French technical assistance in Mali : a review of groundnut operation and cotton scheme

47 CNFIDENTIAL AFRICA RURAL DEVELOPMENT STUDY BACKGROUND PAPER FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSILF TANCE IN MALI: A REVIEW OF GROUNDNUT OPERATION AND COTTON SCHME by G. Anderson Series : Studies in Employment and Rural Tevelopment No. 10 Division : Employment and Rural Development Department: Development Economics Development Policy Staff International Bank for Reconstruction and Development The author prepared this background paper in his capacity as consultant to the Bank. The views expressed represent those of the author and not necessarily those of the Bank. This report may not be published nor may it be quoted as representing the views of the Bank and its affiliated organizations. Washington, D. C., September 1974 FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MALI: A REVIEW OF GROUNDNUT OPERATION AND COTTON SCHEME TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE . . a . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Part A - BDPA: THE GROUNDNUTS OPERATION I. HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUNDNUTS OPERATION-- OPERATION ARACHIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 1 A. Situation before Operation Arachide a . a . a a a . 1 B. Operation Arachide.. .. a .*.. a a . . 3 C. The Expatriates' Role and the Viability of the Organization . . . . . . . . ... . . .. 5 D. Broad Outline of Activities over the Past Five Years and Projected Role . . o . a a a . . 6 II. RtSULTS .. . . . . . . . a . a a a a . a . 9 A. Production, Marketing, and Farmer Revenue . a a 9 a. Description of the Marketing Operation . a a 13 b. Value of Marketed Production--Revenue per Hectare Over Time--Production Costs Netted out . . . . . . . . a . . . . . . . . . . 13 c. Potential Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 d. Animal Traction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 B. Progress in the Adoption of New Techniques . . . . . 20 a. Training of Extension Personnel . . . . . . . . 20 b. Adoption of New Techniques and of Animal Traction .. . . . 22 G. Costs and Benefits, Overall . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 III. SECONDARY EFFECTS OF OPERATION ARACHIDE . a a a a a a . 34 A. Land Tenure, Social Systems, and Migration . a . 34 B. Food Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a . 36 C. Functional Literacy Program . . . . . . . . 37 D. Participation of Farmers in Operation Arachide .3 IV. COCLUSIONS AND FUTURE OF OPERATION ARACHIDE . . . . . 38 -2- Part B - CFDT: THE COTTON PROJECT I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 II. ORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATION . . . . . . . . .. 44 A. Credit * * 0 * * * 0 * . . . . . . . 59 B. Marketing 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 C. Extension Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 a. Technical Content of Extension . . . . . . . . . 62 III. RESULTS OF THE OPERATION . .. .. . . . .. 65 A. The Overall Operation .. . . . . . . . . 6 a. Effect on Farmer Revenue . . . . . . . 66 b. Food Crops and Other Concerns . . . . . . . . . 71 B. Operation Fana . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .... 71 a. The Basic Aims of the Project 0 0 . 0 . . 71 b. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . 72 c. Later Additions to the Program . . . . . . . . . 75 i. Livestock program . . . . . . . . 7 ii. Rural education . . . 0 . 0 0 . . 0 78 iii. The blacksmith training program . . . 79 d. Conclusions on Fana . . . . . . 80 0. Financial Aspects of the Operation . . . . . . . 81 a. Net Benefits to the Country 0000000000 81 D. The Creation of a Malian Organization . . . . . . . 83 IV. SECONDARY EFFECTS OF CF.T OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . 84 A. Food Crops .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 B. Migration Effects .. . . . . . . . 8 C. Functional Literacy Program . . .. . . . . 86 D. Income Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Part C - COMPARISON OF THE TWO PROJECTS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS I. COMPARISON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 II. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS * * 000 * * * . * * . . . . . . 90 LIST OF TABLES Table No. Title Pge No. 1 Farmer Revenue Per Hectare - Outside Operation Arachide 0 0 a 9 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 0 0 . 10 2 Farmer Rev6nue Per Hectare - Inside Operation Arachide 0 0 . 0 . o . 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 . 16 3 Costs - Operation Arachide . . 0 . . a . 6 0 . 0 . 26 4 Benefits - Operation Arachide . 0 0 a 0 27 5 Groundmts Exports - Draft Schedule of Charges Crop Year: 1971/72 0 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 28 6 Groundnuts - Draft Schedule of Charges - Crop Year 1970/71 . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 7 Groundnuts - Draft Schedule of Charges - Crop Year 1969/1970 . . . . . . . . ... . . 0 0 0 a 0 0 30 8 Groundnuts - Schedule of Charges - 1968/9169 . . . 31 9 Groundnuts - Schedule of Prices - Crop Year.1964/ 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 32-33 10 CFDT - All Area, - Results o o 0 0 0o 0 0 o 0 . 43 11 Schedule of Prices - "Allen" Cotton - Mali Crop Year 1963/64 0 0 a 0 a 0 0 a .o 46 12 Schedule of Prices - "Allen" Cotton - Mali Crop Year 1965/66 . . . . . . . . . a 0 . . . 47 13 Schedule of Prices - "Allen" Cotton - Mali Crop Year 1966/67 . . . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 14 Schedule of Prices - Mali - 1968/69 0 0 . 0 0 0 49 15 Schedule of Prices - Mali - 1969/70 0 0 0 0 . 50 16 Draft Schedule of Prices for Cotton Crop Year 1970/71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51-52 17 Schedule of Fiber Prices - Mali - 1971/72 0. . . 3 18 Schedule of Fiber Prices - Mali - 1971/72 0. . . 54 19 CFDT - Results Comparison - Total CFDT Area & Fana Secteur - Number of Agricultural Implements InService o.......a..o... . * 67 20 CFDT - Revenue Calculations . o * o o o . a c . . o a o 69 21 CFDT Inputs . . . . o . ... . . . . . .... . . 70 22 CFDT - Fana Region- Results o 0 o o a 0 0 0 0 73 23 CFDT - Fana Region -Results . . . . 00 0 0 76 24 CFDT - Benefit - Costs That Are Not Netted Out by Bareme 82 MAP 1 Territorial Development of Operation Arachide . . . . 7 2 Territorial Developmen-t of Operation Arachide . . . . 8 PREFACE *. This report was prepared as a background paper for the Africa. Rural Development Study (ARDS) conducted by the Development Economics Department of the World Bank. The ARDS was prompted by the very substan- tial interest in the East and West Africa Regional Offices of the Bank in finding ways of designing rural development projects which, despite the limited financial and manpower resources available for rural development in Africa, will effectively "reach" large numbers of low income rural people. Thirteen rural development projects and, programs from sub-Saharan Africa, representing diversity in location, design and implementation, were selected for analysis (see attached list). The reviews raised a consistent set of questions regarding design, implementation and performance of these projects and programs to provide the basis for a comparative evaluation. The main report on the Africa. Rural Deve2opment Study by Uma Lele suuarizes the lessons that can be learned from these project reviews. 2. Each of the background papers is based on existing information, supplemented by field investigations. With rare exceptions, no additional quantitative data were collected. Because the availability of data varied widely between projects, there are substantial differences in the scope of the individual project -reviews. 3. Since most of the data were collected by other agencies, the IBRD can not attest to the accuracy of the statistical information which appears in this report. The views expressed in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IBRD, French Technical åssistuc in Crorronz A Review of the Zæws d'Actioæ Prøoritalzes Wn4r4e3 (AVI) mnd tA sSomstd ån Devploppnyx, du Ra (SODYNW , .by G. Belionele and D. GLatil. Studies in Enleyvunt and Rural Deøve op>r: tt No. 2. Rural Derelorænt Progrcus in Etbiople: A Beview of the ChiWA AericuLurn DMvloppeDt Unit, TheWloi Agriculturnaevalrpuent Unit Lnd The Esriam Pachag, Pvogrqm, by T. Tnele. Studies.c,. in Emum iplo. pnt and Pural Develor=n Eo. 3.. . Rang' Deve og:it in ' eny: A ?evi~?er of Ccæmmrcicl, COrpemy, liMVdiviA en? Group Mace, by U. JAhnke, H. Muhøbrg, E. Thiss. Studius ini Epploy==nt and Lutal Develeppent Uo. 4. Sunil Parmer Cr~dit in Kenya: A RUvIM7 of Major Cr91t Sch=s Ly J. D. von Pivck. St.uJIs in Employ"nt and Rural De"In=lL no. 5. lrælholder Ten Projeet in Renya: A Review of Keny a Tea DHvolopment A~Lority, by D. Sullivvn, Studis Ar Ampleynent nnd hurnl Tvelopent N 6. Iural Developront ix Krnya: A WReve uf Specl Riral D~:cpl opunt Prager, by A. hedi. Stuites in E IployLant 'un-dRra Dvlpbn Pø. 7. Land setteAt in Kenyk: A Review of thn Squatt-r !,roble: y P. Lbithi and C. Earna: Studies in Employrvent Rud Rural DuvW,wi o t bo. 8. Rural Develupment i Mlawi: A Review of the Lilonge Lnud Dpvelonss rogram, by E. f. Mincy. StudIes -u rloyent -4id Rur;l Devloprient No. 9. Frech Tmnicral AwiArree in Mali: A Rveview of Crounut Operatimn end CotLon Schece by G. Anerson. Studies in Employt and Rurd DevelopMn NO. 10. s.å!!k Aa, e nav.!0 Ah,11a EALLIU 1" =~lå A LA RU4 .VAIVW ufA A"WialAO ACYV:=lM Centers, by H. Turner. Studies in Employent and Rural be3opmunt No. 11. Smaliholder Tobacco bavelopvent in Tanzania: A Review of Uucubn and Tw=b Schem.s, b-y tL Arual and D. .Lincenreyer. Studiemi n Epiont adr, Developmi'ent . 12. Cotton Dcvelopuunt in Tanzenia: A Reviuw of Cotton ProAr= in SkumLid, by k. Collinson. Studies in Eup.oysnt and eurd Devderet Uo, 13,. Rural Døvelopmeøt n TanzMu: A Review øf UjAY&Y by P. Abraham and . Robinson. sy"divs in Eployæent nd iensuvrul Da rp t roe 14. FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MALI: A REVIEW OF GROUNDNUT OPERATION AND COTTON SCHEME Part A BDPA: THE GROUNDNUT OPERATION 'FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MALI Part A BDPA: THE GROUNDNUT OPERATION I. -ASTOR ,A - ORGANIZATIONOF THEMRQUNDNUTS QfRA TION-- OPU&MMONARLQUO A. Situation before Operation Arachide 1. For many years groundnuts have been one of the principal cash and export crops in Mali. Before independence in 1960 they were the country's second leading earner of foreign exchange, after cattle. In 1968 groundnuts comprised 17 percent of Mali's official (recorded) exports. In 1970 groundnuts were cultivated on approximately 7 percent of the total cultivable surface of 1,778,400 ha in Mali, while cotton accounted for a further 4 percent. 2. In 1961, however, groundnuts had contributed nearly two-fifths of Mali's exports. The reason for the substantial decline during the sixties lies in a sharp drop in the voluw of marketing by farmers of this crop. While marketing remained constant within certain limits in the twelve years prior to 1965, it began to fall drastically after that year as can be seen from the following table: Marketing Figures for Unshelled Groundnuts in Mali, 1953-67 (in tons) Groundnuts Groundnuts Year Marketed Yeai Marketed 1953 68,900 1961 85,700 1954 55,000 1962 66,900 1955 80,000 1963 73,600 1956 85,500 1964 72,100 1957 83,400 1965 44,800 1958 97,000 1966 27,900 1959 85,800 1967 39,000 1960 50,100 3. This decline in marketing may or may not reflect a decline in production: no information on groundnut production in Mali is very reliable. An increased proportion of the crop may have been consumed on the farm or marketed outside authorized channels (with long land frontiers close to the groundnuts region, smuggling across the border is apparently a marked phenomenon). -2- -. Volume probably declined as a result of changes in marketing organization. Before independence, a number of French processing companies competed for farmersr production through efficient networks of bl7ers who were Malian middlemen. These buyers went to all the small country markets in the harvest months of January, February, and March, where they competed in buying prices (set by the companies). At the same time, they brought with them basic consumer goods, such as oil for oil lamps, cloth and other staples, which they offered to farmers immediately after buying their harvests. 5. According to experienced observers, farmers did not receive good prices under this system, but processing companies did closely control their networks of buyers so that farmers were paid the companies' full price, and buyers did not receive too large a commission. 6. With independence, the processing companies disappeared along with other colonial institutions. To replace the former marketing structure, the Government attempted to create a cooperative movement. Farmers were grouped in village cooperatives. Village cooperatives were combined into cooperative groups, and these in turn were combined into cooperative federations. Theoretically, only the cooperative groups could legally buy groundnuts; but, in fact, they had few means to per- form their function. For example, the director of the "circle" of Kita had 2 trucks with which to serve his circle (a circle is the third of five administrative levels--nation, region, circle, arrondissement, village). At present (1972), Operation Arachide employs 20 trucks for its marketing operation in the same area. 7. Without the means to perform their functions, the directors of the cooperative groups turned to private merchants who could buy ground- nuts and provide them with their district quotas. These merchants were the former middlemen of the processing companies. However, whereas before independence the companies had tightly controlled their buying operations, now the buyers had.a much freer hand. Since only the cooperative groups could buy groundnuts legally, the directors could not admit that they were using private merchants. Consequently, the buyers, less strictly controlled, paid progressively lower prices for groundnuts. Furthermore, the official price was lowered in 1965 from 14 FM to 13 FM. In addition to these factors, consumer goods became even scarcer during the financial difficulties of the early sixties. This scarcity probably affected the incentives for farmers to grow more cash crops. 8. In an attempt to reverse this drop in marketed groundnut production, the government of Mali developed a five-year plan in 1965 to be implemented by the existing agricultural extension service. The major emphases of the program were to be the use of fungicides and insec- ticides on seeds, use of chemical fertilizers, and improved cultivating techniques. However, the program, largely drawn up and financed by FED (the European Development Fund), contained several faults. First, it did not include provision for improved seeds. Second, the existing extension service was not sufficiently trained in the technical improvements which -3- it was supposed to introduce. And third, the program included no mar- keting organization which could assure farmers an outlet for their crop. This last point seems to have been a failure of the team of agronomists planning the operation. They were relatively unfamiliar with marketing problems and were also constrained from leaving Bamako, which prevented them from seeing the real problems facing farmers. B. Operation Arachide 9. Faced with the failure of this five-year program, the Malian government decided to try a new, more integrated approach, with financing from the French aid agency (FAC) and technical assistance from BDPA (Bureau pour le Developpement de la Production Agricole). In May 1967, Operation Arachide was created. The first crop year, 1967-68, was devoted almost exclusively to the design of the program and the estab- lishment of a marketing network in a limited area within the groundnuts region. In 1968-69, extension and training work began on a series of technical themes designed to raise the yields of groundnuts in the operationts area, which was extended substantially over the previous year. In 1969-70, these activities were continued and, for the first time, quantitative targets were established for marketing and area covered. In addition, during this year other rural activities were initiated under the program. Details of these are given below. 10. Organization. The initial financing agreement provided for Operation Arachide to be managed by a semi-autonomous agency. Since the purpose of the initial thrust was to concentrate on 1he areas supplying the oil mill at Koulikoro, the Malian co-director of the operation was to be the head of the oil mill. However, the :Malian government subsequently requested that the operation be subordinated to the Director of the Agricultural Service in the Ministry of Production. FAC and BDPA agreed to this change. The current French Director of Opera- tion Arachide, M. Giordano, feels that this change has been important for the successful integration of the operation into Malian governmental structures. All Malian personnel in the operation are drawn directly from the Agricultural Service. 11. However, this change does present challpnges in defining the relationship between the operation and the Malivn administrative struc- ture (especially for the future when French expatriates will be phased out). Prior to the establishment of the operation, local agricultural staff were freqtiently subject to direct interference from officials in the local administration. For example, a circle commandant (roughly the equivalent of a district officer) could request the vehicle of an agricultural officer for a week's trip. The latter had no choice but to comply and thus was unable to carry out his own duties in super- vision and training of extension agents at local levels. 12. This blurring of lines of authority between technical and administrative services in the Malian government still lurks in the 14- background of Operation Arachide. The political problem has in part been overcome by the immunity of the French expatriates to certain of the pres- sures exerted by the district administrators. In addition, employees at the zone level in the operation address themselves directly to the governors of the regions, thus bypassing the circle commandants who have been the more troublesome in the past. Finally, operation cadres have always taken care to inform the circle commandants and lower administrative officials of their actions. Local administrators receive reports every ten days on the operation's activities. Foreign experts who happen to visit areas of the operation are always introduced to the commandant and lower officials in a courtesy visit. When the consultant visited Zones I and II of Operation Arachide, he was accompanied by operation personnel to visit each local administrator through whose territory they passed. 13. For Operation Arachide to operate as an independent technical service, however, still requires the insulation of expatriate personnel. To what extent the operation can succeed in resisting the interference of local administrators after the expatriate personnel leave is a difficult question which will be assessed below. 14. A simplified organization chart of Operation Arachide (set out below) describes the principal components of the operation under the Agricultural Service- Ministry of Production Agricultal Service Operation Arachide Directors H.Q. staff Technical Service Accoutantfs Logi tics Office 1) Extension Office (supplies, 2) Training vehicles, etc.) Regional . organizations IZnes (4) Sub-fectors Rural Eayansion Zones (ZER; 47) Base Sectors (Secteurs de Base; lowest operational level; 253) C. The Expatriates' Role and the Viability of the Organization 15. Whether Operation Arachide has become a viable organization whose Malian personnel can run it is an important question. A set of institutional relationships appropriate to this function exists because Operation Arachide is an organization independent of the administration, with financial autonomy. It no longer depends on a subsidy from the national budget to finance its local personnel and operations, but instead supports itself. 16. In addition, a team of qualified Malians does exist to take over the operation progressively as the expatriates change from directors of the project to advisors (conseillers techniques) in March 1973. The French director of the operation has attempted to prepare Malians from the beginning to take over by involving all top-level members, both Malian and expatriate, in important decisions, and by creating pedagogical situations such as annual preparation of the budget in which Malians could develop needed skills. 17. More important, at the beginning of the operation a serious effort was made to open communications between expatriates and Malians. A number of persons interviewed remarked that a seminar at the beginning of the operation enabled potential psychological conflicts, such as Malians' suspicion of the expatriates' attitudes toward them as Africans, or the expatriates' frankly paternalistic and even racist views toward Africans, to be discussed frankly and dealt with. The result has been the development of a close-knit team with a high degree of enthusiasm and cooperation. 18. The number of posts in the operation held by expatriates reached a high of 17 in 1969-70 and is now declining. These posts include those of Director, Chief of Extension and Training (Service Technique), sector chiefs and zones. The following table notes the past and projected number of expatriate personnel through 1977-78. Expatriate Personnel 1/ 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 11 l4 17 17 16 12 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 13 10 6 2 2 Figures for 1967-73 from BDPA reports for years 1967-72 and from M. Giordano, 1973; figures for 1973-78 from PMWA, office memo, February 3, 1972, letter No. 31 from Messrs. el Moghazi, U. Fontana and R. Egli. D. Broad Outline of Activities Over the Past Five Years and Projected Role 19. During its first year (1967-68), Operation Arachide concentrated on re-establishing an effective marketing system in the circles of Kolokani, Banamba, and Koulikoro. The attached map shows the territorial evolution of the operation through 1970. In 1971-72, the area in the circle of Kayes north of the Senegal River was dropped from the operation because of the limited success with the Kasonhe and Sarakole people in that area. Instead, the operation concentrated on the Malinhe people to the south of the Senegal River and has moved into the circle of Kenebia. In addition, the northern circle of Nara was added. 