Jamaica - Education Project

.((JLAL[f ~CONFIDENTIAL TO BE RETURNED TO REPOR-S En, Report No-649 !iTERATUINAL DBAN FU RUEONSTUC1UIN AlNU DLVELLitN1 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT ON JAMAICA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 468-JM) March 4, 1975 Operations Evaluation Department  TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. Introduction I The Project 1 Project Implementation 3 Operating Outcomes 6 The Bank's Role 8 Conclusions 10 Attachment: Project Completion Report .L DIi ~j.Vin, LL JU 4 dlJ L/ouQL k 1967-1968: Jh 1 = US$ 2.40 1969-1972: J$ 1 = US$ 1.20 1973-1974: J$ 1 = US$ 1.10  PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM JAMAICA FIRST EDUCATION PROJECT Introduction This memorandum reports on an audit of achievements under the Jamaica First Education Project, for which Loan Jo-1 u1 Deptemver au, oa V J, was fully disbursed in October 1973. It is based mainly on a review of the attached Project Completion Report (PCR), prepared by the Bank's Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office, as against relevant documents and material from Bank files, and on discussions held with Bank staff involved in the project. The Project At the request of the Government UNESCO sent an educational plan- ning mission to Jamaica during 1964 to assist in the development of the country's educational program. Included in the mission's report of November 1964 were a number of suggested projects for which external financial assist- ance was recommended. In July 1965 the Bank, at its own initiative, sent an informal reconnaisance mission for preliminary identification of projects suitable for financing. In view of the Bank's preference, at the time, for education projects aimed at increasing productivity and diversifying tradi- tional academic systems, the mission's interest was confined to proposed projects for expansion and improvement of midlevel facilities providing technical, vocational and general secondary education and to teacher training facilities. Towards the end of 1965 two UNESCO experts (an architect and an educator) assisted with the preparation of a project for which the Government requested a Bank loan in January 1966. No further project pre- paration mission was undertaken: the Chief of the earlier UNESCO planning mission, who had returned to the Ministry of Education in an advisory capacicy, also served as advisor to the appraisal team during its mission in February 1966. The appraisal mission found the project in a less advanced state of preparation than anticipated. Pre-negotiation issues centered around the proposed main project item -- construction of 66 new iunior secondary schools (JSS) for children in the 12 to 14 age group. First, the appraisal mission had concluded that the capacity of the local contractina industry was limited in terms of skilled labor and productivity and that the scattered nature of construction sites would discourao international bidding. WTh - 2 - the intent of suDportinR a project to be implemented within three and a half years, the Bank requested a reduction in the number of JSS to be con- structpd and during negotiations it was agreed that only 50 be included under the project. Secondly, the mission had judged the JSS draft designs and schedules of a-ccommodation (timeatableQ for Qnr iiti1iv.t-inn in qrrnATHnrP withb Pritirn- tional requirements), prepared by a newly created Planning Unit in the Miisr of~ Educ'~-atn, 1-^~ lc. 1nn1rinc in ,lctnil Pnprinllu fnr -mr nP; % accurate cost estimates. As a result, the Bank required retention of an eprenced'oeg cnutn architect to reviewth TSSMatrPn and to finalize designs and schedules of accommodation. Finally, the mission found that site acquisition for the JSS, to -~ - I- _ I .-~~ nave been completed prior LU tue Loan agLement, was proueuig Very aiuWLy. To avoid further delay, the Bank agreed that negotiations be held as soon as 20 sites had been fully acquired and some progress had been made towards acquisition of the remaining 30 sites. Negotiations were carried out during July 1966. In addition to construction, equipping and furnishing or the 5u JSb, the project comprised the expansion of the College of Arts, Sciences and Technology (CAST), of the Jamaica School of Agriculture (JSA) and of four teacher training colleges. A technical assistance component of US$ 0.3 million was included in the loan to assist with provision of 15 man-months of expert services for curricula development and scheduling at CAST and 11 man-years of similar services plus 5 man-years of teacher training fellowships for the JSA. The project also included 40 man-years of technical assistance and 8 man-years of fellow- ships for the JSS to be financed by a USAID grant of up to US$ 1.3 million equivalent (PCR 1.02). During project preparation USAID had expressed an interest in providing technical assistance for the JSS program and in May 1966 it entered into an agreement with the Government to provide the required services, mainly for curricula development and teacher training. Overall responsibility for project implementation was assigned to a Project Unit, consisting of a Project Coordinator and a Project Architect. to be employed on a full-time basis. The Bank loan, in the amount of US$ 9.5 million equivalent, represented 50% of total estimated project costs and was to cover all foreign exchange costs (excluding the USAID contribution) and 32% of local costs. -3- Project Implementation All project schools and colleges were constructed or expanded na nlanned and the minlity of contrtction was generally satisfactory. However, delay was encountered for construction works, with the exception of the four teacher trai ning colleges nd eriousc costl ove-rru,ns occurredl in the JSS item. The six-year implementation period for the JSS was almost twice as iuig d~L I~dkJ =0~i LiLtCLV= L LLL diiU _0 .L La L U a jWO LLL - - LL final closing date of the loan by more than two years, to October 1973. wnereas 33 oL Le J sctol were cuniplete' anu uperating vefre LLne v_ ginal July 1971 closing date and 42 had been completed by November 1971, the final 8 schools were not finished until August 1973a delayed chUice of sites and slow bureaucratic procedures had prevented completion of site acquisition for these last schools until August 1969, one and a half years after the date specified in the Loan Agreement. Construction of the first 18 JSS began in February 1968, six months behind schedule, due to delays in initial stages of project imple- mentation. To avoid further delay, the consultant architects were asked to group preliminary designs and other bid documents for all 50 schools into a single package. The contract was then awarded to a general con- tractor who was to employ Jamaican subcontractors (PCR 2.05). Delays in construction of individual schools resulted largely from originally inadequate choice of sites, inaccurate land surveys and too rigid adherence to master designs (PCR 2.03, 2.04). As a result, greater than planned quantities of site development and construction works were necessary and excessive quantity change orders were made throughout the construction period. The JSS construction delays were largely caused, and in turn reinforced, by inefficient project management. The consultant architect received inadequate instruction from the Project Unit, in part due to appointment of only a part-time Project Architect during the first year of construction and to appointment of two replacements thereafter (PCR 3.01). In addition, the delayed site acquisition and necessary extra works made implementation of a planned three phased JSS construction program impracti- cable: as many as 47 of the schools were under construction simultaneously. This proved to be too great a burden for the consultant architect both in terms of timely delivery of final designs and specifications to the contractor and of supervision of construction (PCR 2-041- Finallv lark of qkillpd -.4 - labor available to subcontractors and a legal requirement to change labor teams each two weeks, to provide employmat opportunities to greater num- bers of local laborers, also contributed to delays and inefficiencies in implementation of the JSS construction program. Local consultant architects, as required by the Bank, had been retained to prepare final designs for CAST and JSA, under guidance of the Project Unit Architect and the technical assistance experts. For CAST, the consultant architects' standards were excessively high and once com- pleted, designs had to be revised under instruction from the Project Unit. The resulting delay and a lack of cooperation on the part of the principal of CAST, who contrary to Loan Conditions continued in the position on a Dart-time basis. postponed the beeinning of construction for three years. Construction of the JSA began a year late, due to delayed preparation of final designs. and was further delaved by student strikes. contratnr default and increased quantities of work owing to use of higher than planned standards Constrction of both schools was cnmnlieted dring 1971 rnchly two years behind schedule. Procurement of instructional equipment for project schools and Cn11PgPR wa.q Alqn deLaynvd. 