Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 9 9 9-S O TECHNICAL REPORT SOMALIA DROUGHT REHABILITATION PROGRAM JUBA-SHEBELLI AREA EMERGENCYi SETTLEiMENT SCHEME June, 1976 Eastern Africa Regional Office ; Agricultural Credit and Livestock Division This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otberwise be disciosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Current Unit Somali Shilling'(So.Sh.) So.Sh. 1.00 - US$ 0.16 US$ 1.00 So.Sh. 6.30 So.Sh. 1,000 US$ 158.86 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 hectare (ha) 10,000 m = 2.47 acres 1 kilometer (km) 1,000 meters (m) 1 square kilometer (km2) = 100 ha ABBREVIATIONS SRC Supreme Revolutionary Council MLFR = Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range ONAT National Agricultural Machine Hiring Agency GU 5 First Rainy Season Crop, April to June DER = Second Rainy Season Crop, October to December FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31 FOR OFFICIAL LUSE ONLY CONFIDENTIA' SOMALIA DROUGHT REHABILITATION PROGRAM JUBA-SHEBELLI AREA EM(ERGENCY SETTLEKENT SCHEKE TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ....... ........................i 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND .1 Rainfed Agriculture ............................... 1 Agricultural Cooperative .......................... 2 II. THE DROUGHT ........................................... 3 III. THE PROJECT ............................................ 6 A. General Description ......................... . 6 B. Detailed Features ................................. 7 C. Project Costs ..................................... 10 D. Accounts and Audit ................................ 12 F. Supervision .12 IV. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ............................ 13 V. PRODUCTION AND PRICES .................................. 15 A. Production ........................................ 15 B. Prices - .......................................... 17 VI. ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND JUSTIFICATION ........ .. .......... 18 This ficurnent has a r:es,r isee disitribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oS their offic.j duxi~s , coxitents may nrot otherwise be disclosed without World Eank authorization. APPENDIXES 1. The Drought Table 1 - Supply & Demand of Staple Food Items for 1975 2. The Settlements Chart - Organizational Chart of Resettlement Committees (World Bank 15394) 3. Project Costs - Rainfed Production Table 1 - Scale of Operations, Equipment and Inputs Needed Table 2 - Investment Cost Estimate and Phasing Table 3 - Operating Costs Table 4 - Technical Assistance Table 5 - Staff Salaries 4. Basic Assumptions 5. Estimated Schedule of Disbursement and Implementation Schedule Table 1 - Estimated Schedule of Disbursement Table 2 - Estimated Withdrawal of Proceeds of Credit Table 3 - Estimated Project Implementation Schedule 6. Draft Terms of Reference for Technical Assistance, and Description of the Juba-Shebelli Interdriverine Area Study 7. Estimated Volume and Value of Production Table 1 - Rainfed Production - 15,000 ha - Estimated Volume and Value of Production 8. Economic Analysis Table I - Amount of Taxes and Duties Table 2 - Assumptions for the Calculation of Taxes and Duties CHART - Organizational Chart (World Bank 15484) MAP - Project Area (IBERD 11964) SOMALIA DROUGHT REHABILITATION PROGRAM JUBA-SHEBELLI AREA EMERGENCY SETTLEMENT SCHEME SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION i. The Government of Somalia has undertaken a compreheusive agricul- tural settlement program to help nomadic livestock producers recover from the effects of the drought which devastated their herds and left them without any visible means of self-support. The major focus of the settlement effort has been on the establishment of three agricultural communities along the Juba and Shebelli rivers in the southern part of the country. These settlements are located on potentially valuable agricultural land which until that time had been only sparsely settled. The new settlements will thus serve the dual purpose of providing a more secure future for the nomads as well as enabling Government to develop new and much needed sources of food production. ii. rhe Project would develop 9,000 ha of rainfed cultivation in Dujuma and 3,000 each in Sablale and Kurtum Warey over a three-year period. Specif- ically, the Project would include proviyions foJ: (a) 25 crawlers for bush clearing on 15,000 ha; (b) 100 tractors with attach ments to be used for plough- ing and cultivation as well as for transport within the settlements; (c) 8 four-wheel drive vehicles; (d) 6 mobile workshops and 3 office buildings; (e) local staff salaries; (f) technical assistance; and (g) Project monitoring and future project preparation. During the initial years while the settlements are being developed the major emphasis would be on land clearing and preparation, crop production, and the process of adapting the nomadic pastoralists to a settled agricultural existence. The realization of crop production targets is essential in the short-term; large quantities of food grains will be needed to feed the people living in the area, and the import of these grains now constitutes a serious drain on the foreign exchange resources of the Somali Government. For the present, therefore, the cropping program would be carried out on a centralized and consolidated basis in order to make the most efficient use of equipment, labor and other limited resources. At a later stage, Government will most likely consider a number of options with regard to the organization of the crop areas, crop diversification and intensification, and soil conservation measures. iii. Overall r-sponsibilblty for the direction and coordination of the settlements would be assumed by the National Rehabilitation Committee of the Supreme Revolutio-.iary Council. The Committee would operate through a Settlement Development Agency. The Settlement Development Agency would be based in Mogadiscio, and would have full operational authority over all development programs being carried out within the three settlements. It would thus have responsibility for the rainfed crop program supported by IDA under the proposed Project, as well as the irrigated crop program to be supported by the Arab Fund, and the hospital construction project to be supported by the African Development Fund. It is envisaged that the Authority would be headed by a Manag4ng Director. DRCVUGHT REHABILITATION PROGRAM JUBA-SHEBELLI AREA EMERGENCY SETTLEMENT SC' I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1.01 The Government of Somalia has undertaken a comprehensive agricul- tural settlement program to help nomadic livestock producers recover from the effects of the drought which devastated their herds and left them without any visible means of self-support. The major focus of the settlement effort has been on the establishment of three agricultural communities along the Juba and Shebelli rivers in the southern part of the country. These settlements are located on potentially valuable agricultural land which until that time had been only sparsely settled. The new settlements will thus serve the dual purpose of providing a more secure future for the nomads as well as en- abling Government to develop new and much needed sources of food production. Rainf ed Agriculture 1.02 Experience has shown that once the average rainfall drops appreciably below 400 mm per annum, its distribution, both in terms of area and in time, becomes so erratic as to make the practice of agriculture a very high risk activity. This is particularly true in Somalia, where even in somewhat better rainfall areas (hardly any place gets above 600 mm per annum), periodic droughts are common. The Upper Juba region with a rainfall between 400-600 mm per annum is one of the best regions in the country for dryland farming; rains fall in one out of four of the 'Gu' or main rainfall seasons (April- July) and in one out of two of the 'Der' or subsidiary rainfall seasons (Septamber-December). The major problems with dryland farming, however, are that: (a) the land use potential is generally low because of inferior soils and unfavorable climate; (b) the fertility of the land is gradually deterio- rating due to nacural conditions as well as bad cultural practices; (c) due to the unevenness of ratnfall in many areas, periodic droughts are common; Cd) applied agricultural and livestock technology is primitive, reducing fur- ther the land use potential; (e) as a result, the rural economy tends to fluctuate betweera periodic famine conditions and subsistence. Even though the nature of these problems has been reasonably well identified, accurate quantitative data is almost complately lacking, as past records and develop- ment efforts have focused primarily on irrigated agriculture. Moreover it should be recognized that the opportunities to be realized in Somalia's dry- land areas are modest. They consist primarily of improvements in grazing conditions, soil conservation, rational water development, and expansion and improvement of crop farming leading to a gradually increasing mixed livestock and crop production. 2- 1.03 The crops mainly grown under dryland conditions are corn, sorghum and sesame for cooking oil. (Some corn and sesame are also grown under ir- rigation). Corn is widely grown in Lower Juba, Benadir and Hiran regions, while sorghum production is largely confined to the Upper Juba region in the South and to parts of Eargeisa and Burao regions in the North. Both crops are grown predominantly under dryland coiditions, but existing plans call for a substantial increase in the area under irrigated corn. Information on area and production is practically non-existent since corn and sorghum are grown by widely scattered smallholders. Estimates for corn range from 30,000 hectares to 80,000 hectares, and for sorghum, the most important food- crop, up to about 350,000 hectares 1/. Fluctuations in production and yields are extreme due to the variability ln the weather, and the marketed share of total production varies even more. Historically, the area under sesame has varied considerably from year to year. Current production on an estimated 50,000 hectares is about 20,000 tons per season. Agricultural Cooperatives 1.04 Government has been giving high priority to the development of agricultural cooperatives, as these cooperatives are expected to be a dynamic instrument in shaping the political, social, and economic objectives of the rural development program. Thus far, however, the effort has not progressed beyond its initial stages; the major constraints have been the shortage of management and supervisory personnel, inadequate assistance, and a lack of understanding on the part of the farmers of the real meaning of cooperatives. Goverument is now making a concerted effort to support the development of various types of cooperative enterprises, and it is expected that they will become increasingly important in the coming years. Three types of agricul- tural cooperatives have been given legal status: (a) Group Farms. These are cooperative agricultural enterprises established by at least 20 farmers or landless workers on jointly reclaimed land for collective or semi collective cultivation using modern technology and improved cultural practices; farmers continue to cultivate their traditional holdings independent from the collective. It is intended that gradually the collective operation would be extended over the total land area. The group farm should be attached to the Local Multi-Purpose Farmers Cooperatives. 