20. After organizing a marketing system in 1967-68, the operation, through its extension agents, began to teach first more productive cultivating methods and then modernized techniques. The more productive methods include: (a) Sowing in line (instead of seeding in handmade, randomly- placed mounds); (b) Sowing early (before June 30); (c) Sowing with a greater density (minimum of 90,000 seeds per hectare); (d) Treating seeds with fungicide and insecticide before sowing; (e) Using improved seeds; and (f) Using fungicide for seeds of mil, together with other appropriate methods for food crops.. 21. After these methods were taught, agents then slowly introduced Phase II: modernized practices for selected farmers (a) Clearing fields of all stumps; (b) Using animal traction, especially with the two implements of multicultivators and seeders; and (0) Using crop rotation. The usual example in the arachide area was the use of groundnuts and mil in alternation for four years in one field, followed by three to four years of fallow. Zone I (circles of Koulikoro and Banamba) and Zone II (circles of Kolokani, Nara, and Mourdiah) entered Phase II in 1969-70. Zone III (the circle of Kita) entered Phase II in 1971-72, Zone IV (the circles of Kayes, Kenebia, and Bafourabe) is still in Phase I. 二 Map 2.- TERRITORIAL DEMOPMENT OF OPERATION ARACHIDE Manritania Niafounké Nara la Doventza A i Is MOPTI 1h Tenenkou 01 Bandia ara < Koro Djenné 0 Bankass acina Banamba n ZÅanj N P- iman pita /Koljäkoro B A 0 Yo?osso Diöl ti i Kan 3 a Guinea o . uni sý 5 5 Isq in 1967 National boundary xlon leba in 19% Regional boundary o 134 19 6 9 Circle boundary JAV I.Limit of the National capital. operation outsiýip the Ivory Coast operation @ Regional capital Scale -1 s.omodo Circle capital, 0 50 100 1.50 200 KrI -9- 22. The extension of Operation Arachide from 1973-74 to 1977-78, to be financed by the Bank, wi'l introduce several new aspects: (a) A greater emphasis on increasing food crop (millet and sorghum) production; (b) Improvement of the functional literacy program supposedly coordinated with the emphasis of Operation Arachide in the groundnuts area, which began in 1969; (C) A training program for local blacksmiths to enable them to repair and make spare parts for the new farm implements3 (d) A health program in Zone IV to attack the problem of river blindness; (e) A well-digging program in the northern part of Zone II; and (f) A road-improvement program, to be financed separately. With these new aspects, Operation Arachide takes on the guise of an integrated development project, instead of a narrowly-focused cash crop project. 23. However, the expatriate director, M. Giordano, feels that this is natural progression of such a project; a cash crop must be the engine of growth because one cannot interest farmers in change without the increase in income resulting from the introduction of a cash crop. In M. Giordano's view of rural development, one is changing farmers' methods of work and this is an extremely difficult first step. Once the first step is taken, however, the process accelerates. It then becomes essential to take account of all those interdependent aspects-- roads, education (especially for basic skills such as calculations and farm management), health, livestock, marketing of consumer goods, and the agricultural equilibrium of individual farms--that begin to enter the process. II. RESULTS A. Production, Marketing and Farmer Revenue 24. The FAC feasibility study of 1970 on Operation Arachide provides a general view of the Malian agricultural sector. The following table sug- gests some of its characteristics in 1970. l/ 1/ It is necessary to note that there has never been any population census in Mali and that these figures are based on sagples and more spurious criteria, such as the number of people who pay taxes (Ken Forpe). - 10 - Total population of Mali (estimate) 4,740,800 Rural population 4,442,000 Agricultural population 3,950,000 Active agricultural population (age 15-60) 2,059,520 Number of villages 9,5Q0 Average active population per village 217 Average active population by farm 5.13 Total cultivated surface 1,778,400 Average size of farm 4.43 ha 25. In Operation Arachide at this time (1970), the comparable figures were as follows: 1/ Total population 669,000 2/ Number of villages 1,515 Active agricultural population by village 227 Active agricultural population per farm 4.99 Total cultivated surface 263,000 ha Total surface in groundnuts 79,400 3/ Average size of a farm 3.3 ha 26. The FAC feasibility study also provides a breakdown of the number of farms with various numbers of people and area in Operation Arachide. The figures show that 60 percent of the farms in the operation had 1-5 active workers (ages 15-60) and 37 percent of the total cultivable area, with an average farm size of 2.36 ha. Twenty-eight percent of the farms had 5-10 active workers with 37 percent of the cultivable area and an average size of 4.46 ha. Ten percent of the farms had 10-20 active workers with 24 percent of the cultivable area and an average farm size of 9-10 ha. 27. Since the operation has expanded in area and population, it is useful to examine the trend. 4/ 1/ FA0 feasibility study on Operation Arachide, 1970, pp. 20-22. 2/ "Rapport Operation Arachide," 1970. 3/ Ibid. 4/ Figures come from "Rapports Operation Arachide," 1968-72. However, both population and area figures are uncertain: area figures especially since a large proportion of farmers do not know and cannot measure the size of their fields. - 11 - Population in Area in groundnuts Population Area in groundnut area outside the in groundnuts Year outside operation operation (ha) operation in operation (ha) 1967-68 ? 173,000 268,000 46,200 1968-69 2,819,000 173,300 327,000 45,6oo 1969-70 2,661,000 175,000 669,000 79,400 1970-71 2,706,000 200,000 687,000 102,600 1971-72 2,760,000 162,400 727,000 92,364 28. The other side of the general picture is, of course, the trend in production and marketing. 1/ Groundnut Production and Marketing (in metric tons) Production Production Marketing Marketing outside inside outside inside Year operation operation ration tion 1967-68 ? 18,000 19,00 10,500 1968-69 74,545 24,000 14,900 14,490 1969-70 76,009 56,665 18,509 38,074 1970-71 87,542 68,507 28,349 46,057 1971-72 76,934 75,185 15,583 43,960 29. The first important question that must be addressed in the effect of the operation on production and marketing independent from factors affecting the whole groundnut zone. The two most important outside factors common to the whole zone are price changes and rainfall. During the period of the operation, the government has raised the producers! price from 16 FM in 1967 to 24 FM in 1968, following the devaluation, and to 30 FM (the present price) in 1970. The rainfall during the years of the project can be characterized as follows: 2/ 1/ Figures from "Rapports Operation Arachide," 1967-72. Of these figures the most reliable are of course the figures for marketing since these quantities are reasonably well known. Production data are less sure, since farmers keep for personal consumption and sell a portion of their production (30-50 percent). Further a significant portion of the production is sold on the parallel market within the countr-y or smuggled out to neighboring countries such as Senegal or Mauritania where the prices for groundnuts are 45 FM/kg respeetively, compared to 30 FM/kg in Mali. 2/ Tapport Operation Arachide," 1970-71, Vol. I, p. 55. - 12 - Year Rainfall 1967-68 good 1968-69 disastrous 1969-70 very good 1970-71 mediocre 1971-72 mediocre Of course, such a general statement on rainfall is an oversimplification, since rainfall varies greatly among the various circles and even arrondisse- ments. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable to expect that yields over the period 1970-72 might be lower than those in 1967-68 solely on the basis of rainfall. This appears to have been true outside tIe operation; inside it, however, yields doubled over this period. 30. Two measures that suggest the effect of the project are the trends of productivity per hectare and quantity marketed per hectare. These measures in part correct for the expanding area of the operation and suggest the effect of the project itself on production. Comparison between Production and Marketing per Hectare Inside and Outside OpEation 1/ Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity produced/ha produced/ha marketed/ha marketedAa outside inside outside inside Year o raionQ(kg) operation (kg) operation (kg) operation (kg) 1967-68 ... .. ... 227 1968-69 430 $26 86 318 1969-70 434 714 106 480 1970-71 438 668 142 449 1971-72 474 810 96 476 31. Productivity per hectare in the area of the operation increased substantially over five years, and it seems reasonable to attribute this increase to the operation, since productivity per hectare outside of the operation varies little. Likewise, the larger quantities marketed inside the operation area indicate a superior marketing operation, which was in fact the first goal of Operation Arachide. 1 ' "Rapports Operation Arachide," 1968-72. - 13 - a. Description of the Marketing Operation 32. The marketing operation organized by Operation Arachide is one of the main components of the project. Observers generally concede that the decimated marketing system after independence was a major factor in the decline of groundnut marketing (no one is sure whether total produc- tion varied that much) in the 1960's. The marketing operation begins in late fall with the establishment of buying points by the extension agents of the operation in consultation with the growers committees of the districts. Differences of opinion over the location of buying points which cannot be settled at the level of the arrondissement are taken up by the growers committees of the circles. This higher committee includes peasant representatives without voting power and are chaired by the commandants of the circles. 33. Two rul-s of thumb In pfking buying points are, first, that the amounl purchased will not be r-;n ttan 100 toons and, second, that no village will be more than 7 kin from , buying poinf., Transportation of the farmers' harvests from the village,s occurs through an operation called "drainage". In the past trucks belonging to or rented by the operation picked up quant ities of at lpast 4-5 metric tons and carried them free of charge to buying points. Now, in sectors like Koulikoro where animal traction is beginning, "drainage', is no longer free in order to encourage the purchase of carts by farmers. 34. At buying points, buying teams hired by the operation purchase the groundnuts and send them on to the Societes d'6tat, SEPOM (oil mill), or Somiex (the import-export company) to be further processed or exported. 35. The process by whichfarmers' groundauts are purchased at the buying points occurs in the following way. The individual farmer brings his sacks of groundnuts first to the government agent who certifies the number of sacks and the quality of the nuts. The farmer receives a receipt and takes the receipt with his sacks to the weigher, who fills out a receipt for the peasant and also tells him the weight in Bambara, the dominant national language. Finally, the farmer passes to the payer who pays the farmer (while also telling him in Bambara the amount of the payment) and who accepts credit repayments if the farmer wishes to repay his loans at that time. But it is the farmer's choice to repay his loans for fertilizer and implements. After the day's purchases, the last member of the buying team, the "pointeur," checks the number of sacks of groundnuts and stores them for transport to the Societes d'6tat. b. Value of Marketed Production--Revenue per Hectare over Time--Production Costs Netted Out. 36. To provide some idea of the change in farmer income, the change in value of marketed production over time (noting price changes) will be presented inside and outside the operation. Secondly, production costs will be deducted to arrive at a net figure. This net figure will not include the costs of animal traction, however, which will be presented later. 37. In comparison with these actual global figures, the best possible yields per hectare of groundnuts using all the suggested methods will be shown to indicate the potential goal for revenue per hectare. 38. Examining Tables 1 and 2, entitled farmer revenue per hectare inside and outside of the operation, one first notices a marked difference under net revenue per hectare not net production costs, which outside of the operation reached a high of 4,252 FM/ha in 1970-71. Inside the operation, the revenue per hectare reaches a high of 14,385 FM. Of course, global averages obscure a number of important differences between zones. Second, production costs within the operation are over three times as great--7,350 FM/ha as compared to 2,050 FM/ha outside of the operation. 'ven so, when these higher production costs are subtracted (using produc- tion costs of 1972 for all years since there are no data on the changes in price of the inputs), the net revenue per hectare within the operation is obviously superior. This superiority of revenue stems from the more efficient marketing system within the operation and the higher yields per hectare--810 kg/ha produced within the operation as compared to 474 kg/ha outside the operation. 39. The second factor that one must take into account in evaluating the operation's effect is the price change from 24 FM/kg to 30 FM/kg in 1970. When one holds the price constant and calculates net revenue per hectare, the effect of the operation appears more clearly. 4O. What has happened to farmers' real income? With such low incomes (6,925 FM/ha or $1h in 1971-72), perhaps it is not very useful to talk about prices, but it would seem necessary that farmers sense some increase of their incomes to encourage their participation in the operation. First, a study by Henry Panhuys entitled "Contribution . la solution du Probleme Cerealier au Mali" (July 5, 1972), offers one estimation of the change in the cost of living from 1964-65 to 1971-72. Cost of living index, Year officil 1rices Black market 1964-65 100 100 1971-72 152 188 Second, prices quoted by M. Bagouro, the Malian co-direc -or of Operation Arachide suggest the change in official and black market prices for essential goods. Table 1: FARMER REVENUE PER HECTARE - OUTSIDE OPERATION ARACHIDE Farmer value of Total production Farmer Marketed farmer Traditional at constant revenue Net revenue production revenue Total Revenue production Net price per ha per ha FM (metric 1000's area per ha costs per Revenue 24 FM/kg at constant at constant Year tons of FM (ha) FM ha 1972 ha FM prices p r i c e FM RIce Farmer price 1967-68 19,5O0 468,000 173,000 2,70c 2,050 FM/ha 655 468,000 2,705 65 24 FM/kg 1968-69 14,900 357,600 173,300 2,063 60 kg of 13 399,6oo 2,063 13 seeds at Farmer price 1969-70 18,509 555,270 175,000 2,776 30 FM/kg 726 444,216 2,538 488 30 FM/kg 1970-71 28,349 850,470 200,000 4,252 and 2,202 680,376 3,4ol 1,351 " 1971-72 15,583 467,490 162,400 2,878 250 FM for 828 373,992 2,302 252 tools Source: BDPA - Operation Arachide reports, 1968-1972. FM Malian francs. Table 2: FARMER REVENUE PER HECTARE - INSIDE OPERATION ARACHIDE Total Total Farmer farmer Farmer Marketed farmer Total revenue Net revenue- revenue Net production revenue area in per ha Production revenue constant per ha at revenue at (metric 1000's groundnuts current costs per per ha price of constant constant Year tons) o f FM 24 FM/k rice FM rice Fm Price 1967-68 10,500 252,000 46,200 5,454 7,350 - 1,896 252,000 5,454 - 1,896 24 FM/kg FM/kg 1968-69 14,490 367,760 45,600 7,626 + 276 347,760 7,626 + 276 (see below) Price 1969-70 38,074 1,142,220 79,400 14,385 + 7,035 913,776 11,508 + 4,158 0 FM/kg 1970-71 46,057 1,381,710 102,600 13,466 6,116 1,105,368 10,773 + 3,423 1971-72 43,960 1,318,800 92,365 14,278 6,928 1,055,040 11,422 + 4,072 Production Costs, Inside Operation Arachide - without animal traction - per hectare 3,450 FM for 100 kg improved seeds at 34.5 FM/kg 150 FM for 1 bag of fungicide/insecticide 3,500 FM for fertilizer - 65 kg/ha (1972 dose and price) 250 FM for small tools (Kellerman and Courtant estimate) 7350FM Actual Prices, of inputs - real price as opposed to farmer price Improved seeds - 50-60 FM/kg instead of 34.5 FM/kg (farmer paying less than real price) Fertilizer - 6-20-10 (65 kg/ha) 37 FM/kg instead of 40 FM/kg for farmer (farmer pays more than real price) Source: BDPA - Operation Arachide reports. -17- Salt Sugar Oil Oil Lamps Cloth !=Fg) F g)(FM71-iter) (_FM Wmeer) 1967-68 15 125 65 450 130 1972-73 official prices 40 250 100 800 225 1972-73 black market (July-Aug.172) 100 300 There is no data on consumption patterns, but it is obvious that part of any increase in farmer income in Operation Arachide has been nullified by rising prices. Of course, groundnut producers outside the operation are even worse off. c. Potential Yields 41. We have seen some overall averages on changes in revenue per hectare. Now let us look at what the best average yields for the whole operation can be following the various new methods of cultivation. The following totals are cumulative; that is, the increase in yield occasioned by the next technique is added to the previous level: Best Possible Average Yields with New Techniques 1/ Traditional methods 500 kg/ha + early sowing 600 kg/ha + correct density 800 kg/ha + fungicide, insecticide 850 kg/ha + selected seeds 950 kg/ha + fertilizer 1,200 kg/ha Total ravenue per hectare = 1,200 x 30 36,000 FM/ha Minus production costs - 7,350 2,650 FM/ha Minus auto-consumption 4,500 42. The resulting net revenue figure per hectare is between three and four times the pre ent figure (6,929 FM/ha in 1971-72). However, the average productivity per hectare of 810 kg/ha is two-thirds the projected goal of 1,200 kg/ha. Thus the net revenue per hectare should be on the order of 16,000 FM/ha at present. There exist several possible explanations for the difference. First, the figures for production and for hectares planted in groundnuts may be on the high side, since they can only be estimates. 3econd, estimates of on-farm consumption may be too low. Third, and moat important, a large percentage of the production I/ Messrs. Courtant and Kellerman, FAC and IBRD Study of Operation Arachide, 1972. - 18 - may be sold on the parallel market within Mali and/or smuggled out of the country to be sold at much higher prices in Mauritania, Senegal, and Upper Volta, and thus does not enter the official marketing figures. 43. During the next five years of Operation Arachide, extension agents will emphasize improved techniques on food crops: millet and sorghum. Below are the potential improved yields from the new techniques. Again the figures are cumulative.1/ Millet Sorghum (kg/7ha) TkT/ha Traditional meIhods 500 650 + fungicide, insecticide 595 750 + effect of Certilizer used on groundnuts (same field) previous year 725 900 + effect of working land with multicultivators 850 1,100 44. For an example of the present spread that exists between various sectors in the operation, here are the average net revenues for groundnuts on average farms in the sectors of Banamba and Kita. Banamba has made the least progress so far in the operation, while Kita is the most advanced. The yield figures assumed, however, that all techniques are u5ed: early sowing, density, fungicide and insec- ticide, selected seeds and fertilizer.2/ Average Area in arn(hal g nuts(ha) Yield (kg) Net revenue (FM) Banamba 2.1, 1.22 1,463 30,757 Icita 5.91 2.66 3,068 71,796 The net revenue figures include deductions for both production costs and autoconsumptiona Howver, the crucial assumption is that farmers will market all 'their prodution through official channels--a large assumption at present. 1/ Messrs. Courtant and Kellerman, FAC and IBRD study of Operation Arachide, 1972- 2/ Messrs. Kellerin and Courtant, interview of FAC exports, June 11, 1972. - 19 d. Animal Traction 45. As mentioned above, the introduction of animal-drawn implements occurs in the second stage of the extension operation together with the total clearing of fields and crop rotation. In increasing productivity per worker and in enabling the expansion of farm size (always in concert with intensive techniques), animal traction enables the small farmer to increase his income sufficiently to better noticeably his material conditions. 46. One estimate of the time saved in man-days per hectare for both groundnuts and millet is as follows.l/ Time required (days) gro undnuts--l crop millet--1 crop Total Traditional methods 116 78 194 Multicultivator + seeder (oxen) 79 64 144 Multicultivator + seeder + cart 73 59 132 Thus, the estimated time saved is 62 days. Of course, one might ask if some other possibilities for productive activity will be possible. 47. In addition, one must count the added costs, which include the farmer prices (which are subsidized) of the new implements, oxen, and upkeep costs for animals and tools. Fatr -price (FMN) Cst/year (4) Amortization (years) Multicultiva'tor 309000 4,286 7 Seedei 18,500 3,700 5 Cart--1,000 kg 32,800 4,684 7 2 oxen 60 000 0 Resell after 3 years for meat at a higher price than was paid Animal feed 3,024 Yoke 600 Medicine for oxen 1,000 Tax--800 M/ox 1,600 Upkeep on tools 3,000 Pique-f ouilleurs 2,520 Replaced each year 27,76 1/ M. Kellerman, FAC expert for FAG-IBRD feasibility study, interview June 11, 1972. - 20 - 48. The questionable assumptions which make this total understated are: first, that farmers will learn to buy young oxen and take care of them so that they can sell them as beef animals for more than they paid; and second, that the amortization periods will be so long. 49. Accordingly, wita an added cost of 24,461 FM/year, a farmer must produce and sell 81 kg of groundnuts (814 x 30 FM/kg = 24,420 FM) to break even. If one assumes that he will be following all the sug- gested techniques, he will be obtaining at least 1,200 kg/ha; therefore, he must increase his area cultivated in groundnuts by at least 2/3 ha to pay for animal .raction. Howevc, with animal traction, he will be able to cultivate at l 3-4 additional hectares while at the same time improving his yields of f9od crops. Consequently, he can plant at least half of the additional area in grouxiidnuts and will obtain noticeable increase in income. At present very few farmers in the operation now own oxen and equipment. 