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Tunisia - Second Education Project

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Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 2226 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT TUNISIA: SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 94-TUN) September 29, 1978 Operations Evaluation Department This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only In the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.  FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT TUNISIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 94-TUN) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET HIGHLIGHTS PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM I. Project Summary and Background I II. Main Issues 1. Project Generation 3 2. Deletion of three Agricultural Training Centers 4 3. Technical Assistance in Educational Planning 4 4. Physical Implementation 6 5. Costs and Disbursements 6 6. Supervision by IDA 7 7. Educational Impact 7 8. Manpower Development 8 9. Lessons from Education Project Experiences in Tunisia 9 III. Conclusions 9 ATTACHMENT I: Letter from Ministry of Equipment, Tunisia ATTACHMENT II: PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT SUMMARY I. INTRODUCTION A.1 II. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES A.2 Socio-Economic Background A.2 Educational Developments A.2 Project Composition and Objectives A.3 III. RESULTS A.4 Organization and Management A.4 Project Costs and Disbursements A.5 Physic.al Implementation A.6 (a) Sites A.6 (b) Civil Works A.7 (c) Furniture and Equipment Procurement A.7 (d) Project Facilities A.8 (e) Maintenance A.9 Educational Results A.9 (a) Quantitative Results A.9 (b) Internal Efficiency A.10 (c) Teaching Methods and Facilities A.11 (d) Recurrent Costs A.11 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page No. IV. SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THE PROJECT A.11 (a) Technical Assistance for Educational Planning A.12 (b) Contribution to Manpower Development A.15 V. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS A.16 ANNEXES Annex 1 - Completion Mission: Methodology Annex 2 - Tunisia: The Structure of Education, 1965/66 Annex 3 - IDA Supervision Missions Annex 4 - Disbursements Annex 5 - Planned and Actual Enrollments in New Project Schools Annex 6 - Enrollment by Course in New and Extended Project Schools and Control Schools, 1976/77 Annex 7 - Staffing in New and Extended Project Schools and Control Schools, 1976/77 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT TUNISIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 94-TUN) PREFACE This is a performance audit of the Second Education Project in Tunisia (Credit 94-TUN) for which a credit of US$13.0 million was approved in September 1966. An amount of US$11.5 million of the credit had been disbursed by the final closing date of March 31, 1976 and the remainder was cancelled at the request of the Borrower. The audit consists of a Project Performance Audit Memorandum prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department and a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated June 30, 1977 prepared by the EMENA Regional Office. An Operations Evaluation Department mission visited Tunisia in February 1978 and held discussions on this project with officials of the Ministries of Planning, National Education and Agriculture. Comments were received from the Borrower on the draft Project Performance Audit Report (see Attachment I) and these have been incorporated in the report. The contribution of these officials is gratefully acknowledged. The audit memorandum is based on a review of the Credit Agreement, the Appraisal Report (TO-552b).dated September 1, 1966, the President's Report (P-505) dated September 2, 1966, the PCR (see Attachment II) and material in the Bank's files relating to this project and to the First and Third Education Projects. Discussions have also been held with Bank staff currently and formerly associated with the project. This audit memorandum generally supports the findings of the PCR which makes a detailed assessment of the project outcomes. It includes a brief review of both the successful and unsuccessful experiences of this project and develops more fully than the PCR the experience in project preparation, its influence on the project outcomes and the lessons it may hold for other education projects.  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET TUNISIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 94-TUN) KEY PROJECT DATA Appraisal Actual or Item Expectation Current Estimate Total Project Cost (US$ m1n.) 19.8 17.2 Underrun (%) 13.13 Credit Amount (US$ m1n.) 13.0 13.0 Disbursed by March 31, 1976 11.5 Cancelled 1.5 Repaid to Jan. 31, 1978 .20 Outstanding as at March 31, 1978 11.31 Date Physical Components Completed. Oct. 1969 (37 months) Oct.1972 (73 months) Proportion Completed by Above Date (%) 90 100% Proportion of Time Overrun (%) 103% 1 Economic Rate of Return (%) n.a. n.a. Financial Performance n.a. n.a. Institutional Performance n.a. Good OTHER PROJECT DATA Original Actual or Item Plan Revisions Estimated Actual First Mention in Files or Timetable Mar. 16, 1965 Government's Application Aug. 16, 1965 Negotiations July 29-Aug. 5, 1966 Board Approval Sept. 13, 1966 Credit Agreement Date Sept. 16, 1966 Effectiveness Date Dec. 20, 1966 Closing Date Dec. 31, 1970 Apr. 30, 1971; Mar. 31, 1976 Jul. 31, 1971; Nov. 31, 1973; Dec. 31, 1974; Dec. 31, 1975. Borrower Republic of Tunisia Executing Agency Ministry of Public Works for civil works J and Ministry of Education for furniture and equipment procurement Fiscal Year of Borrower Calendar Year Follow-on Project Name Third Education Project Loan Number 1155-TUN Amount (US$ m1n.) 8.9 Loan Agreement Date August 13, 1975 /1 The technical assistance component which was added in August/September 1971 has not been included. /2 Subsequently renamed Ministry of Equipment. PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET (Cont'd.) MISSION DATA No. of No. of Man- Item Sent by Month, Year Weeks Persons Weeks Date of Report Pre-appraisal Bank Group Dec. 1965 1 2 2 Dec. 28, 1965 Appraisal Bank Group Feb./Mar. 1966 4.6 3 13.8 Sept. 1, 1966 Total 5.6 15.8 Supervision I IDA Oct./Nov. 1966 1.4 1 1.4 Nov. 14, 1966 Supervision II IDA Feb. 1967 .8 1 .8 Mar. 7, 1967 Supervision III IDA Oct./Nov. 1967 1 1 1.0 Mar. 1, 1968 Supervision IV IDA Jan. 1968 1 2 2.0 Feb. 9, 1968 Supervision V IDA Apr. 1968 1.8 1 1.8 June 18, 1968 Supervision VI IDA Aug. 1968 1.2 1 1.2 Oct. 3, 1968 Supervision VII IDA Jan. 1969 2.2 3 6.6 Jan. 31, 1969 Supervision VIII IDA May 1969 .6 1 .6 June 18, 1969 Supervision IX IDA Nov. 1969 1 1 1.0 Nov. 26, 1969 Supervision X IDA June 1970 1.2 1 1.2 July 22, 1970 Supervision XI IDA Dec. 1970 1 1 1 Dec. 15, 1970 Supervision XII IDA Mar./Apr. 1971 3.6 2 7.2 July 1971 Supervision XIII IDA Mar. 1972 2 2 3 Apr. 24, 1972 Supervision XIV IDA Oct. 1972 1.6 1 1.6 Nov. 14, 1972 Supervision XV IDA July 1973 1.4 1 1.4 July 26, 1973 Supervision XVI IDA Oct./Nov. 1973 1.2 1 1.2 Dec. 19, 1973 Supervision XVII IDA Feb. 1974 1.8 2 3.6 Apr. 10, 1974 Supervision XVIII IDA June 1975 .8 1 .8 June 30, 1975 Total 37.4 Completion IDA Feb./Mar. 1977 3.4 4 13.6 June 30, 1977 CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES Name of Currency (Abbreviation) Tunisian Dinar (TD) Appraisal Year Exchange Rate US$1 = TD .525 Exchange Rate (1976) US$1 = TD .435 UNIT COSTS Appraisal Capital Cost per Student Place Estimate Actual US$ US$ Government Secondary School (i) Construction costs only 570 511 (ii) (i) + costs of equipment, furniture and professional fees 792 815 PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET (Cont'd.) ALLOCATION OF CREDIT PROCEEDS IN US$ Allocation as per Revised Credit Allocation Actual Heading Agreement Sept. 1971 Disbursement A. 9 new schools (1) Construction 4,765,000 (2) Furniture/Equipment 1,555,000 B. Extension of 6 schools (1) Construction 1,665,000 (2) Furniture/Equipment 675,000 C. Equipment only for 16 schools 1,480,000 D. 3 new Agricultural Training Centers (1) Construction 685,000 (2) Furniture/Equipment 135,000 E. Professional Fees 345,000 F. Contingencies 1,695,000 13,000,000 Summary 1. Construction and Professional Fees 7,460,000 2(a) Furniture/Equipment (9 new + 6 existing schools; 3 centers; equipping only of 16 schools) 3,845,000 Subtotal (11,305,000) 9,820,000 9,820,000.00 2(b) Equipment for 11 schools 1,400,000 1,329,713.17 3. Technical Assistance - 410,000 361,344.80 4. Contingencies 1,695,000 270,000 - 5. Cancelled - 1,100,000 1,488,942.03 Total 13,000,000 13,000,000 13,000,000.00  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT TUNISIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 94-TUN) Highlights The Second Education Project in Tunisia (Credit 94-TUN) was provided to expand, diversify and improve secondary schools and to establish three new agricultural training centers. After the deletion of the agricul- tural training centers (largely because of their redundancy) the savings were allocated to provide equipment for more secondary schools and technical assistance experts to help with educational planning. By March 1976 US$11.5 million of the Credit of US$13.0 million had been disbursed and the balance was cancelled. The Borrower, using largely its own procurement methods for civil works, furniture and equipment and its existing services (that is not a special project implementation unit), efficiently constructed, furnished and equipped the schools. The technical assistance component, however, was less successful because the Borrower and the Bank were not fully agreed on the objectives of the team of experts and because the experts were not all of the highest caliber. Other points of special interest are: (a) the absence of an agricultural educator and economist from the IDA missions during project generation despite the fact that agricultural training had been included in the project on IDA's recommendation (para. 11); (b) the project's good impact on internal efficiency of the schools (para. 19; PCR, para. 3.24); (c) the more limited impact of the project on teaching methods (para. 20; PCR, para. 3.25-3.27); (d) the existence of some unemployment problems for the graduates because secondary school enrollment grew faster than employment opportunities (para. 24; PCR, paras. 4.14-4.17).  PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM TUNISIA SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT (CREDIT 94-TUN) I. Project Summary and Background 1. The first credit provided by IDA for an education project was made in September 1962 in favor of Tunisia (Credit 29-TUN). This provided US$5.0 million to expand and improve the secondary school system through construct- ing and equipping the following: (i) a teacher training institution for first-cycle secondary school teachers; (ii) one new technical secondary school and the expansion of another; and (iii) three multilateral 1/ secondary schools. 2. The Tunisia Second Education project (Credit 94-TUN) of September 1966 provided US$13.0 million to construct and equip: (i) nine new secondary schools (12,460 new places); (ii) extensions to six existing secondary schools (6,110 new places); and (iii) three agricultural training centers (1,080 new places), and to supply equipment to 16 existing secondary schools (already containing 27,000 students). These secondary schools were all multilateral. In its supplementary letters the Government undertook: (a) to prevent its recurrent educational expenditures from increasing at a rate materially greater than the rate of growth of the national product, to do this without affect- ing the quality of teaching, and to explore such possible economies as reducing the number of expatriate teachers by expanding secondary teacher training facilities for producing Tunisian teachers; (b) to attempt to reduce the percentages of repeaters and dropouts in all schools; (c) to reduce the proportion of persons entering the general course in the middle (lower secondary) school system (in favor of the vocational course); I/ A type of school which contains both technical/vocational and academic streams. - 2 - (d) to increase the subjects available for women in the middle secondary school systems; (e) to increase the numbers of hours devoted to technological studies and experimental science in the "Industrial" section (mechanical engineering course) in the upper secondary cycle and make more effective use of science laboratories in secondary schools; (f) to consider ways of initiating primary school pupils in agriculture through extra-curricular work in order to arouse their interest in agriculture. 