1/ Annual production averages between 30,000 and 50,000 m tons for corn and between 100,000 and 150,000 m tons for sorghum. - 3 . (b) Local Multipurpose Farmers Cooperatives. These cooperatives would have a minimum of 100 members and are designed to render organizational, technical and administrative assistance to the Group Farms and to help them set up their financial accounts. They would also supply the inputs to Group Farms, provide ser- vices, market their agricultural products and, if required, handle their storage and processing. (c) Production Cooperatives. These cooperatives would have a mini- mum of 30 members and are expected to be the final stage of agricultural cooperative development; farmers would pool their resources and consolidate their land into large units, or the State would assign new land to be cultivated collectively. Members would be entitled both to work in the cooperative for payment in kind (distributed according to the work done by them), and to keep a homestead plot of 0.5 ha in the rainfed areas (0.2 ha in the irrigated areas). The location of the homestead plot would be determined by the managing board of the Production Cooperative. On his homestead plot the member may have his house,sa cow, poultry, and limited numbers of other small livestock. These cooperatives will-if successful--constitute Government's primary tool for organizing and developing the productive resources both in the agricul- tural sector as a whole, and particularly in the newly established settlements in the Juba-Shebelli area. However, in the immediate future Government will be required to provide them with significant financial and technical assist- ance if they are to attain their full potential. II. TEIE DROUGHT 2.01 The drought of 1973-1974 had immediate and wide-ranging consequences for almost all the Somali people (Appendix 1). The drought itself was the product of any number of factors, both climatic and human, which magnified the short term effects of the failure of successive rains and which may have resulted in a long term change in the ecological balance of the regions. The amount of rainfall has been decreasing over the past several years, and has been very unevenly distributed in both space and time. U.N. studies of the Sahelean drought concluded that on the basis of meteorological observations, it is difficult to deduce specific conclusions concerning a general climatic trend in Africa. 1/ What is obvious, however, is that there has been a recurrent pattern of dry periods over the past fifty years, with drought conditions being noted on average every four years. Unfortunately, the present drought has been very different from the previous ones both in territoral coverage and duration. Most of the previous droughts were either confined to specific regions or 1/ Information received from the FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program in Rome, March 1975. -4- lasted only one seasont; the present drought covered most regions of Somalia (as well as parts of neighboring countries) and extended over several crop seasons. Effects of the Drought 2.02 The immediate effects of the drought have been obvious - the devas- tation of the livestock herds, the almost complete deterioration of the ranges, the failure of water sources with consequent crop failures, and not least of all the destitution of a large part of the Somali population. Livestock losses are difficult to calculate, but it is estimated that as a result of the drought about 30% of the cattle, 40%. of the sheep and goats and 20Z of the camels died over a two-year period. These animal losses also entail losses in current production of milk and meat, the basic staple foods of the nomadic peoples. Due to the failure of at least two successive crop seasons since 1973, there has also been a sharp decline in the total production of cereals, making it necessary for Government to import substantial volumes of foodstuffs; as these increased imports had a serious effect on the country's balance of trade, Government was forced to introduce import restrictions on certain items and on the global volume of all goods. 2.03 The drought has also had a significant effect on the distribution of the population within the country, as there was understandably a substantial exodus of nomadic livestock owners from the affected areas. As these nomads began to pour into the towns in search of water and food, Government undertook to set up relief centers as a means of coordinating assistance for them; by May of 1975 a total of 245,000 people were being cared for in 20 relief centers scattered throughout the country. The National Relief Committee worked quickly and effectively in mobilizing both domestic and international assistance and in coordinating the distribution of goods and services. With the advent of the spring rains, however, a moderate exodus from the camps began, as the nomads undertook to return to the ranges and begin anew the process of building up their herds. Government at the same time decided to close down the relief centers as quickly as possible by relocating up-So 120,000 nomads on a voluntary basis and providing them with a new life style which might offer them a more secure future. These people were established in three agricultural settlements bet- -ween the Juba and Shebelli Rivers, as well as in several fishing communities along the coast. 2.04 The major focus of the settlement effort has been the establishment of the three agricultural coimnunities in the Juba/Shebelli area (Appendix 2). The largest of these - Dujuma - is located on the Juba River in an area of fairly high agricultural potential and is designed to absorb up to 50,000 persons. The other two sites - Sablale and Kurtum Warey - are located some 30 km apart along the Shebelli River, and are designed to include some 30,000 persons each. The settlements were established with the same precision which had characterized the relief center operations. About 105,000 nomads were transported by air and by truck from the relief centers to the agricultural settlement sites 1/; most carried with them their traditional huts, and what- ever personal belongs they had left. These huts were then reassembled in carefully designed groupings at specific locations chosen by the settlement authorities. Some make-shift accommodations were also constructed out of local materials for those who had no shelter of their own. Food and medical facilities were immediately made available to all families, and sanitation and health services provided. Teachers who had been working in the relief centers accompanied the settlers and education classes were continued without interruption. The people in the settlements exhibit a high degree of enthu- siasm and seem to have achieved a remarkable accomodation to an entirely different life style. 2.05 The rate of physical development of the three settlements has been astonishing. Since August 1975 when the last of the settlers were brought in, a comprehensive administrative and human effort has succeeded in transforming these sites into agriculturally oriented communities. The areas have been surveyed, planned, and demarcated; the first fields have been cleared, ploughed, disced, levelled and planted. Irrigation works have been constructed, and arrangements made for transport of water by gravitational flow and pumping when necessary. The physical development at each settlement has varied accord- ing to the difficulty of the terrain and the size of the available labor pool; the progress achieved in each settlement as of November 1975 is detailed in Appendix 2. 2.06 Government plans to develop the settlements as rapidly as is possi- ble given the existing financial and equipment constraints. The financial constraint is particularly important, as it is- costing Government about US$1.5 million per month to provide food, clothing, health care and other necessities to the almost 120X000 persons now in the settlement areas. It is absolutely cruci.al and of the utmost urgency that the settlements be transformed into productive self-sufficient entities as rapidly as possible. Development in the settlements can be achieved at the expense of other programs for a limited period, but Government is fast approaching the time when its priori- ties will have to be given careful reconsideration. The settlements have also had a direct effect on physical development in other areas. In order to provide sufficient equipment for the massive land clearing needed, Govern ment diverted almost all the heavy equipment available in the country to the settlement program; this means that some other projects are at a virtual standstill due to a lack of tractors, bulldozers and attachments. A massive infusion of new equipment will be necessary to replace much of the worn-out machinery now being used (some of the items are over 18 years old), and to allow other equipment to be returned to the projects from which they had been temporarily diverted. 1/ The remaining 15,000 persons were settled in various fishing communities along the coast. -6- 2.07 Over an eight year period Government plans to invest some US$228 million in the development of the three settlements. At the end of this period, the composition of the settlements would be approximately as below: Dujuma Sablale Kurtum Warev Total Total area under crops (ha) 30,000 18,000 18,000 66,000 No. of Persons 50,000 30,000 30,000 110,000 No. of Families (houses) 10,000 6,000 6,000 22,000 Roads (km) 16 30 26 62 Airports 1 1 - 2 III. THE PROJECT A. General Description 3.01 The proposed Project would support the development of emergency rainfed food production on 15,000 ha within the three settlements. It would form part of an overall agricultural development program supported by IDA, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (Arab Fund), and the African Development Fund. The Arab Fund would provide support for the development of 15,000 ha of irrigated cultivation, and the African Development Fund would assist in the establishment of 3 hospitals for the settlement populations; these projects have been prepared separately by the respective donors, but would be implemented along with the proposed Project as part of an integrated program. The rainfed and irrigated agricultural development projects would be particularly interdependent, as they would to some degree share a corcon pool of machinery, technical assistance and personnel. For this reason the two projects were prepared in close coordination and have been tailored so as to ensure opti-.al utilization of available resources. During the three year implementation period, the cropping program would concentrate on the production of corn and sorghum. This type of production would be particularly appropriate ln the short-term in view of the over-riding need to achieve sufficient food production to meet the needs of the people now living in the settlements. However, at a later stage when experience has been gained with rainfed cult'vation in the Project area, it is expected that alternative crop- ping programs would be developed, and that consideration would be given at that time to the possibility of alternative land utilization schemes (including the integration of livestock) and to the desirability of soil conservation and! or improvement programs. Provision has been included for Project monitor4ng and evaluation and for the preparation of a Juba-Shebelli inter-riverine area agricultural development study; the latter would then form the basis for the preparation of future projects within the agricultural sector. 