50. But the object of a growing number of farmers is to obtain several sets of oxen and implements with the goal of expanding their farms, to a size of 15 ha. One might ask, of course, whether general expansion of farm size is feasible. According to many sources there exists no land pressure within the groundnut zone. For the foreseeable future, let us say the next generation, there should be no problem for any farmer in expanding the amount of land he cultivates to 15 ha, or more. This farm aise can require two to three pairs of multicultivators and seeders, depending on the number of active workers on the farm. B. Progress in the Ado bion of New Techniques a. Training, of Extension Personnel 51. In OperaLion Arachide, the twin functions of extension and training are centra.ized0 The operation hires personnel trained through the Malian agriiiltural eduLication system for most posts. For example, sector chiefs and somp sub-sector chiefs have diplomas from the Rati- bougore Rural InstUtte. Their training consists of three years after the ba n ( myear education. 52. Aftei entering the operation, however, all extension personnel receive additionaltr While graduates of the government agricul- tural schools generally iave adequate technical knowledge, they receive little training in p.rsonal contacts and in the social and psychological dimensions of their work. As emphasized by M. E. Mang, the expatriate director of the Service Technique of Operation Arachide, training exten- sion agents in the techniques to be employed is much less difficult than training them to lead village meetings,to inspire the confidence of farmers, and to convince farmers to follow their advice. 53. Since many of the extension agents at the lowest level,the base sector, are young men from the larger towns, this human contact side of -21- the operation becomes more difficult. Farmers who have been planting food crops and groundnuts for years do not accept advice easily from young men who, in addition, have little farming experience. (The exten- * sion agents have little or no farming experience because the opertion recruits them through written examinations from the graduates of the nine-year basic education course, and to complete that course one must go to school for the last years in the towns.) Thus the farmers are likely to test the young agens agricultural knowledge and can often trip them up. The extension agents who are former agents from the government Agriculture Service are older and face less of a problem in this respect. 5h. But, in elther case, the extension workers are asking farmers to change their traditional wrc(k habits and methods, an extremely dif- ficult first step. To explain and bring acceptance of the new.techniques, the extension workers principally employ village meetings. When an agent first presents a new technique to a village, he is supposed to note carefully what people attend--young men, the chief of the village, a representative of the chief of the village, older farmers. He then visits in the fields those farmers who are following the new techniques to be sure they are working correctly. 55. During the planing and growing season from May through September, extension agents have two days of training every two weeks by their sub- sector chief. In these meetings they report their progress from the previous two weeks and receive explicit instructions on what techniques they are to emphasize during the next two weeks, such as treatment of seeds, early sowing, preparatory plowing, or application of fertilizer. The fact that sub-sector chiefs train extension agents illustrates the principle of "Pyramid training-, common to both Operation Arachide and the CFDT's coi,ton operation.l/ The Service Technique in Bamako trains the zone chiefs who train their sector chiefs who in turn train their sub-sector chiefs. One must then ask, how well is the information transmitted down the chain? The only evidence available lies in the progress in the adoption of the various suggested techniques. 56. An extension gent's secteur de base includes, on the average, 6-10 villages with 200-200 Parmers (that is, heads of farms) and 1,200- 1,500 people.2/ The iop persoinel of Operation Arachide insist that all farmers are a7fected in an area in which they are operating (in contrast to the CFDT's prtctice of recording the numbers of farmers actually participating). In fact, however, extension agents concentrate on the villages and farmers who are making more progress.. And when extension agents begin to introduce animal traction in their i1secteurs de base,rt their efforts inevitably become more restricted to the individuals adopting animal traction because it is critical that they succeed. Specialized agents to introduce animal traction were foreseen, but they are not sufficient in number in the zones where animal traction is appearing. 1/ See Part B for OFDTs Gotton Operation. 2/ "Rapport Operation Arachide," 1969, p. 29. - 22 - b. Adoption of New Techniques and of Animal Traction 57. What has been the progress on the adoption of the new techniques? First, for the use of selected seeds, the progress is as follows:l/ Selected Seeds Year Area sowed (ha) % of area covered 1968-69 4,927 10.10 1969-70 8,319 14.34 1970-71 15,394 19 1971-72 14,695 16 58. For early sowing, progress has been somewhat slow.2/ Early Sowing % of area % of area in sowed before groundnuts sowed Year No. of circles June 30 No. of circles before July 15 1970-71 2 15 2 60 3 20 2 70 1 30 1 80 1 40 1 100 1971-72 1 30 1 75 1 45 3 80 5 50 4 85 1 70 - - These results mean that in 1970-71, for example, of a total of seven circles in four zones, two circles had 15 percent of their ground area sowed before June 30. In three circles 20 percent of the groundnut area was sown before June 30, and so on. 59. Usor fungic ide-in secticide in treating seeds has also been slow to expand becau8e of he poor quality of product furnished by the SCAER (Societe du Credit Agicole et de 1'Equipement Rural) in the first years of the operation and berause of the low return to the technique (see below)-- approximately 50 additional kilograms of output per hectare. 1/ "Rapports Operation Arachide,.1 1969-72. 2/ "Rapports Operation Arachide," 1970 and 1971. - 23 - Fungicide-Insecticide, Groundnuts.l/ Objective, Result, Result, surface to surface surface to Year be treated treated be treated () 1967-68 6,238 - 1968-69 - 9,9141 21 1969-70 19,077 11,229 19 1970-71 25,720 18,556 18 1971-72 46,ooo 22,491 24 The operation also counsels treatment of millet seeds with insecticide and fungicide. Fungicide-Insecticide, Millet 2/ Objective, surface Result, surface Year to be treated to be treated (ha) 1967-68 2,305 1968-69 - 9,606 1969-70 18,590 13,057 1970-71 24,120 11,205 1971-72 34,500 20,135 60. The progress in expanding the use of fertilizer has been satisfactory. The present dose is 65 kg/ha of 6-20-10 super phosphate.3/ Use of Fertilizer Objective, area Result, area % of area planted Year to be treated to be treated (ha) in groundnuts treated 1967-68 1,824 - 1968-69 - 4,925 9 1969-70 95197 5,707 10 1970-71 11,h55 20,527 20 1971-72 30,000 23,01 25 61. These preliminary techniques lead to the introduction of animal traction in combination with crop rotation. However, before a farmer can buy a multicultivator or seeder, he must completely clear at least one ha of land of all stumps. The operation pays a bonus of 3,000 FM for each hectare cleared, and the top personnel feel that only after a farmer has gone to the trouble of clearing has he proven that he will work seriously with the new implements. Further, when extension agents begin to introduce the new 1/ "Rapports Operation Arachide," 1969-72. 2/ Ibid. 3/ Ibid. implements in an area such as Koulikoro, they provide no more than five multicultivators per arrondissement and no more than two multicultivators per extension agent. 62. Such care is taken at the beginning because it is important that the first farmers trying the new implements succeed. In addition, during colonial times the French forced farmers in various parts of Mali to uie plows and oxen, but the plows were not suited for the cultivation of groundnuts, and farmers were not taught how to use them, in any case. For example, the FAC feasibility study of 1970 provides these results of a census taken of oxen and plows:1/ Oxen Plows Koulikoro 1,155 1,608 Banamba 3,356 2,185 Kolokani 812 192 5,323 3,985 63. At present, the three implements which Operation Arachide is beginning to introduce are multicultivators, seeders, and carts. The following table shows the growth of the total number of each in service. Agricultural Equipment in Service Year Multicultivators Seeders Carts 1969-70 79 - 132 1970-71 89 81 156 1971-72 466 213 395 64. As noted above, the farmer prices for the three implements are 30,000 FM for the multicultivator, 18,500 FM for the seeder, and 32,800 FM for the 1,000 kg cart. The operation offers credit with no interest for purchase of these implements. In order to encourage farmers to purchase both the multicu tivator and the seeder (which can be used for millet, sorghum, corn as well as groundnuts), farmers can purchase the pair for 16,000 FM in cash, 16,000 FM at marketing time the first year after and 16,500 FM the second year. If they purchase the multicultivator alone, they pay 15,000 FM in cash and 15,000 FM at marketing time the year after. To purchase the cart, they can pay one-half in cash and the remainder likewise at marketing time. 65. Farmers can also purchase seeds and fertilizer, as well as material,on credit. The following table recounts the total amounts given and reimbursed over the last four years.2/ l/ FAC feasibility study, Operation Arachide, p. 30. 2/ "Rapports Operation Arachide," 1970-71, vol. 1, and 1971-72. Credit Year Credit given FM) Credit received (Fr)payed 1968-69 37,163,000 2h,089,000 64 1969-70 51,335,000 .43,263,000 84 1970-71 118,871,000 99,780,000 8 1971-72 19,042,000 123,927,000 79 C. Cotsand BenLfib, Overall 66. Table 3 lists the best available approximation of the costs per year of the operation. They include the foreign aid of FAG and FED, the local funds provided by Mali itself, the credit for inputs, and the subsidy provided to the SCAER in 1971-72 (imputed in 1970-71). These cost figures are based on the low side in the category of input costs because the farmer prices of inputs are subsidized. The inclusion of the FED fertilizer subsidy (1967-70) and the SCAER subsidy (1970-72) corrects this to a certain degree. Benefits 67. The calculation of benefits in Table 4 has a number of problems. First, because of the gyrations of marketing over the years, it was difficult to decide on a base year. The year of 1967-68 was taken as a base year, since the project had had little effect except to begin to reorganize the marketing system. Then the difference between marketing in 1967-68 and the quantity marketed in the four succeeding years ias taken to estimate the increased quantity marketed as an effect of the project (Column 1). 68. Government revenues from the increased quantity marketed were calculated using the taxes per ton -which the government receives (Column 6). Then farmer revenue (at a constant price of 24 FM/kg) gained from the increased production (over 18,000 T in 1967-68) was added (Column 3). Thirdly, the difference between the quantity produced in the project area and the quantity mairketed was valud at the current producer's price for each year. This quantity ol groundnuts was used for individual consumption, seeds, and clandestine sales on the parall -xrket. By using the official price of 24 FM/kg (for 1968-69) and 30 FYi: (fr 1969-70, 1970-71, and 1971-72), the value of this production W n; 0 .bly understated since purchase prices on the parallel market are hyier than the official price. 69. Finally, by using the official bareme price to estimate the benefits to the government understates the benefits since in every year of the project the average margin between the world price of groundnuts and the official bareme price has been from 15,000 to 25,000 FM/ton (see Tables 5 -1 9T he barkme price for 1971-72 at a European port Table 3: COSTS - OPERATION ARACHIDE Costs of FED inputs as SCAER fertilizer Local total subsidies FAC FAC FAC FAC subsidy costs credit in place of Total personnel investment operation total 1oo's loo's extended FEDsubsidy Costs Yer10' FM 000 s FM_ FM 100sF MF 0OOsFivi 1000's FH (- 8) 1967-68 148,510 80,210 64,280 293,000 34,000 163,000 No credit - 0,00oo 1st year 1968-69 163,150 5l,80 65,960 281,000 33,000 163,000 37,463 - $16,h63 1969-70 230,516 98,012 56.200 384,728 33,000 163,000 51,335 - 632,063 1970-71 236,852 15,705 51,oLo 303,597 (see col.8) 163,000 118,871 46,057 631,926 (imputed) 1971-72 217,200 16,200 59,200 293,600 (see col.8) 204,196 159,042 43,960 700,198 (1000 FM per ton) ro Sources: FAC figures - from photocopies of FAC Conventions de Financement. FED figures - FAC feasibility study - Operation Arachide, 1970, p. 39. Local costs - from 1967-71 - BDPA Operation Arachide Report, 1970, tome I, p. 57. 1971-72 - from BDPA personnel in Mali Total credit - BDPA Operation Arachide Reports 1970-71, tome I, p. 263 1971-72, p. 50. SCAER subsidy (1970-72) - 1,000 FM/ton - from bareme (price sheet), 1971-72 added same amount, or 1,000 FM per ton, to 1970-71 to make up difference between real and farmer prices of inputs since FED fertilizer subsidy (column 5) ends in 1969-70. Table 4: BENEFITS - OPERATION ARACHIDE Increased Farmer Government 68% of Total Increased production revenue taxes increased govern- production (total constant per ton marketed ment not Valie of production Increased price (price production taxes marketed unmarketed Total minus base marketed 24 FM/kg sheet) (yield after 1000's tons increased benefits yer in(00sTi FM' shellim:) M(eic routn1/ 368 Base lear - 18,000 10,00 - - - 1967-68 18,000 tons (metric) total production 1968-69 6,000 3,990 95,760 31,901 2,713 85,547 2,010 48,240 229,547 1969-70 38,665 27,574 661,776 21,051 18,750 394,706 11,091 332,730 1,389,212 1970-71 50,507 35,557 853,368 21,051 24,179 508,992 14,950 448,500 1,810,860 1971-72 57,185 33,460 803,040 15,951 22,753 362,993 23,725 711,750 1,877,783 1/ Based on prices in 1968-69 of 24 FM and of 30 FM in subsequent years. - 28 - Table 5: GROUNDNUTS EXPORTS - DRAFT SCHEDULE OF CHARGES CROP YEAR 1971/72 (In metric tons and Mali francs) Metric Malian tons francs 1. Cost of production 30,000 2. Collection cost 2,296 3. Handling, bagging 390 4. Baying commission 65o 56 Supervisory staff costs 4385 6. scAER subsidy 1,000 7. Wear and tear, bags and caxts 585 8. Waste, 15O Z of purchase price 450 9,756 9. cost rice04 gromndnats in shell 39,756 lo. Sdhee-d-e e,d Z ="6 -F(;Fe-rt 58)4641 11. Shelling cost 1>775 12. Cost price, machine-shelled 07, 239 13. Handling, loading 1,250 14. Land transport insurance 556 15. Bank interest 1,458 16. Wastage, etc., Africa 10 30304 17. Value on weighbridge 63,543 18. Road/rail transportation, duly weighted 5,502 19. Usual taxes 4,901 20. Special Export Tax 1,050 21. Prices Office Tax _,000 21,503 22. Value free to frontier U ,006 23. Transportation via Kidira/Dakar 6,880 24. Handling (? papei-ork), Dakar 3,526 10,4c06 25. Value FOB por- of loading 95,2 26. FOB to CIF costs 15,280 27. GIF value Annex 1 - Breakdown of pric.e of machine-shelled groundnuts Annex 2 - Broakdow of price of hand-shelled groundnuts PFODUCTION COST Groundnwts in shall - .....o.*..... F 30/kg Groundnuts, machine-shelled ....... F 18/kg Groundnuts, hand-ohelled F 50/kg COST OF SUPPLY SECCOS S0MIEX / SEPON SOMIEX ZONE OPERATION ZDNE In shell 33,350 -~9,L{5U Machine-.helled 51,350 60, 3Q5 Hand-shelLed 53,350 62, 305 COST OF RESUPPLY SEPON In shell 35,370 40,470 Mh0hina-sholled 53,985 61,M85 Hand-ahlled 55,755 63,255 - 29 - Table 6: GROUNDNUTS - DRAFT SCHEDULE OF CHARGES - CROP EAR 1970/71 PRICE TO GDWER 30,000 Transportation to place of purchase 1,500 Handling, bagging 390 Buying comission 60 ?2,54 SUPPLY COST 8000 S01IEX 32, 40 Wear and tear, bags and carts 585 Wastage, etc. 1 percent of purchase price 240 825 COST PRICE GRDUNDNUTS IN SILL SE0008 33,365 Shelled value, yield 68 percent 49,066 Shelling cost 1,720 MACHINE-SMELLED GOUNDTUTS 50,786 Handling, loading 1,280 Land transportation insurance 556 Bank interest 6 percent, 6 months + IAS 1,523 Wastage, etc., Africa 10 3 369 VALUE ON EIGHBRIDGE, MALI Road transpo:rtation, duly weighted, to Mali frontier 5,552 Usual taxes 4,901 Supervisory staff costs 9,150 Prices Office tax 7,000 26,603 Value free to frontier 80,7 8 Transportation via KIdira/Dakar 6 880 Value FOB port of loading in shell 32,540 Machine-shelled 51,000 Hand-shelled 53,000 - 30 - Table 7: uROUNDiiUTS - DRAFr,T SCHEDULE OF CHARGES - CROP YEAR 1969/1970 DOMESTIC PRICE TO GROWER 30,000 Tran-portation from Place of nurchase to Socco Somiex 2,600 Buying commission 650 Handlinr, bargin, 390 33,640 SUPPL COST OF GM01)NTS III SJÄL_ Wear and tear, bage and, carts: 19" x 15 =585 kaastare, etc. : 1 r'ercent of purehare price: 300 885 34 ,7525 COST PRICE OF GRO?TED S I SHELL. SEKCOS SOMIEX Shelled~ :alue, yield 68 oercent - 34,525 x 100 50,772 Shellin7 cost6 1,775 52,547 IACHLE-SHELLED GR 1) DTTF Handlin~., loadin7 1,280 Lnnd transportatiorn inrurance 556 Bank intere-lt 1 ,523 Wa,ta0o, etc., Africa 10 3,369 VADIE, Mý TIVGII -CWI'. 12111J Rand drnuoraion, dly wei2hted, to M-Ili frontier + IAS 6 cn5,552 Usual a ~ ,901 Special kpor,6 9,150 Pricer Offirce 7,000 26, 603 82,-519 VALDE FREE2 '"'0F!TE 6880 VALTIE FOP POR'T OIF LCAD% 89,399 ResuppY price In sheL 33,640 Machine-shelled ~ 53,000 Hand-shelled 55,000 Bamako, May 27, 1969 -31- Table 8: GROUVJUTS - S31EDULE OF CHARGES - 1968/1969 PRICE TO GROWER 24,000 Transportation to plice of purchase 1,500 Handling, baggi 390 Buyinr: comission 650 2,540 SUPPLY COST SECCOS SCMIEX Wear and tear, 1 gz -nd corts 585 Wastage, etc. 1 percont of purchane price 240 825 27,365 COST PRICE GROUNDv1TUS !l WPELL SECCOS Shelled vnlue, yicld !5 perc4nt 0.,242 Shellin ror-t 1,720 41,962 biACH1INE-SHEiLLED 3Rsni2 Hanidln, loainir 1,280 Land tranrportation ins-rnce 556 Bank interest 6- p)ercent, 6months + IAsý 1,523 Wästn7e,e AIfrica 10 3,369 45,331 VALUE Oi WE1 IGHID _E MALI Road trarnrport:t lon, dV1y :T ighte d, to eli frontier 5,552 jsrj t-axes 4,901 Spoial Epor r20, 000 Prirc- Offic,: 7,000 82,78h Tranportationi idirr/Dakar 6 .880 r lan- 8,p66yrice In hell 26,540 achine-sheliled 42,000 Hand-shelled 44,000 32 - Table 90 GROUIIDNJUTS - SCHEULE OF PRIGES - CROP YEAR 1964/1965 CAF PRICE 87,354 3ellin~ coimission 2. -ercent 2,370 Bonus 1 percant 862 1/2 weiuhin!, ro"rvion, e:pertiVo 334 .arinp insurance 350 Wastare, etc., rorc %.7 percent 670 Frei,ht 7,000 11,586 FOl `JALE 75,768 In Hali france: 37,884 Duties and taze7 6,604 VALiUE ,1X1I2 011F DKTuWC.iL 31, 280 Handlin, lovdin, 800 Oosts of acceptrince nd tora e 572 Depreciation rf 10TLL oan~ 650 ctare, e t, e Affri 10 2,032 VALU,E 01, 'UEICI 3WI D'h' OF LOADITP 29,248 Land trepor&tion incunce 278 Tran-porta-,tio,n Dakar vndVor Aibidjan 7,058 Ilacin, on umon 430 Hisellneor r ses200 7,966 VAL ~E 0P UElIP TPIDGE LALI 21, 282 Shelln, co, 1,100 Ba,r, carts 570 Harin, 300 Waa t,130 Buyinj comi o 500 2,600 'IE TO dYU k 42 66 12 Frs 69 "3K rounded 13 Frs FED S id1 Suport pri I 1 Frs - 33- Table 9, contd. DOMESTIC PRICE TO CROWE[ 13, 000 Transportation to place cf ourchas- 1, 000 PRICE AT CAPITAL CIT- F ICEC" -i000 Buying commision 500 Wkastage, 1 percent 130 Handling 300 Wear and Tear, bags and crts 190 : 15=570 1,500 PRICE OF RESTPUIPLY S0-iX I SMEL 15,500 Shelled rrroundnuitr,, yel .6 percent 15,500 s- 100 66~~ 23,500 Shelin and handlin- 1ostV i,100 Rounded up 25, 000 position was 110,612 FM/ton whereas the world price varied between 125,000 FM/ton and 13.,000 FM/ton. In the August 11, 1972 issue of Marches Tro icaux the rrent world price of groundnuts was quoted at between 12,000 and 128,000 FM/ton. 70, The fact that Mali enjoys this positive difference between its bareme price for gr oudnuat and the world price means that it can sustain its current government e, ' port %axes on groundnuts even as the world price begins to drop ac expec,ed by 30 percent. ITI. SED`OFTEGDAR OF OPERATION ARACHIDE A. Land Tenure, Socl Sysem and Migration 71. The populiton of 4al.i includes a number of ethno-linguistic groups, although Banbara is thp dominant language and ethnic group. Based upon an intr1cate system of castes (to be understood as social classes, not in the of Indian castes), the rural social system defines the roleu of blacksiiths, the shepherds, fishermen and farmers. 72. According to the 1970 FAC feasibility study of Operation Arachide quoted abovs 1,he 1,500 villages in the project area in 1970 had an average population of 227 active agricultural workers or between 1,000-2,000 people! Land belongs collectively to the village, and no explicit property law exists in the countryside. At the level of the individual farm, a fawily "owns" land because it works it. If a family wishes to increase thrt nt of land farmed, the head of the family by custom asks permiso of the village chief. It appears that no scarcity of cultivabale land exists now or in the foreseeable future. This question needs more invel i on, houever . Thus we can assume that family farms can expand undr thueo at,imal traction to the 15-20 ha size without causing serlou,, I 73. In le heads of families run individual farms with absolute uh'iS Th,ie number of people who follow one head's decisions may vryfj, to 0., with the usual number being 8-10. Heads of failies oc what orops are to be planted, where, and in what amountn. T uc hether to adopt the new techniques proposed by the agents of Opert5on Arachide, whether to purchase the new imple- ments, and how W0 diposeo of the farm's income. 74. It it law, po,,rwerp the distribution of the farm's income, which has contribt) d to the. migration of young men from the land in the cities of Mali and of ig_hboring countries. As young men in the villages began to expand hei hor1zons through wider travel and the appearance of consumer goods, such s ioycle and radios, their desire for their own income increase2- o they must have a sizeable amount of money-- about 30,000 FMfor t marriage price when they want to marry. In a family working a small aqount of land by traditional methods, no income remains after the hre too parcel out among the younger workers. Or a farm may bring a sizeable revenue, but the family head puts other needs before the desires of the young men to be married or to purchase clothes, a bicycle, and so on. 75. Consequently, young people have searched for a way to make money on their own. Several possibilities exist. They can attempt to cultivate their own parcels of land (half to one ha) in a cash crop like arachide, during their days off from the family farm or during evenings and at night after they finish work in the family fields. If the family head does not agree to their cultivating parcels of family land, they can walk into the bush and find a parcel of land on their own. A second possibility is to leave and try to find work in thp cities. The question in this case is whether young men leave only afber the planting season of June through September or whether they leave before and attempt to stay in the cities for several years, working as tailors, raiters, or taxi drivers if they are lucky enough to find jobs. 76. Where do they go? Depending on what region of the country they live in, they migrate to Bamako, to Bobo-Dioulasso in Upper Volta, to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, or to Dakar in Senegal. They often return if they make enough money to buy their brides, their bicycles, their radios, or clothing. 