1-hP first- rnntractsz we?re placedl only by April 1969 though most equipment had been delivered and installed by the time the new or expanded facilities began operati ons DuNg project 4 -- --- tion draft master lists for equipment had been prepared in large blocks by ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - tecig-raan-yscol-i corac wt amia procurement procedures. In order to meet Bank procurement requirements for international comDetitive bidding. these blocks wPrP broken dian hX 1-he vroeCt TTn,*- 4-o more numerous smaller groups comprising different types of equipment. The Denartmpnt of qiinplip. ns f Hp Mini ct-r r n-F V-; responsible -411-C- ment, was inadequately staffed to handle the preparation of the resulting large nuber on 16, after repeated requests for assistance, the Bank agreed that the Crown Agents be hired to supervise procurement. Continued delay resulted fum cunnunicatos problems, slow instruction by the Ministry of Education and inefficiency on the part of th Crown,, Agents- "PoRn- O DiJstri"Dutun u equipment was also inefriclently carried out: upon receipt, equipment had to be stored, sorted and packaged before delivery to each school. in te process, some equipment was damaged or misrouted. The absence of local supplier representatives for some items and the Govern- ient s uecision to take the risk of not insuring goods created further problems: lost or damaged equipment was not immediately replaced and spare parts and maintenance services were not readily available. Less complex banK procurement requirements, allowing for the packaging of bids by teaching area, as originally planned, might have eliminated some of the procurement difficulties and distribution problems (PCR 2.10). Allowance for off the shelf local purchase of smaller less costly items also would have simplified procurement and assured accessibility of spare parts for those items (PCR 2.09). The project's final cost, US$ 29.8 million equivalent, represented a 54% total increase over the estimated cost of US$ 19.4 million, including contingencies. A 25% overrun, leading to a final cost of US$ 2.5 million equivalent for the JSA, resulted from use of design standards higher than those appraised but the major overrun occurred in the JSS item where the final cost, US$ 25.01 million equivalent, was 67% higher than estimated. The JSS overrun was mainly in the construction category, which was 82% above the estimated US$ 10.48 million equivalent, but also in the high fee paid to the general contractor. The contractor performed a valuable service, taking over from the understaffed Project Unit a significant part of mana- gerial and supervisory tasks, but at a rate of 12.5% on top of civil works costs. (Under the second Jamaica Education Project, Loan 727-JM, the Government agreed to make professional fees indenendent of roRt increases.) The US 9.3 million PnIiv7lA nt niprriin in rivil works (including construction costs and professional fees) for the JSS was attributed in part to an averagen inn-rnq in PnQt- fn -qena f 1A'/ (T4Z A 4. 1 equivalent), and to unforeseeable price increases over the implementation nPrind (USs. 1.3 million) MPCR Annn, 2). T. ~A4-Ion,, 36/ of the overrun (US$ 3.4 million) was attributed to original underestimates of costs. The II <C 0LbL LJL L Wa.~ H.y , 80 eq ~i.{ valenZtL for the JSS while the appraisal estimate had been US$ 4.80 equivalent. Bot drn g a pp -1raisal an1 d neL--got +-ia--t ions th -e BankI 1_3 _ 121 ty_ of this lower figure, its own original estimate, based on similar accommo- dations, having been almost USs I.20 equiValtL. HUWVeL, aL negotiatiOnS the Government produced evidence substantiating the lower unit cost. 1W- -en1 - - r,- U.IY LLM~ %_LIU.LLCLLL _LIJ C L L1i 1:;U/J it was confirmed that the estimated baseline unit construction cost for the iSS should have been abou USO 'r 6.0 n 196 h resa US$4. million overrun was attributed to delays and inefficiencies, and to avoid- able p - as, mainy te result or tne 34-monEn aelay in completion of the JSS item. As a result of cost overruns the cost per planned student place at the JOSS rose from the estimated US$ 450 equivalent to US$ 750 equivalent. Further, the Government contribution to total project cost more than doubled, trom nthe estimated US$ 8.6 million equivalent to US$ 19.2 million equivalent. - 6 - Recurrent project costs have been in line with appraisal esti- mates of 9% of total Ministry of Education recurrent expenditures. The amount budgeted for project schools has been adequate though teacher salaries have absorbed too great a share for the JSS as a result of a too low student-teacher ratio, 27:1 in 1973/74 (whereas during appraisal 35:1, later revised to 30:1, had been targeted), in contrast to an average class size of 45 students; this discrepancy is explained by the scheduling of only 30 hours of direct class contact per teacher per week compared with 50 teaching hours required for each class (PCR 5.08). Recurrent costs per student at all Government JSS were slightly lower than expected, at US$ 160 equivalent for 1973/74, mainly because all intended quality improvements were not undertaken. Maintenance of project school buildings and equipment and furni- ture- as ranilired by Loan Conditions. has been inadequate (PCR 5.14). Improved procedures have been recommended by the Bank, but have not yet been _vtPmaTarl;1v uindertaken- Tpihn-il i rntnr1 rpryii-rPd iini1r -hp po jer~t- w~as fu1lly iiiv ptj by CAST and JSA. A UK expert assisted with the development of an improved Tiop tiipwf nrnmatinn for rpvi.qtd omrricula at CAST- For th TA_ a Canadian advisor and a university team headed a major reorganization of curricula and schedulin- and i ple,,er,c tHc fPl InT.T<hJ pnprog-ram. A uni- versity team provided under the USAID grant worked with the University of t-he WetJo !nd4_ f0-n Ac,lo -rrr ', o -anrt,or trn4 n-inc n-rnrrrarn -Fr +-I. JSS. Draft syllabi were prepared by 1970, with sane delay resulting from inadequate- conoratin amn,c the Pr-4-fr- TT,41- i-hn TIZiATnh tn-, and the University's Curriculum Committees. The USAID advisors also assisted in organ-4zng in_--sevc woksop f- -- -A-4 -1or r,.h- and in implementing the fellowship program. The main objectives of the UGTiTO tecniia asstLaLc proglam were achieveu LhoUgh L U0 Sfl J U. LI I L1U1- of available grant funds and 11 man-years of planned expert services were Operating Outcomes Enrollments and the output of graduates at CAST have been higher than planned due to intensified utilization of new and existing facilities (PCR 5.01). For the iSA, output has reached planned targets, but an inetti- cient admissions policy, providing for mid-year (January) entrance into the two and three year diploma courses has resulted in an inefficient use of facilities (PCR 5.03). The required provision of short courses for 50 students at a time, by the JSA, has not yet been implemented. Enrollments - 7 - at the aroiect TSS9 increased as n1anned- exceedine the tareeted 33.360 by 13% in 1973/74 though a low average attendance rate, 70% in 1972/73 (PCR5.05), suggests an underUtilization of fclte,in prcie A notabile shonrt- fall in implementation of JSS program objectives has been the lack of tJLUVJ_1.LVII LU UCL_ U.L LLC CLUU.L I AZLCILD.LLL %_UULCO ,L%a1 J .UI,. Output at the four project teacher training colleges has reached the agreed target. However, late in the implementation period, Bank supervision missions noted a shortage or reachers, particularly or prac- tical subjects, for the