3.02 The Project would develop 9,000 ha of rainfed cultivation in Dujur-a and 3,000 each in Sablale and Kurtum Warey over a tlhree-year period. Specifi- cally, the Project would include provision for: - 7 - (a) 2.5 crawlers for bush clearing on 15,000 ha; (b) 100 tractors with attac_hmets to be used for ploughing and cultivation as well as for transport within the settlements; (c) 8 four-wheel drive vehicles; (d) 6 mobile workshops and 3 office buildings; (e) local staff salaries; (f) technical assistance; and (g) Project monitoring and evaluation and future project preparation. Overall responsibility for the direction and coordination of the Project would be assumed by an autonomous agency under the supervision of the National Rehabilitation Coamittee. B. Detailed Features Bush Clearing 3.03 Bush clearing would be carried out on 15,000 ha in the three settle- ments - 9,000 ha in Dujuma and 3,000 ha each in Sablale and Kurtum Warey. Perhaps one-third of the bush in Dujuima would be heavy forest cover necessitat- ing the use of heavier equipment and a higher manual labor component, while the remainder would be medium or light bush. The required investments would therefore include five 200 to 220 hp crawlers with rippers, and twenty 140 to 160 hp crawlers; additional items would include ancillary equipment, spares and operating costs over three years. The assumptions on which these require- ments were based are given in Appendix 4, pages 1-3. The bush clearing would be carried out over a three-year period, with approximately one-third of the total area cleared in each year. Agricultural Machinery 3.04 Two types of wheel tractors would be provided to carry out the ploughing and cultivation of the 15,000 ha; these would include 20 tractors of 90 to 100 hp and 80 tractors of 60 to 70 hp. The smaller tractors would also be used for transport during that time they were not required in the fields. The assumptions on which the tractor requirements are based are given in Appendix 4, pages 3-5. The projections are based on two crop seasons per year, with the only crops grown being corn and sorghum; thus 10,000 ha would be planted in year 1, 20,000 ha in year 2 and 30,000 ha in year.3. A lump -8- sum equal to 20% of the tractor cost was included for the purchase of tractor attachments including ploughs, harrows, toolbars, furrowmakers, etc. Other investments would include a 15% allowance for spare parts, 50 trailers (1 for each 2 tractors) handtools, and fifty stationary threshers. 1/ Operating costs would be supported for the three-year development period. A lump sum of US$10 per ha was allowed for the purchase of seed for start-up production, and it was assumed that the seed would be purchased locally. Mobile Workshops 3.05 Six mobile workshops would be provided to help service the vehicles, equipment and agricultural machinery being provided for the settlements under the overall development program. Two mobile units would be set up in each of the settlements; these would operate out of stationary workshops already established by ONAT, 2/ which would continue to be responsible for their over- all operation. The mobile units would be under the direct control of a master mechanic to be provided under technical assistance (para 3.07). Office Buildings and Vehicles 3.06 A central office building would be established in each of the three settlements; these would be simple structures, possibly pre-fabricated. A limited amount of office equipment and furnishings would also be provided (para. 3.09). Eight four-wheel drive vehicles would be provided for the use of Project administrative staff (para 3.08), along with the required spares and allowance for operating expenditures. Technical Assistance 3.07 The overall settlement program would require a certain amount of technical assistance in order to ensure that the crop development programs are properly planned and implemented and to allow for the training of local staff. It is expected that this assistance would be provided by a single consulting firm, and that several of the advisors would be utilized jointly by the irrigated crop development project to be financed by the Arab Fund (para 3.01) and by the rainfed crop development project to be supported by IDA. Therefore, the total amount of technical assistance required has been calcu'lated on a global basis, and for costing purposes the staff time alloca- ted between the two projects on the basis of their anticipated requirements (Appendix 3, Table 4). A total of 34 man-years wqould be required, of which some 12 man-years would be utilized by the proposed Project; the technical staff required would include: 1/ It should be noted that the purchase of combines was thought unnecessary in view of the desire to make the operations as labor intensive as possible. 2/ National Agricultural Machine Hiring Agency. -9- 1 Dryland Agronomist 3 years 1 Master Mechanic 3 years l Financial Advisor 3 years I Procurement Officer 3 years Terms of reference for the required staff for the technical assistance compo- .>ent are given in Appendix 6. Local Staff Salaries *.08 A large number of local staff would be required for the planning, administration and implementation of the settlement program. As Government requested that the management of both the rainfed and irrigated production should be under a joint authority (para 4.01), the local staff requirements vere estimated on an overall basis, and then a rough allocation nade between the two projects. A total of 1,085 staff would be required to carry out the complete program at full development (year 3); these are shown in Appendix 3, Table 5. A nucleus of 64 administrative and financial staff would be station- ed in Mogadiscio; these would include a Settlement Managing Director and Deputy Director, Personnel, Legal and Administrative Officers, an Evaluation Unit, an Accounting Unit and various supporting staff. In addition, 1,021 staff would be required within the settlements themselves (571 in Dujuma and 225 each in Sablale and Kurtum Warey); these staff would include a Settlement Manager and a Deputy Manager, administrative and finance staff, mechanics, health and education officers, and farm management personnel (e.g. Farm Mana- gers, Agronomists, Horticulturalists, Livestock Officers, and Production Supervisors). Once the total cost of all local staff (excluding those staff related specifically to the irrigated development) wqas estimated, a rough apportionment of staff costs was made on. the basis of the relative value (cif settlement price) of the crop production from the two projects. Thus approxi- mately 15% of the staff costs were attributed to the proposed IDA Project, and the remainder to the irrigated crop development project supported by the Arab Fund; this allocation of costs was considered realistic in view of, among other things, the fact that the irrigated development would require a substan- tially higher labor and management input. Finally, although the number of persons required for the settlement program is quite large, it must be noted that a substantial percentage of these staff are already in post, and Govern- ment has already rmade plans for the assignment of the remaining staff when they are needed. As noted below (para 3.12) , Government is now and will con- tinue to be completely responsible for the payment of local staff salaries. - 10 - Sundries 3 09 Provision would also be made under the Project for office equipment (para3 .06), and for the purchase of mobile fuel and water tanks. Project Monitoring and Evaluation and Future Project Preparation 3.10 An important aspect of the settlement program would be the continu- ous monitoring and evaluation of the proposed projects. To this end, an Evaluation and Monitoring Unit separated from the day-to-day activities of the projects is proposed. The Unit would concern itself with the analysis of Project costs, benefits, changes in socio-economic patterns, etc. Preparation of future projects in the Juba-Shebelli inter-riverine area would include: (i)_ review and updating of the physical resources data contained in past studies; (ii) the preparation of a land use map combining soil classification,-.c.rop ecology, climatic data and the status of water availability including under- ground water supplies to be used as a base map for future development; and (iii) the formulation of an agricultural development plan or plans with objectives in the medium and long term including crops, livestock, forestry, watershed conservation, agro-industries and agricultural infrastructure. This work would take into account data obtained from ongoing projects and would form the basis for identification of future projects and their preparation for international financing. Technical assistance for Project monitoring and evaluation would be financed by the Association; the study to be undertaken by Somalia for future projects in the Juba-Shebelli inter-riverine area would be financed by the Arab Fund. The terms of reference and appointment of consultants for such studies would be mutually agreed upon between the Arab Fund and the Association. The Arab Fund and the Association would closely cooperate in the supervision of the consultants and the review of the studies prepared by the consultants. C. Project Costs (Apoendix 3) 3.11 Total Project cost is estimated at So.Sh 68.3 million (US$10.8 million), of which So.Sh 50.5 million (US$8.0 million) or about 74Z would represent foreign e:xchange requirements. Total Project costs are detailed below: - 11 - Foreig Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Exchange (So.Sh.'000) (US'OOO)7 Bush C1 earin& CrawLers 2,960 11.840 14,800 470 1,880 2,350 ; 80 Equi:nent 80 7.40 820 13 117 130 90 Spares 220 1,990 2.210 35 315 350 90 Operating Cost 1.650 4.020 5.670 262 638 900 70 Sub-total 4.910 18.590 23.500 780 2.950 3.730 79 Aaritcultural Machinery 820 6,110 6,903 130 970 1,100 90 cmrahents 860 3,200 4,060 137 508 645 79 Fa' "-oo w013 s670 970 1,640 106 154 260 59 Spar4s 1la 930 1,040 17 148 165 90 Operaring Cost 2.755 6.430 9.185 437 1.021 1.458 70 Sub-total 5.215 17.540 22.855 827 2.80t 3.628 78 ~iobile 95 850 945 IS 135 150 90 Sub-total. 95 850 945 15 135 150 90 Of Stce BuiI.dint 345 345 690 55 55 110 50 Sub-total 345 345 690 55 55 110 50 Vehicles Four Wheel Drive 200 300 500 32 43 80 60 Spares 1. 