3. As a result of administrative and policy changes and redundancy, the three agricultural training centers were deleted from the project in 1968. This modification, together with favorable prices on civil works and equipment, resulted in credit savings, a proportion of which was re-allocated to provide: (i) industrial equipment for 11 technical secondary schools; and (ii) eleven man-years of technical assistance for educational planning. 4. The aims of the project were to expand secondary education to meet middle-level manpower demand and to increase the supply of persons qualified to enter higher education. The Borrower confirms that the project objectives were directly related to its development priorities. After credit realloca- tion, the total number of new secondary level places expected to be created under the project was 18,750 (equivalent to 44% of the government's overall planned expansion between 1965/66 and 1968/69) of which 6,190 (33%) were reserved for girls and 5,132 (27%) were boarding places. 5. The project, as modified in 1968 and 1971 (para. 3) has been imple- mented. By the final closing date of March 31, 1976, US$11.51 million of the credit had been disbursed, and the balance had been cancelled. The estimated cost of the appraised project was US$19.8 million, while the actual cost of the project as implemented was US$20.8 million. - 3 - II. Main Issues 1. Project Generation 6. Between March and August of 1965 Tunisia, already familiar with project procedures, identified and prepared a project for possible IDA finan- cing. IDA advised that.the project should conform to the standards and costs recommended by the London Group on School Building in Tunisia. 1/ The final report of this group was, however, not yet ready. The proposed project comprised: (i) constructing and equipping 10 new secondary schools for 12,600 students including 4,200 boarders; and (ii) building and equipping two science blocks at existing schools; at a cost of US$14.7 million. All schematic drawings were provided; as were furniture and equipment lists, except for science subjects. Shortly afterwards the Government revised the composition of the proposed project to consist of: (i) 12 different secondary schools (then being constructed), at an estimated cost (inclusive of equipment) of US$14.7 million, to provide for 12,600 students including 4,200 boarders; and (ii) 21 other secondary schools, the estimated cost of which was US$23.0 million, to provide for 24,000 students, in- cluding 8,000 boarders. 7. IDA did not avail itself of an offer by Unesco - which, under the Bank Group/Unesco Cooperative Program, had responsibility for identifying and helping to prepare projects - to assist in the pre-appraisal of this project. Instead, IDA sent an architect and a general educator to Tunisia for about one week in December 1965 to conduct the pre-appraisal. At the instance of this mission the Government added three agricultural training centers to the proposed project. This mission found that many of the proposed secondary schools were already under construction and that there was little adherence to the recommendations which had been made by the London Group. A new list of schools not yet under construction was therefore prepared by the Government for the appraisal mission of February 1966; this list included the agricul- tural training centers. 1/ In connection with the first education project, the Bank had made a technical assistance grant of US$375,000 to finance consultants to advise Tunisia on improving the design of schools, standardized building procedures and reduction of school building costs generally. The consul- tants were known as the London Group and IDA considered that their work had been quite successful. 8. The appraisal mission found that construction of some 12 of the 20 schools had been started and that designs were not all in conformity with the London Group's recommendations. Hence the final list of project secondary schools included nine new ones, six extensions and equipment only for 16 others. 9. Negotiations took place in July/August 1966; the credit was approved on September 13, and the credit documents signed on September 16, 1966. 10. The project design/generation period lasted 18 months (March 1965- September 1966). It is possible in retrospect to see how the period could have been reduced and utilized more efficiently. Assistance to the Borrower, for example by Unesco, in project preparation might have shortened the period of preparation, facilitated conformity with the London Group's recommendations, contributed to a more complete loan application and to on-the-job training of government officials, and mitigated some of the difficulties which arose during implementation. The absence of an economist and agricultural educator on the appraisal mission was critical since the mission was specifically requested to appraise the country's ability to finance the educational de- velopment program and to assess the demand for various types of manpower. 2. Deletion of Three Agricultural Training Centers 11. The three agricultural training centers were deleted from the project in 1968. In 1967 the control of agricultural education and training was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Educa- tion. In that year the decision to reform the education system was also taken and one aspect of this reform was the addition of agriculture as a subject at several secondary level schools. The Ministry of Education at first decided to establish the three training centers at a reduced cost by renovating existing farm buildings and then, in 1968, with the agreement of IDA, dropped the idea of providing the centers altogether. This decision was arrived at because the Government felt that the number of training institutions exceeded the needs and the graduates were already encountering unemployment. At that time some nine agricultural secondary schools (lycees) were also closed. The inclusion of these centers in the project was clearly ill-advised and this might have been avoided if the appraisal mission had included an agricultural educator and an economist. 3. Technical Assistance in Educational Planning 12. The Credit Agreement did not originally provide any technical assis- tance. In August 1971, some four years after the original credit date, it was agreed to reallocate US$410,000 to provide 11 man-years of such assistance. This omission from the original credit of funds for educational planning is puzzling since, at the time of making the first credit available, IDA had developed an understanding with the government that any further IDA financ- ing of education would be forthcoming only if Tunisia strengthened its edu- cational planning. Certainly educational planning had not been significantly strengthened at the time of consideration of the Second Education project because as early 'as May 1968, an end-use supervision mission of Unesco, concerned with the First Education Project, drew attention to the inadequacy of the planning machinery in the Ministry of Education. - 5 - 13. The Association refused to accept the Borrower's suggestions that the savings resulting from the elimination of agricultural training centers be used to provide an agricultural secondary school or four new secondary schools; IDA considered that these proposed items had not been sufficiently prepared. Eventually, among the several different suggestions being put forward every few months by the Borrower for use of these funds, appeared the mention of technical assistance - at first for higher education planning and technical/vocational education and its relationship to the job market and later, under some influence from the Association, for educational planning generally. However, IDA and the Borrower never found common ground on the approach to educational planning. IDA wished to have a team whose work would have led to a comprehensive plan and to preparation of a third education project while the Borrower had only very specific areas of its ongoing edu- cational planning efforts on which it wished assistance. This fundamental difference highlights the importance of full participation by the Borrower in determining project content and explains some of the difficulties encountered during implementation. 14. The completion report (paras. 4.02-4.13) details the vicissitudes of implementing this component. Following lengthy discussions and correspon- dence on the number of positions, terms of reference, staffing of the edu- cational planning unit, the choice of executing agency and selection of candidates, it was close to the end of 1973 before four Unesco experts were in place. This team of experts was assessed by supervision missions to be deficient in caliber, number and range of specializations and the Borrower, despite repeated requests by IDA, did not appoint sufficient Tunisian coun- terparts or any Tunisian or expatriate general educators to assist the plan- ners. The Borrower also found that the ability of the individual experts varied widely. In addition, the Borrower has maintained that there were strained relationships between the first team leader and the Tunisian assis- tant directors in the educational planning unit. Hampered by its own pro- fessional limitations and by the provision of office accommodation which was too remote from the other ministries, lacking effective cooperation with inter-ministerial agencies and with units of the Ministry of Education, and given only inadequate counterpart support, the technical assistance team was unable to accomplish effective planning. Its mid-1974 draft report did not cover education finance and vocational and technical training and education, and received little or no recognition from the Borrower. This component resulted, therefore, in little more than an extension of the closing date of the credit by about five years. In restrospect, the Borrower believes (a) that short-term advisors would have been preferable, and (b) that the contracts with technical assistance experts should be designed to permit cancellation of the contract when, after three months, it is demonstrated that the expert is unsuitable or unqualified. 15. Differences between IDA and the Borrower have carried over into the Third Education Project (August 1975) which provided financing for an eight- man team of experts (10.5 man-years) to assist the educational planning unit to examine various reform measures and to identify the measure necessary to make the education/training system more responsive to the job market. The - 6 - filling of all vacancies in the educational planning unit with technicians was prescribed as a condition of disbursement of funds for this technical assis- tance component. However, this condition subsequently became a source of strong protest by the Borrower who has held consistently that the condition is restrictive in view of the difficulty being experienced in recruiting competent staff in sufficient numbers. The Borrower considers that the lessons drawn by the Bank Group from the Second project experience may have been technically correct but were psychologically wrong and that the result was an overburdening of the Third project with safeguards which produced a reaction. 4. Physical Implementation 16. The completion report notes the implementation of civil works, fur- niture and equipment without any major problem (paras. 3.09-3.13). However, the Borrower has observed in the light of problems experienced with the lack of spare parts for some of the equipment purchased that (a) in future pur- chases will be made only from dealers who guarantee parts and after-sale servicing and (b) that some of the schools are building some of the needed spare parts. All sites have been found to be suitable in relation to catch- ment areas and size (para. 3.08). Architectural design and construction details are generally satisfactory, and enrollment targets have been exceeded (PCR, paras. 3.20-3.23). The completion report (para. 3.16) notes some minor design deficiencies: (i) poor design of window-sills in dormitory buildings lead- ing to seepage of rain water; (ii) over-use of unprotected glass leading to excessive glare; (iii) the lack of exhaust fans-in kitchens and dormitory toilets, and (iv) the lack of window stays resulting in wind damage to windows. The Borrower considers that the deficiencies noted in (ii), (iii) and (iv) above are easy to remedy and that the deficiency noted in (i) is unlikely to be applicable to all of the buildings (see Attachment I). 