Nepal - Settlement Project

C?RCUIJMTING COPY FILE COPY UN C ONE40 To REPORTS DESK DOCUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION Not For Public Use Report No. P-1457-NEP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL FOR A SETTLEMENT PROJECT May 30, 1974 This report was prepared for official use only by the Bank Group. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. The Bank Group does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report.  CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit - Nepalese Rupee (NRe) US$1 = NRs 10.56 NRe 1 - US$0.095 NRs 1,000 = US$94.70 NRs 1,000,000 = US$94,697 FISCAL YEAR Nepal Fiscal Year July 16 to July 15  INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL FOR A SETTLEMENT PROJECT 1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed development credit to the Kingdom of Nepal for the equivalent of US$6.0 mil- lion on standard IDA terms to help finance a project for removal, sawmilling and sale of logs and lumber from areas suitable for agriculture in the Terai plain and settlement thereon of families from the lowest income groups in Nepal. Part of the proceeds of the credit estimated at approximately US$3.3 million equivalent would be relent to the Timber Corporation of Nepal for a term of five years, including a one-year grace period, with interest at 7-1/2 percent per annum, and part, estimated at approximately US$1.0 million equivalent, to the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) at 3 percent interest per annum, to be repaid as ADBN receives repayments from its borrowers. Approximately US$1.5 million equivalent would be made available by the Government to the Nepal Settlement Company as a grant, and the balance, approximately US$0.2 million equivalent, would finance further studies. PART I - THE ECONOMY 2. The most recent economic report entitled "Economic Situation and Prospects of Nepal" (125-NEP) was distributed to the Executive Directors on April 18, 1973 (R73-78) and its sector annexes on August 15, 1973 (R73-217). The principal findings and conclusions of that report, brought up to date, are summarized below. The country data sheet is given in Annex I. 3. Nepal has been classified by the United Nations as one of the 25 least-developed countries in the world. Its per capita income is esti- mated at $90 per year and the literacy rate at about 14 percent. Lack of dependable statistical data makes difficult a precise assessment of recent economic performance. Available statistics should therefore be considered as indicating no more than orders of magnitude and broad trends. There is, however, evidence that since 1965 Nepal's real economic growth has been almost entirely neutralized by population growth, estimated at 2.2 percent a year. Agriculture accounts for about 70 percent of GDP, 80% of export earnings, and provides employment for over 90 percent of the labor force of which the great majority are subsistence farmers. The industrial sector is very small and its contribution to GDP has been marginal. 4. Serious efforts toward development have been underway only since the late 1950's. Development expenditures have increased rapidly -- from NRs 232 million in 1964/65 to NRs 620 million in 1972/73. The great bulk of the resources available for development have been invested in infra- structure, particularly roads, power and irrigation facilities. About half of expenditures for development during this period have been financed  with external assistance, notably from India, the United States and China. About 80 percent has been in the form of grants. Gross external reserves have been increasing and as of August 1973 stood at $131.9 million, of which about $110 million were convertible. Reserves are equivalent to about 12 months' imports. 5. In its efforts to formulate and implement development programs and projects, the Government (HMG) is faced with unusually severe constraints. The country is landlocked and the physical resource base is very narrow, consisting mainly of agricultural land, hardwood forests and abundant water resources available for both power generation and irrigation. No minerals in commercial quantities have been discovered. Nepal's internal market is small and production costs tend to be high. About 60 percent of the popula- tion live in the Hills 1/ at or near subsistence levels. For lack of trans- portation facilities, large numbers of communities are virtually isolated from each other. 6. One of the important constraints on Nepal's economic development has been the limited capacity of HMG to plan, appraise and implement devel- opment programs and projects. The problem is apparent in most sectors and its principal elements include poor coordination of closely related programs; lack of progress reporting and evaluation; and defective project formulation and implementation. Given Nepal's early stage of economic development, these problems are to be expected. While noteworthy attempts at improvements have been undertaken in the past few years, much remains to be done and substan- tial technical assistance will be required to supplement the limited Nepalese staff that possesses requisite skills. 