77. But what effect, if any, has Operation Arachide had on migration patterns? Of the farmers visted in the sector of Koulikoro, several in the village of Chola said that as income had increased with the increasing production of groundnuts, heads of families were sharing the increased income with young men. 78. L an experienced extension agent, Moulobali Diallo in Nyamina (sector of Koulikoro), said that as income increased, the heads of families weTe consideving the needs of the young men in their families and were buying them byide or giving them a share of the revenues. 79. The other pt of migration is the movement of seasonal workers. In Zone IV, noedoning Senegal, the movement of seasonal workers varies greatly from ynar to Xomr. According to Roland Deplessis, Zone Chief in 1970-71Y large numbori of seasinal workers came to the region. Their numbers increanad in 071-71 but decreased this year (1972-73) as the price for groundnuts rose In Sonegal and the seasonal workers moved across the border. 80. When seasonal workers come to an area and find a farmer who needs their labor, tiy work three to four days a week and receive room and board. The remaining days of the week, they work on a parcel of land by themselves which they plant in the cash crop of the area. Since they plant only cash crops, howover, they deorease the food crop surplus of an area and in years of bad raiN An contribute to a food shortage--rare in rural areas. The movement of seasonal workers in the groundnut zone are not as great as in the cotton zons, especially in the sector of Fana (see OFDT review). - 36 B. Food Crops 81. The second major concern under secondary effects is the question of Operation Arachide's effect on food crops. Mali has a cereal deficit in the urban areas and for the past two years has imported large quantities of American grain--2.,000 tons of sorghum in 1971-72 and 10,000 tons in 1972-73. 82. OPAX (Office des Prodiits Agricoles du Mali), the government agency charged with buying cereals to supply the cities, is consistently unable to fulfill its quota of 40,000 tons a year. For example, in 1970-71, it purchased 12,000 tons of cereals and in 1971-72, 26,000-27,000 tons. 83. The two basic reasons for the cereal deficit in the urban areas are the price structure and the weak marketing organization of OPAM. Since the government is sensitive to the demands of government civil servants for stable food prices, it is reluctant to raise the price of cereals-- now set at 18 FI/kg. However, the wide gap between this cereal price and the prices of groundnuts (30 FM/kg) and cotton (50 FM/kg) destroys any incentive for farmers to grow more food crops than they need. Further, neighboring countries offer mnch higher prices for cereals--Upper Volta's official price is 50 FI/kg and in Mauritania the price approaches 150 FM/kg in July and August. Smaggling is common, and a Mauritanian minister inforned one USAID official lthat Mauritania purchased 20,000 tons of cereals from Mali in 1972. 84. The seond factor behind the cereal shortage is the weakness of OPAM as a markeating organization. It lacks the personnel and funds to enter the cereals market early Thus private merchants buy up the stocks of cereals at low pri:es and hoard them. In July and August as the prices rise to 50-60 F-/kg theY resell these stocks. Thus the government's attempts to keep the ce:real' price low have thus led to a growing black market. One Mini3try f Production analysis of the situation estimates that in 1970 the black market carried on 58 percent of cereal sales and 67 percent of ereal parchases.1/ But our concern is Operation Arachide ' s effect on food crp 0roduction. 85. The dirction of Operation Arachide argues that the project has no deleteriou? effect orood production. They acknowledge that the large price gap between c Ireals (18 F4/kg) and arachide (30 FM/kg) destroys incentives for cereal production, but argue that the government should accordingly raise substantially the price of cereals. In fact, the USAID agricultural study mission recommended a price raise to 25-26 FM/kg and a reorganization of OPAM4 in combination with a millet production project that USAID is preparing, to implement in the Sixth Region--outside of the cotton and groundnut zones. 1/ Ministere de la Product-ion, "Bilan Cerealiar du Mali et Projections pour 1974/75 et 1977/78," Resume du Dossier, p. 2. 37 - 86. Further, the direction of Operation Arachide argues that the wider adoption of animal traction, use of fertilizer, and crop rotation will increase food crop yields per hectare. The recent FAC study team of Messrs. Kellerman and Coartant reported that the effect of fertilizer (used for groundnuts) on fields alternately planted in groundnuts and food crops leads to an increase in yield of 138 kg/ha for millet and 150 kg/ha for sorghu. S econdly, the effect of working the land with multicultivators in-reases yields by 125 kg/ha for millet and 200 kg/ha for sorghum. 87. M. Djibril tw, the D-rector of the Institut de 1'Economie Rurale (IER), ages the ihe new methods can have secondary beneficial effect on fod crops, He states ihat food crops in the cotton zone, where use of erl ad of animal traction is more widely adopted, have benefited. But he argues that the same is not true of the groundnut zone where fe eus and aninal traction are not sufficiently wide- spread to provide h .-:ebef1ts to food crops. It is impossible to resolve these issues -ithout further study. C. Functional Lite_rac froga 88. A functional Rlteracy program began in 1969 in the groundnut zone to attempt to ail the task of bringing adoption of the new agricultural techniques of Uhe operation- Functional literacy centers were established in villages by e n i agents and were to function during nine months of the year--September through May. 89. HoTever, according to Operation Arachide personnel, the functional literacy progrim snot adding a great deal because of lack of control of the centers nbeause the teachers in the centers are not motivated. The teachers ar.e n,, , aqnd are either extension agents of the operation, who are burA e ih nuoto. otdier duties, or literate peasants who teach volunr,il. Th Opef-ration Arachide report of 1971-72 reports that of 355 functi`nl enterq existing in March 1972, only 243 were actually in or J,,' D. PartiVai in 0:eration Arachide 90. One of -hc o of the functional literacy program was to teach farmers to calculate otat they could check the weighing and purchasing of their groundutzs by hebuying teams of the operation. In fact, Operation Arachide reque.ted i,a4 each village choose representatives for the weighing and paying station wn the marketing season began. Most farmers in the groundnut zone said thal their villages had had representatives for the marketing operat-on. 1 rRapport 0peraGion Ararhide," 1971-72, p. 101. - 38 - 91. Admittedly, this is a fairly minimum form of farmer participation. According to operation officials, extension agents are attempting to encourage collective actions by farmers on several fronts--collective storage of ground- nuts, grouping of harvests so that trucks can pick them up, and group efforts at improving roads between villages. For improving roads, the operation provides the tools for the farmers to use. 92. But the Director of the operation considers any more ambitious grouping of farmers, as infeasible, as in cooperatives. Such an attempt was made by the Malian government soon after independence, in a coopera- tive movement. It failed miserably because it was imposed from above and because it included an attempt to regroup farmers' lands into collective village fields. Now, farmers are suspicious of any attempt to form similar organizations. 93. The Director of the Agricultural Service intends for Operation Arachide and the CFDT cotton operation to be progressively taken over by what he calls Iprofessional peasant groupings." 94. But this is a long-range goal and can occur only as farmers re- ceive the appropriate form of functional education in rural areas that will provide them with the skills to take charge of the operation. IV. OILUSIONS AND FUTURE OF OPERATION ARACHIDE 95. Operation Arachide has functioned since 1967-68. What have been the reults of the project itself independent of climatic conditions and price changes? Productivity per hectare and net farmer revenue per hectare have increased with the adoption of the new cultivating techniques. But the intended of this first increase in farmer income was to enable farmers to purchase, rith the help of credit, new farm implements and oxen, and continue in th development of their farms. 96. Thia s9cond age is only beginning and will then have to be followed by a liveshook program that will teach farmers how to buy young oxen and re;se1 thom at a proit three to four years later, as well as correct feeding techiqu Adittedly, Operation Arachide has been a narrowly focused agricultural project. However, in its second five years additional apc of , training of village blacksmiths to repair new farm impmnt he digging of wells in northern areas of the zone, a related road projc', and the functional literacy program (if it can become effective) will broaden the operation's impact. Thus the infra- structure for supporting rural development should be in place as agri- cultural incomes increase and the project becomes an integrated development project. 97. Will the incroase in income have the desired multiplier effects throughout the economy, increasing demand for local manufactures and leading to the developi4nt of rural industries? At present, the increased income of farmers is used to pay taxes (approximately 1,500 FM per person aged 15 to 60), to buy fams implements and oxen, to buy consumer goods -39 - such as clothing, radios and bicycles, and to finance social expenses such as marriages. The crucial question is in what order are these purchases made? From farmers visited whose income was increasing appreciably, the priorities are first, taxes, second, some new farm implements or oxen, and third, consumer goods. Slowly, farmers are beginning to consider constructing houses. However, it is necessary to remember that the head of the family controls the use of family revenue. 98. In the zone of Kita, however, there are farmers who are making so much money that they have run out of things to buy and store their excess paper money in boxes in the ground since no banks exist. If a livestock program were operating, farmers could be increasing their herds of oxen, beef cattle, and cows and thus associating livestock breeding and crops in a more stable agricultural situation. 99. Thus, Operation Arachide appears to have succeeded in laying the basis for agricultural growth which in turn will support rural development. The broadening of concerns to health, roads, wells, and education should add the social infrastructure which is the remaining block to rural development. 100. How and why has Operation Arachide succeeded? First, a classical, dense extension service which first reorganized marketing in the groundnut zone and then began to teach new cultivating techniques. However, partici- pation in the program was always voluntary in every respect, unlike French colonial programs and government programs in the past. The approach to farmers was one of convincing and persuading them to follow the new tech- niques, never one of pressuring them to do so. In this way, the operation has begun slowly to gain the confidence and cooperation of Malian peasants who have in the past been beset by heavy-handed and ill-advised agricultural programs. 101. To expect that farmers will progressively take responsibility for more and more aspects of the operation is to expect too much, however, for at least the next five years. 102, The se ond major criterion of 11successIt at this stage of the project is the amount of progress made in building a self-sustaining organization which can function when the expatriate personnel leave. As indicated in the beginning of this report, the close learning relation- ships established between the expatriate personnel and their Malian counter- parts has enabled the upper-level Malian personnel to improve their management skills so that they will be qualified to take over when the expatriates leave. However, another critical question is whether the then wholly Malian Operation Arachide can withstand the pressures likely to be exerted upon it at all its levels by the government administration- especially by the commandants of the circles. The Director of the Agricultural Service insists that it is the aim of the Ministry of Production to keep the agricultural operations, specifically the BDPA and the CFDT, independent of the government administration. But success - 40 - in retaining this independence depends on the power relationships between the Ministry of Production and the other ministries. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic relationships developed over the past five years and during the remaining years of expatriate involvement have established Operation Arachide as independent of the administration. Although this independence has depended on expatriates acting as buffers in many cases, it is likely that the relationships established between sector chiefs and commandants of the circles may persist to some degree. 41 - FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MALI: A REVIEW OF GROUMMNUT OPERATION AND COTTON SCHEME Part B CFDT- THE COTTON PROJECT Part B CFDT: THE COTTON PROJECT I. INTRODUCTION 1. The CFDT (Compagnie Francaise pour le Developpement des Fibres Textiles) is a French "societe dlintervention, that is, an organization analogous to a consulting firm but with close ties to the French government. The French government created the CFDT in 1949 with the goal of increasing cotton production in the then French African colonies to provide France with cotton supplies within the franc zone. In the 1950's the CFDT began cotton operations in a number of African countries. 2. A low-yielding, short-staple type of cotton has been cultivated in Mali since the Middle Ages, but new industrial varieties were intro- duced only recently. The Office du Niger first began modern cotton cultivation but in irrigated areas. However, after rising steadily until 1963-64, irrigation cotton production fell markedly.1/ 3. The F'DT began rain-fed cotton farming in 1952, and the levels of cotton production in the first years were as follows (see Table 10, Column 2 for later years): 7ear Production (tons) 1954-55 1,127 1955-56 1,538 1956- 57 2,603 1957-58 2,884 1958-59 3,825 1959-60 2,653 196061 6,393 The area and population covered by the operation has increased steadily over the 1960's, so that the CFT cotton zone in 1971-72 included more than 1,000,000 people-- 72,160 farmers (an average of 14 people per farmer), and 2,446 villages. 4. Although beginning in the 1950's with the object of serving French economic interests, the CFDT cotton project shifted to a Malian focus after independence. Essentially all cotton in Mali is now produced within the OFDT zone. One of Mali's major exports, cotton, made up 33 percent of Mali's official exports in 1968. And since the major devalua- tion of the Malian franc in 1968, the government has received substantial 1/ IBRD, 'Notes on Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries,' in'Economic Development in Mali: Evolution, Problems and Prospects,"Vol. II, Report AW-14a, p. 1 Table 10: CFDT - ALL AREA - RESULTS 1 23 h 6/a 7 8 Area Total Area Area Area Area Numbers of planted product 3 pesticide 5 pesticide fertilized worked chefs de S.B. in cotton marketed treatmients treatments (mineral) with plows extension rear _(ha) (tons) Product/ha (ha) (ha) (ha) labor agents 1961-62 42,5J3 5,893 139 312 228 87 1962-63 5o,h4 12,3h 1,187 893 144 1963-64 57,049 15,73 2,708 1,873 1,56 253 1964-65 67,630 21,772 321 6,429 h,119 1,8h0 280 1965-66 $6,228 16,2185 88 10,hho 222 6,525 h,6h5 309 1966-67 47,080 21,731 462 10,178 492 10,229 17,065 307 1967-68 58,829 29,888 508 18,793 951 15,379 20,397 327 1968-69 70,977 1o,889 576 28,895 2,416 22,174 23,750 3h 1969-70 68,909 41,666 605 36,88 7,633 2h,h9h 26,h95 363 1970-71 65,660 52,762 804 46,154 14,465 34,645 29,763 382 1971-72 77,710 67,939 874 63,386 17,778 51,155 37,hoo 412 (175/agent) (72,180 farmers) Earlier product - 1954-55 1,127 1955-56 1,538 1956-57 2,603 1957-58 2,884 1958-59 3,825 1959-60 2,653 1960-61 6,393 * Source (1954-61) - 1-lRD, INotes on Agriculture, Livestock, & Fisheries,1 in "Economic Development in Mali: Evolution, Problems, Prospects." May 20, 1972, table 1, p. 1. # Source - CFDT figures - Paris. a Not counting area with manure/compost. Labor - working the land before plowing for seeding. revenues in expott taxes on cotton. In 1971-72, the export tax per ton of ginned cotton was 54,000 FM. 5. This report will describe the organization of the CFDT cotton operation, outline the results in various areas, and offer some general judgments. II. ORGANIZATION OF THE OPERATION 6. The CFDT is responsible for the production of cotton, for the supply of inputs, and for the marketing and ginning of cotton. Its organization includes a local director's office at Bamako; departments responsible for general administration, for extension (vulgarization), for credit and agricultural inputs, for the training of personnel, for industrial and vehicle repair service; and a separate department for Operation Dah. Operation Dah encourages the production of dah, a hard vegetable fiber useful in the production of rope and sacks in areas within the cotton zone, especially in the South. The total organization has expanded greatly over the years, and, of the more than 2,000 current workers, 46 are permanent employees in the extension service and 953 are seasonal factory (cotton gin) workers. Thirty-three expatriates remain in positions of authority in the extension service as well as in other departments, although the French director, M. Nicolas, has just been replaced by M. Kone, a Malian.l/ 7. The organization chart of the CFDT operation resembles that of Operation Arachide as the following table shows. However, unlike Operation Arachide, the CFDT operation arose out of the French colonial administration. Thus there has never been any question that Malian administrators had power over the operaticn in their circles. 8. The organization chart below shows the four major activities of the CFDT operation- (a) the cotton ginning service, (b) the vehicle maintenance service, (C) Operation Dah, and (d) the central extension service, concentratIng on cotton. 9. At the directorrs level two major changes have just occurred: (a) a Malian has taken over as director, and (b) the local CFDT office in Mali has just been given responsibility by the central CFDT office in Paris for managing its own finances. Up to this year, the director of the opera- tion was a Frenchman, M. Nicolas. According to expatriate members of the organization, M. Nicolas ran the Malian operation very tightly with little delegation of authority to subordinates. Further, new programs ran by force of personality, not by explicit structure. The new Malian director, M. Kone, has been assistant director for two years,but his knowledge of the past and present workings of the operation seems to be limited. 1/ CFDT Administrative Services, personnel table, Mali. Minister of Production Director of Agricultural Service CFDT Administration DiWector Accounting Cotton ginning Extension Vehicle Operation 8 ginneries maintenance Dah 100,000 tons capacity Regions (2) / Sector Sectors (17) z ER's (71) Distri cts Extension Agents (374) 10. The change to local management of finances was striking in its lateness. Until this year (1972), the CFDT's central office in Paris controlled the finances of all of its offices throughout the world. In August 1972, a CFDT accountant from Paris arrived to assist the Malian operation in taking on responsibility for its finances. Thus the direction of the CFDT operation is in a state of flux at the moment. 11. The four major parts of the operation are now described. First, the ginning operation includes eight ginneries with a capacity of 100,000 tons. The cost of processing is supported by the operation on the cotton price table (bareme) by a tax of 31,500 FM per ton of ginned cotton. The cotton fiber yield of the ginning operation has increased from 35 percent of a ton of unginned cotton in 1963 to 38 percent in 1971-72 (see cost sheets 1963-64 and 1971-72, Tables 11-18). The Research Institute of Cotton Textiles (IROT) conducts research on improving the yield. The ginning operation provides a significant number of jobs, employing nine expatriates and 81 Malians full-time and 953 Malians as seasonal laborers during the marketing-processing season. 46 - CFDT Table 11: SCHEDILE OF PRICES - "ALL" COTTON - MALI GROP YEAR 1963/64 1 . Average intervention price to producer 33,760 94 percent first grade at IrM34 6 percent second grade at 'M30 2. Market costs 1,200 3. Factory transoortation 4,300 COST PRIGE OF SEED COT DIVERI) TO MILL 39,260 COST PRICE OF FIBE COTT03 BASE 35 PERCEjT 112,172 4. Ginnin 16,000 5. Trarisportatien mill to port 8,500 6. Port handling and storage 475 7. Tranisit expenses (+ local taxes)/a 1,000 8. 1 i7te-age and port dues (+ locaT~taxes)/a 1,154 9. Statistics ta. (F 20 ner bale) 100 10. Flat-rate export tax (. percent of market value 60,000)/b 3,240 11. Export dutie-, (0.10 percent of market vauie 50,000)/b - 50 12. Research and packaving tax (1.50 percent of market ~a~lue 50,000)/b 750 13. Bank intere:t ~~ 2,400 14. Ey.nort licen-e 200 15. Senlin, empen-os 7tronoio /c 1,000 16. Insurance 900 17. General expenses 3,100 18. Upper Volta statistics tax 500 COST PRICE FOB AJDJA1 151 541 <Tran-l-ýtrl notr /a "Taxes"can incluide dues, char~es, etc. 7U 'I"qarket value" i a possible mevninr of ".M." (valeur marchande); anther is aera;-,e .alue; and ro on. c "M1gtropole" could mean France; note that on following pages the expression used is "sellin2 -,.enres Europel. - 47- CFDT Table 12: SCHEDULE OF PRICES - "ALLELV" COTTON - MALI CROP YEAR 1965/66 Average intervention nrice to producer 33,760 94 percent first grade at FM134 6 percent second grade at FO0 Market costs 1,100 Factory transPortation 32800 COST PRICE OF SEED C0TTO j DELIVERED TO ;IELL 38,660 COST PRICE OF FIDER COTTO11 BASE6_PCEf 107,388 Ginning 18,000 Traneportation mill to nort 9,000 Port handling and rtore Transit expencs (+ local taye5s)/a 1,100 Lightera-e and port det, (+ looql ta e)/a 1,200 Statistics tax (F 20 nor bale ) 100 Export dutier (0.10 nercent of marzet value 50,000)/b 50 Flat-rate export ta (,.