63 75 2 10 12 90 Operating Cost 228 227 455 36 36 72 50 Sub-total 440 590 1.030 70 94 164 7 57 'echnical Assistance - 3.780 3.780 - 600 600 100 Sub-total _ 3.780 3.780 - 600 600 1t00 .Iaries Overheads 365 - 365 58 _ 58 On Settlements 2,507 - 2.507 398 - 398 Sub-tocal 2.372 2.872 456 - 456 - S'.Lndries 113 360 473 18 57 75 76 Sab-total. 113 360 473 18 57 75 76 TOTAL 13.990 42.155 56.145 2.221 6.692 8.913 75 Continscencies Physical Contingencies 1,420 3,000 4,420 226 476 702 68 Price Contingencies 2.414 5.312 7.726 394 832 1.226 69 Sub-total 3.334 8.312 12.146 620 1,308 1.928 68 GRAND TOTAL 17.824 50.467 68,291 2.841 8.00a 10,841 74 Fabruary 4, 1976. - 12 - Costs have been estimated at prices prevailing in November 1975, and the basic assumptions used in this computation are given in Appendix 4. A physical contin- gency of 5% on crawlers, tractors and vehicles and 10% on all other items has been included. In addition, overall price contingencies of about 14% have been included on all investment costs to allow for expected increases in foreign and local costs; these are equivalent to a price contingency of 10% in year one and 8%. in each of the two subsequent years. On average a cumulative price contingency of 10%, has been assumed for all operating costs excluding salaries. Price contingencies for machinery, equipment and vehicles are based on suggested IDA guidelines, and those for other items on the estimated level of price increases for Project items in Somalia. In calculating costs, efforts were made to make the Project as labor intensive as possible, taking into consideration the limitations imposed by the type of work to be done, seasonal work variability, the duration of the investment period etc. Import taxes and duties on Project goods are estimated at So.Sh 6.3 million (US$1.0 million) and have been included. This amount includes about So.Sh 3.0 million (US$500,000) of taxes on fuel. D. Accounts and Audit 3.12 All Government institutions are required to have their accounts audited by the Magistrate of Accounts, and this Department would assume responsibility for the auditing of Project accounts. The consolidated accounts for the Project would be audited within six months of the end of each fiscal year and submitted to the financing agencies. Government would have flexibil- ity in the transfer of funds within broad categories and from one category to another, but the approval of the financing agencies would be necessary before such transfers could be carried out, Similar arrangements utilized under the Somalia Trans-Juba Livestock Development Project and other IDA projects have proven to be acceptable. E. Supervision 3.13 Available local qualified manpower and the public administration in Somalia have limited spare capacity, and the proposed Project, together with other drought related programs, would impose additional and heavy bur- dens upon them. Consequently it is important that Project supervision ar- rangements should be adopted which would provide the Government with a high degree of technical assistance; in each instance the scope and content of the supervision missions should be adapted to the specific needs of the Project. Supervision missions would concern themselves with providing Government with timely and practical assistance in the following critical fields: - 13 - (a) development of the institutions needed for Project implementation; (b) establishment of financial and operational procedures; (c) recruitment of staff; (d) procurement and disbursement; (e) establishment and evaluation of adequate Project related accounts; (f) initiation of follow-up studies; and (g) coordination with other aid donors including the presentation of regular information about Project programs. IV. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 4.01 Overall responsibility for the direction and coordination of the settlements would be assumed by the National Rehabilitation Committee of the Supreme Revolutionary Council. The Committee would operate through a Settle- ment Development Agency. The Settlement Development Agency would be based in Mogadiscio, and would have full operational authority over all development programs being carried out within the three settlements. It would thus have responsibility for the rainfed crop program supported by IDA under the pro- posed Project, as well as the irrigated crop program to be supported by the Arab Fund, and the hospital construction to be supported by the African Development Fund. 4.02 The three settlements would be under the direct authority of a Managing Director, who along with certain other administrative staff (per- sonnel, Lego%, accounting, etc.) would be located in Mogadiscio. A total of some 64 staff would be required for this central unit - 15 of whom would be professional staff, 30 of whom would have intermediate level qualifications, and the remainder of whom would be lower level support staff (Appendix 3, Table 5). In addition to these central staff, a large number of staff would be required in the settlements themselves (571 in Dujuma and 225 each in Sablale aad Kurtum Warey). Each settlement would be under the day-to-day control of a Settlement Manager, who together with a Deputy Manager would be responsible for all Project activities. The manager would operate through three field divisions - administration, services and production. The latter division would be the largest, and would itself be divided into three branches: (a) a specialist branch including agronomists, horticulturalists, livestock officers etc; (b) a field operations branch providing such services as land preparation, irrigation, and irrigated and rainfed crop protection; and (c) - 14 - a r,.uction branch composed of field operatorslextension agents dealing with dAy-to-day crop development activities. The above staffing plan is detailed in an accompanying chart (World Bank 15484). These staff would serve both the rainfed and the irrigated crop development projects; costs have been allocated between the two projects on the basis of the relative value of the expected production from each project - i.e. 85% of total staff costs (excluding irrigation related staff) were allocated to the irrizated cron oroject ard 15? to toe rainfed (IDA) project. Technical Services (Appendix 6) 4.03 Technical assistance would be required to assist Somali personnel in organizing agricultural production in the three settlements. As it is expected that this assistance would be provided by a single firm, and as some of the technical consultants would be shared by the two projects, the total assistance requested by both projects was estimated on a global basis, and staff time then apportioned between each. A total of 11 inter- nationally recruited specialists for a total of 31 man-years would be required over a three-year period, as well as 3 man-years for unspecified consult- ancies. In addition, a lump sum would be provided for six man-years of training. Training would be given to selected staff working in the settlements by means of short practical courses and visits to other agricultural develop- ment projects either in Somalia or abroad. As the technical services compo- nent is considered essential for the successful start of the Project, the firm of consultants would be selected and the procurement advisor would be in post within four months of the signing of the credit agrement. organization of Production 4.04 During the initial years while the settlements are being developed, the major emphasis would be on land clearing and preparation, crop production, and the process of adapting the nomadic pastoralists to a settled agricul- tural existence. The realization of crop production targets is essential in the short-term; large quantities of food grains will be needed to feed the people living in the area, and the import of these grains now constitutes a serious drain on the foreign exchange resources of the Somali Government. For the present, therefore, the cropping program would be carried out on a centralized and consolidated basis. This would enable the settlement managers to train former nomadic livestock-owners to become settled agriculturalists, and such an arrangement would also make the best possible use of equipment, labor and other limited resources. At a later stage, Government will most likely consider a number of options as to the organization of the crop areas. One alternative for the rainfed crop area which has been mentioned by Govern- ment is that the area should be divided into plots of about 400 ha, which would then be cooperativelY cultivated by groups of 100 families. Division on this scale would allow a reasonably intensive supervision - an essential factor until such a time as the new settlers gain the necassary experience in agricul- tural tet*uques. If this approach were to prcve feasible, the settlement - 15 - managers might then wish to consider pilot schemes involving other types of cooperative production. In any case, whatever production system should be adopted, the settlement management would for a long time be required to provide common services and inputs such as land preparation, improved seed, fertilizer, crop protection chemicals, storage, marketing and extension services. The farmers would perform most of the other production operations including seeding, spraying, harvesting etc. V. PRODUCTION AND PRICES A. Production 5.01 The proposed Project would provide for interim foodcrop production under rainfed conditions on some 15,000 ha of previously unutilized agricul- tural land in the settlement areas. Given the over-riding need to produce food for the settlers now living in the area, Project production would be limited to corn and sorghum, as these two crops appear to offer the most promising prospects for start-up production under rainfed conditions. It is recognized that the viability of production under the specific conditions prevailing in the Project area hAs not been extensively studied, but experi- ence with these crops under similar conditions elsewhere in Somalia indicates that with proper supervision, the cropping program should not be subject to undue risk. Yield estimation is under these circumstances extremely diffi- cult, particularly as standards of land management are expected to vary widely. However, based on data from the UNDP Water Control and Management Report of 1969, suitably amended by experimental results from the Afgoi Research Station, it was estimated that for two crop seasons per year, yields of 750 kg/ha for corn and 550 kg/ha for sorghum should be able to be achieved within the first two seasons. This assumption is based also on the expectation that local, highly drought resistant varieties would be used. It was felt that the use of higher yielding varieties under the conditions expected in the foreseeable future would be premature and subject to an unacceptable degree of risk. The full potential of expensive higher yielding varieties can only be achieved through adoption of improved cultural practices and greater use of inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides, combined with a reasonably reliable water availability during the vegetation period. As the new settlers are totally inexperienced in crop cultivation, and as the rainfall in the area is at best highly erratic, any experimentation with improved varieties would pose a real threat of crop failures. 