7. In spite of these constraints, the prospects for increasing agri- cultural output are reasonably good. Within the agricultural sector, the best possibility over the short and medium term is increasing the production of foodgrains, particularly rice, wheat and maize. Preliminary analysis of Nepal's future foodgrain position indicates that, unless timely and effective measures are taken, the current export surplus (about 300,000 tons of rice per year mainly to India) may soon turn into a deficit. In the Hills, where no additional land is available and yields are low, the principal require- ment is to increase productivity by means of improved technology and to restructure agriculture away from foodgrains toward more suitable horti- culture and livestock production. The Association is presently discussing projects for the development of the Hills. In the Terai 2/ to the south, foodgrain production can be substantially increased by improved technology and by expanding the area under cultivation and making use of the potential 1/ The Hills in the central region consist of rugged mountains ranging from 1,000-4,000 meters in elevation and cut by the valleys and gorges of Nepal's major north-south river systems. 21 The Terai is the narrow plain along the Indian border with elevation up to 1,000 meters.  - 3 - for extending irrigation and for controlled resettlement in cleared forest areas and waste land. 8. Over-population in the Hills and the consequent unorganized migration to the Terai pose serious threats to future development. A greatly expanded land clearance and resettlement program in the Terai would help to absorb part of the excess population and, if carefully plannied and controlled, could substantially reduce wasteful destruction of forests and severe erosion of arable land. Intensive farming of new irrigated land would also provide a livelihood for migrant farmers as would a program for systematic and efficient utilization of Nepal's forest resources. 9. Over the past nine years (1964/65-1972/73), domestic revenue and total expenditures grew by about 16 percent per year - or about 10 percent in real terms - substantially faster than the growth of GDP. Development expenditures alone nearly tripled. About half of the development expendi- tures is financed by external assistance (grants and loans). With a quicken- ing of the pace of the development efforts, a major constraint on further development is Nepal's ability to mobilize resources, both domestic and foreign. 10. Current domestic budget revenue does not exceed 6 percent of GDP. This tax effort may appear rather low, but the country's ability to pay taxes is also very low. Since the monetized sector of the economy is small (covering perhaps 20 percent of active population) and is generating most of Government's revenue, the fiscal pressure is indeed quite high on the limited number of tax payers. There is probably some room to increase further the taxation of the monetized sector, which in the past benefited from the bulk of public investment, and also for better tax enforcement; by and large, it would be reasonable to expect a moderate growth of revenue in the future as the monetized sector gradually reaches larger segments of the population. 11. In that respect, the very comfortable level of foreign exchange holdings should be seen in its proper perspective. Despite substantial balance of trade deficits both with India and third countries, Nepal has been able to generate substantial overall surpluses (the equivalent of an average of $10 million a year for the last 6 years), thanks to its export of services (Gurkha pensions and remittances, remittances from Nepalese working in India, tourist industry, etc.). It would be nonetheless unwise to expect this situation to remain unchanged since development expenditures are bound to increase much faster than domestic revenue collection and expected foreign savings inflow. Moreover, increases in the price of petroleum may cause a balance of payments deficit in 1974. In 1972, Nepal's imports of petroleum products amounted to about $8 million. Consumption in 1974 is likely to be cut sharply on account of increases of domestic prices combined with strict rationing system and supply difficulties. India supplies Nepal with all its consumption needs and is facing difficulties of its own. This situation is likely to affect the growth of productive sectors. To overcome these difficulties, Nepal has recently concluded an agreement, whereby Nepal will purchase crude directly from oil-producing countries for refining in India.  - 4 - 12. In summary, on one hand, the extreme poverty of the country points to its limited capacity to generate resources; on the other hand, urgent development needs and the expected gradual improvement in the countryJ's absorptive capacity will lead to an early utilization of foreign exchange holdings. Consequently, Nepal's requirements for foreign assistance on soft terms will rise rapidly and there is a clear need for some local cost financing, as most projects with high development priority have a larger domestic cost component than can be mobilized from internal sources. 