JSS. (Junior secondary teachers were trained along with primary teachers mainly in the project teacher training colleges.) The shortage can be attributed in general to inadequate numbers of potential candidates from senior secondary schools, inadequate numbers or places available and high attrition rates. The appraisal target calling for 100% fully qualified JSS teachers by 1972 has not yet been achieved, nor have all principals benefitted from the new in-service programs to improve school administration: as a result the 90% utilization of JSS facilities has caused scheduling difficulties (PCR 2.07). The quality of teachers and improved curricula at CAST and JSA appears to be adequate, as reflected in a continuing labor market demand for graduates. For the JSS, new curricula -- including exploratory courses in the fields of agriculture, industrial arts, home economics and arts and crafts-- have been satisfactory. However, supervision missions reported the need for an improved quality of teaching of science, mathematics and languages: UNDP assistance was obtained in 1971 to improve teacher train- ing in these areas. Remedial training provided in literacy and mathematics has slowed implementation of the intended full JSS program, but is necessary for achieving the original project objective of raising the level of educa- tion of the average student in the 12 to 14 age group. The schools are providing an increasing number of Jamaicans with a strengthened educational background. The graduates are better prepared for pre-employment training or continued formal education than the graduates of the three "senior classes" appended to most primary schools prior to introduction of the separate junior secondary cycle. The anticipated impact of provision of the JSS has, however, so far been significantly reduced: JSS graduates' opportunities for aconirino the necessary further pre-vocational training, formal or on-the-job, are limited. The unemployment rate in jnmnira has continually arown from roughly 13% of the labor force in 1960 to 23% in 1972, and much of the unemploved group comnrises technipplIv unchilled ung pponpi, neor - 8 - includinp the JSS students: early employment has been obtained by a very small proportion of JSS graduates (PCR 5.06). A significant labor market demand for already skilled technicians persists, but above the Junior sec- ondary level adequate development of the necessary training capacity has not been achieved and the Government has proceeded more slowly than planned at appraisal with expansion of upper secondary facilities. The second Bank loan 4,c ---4A4--, 4--nvnAr t-ho needed expnsi on ofn uppr cycle scondomaryr schools offering comprehensive (pre-vocational as well as academic) programs a nu 4:J Lr [1 UC V 'ev .1I I lonnn oC LWo smala tS VLJ.OCI. voato al tri ng .[LL~.ce[ter. UL tHE pLUJecL proje s genial Ud UUiol CUivs, CAjitabtu 1H a supplementary letter, only one has been largely fulfilled: the Ministry of EaucaLion S supervisory services aLe veing improveu and in-service training for teachers and principals has been initiated. Other important objectives have not been fully achieved: the Government was to undertake a strengthening of the Ministry of Education's statistical and planning services, but little progress was made. (Technical assistance has been provided under the Bank's second education project to improve these services.) Likewise, some progress was made under the project with selecting and procuring textbooks, but an intended program for local textbook production was not developed. The Bank's Role The Bank's participation in the First Jamaica Education Project was confined mainly to the implementation of the construction/expansion program. With one exception, the Bank's supervision missions devoted only minor attention to the project's educational aspects and the Bank exerted little pressure on the Government to fulfill the educational objectives. As regards the construction program, the Bank was already aware, at the time of project preparation, of problems likely to be encountered. In its effort to support an efficient lending operation, the Bank can be credited with reducing the number of JSS and requiring architect consultants to review designs and schedules of accommodation and to prepare accurate cost estimates. It should also be noted that during project implementation, Bank supervision missions were frequently carried out and supervision reports show that the problems associated with the construction program were well understood by the Bank staff. However, the brevity of the missions. averaging five man-days each, impeded active participation in resolution of those problems. A more direct and continuing Bank participation esnPcially dlrino the early implementation period, might have resulted in a more economical construction program. Specificly the Bank could have moved earlier towT7ards a s trengtCh- ening of project management and exerted greater control over project costs. In large mesr,the limitations of1 the administrative ~a-----1 ities of the Ministry of Education and the Supplies Department of the Ministry of rIuanc were recogized by the nank pior to implementation. More timely provisions for expanded expertise in the Project Unit -- including an educator, economist, quantity surveyor, equipment/procurement specialist, and Bank insistence on appointment of a full-time architect -- could have improved the efficiency of project Implementation. A well-integrated team of Project Unit specialists might also have allowed for more effective coordination of activities between the project implementing authorities and technical assistance advisors as regards both construction and achievement of educa- tional objectives. (An expanded Project Unit and a Coordinating Committee, comprising representatives from relevant Ministries, have been required under the Second Education Project.) Ideally, pre-project retention of necessary technical consultants, recommended in the PCR (7.01b), could also have speeded and improved the efficiency of project implementation. In view of the actual uncertainties remaining during early project implementation, however, the Bank could then have financed under the loan an extended two to four month mission, com- prising an experienced architect and economist. Such experts could have assisted the Project Unit and consultant architects with preparation of final designs and cost estimates as well as construction schedules. (Similar but shorter early implementation "critical assistance" missions are currently being carried out by Bank staff.) The resulting cost and scheduling data could then have served as a model for project progress reporting, which was particularly weak under the project: its utility as a gauge of project progress was very limited. In the effort to avoid delay, the Bank did not insist on reviewing final designs, as called for in the Loan Agreement nrior to Aarrf nf on- struction contracts. However, part of the JSS construction overrun could have been eliminated directly by the Bank if it had systmatirq11v rouin'w all designs, and required use of the simpler and adequate standards agreed upon during negotiations. Pre-qualification of subcontractors by the Bank might also have promoted a less costly JSS construction operation (PCR 2W06). Further inefficiency might have ben Pliminntpd had the contracts fo- he 50 JSS been awarded in smaller phased groups, as originally planned, rather thian in a sing1p nnrUnape Tnitat--inobi migh h,Aave been extended-nl - -niAC - - - -V- - -G6LLL CA C UVU UL11Ly for groups of schools for which land acquisition had been completed and review of final esien n - cin completed. o J- - i and economy, had been completed. - 10 - In view of the increasing costs of the JSS construction item, the Bank might have considered reappraising the project, especially before construction of the last eight schools was undertaken. On the basis of the earlier implementation experience and in view of the limited possi- bilities for employment or continuing education, a decision might have been made to delete them from the project. The US$ 4.4 million equivalent cost of these last schools, borne mainly by the Government, was extremely high (PCR 4.04), and undoubtedly strained resources available for the Government's other educational investment priorities. Conclusions Under the First Jamaica Education Proiect all schools and collpocp were constructed or expanded and equipped as planned despite delays and significant cost overruns. mainly related to the JSS construction item The project's quantitative objectives have been largely achieved: enroll- ments and ontout have equalled or exceeded targets. 