- nercent of market value 50,000 +100+ 5o)/b, 3,248 Research and oackapins ta,. (1.50 percent of market value 50,000)/b 2,70 Bank interest (including 1AS of 130/0) 2,700 Exnort license 200 Selling expenses &urow) 1,300 Insurance 1,400 General expenses 3,100 COST PRICE FO7 AfIDJAL (or Dak J, for SEGOUf production) 150,011 (arninst 150,3L6 in 196/65) Translator's nof- /la "Tares" can include dues, charrer, etc. 7E "Mariet vlue" if - nonible mraning of "11.1' (valeur marchande); another is average v le; ano so on. - h8 - CFDT Table 13: SCHEDULE OF PRICES - "ALLEN" COTTON - mALI GROP YEM 1966/67 Average intervention price to producer 33,760 9b percent first grade at FM34 6 percent second grade at FM30 Market costs 1,100 Factory transportation 3,800 COST PRIGE OF SEED CQ0OJ DELIVERED TO ILL 38,660 COST PRICE OF FIBER COTTWt, BASE 36.25 PERCET 106,648 Ginning 18,000 Transportation mill to port 9,000 Port handling and rtorage 475 Transit expenses (+ local taxes) /a 1,100 Lighterage and port dues (+ local taxes)/a 1,200 Statirtics tax (F 20 per bale) 100 Export dutiev (0.10 percent of narket value 50,000) 50 Flat-rate export tax (5.h percent of market value 50,000 + 100 + 50) 3,248 Research and packaging tax (1.50 Dercent of market valne 50,000) /b 750 Bank inter cest (including IAS of 130) 2,700 Exoort license 200 Selling expenses Elrope 550 Insurance (includinr taxer and chargen) 2,000 General expenses 3,100 AERA E COST PUCE FOB ALIDJ1,E (OR DAKAR, FOR SEGOU PRODUCTIOIN) 149,121 Translator s noteý' /a "Ta xe" car ne duer enirges, etc. M"larket valur" ir aossible meaninr of "V (valeur marchande); another is averae valc; and so on. - 49 CFDT Table 114: SCHEDULE OF PRICES - HALI - 1966/69 Via Via A. COSTS INCUREDM III MALI FRANCS Abidjan Dakar Price to grower 39,700 39 700 54 percent first grade at FIO 6 percent cocond grade 2t FM35 300 300 Seed cotton insurance 300 300 market expenses 200 200 Municipoal ginnin. tax20 ilill collecti on expenses 5,725 5,725 PRICE OF RAWT COTTON AT MILL GATE 47, 625 47, 625 PRICE OF COTTON F'IBER base 37.50 percent (adjustable)127,000 127,000 Ginning 30,600 30,600 Transportation by rail and road, mill/Mali frontier 8,860 Uill to hidira Hill to 3obo/Ouangolodog,u 7,401 Special Export Tax 69,900 69,900 Prices Office Tax 12,000 12,000 Share of suppervisor7 staff cost 20,300 20,300 Export licence 200 200 Cotton Fiber insurance 2,100 2,100 B!nk interest 4, 860 4,860 COST PRICE/ALI FROTIER F 274,361 275,820 CFAF 137,180.5 137,910 B3. COSTS INCIMN)D OTSIDE MALI (IN CFAF) Costc, of transit through port Kidira va Dakar 3,364 tobo/Ouanf7olo via Abidjan 4,392 Port handlin" 475 Transit exenises 2,111 3,134 Selling erxonses (CFDT/Somiex eaualization) 465 165 Oeneral ex ce 3,100 3,100 COSP PRICE FOE CFAF 147,723.5 148,448 WEIGTED F10B COST PRICE 148,013 (60 percent Abidjan/40 percent Dakar) against 150,1461 in 1967/68 - 50 - CFDT Table 15: SCHEDULE OF PRICES - MALI - 1969/70 Via Via A. COSTS INCURRED IN MALI FRANCS Abidjan Dakar Price to grower 4,400 44,400 94 percent first grade at FMI$ 6 percent second grade at IM35 Seed cotton insurance 300 300 Market expenses 1,700 1,700 Nunicipal ginning tax 200 200 Mill collection expenses 5,725 5,725 PRICE OF RAW COTTON AT HILL GATE 52,325 52,325 PRICE OF COTTON FIBER base 37.50 percent (adjustable)139,530 139,530 Ginning 30,600 30,600 Tranportation by rail and road, mill/Mali frontier 1ill to Kidira 8,860 Mill to Bobo/0uangolodaogou 7,401 Special Export Tax (+ usual taxes) 45,365 45,365 Prices Office Tax 24,000 24,000 Share of supervisory staff costs 20,300 20,300 Export licence 200 200 Cotton fiber insurance 2,100 2,100 Bank interest 4,860 4,860 COST PRICE11ALI FRONTIER Fl 274,356 275,81 CFAF 137,178 137,908 T3. C0S3 ICURRED OUTSIDEML 1 FF Costs of transit through nort Kidira via Dakar 3,364 B-obo/onolo via Abidjan 4,392 Port handlinr 475 475 Transit exee 2,111 3,134 Selling e-penf7es 1,300 1,300 General epenses 3,100 3,100 COST PRICE FOB CFAF 148,536 149,280 THEORETICAL WEIGHTED FOB COST PRICE 148,834 (60 percent Ahidjan/)40 percent Dakar) against 148,013 in 1968/69 Table 16e DRAFT SCHEDULE OF PRICES FOR COTTON CROP-YEAR 1970/71 This draft Schedule is subject to speedy conclusion of the current negotiations with the Government with a view to signature of an Agreement of Association between li and the CFDT. Thus, with this draft it should be nossible to change over to a system of controlled expenses, so far as the marketin, scales are concerned, from 1970/71 onwards. The system should enable the variouc items of the Schedule so far entered in flat-rate amounts to be estimated at their real cost. It rhould be noted also that this draft Schedule is based on the marketing of about 05,000 tons of raw cotton, against 42,000 tons during the preceding two crop years0 Thi- new rise of 25 percent should ala allow certain expense items to be reduced; account has been taken of this in the estimates below: Exports A. COSTS INCURRED IN MALT FRATCS Abidjan Dakar Price to -rower 90 percent -first =rade at FM50 10 percent -econd/third frade at FM35 48,,500 48,5oo Seed cotton inFurance 300 300 _qrket expenses l,500 1,500 unicinal ginnin,' ta-, 100 100 1;ill collection e-nenses 4,800 4,800 PRTCE OF RAW COTTO', A'ThILL 5A5 $,200 5,200 PRTCE OF COTTO` MIMER,yield 3' percent 145,263 145,263 'innin- 30,600 30,600 Transportation Tortern mills to idira 8,860 T-annortation cntern nillr to Kco/Ouangolo 7,401 Domestic rro e co (Sic-so) 50 Eynort licc-c 200 200 Yiber 4crto r rance 2,100 2,100 t intere-t 5,000 5,000 Soecial kn)ort i" 39,000 39,000 S0AEM subsidy 6,000 6,000 Price- Office ' 11,000 11,000 Share of -upervicorw staff and technical activ itie sunnort costs 20,000 20,000 CST J213 268,023 CFAF 133,307 134,01, - 52 - Table 16 (contd.) Abidjan Dakar CFAF 133,307 134, 011 B. COSTS INCUELED It CFAF External storage costs (Bobo/Ouangolo) 450 Transportation Kidira-Dakar 3,364 Transportation Bobo-Ouangolo/Abidjan 4,392 Storage costs Abidjan-Dakar 600 050 Transit expenses 2,111 3,134 Selling expenses 1,300 1,300 General exoenses 3,100 3,100 COST PRICE FOB CFAF 145,260 1451359 WEIGTED FOB COST PRICE (60 percent Abidjan/hO percent Dakar) 145,299.60 rounded up to: 14,300 - 53 - CFDT Table 1 7: SCHEDULE OF FIBER PRICES - kALI - 1971/72 Based on a forecast of: 60,000 tons of RAW COTTON 23,000 tons of FIBER COTTON Via Via A. COSTS INCURRED I" iIALI FRANCS Abidan Dakar 1. Average price to -rower 48,500 48,500 90 percent at A450 10 percent at WM35 2. Market expenses 1,700 1,700 3. mill collection o9enses 5,000 5,000 h. unicipa1 taxes (aerage liability) 100 100 5. Share of suoer-iý..ory staff costs 6,000 6,000 6. SCAER subsidy for uport of fertilizer, insecuicides, agricu1tur1 equipment 4, 000 44,000 7. Seed cotton inrance 500 500 PRICE OF RA ,1COT1OJ AT ?IILL GATE 65,800 65,800 PRICE _F COTPrA TQ I1gER base 38 percent 173,157 173,157 9. Ginnin 31,500 31,500 10. Transporta-tlon nar tills to BOBO DIOU-LASSO 7,201 --- 11. Transportaiorn wet mills to KIDIRA --- 10,169 12. Domestic storae costs (Sikasso) 50 13. Export licence 200 200 lh. Fiber cottninrance 2,100 2,100 15. Bank Jntere t 6,500 6,500 16. Special F3nort TW 50,000 50,000 1Y. Prieos Officc Yax 14,000 14,000 C,OS P'PlF'ILiTÅZi:EP? FM 284,708 - 287,626 - CFAF 142,354 -- 3,813 18. External storare e t (Boho/Ouangolod.ougou) 450 --- 19. Tranrpor!.t.4 ri ,i r ar -3,365 20. Tranor r b -r:o0/Abidjan 49392 -- 21. Stora e cot= Anian 600 --- 22. Storage D450 23. Tranrit exere' 2,216 3,290 2h. Selling eress1,400 1,400 2>. Gencral e1x C DT 3,100 3,100 COST PRIC OK'' CFAF 154,512 155,418 T11URESTICAL WEIGT FO. GOST PRICÉ (60 nercen i/rnercent, Dakar) CFAF 154,874.- N. B. Iten 1, , 10-1a 1 -73 are -djutable at the ond of the cron year. Items 14 and L5 cover h ope ration to June 30, 1972. After that date, the procedure of financig oft 'os of' prolonged storage will be applied. -514- Table 18: "CHIEDULE OF FIBER PRICES - MALI - 1971/72 Based on a forecast of: 60,000 tons of RAW COTTON 22,800 tons of FIBER COTTON Via Via A. COSTS INCURRED IN MALI FRANCS Abidjan Dakar 1. Average price to grower 90 percent at FF60 10 percent at FM35 48,500 48,500 2. Market expenses 1,700 1,700 3. Mill collection expenses (handling, transportation and related costs) 4,800 4,800 4. Municipal taxes (average liability) 100 100 5. Share of supervisory staff costs 6,000 6,000 6. SCAER subsidy for support of fertilizer, insecticides, agricultural equipment 4,000 4,000 7. Seed cotton insurance 460 -460 PRICE OF RX9 COTTON AT MILL GATE 65,560 65,560 PRICE OF COTTON FIBER base 38 percent 172,526 -172,526 9. Ginning 31,470 31,470 10. Transportation east mills to BOBO DIOULASSO-OUANGOLO 8,417 11. Transportation west mills to KIDIRA --- 10,169 12. Domestic storage costs (Sikasso) 50 --- 13. Export license 200 200 14. Fiber cotton insurance 2,100 2,100 15. Bank interEst 6,510 6,510 16. Special Export Tax 54,000 54,000 17. Pricos Office Tax 10,000 10,000 0O'3T PRIME/MAL-I FRONTIIR FM 285,273 286,975 CFAF 142,636.3 113,147.5 B. COSTS INCURTD IN OFAF 18. Extprnal storary - ts (Bobo/Guangolodougou) 450 --- 19. Transportation X ira/Dakar --- 39365 20. Transportation Bo!o-Ouangolo/Abidjan 4,392 --- 21. Storage conil Abldjan 600 --- 22. Storage costs Dakcar --- 450 23. Tran-it exp-nse 2,216 3,290 214. Selling expenses 1,403 1,403 25. General expense; CFDT 3,,10 3,100 00dT P?ICE FOB GFAF 154Z797.5 155,095.5 TH1O7RETICAL W"IGHTD FOB CO,.T PRICE (60 perceT aidjan FTpercent Dakar) 1514,916.7 N.B. Items 1, 8, - and 18-`3 are adjustable at the end of the crop year. Itemi 114 and 15 covr th ouperation to June 30, 1972. After that date, the procedure of financtng of costs of prolonged storage will be applied. 12. Second, two garages exist for vehicle repair and maintenance, one at Koutiala and one at Fana. The vehicles in the operation include five-ton trucks for hauling the cotton harvest, the land Rovers of sector chiefs, and the Peugeot 404's which the headquarters personnel and region chiefs use in making their rounds in the cotton zone. 13. Third, Operation Dah works with the production of dah, a hard vegetable fiber suitable for rope and sacks. Local production of sacks for cotton and groundnuts is important since in the past Mali has imported large amounts of sacking. With 30 extension agents at present, CFDT is attempting to increase the production of dah in the sectors of Gan Bougouni, and Sikasso. The three major varieties being tried now are Soudan (291 ha in 1971-72), Poheo (92.5 ha in 1971-72), and the local variety (226 ha in 1971-72). In 1971-72, there were 6,483 cultivators and 624 ha in dah; therefore, production is still concentrated in small patches for local rope-making. Extension agents who are in suitable areas although not part of Operation Dah are also encouraging farmers to diversify their production and grow dah. 14. Fourth, the central part of the CFDT operation is the extension service whose three basic functions are increasing the production of cotton in combination with balanced food crop production, providing credit and inputs, and training extension personnel. At the country headquarters, the heads of the extension service and of training set up the procedures to be followed- the content, timing, an manner of teaching new tech- niques and of training extension personnel. The head of the extension serv- ice, Jacques Moineau, makes rounds continually throughout the cotton zone, seeing sector and ZER 1/ chiefs, extension agents, and individual farmers. The headquarters training personnel also make rounds continually to give seminars to sector chiefs in any new techniques and in training methods. 3ector chiefs are then responsible for training .ZER chiefs who train their extension agents in a process known as "pyramid" training ("formation an cascade"). 15. At the sector level, sector chiefs monitor production and adoption of techniques, grant credit, provide inputs, and train ZER chiefs. Their role i essential in paving the way for the acceptance of young, inexperienced extension agents by farmers. Sector chiefs have Land Rovers or comparable rehicles for making rounds during which they inspect progress during the growing season, oversee training sessions given by ZER chiefs for extension agents, and maintain or enlarge contacts with individual farmers. Consequently, there exists an overlapping process of information gathering by the top people in the extension service. 16. With regard to credit and inputs, sector chiefs make the final decision on granting credit to individual farmers. The decision is based on the area of the farm, the size of the farmer's family, and the size of the parcel of cotton which he will cultivate. Moreover, the sector chief relays input supplies to ZER chiefs who each have storage sheds. From these storage sheds the inputs are supplied to farmers by extension agents, and any cash payments (more and more common in areas like Fana) are transferred I/ Rural expansion zone. immediately to the sector chief. Sector chiefs have generally had secondary education in agriculture with a number of years experience as ZER chiefs and/or extension agents. 17. The head of the CFDT extension service hopes to begin to train sector chiefs to work out development programs according to the needs of each sector. A process something like this has occurred in the experi- mental sector of Fana (discussed below), where the sector chief, M. Michel Daou, in collaboration with the CFDT extension director, recognized the need for a livestock program, a blacksmith program, and revamped agri- cultural education (see section III, B. 3). 18. The next lower.level, the ZER chiefs, store and distribute inputs, train extension agents, monitor the extension agents' work, and check progress of individual farmers. Provided with motor-bikes (Mobylettes), ZER cliefs make rounds continually, carrying out training sessions and participating in demonstrations by extension agents. They must keep records of sales of insecticides, fertilizer, and agricultural implements, and turn in periodic reports on progress in the important techniques at each critical part of the growing season. For example, a report at the end of June would include the amount of cotton area worked by plows in the correct manner, the area sowed at the recommended time in the proper manner, and the area of food crops worked by plow and sowed with treated seeds. Later reports would include the cotton and food crop area weeded with multicultivators, that weeded by hand (with the daba), and the area treated with fertilizer and insecticide (with the number of treatments). ZER chiefs have either the nine-year basic educa- tion course at the government agricultural school or a secondary agricul- tural education and some experience as an extension agent. 19. Finally, the extension agents, the lowest-level but most important personnel, must teach all the techniques to the farmers at the proper time, distribute inputs, and increase the numbers of farmers in the program. Formerly, CFDT extension agents were primary school leavers who were paid less than government extension agents (192,000 FM instead of 252,000 FM). But now CFDT extension agents receive comparable salaries and have generally completed the nine-year basic education course in agriculture. 20. At the marketing season, CFDT collection teams come to local buying points with OFDT trucks to purchase the farmers' cotton and to collect credit repaymento. 21. One striking characteristic of the organization is the preva- lence of expatriates in top posts in the organization after 20 years in Mali. The numbers of expatriate and local employees in the major sections oC the CFDT operation in Mali are as follows: Expatriate Local CFDT department employees employees Extension service 8 457 Cotton gins (8) 9 81 full-time 953 seasonal Vehicle maintenance service 2 163 Operation Dah 1 84 22. The CFDT has made little effort to build a Malian as opposed to a French organization. Why? Because the CFDT began as a French organization to serve French interests. In addition, after independence the Malian government allowed the CFDT to carry on essentially as before because the cotton operation (always the central part of the CFDT's activities) was progressing satisfactorily and providing foreign exchange through cotton exports. 23. Only in the last three years has the Malian government attempted to bring the CFDT operation under its control. One of the Malian govern- ment's main pressures has been to replace expatriates in the higher posts of the operation by Malian.s. The major success has been in having a Malian appointed as director of the operation. 24. However, expatriates still dominate the higher posts in the organization. Of the eight expatriates in the extension service, one is the head of the service, two are region chiefs, and five are sector chiefs (sectors have three to eight ZERs and 12 to 32 districts). Thus expatriates remain at the middle or sector level of the extension service. Extension Service Eployees (1972) 1/ Expatriate Local Region chief 2 0 Sector chief 5 12 ZER chief 0 71 Extension agent 0 374 25. According to the 1970 Bank report on Mali, this is one more expatriate than was in the extension service in 1969. 1/ CFDT personnel inventory table, Mali. Bank Report CFDT Extension Service Employees (1969) 1/ Expatriate Local Region chief 1 0 Sector chief 5 Deputy sector chief 0 7 ZER chief 0 70 Extension agent 0 70 26. One might argue that a steady level of expatriates or a slight increase would be understandable if the area affected by the operation were growing rapidly and time were needed to train middle-level Malians. However, the number of ZER's increased by only one from 1969 to 1972 although the number of sectors grew from 9 to 17. 27. In the ginning service, there are 9 expatriates and 81 Malian full-time workers. Ginning Service Employees 2/ Expatriate Local Service chief 1 0 Assistant chief 1 0 Chief electrician 1 0 Ginnery chief 4 4 "Closseurl (quality marker?) 2 0 Worker 0 77 Seasonal worker 0 953 28. According to the CFDT's personnel table, at least, there is no provision for training Malians to take the place of the higher technicians except at the level of factory heads, in contrast to Operation Arachide. 29. In the vehicle maintenance service, the same is true, although the department is a smaller one. Vehicle Maintenance Service Employees 2/ Expatriate Local Garage chief 2 0 Driver 0 139 Worker 0 24 l/ IERD, Notes on Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries,lin"Economic Development in Mali: Evolution, Pro,blems, Prospects,"Vol. II, Report AW-14a, Table 4. 2/ CFDT personnel inventory table, Mali. 30, Finally, Operation Dah follows this sequence with an expatriate director Operation Dah Employees 1/ Exatriate Local Service chief 1 0 Sector chief 0 3 Extension agent 0 30 Employee 0 51 31. Expatriates in a number of other positions such as accounting and training bring the total number of expatriates employed in the CFDT operation in Mali to 33. A. Credit 32. The CFDT receives inputs (principally fertilizer, insecticide, fungicide for millet seeds, and agricultural implements) from the SCAER (Service du Credit Agricole et de l'Eauipment Rural) which itself operates within the Development Bank of Mali (BDM). The CFDT then provides farmers with these inputs in cash or credit sales. Terms of credit for fertilizer and pesticide are one year or until the next marketing season, because farmer costs per hectare for these two inputs total 12,000-15,000 FM/ha, and the farmer's increased cotton production should easily cover these costs. The farmer prices for the insecticide sprayer, the multicultivator, and the 1,000 kg cart are 16,500 FM, 30,000 FM, and 32,800 FM respectively. They may be bought on credit with repayment in the following marketing season. No interest is charged, and the CFDT makes repayments in cash to the SCAER. 33. The FDT sells most of its inputs on credit as the following figures show. It has an excellent repayment rate.2/ Total sales of Credit sales Year inputs 1000 s FM) (1000's FM) Repayment rate () 1966-67 212,139 180,309 98.21 1967-68 169,242 143,836 99.09 1968-69 304,323 258,675 98.46 1969-70 350,775 298,159 98.11 1970-71 603,728 524,04 98.C5 1971-72 898,000 761,400 98.40 1/ CFDT personnel inventory table, Mali. 2/ 1966-67 to 1970-71 from "Rapport CFDT CampagnieCotonniere," 1971-72, and M. Nudant, Chef de Service du Materiel Agricole, CFDT, Mali, interview July 29, 1972. 60 34. Observers attribute this excellent credit repayment rate to a combination of two factors. First, since cotton must be ginned to be marketed, farmers cannot sell their cotton production to buyers other than CFDT agents, unlike groundnut producers. When farmers come to sell their production to CFDT agents they are asked immediately after payment to repay their loans. Many observers report that, until recently, CFDT paying agents deducted the credit owed by a farmer before paying him for his cotton. CFDT agents insist that at present they do not deduct payments. But, according to some extension agents, it is virtually impossible for farmers to choose not to repay loans because the contract they sign to receive credit for inputs has a fixed repay- ment date. B. Marketing 35. The marketing operation is essentially the same as that of the BDPA, except for the difference in credit repayments. Farmers transport their cotton to buying points, where trucks of the CFDT transport the cotton to the cotton gins at CFDT expense (see Tables 11-18). From the gins the cotton passes to the SOMIEX (Societe Malienne d'Import-Ex-port), which exports it. .Roads in the cotton zone, especially feeder roads, are much superior to those in the groundnut zone; and fewer difficulties exist in getting the production to market than in the groundnut zone. 36. Inputs (fertilizer, pesticide, implements) are imported by the SCAER, which provides them to the two cash-crop operations. The opera- tions sell them to farmers and forward the receipts to the SCAER. 37. In both operations the inputs are distributed down to a fairly low level--to the ZER chief in the CFDT and to the sub-sector chief in the BDPA. These extension agents then sell the inputs to farmers. As foreign prices for the inputs change, so do farmer prices, although most of the essential inputs (fertilizer, pesticide, multicultivators, and seeders) are subsidized. Farmers often do not understand why prices are going up, however. In the CFDT area this year, the fertilizer cost per hectare for farmers has risen from 6,000 to 8,000 FM, and fertilizer sales have shown a noticeable dip, according to Michel Daou, a sector chief. 