5.02 It is expected that over the three year Project period, 60% of the land would be devoted to sorghum and 40% to corn production. Th:aL estmAt9A.,. Project production in year 4 (when full development would be achieved) would ~l~e abou~t5,00u tons o isorghum 'an43 W -fo suming that about 5% of the total production would be needed forseedand 20% would be lost through wastage during storage and by damage caused by various grain eating birds (para 5.04), the balance would provide food for about 36,000 people - 16 - (assuming that each person would consume about 200 kg annually; this is equal to about 1 ton of grain per family per year). This would satisfy about 60% to 70Z of the daily calorie requirements of these people. The otl a ma nf praislJlam Da.rsvrL4 would be abut US$750,000 or about US$50 per hectare. Assuming that an area of about 4 ' La&2oiu i -eessary to support a family of 5 persons, the following results would be achieved for a family cultivating under rainfed conditions: (a) Employment: 2 able-bodied persons in a family would be employed for 220 man-days per annum. /1 (b) Production of sorghum and corn: Year 4 2,500 kg (c) Surplus above subsistence of the family: Year 4 1,500 kg (d) Value of production: Out of which Total for subsistence marketed -US$- - US$ - Year 4 200 80 120 5.03 it must be recognized that the Project was generated as a response to the emergency conditions brought about by the recent drought, and that it was to a large extent shaped by the need to ensure rapid foodcrop production. Consequently, given the lack of experience with cultivation in the Project area, the absence of a reliable data base, the marginal rainfall, and the need to train the settlers in agricultural techniques, it is not possible at this stage to extrapolate the cropping pattern postulated for the first three years much beyond this initial "trial" or "experimental" period. Continual Project monitoring and evaluation (para 3.10) would enable manage- ment to benefit immediately from the experience gained and, where desirable, /1 Handays/ha Planting 5 Weeding 20 Harvesting 15 Sundries 15 Total 55 x 4 ha - 220 mandays It was considered advisable to make the Project as labor intensive as possible. The amount of labor which was projected per ha however is somewhat higher than would be needed if the settlers were acquainted with the type of work to be done. - 17 - to experiment with alternative crop strategies. It is expected therefore that by year 4 (when the anticipated output from the irrigated component would alleviate the need for sustained foodcrop production), the Project management would begin to experiment with alternative crops, and to consider the possibility of integrating livestock with the rainfed production. Once the development program is well underway, a crop diversification and/or land use program could be drawn up for each settlement; this program would take into consideration soil characteristics, water availability, agronomic factors, soil conservation problems, as well as the needs and capabilities of the settlers then'selves. Such a totally flexible approach would allow an imme- diate response to the exi zency of the existing situation, while at the same time pruv:dirg a firm organizational and experimental base from which future developzunv could build. Control ,;-ain Eatina i4rds ,.04 D}uY? to an absence of adequate data and of a feasible control program, i.t wac Ot considered advisable to include a bird control component in the proposed Project. iT is evident, however, that at some stage of the settle- ment program Goverum>ent will have to give serious consideration to means of contro' ling quelea-quelea and other grain eating birds; the potential seri- ousness of this problem can be judged by the fact that in other parts of Somalia damage from these birds has resulted in the loss of up to 5% of the total crop. Research in bird control is now being carried out by UNDP/SF regional study now underway in Somalia; preliminary trials have been completed, and studies have been undertaken to evaluate their feasibility on a larger scale. Although no firm results are yet available, the study expects to present conclusive recommendation within two to three years. Grain Storage 5.05 Grain losses from spoilage during storage may be as high as 20% in some cases, and every effort must therefore be made to reduce losses and to prevent deterioration. As a general rule, before storage the grain should be dried to an app::opriate moisture content (10% - 14%) and sprayed with insecticide. No provision for grain storage has been included in the pro- posed Project, as the African Development Fund (ADF) has agreed to discuss with Government the possibility of financing storage facilities within the three settlements. If financing is not available from the ADF, Government should be prepared to develop alternative sources of financing, as permanent storage facilities will be required within five to six years. In the interim, however, some type of temporary storage should prove adequate. B. Prices 5.06 The 1975 import settlement parity price for sorghum has been uti- lized in Project economic calculations, and this same price has also been used for corn. A tentative breakdown of this given below: - 18 - US$ Per Metric Ton Grain Sorghum (US No. 2 Milo, Yellow, fob Gulf Ports) 115 /1 Gulf to Kisimayu or Mogadiscio - Ocean Freight 42 72 Sub-total: price cif Kisimayu or Mogadiscio 157 Wharfage at 1% of US$157 2 Handling at US$1 per ton 1 Cost of transport from Kisimayu or Mogadiscio to the settlements, US$20 per tou /3 20 Cost of sorghum in sack cif in one of the three settlements: 180 /1 Source: IBRD Commodity Forecasts - Commodities and Export Projections Division, Economic Analysis and Projections Department - Estimate of Actual Price for 1975. /2 Estimate - UNDP Mogadiscio - World Food Program. /3 Estimate - ONAT Mogadiscio. The import parity price cif settlement for corn and sorghum would therefore be as follows: Local - Import Price Commodity Farmgate Price cif Mogadiscio or Kisimayu cif Settlements US$ per metric ton - Sorghum 80 157 180 Corn 80 157 180 It can be seen that there is a considerable disparity between the farmgate price and the -cif settlement price. VI. ECONOMIC BENEFITS AND JUSTIFICATION 6.01 The Project would be an integral part of Government's comprehensive settlement program in the Juba-Shebelli area. It would concentrate on the development of start-up production under rainfed conditions on some 15,000 ha within the three settlements. It would be a low cost and technically simple intervention that would provide a sound base for the later intensification of - 19 - production on the same area. The cost per ha would be about US$650, out of which some US$250 would be spent on bush clearing. Total Project production would be about 9,500 tons of sorghum in year 4, which would provide the basic food requirements of some 7,200 families or about 36,000 persons. A total of 150 mandays of labor annually would be provided for some 5,400 laborers. Government would achieve substantial savings from the Project, as the incremental production would be used to offset imports of sorghum and xaize which would otherwise be necessary. 6.02 The Project would have several unquantifiable benefits, the most important of which would be the transformation of the nomadic families ren- dered destitute by the drought into productive agriculturalists. Such a transformation would not only assure these families a more secure livelihood, but would also facilitate their absorption into the mainstream of Somali society; this would in turn facilitate their inclusion in Government literacy, health and employment programs - opportunities which prior to the drought were largely unavailable to them. These new sources of production will enable Government to ensure a more reliable supply of food for consumption throughout the country, and eventually will allow Government to accumulate reserves as a hedge against partial crop failures brought about by future droughts. Finally, it should be noted that the creation of three relatively large settlements - fujuma will in fact become the third largest population center in the country - will bring about many changes in the economic and cultural life of a large area of the country. While most of these changes will be positive, Govern- ment will also have to begin to consider the many problems which will inevi- tably arise in the new communities (e.g. assurance of an adequate fuel supply, protection of water sources, urban health problems, etc); these problems must be recognized and dealt with at an early stage in order to permit their suc- cessful resolution. 6.03 One substantial risk facing the Project would be below average or badly distributed rainfall; available estimates indicate that there is a 20% chance of a total or partial crop failure in any given year. However, this possibility has been fully taken into account in the estimation of Project yields. Another potential risk - the probability of price decreases for corn and sorghum - was not taken into consideration as the available price forecasts indicate such a possibility is most improbable. APPENDIX 1 Page I SOMALIA DROUGHT REHABILITATION PROGRAM JUBA-SHEBELLI AREA EMERGENCY SETTLmMENT SCHEXE The Drought Historical Note 1. The drought which affected large parts of Somalia in 1972-1974 was not a new phenomenon; although no systematic evidence related to earlier drought periods is available, many of the people remember well the recurring droughts of the last 50 years. In 1918 there was an exceptional drought, some details about which can be determined by a study of the records of the limited relief measures carried out in the North. Serious droughts occurred again in 1923, 1924 and in 1927/28. The latter seems to have been one of the worst droughts on record, as an estimated 80% of the country's sheep and goats were lost at that time 1/; about 15,000 persons were given shelter in one relief center, which remained open until 1930. In 1933/1934 and again in 1951/52 there were other serious droughts. Numerous deaths, chiefly among children, were reported. Somalia also suffered droughts in 1956, 1959, 1963 and 1970, in near 3-year cycles 2/. - A.- The Drought Situation 2. The drought in Somalia was closely related to the recent drought in Eastern Ethiopia, as both areas fall within the same ecological zone in the eastern tip of the continent, the Horn of Africa. The most seriously affected part of Somalia was the northeastern area covering the regions of Tugdeer, Sanaag, Nugal and Bari, and extending southward through the regions of Mudug and Galgudud. There failure of the rains in two successive seasons provided the catalyst for the events which followed. The rainfall in those areas normally averages from 100 mm to 500 mm with a very high degree of local vari- ability and low reliability, but the results in these two seasons were excep- tionally disappointing. 