1owever in rpnort of JSS graduates, benefits have been less than anticipated due to continuing high rates of unemnlovmPnt amonp iunqkillpf lahor nnd inadoint-0 nrneN1?qns for continuing midlevel education and training. More efficient utilization of Government and loan resources miaht have resulted from greater RRnk involvement, especially during the initial project implementation phase and, Dossiblv from deletion of th final PiQht Tqq fonm to n-44nal Loan Project. COMPLETION REPORT JAMAICA - LOAN NO. 468 - JM First Education Project I. PROJZCT DATA 1.01 The Loan Borrower Jaaioa Loan Amount Vs$ 9.5 million Date of Loan Agreement Septe*ber 30, 1966 Effective Date October 25, 104 Original Closing Date July 31, 1971 Final Closing Date October 31, 1973 Terms of Loan 20 years, including 5 years of grace Interest Rate 6% p.a. Fiscal Year July 1 - June 30 Current Exchange Rate us$ 1 J$ 0.88 Average Exchange Rate of Disbursements US$ 1 - J 0.84 Appraisal Report No. TO-553a of September 8, 1966 1.02 The Project. The project consisted ofs (a) additional buildings, equipment and farnitare for the College of Arts, Science and Tohnology (CAST) and the Jamaioa School of Agricultars (JSA); (b) additional buildings, eqaipment and faraiture for four teacher trainiag colleges (c) construction. emiument and frnitare for 50 now jumior secondary schools; and (d) technical assistance, comprisigs (i) 15 man-months of expert services for CASTI (ii) 11 man-years of expert services and 5 man-years of fellownhi nxn .TnAy and (i ao fl0 for th shnio ec no andy s iVogara of flowakips for the junior secondary school program. - 2 - The total project cost was estimated at US$ 19.4 million, to be financed bys (i) a Bank loan of US$ 9.5 million; (ii) USAID grants of US$ 1.3 million; and (iii) a government contribution of US$ 8.6 million. 1.03 Project Objectives. The project had the following objectivess (a) to help meet the immediate needs for technicians in industry and agriculture through the provision of 390 additional student places in CAST and 330 additional places in JSAS (b) to heln meet the staffina needs of iunior secondary schools and to allow for a gradual upgrading of the teaching force in primary schools thromugh the nrovision of 67q additional student n1aoes at four teacher training colleges; (c) to helps (i) improve the quality of the education received by students +--m4na+4-- +b.4, the+r e4 -- 15 so that they maw filly benefit from pre-employment and on-the-job training no on Awu &rv .o sw'jma LVU U uI us lnAu Y muas.a6 "U" J A (sL AmALaLe the nmuav VA quwLifiu muwdents for furwher formal education; and (iii) make available workshops and instructors for general upgrading of the skills of the adult population; all this would came about through the provision of about 33,000 student places in 50 new junior secondary schools; and (d) to assist in the implementation of the proposed educational development through the provision of 52 man-years of expert services and 13 man- years of fellowships. II. PHYSICAL EXECUTION Civil Works 2.01 General. All physical facilities included in the project description have been provided and the construction of all project institutions have been practically completed. Serious problems were encountered, however, during project implementation, mainly because the project was too large in relation to the implementation capacity of the Education Ministry. At the time of appraisal, the construction period was estimated at three and a half years, -3- but construction was actually spread oat over a six-year period (Chart). With the exception of JSA, construction of the post-secondary institutions met wia only minor problems. Construction of the 50 junior secondary schools, however, was beset with problems during the entire period. 2.02 Post-Secondary Institutions. Outside experts were engaged to develop detailed accommodation schedules for CAST and JSA. Since the expert for CAST did not follow the agreed accommodation schedule and the principal of the college did not adequately cooperate, the preliminary designs, once completed, had to be redone. As a result, actual construction started 38 months later than expected, but was ccupleted within the period foreseen. The new facilities of CAST are satisfactory. Construction of the extension to JSA started 13 months behind schedule, and took 15 months longer than expected because of student strikes, contract cancellation and cost overruna. The new facilities of JSA do not particularly reflect austere standards. Only slight delays were encountered in the civil works for the four teacher training colleges and the new facilities are satisfactory. Most of the constraction delaLs in CAST and JSA could possibly have been avoided if the consultant had been engaged before appraisal, financed either by the Govern- ment or retroactively by the Bank. 2.03 Junior Seaondar' -ehoaln. All nitmm fnr thamn mi-hhnon shnulti hnvp- bakn acquired before res r 1, 1967 (Side Letter on Project Execution). At that time. hnmva % mi r l+aot waveA a+411 *w%MhA anA I +nk ril4 11 An"nt 196A before the government complied with this covenant. As a result, construction nf the lnst school 8USA-1 a-A TO ,4k l.- a 1 A4 +I' same WW_"mM%4 Lm w wR W % o un %&U&ne ovwa . At 5u tm time, selection of sites was not always carried oat satisfactorilys factors like t-orpuy na mam. avakllas.li-ty o almUanld. ea w.ere- no U properly taken into account, leading to unnecessary costa of site development 0".A 1 -1i *,.nn4 __ _.,&L - na- - - - - ta t -I =*au o WA aJVJwae rAJ ULP LMU DLZVUYZI WUre RUo A.LWUYb accuaw, WH.Lua J_UU to major variation orders, once construction was under way. Land acquisition iso a W-MI-Mosme process in- liamaua. THmw, I-or future projecta in jamRIca and comparable countries, consideration should be given either to the require- mont of sahool site acquisition before loan effectiveness or cancellation of part of the loan amount if sites are not acquired by an agreed date. 2.04 The consultant architects, a consortium of one American and two Jamtaican LIrms, performed generally satisfactorily. However, the grouping of all 5U schools into one bid package exceeded their capacity. As a result, various urawiWngs were late, teir supervision was not always adequate, and measures to increase their capacity, such as the use of helicopters for site super- viuion, increased reimbursable expenses. Closer supervision of the consultant architects by the project unit appeared necessary. Further, contrary to the Loan Agreement (Section 5.01(g)), the majority of the designs were only sent to the Bank for information after civil works bids had been opened. As a result, the designs were not always economicals (1) The average construction areas agreed upon during appraisal were in fact used as minima, increasing the total oonstrao- tion area by 16%; (ii) the specifications and design standards could have been more appropriate and economical; (iii) two model master-designs were developed, but they were sometimes applied too rigidly, requiring adaption of sites to designs rather than the reverse. 2.05 Civil works for all 50 junior secondary schools were grouped into one bid package because of delays in the preparation of bid documents. The contract wa: awarded to F.G.M., a consortium of one Canadian and two Jamaican firms, which employed Jamaican subcontractors. The involvement of the Canadian contractor was beneficial to the project, since F.G.M. took over from the understaffed project unit part of the task of coordinating, supervising and Paying the individual subcontractors. 2.06 When the contract with F.G.M. was signed in January 1968. the government had not yet acquired six sites. Further, problems with two other sites, which had bAen aulred earlip. In&T%aRiari tha mnhr. nf Ptehoolf in the last construction phase to eight. For these sdools, the government insisted that F'.GoM* shoulA choosa suntr+acto s m m ac4.4 14 .+ = f4we n+t all of whom had been included for their technical competence. F.G.M. complied with th a dem-a-d to ava4A + An sye .