38. Inputs appear to be currently available in sufficient quantities. Operation Arachide reports have mentioned problems with the low quality of fungicide-insecticide provided by the SCAER. In the cotton zone, the major problem with inputs has been the supply of spare parts for imple- ments, a scarcity which prompted the creation of the blacksmith training program in Fana. C. Extension Operaton 39. The guts of the operation, the CFDT extension service, is beginning to undergo a marked change in style of operation from that of the past ten years. Of course, it has grown in numbers of personnel, from 87 extension - 61- agents in 1961-62 to 412 in 1971-72 (see Table 10, Column 8). But extension agents are beginning to change their mode of interaction with farmers from an authoritarian style to an advisory one. 40. Naturally, part of the change reflects the change in Mali's status from a French colony to an independent nation. While a colony, Mali had French administrators who were ordered to meet quotas for cotton production in their areas and who used the CFDT service to produce these quotas. An extension agent would tell a farmer that he had to purchase a plow and oxen and that he had to cultivate so many hectares of cotton. If the farmer did not cooperate,-The extension agent sent his name to the French circle commandant who had him arrested. L1. After independevee the CFDT style continued to be dogmatic although extension agents were nro longer agents of a colonial regime. However, the present hed of the extension service, Jacques Moineau, has been trying to change thji style. He has been working for the CFDT for five years and has bepn head of the extension service for three. Moineau feels bhat the e'-t. nsion agent must change from a technico- administrative agent to an agricultural adviser who enjoys the confidence of the farmers. He admits thaft it is difficult to effect such a basic change in an organizatLon, but he is determined to make the change. Up to now, he has succeeded in making the change especially in new sectors like Fana and Kadiolo where he has sector chiefs who agree with this goal and who will hire young agents and mold their style to this ideal. In Fana and Kadiolo, the role of extension workers seems to conform to this expectation, although Moineau indicated that the extension workers in Fana were the best in the cotton zone. 42. What is the new manner in which CFDT extension agents will attempt to work with farmers? As Michel Daou, the Malian sector chief in Fana, describes it, extension agents must begin slowly and carefully to build contacts with farmers. He feels that the relationship between farmer and extension worker must begin correctly, As M. Daou puts it, when extension workers are making their rounds and stay overnight with farmers, they must show farmers that they are happy to sleep where the farmessleep (that is, on the floor of a mud hut) and eat what they eat. Those extensinn agtn-s who are young men are told by M. Daou to address older farmers respectfully and modestly and to address them in Bambara as "Papa.I 43. For M. Daou, the psychological dimension in extension agent- farmer contacts in essentuiol to success, for farmers must come to accept the advice of agents who are often much younger than they are on matters in which the farmers have much more experience. In Fana, farmers often report to M. Daou what their extension workers have told them and ask him if the advice is correct. If the sector chief has ten years of experience in the sector and close relationships with a number of farmers i the area, he can smooth the way for younger, less experienced agents. -62- h. To say that the psychological dimension is important in agri- cultural extension is only to state the obvious and says nothing about the quality of CFDT extension workers. However, that such basic concerns exist at the all-important middle-management level of an organization indicates that some of the right people are being promoted and gaining responsibility. And since a sector chief has some say in the hiring and firing of his personnel, he gives his part of the organization his imprint. 4$. Fana is, admittedly, an experimental, somewhat atypical sector, but the content of the extension operation for cotton and food crops is the same in other areas. The CFDT recruits extension workers periodically from primary school graduates, rather than from primary school leavers, as in the past, when they were paid somewhat less than government exten- sion agents. The education and salary levels are now comparable to government standards. Evaluation of extension agents and higher-level personnel goes on constantly, with effective workers being promoted and poorer workers being fired. Moreover, a bonus system exists, as in the BDPA. At the end of each agricultural year (January-February, the marketing season), the CFDT evaluates all its workers according to their performance in meeting specified production and extension targets. The most successful receive bonuses of up to one month's salary. a. Technical Content of Extension 46. After the basis of contact between extension agent and farmer has been laid, extension agents try to convince farmers to try the new methods. When M. Daou first came to Fana, he tried to convince first of all the poorer farmers in the bush because they were the ones who needed help and who could be most easily persuaded. He encountered strong opposition from the merchants of the area, who bought and sold food grains and controlled the many farmers to whom they loaned millet on outrageous terms in times of food shortages. Knowing that they would lose their power if the farmers of the area no longer needed their services, the merchants opposed the introduction of a cash crop like cotton. 47. M. Da,o began by c,onvincing a few farmers to try the new seeds and cultivating techniques for cotton in a small part of their fields. As they reali ed the sup-riority of these methods they began to use them for all of thvir cotton area. At the beginning, of course, the farmers cultivated by hand until thcy made enough money through increased produc- tivity to begin purchasing animal-drawn implements. 48. At present, the set of basic techniques taught by CFDT agents includes the following: (a) Early seeding before June 30 with CFDT-supplied selected seeds; (b) 3eeding in line and in pockets; -63- (c) Correct density (between pockets); (d) Thinning of cotton plants to two plants per pocket; (e) Use of insecticide--up to five treatments spaced throughout the growing season; (f)' Use of fertili7er--150 kg/ha spread by hand between pockets, a mixture of 100 kg of ammonium phosphate (18-47-0) and 50 kg of ammonium sulfate; and (g) Spreading of manure and compost 10 metric tons/ha. 49. The adoption and correct use of these preliminary techniques should lead to the following increases in yield over the yield of 300 kg/ha given by use of the traditional methods (with the local cotton variety).1/ traditional methods 300 kg/ha + four insecticide treatment 600 kg/ha + weak dose of fertilizer 950 kg/ha + strong dose of fertilizer 1,350 kg/ha + manure 2,000 kg/ha The last method, use of ten metric tons of manure per hectare, requires a cart for transportation and thus the introduction of animal traction. Of course, if a farmer with on hectare of cotton were obtaining a yield of more than a ton he would be able to start equipping himself with animal-drawn implements. 50. In teaching this first group of techniques, the extension agent presents demonstrations in fields of individual farmers to groups of farmers. He then follows up these demonstrations by visiting farmers in their own fields, examining their progress, and correcting mistakes. He may bring groups of farmers to see for themselves the results obtained by more successful farmers. 51. The second stage in thn extension effort is the equipping of farmers with animal traction.. As explained before, farmers may buy the implements, but not the oxen, on credit. Consequently, they must have 60,000 FM for a pair of oxen before they can begin to purchase the implements. The basic set of implements, as described above, is the multicultivator, the insecticide sprayer (which is often shared among two or three farmers), and a 500-kg or 1000-kg cart for transporting manure, the cotton and food crop harvest, wood, and for transportation to the local market. In addition, farmers may own plows and animal-drawn hoes. 1/ Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation, "Convention de Financement," 1971-72/197?-73, p. 10. '4 - 614 - 52. The basic techniques counseled for cotton are: (a) Level plowing rather than the creation of ridges; and (b) Weeding with multicultivators soon after planting and periodically thereafter. Teaching the techniques places an added burden on extension agents who must also be trained themselves in using the implements. 53. At present, each CFDT extension agent theoretically is respon- sible for six to ten villages with 200-250 farmers (heads of families) and 1,000-1,200 people. For 1970-71, 412 extension agents were respon- sible for 72,180 farmers, giving an average of 175 farmers per extension agent.l/ 54. With a large number of farmers using animal traction currently, CFDT extension agents have also begun to counsel improved techniques for food crop8 (millet and sorghum)8 (a) Crop rotation betwveen food crops and cotton; (b) Preparation of fields before sowing as with cotton; (0) Early sowing and correct density; (d) Weeding at prescribed times; and (e) Treatment of seeds with an insecticide-fungicide mixture. It is the adoption of animal-drawn implements that breaks the labor shortage at cribical times--seeding and early weeding--and allows increased production of both food crops and cotton. In response to critics who blame increased cotton production for contributing to Mali's food crop problem, the OFDT argues (as does Operation Arachide) that the correct use of animal traction and fertilizer (on cotton in a field which is then more fertile for the food crop which follows) increases food crop production (oeF Operation Arachide report on increases in food crop yields, p. 36). 55. However, the head of the CFDT's extension service acknowledges that the time required for individual farmers to adopt both groups of new methods with a rational distribution of acreage between cotton and food crops is upwards of five years. He sees the process as one of five phases. (a) First phase(two-three years). The farmer adopts the package of techniques which increases his productivity per hectare in cotton. 1/ Institut de 1'Economic Rurale, "Schema directeur de l1action cerealiere en zone cotonniere," pp. 4-5. -65 - (b) Second phase (one-two years). The farmer adopts animal traction and increases his cotton acreage. At first, he descreases his food crop area without increasing nis food crop production. (c) Third phase. The farmer masters the techniques for cotton production and transfers them to food crop production. (d) Fourth phase. The farmer, with his new techniques and equipment, increases his food crop production (along with other farmers in the area) and faces a food crop surplus with falling prices. Regional food crop distributiol is faulty. If a region has a food crop surplus, the surplus often stays within the region. Food crop prices on the parallel market drop, and official purchases don't soak up the whole surplus. He then decreases his cultivated area of food crops to correspond to his family's needs. (e) Fifth phase. Eventually, because of climatic conditions, the region has a food crop shortage, the price of food crops rises, and farmers increase their food crop acreage. The prevailing view is that the farmer integrates the new techniques and animal traction only gradually into a different farm equilibrium. And once farmers reach the fourth and fifth phases, they begin to alternate between them. III. RESULTS OF THE OPERATION A. The Overall Operation 56. The CFDT cotton program has been in operation in Mali since the early 1950's. The progress achieved in the area planted, total production marketed, and productivity per hectare has been impressive (see Table 10, Columns 1-3). As TablelO shows, total cotton production has increased since 1961-62 from 6,000 tons to 68,000 tons and productivity per hectare from 139 kg/ha to 874 kg/ha. On the basis of these criteria, the project has had a large success. 57. How has this success been achieved? A combination of factors has been responsible, but principally the adoption by farmers of new techniques enabling them to first increase their productivity per hectare and then to purchase the implements for increasing their acreage. They have adopted the techniques because of the effect of increasingly effective extension work before 1968 and because of the combination of effective extension work and producer price increases after 1968. -66- 58. For three of the basic techniques taught--use of insecticide, use of fertilizer, and preparation of land with plows or multicultivators-- progress has been substantial (see Table 10, Columns 4-7). For example, from 1961-62 to 1971-72, the proportion of the total area planted in cotton treated with insecticide at least three times increased from 0.7 percent to 81.6 percent; the proportion of the area treated with fertilizer increased from 0.5 percent to 65.8 percent; and the propor- tion prepared correctly with plows or multicultivators (from 1963-64, the first year for which figures are available) increased from 2.7 percent to 47.9 percent. Moreover, in 1971, only 18,000 ha of the cotton area were planted in land prepared by the old method of plowing (ridging). Thus, of a total of 77,710 ha planted in cotton in 1971-72 55,400 ha or 71.3 percent were cultivated with animal traction. Fertilizer, insecticides, and plows are all subsidized (see Table 10). With the information available, it is not possible to determine why more farmers use insecticide than fertilizer, when the returns to the latter appear to be higher. 59. For the years in which censuses of agricultural imlements have been taken (1968-69 through 1971-72), the total numbers of the various inplements in service have shown a large increase (see Table 19). For example, over this four-year span, the total number of plows and multicultivators increased from 19,470 in 1968-69 to 29,616 in 1971-72, or one plow or multicultivator for every 2.44 farmers. 60. Thus, for 71.3 percent of the total cotton area to have been cultivated with animal traction in 1971-72, there must be a number of farmers cultivating several hectares of cotton each and thus having farm sizes of 12-15 ha (assuming a one to four ratio of cotton area to food crop area). Such farm sizes are large by Malian standards. Possible explanations for this seeming disparity between cotton area plowed and the availability of plows or multicultivators are (a) that the census figures for plows and multicultivators are too low or (b) that farmers are sharing plows and multicultivators. The answer is probably a combination of both. 61. During the same four-year period the total number of carts in service increased from 6,230 to 9,500 and the number of insecticide sprayers (which can be shared among several farmers) from 6,526 to 12,993. With 12,993 sprayers for the 63,386 ha of cotton that received at least three insecticide treatments, there is roughly one sprayer per five ha of cotton. a. Effect on Farmer Revenue 62. Some illustrative calculations have been made on the effect of the project on farmer revenue. The producer price of cotton has increased 47 percent since 1968 (after the devaluation). Holding the price constant in calculating farmer revenue will not correct completely for the price change, since part of the increased production results Table 19: CFDT - RESULTS COMPARISON - TOTAL CF AREA & FANA SECTEUR - NUMBER OF AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS IN SERVICE Fana PLOWS (CHARRUES) MULTICULTIVATORS INSECTICIDE SPRAERS 0 A R T S % of Fana Fana total % of % of total Fana Fana % of cotton Plows Total total Total multicul- Total % of total Total % of total Year product area Fana CFDT plows Fana CFDT tivators Fana CFDT sprayers Fana CFDT carts 1965-66 1,001 324 1966-67 1,233 29 hoh h03 1967-68 1,351 127 745 466 1968-69 1,755 18,080 200 1,390 961 6,526 495 6,230 1969-70 2,260 20,014 376 2,298 1,265 7,337 802 7,675 1970-71 (20.0) 13.9 2,380 21,999 10.8 867 h,012 20.1 1,469 9,523 15.h 872 8,316 10.5 + 230 + 128 1971-72 (17.8) 15.9 23,200 (June 30) 6,416 12,993 (June 3)9,500 =1,000 =1,000 Sources - 1) Fana - 1971 Report on Fana - Jacques Moineau - Chef de Service de Vulgarisation, CFDT, Mali. 2) All CFDT - CFDT report, 1970-71, Campagnie Cotonniere. -68- from the price increase. Nevertheless, with a realization that this bias is present, the Increase in revenue per hectare from 1961-62 to 1971-72 has been calculated using a constant price of 34 FM/kg (see Table 20, Column 6). From 1961-62 to 1971-72 revenue per hectare increases from 4,726 FM to 29,716 Fx. 63. Second, production costs per hectare were estimated for fertilizer, pesticide, and small tools from the current figure in 1971-72. 4,080 Fm - three treatments of insecticide + 6,000 Fm - 150 kg of fertilizer + 250 FM - small tools, daba, etc. 10,330 FM4 For the years preceding the 1968 50 percent devaluation, half of this figure was used. The net revenue figure per hectare and the current cost per year for a basic set of animal drawn implements were also compared: FarerLrice {M Cost p2E year Multicultivator amortized over seven years 30,000 4,286 1000-kg cart amortized over seven years 32,1800 4,684 Insecticide sprayer amortized over five years 16,500 3,500 Other expenses including animal feed, medicine for oxen, yoke, tool repairs 9,224 21,694 These periods for amortization are the period-which the CFDT itself uses. The FAC-IEWD feasibility study team of Messrs. Kellerman and Courtant figures ten years for the amortization of the multicultivators and cart. The estimate for "other" expenses also comes from Messrs. Kellerman and Courtant . (Aso see Table 21. 64. However, this total includes no cost for oxen since the assup- tion is th-at farmers will learn to buy young oxen, keep them for three or four years while caring for them, and then sell them for beef for more than they paid. The current price for oxen is on the average 30,1000 FM per head; thus to equip himself the farmer has to save or borrow this amount from someonp other than the CFDT, since it offers no credit for oxen. Table_2O: CFDT - REVENUE CALCULATIONS 1 2 _ _ 3 7__/a_7T8 9110 Prod/ha Subtract Total Total Total x price= prod.costs Prod/ha farmer sales or farmer 34 FM/ha per ha x price Year Price Total revenue- inputs- revenue- revenue fertilizer Net revenue revenue per production current correct constant per ha - pesticide per hectare hectare Net revenue - base level - tons prices prices prices constant little constant current per ha at 6,O00 tons 1000's 1000's 1000's prices tools prices prices current prices 1961-62 34 Fm,/kg 5,893 200,362 200,362 4,726 5,165 - 439 4,726 - 439 1962-63 " 12,342 419,628 419,628 8,262 5,165 3,097 8,262 3,097 1963-64 i 15,763 535,942 535,942 9,384 5,165 4,219 9,384 4,219 1964-65 " 21,772 740,248 740,248 10,914 5,165 5,749 10,914 5,749 1965-66 " 16,185 550,290 550,290 9,792 5,165 4,627 9,792 4,627 1966-67 21,731 738,854 212,129 738,854 15,708 5,165 -L0,543 15,708 10,543 1967-68 40 FM/kg 29,888 1,195,520 169,242 1,016,192 17,272 10,330 6,942 20,320 9,990 1968-69 4 40,889 1,635,560 304,323 1,390,226 19,584 10,330 9,254 23,040 10,330 1969-70 45 FMAg 41,666 1,874,970 350,775 1,416,644 20,570 10,330 10,240 27,225 16,895 1970-71 50 FM/kg 52,762 2,638,100 603,728 1,793,908 27,336 10,330 17,006 40,200 29,870 1971-72 67,939 3,396,950 898,000 2,309,926 29,716 10,330 19,386/b 43,700 33,370 /b 0 /a Production costs per hectare - fertilizer, pesticide, small tools - price doubled in 1967-68 because of devaluation - both imported. /b compare figures in 1972 to cost per year for set of implements, multicultivator - 4,286 FM/yr. oxen 0 assume can resell cart 4,684 FM/yr. insecticide sprayer 3,500 " other 9,224 " 21,694 - 70 - Table 21: CFDT INPUTS FarrE price Real rice (delivered at Bamako) 1. Fertilizer - 150 kg/ha 8,000 FM/ha 10,950 FM 100 kg. ammonium phosphate 50 kg ammonium sulfate - Farmer price 1971 - 6,000 FM/ha 2. Area - cotton - 50 kg/ha 3,150 FM 4,350 FM 3. Insecticide - . 3 treatments 4,080 FM 7,320 FM 4 treatments 6,000 FM 8,418 FM 5 treatments 7,000 FM 10,370 FM 4. Plow (charrue) 23,600 FM 17,312 FM 7 years' amortization 5. Hoe (houe) (animal drawn) 17,300 FM 12,470 FM 7 years' amortization 6. Insecticide sprayer 16,500 FM 11,700 FM 5 years' amortization 7. Multicultivator 30,000 FM 44,337 FM 7 years' amortization Farmer price before March 1971 - 20,000 FM 8. Cart 1,000 kg. 32,800 FM 31,921 FM 7 years' amortization Source: Director of SCAER - Bamako,Mali. Interview, August 10, 1972. - 71 - 65. After these calculations, one sees that the net revenue per hectare, calculated using a constant price of 34 FM/kg, is insufficient to finance a basic set of agricultural implements, assuming the unequipped farmer cultivates approximately 1 ha of cotton. Since these figures are gross averages and are not even disaggregated into sectors, they obscure some of the differences between sectors. However, this figure shows that the project itself, without the producer price increases granted by the government, could not have enabled the average farmer, who has 1.08 ha of cotton, to finance his equipment. Under current prices, however, the net revenue per hectare rises to 33,370 FM (see Table 20, Column 10), which does provide a large margin above the yearly cost of 21,694 FM for a basic set of agricultural implements. It is also worth noting that the average farmer generally does not possess the entire range of equipment mentioned above. 