1/ Somalia New Agency (SON'NA). 2/ The Somalia Drought, International African Institute: London, February 1975. A-PPENDIX 1 Page 2 3. Water resources in the drought stricken areas are limited to the seasonal rivers (tugs) which flow intermittently across the plains after rain, and the occasional sites where underground drainage provides adequate quan- tities of fresh water from dug wells. The longest seasonal river is Tugdeer, which runs from the North West region to the eastern coast of Nugal region; this and other larger tugs represent one of the most valuable water resources for the nomadic as well as the settled agricultural population, and the pro- longed drought seriously restricted the available flows. Some hand-dug open holes which might otherwise have provided a supplemental water source also dried out. There are a few natural springs in the range areas, but these are not properly utilized. Surface rainwater reservoirs, normally the main water sources for the nomads and their animals, were exhausted in the drought. 4. Indications of the severity of the drought situation emerged in the early days of the Gu 1/ season in 1974. The Gu season production was much below expectation, totalling about 40% of the average crop yield in normal years. Inadequate rainfall was the main cause of this crop failure, and the situation provided an early warning of the serious impact of the drought to come. Preparation for the Der 2/ season planting went on as usual, but the rainfall needed for crop growth in October again proved disappointing. The harvest was barely enough to meet seed requirements for Cu season in 1975, and the season was a complete failure in regard to food production. At the same time the available stock of staple foods (maize and sorghum) started to be depleted rapidly as a result of an increased reliance on them (estimated at 15,000 tons per month) to satisfy consumption demands. 5. In addition to its serious effect on crop production, the drought also had a disastrous effect on the rangeland areas. The effects of the drought were heightened by the fact that the rangelands have suffered from an almost continuous deterioration in the past thirty to fifty years. This deterioration can be attributed partly to the introduction of water reser- voirs at various locations on the range without a simultaneous effort to achieve a systematic balance between the carrying capacity of the ranges and the availability of water in a particulai area. These increased water supplies allowed an expansion of the herds beyond the optimal level which -could be supported by the available feed reserves. The build-up of stock numbers thus threatened the already precarious balance between livestock and the environment in which they lived. The increase in herd numbers was also facilitated by the expanded veterinary services which became available to the nomadic herdsmen; the reduction of herd losses put additional pressure on the already deteriorating range resources. 1/ Rainy season from April to July. 21 Rainy season from September to December. APPENDIX 1 Page 3 6. In an effort to combat the effects of this continued deterioration, the development plan of 1968-1970 emphazised the importance of range use controls. During this time seasonal grazing plans were first introduced, although they were able to achieve little in the way of arresting the over- all decline of the ranges. Further efforts were outlined in the plan for 1974-1978, which cited the livestock industry as one of the mainstays of the Somali economy. The plan recognized that the problem of water supply is intricately related to the preservation of the whole ecological system, and that the balancing of the various factors is of crucial importance. It noted that Government intervention must be carefully reviewed, and all programs affecting the ranges completely synchronized. The attention given to the livestock sector makes clear that Government has been well aware of the possibility of the gradual decimation of the country's livestock herds as a result of cyclically recurrent droughts, but unfortunately little real prog- ress has been made thus far in mitigating the effects of these natural disasters. B. Effects of the Drought 7. The drought has had an immediate and catastrophic effect on the largely nomadic population of the drought stricken areas. It is estimated that about 80% of the population in the area is nomadic, depending almost entirely on their livestock herds as a source of livelihood. These nomads travel widely, crossing the border to and from the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, moving from one place to another in search of grazing and water for their animals; unfortunately, however, the drought has been so widespread that they have not been able to separate themselves from its consequences. Permanent towns in the drought area are few and far between-the major ones being Hargeisa, Berbera, Burao, and Erigavo. The drought in due course somewhat altered the distribution of the population, as there was a substantial exodus from the affected areas into the larger towns; this in turn resulted in a large increase in the numbers of unemployed, mostly in Mogadiscio. 8. One of the most important effects of the drought was the decimation of the livestock herds in the range areas. It is estimated that about 30%. of all cattle, about 40% of the sheep and goats, and about 20% of the camels died over the past two years. The following table shows the estimated loss of livestock caused by the drought 1/. 1/ Estimate of the Ministry of Interior. APPEN DIX 1 Page 4 Sheep and Region Cattle Goats Camels Value '000 head (million So.Sh.) Sanaag 80 700 60 200 Tugdeer 100 1,500 110 370 Bari 50 700 50 170 Nugal 100 800 80 250 Mudug 140 700 50 240 Galgudud 100 500 40 170 Hiraan 70 300 40 130 Bakool 200 400 50 240 Gedo 160 200 40 180 Total 1,000 5,800 520 1,950 Cases of families who lost all their herd or flocks were not unusual. Animal losses also entailed losses in current production of milk and meat, the basic food of the ncmadic population. It should be noted here that estimates of drought related livestock losses are at best tentative. However, between February 5 and 21, 1975 the first comprehensive Census of Population and Livestock in Somalia was performed with UNFPA 1/ assistance; this census could be a reliable source of actual livestock numbers, but thus far no figures from the census have been released. Therefore, all figures indicating livestock losses to date have to be treated as rough estimates and are subject to a large degree of error. 9. Due to the failure of two successive crop seasons, the drought also had other widespread implications for Somalia. Most important perhaps has been the sharp decline in the total production of cereals since the 1973 DER season. Two main consequences of this decline can be immediately noted: (a) Government has been forced to reallocate funds set aside .for agricultural development to relief operations; and (b) it has been obliged to import increasingly larger amounts of foodstuffs as its own cereal reserves have been depleted. The increased imports in turn have contributed substantially to the worsening of the country's balance of trade. The overall trend for the past several years is illustrated below: 1/ United Nations Fund for Population Activities. APPENDIX 1 Page 5 (Million So.Sh.) /1 Exports Imports Trade Deficit 1972 394 503 -109 1973 358 704 -346 1974 400 1,000 -600 1975 (forecast) 400 1,400 -1,000 /1 Source: Central Bank of Somalia In effort to reduce the effect of this unfavorable trend Government has introduced import restrictions on non-essential items and imposed global limits on the volume of all commodities imported. 10. The drought also precipitated a reduction in exports of both meat and live animals, which has in turn had a noticeable effect on Somalia's balance of payments. C. Relief Operations 11. The drought was highlighted as a serious problem when the nomadic livestock owners began to pour into the towns in search of food and shelter. The first group seeking relief assistance arrived in Burao in August 1974, and the steady stream of nomadic refugees thereafter turned into a flood. Government began setting up relief centers during October, with the first two being established in Tugdeer and Nugal regions. Additional centers were later set up in Sanaag, Bari, Nudug, Galgudud, and Bokool regions. By March twenty centers were in operation. The population of the relief centers grew slowly at first, but by mid-January 1975 the growth rate increased markedly; by May 1975 a total of 245,000 persons were being fed and sheltered in the various centers (Table 1). 12. The Government recognized at a very early stage that it would require not only material resources but also an organization capable of ensuring that services and supplies reached the affected population with the absolute minimum of delay. Government thereafter moved quickly and effec- tively in setting up the administrative structure necessary to ensure proper care of the stricken people. The overall drought relief program was put under the authority of the National Relief Committee (NRC) under the Chairmanship of a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) member. The NRC, headed by a Commissioner, was established to coordinate planning and to administer various aspects of the day-to-day relief task. Local relief committees were also set up under the chairmanship of Regional and District Governors. Government transport resources were used in distributing food, medicine, water and other supplies both to re- Lief centers and to drought victims still in the bush. Beginning in early October appeals for assistance were addressed to the United Nations, to friendly APPENDLX 1 Page 6 governments and other governmental organizations. The National Rural Develop- ment Campaign (including literacy classes) which had been launched independently of the drought and well before the crisis stage was reached, was integrated into the drought relief effort; health, literacy and general education classes for adults and children were thus made a normal.part of the relief centers' routine. Each center was organized under a committee composed of a teacher, a health official, national security personnel and members elected from among the people in the center. Radio transmissions were installed to link the centers with the National Relief Organization headquarters in Mogadiscio. Each center was divided into sections of 50 huts each, and then into sub- sections of 25 huts each in order to ease problems of supervision and manage- ment. The administrative staff at each center ranged on an average between 10 and 20 persons per 1,000 inhabitants, and most of these were drawn from the cadre of teachers and students mobilized for the literacy campaign. 13. In order to help meet the emergency situation, in January, 1975 Government introduced measures aimed at food ration ng. Identity cards were issued order to streamline food distribution according to a ration-scale. These measures were accompanied by the tightening of general price and food controls, by appeals to the public to volunteer assistance and to exercise self-restraint, and by mobilization of all available resources to ease the crisis. Also, aid received from international and other donors helped to substantially ease the serious food situation. 