African context), it is a new organization which will require time to develop and grow. PART IV - THE ENGINEERING PROJECT 37. The Port of Dar es Salaam is the key link in the Tanzanian transport system and while traffic has increased rapidly over the past 4 to 5 years (particularly after Zambia closed its borders to the south), virtually no major investments have been made since the Third Harbours Project in 1972. This has not reflected a lack of planning or preparation (as noted below, the developments necessary are well studied) but rather the general diffi- culties that were faced by all of the EAC's Corporations in the mid seventies. The uncertainties regarding the future of the EAC made financing further  - 12 - investments impossible. The Port of Dar es Salaam, therefore, faces a con- siderable backlog of high priority investment. When the organizational issues were resolved after the collapse of the EAC (para. 15) by forming a national port authority, THA, the Government of Tanzania in March 1978, approached the Bank Group for financing of the most urgent investments. Two preparation missions were mounted in 1978 and an appraisal mission visited Tanzania in April 1979. As noted below (see para. 39), and in view of the nature of the work involved, it was decided to proceed initially with an engineering credit. Negotiations of the engineering credit were held in Dar es Salaam in October 1979; the Tanzanian delegation included representatives of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of Communication and Transport, the Tanzania Harbours Authority, and the Attorney General's Chambers. A Credit and Project Summary is at the front of this report and a supplementary project data sheet is at Annex III. Background 38. As one element directed at ensuring the continued orderly develop- ment of the Port of Dar es Salaam, a development study (financed by the UNDP with the Bank as executing agency) was carried out in 1973-74 by Bertlin and Partners (UK). This resulted in a long-term master plan for port development including a detailed investment program. As a follow-up to this master plan a preliminary design effort was undertaken in 1976-77 to investigate further the various proposed facilities, to evaluate engineering alternatives, and to establish preliminary cost estimates for the principal components. By late 1977, it became increasingly apparent that the detailed investment program had to be updated to ensure adequate consideration of the growth in container traffic, of bulk grain handling requirements, and the increasing need for warehousing for imports. This updating, including a review of traffic pro- jections, was initiated in October 1978 and carried out by the consultants Bertlin and Partners (UK) and was financed by the United Kingdom. It was completed in March 1979 and concluded that further development of the Port of Dar es Salaam had high priority and that facilities for handling bulk grain, container traffic, and warehousing for imports are justified and should be included; these components had not been included in the original master plan. 39. In April 1979, an appraisal mission reviewed the harbours project proposed in the updating study for financing. While the mission concluded that all the investment proposals were economically, financially and tech- nically viable, it was not able to finalize project costs. The principal uncertainty involves dredging, which constitutes a major portion of project costs. To achieve a sufficient degree of accuracy in cost estimates in order to ensure adequate financing for the proposed Harbours Project, it was there- fore considered desirable to postpone completion of the appraisal of this project until detailed designs have been completed and bids for the dredging contract have been received. Therefore, the appraisal mission recommended an engineering credit to finance the additional work required. Furthermore, as preliminary engineering is not available for either the bulk grain-handling facilities or the import warehouses, these would also be undertaken under the engineering credit.  - 13 - Dar es Salaam Port 40. Until 1956 Dar es Salaam was a lighterage port. In that year three berths were completed; eight others have been added since then. In 1958 the petroleum jetty within the harbour was commissioned, and in 1973 the single buoy mooring facility was added outside the harbour. Traffic consists of vessels covering a spectrum from dhows and coasters to modern freighters and tankers. Presently, few specialized ships (dry bulk carriers, container ships, etc.) call at Dar es Salaam due to lack of appropriate facilities and as yet marginal traffic for these specialized carriers. However, the signif- icant growth in worldwide specialized shipping must be reflected in considering the long term needs for developing the port. While the port was constructed as a traditional rail-served facility, trucks are playing an ever increasing role in transport to and from the port. Break bulk cargo is handled con- ventionally with a combination of ships! gear, quay cranes, tractors, trailers, forklifts and yard cranes. Availability of this equipment is insufficient due to inadequate maintenance. Stevedores lack adequate handling equipment and gear for use aboard ships, and there is a shortage of properly trained supervisors. The proposed Harbours Project will assist THA's develop- ment as an organization through technical assistance and training,as well as address its equipment needs for Dar es Salaam. 41. Facilities. The harbour is rather narrow with limited ship maneuver- ing room. The entrance channel is a natural water fairway, some 3.5 km in length dredged in 1953 to provide a minimum water depth of 7.6 m at low water. The present channel alignment contains three bends in the configuration of an "S" curve. These bends, together with the limited water depth, impose severe restrictions on ship movements in and out of the inner harbour. Ships drawing in excess of 7 m must enter and depart on the tides and arrival or departure at night is not possible with large ships. Addressing these constraints will be a major aim of the proposed Harbours Project. 42. The main cargo handling facilities are situated on the east side of the harbour, consisting of approximately 600 m of lighter wharf (minimum depth 2.4 m) and 11 general cargo alongside berths with a total length of 2,013 m. There are eight stream berths for deep sea vessels within the inner harbour for working of ships to lighters. There is a petroleum jetty in the inner harbour adjacent to and south of the general cargo berths; and a single buoy mooring terminal at Mjimwema Bay outside the harbour for large tankers. General cargo berths and their stacking areas are served by travelling portal cranes. The lighterage wharf is served by portal cranes and mobil cranes. The reorganization of the cargo handling facilities to increase the efficiency of the port will be a second major objective of the proposed Harbours Project. 43. The Port of Dar es Salaam has few facilities for handling special commodities. Molasses and edible oils are handled over one berth through embed- ded pipelines. Bulk grain is handled inefficiently over general cargo berths, using vacuvators discharging into hoppers from where it is trucked to either the  - 14 - Tanzania National Milling Corporation (NMC) silo, or to the TAZARA rail depot for onward shipment. As there are no special facilities for the growing container traffic, containers are handled over all berths. While recently containers in transit have been segregated into two areas for better manage- ment, they continue to be loaded and offloaded from ships at all berths, contributing to traffic disruption as well as congestion. It is anticipated that bulk grain handling facilities and container handling facilities will be included in the proposed Harbors Project. 44. Organization, Management and Operation. The Port of Dar es Salaam was formerly one of the two principal ports (the other being Mombasa) of the East African Harbours Corporation (EAHC). Upon the collapse of the EAHC, the Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA) was created by legislation in July 1977 to establish, administer and operate a system of harbours to serve the needs of Tanzania. THA is headed by a full-time Chairman and a Board of Directors, all appointed by the President, whose duty is to "carry out the functions and manage the business and affairs of the Authority." MCT is responsible for the ''general direction and control of the Authority." The chief executive officer of the Authority, who is also a member of the Board, is the General Manager who is