5. Costs and Disbursements 17. The overall project capital costs have been estimated by the com- pletion mission (paras. 3.05-3.06) as being roughly within the appraisal estimates in local currency terms. Some civil works were, however, financed unilaterally by the Borrower and have not been included in the estimate of project costs. Actual disbursements were also roughly within appraisal es- timates never amounting to less than 70% of the originally projected dis- bursements (para. 3.07 and Annex 4) even though slow local procedures for transmitting withdrawal applications considerably delayed reimbursements. -7- 6. Supervision by IDA 18. Over the 9-1/2 years of implementation, the 18 supervision missions show a reasonable balance of architects and economists, but a shortage of general educators. Only two general educators visited the country on super- vision missions, one in March 1972 for two weeks and the other in October 1972 for 1.6 weeks. Over the triennium, 1968-70, the project was well supervised with three missions in each year. The years 1971-1973 had only two missions per year at precisely the time when the educational planning component was experiencing great difficulties. Despite the generally sound and effective supervision of physical aspects of the project, there was an oversight which might have been avoided by proper monitoring of withdrawal applications. In 1967 the Borrower had included, in respect of one project school, application for reimbursement under a contract for civil works which did not belong to the project and were to have been financed entirely by the Borrower; IDA's reimbursement of these costs resulted in an over-disbursment of US$390,000 on this school. 1/ 7. Educational Impact 19. In regard to the undertakings reached between the Government and the Bank during negotiations, there have been several positive achievements. Estimated national repeater and drop out rates in 1975-76 were significantly lower than those at the time of appraisal; and the project schools' dropout and repeater rates were lower than the national average (PCR, para. 3.24). In 1975/76, the national teacher/student ratio was 1:21, while in the project schools it averaged 1:20 with a range of between 1:16 and 1:24. Since 1965/66, a steady decline in the proportion of expatriate secondary teachers was observed - falling from 34% in 1965/66 to 16% in 1975/76 (18% in the project schools) (PCR, para. 3.25). Recurrent expenditures have increased as a proportion of national income from 4.9% of GNP in 1965/66 to 5.3% of GDP in 1973. 20. The impact of the project on teaching methods and the use of modern facilities has been relatively weak. Some laboratories were being used as ordinary classrooms and, although adequately equipped, important items of equipment were not used regularly. Workshops were, however, well-equipped and used satisfactorily for practical work. Libraries were under-stocked and reading space limited or not available (PCR, para. 3.27). The project schools in the baccalaureat and diploma examinations show pass rates of 50% - slightly higher than the national average of 43%. (PCR, para. 3.24). 21. With regard to the following undertakings: (a) widening the options available to girls in the secondary program; (b) reducing the proportion of students entering the general course in the lower secondary school system in favor of entry into the vocational courses; and 1/ This was eventually offset against withdrawal applications for other schools. - 8 - (c) increasing hours devoted to technological studies and experimental science in the mechanical engineering course of the upper secondary school; progress toward the achievement of these objectives had not been monitored. However, on the introduction of primary school pupils to agriculture through extra-curricular work, the experimental initiation into manual work (initia- tion aux travaux manuels) represents a more direct approach, and support for this experiment has been included in the Third Education project. 22. In educational terms the project can be judged generally success- ful. The achievements of the project schools in quantitative terms have been up to appraisal expectations, but the project's impact on teaching methods, especially in science subjects, has been more limited. 8. Manpower Development 23. The project was intended to contribute significantly to meeting man- power demands, although it was recognized that the supply of subprofessional and skilled workers would remain well below demand. The appraisal report dealt extensively with manpower and employment, but the project's composition did not sufficiently reflect the issues revealed by the manpower analysis. The project schools were expected to produce 3,000 clerical and 4,800 skilled workers while existing schools were estimated to produce 7,100 clerical and 4,500 skilled workers. The estimated total demand and supply of clerical workers (10,900 and 10,100 respectively) were projected to be roughly in balance while the statistics of demand and supply of skilled workers (23,500 and 9,300 respectively) indicated a shortage of 14,200. It remains question- able, however, whether the secondary schools are the best means of producing skilled workers. 24. By comparison with the appraisal report forecast estimate of a 2% per annum rate of growth, total employment grew at 3.2% per annum; however, in spite of this higher rate, employment opportunities were insufficient to match outputs from the education system, mainly because of the increase in secondary enrollments that occurred, which was much higher than the appraisal estimates. Within the category of middle-level manpower, the category at which the project schools were aimed, skill shortages exist in some areas with marked unemployment in others, which confirm the continuing imbalance between the supply of and demand for different categories of skilled workers. 1/ Whether the inclusion of an economist on the mission would have made a significant difference to the quality of the manpower analysis and its impact on project content is difficult to say. However, to have appraised a project enjoying so close an interrelationship with manpower considerations without an economist was unwise. 1/ Paras. 4.14-4.17 of the PCR provide details of the problem. -9- 9. Lessons from Education Project Experiences in Tunisia 25. In May 1968 a Unesco mission visited Tunisia to assess the effec- tiveness of the First Education Project. The mission produced a draft report which indicated: (a) that in the science teaching program the emphasis was on demonstration experiments performed by the teacher rather than on individual student experiments; Cb) that the educational planning machinery was very weak; (c) the high proportion of expatriate teachers at the secondary level and lack of workshop instructors; and (d) the relative lack of contact between the school system and employers in regard to vocational courses and the lack of an official in the Ministry of Education charged with responsibility for technical/vocational education. 26. A more active interest in benefitting from such evaluations might have prompted IDA: (i) to pay closer attention to supervising the educa- tional aspects of the then on-going second project, (ii) to have initiated immediately with Tunisia some discussion of measures to strengthen educa- tional planning, and (iii) to consider the need for measures to strengthen technical/vocational education and increase the supply of appropriately trained secondary school teachers. However, because of lack of interest on the Association's part at that time in such evaluation, the report was never carried to its final stage and the lessons were neglected both in the super- vision of the Second Project and in the design of the Third project. III. Conclusions 27. The Second Education Project in Tunisia in terms of its main item - the secondary school component which had been identified and prepared by the country - was generally in line with Tunisian needs and, in regard to physical plant and enrollments, was successfully implemented. However, these schools would have provided a better response to manpower needs if they had been designed to produce less clerical and more skilled workers (paras. 23, 24). In terms of the other two project items identified by IDA - (a) the agricul- tural training centers which were deleted (para. 11) and (b) the technical assistance intended to assist educational planning (on the objectives of which there was insufficient consensus between IDA and Borrower) (paras. 12-15) - implementation was less successful. Supervision by IDA was strong on the physical but too limited on the educational aspects of the project (para. 18).  ATTACHMENT I Republic of Tunisia Ministry of Equipment Ref. M.E. Azx No. 1-4 Engineer General of Public Works A. Fekih Director of Construction Tunis, June 22, 1978 to Mr. Shiv S. Kapur Director, Operations Evaluation Department World Bank Subject: Project Performance Audit Report Tunisia Second Education Project (Credit 94-TUN) Ref.: Your letter of May 26, 1978 Dear Sir: In your above-mentioned letter you enclosed a copy of the Preliminary Project Performance Audit Report on the Tunisia Second Education Project (Credit 94 TUN), requesting my comments. In reply, I would inform you that the Ministry of Equipment (Former Ministry of Public Works), and specifically its Construction Department, is concerned only in the capacity of "Construction Service," and that the following comments are limited to technical observations or statements: A. Memorandum (1) Project Generation (pages 3 and 4)* As stated, the report of the London Group was not yet ready. It is not therefore surprising that the drawings for the 20 schools to be built, of which 12 were already under construction, could not conform to the recommendations of the London Group (page 5). I think it unnecessary to press this matter of non-conformity. (2) Physical Implementation. On pages 10-11, and in paragraph 3.16 of the (completion) report, reference is made to certain "deficiencies": (a) the dormitory window-sills are defective, being too wide and dead- level or sloping in; (b) too much glass has been used and glare from the sun is excessive; (c) exhaust fans are lacking in kitchens and dormitory toilets; (d) window-stays are non-existent and windows are being broken by the wind. *T.N. The page numbers presumably refer to the French version of the report. - 2 - In my opinion, the term "deficiency" is too strong. At most, comments (b), (c) and (d) can be attributed to errors or omissions on the part of the designer, and these can easily be remedied by putt- ing in the exhaust fans and installing simple hook-and-eye devices instead of the very expensive window stays. Finally, as regards the window sills, it would indeed be a deficiency if a contractor had placed them with an inward slope. However, it would be very surprising if, for the 15 schools concerned, designed by different architects and built by more than a dozen different contractors, the same defect has occurred without any of the architects or engineers having noticed it. I therefore feel that this defect should not be referred to as if it applied to all the buildings constructed. (3) Civil Works (para. 3.11) - Reference is made to the inconvenience of fragmenting contracts into various sub items (six contracts per school on the average). We are aware of the inconvenience in question, but we are obliged to use this method because Tunisia has no multi-purpose contractors capable to dealing with the entire range of specialised works. It is, therefore, necessary to proceed in this manner of separate tenders for certain specia- lised works such as high and medium voltage electrical installations, the kitchens,laundries and cold storage rooms. (4) Project Facilities (para. 3.17) - It is stated that in the majority of the schools the surfaces of the sports fields are "poorly developed," "roughly graded", and, in most cases, "of concrete/stone." The reason for this is that Tunisia has only one contractor specialising in developing sports fields. It is therefore likely that this contractor has not been able to put in all the fields, and that some of them have been installed either by general contractors or by local labor. The foregoing are the only comments I have on the Report. Very truly yours, Is/ A. Fekih ATTACHMENT II COMPLETION REPORT TUNISIA - CREDIT 94-TUN SECOND EDUCATION PROJECT June 30, 1977 Education and Manpower Development Division Europe, Middle East and