14. The relief centers were designed to provide the following basic services: (a) Food Distribution. The following ration-scale was recommended by the Ministry of Health: Item Adult Child ----grams--- Rice (4 times a week) 250 100 Sorghum/maize (3 times a week) 300 100 Powdered milk (daily) 20 40 Dates (daily) 30 40 Sugar (daily) 50 25 Edible oil (daily) 47 20 Tea (daily) 3 3 Meat (when available, 2 times weekly) 250 100 Survival biscuits 4 pieces 4 pieces The ration as recommended in the above-mentioned scale is more than a "survival" one; however, it is doubtful whether the full-scale was always distributed daily. Distribution of food items (in pre-cooked form) was made by the store- keeper in each center to groups comprising at least 25 *families, who undertook jointly the preparation and cooking of meals. Govermment provided simple cooking facilities, and wood was used as a fuel. In many camps it was not APPENDIX 2 Page 7 only required m limited areas. The overall development will be very similar to that at Dujuma; however, as there is some serious question as to the relia- bility of water from the Shebelli in certain seasons, ouly seasonal irrigation is planned. In general terms it would appear that irrigation would be possible for some eight months of the year (April-December), but this capability would of course depend on the demands made on the water supply by other irrigated developments (e.g. banana plantatious) elsewhere along the river. In any case, the total planned agricultural area (by year 8) is estimated at 18,000 ha, of which some 3,000 ha are expected to be planted in the approaching crop season. The Government hopes to eventually irrigate the entire crop area. In order to make this possible and to reduce the water lost in the vast swamp into which the Shebelli disappears, the staff at the settlement are currently in the process of strengthening the embankments on both sides of the river; thus far some 68 kms have been completed on the settlement side of the river. 16. As of mid-November 1975 some 3,000 ha had been cleared (bush clear- ing was actually required on caly 1,000 ha), the area ploughed, and the farm divided into plots using ridgers so as to facilitate both sowing by hand and irrigation. Because of the shortage of time before the first crops had to be planted, the land was not levelled; this deficiency will, however, be correc- ted before the next planting takes place. Construction of the primary canals has been completed, and construction of the secondary and tertiary canals, headgates and culverts is nearing completion. These combined operations required 18,000 tractor hours, including the time devoted to the establishment of settlement quarters and the construction of access roads. Although the crops will be mostly gravity irrigated, pumps will be available on a stand-by 17. Crop grown will be maize, sorghum, sesame, peas and vegetables. Land in the settlement is also being distributed on the basis of 30 ha/100 families for cooperative rainfed cultivation. The settlement crop scheme is headed by an agronomist assisted by 45 field foremen, and a large number of people are being trained to supervise future cultivation. iurtum Warey 18. Kurtum Warey is also located on the Shebelli some 30 km from Sablale. The bush is somewhat heavier in this area, necessitating more tractor hours spent in bush clearing. The settlement is subject to the same difficulties with respect to water availability as is Sablale; consequently, irrigation will generally be possible for about eight (or less) months of the year, and seasonal crops only will be cultivated. The total planned agricul- tural area is 13,000 ha, of which about 2,000 ha will be planted in this crop season. All of this area will eventually be irrigated if sufficient water is available. APPENDIX 1 Page 8 of rehydration fluid, the highest death toll was recorded. Mortality was also high due to gastroenteritis and pneumonia among malnourished children. Medical staff were unable to attend to all the seriously sick due to the fact that the nomads tended to keep their sick confined to their huts for a few days before reporting to medical staff. The death toll since the establishment of a record system in the centers totalled 19,000 by May 31, 1975, and most of the victims were children. A WHO team was sent to Somalia to help recommend remedial measures, while WHO experts stationed there on a regular program basis kept close watch on the situation. The supply of basic medicines was always adequate, thanks to the generosity of donors from the international community. By the end of May about 125 tons of various types and kinds of medicaments had been shipped by air to Somalia for relief purposes, and by that time all centers were staffed by medical and para-medical personnel and Red Crescent volunteers. (d) Distribution of Shelter and Blankets. Government provided material assistance to help in establishing the victims at the relief centers in a pattern similar to that of nomadic life. They were housed in their own huts, and if the newly arrived family had no shelter, Government provided the materials needed to build a hut. The families were also provided with blankets, especially those who were in areas where weather conditions gave rise to health problems. Donations of blankets were made by a number of countries, and Government purchased others abroad. (e) Other Basic Services. Efforts were made to maintain satis- factory sanitary conditions with the help of Red Crescent volunteers and para-medical personnel. Full use appeared to have been made of extensive Government transport resources for the distribution of food, medicine, water and other essentials. Problems with the procurement of an assured supply or vehicle spare parts emerged, as the country experienced a shortage of the foreign currencies required to import such essential items. 15. Substantial assistance was received from the international commu- nity. Pledges of food aid alone exceeded the requirements of the relief centers and helped to reduce the deficit between the estimated national requirements and the stocks available to the country (Table 3). Assistance in the supply of medicines, other essentials of high priority as well as contributions in cash were provided to meet the increasing needs of relief operations. APPENDIX 1 Page 9 D. Drought Rehabilitation 16. There were two categories of people affected by the drought who were supported by Government and other relief assistance: those inside the centers, and those remaining outside. The table below illustrates the total numbers involved from December 1974 to July 1975. Affected Population Li Inside Outside /2 Under 'Months Centers Centers Rehabilitation Total Dec. 74 80,000 - 80,000 Jan. 75 160,000 60,000 - 220,000 Feb. 75 170,000 170,000 - 340,000 Mar. 75 190,000 300,000 - 490,000 Apr. 75 220,000 400,000 - 620,000 May 75 230,000 300,000 - 530,000 June 75 150,000 250,000 50,000 450,000 July 75 50,000 200,000 100,000 350,000 /1 Ministry of Interior, Commission for National Relief, unofficial estimate. These figures represent monthly averages and may not therefore exactly coincide with figures in Table 1. /2 As data for the census of population and livestock carried out in February 1975 have not been released by Government, any figures regarding the population affected by the drought can only be treated as rough estimates subject to substantial error. By July, 1975 a large number of the people remaining in the relief camps began to return to their previous nomadic way of life. Between July 21 and July 27, for example, it was estimated that about 23,000 people (over 3,000 daily) left the camps. By the end of July, about 118,000 people - 44% of the maximum number registered in the camps at the peak period - had returned to the ranges. It is estimated that eventually 135,000 to 140,000 persons (or around 50% of the camp's total population at the height of the drought) eventually followed the same route. APPENDTX 1 Page 10 17. These nomads should have a reasonable chance of rebuilding their herds, and thus restoring the livestock industry which is so important to the economic well-being of the entire country. According to information received by representatives of the Livestock Development Agency (LDA) and the M inistry of Livestock, Forestry and Range (MLYR), conditions on the rangelands are gradually improving. Prices of livestock in general, but particularly for breeders, are high; cattle of about 250 kg liveweight sell for about So.Sh. 600 to 700 (US$100 to 110) per head 1/, and one breeding cow of average quality for about twice as much. Thus livestock prices have almost doubled as compared to those before the drought in 1973. Presently demand for any breeders (cattle, goats, sheep or camels) is high, and any female animal offered for sale is readily sold. Government has not yet released the results of the population and livestock census which was performed in February (para. 8); however, according to recent estimates, the number of sheep, goats and camels in the North is almost back to normal, and the supply of cattle for slaughter required by the Chisimaio and Mogadiscio export slaughter houses (although being sold at higher prices than anticipated) is satisfactory. The Mogadiscio meat market is well supplied at the controlled price of around So.Sh. 6 per kg (US$1). Resettlement Program 18. Government at this time decided to close down the camps as rapidly as possible. In order to speed this process, and in an effort to provide the nomadic peoples with a new life style which might offer them a more secure future, it planned to resettle from 100,000-110,000 persons (20,000-22,000 families) in the South in the inter-riverine area between the Juba and the Shebelli rivers. The families were to be established in three settlements based on organized ralnfed and irrigated agriculture. In addition to these agriculturally based settle- ments, it was decided also to settle nomads from the camps in fisheries settle- ments along the coast. 19. On June 20, 1975 Government began the relocation process. As the bulk of the people were to be transported a very great distance, a massive organizational effort was required. Special arrangements were also made necessary by the fact that the roads between the camps in the north and the southern agricultural areas were either in poor condition or represented only rough tracks across the bush. As local means of transport were insufficient, Government sought assistance for the purchase of trucks, fuel, building materials, etc. The Soviet Union provided 165 trucks and twelve aircraft to help transport the people. Expenditures for this service were included in the US$60 million 1/ This price is about 20% to 30% higher than that for comparable animals in Ethiopia. APPENDIX 1 Page 11 economic aid credit recently approved by the Soviet Union. The settlement program was carried out with incredible speed and with a minimum of confusion. By August 18, 1975 some 120,000 persons were re-established in the new communities, and by late October, the relief camps were closed. 