responsible for the day-to-day operations. The principal subordinate element of the THA is the Port of Dar es Salaam, headed by the Port Manager. The port management organization is composed of two principal elements (opera- tions and services), each headed by an assistant manager. Under operations are included the operations manager, commercial manager, harbour master, and port engineer; under services are included managers for supplies, finance, and personnel, and a medical officer. The financial results of the ports operation are at present satisfactory. THA's tariff structure is sound and its earnings have been sufficient to cover the cost of its operations includ- ing current debt service obligations. However, with the launching of the proposed Harbours Project, it will have to meet the local currency portion of some TSh. 380 million of the proposed project costs over a period of about four years. It will be able to do so only if the current rate of internal generation of cash is increased through improved efficiency and higher tariffs. To achieve this, THA, by June 30, 1980, will review its tariff levels to determine appropriate changes which should be made in tariff levels to ensure coverage of the economic cost of its operations, including the financing of the local currency costs of its future investments. The findings and recom- mendations of this review will be furnished to the Association for its review and comment (Section 3.03 of the draft Project Agreement). This issue will be further addressed during processing of the proposed Harbours Project. 45. Past and Present Traffic. There has been a steady growth in the traffic of Dar es Salaam Port, even though it is subject to fluctuations due to changing economic conditions in the countries which it serves, 1/ political conditions in the region, and disruptions or deterioration in the regional land transport systems - rail and highway. 1/ Tanzania, Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, and to some extent, Uganda.  - 15 - Dar es Salaam Port Traffic (Thousand Tons) 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 General Cargo Exports 625 639 987 955 1,049 Imports 761 978 1,034 1,190 1,378 Total 1,386 1,617 2,021 2,145 2,427 Oil Exports 249 1/ 196 1/ 249 1/ 217 1/ 114 2/ Imports 1,698 1,772 1,818 1,892 1,736 Total 1,947 1,968 2,067 2,109 1,850 1/ Including bunkering. 2/ Not including bunkering. Description of the Engineering Credit and a Proposed Harbours Project 46. Because of the substantial uncertainties surrounding the cost estimates for the civil works involved in the proposed Harbours Project, a two-phased approach to financing is proposed. The first phase would involve an engineering credit to cover detailed engineering design and preparation of tender documents for the anticipated port investment including a feasibility study of the location of a bulk grain silo. The civil works for which detailed design and preparation of tender documents is proposed include: straightening and deepening the entrance channel; a container facility; a petroleum jetty; a tug berth; a grain silo with ship unloader, conveyor system and elevator; and an import storage warehouse. This would require topographic and hydrographic surveys; sub-surface exploration (drilling); civil, elec- trical, and mechanical engineering; architectural services; drafting; and support costs for the effort (transportation, accommodations, subsistence, printing, communications, overhead, etc.). An estimated 300 man-months of engineering effort, at a man-month cost of about US$6,500 (including the man-month rate, international travel and subsistence) will be required. 47. The second phase would cover the financing of the proposed Harbours Project. This would consist of the items for which design work is proposed as well as technical assistance and training components and equipment for the Port of Dar es Salaam. As noted above (para 37), an initial appraisal mission visited Tanzania in April 1979; a post appraisal mission would be expected to finalize an investment proposal after the engineering services have been completed. However, in order to confirm that the estimated civil  - 16 - works costs are accurate, it is expected that the bids for that item will be received before presentation of the proposed Harbours Project to the Executive Directors. It is not anticipated that any contract will be signed prior to consideration of the proposed Harbours Project by the Executive Directors. 