North Africa Region Glossary of Terms Used in the PCR Baccalaureate Secondary completion certificate Boursier Scholarship holder Collage Moyen Three year institution with vocational and general programs for primary leavers not proceeding to secondary (abolished in 1971 and replaced by the CSP and CCSP) CSP - College Secondaire Vocational school (grades 7-9) Professionnel CSSP - CollIge Secondaire Combined lower general secondary and et Secondaire Professionnel vocational school (grades 7-9) Lycee General secondary school (grades 7-12) Rolling class Repetition of the same subject during a school day to accommodate all classes taking the subject SEDES Socift6 d'Etudes et de D6veloppement Economique et Social (Society for Studies and Economic and Social Development) SUMMARY i. An IDA credit for $13 million was approved in September 1966 for the project. The credit provided for the expansion and improvement of the secondary school system through the construction and equipping of nine new general secondary schools and three agricultural centers, extensions to six existing secondary schools and the supply of equipment to sixteen secondary schools. In 1971 reallocation of credit savings provided equipment for 11 technical secondary schools and technical assistance for educational planning. The three agricultural centers were deleted following the government's decision to develop three existing farms as training centers at a fraction of the cost of the proposed new ones and later, not to proceed with providing these centers. ii. The project as originally appraised was justified in terms of Tunisia's priorities for expanding secondary education and increasing the supply of middle level manpower. Physical implementation of the project was undertaken in general with reasonable dispatch and efficiency. Construc- tion of schools was completed on schedule although delays were experienced in some schools in relation to the supply and installation of equipment and electric power. Tender prices for both civil works and equipment were favor- able and led to significant savings in the original credit amount. Mainte- nance has been generally good. On the whole, the project schools were found to be well-integrated within the secondary school system and there was no evidence that the schools have been favored with additional allocations of staff or finance. iii. Enrollments in the new project schools have expanded 25% beyond appraisal targets and this has led to heavy utilization of teaching facili- ties and crowded dormitories. The planned proportion of places reserved for girls has not been maintained as the new project schools expanded and the current level of female enrollment is marginally below the national average. Vocational enrollments have maintained the proportion envisaged in the appraisal report. Dropout and repeater rates are high nationally but some- what lower in project schools. iv. Teaching methods in scientific subjects were observed as being very much of the non-practical kind, with poor utilization of laboratories and equipment for experimental purposes, although laboratories were in general adequately equipped. Library rooms were poorly equipped in terms of books and reading spaces. On the other hand, workshops were being properly used for practical work. They were adequately equipped and the machines were for the most part satisfactorily maintained although some spare parts problems were noted in relation to older machines. v. The project was implemented satisfactorily up to the point at which the government requested the reallocation of part of the project savings to finance technical assistance to educational planning. Although the need for educational planning was well founded, severe difficulties were experienced in developing an effective technical assistance program which resulted in the credit remaining open for more than five years beyond the original closing date. - ii - vi. From the beginning the Association paid insufficient attention to and followed up insufficiently the need to link the objectives of the TA program with a detailed definition of the skills required to meet these objec- tives. Furthermore, complex and time consuming methods of recruitment were adopted and the choice of an executing agency and approval of job descriptions and candidates further delayed project implementation. The original TA program was subsequently reduced by the government with the result that a team of experts, inadequate in size and range of competence, was finally fielded. These deficiencies were reflected in the team's work and its impact was accordingly reduced. vii. The contribution of the project towards manpower development has been positive in the sense that secondary enrollments were increased signifi- cantly and adequate equipment was supplied for relevant technical courses which undoubtedly contributed to improving the quality of training. However, these achievements must be seen against the general problem of mismatch between demand and supply of various types of skills as well as the emerging problem of unemployment of the educated in Tunisia. This is a problem of adjustment largely beyond the control of IDA. viii. The difficulties which the project encountered in its latter stages provide a number of lessons for IDA and the borrower and these are of parti- cular significance to the Association since they relate to the supply of technical assistance and the manpower justification of the project. The lessons to be drawn from this project concern the need for a more rigorous examination of the planning "climate" within the country to assess the prob- ability of success of technical assistance to planning and also a more systematic approach to the stages of implementing a TA program. In respect of the manpower justification of the expansion of places and supply of equip- ment, experience with this project underscores the uncertainty surrounding any projection of manpower requirements and the need for a great deal of caution when using these projections to determine specific training programs. I. INTRODUCTION 1.01 The first credit for an education project in Tunisia (29-TUN) was approved by IDA in September 1962 for US$5 million. It provided for the expansion and improvement of the secondary school system through the con- struction and equipping of five secondary schools and a training college for lower secondary teachers. The second education credit (94-TUN) for US$13 million in September 1966 aimed at similar objectives and provided for the construction and equipping of nine new general secondary schools, extensions to six existing schools and the supply of equipment to sixteen schools. The credit also provided for the construction and equipping of three agricultural training centers which were later deleted from the project following adminis- trative and policy changes in education. Following the reallocation of credit savings in 1971, industrial equipment for 11 technical secondary schools and technical assistance for educational planning were added to the project. 1.02 An IDA completion mission for the second project visited Tunisia between February 14 and March 3, 1977 comprising R. C. Prosser (mission leader/ educator), W. E. Rees (economist), J. St. Germain (architect/consultant) and J. C. Jones (technical educator/consultant). The mission examined relevant documents in Washington and Tunis and visited 10 out of 15 new or extended schools, 6 out of 21 1/ schools for which equipment only had been provided under the project, and five control schools. The Ministry of Education made available to the mission a copy of the general statistical return for each school visited. Discussions were held with Ministry officials, provincial officers, school principals and senior staff and a questionnaire was completed at each school. Details of the mission's methodology of assessment are con- tained in Annex 1. At the completion of the mission's field work, a meeting was held with the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education to discuss the mission's preliminary findings, issues and problems. 1.03 The approach adopted in the preparation of this report has been to treat briefly those aspects which presented few problems during implementa- tion and other results which can be considered unexceptional. Conversely, considerable emphasis has been placed on the aspects which have operational significance for both IDA and borrower namely the technical assistance pro- gram which caused major delays in project implementation and the impact of the project on manpower development. I/ The credit originally provided equipment only to 16 schools. After reallocation of credit savings additional equipment was provided to 11 schools of which 6 had already received some equipment under the credit. Thus 21 individual schools received equipment only under the credit. - A.2 - II. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES Socio-Economic Background 2.01 Tunisia covers some 164,000 sq. km. and has a population (1975) of around 5.6 million concentrated mainly in the northeastern provinces. The population is Arabic speaking with widespread use of French as a second language. Tunisia achieved independence in 1956 after 76 years as a protec- torate of France. Since independence major social gains have been made in the fields of education, health and the emancipation of women. 2.02 The Tunisian economy has achieved solid growth in recent years with GDP expanding at an average rate of 7.6% p.a. in real terms during the Fourth Plan, 1973-76. Tunisia's natural resources include considerable deposits of phosphates and more limited reserves of oil and natural gas. The main crop is olives which, processed as oil, accounts for over half of all agricultural exports. There is considerable potential for further development and the country's proximity to important markets and its untapped labor reserves are all factors favorable to continued economic growth. Nevertheless growth poli- cies have been followed without sufficient regard to distributional problems and new industries and tourist facilities have continued to concentrate in the northeast and coastal provinces. Thus the prosperity of these areas contrasts sharply with the rural hinterland and the southern provinces. In the distri- bution of social services, particularly health and education, the poorer areas have been less than adequately served. The Fourth National Development Plan (1973-76) recognized the need to redress these imbalances and placed much greater emphasis on the development of the poorer rural areas. Similar priority is being given to distributional policies in the fifth plan, cur- rently under review. Educational Developments 2.03 In 1966 the education system comprised a six grade primary cycle from which graduates passed either into the three grade terminal college moyen or the six grade lycee. About 40% of primary completers went on to further education--one third into colleges moyens and two-thirds to lycees. *The coll6ge moyen was intended for older primary leavers and those consid- ered less able to benefit from the full secondary course. It had three sections--general, commercial and industrial. The general arts course, in contrast to the commercial and industrial courses, suffered from the dis- advantage of not offering specific preparation for employment and really offered little more than some form of compensation for those not selected for full secondary studies. The six-grade full secondary course was divided into two three-year cycles with all students taking a common first year. At the end of the common year, students were diverted into either general, economic or technical streams and during the second cycle, each stream was divided into separate specializations (Annex 2). - A.3 - 2.04 In 1971 the coll'ge moyen system was abolished and replaced by a three-grade vocational stream following primary schooling in which students specialized from the first year in one of 13 different options. The "long" secondary course comprised a common cycle of three years followed by either a three-year technical stream leading to a diploma with an extra preparatory year available to those proceeding to higher education, or a four-year academic course leading to the baccalaureate. Some students could also enter agricul- tural secondary schools run by the Ministry of Agriculture after completion of the common cycle. 