-A __A_A -- +4..-4 - a- ___ building operations. Since the contract with F.GoM. was more a management conrac than~ a regula co,t.-4" on. cotrc',n.I 4 L - inthe ro-e '~~~~~~.,~~~~~ - n u u.i ..JiJ W LW .VbL IB o .uJl. inEvo3.vnenk .L %" qualification of subcontractors and in the award of suboontracts would have 2.07 It quaLity of construction of the bui"''ngri is generally satisfact-ry. .)ome false economies have been made by not adequately waterproofing the rool', and 'y uing low-quality doors, luvers and sanitary rixures, mac of which is already in need of replacement. The accommodation schedule of tne schoolR, with a use factor of more than 90%, appears tight in the Jamaican context, because of the large number of inexperienced school principals. As a result, most schools use the mltipurpose hall for regular teaching to alleviate scheduling problems. 2.08 Delays. Almost all the project implementation delays can be attributed to the construction program, and in particular to the junior secondary school component. Actual construction started in August 1967 (for the teacher training colleges), or seven months behind the appraisal schedule, and took a total of 70 months, or 27 months longer than the appraisal estimate. Thus, the total delay was 34 months. All schools were in operation in August 1973, but two schools have not yet been properly completed. 2.09 E4miument. Because the Denartment of Sunnlies of the Ministry of Finance ia;s Urstaffed, the Crown Agents were engaged to handle equipment pro- ourement ander the nroiet. ommuintation nroblems Alaw Instructions bv the Ministry of Education, and inefficiency of the Crown Agents caused many delaSn VUrther, all 4+ame megardlas of type or nty" wee- procured on the basis of international competitive bidding, which was numm1Anma Iv- "4,a 4mUats"4 nkle a the la 1a mbow t aun.l 4+%4a required for this project. The practice, presently being introduced in +I4 rdvld- ' " r prjets, of~ prormetA. LUZ JLP. U WIUMIL A. &V7M "A~ .Z acordance with the borrower's regular procurment practices wold have n*~ a 111 h intpWoo and,1 nost. p"knib.1j, relve cost-'L1~u 2.1 meipt,, storage, sortUng and duiivery of equipment o schoolU, which was handled by the Departeent of Supplies, was also less than satisfactory. P-quipment was sametiues sent to the wrong schools and some equipment never reached the schools. The Government took the risk during storage in the warehouse and transport to the schools of not insaring the goods. Thus, damaged and lost equipment had to be replaced by the Government (Loan agreement, Section 5.07), but this is only slowly being done. Most of the distribution problems and part of the procurement problems could have been avoided if equipment had been groped into bid packages by teaching area, as is new being dam in nw edacation projects, nlding the second ed- cation project in Jamaica. 2.11 The quality of equipment was not systematically tested during bid evaluatiun, and whatever testing took place hardly involved responsible Jamaicans. Also, the bid documents did not require suppliers to have local agents who could ensure the availability of spare parts and maintenance services. The incla- sion of such a clause in all equipment bidding docuients should be considered even though this might cause problems for same snoliers and zight limit competition. With some exceptions, however, the qaality of equipment ies satisfactory. Furniture 2.12 Three tyes of furniture were orocuredt wooden. mntAl and lamind tAd ni awtin._ Neither dring bid evaluation nor upon receipt in the schools was proper testing carried out. The wooden fnrnitarn in fairly natfatory thaw there has been warping of same furniture due to the use of aseasomed timber. The desirn and wnrkmanhin of metal ?uin+.u7m_ wh4A*i% nu. a a is generally of low quality. The imported laminated plastid furniture has not stood un imll tn +he nnmatg% s%nd44mm amA moe atA gmw"mR h -a4lw repaired or maintained locally. Technical Assistance 2.13 Post-Secondary Institutions. No proper records could be fomd in the Ministry provision of technical assistance in the amounts foreseen was confirmed 'by - 6 - CAST and J3A, and in Bank records. An expert, financed by the UK Government, assisted CAST in elaborating the accommodation sohe-ae on we sas u, a revised curriculum (para. 2.02). Technical assistance for JSA was financeo by the loan under contracts with the Guelph University (Canada) and the Florida State University (USA). Expert services for the teacher training colleges, which were not included in the project, were provided Dy uINDP and USAID. 2.14 Junior Secondary Schools. Technical assistane for the junior secondary school program, which was included in the project but not in the loan, was provided by USAID under a contract with the San Diego University (USA). However, this assistance was not used fully, owing to a lack of planniag and definition of assignments. As a result, same experts ended up in teaching. The original intention was for a USAID grant of US$ 1.1 million to be later supplemented with an amount of US$ 0.2 million, but this supplement was not necessary since most of the objectives had been achieved by August 1969. A total of 29 man-years of expert services - 11 man-years fewer than foreseen - and eight man-years of fellowships was provided for this program. III. OFGANIZATION AND MAAGEMENT 3.01 The Loan Agreement (Section 5.01(d)) required the appointment of a full-time oroiA&t oninninv and nroint arnhitnet to be reannimible for the ereention of the project. It soon became clear that such staffing was inadequate for a .'.#n a +4. a4 'a ua.warthal.ae then Rmun+atn M14mwrin (hIef Aw.nhi tnt functioned as part-time project architect during the first year, the project -N4 was + me '-" sm,&A mA +hm .^a was want"+ f^" rw-4nAe nf n n ten months. Adinistrative officers were added to the project unit after two was. -A 4 e. ad -6 17T 4. n ome.c4onn -4+6 +he secnd. aA-anf4 or years and it was not un.1 .1G71 2 z-4 VA . W.L ,&%0 % project, that a quantity surveyor and equipeat specialist were appointed. 1mAB, %o prvJect amUs was muc I. uns Iu use auwquaa. aJazUwn, an W&V %&m wLW in the Side Letter on Project Execution. 3.02 The project unit did not receive effective administrative support from other entities in the Ministry of Education. Also, inter-m1nisterial cooperation was inadequate, particularly with the education planning unit, and intra- ministerial cooperation was unsatisfactory, particularly with the Land Authori- ties and the Department of Supplies in the Ministry of Finance. The latter unit was already understaffed before procurement for the Bank-financed project was added to its responsibilities, and the absence of a procurement officer in the project unit aggravated this problem. 3.03 As a result of the above, project management faced the following specific shortcomingas (i) no proper project-implementation schedule was ever worked out in detail; (ii) site selection and acquisition were insufficiently controlled (para. 2.03); - 7 - (iii) land surveys were not properly checked (para. 2.05); (iv) the execution of the construction program was not adequately supervised by the project unit; (v) payments to contractors were delayed; (vi) decisions were delayed and, once made, often changed, leadinr to delays and excessive variation orders for construction; (vii) procurement and delivery of equipment and furniture were not adeauatelv aunerviseds (viiI) no inventorv has vnt bann made of the aoninent and furniture available in the schoole; and (ix) although financial records have been kept accurately, thww An nn nrnviAm an aelan-t hnaiQ frv e-nQ analwRip- 'A *t . ES WA' . n) Tk t '.s +k- W +),aJ ' encountered and of the resulting cost overrns. At the same time, costly a.wrange+a A m km mad tA onwannroa a s oan othose nnmanoea. IP. a main contractor for the junior secondary schools, F.G.M., took technical struction quality, but at a fee of 12 6 of civil works cost, or about UV . mLliuu. Lkewisw, the Crown Agens arrangd for proarament at a fee of 7% of equipment costs, or about US$ 120,000. Neither at the projectis concep1Ion, nor during its Implementation, ala the fMnistry of Education conceive of the sheer magnitude of work involved. The experience wita the implementation of the second education project so far does not show a major improvement of this condition. 