48. It is proposed that the engineering credit would be refinanced under any subsequent credit or loan provided by the Bank Group for the proposed Harbours Project. While other alternatives for financing the engineering credit were considered, they were rejected because the prospective funds were inadequate to meet the cost of the engineering services and would have unduly delayed their completion. Implementation of the Engineering Credit 49. Detailed engineering and preparation of tender documents will be undertaken by Bertlin and Partners (UK) (para. 38), the consultants selected by the Tanzania Harbours Authority (THA) and accepted by the Association (Section 2.02(a) of the draft Project Agreement). Copies of documents pre- pared by the consultants for the project, including reports, drafts, plans, designs, specifications, work schedules and estimates of costs will be fur- nished to the Association (Section 2.02(c) of the draft Project Agreement). THA will execute the contract for these services by assigning principal responsibility to its Director of Engineering and Technical Services. The personnel of this Directorate have the capability to supervise the execution of a design contract. Terms of reference for the design contract were devel- oped jointly by the Association staff and THA staff. Upon completion of the engineering services, the Government and THA would consult with the Asso- ciation on the recommendations and conclusions relating to the project (Section 3.01(d) of the draft Development Credit Agreement and Section 2.02(d)(ii) of the draft Project Agreement). Project Costs, Financing and Disbursement 50. The estimated total cost of the engineering services is US$3.0 million net of taxes and duties. 1/ This cost estimate includes an adequate margin for contingencies (22%) and is based on a recent quotation. The foreign exchange component would amount to US$2.5 million equivalent or 83% of total costs. Details of project costs are included in the credit and project summary. The proposed engineering credit of US$2.5 million would be repayable over 10 years, including 2 years of grace and carrying a service charge of 3/4 of 1% per annum (Sections 2.05 and 2.07 of the draft Development Credit Agreement). The proceeds of the credit would be onlent by the Government to THA under a Subsidiary Loan Agreement on terms and conditions acceptable to the Association; this would include an interest rate of 7.95% per annum, repayment in 10 years including 2 years of grace and the foreign exchange risk borne by THA (Section 3.01(b) of the draft Development Credit Agreement). The proposed engineering credit would finance the entire foreign exchange cost and THA would finance the local costs amounting to US$.5 million equivalent 1/ The project is exempted from identifiable taxes and duties.  - 17 - (Section 2.01 of the draft Project Agreement). The proposed engineering credit would be disbursed over a period of 20 months against 100% of the foreign cost of the consultant's services. All withdrawal claims would be fully documented. Reporting and Accounting 51. THA will maintain records adequate to record the progress of the engineering credit and to reflect project expenditures; the Association will be able to inspect all relevant records and documents (Section 2.04 of the draft Project Agreement). THA would have its accounts audited each fiscal year by independent auditors acceptable to the Association. Within six months of the end of each fiscal year it would furnish its audited financial state- ments to the Association (Section 3.02 of draft Project Agreement). Justification and Risks 52. The risk involved in the proposed engineering project is minimal as the same consultants who carried out the long-term development and updating studies of the Port of Dar es Salaam have been selected for the engineering services (paras 38 and 49); the consultants' previous work has been satis- factory. No major delay in the implementation of the project is therefore anticipated. The proposed Harbours Project, for which the engineering credit is a necessary prior action, will be a major step towards the development and the modernization of the Port of Dar es