13. So far, Nepal's external debt has been very low. As mentioned in paragraph 4, the bulk of foreign aid has been in the form of grants. As of March 1973 foreign debt, which was all contracted with countries other than India, amounted to only $65 million of which $50 million remained un- disbursed. $8.4 million of foreign debt was in IDA credits, of which only $0.8 million was disbursed. This low utilization is largely due to the fact that 2/3 of foreign loans have been contracted after mid-1970. Consequently, debt service was about $0.6 million in 1973 or equivalent to 2% of exports of goods and services to countries other than India. IDA's share in the debt service was negligible. However, future assistance may increasingly take the form of loans, albeit soft. In view of the accelerated development efforts, external public debt is expected to rise and, based on the trend in recent years, may well reach $250 million by 1980, of which 1/3 could be in IDA credits. Debt service ratio by 1980 is forecast at below 10%, of which Bank Group share would account for less than 1%. PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN NEPAL 14. The first IDA credit to Nepal in the amount of $1.7 million equiv- alent was made in FY 1970 for a telecommunications project. This was fol- lowed by credits for highways ($2.5 million), tourism ($4.2 million), irri- gation ($6 million), a second telecommunications project ($5.5 million) and a water supply and sewerage project ($7.8 million). The proposed credit would bring the total amount of IDA assistance to Nepal to $33.7 million equivalent. No Bank loan has been made to Nepal. IFC is considering an investment in a hotel project in Kathmandu. This would be its first opera- tion in the country. Annex II contains a summary statement of IDA credits as of April 30, 1974 and notes on the execution of ongoing projects. It shows certain delays in the implementation of these projects, particularly during the initial periods. These delays are largely due to Nepal's limited technical and managerial capabilities. In order to assist Nepal in coping with this constraint, considerable technical assistance is required in the form of inputs of staff time in Washington, from our Resident Mission in Kathmandu, and during frequent missions to Nepal. 15. Bank Group lending to Nepal has so far been at a modest level compared to the country's needs for, and total receipts of, external as- sistance. This is due to the relatively large amounts of assistance given to Nepal by other donors and the country's limited absorptive capacity, affecting the rate of project identification, preparation and implementation.  - 5- Prospective Bank Group objectives in Nepal reflect the country's needs: (a) to place major emphasis upon directly productive sectors, particularly agriculture and forestry; (b) to give special attention to integrated schemes within the agricultural sector upon which economic development in Nepal basically depends; and (c) to continue assistance for the devel- opment of complementary infrastructure, including feeder roads in support of other development expenditure and other forms of communications, partic- ularly between the Hills and the Terai. 16. Preparation work is being carried out for a number of projects, in- cluding a second highway project, a rural development project, a power proj- ect and a second irrigation project. In view of the institutional constraints and shortage of trained personnel in Nepal, the identification, preparation and implementation of these projects are likely to require more time and ef- fort on the part of the Bank Group, as well as greater inputs of technical assistance, than usual. For this reason, technical assistance and training will be an important element in the proposed project as well as in most fu- ture projects. PART III - AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY IN NEPAL General 17. As mentioned in paragraph 3 above, agriculture (including forestry) directly accounts for about 70% of GDP, 80% of Nepal's export earnings, and provides employment for about 90% of the labor force. Forestry alone is es- timated to account for approximately 15% of GDP. Agricultural production grew at a rate of about 2.4% per year in real terms between 1965-70, barely faster than the average growth of population of about 2.2%. With limited possibilities for diversification, Nepal's economic development will, for a long time to come, largely depend on its ability to increase agricultural production, and to create surpluses to pay for its large and growing import requirements. 18. Although HMG has not been inactive in the realm of land reform, much more needs to be achieved. While tenant cultivation is relatively un- important in the Hills, the land tenure system and the rent practices in the Eastern Terai, where most of the surpluses are produced, act as a serious disincentive to improved cultural practices. Another weak link in the agri- cultural development effort is the inadequacy of agricultural extension services. The staff is generally poorly trained and rarely has at its dis- posal the minimum quantity and variety of agricultural inputs necessary for successful demonstration. Use of modern inputs is limited by shortages and the lack of an integrated production program. Nonetheless, the area under improved cultural practices is reported to have increased from about 4% of cultivated land in 1968/69 to 7% in 1970/71. This has, however, been mostly concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley.  -6- Forestry 19. All forest land is owned by HMG. The Ministry of Forest is respon- sible for forest management and forest industries. Nepal's forest industry is poorly developed, partly because domestic markets for forest products are small, fragmented and without connecting transportation networks, and partly because HMG has not awarded concessions large enough to provide log supplies on which investments in improved and enlarged timber manufacturing facilities could be based. Sawmilling has therefore been limited to small units drawing on whatever forests and supplying whatever markets are available in their own local areas, with the notable exception of the Nepal Timber Corporation (TCN) which has a sawmill complex at Hetaura. 20. The low-lying Terai plains have the only forests now used as a source of industrial timber; semi-tropical hardwood, dominated by Sal (Shorea robusta), and, to a lesser degree, Asna (Terminalia tormetosa). Both species are heavy hardwoods and Sal, in particular, is in strong demand in Nepalese and Indian markets. Other valuable species are present to a minor degree, but they are found only as scattered individual trees or groups, with no concentration capable of sustaining major industries. Land Development and Settlement 21. Spontaneous migration of landless Hill people and their illegal settlement in the Terai is estimated to have averaged about 7,000 families a year over the last ten years. Most have destroyed the forests on which they settled (paragraph 8 above). In 1963 HMG created the Nepal Settlement Company (NSC), in order to cope with this growing problem. NSC, wholly owned by 1IMG, aims to plan and carry out the systematic distribution of land in organized settlements and to assist settlers to improve their farming through provision of advice and credit. Organized settlement under NSC began in Nawalpur in the Terai in 1965. Four other sites have since been added and a total of approximately 4,300 families settled. In the settle- ments NSC has built 190 km of roads, 26 schools, 3 clinics and installed about 90 drinking wells. Recognizing the size of the settlement problem, and the inevitability of the trend given the high pressure for land in the Terai, UNG recently approved an expanded NSC settlement program. The pro- posed project would be a major part of this program. PART IV - THE PROJECT 22. The proposed project is based on the report of an FAO/IBRD Coop- erative Program preparation mission and on the findings of an IDA appraisal mission whose report, "Nepal Settlement Project" (No. 377 a-NEP dated May 24, 1974), is being circulated separately. A credit and project summary is attached as Annex III. 23. Negotiations were held in Washington during April/May 1974. The Government of Nepal was represented by Messrs. K. D. Adhikari, Secretary, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Irrigation; G. P. Rajouria, Chief, Forest  Resources Division, Ministry of Forest and B. P. Rimal, First Secretary, Royal Nepalese Embassy, Washington, D. C. Project Description 24. The proposed seven-year project would consist of (a) felling of timber by TCN, over a period of five years, from about 17,600 ha of new land, and 1,000 ha of land already allocated for settlement in the Terai; (b) sale of logs in the initial period, followed by sawmilling and sale of logs and lumber when sawmills are established by TCN; (c) settlement by NSC of about 7,900 families and provision of timely availability of cultivable land for about 1,500 more; (d) provision of timber extraction and sawmilling equipment, farm inputs, settlement infrastructure (including villages, village roads, warehouses, schools, clinics, extension services, agricul- tural credit); and (e) technical assistance for logging, sawmilling, soil surveys and irrigation investigations. 25. Two project areas in western Terai at Kanchanpur and Bardia would each have two new settlement sites, and one site would be in eastern Terai at Jhapa. A sixth site, at Kanchanpur, is already settled but needs timber removal. All sites are close to the Indian border and to railheads. The new project sites are uninhabited forest owned by HMG. Timber would be extracted from Kanchanpur and Bardia by winch lorries, using a technique developed in Malaysia for similar conditions. Sawmills of a type commonly operated in India would be established. At Jhapa, where the forest is not suited to mechanical extraction, logging would be carried out by contractors employing conventional manual felling and bullock-cart extraction. Logging would only be carried out during the dry season, but sawmilling and shipment of lumber would proceed almost year-round. Technical assistance would be provided by experienced Malayisian and Indian personnel to TCN for operating timber extraction lorries and for installation of sawmills respectively. A Sales Adviser would help TCN develop a market for its products, particularly lumber, in India and elsewhere. Since there would be little vehicular traffic once the timber has been extracted, most project roads would be manually constructed and maintained to dry weather standards. Approximately fifty kilometers would be provided at both Kanchanpur and Bardia. The existing road system in Jhapa is adequate. 