3.05 Progress reporting was not wholly adequate, both in content and in timing. Progress made was only described in general terms anc elays were not Ially analyzed. Since progress reporting is an important management tool, both for the borrower and for the Bank, it should be given more attention. In this regard, guidelines for progress reporting alreay introduced in this Division should prove useful. Bank supervision missions visited Jamaica on the average every seven months but only for about five man-days per visit, which was insufficient to fully appreciate and help overcome some of the above implementation problems. Only little assistance was provided by the Bank in the earliest stages, when Bank involvement was most needed. The recent trend in this Division of mounting supervision missions to assist project units at critical moments, particularly during the early stages of project implementation, should be of benefit to our borrowers. - 8 - IV. COST AND FINANCING Project Cost 4.01 The estimated and actual cost by project items was as follows (see also Annex 1): Estimated Actual Excess CAST 1.2o 1.18 -6 JSA 2.02 2.52 25 4 Teacher Training Colleges 1.10 1.11 0 50 Junior Secondary Schools 15.02 25.01 67 19.40 29.82 54 L.02 Higher construction costs, narticularly for the junior, secondary scho(1s and JSA (paras. 2.02 - 2.06), are the major reason for the cost overruns; actual construction costs for the entire project were 70% higher than estimated. Professional fees increased more than proportionally because of the involvement of the main contractor (para. 3.04) and high reimbursable expenses; actual professional fees were 190% higher than estimated. The costs of equipment, furniture and technical assistance were well within appraisal estimates, partly because equipment and furniture lists were reduced in the later staces of project implementation and because less technical assistance was provided than foreseen (para. 2.14). implementation. During appraisal, construction costs had been estimated at lk~ 7 1)A P--n + i-+ _OVe__r..t .~ 44.p v Ie Ay pwW .jaSW -MV use u M %saw I s A 942M a A.O.& waALL %L"" L.LPJ%LVe wao reduced to US$ 4.80 per square foot during negotiations. Further, the contin- genCsuSn sm-+ of 123 4 d noU aC"Is quatoe----l l UR price sy UULO Ljluv- &.;%;%JLUA#. U11a~ Pi uuau.W P .o increases, particularly in view of the fact that baseline-cost estimates had men Spt to a manimum and counst4um tion coBta were alreay Increasing at 4-e; p.a. in 1966. However, the bulk of the cost increase, mainly as a result af inefficiway and aocelerade prce aincrease, could not have been foreseen. 4.u4 The construction cost increase for the junior secondary schools accounted for 85% of the total cost overrun. The last eight schools in particular showed very large cost increases (para. 2.06). Canstruction costa for this project item were US$ 7.80 per square foot on the average, but US$ 11.00 per square foot for the last eight schools. Likewise, the total cost per student place, which had been estimated at US$ 450, amounted to US$ 750 on the average, but US$ 1,250 for the last eight schools. The total cost overrun in the construction of the 50 junior secondary schools of US$ 9.3 million can be attributed to the various factors as follows (see also Annex 2): 1. UJndArPstAmti, at. anrniran -t.nv USA I-h M1illon (par-. Jh.03) 2. Increase in construction area US$ 0.6 million (rna 9fl.b\ original implementation schedule US$ 1.3 million U. Avoidable price increases, delays, anu Lue1x1ciencies U,- % .V MAlion US$ 9.3 million Tne analysis shows that more stan 40% of the cost overrun or some US$ i milio of expenditures could probably have been avoided if the project had been implemented by a well-staffed, efficient project unit. ia.0 Toward the end of 1972 the new government in Jamaica established a camission (the De Costa Commission) to inquire into the award of contracts under the former admini8tration. This commission investigated also the appropriateness of contract awards under the first education project. The commission's report criticised the way in which the project was implemented, including the procedures for the award of some contracts (para. 2.06). However, no question had arisen during the course of the commission's inquiries of possible irregularities in the award of contracts financed from Bank loans, or of possible misapplication of Bank funds. Assurances to this effect have been provided in writing by the government. Finance 11.0X The loan was expected to be disbursed at q1% of the nroient nost excludino the USAID-financed technical assistance component (para. 1.02). This disbursement percentare was sradual1y raned to q9 for the AsAt di1burPement aplicationA while no disbursements were made on an additional US$ 2.6 million (Annex 3). USAID contributed USA 1.1 million And the Hf rtnvernment some S1 lAfrd Jin technical assistance (paras. 2.13-2.14). The Jamaican Government provided the remainino funds amanting to nTJ 1o9 =411o' or 1984 mre +].V% In addition, the government financed the purchase of land and the cost of nront faament. Gawoermern nnt cv+erpar - uns wa av le rcedTlr *h4n needed. Recurrent Costs 4.07 The 1974/75 budget includes J$ 8.0 million for recurrent expenditures of the pirlJect+44 -,i4on n%. 1hS c Gns~--- nd _'~ &I-].-0 Iy--- -e Lnto k"noAURUVO YA VA.AUX7j UV WL d IUR FUrKVnL. RGgeb 1 the Ministry of Education, about the same proportion as estimated in the a-Pr - report. The tota uAgetary appropriation for recurrent funde of the project institutions is adequate, but the composition could be improved. - 10 - In particular, a too high proportion is allocated for teacher salaries, as a result of the low student-teacher ratio of 27ua (para. 5.08). At the same time, inadequate amowsts are available for materials and maintenance, covering only about two-thirds of the needs. A general provision in the Ministry's budget for maintenance is used to finance major repairs of older school buldings, and does not compensate fer the shortage or maintenance funds in the new project institutions (para. 5.14). 4.08 The projections of total recurrent expenditures for education in the appraisal report are close to the actual figures. Enrollments have increased as expected, except for non-project junior secondary schools, where the delays in project construction have also delayed implementation of the Government's larger expansion program. Costs per student at the JSS are slightly lower than expected, since several intended measures to improve quality have not been implemented. Further, the appraisal report indicated that recurrent expendi- tures by the Ministry of Education would be kept within the limit of 19% of total government recurrent expenditures. The actual proportion is 16.5%. caused by a larger than expected increase of total government expenditures (Annex h). V. OPERATING RESULTS Enrollments and Graduates 5.01 Planned and actual numbers are as followes Enroll"nepts Graduates 1PlAnn"d 1071/7). DT1m0- 6X 10W7J. CAST 735,2 02i5 3382 *,c ?;AJ T m Te nuer5 of atente and graduates of CAST are higher than foreseen, since buildings that were to be replaced under the project continue to be used, and becaas faciities are used more intensively than expected. CAST maintains close contact wiLth indastry and expands or oeatracts courses according to needs. Its grauaes are ia nign demana. Inua, the aechievemeate surpass the projest's objectives. 5.03 JSA. -The structure of enrollment in JSA leada to an inefficient use of racilities. New entrants are admitted half way during the academic year, resulting in a fluctuation of enrollments between 350 in the first semester and j0 in the second. In 197U the school was transferred fran the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Education, which is reconsidering this - 11 - situation. Because of more emphais on two-year instead of three-year courses, JSA has been able to meet the overll taret of 1140 graduates p.a., all of whom can find jobs easily The projct ialuded privision of facilities for short coarses enrolling 50 students at a time and with an annual output of about 1,000. These courses have not yet been provided and all facilities are used for the reaular teaching prorram. Thus the project's objectiveB have so far only partly been achieved. 