Salaam. Its objective will be to improve the ports productivity, management efficiency, capability to handle bulk grains and containers, and facilitate the entrance to and departure from the harbour by ships. The project does not include any expansion in physical facilities for handling break-bulk cargo as such, although it will contribute greatly to the effective capacity for handling general cargo. The improvement in efficiency of the port will relieve congestion and improve throughput, as well as introduce modern techniques for grain and container handling. A portion of the cargo handling equipment fleet will be replaced as it becomes worn out. Improvements in equipment maintenance will be introduced; waste removal will be facilitated; and a capability for continuing maintenance of the paved surfaces of the port area will be provided. Technical assistance in critical areas of port operations and management will be provided, as well as assistance in training of personnel in critical skills, both at the port's training center, and through offshore training. 53. The major risks involved in the proposed Harbours Project for which engineering design is to be undertaken are two fold: (i) traffic forecasts; and (ii) capacity of the regional transport system to serve the Port of Dar es Salaam. The principal uncertainty relates to Zambian traffic. Zambia, a landlocked country, has traditionally been served by numerous routes through Zaire/Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and South Africa, as well as Tanzania. In recent years the availability of all these routes, except that through Tanzania, have been interrupted or denied completely due to political turmoil in the region. Future availability of these alternative routes is currently uncertain and is expected to remain so. It is clear that access to the sea via Tanzania is the most economical and responsive one for Zambia.  - 18 - 54. The second uncertainty relates to the transport links between the Port of Dar es Salaam and the interior. The links to Zambia are the TANZAM highway and TAZARA. In expectation that TAZARA would carry the bulk of Zambia's traffic, the trucking services (mainly through ZTRS), were allowed to deteriorate; however, TAZARA's performance has fallen short of expecta- tions (low locomotive availability, poor wagon turnaround, and recently land slides and damaged bridges). To deal with this, trucking services are now being restored, and the international community is beginning to assist TAZARA to deal with its difficulties. On a somewhat lesser scale, but of great importance to the countries concerned, are the serious difficulties of the TRC in efficiently linking the Port with a large area of Tanzania, and with the landlocked region comprising Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and eastern Zaire. Substantial investment aid, notably from the Canadian Government, is already committed for the Railway, and a project is being prepared for possible Bank Group financing. It is expected that these will provide significant input into the rehabilitation of this railway. 55. It is evident that the Port of Dar es Salaam cannot be considered in isolation, but only as one link in a regional transport system. Conse- quently, careful consideration has been given to the foregoing uncertainties in relation to improvement of the port. With all factors taken into account, the proposed Harbours Project is justified and has high priority. This judgment is based on the assumption that Zambia will continue to use Dar es Salaam as its principal outlet to the sea, and that the transport links connecting Dar es Salaam to Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda and eastern Zaire will be restored to an acceptable level of efficiency. PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 56. The draft Development Credit Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Association, the draft Project Agreement between the Association and the Tanzania Harbours Authority, and the Recommendation of the Committee provided for in Article V, Section 1(d), of the Articles of Agreement of the Association are being distributed to the Executive Directors separately. 