26. Each NSC settlement site would comprise four or five villages. NSC would be strengthened by appointment of an agricultural adviser who would be attached to NSC headquarters to assist NSC's chief agricultural officer in planning and implementing the special kind of extension work needed for farmers moving to a completely new environment. Credit for farm inputs would be supplied by the Agricultural Development Bank of Nepal (ADBN) through settlement cooperatives. 27. NSC schemes are designed for rural families, mainly from over- crowded Hill regions, who possess no land or have insufficient land to obtain an adequate living, but have farm experience as laborers or tenants. As soon as logging permitted, NSC would set up temporary headquarters, select settlers, and plan villages of about 250 families, each with a house plot of 0.68 ha (one bigha). Settlers would receive the remaining 1.36 ha (2 bighas)  -8- as their farm plot one year later. Settlers would purchase their land for NRs 300 per bigha, payable, interest free, in ten equal annual installments starting in the fourth year. Cropping would be based on maize (mostly consumed by the family) with a little rain-fed paddy in the monsoon, followed by mustard (the main cash crop) and pulses in the dry season. Several years' NSC experience shows this to give a satisfactory livelihood from land properly cleared of heavy timber. Inputs include seed, fertilizer and pesticides, supplied mostly by the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC), on short- term credit from ADBN, which would also supply medium-term credit for the purchase of bullocks and tools. As with other NSC schemes, settlers would receive free WFP food during the first 270 days and further food on medium- term credit from ADBN to cover any short-fall between production and family consumption up to the end of the first 18 months of settlement. 28. The proposed project would include, on each of the five new schemes, a simple demonstration farm and settler orientation center, equipped with a small amount of visual aid equipment. Extension staff would provide courses to all settlers upon arrival, and follow-up extension until the last arrivals reach full development. Hydrological investigations would be conducted to assist HMG in assessing irrigation possibilities in the project areas. Soil surveys would be undertaken to identify additional areas suitable for future settlement. Or_ganization_and_Implementation 29. Forestry operations, including sawmilling, would be carried out by TCN. Area Managers directly responsible to the General Manager of TCN would be stationed in each project area. 30. Settlement would be organiized by NSC with a Scheme Manager on each of the five settlements directly responsible to the General Manager of NSC. Deputy Scheme Managers would be agriculturists with several years' experience in extension. They are to be assisted by two or three junior technicians and up to nine technical assistants, each living in a project village. 31. In view of the participation of two different Ministries and two corporations in the implementation of the project, a Settlement Co- ordinating Committee (SCC) would be formed comprising one representative each from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Irri- gation and the Ministry of Forest, and the NSC and TCN general managers. Its principal purpose would be to coordinate timber removal with settlement implementation. The establishment of SCC would be a condition of effective- ness of the credit. Cost and Financing of the Project 32. The total project cost is estimated at US$11.5 million equival- ent, with a foreign exchange component of about US$6.9 million. The proposed credit of US$6.0 million would cover 52% of total cost (100% of the foreign exchange component excluding the WFP food element, plus some of the local cost); WFP grants, 16%; HMG, 29%; and farmers 3%. The proceeds of the credit would be channeled to TCN and ADBN through the Rastra Bank and to NSC through  the Treasury. On behalf of HMG, the Rastra Bank, the Central Bank, would on-lend part of the proceeds of the credit estimated at US$3.3 million equivalent to TCN for a term of five years including a one-year grace period with interest at 7.5% per annum, and about US$1.0 million equivalent to ADBN at 3% per annum to finance farm inputs, to be repaid as ADBN receives repayments from its borrowers. ADBN would lend to cooperatives at 7% interest per annum for short-term and 5% interest per annum for medium-term credit. Farmers would borrow from the cooperatives at 10% interest per annum for short-term and at 7.5% interest per annum for medium-term. These rates are fixed by the Rastra Bank in consultation with HMG. The interest spread to