20, It appears-then that the final outcome of the rehabilitation/ settlement program will be as follows: (a) Three agricultural resettlement centers in the South 105,000 persons (b) Six to eight fisheries resettlement centers along the coast 15,000 persons (c) Nomads who have returned to their former way of life 150,000 persons June 21, 1976 SOIIAL I A D)ROUGHIT REJIA BILl rAT 1ON PRO(;IAII JUIiA-SIIHEIII..1. AREA EIIHI(CENCY S1;'1'1',1IINT SCHEIIIIE 0' Suppy and Demand of Staple Food Iteims for 1975 Estimate as at let Augtst 1975 1/ Coverni- National Grain Stocks Der Season Cu Seasot mieLnt Not Yet rotal Require- Grain 1/1/75 1974 1975 kikorta Delivered Available ments Balance i:aize/Sorgluum 1,700 10,000/ 30,000-/ 50,000 52,000 143,700 180,0004/ 36,300 Wl4eat/Wheatflour 200 - - 4,650 63,000 67,850 25,000 (+) 42,850 Rice/Btulgur 6/ }lhcat5/ 2,700 - - 5,000 25,450- 33,150 25,000 (i) 8,150 TOTAL 4,690 10,000 30,000 59,650 140,450 24,s,700 230,000 (+) 14,700 1/ No substantial changes occurred within thie period Juue Ist - August 1st in thle estimates. 2/ Used as seeds and not food. Previous DER production: 1971 - 25,000 tons; 1972 - 24,000; 1973 - 11,000 tons. 3/ Conservative estimate. Previous CU production; 1971 - 58,000; 1972 - 77,000 toIls; 1973 - 13,000 tons. 4/ tlrional requiremeot is estimated at 15,000 tonis per molLth, corresponding Lo 180,000 tons/year, or 160 gr/day/per capita. S/ bulgur whieat is expected to be utilised as a subtiituce for rice. 6/ Inicluding 2,800 tons purchased tinder an UNIO alLocationt. H t M t2 Source: Ministry of Interior - Coiniiission, fuv- Nationial Relict. ,- > APPENDIX 2 Page 1 SOMALIA DROUGIT REHABILITATION PROGRAM JUBA-SEEBELLI AREA EMERGENCY SETTLE1ENT SCHEME Agricultural Settlements A. Introduction 1. The Goverument of Somalia has undertaken to settle 100,000 - 110,000 nomads rendered destitute by the drought in agricultural areas in the southern part of the country, and in fishing communities along the coast. These persons were selected from those remaining in the drought relief centers in June 1975. Participation in this program was voluntary, and only those people were included who chose to undertake an entirely new way of life. At the peak of the opera- tions, about 268,000 persons were registered in the 20 centers, but by mid- June some 70,000 of these had already returned to nomadic life. This left a population of some 195,000 eligible for settleaent. It was projected that some 110,000 of these would be relocated in three agricultural settlements in the Juba/Shebelli inter-riverine area, and that some 20,000 - 25,000 would be settled in fishing communities along the coast. The balance it was expected would return to the ranges to rejoin their families. The resettlement effort began on June 20, 1975 when some 3,000 men of working age were transported to the agricultural settlement areas to begin bush clearing, land preparation, and construction of huts and other facilities. The program was completed with incredible speed; by August 18, 1975 some -120,000 persons had been transported to their new homes. 2. The major focus of the resettlement effort has been the establish- ment of the three agricultural communities in the Juba/Shebelli area. The largest of these - Dujuma - is located on the Juba River in an area of fairly high agricultural potential and is designed to absorb up to 50,000 persons. The other two sites - Sablale and Kurtum Warey - are located some 30 km apart along the Shebelli River,- nd are designed to include some 30,000 persons each. The settlements were established with the same precision which had characterized the relief center operations. The nomads were transported by air and by truck from the relief centers to the settlement sites; most carried with them their traditional huts, and whatever personal belongings they had left. These huts were then reassembled in carefully designed group- ings at specific locations chosen by the settlement authorities. Some make-shift accommodations were also constructed out of local materials for those who had no shelter of their own. Food and medical facilities were immediately made available to all families, and sanitation and health serv- ices provided. Teachers who had been working in the relief centers accom- panied the settlers and education classes were continued without interruption. The people in the settlements exhibit a high degree of enthusiasm and seem to have achieved a remarkable accommodation to an entirely different life style. There is little question that the tremendous physical development achieved to date could have been possible only with an enthusiasm, efficiency, and willingness to transform a vision into reality that is perhaps unparalled in Africa today. APPEITDIX 2 Page 2 B. Organization of the Settlements 3. The settlements are highly structured - both physically and by age group - and are designed to ensure that each member of the community contri- butes to the eooperative effort. As of November 15, 1975, a total of some 103,291 persons were living in the three agricultural settlements. 1/ These were distributed as below: DuJuma Sablale Kurtum Warey Total No. of Persons 47,896 29,486 26,295 103,677 - of which are productive labor 20,086 12,000 10,019 42,105 Total Planned Area of Agricultural Develop- ment (ha) 30,000 18,000 18,000 66,000 These detailed figures are made possible by the carefully controlled records kept by the settlement authorities. Records are kept of each person who entered the settlement, his/her age, sex, region of origin and births and deaths within the settlement itself, These figures are prominently displayed on blackboards posted in the administrative headquarters, and are updated on a daily basis. 4. The highly centralized administrative structure of the settlements is illustrated in the attached Chart (World Bank 15394). Each of the settle- ments is run by a Central Committee under the direction of a Chairman and a Secretariat. The day-to-day administrative matters are in the hands of functional sub-committees who set general policy guidelines; these committees include a Law and Order Committee, an Orientation and Education Committee, a Health Committee, an Economics and Statistics Committee, a Construction Committee and a Production Development Committee. The community is divided into quarters, zones and sections - each of which has its parallel committees charged with carrying out directives received from the Central Committee. (The settlements areas have been physically divided for reasons of convenience, health control, etc., but no final decision has as yet been reached whether each of the three might be ultimately divided into constituent villages). Families are thus organized into groups of 500, 250, 100, 50, and 10, with committees established at each organizational level. The lowest grouping - 10 families - constitutes a unit for cooking purposes. Given this formal structure, those in charge of settlements are able to quite easily organize the people into working groups for crop cultivation and construction of I/ In three fisheries settlements along the coast 14,491 persons were settled by this same date, bringing the total settled population to 117,782 persons. APPENDIX 2 Page 3 housing and offices. These groups are set a day's quota of work and are allowed to return home when the job has been completed. Others are employed in the running of day care centers and schools, work shops, health facili- ties, the distribution and cooking of food, and numerous other activities. In addition to their regular duties, at the end of the work day (usually 2 p.m.), adults are given special education and training in a wide range of areas. Human Health and Sanitation 5. Comprehensive human health programs have been undertaken in all three settlements along the same lines as the measures implemented in the relief camps; obviously, however, more permanent arrangements will have to be made in the fairly near future. Every person who entered the settlements is examined medically and treated where necessary by doctors, volunteer nurses and/or local assistants. Hospitals have been set up in each settle- ment; these are now housed in tents, and are generally divided into a general hospital area and an infectious disease area. At the present time there are generally adequate medical supplies available (largely from donations received from abroad during the drought). Permanent treatment facilities are beinz planned. kventually, Government intends to provide three permanent hospitals and a clinic or dispensary per each 10,000 persons. The Ministry of Health also has plans to train local health workers to assist in dispensing medical treatment and supplies. 6. Malaria. As the settlement areas are highly malaria endemic, the following activities are now underway, and will receive considerably greater attention in the coming year: (a) DDT spraying of all existing and new structures, and general spraying of all housing areas within a distance of one km; (b) Prophylasis with chloroquine (a dose of 300 mg per adult weekly) to the entire adult population; eventually treatment would be given only to infants, children under 10, expectant mothers and debilitated older persons. Rather sizeable investments in DDT powder, Hudson Expert sprayers, chloriquine tablets and some transport will therefore be required. 7. Schistosomiasis. The settlement areas are known to be hyperendemic for schistosomiasis. The Ministry of Health plans to put into operation a combined program of periodic mass therapy, treatment of snail infested water collections with molluscide, and water management programs. These activities APPENDIX 2 Page 4 will be carried out by two mobile teams - one for mass therapy and health education and the other for molluscides application and water management. It is expected that advisory services would be provided by WJHO and that opera- tional and otber costs would be met by Government or other international agencies. 8. Sanitary Control. Two basic elements - a safe water supply and adequate sanitation are indispensable for every settlement. All three of the settlements have been established near potable water supplies. Shallow wells dug by the cotmunity have been completed in sufficient numbers to meet existing needs; although water is found at 10 meters, most of these have been extended to a depth of 40 meters. Plans have been made for drilling future wells either as part of the overall water development program or as part of self-help schemes. Depending on local conditions, drilled wells cost be- tween US$20 and US$25 per meter to construct with the help of the community; a complete 120 meter deep well therefore will cost about US$30,000. Care must be taken in the location of these wells to ensure that they are located at least 30 meters away from possible sources of pollution such as sept
World Bank Group · Staff Appraisal Report
Somalia - Drought Rehabilitation Program Project
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