5.0h Teacher Traijng Colleges. The numbers of students and graduates are as rmsann and nrlmary tneAhara are bein unfraded. Thus the Droject's obJectives have been fully achieved. 5.05 Junior Second5a Schools. With Bank agreement, the class size in the junior MCnarv AfhooDn hAR emnorarlv bann increased from hO. as appraised, to L5. and additional furniture has been provided under the project. This would inevMam th _ _A11=gbmt eaniamty - inis inin shift - frCM 11-160 to 17-ql0. Official enrollments Rurpass this figure. However, actual school attendance is ra+her 1lMe 9%m -aw"-om v+-Ane m+m voas mnly 7nqf in 1977/7 vtriha low 62% in Westmoreland and a higher 82% in Manchester. There is no evidence of ib-r-Vmme-14 tk h on. a.a6eaVeatenance ra+. -a 77t 4m th,% w-"s Urim H special stay has been made of the causes of an-attendance, but this is not a spociaL phUaumanon onfiued to ne jWniC r oUA"aniy sosa. u "h %nitry of Education's ever-enrolling of students in the expectation of low attendance can be oasidered as being realiatil. >.06 The junior secondary schools were intended both to provide a bettor preparation for pre-employment and on-the-job training for those leaving school at age 15, and to increase the number of qualified stmdents for further formal education. No intentions were expressed as to the relative number of those leaving and those continuing. In practice, however, not more than 5% of the graduates find employment as a result of generally high unemployment in Jamaica. The above dual objective is no longer considered realistic by the Ministry of Education, which has decided to offer upper-secondary education in all project schools by introdnoing a second shift, starting in the 1974/75 school year. Although the facilities would be used more efficiently, it is doubtful that this constitutes an efficient use of Jamaica's human and financial resources. 5.07 An additional objective of this project item, expressed in the appraisal report only, was that the schools would offer extension classes for a general upgrading of the skills of the adult population. No systuaatic effort has been made, however, to develop such courses. The schools are used in the afternoons, mostly by former students, for academic courses leading to the Jamaica School Certificate. These courses will probably be discontinued once the schools are used in doable shift. Thus several of the project's objectives have not been achieved so far and are unlikely to be achieved in the near future. 5.08 Staffing. The staffino of the post-secondary institutions is in accordance with expectations. For the junior-secondary schools, the Government intended to achieve a student-teacher ratio of 3qil (Side Letter on Educational Obiec- tives), but this was later considered too high Fid reduced to 3Ctl in the Loan Arreament for the second adnntion nroiAnt (Lan M!o. 727-J.- Thl. ratA - 12 - reached 3L81 in 1971/72, but was only 27&1 in 1973/74, though the class oiZe in C (nrn C05). The raaon for this discrananey in the small number of teacher contact Ioare of 30 per week in couparison with the 50 teachi.nq hen% v%annived I/ Asatiatone pronortion of 0%O of the inior secondary teachers is fully qualified. Curricula 5.09 Post-SecondLarIntitutions. No intentions were expressed in the project A, _J -L J 1--.L .., .&.J LL --P InACP ~ TOA --,.A 4--- 4- l uucu'IV a 1uo uuA1 0IX. LL, IVs u W. VJaJ UO L a"u "LOLWVI training colleges have been improved with outside technical assistance and are 5& a y uu nw pruy LJUV UUJUU%kLv%V Wx vqMu"L.J L=Pj.LVVC#WM& sV been achieved. 5.10 Junior Secondary Schools. A National Curriculum Development Committee and more recently, a Curriculum Development Thrust have worked out the course content and prepared syllabi and teacher manuals for this program. An important contribution has been made by USAID technical assistance (para. 2.13) and the curriculum is generally satisfactory. There is general agreemant in Jamaica that the new junior secondary schools constitute a great improvement over traditional junior secondary education. 5.11 The concept that the junior secondary schools wold in fact provide secondary- level education to all those attending seems unrealistic. Since there is no entrance selection and because of the uneven quality of edacation offered in many primary schools, large numbers of entrants are not of the expected level. For example, up to 40% of the new entrants are not fvlly literate. Thus nch time and effort are spent on remedial teaching rather than the intended junior secondary program. $.1' Concerninx the intention to establish facilities and a program to prodmce textbooks and instruction materials adapted to local requirements (Side Lozter on Educational Objectives), so far activities have been concentrated only on selecting and procuring, rather than preparing and producing, these materials. This situation should imorove. however. when the Edcational Television. Materials and Aids Center, provided under the second education project, starts nAraon. The t4athnOkS and antprials availhablA wavnAraly moot lanl requirements as currently perceived. 5.13 Supporting Services. The government undertook to strengthen the Ministry of ~ - . -44. ^ .. - 4 ''fQ4k''~~~I6~' ''' A - T-++- on# T W A -C~~A L tiVe). These services have been slightly strengthened, but the expected wanse .4 ..w ...4 I.Ann mak .wA A .1l..n 4A -4 - AP ad J4m .dal J.&. ma Ja U wwoA C.-a.udovou*~~.&. A L .LLAL U L O %UhA.D AU Ra.L M A a HWO e or of the purpose of data collection ani processing is lacking. Further, those k)I .. %h~L CJUL U. k 6% kdAU LI !CA.L 0 I. .L tow %pIU a W UO~U J= . ho rLRn. being carried on, but related chiefly to projects. An overall plan as a basis :1/ - Based on a usual student timetable of 40 periods per week, additional periods when classes are divided for practical work, and local timetable adjustments. - 13 - for education oolicv does not exist. nor is av systematic procreas toward this readily disoernible. The statistics and planning services have recently been strathaed with exrerint under the segnd adiati n oralmot. Aacordin& to the intentions, the supervisor7 service has been strengthened. 5.14 Maintemance. Maintenance is mainly carried oat an the initiative of school 4em4 ai m a i** .T. 4mA nae fram Ahn.sm + Q ,+4nn C All 1 The inatitatin of a maintenance program and the development of a maintenanoe Mammal a ]mAaA 416 0-. D..L .A, USDA -..A .4mn ao ..4Ammon 4. m We CGImVm Im nms" are LO&y ARM o Am JJNL.m *AwAn AW presently given to the principals. Further, tools which have been lost or W WW ASOL w1a W1 V~ 0 VJO iMA %LU 4LJ 40 AJI I"CALUU Q MOQPWU- M LLLU~M A.0 %M%6%4-AA urgent in several workshops. Shortages of funds are partly responsible for &U-I a -4-&mAman so rs forf VI* CEUVRAT) The folowlaW agreements nave not, or nave not adequately, been complied with by the borrowers 6.01 Project Execution. Section 5.01(a) of the Loan Agreement required that the projeot be earried out vith due diligence and efficiency and with due regard to eCoaWo Project impleaatatio has been less than efficient, causing large cost everrame JChapters II, III and IV). 6.02 Prot Unit. Section 5.01(d) of the Loan Agreement required a fvll-time Project C oordinator and Architect and para. 3 of the Side Letter on Executiou of the Project required that the project w%it be kept adequately and competle,Ly staffed. The project unit was without a fall-tim project architect for extended perioda of time, and the project uit was contmnaously understaffed (paras. 3.01-3.04). 6.03 Site doggaition. Para. 6 of the Side Letter in Execution of the Proect requfred that sites for all junior secondar schools be required before December 31. 1967. On that date. only h sites had been accuired &nd the last site was acquired in August 1969 (para. 2.03). 6.0 Approval of Desi s. Section 5.01(g) of the Loan Agreement required that the D1ans, spOcil7rations, and work schedales be furnished to the Bank -for its approval promptly upon their preparation. The designs were not serti. Dronntlv unon their nrenarstjon and the maimv4tw w%m only r nnt t% the +$ ank after construction bide had been opened (para. 2.04). 6.o5 Teaa and Installation. Paras. 1(e) and 5(b) of the Side Letter an and tested, and that they should be inspected when delivered to sites. This boan anr+ hea sw ns1 4.-mrS 1 .. '0 a a 1 r- J J --AI F04SQ. r-.LW. J. - . v-.. numssum vs J.