the ADBN and cooperatives would cover credit management and administration costs and the risk involved in a large number of small loans to farmers. Approximately US$1.5 million equivalent, would be a grant from HMG to NSC, since NSC has no revenue and is essentially a government agency, and the remainder of the credit approximately US$0.2 million equivalent, would finance further studies. Procurement and Disbursement 33. Purchases of equipment would be bulked into single contracts wherever possible. Contracts above US$50,000 would be awarded on the basis of international competitive bidding, in accordance with IDA guide- lines, except that prudent shopping would be permitted for one or two winch lorries, and equipment not exceeding a total of US$50,000 may be purchased off-the-shelf. Farm inputs (mostly bullocks for plowing) would be locally purchased by individual farmers through their cooperatives. Fertilizer would be procured by AMC in bulk through international tender procedures consistent with Bank/IDA guidelines. Roads and buildings, widely scattered, small in size and the construction of which would be spread over several years, would not be suitable for international bidding, but would be contracted for according to NSC and TCN tender procedures, which are satis- factory. 34. Disbursements would be made against 100% of foreign expenditures for imported equipment and technical assistance, and against 75% of civil works and field settlement cost, ADBN medium-term sub-loans for bullocks and tools, and the incremental amount of ADBN short-term sub-loans to farmers for farm inputs. To expedite the project, retroactive financing is proposed for the winch lorries and equipment in an amount not exceeding $50,000, if purchased after April 30, 1974. Benefits and Justification 35. The project would introduce in Nepal a novel and cheap method of extracting timber, provide training and experience not previously available for Nepalese loggers and sawmillers, and provide part or full-time employment in forestry to about 1,100 workers during a period of six years with prospects for continued employment. The project would also make fertile agri- cultural land swiftly and effectively available for settlement, reducing population pressure in the hills. At a very low cost it would settle and substantially improve the standard of living for about 7,900 farm families and lead the way to further projects of similar nature; overall cost per  - 10 - settler family is estimated at about $1400, and net cost at $100, after deduction of net incremental forestry revenue. The project would provide a gross incremental output of US$16 million equivalent in timber value over a period of five years. At full development (year 13) the project would increase annual agricultural production by an estimated gross value of US$2.9 million equivalent. 36. Most of the benefits of the proposed project would accrue to settlers whose present income and living conditions are well below the Nepalese average. The distributional impact of the project is therefore favorable. 37. The economic rate of return is estimated at about 42%. This high return is reached when logs and lumber are valued at average 1972/73 Indian railhead prices, agricultural output at farmgate prices, and investment costs at their financial value after adjusting for duties and taxes. The economic return is highly sensitive to changes in costs and/or revenues: a 10% change in either affecting the return by about 12 to 13 points. As with most settlement schemes, the project is risky. However, adequate organizational and management safeguards have been built into the project. 38. Due consideration has been given to the ecological aspects of the project. Clearing the project areas (less than 2.5% of the total forest remaining in the Terai) would not affect rainfall. Run-off would be minimal because land is level, soils are pervious and erosion control would be enforced. Since farm incomes are slender and farmers cannot afford loss of crops from serious pest infestation, pesticides (i.e. small amounts of chlorinated hydrocarbons, less persistent than DDT) would be used. PART V - LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 39. The draft Development Credit Agreement between the Kingdom of Nepal and the Association, the Recommendation of the Committee provided for in Article V, Section 1(d) of the Articles of Agreement and the text of a res- olution approving the proposed credit are being distributed to the Executive Directors separately. The special features of the credit referred to in paragraphs 27, 31 and 33 are found in Sections 3.02 and 3.05 and in Sched- ules 3 and 6 of the Development Credit Agreement. 40. I am satisfied that the proposed credit would comply with the Articles of Agreement of the Association.  - 11 - PART VI - RECOMMENLATION 41. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed credit. Robert S. McNamara President Attachments May 30, 1974   ANNEX I ODUNTRY DATA- NEPAL Page 1 of 3 pages AREA POPULATION DENSITY 1 k=0,797 11l 5T3'fIlion (mid-1971) 140,797 k-2 631 Per ke2is arable land SOCIAL INDICATORS Reference Countries Nepal i:thiopia Peru Austria _ a 197