2.05 The Tunisian education system has experienced spectacular growth in the two decades following independence with primary enrollments increasing more than four times while enrollments in secondary schools increased six times. About 74% of the primary age group and 12% of the secondary age group were enrolled in 1966 compared with 88% and 19% in 1974. Within the secondary system, vocational enrollments expanded around three times between 1965 and 1976. Such a rapid expansion has predictably led to significant qualitative deficiencies in the system which is characterized by high dropout and repeater rates, inadequately prepared teachers, and a curriculum which is inappropriate to the country's development aspirations and employment needs. The system is also a high cost one, with Tunisia consistently spending around 30% of its recurrent budget on education. Weaknesses in education,planning have made it very difficult for the government to improve the efficiency of the system, increase its relevance to the country's needs and reduce costs. Project Composition and Objectives 2.06 The project was conceived as constituting an important part of Tunisia's educational development program which placed high priority on the expansion of secondary education to meet middle-level manpower needs and pro- vide inputs to the expanding higher education system. The inclusion of 6,190 or 33% of the.new.places for girls provided a significant contribution to increa4-, ing educational opportunities for girls and by providing 5,132 (27%) boarding places, the project contributed to improved enrollment of rural children. The provision of equipment in all project schools served to enhance the opportuni- ties for scientific and technical training. The total of 18,570 new places was expected to contribute 44% of the government's planned expansion of secondary schooling between 1965/66 and 1968/69. 2.07 The project, as originally appraised, provided for the construction and equipment of nine new secondary schools (12,460 places), the expansion and equipment of six existing secondary schools (6,110 places) and equipment only for 16 secondary schools with 27,000 places. The construction and equipment of three agricultural training centers (1,100 places) was also included but following a government decision to convert three farms into training centers, this item was deleted. 2.08 Modifications were made to the project in 1971 after the deletion of the agricultural centers and favorable prices on civil works and equipment resulted in credit savings. A proportion of the credit savings was reallocated - A.4 - to provide: (a) industrial equipment for 11 secondary schools to improve workshop training and thereby raise the quality of technical manpower outputs; (b) 11 man-years of technical assistance to aid the government in the estab- lishment of an educational planning unit. III. RESULTS Organization and Management 3.01 Implementation of the project was the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works (since redesignated Ministry of Equipment) for civil construc- tion and the Ministry of Education for procurement of furniture and equipment. The credit became effective on December 20, 1966 with an original closing date of December 31, 1970. The closing date was postponed for seven months in late 1970 to allow for reallocation of project savings and postponed again on four occasions as difficulties developed with the technical assistance program (see Part IV). The credit was closed on March 31, 1976, more than five years after the appraisal estimate. 3.02 The civil works and procurement phases of the project were imple- mented with speed and efficiency. Construction started immediately and in less than a year, four schools were partially completed and operational and two years later all schools were open. The process was speeded up by the use of standard designs which enabled the Ministry of Public Works to receive and evaluate bids in an expeditious manner. The absence of cost overruns and completion of major works on schedule testifies to the Ministry's efficient implementation practices. The only problem to emerge during the construction and equipment phase was the delay in final acceptance of some schools due to late arrival of some laundry and laboratory equipment and the tardy installa- tion of power to workshops and laundries. Thus while all schools had been provisionally accepted by 1970, final acceptance was delayed for another two years. However this constituted a relatively minor problem. In general, the procurement of furniture and equipment was carried out with dispatch and efficiency and also resulted in substantial savings from favorable tender prices. 3.03 The implementation process which was relatively smooth and timely until 1970 began to deteriorate following the reallocation of project savings to provide technical assistance for educational planning and industrial equip- ment for 11 technical schools. Procurement of the latter was subject to inter- vention by the Association in November 1972 to ensure that several bids which did not conform to IDA guidelines were reevaluated. Implementation of the technical assistance program was subject to many delays due to: (i)differences of vidws between the Government and IDA on the objectives of the technical assistance'program; (ii) complex administrative procedures concerning matters of recruitment and educational planning, and (iii) inadequate recruitment procedures for employing technical experts. These issues are dealt with fully in Part IV. - A.5 - 3.04 Supervision of the project by IDA was satisfactory during the physical stage of implementation, with three supervision missions in most years through 1970 (Annex 3). Missions were quite well balanced in terms of composition with an economist and/or educator accompanying an architect as appropriate. Nevertheless as difficulties developed in the technical assis- tance program, supervision missions were unable to achieve any significant breakthrough in influencing the situation regarding the recruitment and utilization of the team of experts. Supervision reports certainly kept the Association aware of the growing problems, but appropriate follow-up action was not forthcoming. Prolect Costs and Disbursements 3.05 The cost of the appraised project, excluding site costs, was esti- mated at about TD 10.5 million or US$19.8 million equivalent. In 1968 the government requested the deletion of the three agricultural training insti- tutes from the project and this resulted in a saving of US$0.96 million. In addition further savings of US$1.26 million and US$0.96 million were achieved. through favorable tendering for furniture and equipment and on civil works, respectively. In 1971 IDA agreed to reallocate US$0.41 million for technical assistance in educational planning, US$1.40 million for industrial equipment in technical schools and allowed US$0.27 million for contingencies from the total savings of US$3.18 million. The remaining $1.1 million was cancelled. The credit balance of $0.39 million was cancelled. The actual total cost of the modified project is estimated at about US$20.8 million. 3.06 A breakdown of estimated and actual costs is presented in the following table: - A.6 - ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL COST (including contingencies) in US$ million equivalent Estimated Cost of Actual Cost Project during Appraisal of Project TD US$ TD US$ (thousands) (milion1 _ ftougand&) (4illc^L (1$=.525TD) (1$=.435TD) Civil Works 5,684 10.8 5,040 11.6 Furniture and Equipment 3,076 5.9 3,465 8.0 Professional Fees 278 0.5 315 0.7 Technical Assistance - - 210 0.5 Contingencies 1,356 2.6 Total 10,394 19.81 9,030 08 3.07 On the basis of about 66% disbursement against project expenditure, the government was entitled to withdraw $13 million equivalent. However the cancellation of $1.49 million effectively reduced the credit to $11.51 million. As of the final closing date March 31, 1976, $11.48 million or 99.7% of the credit had been disbursed. Between June 1967 and January 1977, 37 withdrawal applications for amounts varying from $11,000 to $2,500,000 were submitted to IDA. The lag between expenditures and disbursement was caused by lengthy procedures for submission of applications involving the various departments in the Ministry of Public Works and the Ministry of Education. The delay between actual and appraisal estimates of disbursements was also affected by changes in the project. Annex 4 shows actual disbursements in relation to appraisal estimates together with a summary of major events in project implementation. Physical Implementation (a) Sites 3.08 The sites selected are in suitable locations in relation to catch- ment areas and are of sufficient size to accommodate the academic and boarding facilities for enrollment levels as determined at the time of appraisal; in general they also provide adequate open space for sports fields. The average site area per student and boarder currently varies from 18 to 50 square meters indicating that even with enrollments at much higher levels than anticipated at the time of appraisal (25% higher in the case of new project schools), site areas are still adequate. Average site area in control schools varies /1 Including the three agricultural centers but excluding equipment for 11 schools and technical assistance. /2 Excluding civil works costs, financed by the government, for addi- tions to schools estimated at about $1.2 million and minor additions made by school labor. - A.7 - from 8 to 12 square meters, the difference between project and control schools being due to the latter group having two city schools with no athletic fields of their own but utilizing city facilities. (b) Civil Works 3.09 The architectural design and the periodic construction supervision of civil works were carried out according to local practice by architects and engi- neers and paid on the basis of a percentage of the construction cost. The archi- tectural work for the 15 new or extended institutions was distributed among nine consultant architects. The continuous on-site supervision was carried out by the consultant architects with periodic supervision by representatives of the Ministry of Public Works. 3.10 Civil works procurement was handled on the basis of International Com- petitive bidding in accordance with Association guidelines. About 100 contracts were awarded to local and foreign contractors established in the country for a total value of US$9.6 million equivalent. The civil works for each school were awarded under an average of six separate contracts for (i) general construction, (ii) plumbing, (iii) electrical, (iv) kitchen and laundry equipment, (v) walk-in freezers, and (vi) sports fields. This method is used extensively by government agencies in Tunisia and is favored because it breaks down the work into many smaller contracts and encourages the participation of small contractors. Coordination of the works and administration of contracts was handled by the Ministry of Public Works. 3.L1 This method does have shortcomings since contracts for all work other than general construction are advertized and awarded at various times after the initial award, thus making it impossible to calculate the total cost of each project item until the last contract is awarded. Furthermore, the involvement of many contractors complicates administration and places a heavy burden on the government and on IDA staff when credits are involved, for the review, approval and recording of so many contract documents. The Govern- ment is aware of the problem and has indicated that the practice arises from the'fact that in Tunisia there are no contractors who are capable of handling all the works, including specialised elements, themselves (see also Attachment I). 3.12 Since the completion of the civil works component in 1969, instruc- tional rooms, change rooms and corridors have been added to many institutions by working groups of teachers and pupils. Three additional dormitories have been constructed by the government at an estimated total cost of about US$1.2 million. It is expected that additional extensions and improvements will continue to be made. (c) Furniture and Equipment Procurement 3.13 The procurement of furniture and equipment was carried out according to government procedures which were in accordance with IDA procurement guide- lines. Bid evaluation and award of contracts, subject to the approval of the Minister of Education were made by a tendering committee representing the Inspectorate and the School Planning and Building Division in the Ministry of Education. No major problems arose during the procurement of furniture and equipment although the Association was required to offer frequent advice on - A.8 - the details of bid invitation and evaluation particularly in relation to clear specification of items and correct numbers of items to be tendered for. In general, however, procurement was executed in an efficient and timely manner thus enabling all major items to be installed by the original closing date. (d) Project Facilities 3.14 The original space standards and the schedules of accommodation of the Ministry of Education, which were reviewed and approved by IDA, were followed without any significant deviation throughout project implementation. Instructional facilities were adequate for enrollments projected during appraisal but enrollment targets have been exceeded by 25% in new project schools and there has been increasing pressure on teaching and dormitory facilities in many schools. Teaching spaces have been added in some schools through the efforts of teachers and pupils. 