*W VAL AIC VUI Fg1tM=U LR para. P&U4. U01 U lt ZaUO Letter an Execution of the Project required that damaged and lost goods be repaced. A naWer u equApment 4.= wACn nad never reaced the school have not yet been replaced (para. 2.10). - 14 - 6.07 Use of JSA. Para. A.h of the Side Letter on Educational Objectives and AIsiistration expressed the government's intention to offer short courses in JSA. These courses are not yet being offered (para. 5.03). 6.08 Student-Teacher Ratio. Para. B.6 of the Side Letter on Educational Objectives and A&iniatraion expressed the government's intention to achieve a student- teacher ratio of 35&1 in junier-secondary schools. However, the Loan Agreement of the secnd education project indicated a student-teacher ratio of 30&1 for these schools. The actual ratio is 27a1 (para. 5.08). 6.09 Maintenance and Materials. Sections 5.01(o) and 5.02 of the Loan Agreement reanired adequae maintenance of buildings and equipment. and the provision of adequate funds for operation and maintenance of the project institutions. Maintenanna is wenerallv imadeauate. and funds for materials and maixtenance insufficient (paras. 4.07 and 5.14). VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 7.01 General (a) In countries where no proper maintenance system exists, projects sn[oula incluue provisiuns - sucu as expert ServiceS, LLUL6ng and equipment - to build up or strengthen the maintenance capacity (para. 5.14). (b) if a project comprising a complicated construction/expansion program is sufficiently advanced in preparation, the engagement of the necessary architectural consultants might be considere Dbefore appraisal and financed retroactively or by an engineering loan (para. 2.02). (c) More flexibility is needed in adapting a loan agreement to changing circumstances. When long delays occur or prices increase faster than expected, the project content and loan amount should be re- appraised (paras. 2.01, 4.03 and 4.04). (d) For countries where land acquisition is a cumbersome process, con- sideration should be given to either the requirement of land acqui- sition before loan effectiveness or cancellation of part of the loan amount if sites are not acquired by an agreed date (paras. 2.03, 2.06 and 4.04). 7.02 Project Management (a) Where a large construction contract is awarded to a main contractor who will employ subcontractors, the Bank should pay more attention to the pre-Qualification of and contract awards to subentrAtor (para 2.06). -15 - (b) More attention should be given to progress reporting and ruidelines shonld be develcned to make meh ranortina more meanigU1 (para. 3.05). 7.03 Procurement (a) The Bank should more liberally allow procurement of small items accornft +n horomere tomamml pocmmen awA -n t4f satisfactory) and ithout international eampetitive bidding / ~ ~ ~ ~ S .A. LWJ4IL A A 0U.LkMr-JM40 DIAWM.LU .L-UU.J.UZ A 0 UdJU&".% Q~LLaUwtT requiring suppliers to have loca agents who can ensure the GLVC%.L.L .% %F.L spJae pa'-PU £aUM .LUVk"0G tPftrRo *) * Field supervision of the project's educational aspects should be undertaken on a regular basis. Latin America and the Caribbean Office July 1974  JAMiTCA - TIIAN No. 68-JM Pr-4ect Coet: Es"imate and4 Actua Civil Professional Tachnical VVj. L w. iQPTMA'?d s ., IrcV TfeesEeni c CPLst 6h9 65 353 157 31 1,255 JSA 1,125 122 320 122 327 2,016 Le-hIer TinIn Colleges 915 91 23 72 - 1,101 Jui.2or Secondary Schools: - 42 first y,oo 825 919 1,036 1,127 12,911 8 last 1,477 134 156 165 173 2,105 - subtotal 10,401) (959) (1,075) (1,201) (1,300) (15,016) Total 13,170 1l237 1,771 1,552 1,658 19, \CTUAL (in '000 US$) CAST 790 50 260 52 31 1.183 JSA 1,795 368 161 58 137 2,519 Teacher Training Colleges 903 133 27 43 - 1,106 Junior Secondary Schools: - 42 first 14,609 2.297 911 718 98L - 8 last 4,422 695 154 115 1h6 - subtotil (1.031) (2-992) (1o1,6) (R833) (i,09l) ( 015 Total 22.319 3 1 2 ACTUAL - ESTIMATED (in %)./ CAST 22 -23 -26 -67 0 JSA202 50 -52 -58 Teacher Training Colleges -1 4461 Junior Secondary - 42 first 62 178 -1 -30 -16 51 - 8 last 199 1419 -i -30 -16 163 - subtotal (82) (212) (-30) (-16) (67) Total 71 186 -36 -24 / As a percentage of estimated costs. Annex 2 ransanno 1 na 5 -LAQ rus - ^ . ~t IT~ -r" JAMPtAk - 1aU n. 4uu-'Url Anasis o0T. he0Cost0 verrun inCivil wOrks for the Junior SecondaZ Schools (in '600 US$) Appraisal Cost Estimate: (incl. L2% contingencies) - school construction 8,027 - site developient - profossional services, 10% - oat'ff housing 887y 11, 441 1. Underestimates at Appraisal\Negotiations Stage (a) Unit Cost Construction co.L had been estimated on the basis of US$4.80 per 5q. ft., but the actual cost at that time was US$6.00 per sq. ft. Thus,cost estimates should have been higher as follows: - school construction 2.007 - professional services, 10% 201 - staff housing 222 2.30 (b) Contingencie3 A contihwcy allowance of 12% hd bAAn inclunded in the -ast ostimates. However, no prototype designs were available yet, so that a nhria nn.nno of' 10 (un uld have been apprnatenta n+.at t++he Lime of appraisal construction costswere increasing at 4-5% p.a., so that the owi a a ati annarchi-Il Ion- heen a+ lenet 101, M M a +-^+zl anAnao allowance of 20%, cost estimates would have been higher as follows: - school construction 717 - professional services, 10% 83 -S taff hounnn7999 Total Underestim-nate ?4. 2. Increase in Construction Area The construction area for the 50 schools had been estimated at 1,280,000 sq. ft., but the actual construction volum was 1,482,000 sq. ft. The resulting cost incredse (at corrected unit cost) was: a/ The working papers suggest that this amount includes provisions for professional services and contingencies. Annnuy Page 2 of 2 pages - sChOo~~Jl consI1A truc -AILi f - professional services, 10% 623 3. Unforeseeable and Unavoidable Price Increases According to the original implementation schedule, construction of the achools would start in july 1967 ana De completed in August IYu. On the basis of the actual construction cost increase during that period, the average price increase would have been 10.2, as against the 1CY which could have been foreseen. The resulting cost increase was as follows: - school construction 965 - site development 140 - professional services, 10% 109 - staff housing .g 12L, 4. Other Factors Actual total cost of civil works 19,031 Profes3ional fees at the assumed rate of 10% 1,903 Total cost 20,934 Appraisal cost estimate -11,441 Cost increases explained above - 5,337 Other cost increases resulting from delays, avoidable price increases and inefficiencies 4,156 JAMEGA - cy No. .68-Jm Expenusa/ and Disoursements (in 'oUa# Cl.ied Disburse- Fiscal Year Cumulative Exenditures Actu ment c ul and Claimed Expend- Percent- Disburse- Cumlative Ds:rrsemenzs semster Ietimated Actual iui-e age men-,s AcEsiated 1967 1st 95 - 2nd 361 361 53 191 191 1963 ist 2,700 366 5 53 3 194 1, 2nd 921 555 53 294 458 1969 ist 8,150 2,669 ,748 53 927 1,415 L,275 2nd 2, 931 262 53 138 1,553 1970 ist 14,500 5,865 2,934 53 1,555 3,108 7,600 2nd 14,518 8,653 4 3,808 6,916 1971 ist 18,10O 14,5.8 0 44 0 6,916 9,500 2nd 17,085 2,567 24 616 7,532 1972 ist 20,622 3,537 24 849 8,381 2nd 23,065 2, 43 24/114/ 581 8,962 1973 ist 23,065 0 14 0 8,962 2nd 26,171 3,106 114 35 9,397 1974 lst 26,171 0 14 0 9,397 Jan. 1974 27,173 1,002 Uk/52/ 103 9,500 After Jan. 1974 29,823 2,650 0 0 9,500 a/ !:ceuding USAID - financed technical assistance. b/ Reduced to 14%, effective March 16, 1972. c/ Percentage at which last disbursernent was made. AnnlIHx .1 JAMAICA eTecuirrent Een ur lo27/73: Pr,)ipcted and Actuavl Ministry of Education) P,ýro ected A tul vuJV vJ% kp z J' V.g -73 -)D Sondnry Edu.- .iUJuI 11,730 42 13,56 31 Hi ghr r "ducai.. 2,570 9 3,670 9 i the r :xpmndi .1i i 1,h?1 6,210 i4 TOT Al. 27,850 100 43,090 100 r. eoorion o r t.nt,L tiovErn'fment i tenren. eniturs19.0 :16 5 ) Aj ^p CJ.a report, Ane ,t. ~$ projectione made on pricea at time Of appralsal (b) IRøvised Estbmates" of the 1972/73 budget JAMAICA - LOAN NO. 468--JM Construction; Planned and Actual fsuý Ir P-SECOND4P INSTITuTES PLANNE-- -- - ----DI ACTUAL 25 - 0 - - - -- - --m~_~ - - - _- -_ - ~~ JUNIOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS 200 - - - - - - - - - -- - -- 175 ACTUAL 150 - ---- - - - - -- - - - - - -_--_-_-_----------_- PLA NNE D I - 125 - 500 - - - ----- - - - -- ---- 100 25 - 1966 1967 19,68 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973