66. Of course, the point of animal traction is that it enables the farmer to cultivate enough additional hectares of cotton to pay for his implements, once he purchases them on credit from the CFDT. However, there exists a threshold in net revenue per hectare that the average farmer (with one ha in cotton and three or four ha in food crops) must exceed before he is able to adopt animal traction. b. Food Crops and Other Concerns 67. The director of the extension service emphasizes that the CFDT in Mali no longer runs solely a cotton operation. As mentioned earlier (see Section II), extension agents advise farmers on a number of techniques concerning food crops as well as cotton. In 1971-72, out of an estimated total area of 367,000 ha of millet/sorghum cultivated, farmers use seeds treated with fungicide-insecticide on 17,000 ha. In addition, 16,422 ha of millet or sorghum were worked with a multicultivator, and 18,110 ha were treated with manure.1/ 68. Besides concerning itself with food crops, the CFDT also encourages the production of dah, a hard vegetable fiber suitable for the production of the rope and sacks needed for bagging cotton and ground- nuts, as well as other crops. However, the CFDT's most striking experiment in expanding its perspective has been a program in the sector of Fana which began in 1967-68. B. Operation Fana a. The Basic Aims of the Project 69. The CFDT proposed Operation Fana as a three-year experiment, 1967-68 to 1969-70, Fana being a sector that was progressing rapidly I/ CFDT Service Vulgarisation, "Rapport Mensuel," September 1971, pp. 27, 3', 34, and 35. - 72 - (having an average productivity per hectare in 1966-67 of 880 kg/ha, more than the 1971-72 overall average), the CFDT wished to see the results of an intensified extension effort. The goals at that time were fourfold: (a) To accelerate the increase in cotton and food crop production (including milleb/sorghum, corn, and groundnuts) with a cotton yield objective of 1,000 kg/ha; (b) To increase the numbers of multicultivators, insecticide sprayers, and carts in use in the sector by 300, 400, and 300 units respectively over a three-year period; (c) To demarcate farmers' fields in one-ha plots with alleyways to aid in farm management; and (d) To study the hired labor pattern in this area to learn its effect on agriculture. b. Results 70. After the first three years of the operation, the area cultivated in cotton grew from 5,049 ha in 1966-67 to 11,238 ha in 1969-70; cotton production increased from h,448 tons to 8,635 tons; and the cotton yield per hectare fell from 880 kg/ha in 1966-67 to 768 kg/ha in 1969-70 (see Table 22, Columns 1, 2, and 3). These yield results when seen alone would seem to indicate a basic failure in the operation. However, the yield per hectare jumped to 1,128 kg/ha in 1970-71 and only receded to 1,000 kg/ha in 1971-72. 71. The decrease in yield per hectare during the first three years of the operation resulted in part from the arrival of seasonal laborers in large numbers at about this time. As described in the Operation Arachide report, seasonal laborers come to an area for the growing season and work three or four days a week for a farmer who houses and feeds them. During the rest of the week they work on a plot of cotton of approximately one ha in size and at harvest time keep the income they receive from their harvest. The seasonal laborers in the sector of Fana come principally from Segou, where they cannot find land, and from Bougoumi and the South where they have heard that farmers in Fana are making money. 72. However, these seasonal laborers present problems for the CFDT because first, they grow only cotton and thus exhaust the land. Second, they try to cultivate large areas and usually do not know the techniques that CFDT extension agents are teaching. The extension workers try to reach the seasonal laborers in their area but since these laborers rarely come. to the same area for more than two to three years, time and effort devoted to thUm are not good investments. The influx of seasonal laborers during these years accounts in large part for the decline in productivity. Table 22: FDT - FANA REGION - RESULTS Area - Total plowed Area Area Area cotton furrows- Area worked treated Area - Area in product No. of Prod./ (old disced by daba mineral organic pesticide cotton narketed Prod./ha farners farmer manner) (new way) fertilizer fertilizer 4 treatments Year (ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) (ha) 1960-61 113 1,027 110 1961-62 1,988 264 132 1,711 154 20 20 1962-63 2,560 912 356 2,577 354 56 45 190 4 1963-64 3,378 1,363 403 3,246 420 79 81 177 24 1964-65 4,400 1,965 456 4,253 462 152 173 669 87 1965-6t 4,655 2,205 473 5,015 439 3,322 134 1,199 329 833 522 1966-67 5,049 4,4h8 880 4,877 912 - - 1,312 923 1,079 (1,229)/c 1967-68 7,375 6,407 868 (5,500) /c 1,164 4,659 156 1,828 2,340 1,224 1,937 1968-69 12,320 9,618 780 6,149 1,564 8,295 51 3,973 3,270 1,608 4,099 1969-70 11,238 8,635 768 7,361 1,173 7,701 349 3,188 3,498 2,378 6,624 1970-71 9,146 10,321 1,128 5,307 1,945 5,793 696 2,657 5,124 1,397 5,796f63.4%) 1971-72 12,344 12,000 1,000 8,567 1,401 6,710{54%)1,020(9%) 3,323 (27) 7,947 (6414 1,904 (6,000) /c /a Includes some seasonal workers. /b Have fallen in 1972-73; price up from 6,000 FN/ha to 8,000 FN/ha. /e Imputed. Source - 1) Rapport Operation Fana, 1971 - Jacques Moineau - CFDT, Mali, p. 17. 2) Rapport Mensuel, Septembre, 1971 - Jacques Moineau, Chef de Service de Vulgarisation, CFDT, Mali. -74. - 73. On its socond and third original objectives, the CFDT made steady progress. With regard to agricultural implements, the number of multicultivators in service increased from 29 in 1966-67 to 376 in 1969-70, exceeding the objective (see Table 19). By June 30, 1972, the number exceeded 1,000. The number of insecticide sprayers rose from 404 in 1966-67 to 1,265 in 1969-70, exceeding the objective by 400, Likewise, the number of carts grew from 403 in 1966-67 to 802 in 1969-70, equalling the objective. And by 1971-72 the number of carts exceeded 1,000. 74. Further, the team carrying out the demarcation of farmers' lands made substantial progress from 1967-68 onward.1/ Year Hectares demarcated each year 1967-68 671 1968-69 5,005 1969-70 22,867 1970-71 20,519 1971-72 36,020 55,052 total By placing small concrete markers in 100-meter squares, the surveying team hoped to encourage farmers to plant in regular hectare-size fields and to enable farmers to more easily calculate their fertilizer and insecticide needs. However, farmers reacted suspiciously to the placing of these markers. They feared a plan of imposing taxes or redistributing land. Furthermore, cultivating according to the markers means that farmers have to make numerous small additions and subtractions to their fields since they presently cultivate in irregular patterns, and they ignored the markers for two to three years. In any case, the CFDT extension director resisted attempts to force farmers to rearrange their fields according to the markers, and they are finding this rearrangement and creation of alleyways beneficial. One farmer who cultivates 20 ha (6 ha of cotton and 14 ha of millet/sorghum) said the demarcation of fields has helped him in several ways, by enabling the oxen to turn in the alleys and making harvesting easier since he can bring carts into the fields and deposit the harvest in the alleyways. 75. In comparison with the overall CFDT area, Fana's cotton yield per hectare of 1,000 kg in 1971-72 surpasses the overall average of 87 (see Table 22). In Fana only in the improved manner, compared with 47.9 percent overall (see Table 22, Column 7). However, 54 percent of the area is still ridged, using the old technique. In 1971-72, the proportion of the total cotton area in Fana treated with mineral fertilizer reached 64.4 percent compared with 65.8 percent overall (Table 22, Column 9). And finally, the portion in 1/ CFDT, Fana sector, "Rapport Mensuel," June 1972. Fana receiving four insecticide treatments was 63.4 percent in 1970-71, compared with the 70.3 percent overall receiving only three treatmeqts (see Table 10, Column 4 and Table 22, Column 11), 76. Performing the same calculations on revenue per hectare (see Table 23, Column 11 and Table 20, Columns 6 and 7), one sees that in 1971-72, the gross revenue per hectare in Fana equalled 34,000 FM as opposed to 29,716 FM overall. Subtracting the production costs, one has a margin of 23,670 FM in Fana compared to 19,386 FM overall. 77. With regard to food crops, however, problems have appeared. Serious food shortages occurred in 1971-72, and the price of millet increased to 80 FM/kg at one point while remaining at 40-50 FM/kg from July 15 to the end of August. The Fana sector chief attributes this problem to the 3,090 seasonal laborers who came to Fana in 1971-72. At the same time, an unfavorable rainy season led to a smaller food harvest than expected, and farmers found that they did not have enough food for their families as well as for their seasonal laborers. According to the CFDT September 1971 report, the estimated area cultivated in millet/sorghum was 24,000 ha. The ratio of food crop area to cotton area was thus less than 2:1 (12,344 ha of cotton), and this is insufficient.l/ 78. According to the Fana sector chief, the ratio of the food crop area to the cotton area increased in the present growing season (1972-73) to 3:1, and he adds that his extension agents now tell farmers that their seasonal workers must cultivate at least one half ha of millet with their one to,one and one half ha of cotton. To what extent farmers have followed this advice is unknown. C. Later Additions to the Program 79. After the end of the original three-year operation, the CFDT program at Fana continued to expand as additional needs appeared. The thr, programs initiated were for livestock (1969-70), education (1970-71), and the training of blacksmiths (1971-72). 80. i. Livestock Program. In 1969-70, the CFDT began a livestock program in Fana with two components: animal health and proper animal feeding, combined with improved herd management. The need for the program &rew from the increase in the number of livestock as farmerst incomes in2reased. They were buying oxen for their increasing numbers of agri- cultural implements, cows for milk, steers for increasing their herds and for replacing old oxen. In fact, animal herds were serving the function of banks since cattle could be sold to pay taxes, to finance marriages, and to meet emergencies. By the end of 1970, 57 percent of the farms in iana had oxen. 1/ CFDT, "Rapport Mensuel," September 1971, p. 27. Table 23: -FDT - FANA REGION - RESULTS 1 ~~ , 8 9 _10 11 12 1 2 7 9 Prod/ha x No. of revenue/ Area oxen Extension ha pesticide Fana No. of agents Farmers Hectares Hectares 34 FM/ha Revenue/ha 5 treat- purchased plows & no. of Total per Area in of cotton of cotton constant current ments (cumu- multicu3- -bcfs farmers extensio cotton per exten- per prices prices Yea Price (ha) l a t i v e ) tiva ors d 8 . followed agent (ha) tion agent farmer FMFm 1960-61 50 1,027 1961-62 34 Fm 100 9 1,711 190 1,988 221 1.16 h,h88 h,488 1962-63 a150 10 2,577 258 2,560 256 .99 12,104 12,104 1963-64 700 10 3,246 325 3,378 338 1.04 13,702 13,702 196h-6 3 950 11 4,253 387 h,hoo ho 1.03 15,504 15,50h 1965-66 108 1,500 1,001 12 5,015 418 4,655 388 .93 16,082 16,082 1966-67 " - 2,850 1,262 12 h,877 4o6 5,049 421 1.04 29,920 29,920 1967-68 40 FM 392 3,700 1,478 16 (5,513)/a (3hh)/a 7,375 461 (1.3h)/a 29,512 34,720 (ha) 1968-69 " 864 4,250 1,955 25 6,149 246 12,320 493 2.00 26,520 31,200 1969-70 45 FM 1,851 4,650 2,576 25 7,361 294 11,238 450 1.53 26,112 3h,560 1970-71 50 FM 2,178 5,600 3,187 25 5,307 212 9,146 366 1.72 38,352 56,400 1971-72 6,692 - 27 8,567 317 12,344 457 1.44 34,000 50,000 Source - 1) Rapport operation Fana, 1971 - Jacques Moineau - CFDT, Mali, p. 17. 2) Rapport Mensuel, Septembre, 1971 - Jacques Moineau, Chef de Service de Vulgarisation, FDT, Mali. /a Imputed. - 77- No. of oxen Farms with oxen () 1/ 1 9 2 54 3 2 14 31 6 2 8 2 9ince 1960 the number of oxen sold in the area has increased from at least 50 in 1960 to 6,692 in 1971-72, or 3,346 pairs (see Table 23, Column 3). These figures record sales only and do not include the number of oxen existing in 1960. 81. Although they were increasing their herds, however, farmers were often not aware of basic principles of animal husbandry. For example, many did not or were not able to treat their cattle against basic diseases and parasites. Further, farmers traditionally burn off the brush in January and February, a practice which destroys pasture land. Consequently, in the latter part of the dry season, March and April, when there is little pasture and water, they send their cattle off with the shepherds to pasture lands in the south. The cattle often return in poor condition and the oxen not able to do the early plowing counseled by the CFDT. 82. The livestock program began with disease and parasite treatments. In the first three years of the program the number of vaccinations was as follows: Nov.- Jan.- Jan.- Dec. 1969 Dec. 1970 Apr. 1971 Pleuralpneumonia 5,225 25,147 8,398 Trypanosomiasis 462 h,771 427 Anthrax - 11,270 3,610 Parasite 5,699 22,186 71 The three veterinary workers in the program travel continually to villages in the sector to perform the vaccinations and castrations of steers. For parasite treatments, farmers bring their herds to one of the three animal dips in the area. 83. The second aspect of the program, providing for pasture and proper animal feeding, has been more difficult because of the conflict of traditional method, (such as brush fires and haphazard grazing) with improved practices. Currently this aspect of the program has five emphases: 1/ Jacques Moineau, "Rapport Operation Fana," 1971. - 78- (a) Encouraging farmers to stop brush fires and to set out. pErmanent areas around villages for grazing; (b) CounsEling farmers to collect the remains of groundnut and corn crops for feed and to collect suitable natural grasses for hay; (c) Attempting to identify suitable forage plants that farmers can grow; (d) Selling enriched feed--sacks of sons de riz (rice bran ? cost 600 FM per sack) and licking blocks containing salt, calcium, decalcified phosphate (phosphate decalciques), and copper sulfate; ond (e) Encouraging the creation of collective animal parks for the collection of manure, 84. The program seems to be going well and has a young, enthusiastic director. The only criticism that might be made is that the program is a response to crisis rather than a planned addition to the development of the area. One asks why the need for such a program was not seen three or four years before it was actually implemented, for by CFDT records there were already 2,850 oxen in the Fana sector in 1966-67. 85. ii. Rural Education. The second major innovation by the 1FDT was to re-open the former seasonal school (Ecole Saisonniere) in Fana and to begin nine-month practical agriculture courses. 86. The Seasonal Schools were instituted under the Modibo Keita government as part-agricultural, part politico-military training centers. Since the school directors were usually military men, the second aspect predominated. These schools were to have fit into the government's Co-operative Movement and socialist ideology. Participation in the schools was not voluntary, however, but enforced by government officials who ordered farmers to send their sons to the schools. Since their sons did not learn a great deal of practical agriculture in these schools, farmers saw little use for them. 87. Gradually, many of the schools closed. The CFDT obtained the authorization of the government to reopen three of them in the cotton zone. In Fana, they chose a former ZELR chief from their extension service to h-ad the program. They took only those young men whose fathers were willing for them to participate. In 1971-72, 11 young men took the course, and 10 are enrolled in 1972-73. The nine-montn course runs from May to February, or for one growing season. Arguing that graduates of the program should be able to act as extension agents in their own families, the CFDT has made its extension practices and the functional literacy course in Bambara the basic content of the program. The students choose the sequence in which they do their work, -79 although their use of the school's land for planting crops imposes a general framework. The principal topics covered besides the literacy program are the following: (a) Staking out and measuring fields; (b) Tilling land for cotton and food crops with the multicultivator; (0) Sowing methods for cotton, millet, and corn; (d) Weeding with the multicultivator--millet, corn, cotton, groundnuts; and (e) Using fertilizer on cotton and corn.. 88. From its description, the course run by the CFDT is an attractive model of rural education. Since the school's curriculum is based on the essential agricultural concerns of the area, it should begin to win the support of farmers if they find that their sons can help them in adopting the CFDT methods. Hopefully, the effect of this school in the Fana region will be closely watched. 89. iii. The Blacksmith Training Program. The third initiative which the CFDT has taken at Fana is a training program for local blacksmiths to enable them to repair multicultivators, plows, and other implements. The program was begun when the CFDT was unable to obtain enough spare parts from the SCAER for the implements in Fana. 90. Consequently, the CFDT organized a training program for 23 blacksmiths, to teach them how to repair the implements (although some knew already) and how to make certain spare parts such as bolts, plowshares and fianEes. After the training program, the CFDT furnished interest-free loans for the new equipment and determined the lages f7rom which each blacksmith could draw his business. They fixed the selling price oO certain parts and followed up on the quality of the spare parts riade by the blacksmiths. Of the 23 black- smiths in the program, "1 have bought improved basic equipment, 10 have an anvil, and 4 have welding equipment with which they can begin to repair the bicycles and motor-bikes that are appearing more commonly in Fana. 91. The program seems to have had a large effect on the work time a.3 the innom, of blacksmiths. One blacksmith estimated that his income had doubled as a result of the program and that the time required to make cert ain spare parts had decreased from one-and-a-half to two working days to on. morning due to the better methods and equipment. - 80 - d. Conclusions on Fana 92. Fana is the most advanced sector in the cotton zone in cotton yield per hectare, although its statistics show slightly less progress in the use of pesticides and of new plowing methods. Moreover, in 1971-72 Fana had 27 extension agents for 8,567 farmers (see Table 23, Columns 5-7), or one agent for every 317 farmers, far fewer than the cotton zone's average of 175 for 1971-72. Why then has the sector made such progress in yields despite its seasonal labor problem, when it does not seem to be superior to other sectors in the use of fertilizer and insecticide and when it has a less dense extension service? 93. The probable cause for this progress is the quality of the extension workers in the sector combined with the personal influence of the Malian sector chief, M. Michel Daou. The extension workers of Fana were said to be the best in the cotton zone. The extension director had worked closely with M. Daou in changing the nature of contacts between extension workers and farmers from one of command to one of collaboration. Moreover, M. Moineau felt that other sectors would not have the same experience as Fana unless the tenor of extension agent-farmer contacts changed in the same direction. 94. Farmers throughout the sector know Michel Daou because he constantly makes rounds, checking the progress of his ZER chiefs and with them of his extension agents. Using principally young ZER chiefs and extension agents has enabled Daou and Moineau to mold the approach of these workers into one of collaboration, while the position of respect that Daou holds has enabled these young workers to be accepted by the farmers. 95. Quantitative evidence on the effect of the other project emphases in Fana--food crops, livestock, rural education, and blacksmith training--is lacking. The description suggests how a narrowly focused cash crop project has found it necessary to expand its concerns in order to break bottlenecks that have appeared. The rest of the cotton zone is theoretically following Fana in these new concerns. In other sectors and even in Fana, however, additional programs have begun after a substantial time-lag because farmers seem to lack the ability and the structures to express their idea of their own needs. New programs have appeared in Fana because of Michel Daou and Jacques Moineau, not because farmers have understood their needs and demanded programs to fulfill them. In a centralized and paternalistic production operation with information- gathering and planning from the top down, the correct decisions can only be made with longer and longer lags, at best. Once agricultural develop- ment and increase in income begin, the myriad other factors in rural development (such as education, transportabion, health, role of livestock, tool repairs, need for crop diversification) become bottlenecks to progress as one important aspect of the process lags behind another. After a certain stage, progress can continue only as the people at the bottom receive the training and the opportunity to take on more and more of the responsibilities themselves. - 81 - 96. The role of suitable rur2l education in preparing farmers to take on such responsibilities then becomes critical, and new structures for farmer participation and planning must be created. C. Financial Aspects of the Operation 97. Apart from its effects on cotton production and farmer revenue, the cotton operation has made significant progress in becoming financially self-supporting. 98. Before the substantial devaluation of 1968, the operation (on its cost sheets), supported the cost of the marketing operation and the cost of ginning (see the 1971-72 cost sheet in Table 17, lines 2 and 9). Since the devaluation and its doubling of the local currency proceeds from the sale of cotton, the operation has added to the sheet the costs of local personnel as well as one-fourth of the cost of the remaining expatriate personnel (see Table 17, line 5). In 1971 the sheet began to carry a reduction entitled "Subsidy-SCAER" (see Table 17, line 6), which corresponded in part to the amount of subsidies for insecticide, fertilizer, and some implements. 99. At the same time, because of the devaluation, the favorable world prices for cotton,l/ and the success in increasing production, the operation has been able To support price increases to producers and extremely high export taxes to the government (see Table 17, line 16) The major cost not supported by the operation at present is the salaries of the 11 expatriates still in the extension operation, which in 1971-72 amounted to 2,690,000 FF or 269,000,000 FM. 100. At the same time, line 17 in Table 11, entitled "General Expenses" and amounting to 3,100 FM, should be noted. In every cost sheet since 1963-64, the CFDT has deducted this amount per ton of ginned cotton. The CFDT contends that this charge (which totaled 72,964,000 FM in 1971-72) pays for general study and research needs, according to M. Jan Traore of Mali's National Direction of Economic Affairs. But the IRCT, the research institute for textile fibers, is separately funded by French Aid Agency (FAC). The CFDT is seeingly extracting some profits from the operation. 