57. Features of the draft Development Credit and Project Agreements of special interest are referred to in the text and listed in Section III of Annex III to this report. Execution of a subsidiary loan agreement satisfac- tory to the Association, between the Government and THA would be a condition of effectiveness (Section 5.01 of the draft Development Credit Agreement). 58. I am satisfied that the proposed credit would comply with the Articles of Agreement of the Association.  - 19 - PART VI - RECOMMENDATION 59. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed credit. Robert S. McNamara President Attachments Washington, D.C. December 5, 1979  - 20 - TABLE 3A L i TANZANIA - SOCIAL IVDICATORS DATA SHEET LEFEJLNCE GROUPS (ADJUSTED A;RACES LAND AREA (THOUSAZD SO. -- (OST REC17 ESTIMATE) -- TOTAL 945.1 SAME UHLE NEXT, hiGNia ACRICULTUPAL 510.1 MOST RECENT CEOCIAPHIC INCOME INCOrz 1960 Lk 1970 Lb ESTI.MATE b LZGION Le CGOUP / GROUP la CN? PER CAPITA (USS) 70.0 120.0 230.0 306.1 209.6 461.5 LIIERCT CONSUMfl!04 ?ER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF COAL EQUIVA'T) 41.0 62.0 68.0 60.6 83.9 262.1 POPUtATION ANI! VITAL STATISTICS POPULATION, SlD-MLAR (MILLIOS) 10.2 13.3 16.4 URBAN POPULATION OF5LC OP TOTAL) 4.8 6.9 9.7. 17.1 16.2 24.6 POPULATION PROJECTIONS POPULATION IN TYAR 20CO (MILLIONS) 32.0 STATIONALY POPULATION (MILLIONS) 94.0 TZAR STATIONARY POPUJLTION IS RACHED 2145 POPULATION DENSITY PER SQ. EN. 11.0 14.0 17.0 18.4 59.4 45.3 tP Sq. KM. AGRICULTUI.L LAND 21.0 26.0 32.0 50.6 252.0 149.0 POPULATION AGE STRUCTOUR (PERCDET) 0-14 YRS. 46.4 46.5 46.0 44.1 43.1 45.2 15-64 TRS. 51.0 51.1 5t.0 52.9 53.2 51.9 65 ns. AND ABOVE 2.6 2.4 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.8 POPULATION GROVE RATE CPECEIT) TOTAL 2.2 2.7 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.7 URBAN 5.0 6. 8.35 5.7 4.6 4.3 CRUDE BIRTU RATE (PtR TiOUSAN) 47.0 47.0 46.0 46.3 42.4 39.4 CRLUDE DEATH IATE (PE TAOUSAND) 22.0 19.0 16.0 17.2 15.9 11.7 GROSS tEPRODUCTION LATE .. 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.7 FAMILY PLANNING ACCEPTORS. ANINUAL (TROUSANS) .. .. 93.6 USERS (PERCENT OF iAAXCED NO ) .. .. .. .. 12.2 13.2 FOOD AND NUTRITION INDEX OF FOOD PROOUCTIO4 PEI CAPITA (1969-71-100) 95.3 104.0 93.0 94.3 98.2 99.6 PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF CALORILS (PERCENT or UEQUILEXLNTS) 69.0 88.0 86.0 69.5 93.3 94.7 PRTtINS (CLAMS PE DOY) 42.0 43.0 47.1 55.8 52.1 54.3 Or WssCH A:lMALAIM PULSE 22.0h 23.0 20.0 17.9 13.6 17.4 CHILD (ACGS 1-4) MO.RAIITY LATH 32.0 25.0 20.0 22.3 18.5 11.4 HEALSE LIFE EXPECTANCT AT AMR (TELS) 42.0 47.0 51.0 47.0 49.3 54.7 INFANT MORTALITY RATE PuR TROUSAND) .. 55.OL& 125.0 .. 105.4 68.1 ACCESS TO SAFE NAT7 0 CICSNT Of POPULATION) TOTAL .. 13.0 39.0 20.3 26.3 34.4 UWAN .. 61.0 88.0 53.9 58.5 57.9 IRDAL .. 9.0 36.0 10.1 15.8 21.2 ACClSS TO 1ZRZEA DISPCSAL (?ZCENT Dr POPULTION) TOTAL .. .. 17.0 22.5 16.0 40.6 gum .. .. U. 62.5 65.1 71.3 RURAL .. .. 14.0 13.9 3.5 27.1 POPULATION PU PSYSICIAN 21000.OLL .20677.0 16490.0/t 17424.7 11396.4 6799.4 POPULATION PER uRSLNc PQSON *300.0oj. 4641.0 33O.00. 2506.6 5552.4 L522.1 POPULATION PQ bOSPITAL ED TOTAL 57S.0& 6S6.0 .. 502.3 1417.1 726.5 auRBA .. .. .. 201.4 197.3 27n. ROAL .. .. .. 1403.6 2445.9 1404.4 &AMlISSIONS PU UDSPITALSI .. - .. . 23.4 24.6 27.5 HOUSING AV*AGE SI2C or 8oUs5COL TOTAL ALL ..9 3.3 5.4 R1 .. 3.2 .. 4.9 4.9 5.1 &RVAL .. 4.5/j 5.3 3.5 3 4 3.3 ACCGH NIfl oF PERSONS PF OM TOTAL .. .. .. UR.A .. .. ..... RURAL .. .. .. &CCCSS TO CLICTUCITY (PUlCUT OF DWELLI4CS) TOTAL .. .. .. .. n.3 MI.1 OKBA" .. .. .. .. 11.8 43.1 RURL .. .. .. .. .. 9.9  - 21 - TABLE 3A] TANZANIA - SOCIAL tYDtCAi0XS DATA SWEET S PTJ.ZUNC ClROUPS (AZhUSJtED AX AE U RAW.AXIA - utOS1 R!C s -SS.-tt ) -- S0.I SAil Nt I H.E, IIC55 SZC.NT CIOGCRIIC 1NC0.X rYCOMt 1960 lb 1970./b ESTIMATE /b ttC1o0 /c 'GROV? /d CG)UP tDUCATION AJUS tEO EOLL<ttNT RATIOS PRIMIAY1 TOTAL 28.0 38.0 70.0 59.0 63.3 62.7 MALi 37.0 46.0 79.0 64.2 9. 6 7.3 FaIALt 20.0 30.0 60.0 4.2 48.4 75.8 SECONDARY: SOTAL 2.0 3.0 3.0 9.0 16.7 21.' MALU 2.0 4.0 5.0 12.0 22.1 33.0 FE-LA 1.0 2.0 2.0 4*. 10.2 15.5 VOCATIONAL ENROL. (2 0F StCOhtDAI) 23.0 .. .. 7.0 5.6 9.8 PUPIL-TtACHER IlATIO PRI MA I 45.0 '6.0 50.0 42.2 41.0 >.1 5ECONDARY 20.0 19.0 20.0 22.9 21.7 23.4 AWLT LTS RACY LArt (PUCIET) 9.5/I 28.1Ls 66.0 20.8 31.2 54.0 CON5Li?:ON PASSENGER CARS Pn ThOUSAND POPVLATION 3.0 2.5 2.8 4.0 2.8 9.3 RADIO LtCE VIES PE* TOOUSAJ POPULATION 2.0 11.0 19.0 44.3 27.2 76.9 TV lLECEIVERS t