3.15 The average instructional gross floor area per student is adequate-- about four square meters in project schools. The average gross floor area of boarding facilities, including dining and related facilities was originally set at about 14 square meters per boarder but present overcrowding (33% in new project schools) has reduced the area per boarding place to about 10 square meters. This overcrowding has also led to lockers being placed in hallways and vestibules thus creating circulation problems. Space standards and boarding facilities in the project schools do not differ markedly from those in control schools. 3.16 The architectural design and construction details were found to be generally of adequate standard. However four problems were noted in all schools visited: (a) in the dormitory design the window sills are extremely wide and dead-level or sloping in, causing leaks in every building due to rain runoff; (b) too much glass has been used with no overhang or other sun protection and consequently a large number of windows have been painted over to prevent glare; (c) exhaust fans are lacking in kitchens and dormitory toilets; (d) window stays are non-existent or difficult to reach and in high wind areas many windows are broken from slamming shut. 3.17 Electricity and water services are provided in all buildings and are generally of good quality. Hot water systems for the boarding, infirmary and kitchen facilities were operating efficiently with one exception--a school having difficulty with its hot water system for showers because of clogging due to lack of water treatment. Systems for gas, water, drainage and elec- tricity are provided in most science blocks and were operating efficiently. The surfaces of sports fields in the majority of schools are poorly developed - A.9 - being roughly graded with many surface stones; as the Borrower has explained (Attachment I), this is because in Tunisia there is only one contractor who specialises in sports field construction and the works had to be executed by non-specialised contractors and local efforts. No change rooms have been pro- vided b-ft these are being constructed by school labor in some institutions. 3.18 Furniture and equipment were in general adequate, the noticeable deficiency being in the provision of library reference books. Laboratory equipment, though adequate, did not seem to be in regular use and in many cases was stacked in storage cupboards. Classrooms were adequately furnished and in general not overcrowded with desks, The provision of dormitory lockers was inadequate but due to overcrowding of sleeping spaces lockers ,were dispersed in corridors. (e) Maintenance 3.19 In general, maintenance in all schools was good with the biggest problem being water infiltration around windows due to a design deficiency (para. 3.16). The kitchens and laundries were in good, clean condition with equipment well-maintained. In most schools gardens were established near the administration block and were well-kept, often by the pupils. Mainte- nance of workshop equipment is the.responsibility of the instructors. IDA supplied equipment is satisfactorily maintained although, being relatively new, maintenance needs are less than for older equipment. It was noted that some of the older equipment was idle partly due to lack of spare parts but also due to lack of experience of maintaining particular machines on the part of some instructors. Educational Results (a) Quantitative Aspects 3.20 Details of enrollments in new project schools are shown in Annex 5. By 1969-70, the first year in which the project schools were operational, enrollments in the nine new schools had reached 86% of the 12,460 targetted places. However, female enrollment was significantly lower reaching only 49% of the project target. Enrollments in the six schools extended under the project were 9,390 of which 6,110 or 65% were project places and female enroll- ment was 2,800 to which the project contributed 1,300 places (46%). The con- tribution of the project's 18,570 places to total additional secondary places provided between 1965-66 and 1969-70 was 23%. This was considerably below expectations as inferred from the appraisal report due to a higher growth in enrollments in secondary schools than anticipated at the time of appraisal. 3.21 By 1976-77 total enrollments in the new project schools were 25% higher than the appraisal estimate. The enrollment of girls was almost exactly on target compared to the appraisal report in terms of numbers but as a proportion of the expanded total enrollments accounted for only 32% whereas the appraisal report envisaged a female enrollment rate of 39%. Overall, 33% of enrollments in Tunisian secondary schools are female. The increase in enrollments has been accommodated mainly through more intensive use of teach- ing facilities through double shifting or "rolling" classes. In a few in- stances the mission noted that additional classrooms had been added through - A.10 - the efforts of students and staff, e.g. at the Lycee de Mateur where four classrooms had been constructed from within the school's own resources. Over- enrollment has led to noticeable overcrowding in dormitories. 3.22 The present structure of enrollments (Annex'6) cannot be compared fully with data contained in the appraisal report because the project schools have undergone considerable expansion and structural change in the last decade. However the vocational courses of the former "college moyen" system which pre- vailed at the time of appraisal can be compared with the present "professional" or vocational cycle. At appraisal it was anticipated that 25% of places in the new project schools would be reserved for college moyen vocational courses and a decade of expansion of the new project schools has seen this proportion maintained. In actual number, enrollments in vocational courses are currently 3,762 compared with appraisal estimates of 3,080 for college moyen vocational courses. 3.23 In the new project schools 37% of enrollments were boarders which slightly exceeds the target of 35% set in the appraisal report. For all new and extended project schools, 33% of enrollments were boarders indicating that the schools are serving a significant proportion of children living on the periphery of the catchment areas beyond the range of daily travel. In the control schools, 26%-of total enrollments were boarders while the national figure (1975-76) is 30%. In the project schools 33% of enrollments were boursiers compared with 29% for the control schools and 28% for Tunisia as a whole indicating a relatively satisfactory level of scholarship support for needy students within the project schools. The social background of pupils in the schools visited was generally representative of the social structure of the schools' catchment areas with children from agricultural (i.e. small farmer or farm worker) backgrounds predominating in most cases. (b) Internal Efficiency 3.24 National secondary repeater and dropout rates are high, both averag- ing 12% in 1975-76; these however are an improvement over the 1965-66 rates when the appraisal mission estimated them at 10-20% and 15-20% respectively. The limited data available for project schools indicated that repeater and dropout rates were around 9% and 5% respectively. Although data are inadequate to test the significance of these results there were no observed reasons for the lower figures in the project schools. They do not serve privileged groups of children and are not better endowed with teaching staff either quantita- tively or qualitatively. The high national repeater and dropout rates are caused by a combination of factors such as lack of stimulus for study due to high parental illiteracy rates, lack of financial resources for continued study and the need for children's labor on family farms, difficulties with French as the language of instruction, irrelevant curriculum and shortage of (highly expensive) textbooks. Evidence of success in project schools in the baccalaureate and diploma examinations indicate pass rates slightly above the national average of 50% and 43% respectively. 3.25 Teacher/student ratios averaged 1:20 in both project and control schools although the range was greater in the project schools--1:16 to 1:24-- - A.11 - than in the control schools where it was 1:18 to 1:22 (Annex 7). In 1975-76 the national teacher/student ratio was 1:21. The past decade has seen a steady decline in the proportion of expatriate secondary teachers in Tunisian secondary schools from 34% in 1965-66 to 16% in 1975-76 (compared to 18% in the project schools and 16% in the control schools). Both project and control schools were overendowed with administrative staff with 100 administrators for every 180 teachers in project schools and 190 teachers in control schools. For Tunisia overall, secondary schools have 160 teachers for every 100 admin- istrators. 3.26 In terms of qualifications, 67% of Tunisian teachers in the project schools were university graduates compared with 70% in control schools. Among expatriate teachers the proportion of university graduates was somewhat lower being 58% and 61% in project and control schools respectively (Annex 5). Nationally, 71% of Tunisian teachers are university graduates compared with 56% of the expatriates. Thus taking the total teaching force in the project schools, the proportion of university graduates (67%) is almost identical to the national figure (68%). (c) Teaching Methods and Facilities 3.27 Teaching methods lack practical application and the use of the lec- ture approach to teaching scientific subjects was much in evidence with labora- tories being used as classrooms rather than for practical work. Laboratories were in general adequately equipped but there was little evidence of some important pieces of equipment (such as microscopes) being used regularly. Workshops were adequately equipped and in general were being used satisfac- torily for the purposes of practical instruction. Textbooks were almost entirely French and' in short supply due to their high cost and this hampered particularly the teaching of science and technology since the language of instruction is French. Library rooms exist in schools but with one notable exception the concept of a library as a place to study reference books and additional texts has not been developed. Libraries were generally under- stocked and reading space was extremely limited or non-existent. (d) Recurrent Costs 3.28 Due to the centralization of salary payments, it is not possible to calculate recurrent budgets or per capita costs for individual schools. How- ever, there is no evidence that recurrent costs differ significantly between project schools, control schools or schools nationally either in terms of staffing allocations, or expenditure on educational materials and supplies. IV. SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THE PROJECT 4.01 Of direct and major relevance to IDA and the Borrower are the prob- lems which arose in the implementation of the technical assistance program which led to major delays in project completion and also the impact of the - A.12 - project on manpower development. An understanding of this aspect is important because it concerns an important component of Bank Group lending in education. Lessons to be drawn therefrom should thus be of operational significance to project implementation. (a) Technical Assistance for Educational Planning 4.02 Experience with the technical assistance program shows that there should have been full dialogue at an early stage between IDA and the borrower to determine the required inputs and objectives for education planning, If these had been established, unequivocal agreement on the program's objectives and the skills required to meet them would have been possible, 4.03 Both IDA and borrower could then have worked closely together to ensure that a team of appropriate size and.range of competence was put into the field. The team would have received the full cooperation of the Tunisian authorities and coordination established between the team and all relevant ministries. Failure to meet these conditions in reality resulted in the life of the project being more than doubled and the impact of the TA program being substantially reduced. 