101. Thus, the cotton operation has become substantially self-supporting except for the cost of 11 expatriates in the extension service. a. Net Benefits to the Country 102. Table 214 presents an attempt to estimate from the inadequate data the benefits to Mali of the cotton operation since 1962-63. The base level of production was taken at 6,000 tons and subtracted from the actual production, giving figures for the increased production resulting from the project (Table 24 Column 2). 1/ World prices: 1971--360,000 FM/ton; 1970--290,000 FM/ton; 1969-- 276,000 FM/ton. However, this varies throughout the year. 、－―一－－一必人t―一 i ! 饞， 蔡 〕訕 83 - 103. Estimates were then made for farmer revenue at constant prices (to correct partially for the effects of price increases) and government revenue (Table 2J4 Columno 3 and 6). Figures f or government taxes per ton of ginned cotton were imputed for the years 1962-63, 1964-65, and 1967-68, for which copies of thr2 cost shoet were not available from the Malian government. 104- Since the cost sheets netted out marketing, transportation, ginning, and in later years local personnel and input subsidy costs, the second half of Table 24 adds in the costs not already subtracted by the sheet. This, ua , !gor, i.ricludes the European Development Fund (FED) -f, loput si.ibsidies, and trucks from 1965-66 to L97 -71 aid for price .5uppox C) and FAC aid for, eNp&friate per.sonyiel from 196.9-70 to 1971-72 and for storage hangare (see Table 24,0,olumns P and 9). However, a record of FAC flnanc'.I.-f before, .19 _-)19-70) when FAG financed seven ginneries and other costs, was nol-' available from the CFDT dir,:,ctor, the Ministry of Production, or the FAG repres ?ni-atiire in Mali. Costs are consequently based on the low side in this ragard. 105- In addition to thE, :e foreign aid costs, estimates were maJe of local costs before 190"'Y-A wh,,n they were first included on the co3t sheet (Table 2h Column 10). Although this estimate is based on the number of peop1 , in the extension operation, it is a very rough calculation. Finally, the total sales of inputs (at farmer prices) were added for the years in which figures were available in CFDT annual reports (1966-67 to 1971-12, Table 24 Column 11). FED aid from 1965-66 to 1970-71 suppo8edly paid for the subsidy of inputs . However, figures are lacking for valur,!,s of inputs before 1966-67. CF`DT annual reports before this year provide qu.-antities of various inputs sold but not prices, and the SCAIiR cauld not provide previous prices. This gap in input costs is thus another bias on the low side. ic)6. Thr -final. missing cost figures represent the difference bAween the real. and -',uboidl, Pd priues, of inputs in the years when the FED provided no aid for or when no subsidy figure was subtracted from the cost sheet for th ; Tho in, this category are 1962-63 to 1964-65, but since thcrc, Js uc) pr ico or quantity information on inputs for tais period, no att.(-.,c. pt been made to estimate these costs (Table 24, Column 10). 107. Thus the rif i benA.1t figures in Table 24 Column 13 were obtained by totaling borr-fii-9 arid costs and taking the difIs-rence. D. Thp Creation r)4'* a 161,,ilian Organization 108. The major ar, a in Wiioh the CFDT cotton operation has had lit-ie success, in contrast to Operation Arachid e, is in creating an organization with Malians in positlion.-, of responsibility. Although the CFDT has been in Mali since long bofore, independence, there still remain five expitriate sector chiefs (out of 1 ) and two region chiefs (out of two) in the extension service. In its -total operation, moreover, the CFDT has 33 expatriates. The Director of the Institute of Rural Economy (IER) said that the CFDT has been very late in training Malians to take over top posts in the operation. 109. Only in th7 last two years was a Malian created assistant director whereas Operation Arachide has had a Malian co-director from the beginning. There are several reasons for this situation. First, since the CFDT began in 19119 as an organization to serve French economic interests, it is likely that the goal of turning its local operations over to African governiments did not seem to be a burning issue. A number of Frenchmen in Africa still do not consider Africans capable of managing their own affairs. 110. Second, in Mall this reason has more weight because until recently the Malian government put little or no pressure on the GFDT to accept Malians for top positions. It seemed to reason that since the CFDT was bringing results and a large export tax, it should not force the issue. Of course, the CFDT had close contacts with govern- mental circles. Therefore, the Malian government sent its best agricultural technicians to other operations. 111. Third, the CFDT has expanded its operations over the years in a diffuse and disorganized manner. According to the director of the extension service, programs often run from the top by force of personality and are not supported by explicit organization. It has consequently been more difficult to train Malians for the top positions in the absence of such clear lines of authority and structure. Mr. Kone, a Malian, was assistant director of the CFDT in Mali for two years and has just replaced the French director, M. Nicholas, but he has appeared to be relatively rmch less informed about the workings of his organization than his Nalian coun,erpart in Operation Arachide, M. Bagoure, the co-director. 112. Thus the 'iDT uont nues to depend to a large extent on expatriate personnel at the top, but the Malian government is beginning to exert pressre on t.h CFDT to train Malians for these positions. IV. SCONDA1RY EFFECTS OF CFDT OPERATION 113. The major senondary effects of the CFDT operation are the effects on food crops, migration, income, and the effect of the functional literacy program. A. Food Crops 1111. As discuied in the report on Operation Arachide, Mali currently has official food crop deficits because of a distorted price level for cereals relative to othfr crops and the resulting smuggling and black market tradin. the questions to be asked of the CFDT operation are first, has it contributed t the creation of the problem, and second, is it con- tributing or can -it oontribute to a solution? 115. A number of observers in Miali, both within the government and the expatriate foreign aid community, argue that the development of cotton production has progressed to the detriment of food crop production. The head of the CFDT extension service acknowledges that in the process of increasing cotton production and adopting animal traction the individual farmer may temporarily decrease his food crop production. But he also argues that farmers respond as well to regional market cycles, which alternate between glut and deficit. (See the description of Moineau's view of the phases a farmer in the CFDT operation goes through, Section II.) He says in addition that the CFDT's extension agents are currently pushing improved cultivating techniques for food crops, their basic aid at present being an equilibrium in the development of individual farms (see Section 1). 116. The Director of the Institute of Rural Economy argues that at present, with the i-ide use of fertilizer and animal traction, food crop production benefits from the after-effect of fertilizer and from the tilling of land with plows and multicultivators. One measure of the two effects on food crops clted earlier in the discussion of Operation Arachide was approximately 150 kg of additional production per hectare from the after-effect of fertilizer and 125-200 kg of additional production per hectare from the effect of animal traction--depending on whether the food crop is millet or sorghum. However, he contends that these positive effects did not counter-balance the negative effect of decreased area in food crops until recently. 117. Variou;3 sectors in the cotton zone have suffered food shortages. Fana, where Jarge numbers of seasonal laborers began arriving to cultivate cotton while being fed by their employers, was discussed earlier (see Section IIT). A serious food shortage in Fana in 1971-72 seems to have result6d in part from this timporary increase in population without a corresponding increase in food crop production. 118. Thus the debate on the cotton operation's effect on food -rop prod-ution has -not eaded. B. Migration Effects 119. The case of Tana introduces a second indirect effect of the CFDT operation: change in migration patterns. At Fana, increasing cotton pro- duction and increasin, Uarmer revenues (part of which comes from producer price increass) have cl arly attracted large numbers of seasonal laborers, who come expressly for the purpose of cultivating cotton and making money. 120. Regarding out-migration, the CFDT workers in Fana and especially the sector chief, Michpl Daou, contend that the numbers of young men leaving their villages to spend several years in the capital, Bamako, or in Abidjan and Bobo-Dioulasso has decreased noticeably. Michel Daou cites as evidene that heads of families no longer complain to him that they cannot do the work advised by the CFDT agents because the young men -86 - were not there. Further, many of the farmers in Kadiolo, a sector south of Sikasso only a few miles from the Ivory Coast, say that the numbers of young men leaving the villages for the cities has decreased. C. Functional_Litarac r rogram 121. As in Operation Arachide, a functional literacy program in Bambara is supposed to operate in conjunction with the cotton operation. The program suffers from the same weaknesses as that in the groundnut zone, however (see Operation Arachide report). Farmers in the cotton zone usually know of the functional literacy center in their village, but few of them attend the centers themselves. In Kadiolo, one farmer who did attend the center and who was one of the most successful farmers in his village, remarked that he would prefer to learn to read and write his own language, Zenoufa, rather than Bambara which was to him a sacond language. His feeling was reportedly shared by most other Zenoufa speakers who attended the center. D. Income Effects 122. On what are successful farmers in the cotton zone spending their increased income? Most persons cite the same basic list of priorities--taxes, more implements, oxen or cows, social expenses such as bride prices, and then perhaps consumption goods like radios, bicycles , or Mobylettes. 123. Lona Traore, responsible for training in the western zone, argues that farmers have a clear idea of priorities in the CFDT sector of Fana, and he cites the above sequence as the basic order of priorities for a family head. He adds that after two pairs of oxen, farmers generally purchase a cow, and that in Fana some heads of families were considering improving their homes. When asked about the number of radios, bicycles, and Mobylettes, he answered thaG young men generally bought these goods as will as stylish clothes with money they made cultivating small, individual cotton plo)ts. 124. Farmers in Kadiolo generally listed more equipment and oxen and cows. To f-armer3 the re were interested in fruit trees, and one, who cultivated 10 ha (four of cotton) has had fruit trees since 1963. Another young farmer who this year was cultivating 15 ha (five ha o- cotton) with two multicultivators, one plow and three pairs of oxen, was planning to start a fruit tree grove and dreamed of owning a tractor. Thus it seems that many farmers are quite shrewd in how they dispose of thpir increased income. -87 - V. CONCLUSION ON CFDT OPERATION 125. Like Operation Arachide, the CFDT cotton operation is a cash crop project whose extension service has focused on increasing produc- tivity per hectare and on introducing animal traction. A credit com- ponent enables farmers to purchase tne inputs--first fertilizer and pesticide and later new implements--that make possible the productivity and production increases. The CFDT is further responsible for marketing and processing the cotton. 126. As noted above, however, the first focus of the CFDT in the 1950's was to provide France with cotton which it could purchase with French francs. With independence, the project's focus changed to include increasing government revenues through export taxes. But the producer price remained constant from 1958-59 until 1967-68. At that time a 50 percent devaluation of the Malian franc enabled the government to double its local currency receipts. The export tax increased from 3,248 FM in 1966-67 to 69,900 FM per ton of ginned cotton in 1968-69 (post devaluation), plus an assessment of 12,000 TM per ton of ginned cotton for a price support fund to prepare for possible drops in world cotton prices. Of this increase in revenue of 130,00 FM per ton, farmers received a 6,000 FM per ton increase, from 34,000 FM/ton to 40,000 FM/ton. Since 1968-69, the producer price has increased bo 50,000 FM/ton while the government export tax per ton of ginned cotbon has dropped to 54,000 FM. 127. Increased revenue per hectare in constant prices (without correcting for the supply response to increased producer prices) barely covers the current 1971-72 costs per year of fertilizer, pesticide, and one set of farm implements (a multicultivator and a cart plus upkeep). It is likely that the series of producer price increases ince 1967 have been necessary to enable farmers to equip themselves with animal traction. 128. What has the CFDT cotton operation contributed during the 1960's? It ha3 had success in a number of areas: in raising production and productivity, in becoming more and more financially self-supporting, and in raising farmer as well as government revenues. However, the organization still depfnds on foreign aid to pay expatriate salaries in the extension oporation. And, in fact, it has failed to train Malians to take over the organization at the top levels. 129. Perhaps its basic weakness is the organization's inability so far to shift from a centralized, paternalistic production operatLon to a broader, rural development operation. Its character was appro)riate for Mali's stage of development at the beginning, since unless some way can be found tc; raise production and income in the rural areas without driving many off the land, little rural development can occur. But as farmer incomes have risen and as new needs have appeared, the CFDT faces 88 the need to improve its planning and its adaptability. A logical direction would be to train farmers to take over the operation more and more in their own areas. At the moment, however, this goal seems to exist only in the mind of Jacques Moineau. - 139 - 98 FRENCH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MALI: A REVIEW OF GRGUYDNUT OPERATION AND COTTON SCHEME Part C COMPARISON OF THE TWO PROJECTS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS -90 Part C COMPARISON OF THE TWO PROJECTS AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS I. COMPARISON This report has described and attempted to evaluate two centralized production operations. Both began as cash crop operations with extension services, responsibijity for supplying inputs and credit, and responsibility for marketing. Both have succeeded in increasing production (or quantity markpted in Operation Arachide), in raising productivity per hectare, and in raising farmer revenue and government revenues. However, each has depended to some extent on increases in producer prices to enable farmers to finance nrw agricultural implements. Finally, each has succeeded in becoming more financially self-supporting, although Operation Arachide has made less progress since it, has been in operation only five years. The major contrasts between the two organizations lie in their styles of extension se rvice and their relative success in training Malians to take over the operation. The CFDT devloped a heavy-handed command style of extenion during colonial times which has been slow to adapt to changing circum- stances except in newer cotton areas like Fana and Kadiolo. Operation Arachide, however, began as a more collaborative and cooperative operation which sought to win .1armers' confidence. Operation Arachide likewise began with a commitment to train Malians to take over the operation completely in a limited time. is discussed earlier, this commitment expressed itself in serious action, and expatriates in thr operation will officially become technical advisers in March 1973. Suocess in thi,- goal aovears possible. The GFDT, on the other hand, n-ver had a commitment to txain Malians to take over, ,and nof until two years ago did a Malian assistant director, M.. Kon-, ent,er tic organization. At the insistence of the Malian government M. Kone ha,- replaced an expatriate as director, but his immediate subordi.nat,s, who still run the operation, are all expatriates. II. OTNERAL CONCLUSIONS This riport has focu-ed on the question of whether most -mall farmers, who rarely cultIvate more than one ha of cotton by hand, can increase their rovenues to the point at which they can purchase oxen and farm implements . Their acreage farmed in food crops and in cotton (as well as other crops that the CPDT is now introducing) then expands, and given satisfactory climatic -,onditions, these small farmers begin to increase thir incomes substantially and to confront a number of pos- sibilities for improving their lives. -91 - However, this increase in farmer income and in cash crop production (with an assumed increase in food crop production) is only a first step in agricultural development, itself only a facet of -rural development. The means by which this increase in agricultural produc- tion has taken place in the GFDT cotton zone as well as in Operation Arachide has important implications for continuing development. In both cases, the increased production has occurred through a centralized, paternalistic organization which provides inputs and credit, which provides a marketing system (and processing in the cotton zone), and which runs the extension service of the area. In neither operation does any form of producers' organization run by producers (such as a cooperative) exist, largely for the reasons discussed in the historical background to Operation Arachide. With the impact of an organization like the CFDT or Operation Arachide, however, it is difficult to avoid giving farmers the impression that the organiza- tion is there to take care of them. Farmer participation in the running of these operations is non-existent and is not planned. Admittedly, few farmers exist who would be qualified to run a cooperative type of organiza- tion, but sitill onr must ask what bottlenecks are being created for the future by not building infcreasing producer participation into the operation from the bottom up. For Mali in its present situation, this type of cen- tralized production organization may be the correct first step, but it is only that. And choosing this vehicle for increasing production creates difficulties by not planning for local participation. Onr sees some of the problems resulting from this centrally managed extension-iiiar,keting-credit operation in the Fana region, discussed earlier as an experimental area and as an especially successful sector within the cotton operation. As noted above, the CFDT added to the cotton production activities in Fana a surveying project, food crop concerns, a livestock operation, blacksmith training, and experimental rural education. The Malian sector chief, in conFulta- tion with the haad of the GFDTs extension service, was responsible for identifying these needs, but the insertion of these components came after the problem had Frsen. For example, wealthier farmers began increasing cattle herds before any persne existed to help them manage their herds, to advise them o7i anfima health, ana to help them integrate livestock with agriculture. Siilry extunsion personnel found that they could not supply suffiKient, spare parts for agricultural implements and the black- smith program was born. However, the identification of these needs had to be done by CFDT personno! and especially the top personnel in that sector. No local planning capacity rxisted. There existed then and exists now fairly effective information-galhering in the area because Michel Daou is close to the farmers of his area and knows what is going on. But he is the except-ion. How much earlier would problems be identified and projects prepared to deal with them if local farmers had the competence and the institutions to model the operation according to how they saw their needs? -92 - But how dore on 'plan for local participation in a situation liki Mali's--where farmers are susDicious of any attem-ot to group them or their land- an-H where the illiteracy rate in villages is 85 to 95 percent? There iei no easy answer. But it seems clear that unless farmer participatlon and' increasing farmer control begins, rural develop- m(nt in M-ali cannot con,inu much beyond the stage of the mo-t advanced sectors of the cotton operation. If the increase in cash cro- production and in farmer income c,')ntinues, changes have been set in motion which will endanger much mi.ore complex goals of completing rural infrastructure (especially in health, roads, and education). And to rrakr continuing developm nt l local planning capacity is essential. Without it, the information necessary for breaking bottlenecks in the process will not be obtained .arly enough to avoid serious disruptions of the fragile procesL. PerTon;n in O- eration Arachide are learning from the CFrT's exprrience and h planned a blacksmith training program to begin as animal traction is first bing introduced. They are further planning for thc introduolion of a livestock extension service. Similar thuUgh the groundnu t oprAtdion i to the CFDTrs operation, however, it will encount.er difi'eren; problems in different sequences, and Operation Arachide al,o has no plan for substantially increasing peasant participation. M. Giordano, the director of the project, feels that such a hope is utopic, but Operation Arachide should be at the present stage of the cotton operation in five years. How will the groundnut operation then repond to the bottlenecks and needs for change that will apprear? The bottlenocks and vastly increased need for planning do appear as agricuitual and rural develcoment begins. Needs for rural instituti ons at ower levels to handle increased responsibilities have surfaed' rpeate.dly in cther developing countries, both inside and outsie o' Africa. That Mali is in the earliest stages of develop- menT dors not mn th i wJil not confront these needs. A> thed y, vnning: bfore; criso-n is rare. But for rural developmircnt, and in for ail development, it is essential.