4.04 The sum reallocated for this item was US$410,000 to provide 11 man- years of expert assistance to establish a planning unit within the Ministry of Education. The state of the Tunisian education system at that time clearly pointed up the need for an efficient planning system. The basic problem was one of growing social demand from an increasing population for more education at all levels and rising pressure on budgetary resources to meet these needs. The system itself was inefficient with high dropout and repeater rates and high unit costs. The labor market too was becoming increasingly incapable of providing jobs for the rising number of school leavers. With a proper planning mechanism, it was felt by the Association that these problems could at least be ameliorated by increasing internal efficiency and reducing costs and ensuring a closer relationship between the education system and employ- ment needs. 4.05 The request for technical assistance to recruit experts to reinforce the proposed planning unit within the Ministry of Education was made to the Association by the Minister of Planning in December 1970. From the beginning two issues emerged which were to become serious problems affecting adversely the implementation of the technical assistance program. These issues were related to (i) definition of and unequivocal agreement on objectives and in- struments of the technical assistance program; and (ii) recruitment methods. - A.13 - 4.06 Draft objectives for the technical assistance program were not sent to the Tunisian government until late August 1971 1/ and these elicited no direct response from the government. By March 1972, the government bad speci- fied six posts it would like filled with experts and during discussions with a supervision mission that month, the list was expanded to 11 posts to cover important omissions in the original list (e.g. higher education planning). In August 1972, Unesco had selectpd 15 candidates (approved by the Association) for submission go the government. However, in September the government rejected some candidates, reequetted ore Uformation on other4 4nd critLzed poat descriptions. These deocriptions had been formulated by the government in conjunction with Unesco and had received IDA approval,. Thus, the appoint- ments of the first experts were delayed until March 1973, over two years after the initial request for technical assistance had been made, 4.07 In spite of slow progress in defining objectives and posts for the team of experts, recruitment activities commenced almost immediately after receipt of the request for technical assistance in December 1970. Early in 1971 the Association contacted Unesco, but concluded that the chances of obtaining experts at an early date through this channel were not particularly good. 4.08 Subsequently the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada was contacted by the Association to see whether this organization could identify "one or two senior and influential people who might go out to Tunisia briefly to try to start up a dialogue with the Minister with a view to slot- ting in people at the working level later on". As a result of this mandate, the Deputy Minister for Education, Quebec Province, visited Tunisia as an IDA consultant in November 1971. He was also involved in trying to recruit Canadian experts and was able to propose a potential team leader who was interviewed in the Bank in January 1972. The applicant was found to have little competence in educational planning, or experience in less developed countries but was considered acceptable to the Association provided he under- took a course on educational planning (preferably at IIEP) and was supported in the field by a strong team of experts. 4.09 However even after the way had been cleared for the recruitment of the team, its actual establishment and modus operandi posed major problems. In September 1972 the government indicated that the number of posts would be restricted to eight. Five candidates were accepted in principle and three team members were in post by March 1973. A fourth expert arrived in September 1973 and the government indicated that the team would be restricted to five members, allowing for the recruitment of a vocational training expert. 1/ Although credit savings were not officially reallocated until August 1971, the TA program had been in preparation since January 1971, - A. 14 - 4.10 Three Tunisian economists were appointed to the planning unit which together with the four Unesco experts gave the unit a strength of seven by the end of 1973. 'IDA supervision missions found staffing to be insufficient in view of the proposed objectives of the planning unit. The problem was also compounded by the lack of Tunisian educators in the team to balance the three Tunisian economists. 4.11 In the early period the Unesco experts made few contacts with Tunisian officials and none with the Ministry of Education. Difficulties were experienced in the procurement of office space for the team which was finally located in the suburbs of Tunis, thus increasing its isolation. While the experts developed sound working relationships (at least initially) with their counterparts in the planning unit, there was little communication with the curriculum development officials leading to a neglect of qualitative issues in education planning. Communications were also poor between the planning unit and other ministries involved in training activities which precluded the planning unit from developing an overall perspective on the educational/training system in Tunisia. 4.12 The government certainly made concrete suggestions from time to time to improve the education planning infrastructure. In September 1971, the gov- ernment indicated that an Inter-ministerial committee was to be estabiphed to coordinate work on all human resource aspects of the fourth plan (197-76).. In mid-1973 the committee was to be "reactivated" and work with the support of the Education Planning Unit. At the same time, a separate unit (Direction de l'Orientation Pedagogigue) was established with responsibility for curriculum development and analysis. However coordination between these two units and between the ministries represented on the coordinating committee was never satisfactory, to the detriment oi planning activities. Furthermore, the strength of the planning team was significantly reduced at the insistence of the government. Although a team of eight members plus consultants was ori- ginally agreed upon, the team never comprised more than four members although seven experts served with the team for varying periods between 1973 and 1976. Even with this reduced number, sufficient Tunisian counterparts were never appointed. 4.13 Inadequacies in the planning efforts were evident in the draft report of the planning unit which contained important omissions (e.g, education finance, vocational and technical training) due to the lack of re- cruitment of the appropriate experts. The Unesco team's draft report which was submitted to the government around mid-1974 seems to have received no recognition. - A.15 - (b) Contribution to Manpower Development 4.14 At the time of appraisal, total employment was expected to increase at 2% p.a. in the following years, and given the inadequate capacity of the school system to produce middle level manpower, significant shortages were forecast for future years. The rate of growth of employment in the period 1966-75 was actually 3.2%, but in spite of this higher growth rate together with a significant rate of worker migration, employment opportunities have not been able to match outputs from the education system (and immigration from rural areas) mainly due to a much higher increase in secondary enrollments than anticipated at the time of appraisal. Consequently, unemployment and underemployment among educated people is a problem in Tunisia. Within the middle level manpower sector, at which the project schools were directed, it seems that although there are skill shortages in some fields, there is a con- siderable unemployment in others, indicating a mismatch between the supply of skilled manpower and market demand. 4.15 Employment data for secondary graduates indicate high levels of un- employment among vocational students (33%), technical industrial (18%) and technical economic (22%) nearly a year after graduation. It seems that employ- ment problems are particularly acute in certain trades and also vary by region. The acute problem trades are general mechanics and to a lesser extent electric- ity, but unemployment in these trades is currently less severe near the coastal areas where tourism is well-developed and new hotel construction has been pro- viding substantial employment opportunities. The cyclical problem of employ- ment is recognized however, and officials are not optimistic for the next few years. Emigration does not seem to be a viable alternative to unemployment of vocational graduates and technicians at least in the traditional West European (mainly French) labor markets which themselves are in recession. The employ- ment issue for technicians is of slightly less immediate concern since a sig- nificant proportion proceeds to higher education. 4.16 School officials emphasized the need for a much closer relationship between educational institutions and employers, a more efficient placement service and much better information regarding job availabilities and institu- tional supply of skilled manpower on a regional basis. The government seems to be responding to these needs and is proposing to introduce more flexibility into three-year vocational courses by proposing a modular approach which com- bines two years of common study followed by specialization only in the third year. This would make skill training more easily adjustable to market demand and give vocational graduates a wider skill base. More specifically, the gov- ernment intends to reduce enrollments in the general mechanics course, which is largely production oriented, and to develop a new course in maintenance mechanics, which would serve a wider range of industries. Nevertheless, al- though these reforms are likely to have some ameliorating effect, the wider requirement of closer integration between educational outputs and employment needs still remains the fundamental issue. In this direction, the government is considering the establishment of regional councils to bring together pro- vincial education officials, school administrators and employers' representa- tives to try to develop a clearer picture of local employment needs and the capacity of local institutions to meet them. - A.16 - 4.17 Against this background, the IDA credit has undoubtedly made a con- tribution to manpower development through the expansion of enrollments and the provision of relevant equipment to improve the quality of training and thereby enhance employability. However, the overall effectiveness of the contribution has been reduced within the context of an internally inefficient education system and a labor market unable to absorb fully the rapidly expanded outputs of the system. The Association was aware of the problem of internal inefficiency from the beginning and for this reason it constantly (though in- effectively) requested that the government introduce internal reforms and meaningful education planning. On the other hand, in the mid-sixties both the Bank and the government recognized only the severe manpower shortages evident almost everywhere and the need to expand education systems to meet these needs; that shortages would very rapidly turn into surpluses was not recognized until much later. V. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS 5.01 In retrospect the major lessons to be learnt from the implementation of the second Tunisian education project seem to be as follows: (i) When technical assistance for education planning was being consid- ered by the Association, rigorous examination of the prospects for a successful education planning exercise should have been made. The fact that objectively Tunisia seemed to need planning was enough for the government and IDA to proceed. However, the problems were not fully thought out and the government apparently soon found incompatibilities between the imperatives of increasing efficiency and the pressure of social demand. (ii) The definition of objectives for the TA program should not have been divorced from the definition of posts and the recruitment of experts but rather treated as a fully integrated exercise. Also the methods and procedures of experts' recruitment left much to be desired. (iii) The main problem however was the lack of full support for the agreed TA program. As a consequence the size and range of competence of the team was drastically reduced and sufficient counterparts were not forthcoming. Cooperation between the team and relevant ministries was never satisfactorily established. The result was a draft report containing a number of shortcomings, Furthermore, although a commission was set up to review the report, no final decision was made on any of its recommendations. - A.17 - (iv) Although the growth of employment over the last decade has been significantly higher than expected at appraisal, the supply of manpower from various sources -- rural migrants, women and school leavers -- has been too great for the labor market to absorb. The result is a severe unemployment problem in Tunisia today. The secondary education system has expanded in response to social demand, at a rate faster than the creation of suitable jobs, thus creating a significant amount of unemployment among the educated. In retrospect, greater emphasis should also have been placed on trying to relate enrollments in particular courses to likely employment needs for each type of skill. This implies the need for greater flexibility in adjusting training to market needs, but it is only now that the government is moving in this direction through the introduction of modular courses and regional manpower coordinating comsittees. (v) In general it is clear that institution building in education projects requires the full participation of the Borrower.  ANNEX 1 Page 1 of 3 TUNISIA II COMPLETION MISSION: METHODOLOGY The aim of the Completion Mission was to compare the project objectives and performance in implementing the project as conceived during appraisal and as specified in the credit agreement (as revised September 1971) with actual achievements to date. Special emphasis was to be placed on particular issues which might have relevance for future preparation and implementation of IDA projects. Pre-mission preparation comprised desk analysis of relevant files and reports and preparation of a short background paper summarizing major facets of the implementation process and suggesting possible issues on which the mission might focus. A request for relevant data was sent to the government in August 1976, but remained unanswered. A questionnaire, to be answered by school principals, was prepared and preliminary travel and interview schedules were drafted. In the field the mission selected ten new or extended project schools, six schools for which equipment only had been provided and five control schools to be visited by mission members. The schools were selected so as to give proper representation to the major economic regions and rural/urban location. The general statistical return for each school was made available by the Ministry of Education in Tunis. During visits to schools, mission members typically met with the school principal and senior staff to discuss pedagogic and administrative matters and an architectural assessment of school buildings, laboratories, workshops, kitchen and dormitory facilities, furniture and equipment was made. ANNEX 1 Page 2 of 3 TABLE I PROJECT AND CONTROL SCHOOLS I. Project Schools New Lycée de Jendouba * Lycée d'El Ouardia, Tunis * Lycée Technique, Djerba Lycée de Kalaa Kebira CSP de Kebili Lycée de Kerkennah * Lycée de Mateur * Lycée de Moknine * Lycée de Sidi Bouzid Extended * Lycée Technique, Rades * Lycée de Menzel Bourguiba * CSSP, Gabès * Lycée Technique, Gabès * Lycée Technique, Kairouan Lycée d'El Omrane Equipmènt i/ * CSP Djerba * Lycée Technique, Sfax * Lycée Technique,. Mahdia * Lycée Technique, Monastir * Lycée de Montfleury, Tunis * Lycée Technique, Béja Lycée du Bardo Lycée de Djbeniana CSP, Hammam-Lif Lycée Technique, Kasserine Lycée de Meknès Lycée de Makfar Lycée de Médenine Lycée Technique, Nabeul Lycée de Souk-el-Arbaa Lycée Technique, Sousse CSP, Sousse Lycée de Tozeur Lycée Bab-el-Khadra, Tunis Lycée Technique, Bizerte Lycée de Gafsa 1/ Six schools received equipment under the original project, and also after reallocation of project savings. * Project Schools visited by Completion Mission ANNEX 1 Page 3 of 3 II. Control Schools Lycée Mixte, Gabès Lycée Ibn Rachik, Kairouan Lycée Bab-el-Khadra, Tunis Lycée Mixte, Ras Djebel Lycée Mixte, Medjez el Bab ANNEX 2 TUNISIA: THE STRUCTURE OF EDUCATION, 1965/66 SCHOOL YEAR I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 "COLLEGE MOYEN" GENERAL 4D__m2 1f3 COMMERCIAL *I 2 --3 INDUSTRIAL PRIMARY EDUCATION SECONDARY EDUCATION TECHNICAL APPLIED MATHEMATICS S D CINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIC ECONOMIC A ENTRANCE EXAMINATION O -COLLEGE MOYEN" BREVET 16 SECONDARY EDUCATION, INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BREVET COMMERCIAL &SECONDARY EDUCATION, BACCALAUREAT EDCATON 0 PRIMARY TEACHERS DIPLOMA GENERAL LIBERAL ARTS SCIENCES MATHEMATICS TEACHER TRAINING PRIMARY SECONDARY ANNEX 3 TUNISIA II IDA SUPERVISION MISSIONS Type of Mission Dates Specialists Report Dates Supervision, Projects 29-TUN and 94-TUN Oct.24-Nov.2,1966 Architect Nov.14,1966 Supervision Feb.15-18,1967 Economist March 7,1967 Supervision Oct.28-Nov.2,1967 Economist March 1,1968 Supervision Jan.22-26,1968 Techn. Educator Feb.9, 1968 Supervision April 16-24,1968 Architect June 18, 1968 Supervision Aug.23-28,1968 Architect Oct.3,1968 Supervision Jan.12-22,1969 Architect Jan.31,1969 Economist Agricult. Educator Supervision May 21-23,1969 Techn. Educator June 18, 1969 Supervision Nov.11-15,1969 Economist Nov.26,1969 Supervision/Reconnais- sance May 11-16,1970 Economist Supervision June 21-26,1970 Architect July 22,1970 Supervision/Reconnais- sance Dec. 1-5,1970 Economist July 12, 1971 Supervision Mar.29-Apr.15,1971 Architect/Techn. Educator ) Supervision Dec. 7-12,1971 Architect March 13, 1972 Supervision & discussion of proposed technical Mar.20-29,1972 General Educator April 24, 1972 assistance under reallo- cated credits Supervision Oct.16-23,1972 Gen. Educator Nov.14,1972 Supervision July 2-8,1973 Economist July 26,1973 Supervision Oct.30-Nov.4,1973 Economist Dec. 19,1973 Supervision Feb.13-21,1974 Architect April 10,1974 April 10,1974 TUNISIA II ANNEX 4 DISBURSEMENTS (in US$ million equivalent) Actual Appraisal Estimates % of Actual Significant Dates and Accumulated Accumulated to Appraisal Events in Project Amounts Amounts Amounts Amounts Estimate Implementation 67 .58 9/16/66 Signing of Credit Agreement 68 2.28 2.86 12/20/66 Credit effective 68 2.28 2.86 *10/24-11/2/67 * 2/15-18/67 69 3.66 6.52 3.90 166% *10/28-11/2/67 *1/22-26/68 *4/16-24/68 70 .80 7.32 5.85 9.75 75% *8/23-28/68 Opening of 7 10/68 project schools *1/12-22/69 71 2.04 9.36 3.25 13.00 72% 9/10/68 Government requeste deletion of agri- cultural training centers 72 .45 9.82 11.90 - 82% 10/69 Opening of remain- der of project schools 73 0 9.82 *11/11-15/69 *6/21-26/70 12/3./70 Original closing date 4/30/71 Revised closing date 7/31/71 Revised closing date *3/29-4/15/71 8/71 Reallocation of credit savings for industrial equip't for 11 tech.schools & tech.assistance for educational planning. 75 .76 11.45 96.2% *12/7-12/71 *3/20-29/72 76 .03 11.48 11. 52 L. 99.7% 10/72 All equipment delivered and *10/16-23/72 schools accepted 77 .03 11.51 100.0% *10/30-11/4/73 11/31/73 Revised closing d. *2/13-21/74 1.2/31/74 Revised closing d. 12/31/75 Revised closing d. 3/31/76 Final closing d. 12/31/76 Extended date for submission of withdrawal appli- caticns Completion mi3sion 2/77 in field * dates of project supervision missions 1/ Adjusted to allow for cancellations of %1.1 million in 9/71 2/ Adjusted to allow cancellation of $.38 million in 1976. TUNISIA II PLANNED AND ACTUAL ENROLLMENTS IN NEW PROJECT SCHOOLS Appraisal Report 1969-70 /1 1976-77 Target Enrollments Enrollments Enrollments Schools T F %F boarders %B. T F %F T F %F Boarders %Boarders Lyc6e de Jendouba 1,290 1,290 100 480 37 1,036 299 29 1,848 990 54 1,044 56 Lycge d'El Ouardia 1,400 450 32 480 34 1,466 520 35 2,406 1,156 48 278 12 Lyc6e TechniqueyDjerba 2,520 850 34 864 61 1,920 301 16 2,129 405 19 1,113 52 Lyc6e de Kalaa Kebira 1,400 450 32 360 26 1,190 275 23 1,585 422 27 251 16 CSP.de Kebili 880 280 32 480 55 1,085 120 11 1,120 142 13 736 66 Lyc6e de Kerkenah 880 280 32 240 27 684 161 24 896 258 29 365 41 Lycge de Mateur 1,400 450 32 720 51 1,121 200 18 1,664 453 27 642 39 Lyc6e de Moknine 1,290 390 30 288 22 1,214 423 35 2,067 773 37 268 13 Lyc6e de Sidi Bouzid 1,400 450 32 480 34 1,057 123 12 1,841 308 17 1,156 63 TOTAL 12,460 4,890 39 4,392 35 10,773 2,422 22 15,556 4,907 32 5,853 38 /1 First year in which project schools were fully operational. TUNISIA II ENROLLMENT BY COURSE IN NEW AND EXTENDED PROJECT SCHOOLS AND CONTROL SCHOOLS 1976-77 Second cycle Common cycle General Technical Vocational All cycles Project Schools M F T M F T M F T M F T M F T Lycée de Jendouba 163 289 452 406 284 690 229 181 410 - 296 296 798 1,050 1,848 Lycée d'El Ouardia 437 515 952 263 278 541 34 363 397 516 - 516 1,250 1,156 2,406 Lycée Technique, Djerba 532 189 721 718 142 860 474 74 548 - - - 1,724 405 2,129 Lycée de Kalaa Kebira 396 211 607 268 146 414 - - - 499 65 564 1,163 422 1,585 CSP, Kebili 419 88 507 137 31 168 - - - 422 23 445 978 142 1,120 Lycée de Kerkenah 289 103 392 208 74 282 - - - 141 81 222 638 258 896 Lycée de Mateur 554 323 877 241 130 371 - - - 416 - 416 1,211 453 1,664 Lycée de Moknine 452 238 690 361 246 607 18 37 55 463 252 715 1,294 773 2,067 Lycée de Sidi Bouzid 604 118 722 451 80 531 - - - 478 110 588 1,533 308 1,841 Lycée Technique, Rades 372 6 378 548 14 562 463 91 554 389 - 389 1.772 111 1,883 Lycée de Menzel Bourguiba 633 423 1,056 223 161 384 - - - - - - 856 584 1,440 CSSP, Gabès 471 454 925 - - - - - - - 270 270 471 724 1,195 Lycée Technique, Gabès 174 - 174 450 5 455 411 - 411 653 - 653 1,688 5 1,693 Lycée Technique, Kairouan 562 19 581 1,038 24 1,062 456 21 477 - - - 2,056 64 2,120 Lycée d'El Omrane 141 1,275 1,416 18 884 902 10 11 21 - 271 271 169 2,441 2,610 TOTAL 6,199 4,251 10,450 5,330 2,499 7,829 2,095 778 2,873 3,977 1,368 5,345 17,601 8,896 26,497 Control schools Lycée Mixte, Gabès 399 87 486 987 373 1,360 118 108 226 - - - 1,504 568 2,072 Lycée Ibn Rachik, Kairouan - 549 549 35 412 447 '3 79 82 - 253 253 38 1,293 1,331 Lycée Bab el Khadra 723 41 764 439 10 449 423 60 483 510 119 629 2,095 230 2,325 Lycée de Tas Djebel 433 282 715 155 138 293 - - - - 81 81 588 501 1,089 Lycée de Medjez el Bab 359 153 512 339 97 436 - - - 594 85 679 1,292 335 1,627 TOTAL 1,914 1,112 3,026 1,955 1,030 2,985 544 247 791 1,104 538 1,642 5,517 2,927 8,444 TUNISIA Il STAFFING IN NEW AND EXTENDED PROJECT SCHOOLS AND CONTROL SCHOOLS 1976-77 Teachers Teacher/ Tunisian Expatriates Student Adminis- AdministrAtor/ Project schools Graduates Non-graduates Graduates Non-grad. Total Ratio trators Teacher Ratio Lycée de Jendouba 52 18 6 10 86 1:21 52 1:1.7 Lycée d'El Ouardia 75 22 14 3 114 1:21 40 1:2.9 Lycée Technique, Djerba 62 8 26 14 110 1:19 66 1:1.7 Lycée de Kalaa Kebira 41 29 6 4 80 1:20 51 1:1.6 CSP, Kebili 26 30 1 - 57 1:20 39 1:1.5 Lycée de Kerkenah 29 18 4 1 52 1:17 35 1:1.5 Lycée de Mateur 44 24 3 7 78 1:21 38 1:2.1 Lycée de Moknine 64 40 4 6 114 1:18 58 1:2.0 Lycée de Sidi Bouzid 43 31 4 8 86 1:21 54 1:1.6 Lycée Technique, Rades 64 19 28 5 116 1:16 52 1:2.2 Lycée de Menzel Bourguiba 44 4 8 4 60 1:24 37 1:1.6 CSSP, Gabès, 25 25 3 5 58 1:21 47 1:1.2 Lycée Technique, Gabès 36 32 16 21 105 1:16 47 1:2.2 Lycée Technique, Kairouan 64 13 7 il 95 1:22 85 1:1.1 Lycée d'El Omrane 94 15 il 2 122 1:21 49 1:2.5 Total 763 328 141 101 1,333 1:20 750 1:1.8 Control schools Lycée Mixte, Gabès 57 6 19 13 95 1:22 59 1:1.6 Lycée Ibn Rachik, Kairouan 39 22 4 3 68 1:20 46 1:1.5 Lycée Bab el Khadra 81 27 12 5 125 1:19 37 1:3.4 Lycée de Ras Djebel 33 10 7 5 55 1:20 41 1:1.3 Lycée de Medjez el Bab 44 39 4 3 90 1:18 51 1:1.8 Total 254 104 46 29 433 1:20 234 1:1.9

Key facts
Organisation World Bank Group
Adoption date
Country Tunisia
Source World Bank