The OSCE in Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Identity 1990–1996

The OSCE in Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Identity 1990–1996 Volume II

Victor-Yves Ghebali 2      3 4   The OSCE in Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Identity 1990–1996 First published in French by Etablissement Bruylant, Brussels 1996 Original title: L’OSCE dans l’Europe post-communiste, 1990–1996.

© VBS/DDPS

Distribution BBL, Verkauf Bundespublikationen, CH-3003 Bern www.bundespublikationen.admin.ch, Art.-Nr. 81.086.ENG

ISBN 978-3-906969-94-7

Premedia Zentrum elektronische Medien ZEM 81.086 e 09.2021 700 Published by The Library am Guisanplatz BiG www.big.admin.ch Printed in Switzerland

Timelines and reference validation: Alice Němcová The OSCE in Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Identity 1990–1996

Volume II

Victor-Yves Ghebali “It is my firm belief that the OSCE’s destiny is conflict prevention, in the broadest sense of the expression … Conflict prevention is not an easy task. It is a tedious process requiring considerable investment over a long period of time. Such investment will have to include significant investment of financial capital, but no less political capital (meaning the political support of the participating States). Speaking about the need to make some financial sacrifices, I hasten to add that such financial effort will have to be seen in its proper perspective. Annually probably less than 1% of what OSCE States spend each year for defence and security would be needed.”

Max van der Stoel High Commissioner on National Minorities, Extract from a speech made at the Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (Stockholm, 5 July 1996)

“[The OSCE] is very profitable: with an annual budget of around 25 million dollars, it costs the equivalent of five days’ running costs of the United Nations, or for an average-sized participating State such as Great Britain, France, Germany or Italy, around a tenth of the sums allocated to the Council of Europe, and a little more than the budget given to the WEU. To take another basis of comparison, it represents 1.4 times the cost of an F16 fighter jet and less than 50% of a future European fighter jet (Eurofighter).”

Lord Chilworth Extract form a report on the CSCE’s Human Dimension: Principles, Mechanisms and ­Implementation (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, 1994) paragraph 41 Preamble by Thomas Greminger Secretary General of the OSCE [2019]

“The OSCE Legacy Project” by Colonel Thomas Schmidt Counsellor, Politico-military Advisor at the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE [2019]

Acknowledgments by Anne-Marie Ghebali [2018]

Preface by Flavio Cotti Federal Councillor, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE [1996]

Foreword by Jacques Attali State Councillor [1996]

Introduction by Victor-Yves Ghebali [1996]  i

Preface of the OSCE Secretary General “History doesn’t repeat itself but it often rhymes.” This aphorism by Mark Twain is a fitting introduction to this impressive set of reference publications by Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali on the history and evolution of the CSCE and the OSCE. His comprehensive, three-volume history begins in 1973, when an assembly of brave diplomats from both sides of the Iron Curtain had the vision and the courage to create an inclusive multilateral forum where they could engage in dialogue and negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe. Professor Ghebali chronicles the maturing of the CSCE in the détente period of the Cold War, and then the transition towards an organization entrusted with many new responsibilities in the post-communist world, which was soon confronted with an array of new realities following a period of hope after the end of the Cold War.

I am delighted that this extraordinary “ouvrage” of Professor Ghebali, whom I got to know personally while attending a diplomatic training course at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva many years ago, is now available in English. I am confident that these volumes will contribute to the understanding of the historic context and underlying political foundations of the OSCE, its evolution and achievements. They also reveal failures and windows of opportunities for the Organization’s engagement and work over time. In this sense, these publications not only serve as a reference for academics and students alike, but also as an anthology of the OSCE’s accomplishments and track record for use by politicians, diplomats and practitioners.

I would like to thank the Swiss Government for generously supporting the translation of the trilogy from the original French into English.

I would also like to extend my sincere gratitude to all those who have contributed to the translation, including the copy editors, project manager and project coordinator. The excellent co-operation between the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and the OSCE Documentation Centre in Prague also deserves to be highlighted.

Furthermore, the electronic version of this trilogy will enable global dissemination, and I hope that this will heighten the visibility of the OSCE beyond the expected target audience.

With this eminent work, now available in both French and English, the OSCE’s acquis, its history and its work are preserved for future generations, who can draw on its experience to promote peace and security in Europe and beyond.

Thomas Greminger Secretary General of the OSCE Vienna, July 2019 ii  iii

“The OSCE Legacy Project” Despite its uniqueness and comprehensiveness in terms of its geographical expanse or its thematic approach, the OSCE does not seem to be very well known or acknowledged for what it stands for among the public. This involuntary public image has had a deleterious effect on the relevance academicians and scholars see in the OSCE: specific and analytic literature on the OSCE remains rare and articles about the OSCE’s current agenda are published rather seldom.

Among the leading-edge experts who covered OSCE matters over a span of time, one name stands out, that of the late Prof. Dr. Victor-Yves Ghebali, excellent lecturer of political science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland, and director of the former OSCE Cluster of Competence. His research interests included the League of Nations, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, East-West relations, the Mediterranean region, national minorities and multilateral negotiations.

Professor Ghebali was the first and so far remains the only expert in this field to have authored a comprehensive collection of writings on the history, the development, as well as the aims and achievements of the OSCE, in the following three volumes: “The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973– 1989 (volume I); “The OSCE in a Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Identity 1990–1996”(volume II) and “The Role of the OSCE in Eurasia: From the Lisbon Summit to the Maastricht Ministerial Council 1996–2003” (volume III).1

This trilogy is not only one of a kind; it is also an excellent academic reference textbook on the OSCE. This work was originally written in French and no English version had ever been published. Consequently, this remarkable piece of work has not been widely disseminated or acknowledged within the OSCE community.

It was not until the aftermath of the Swiss OSCE Chairmanship in 2014 that the International Relations Division of the Swiss Armed Forces launched the so-called “OSCE Legacy Project” in view of the OSCE’s 40th anniversary celebration in 2015. The aim of this project was to make the three volumes available in English to an international public and thereby to “provide the OSCE with its own history”. The initiative was intended as a post-mortem tribute to the dedication and commitment of Prof. Victor-Yves Ghebali, who devoted a large part of his professional life to the OSCE and to Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic security in general.

1 The original titles of these three volumes are respectively: “La diplomatie de la détente: La CSCE, 1973–1979” (vol. I); “L’OSCE dans l’Europe post-communiste, 1990–1996” (vol. II) and “Le rôle de l’OSCE en Eurasie, du sommet de Lisbonne au Conseil ministériel de Maastricht 1996–2003 ” (vol. III). iv

The Swiss Armed Forces have a long tradition of engaging in academic and specialized publications related to security and military policy, as has been the case, for example, with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) or the Center for Security Studies (CSS). The Swiss Armed Forces have not only been providing information from national and international specialists to the Federal Administration for decades, but they have also been catering to the needs of the scientific community and responding to the interests of the public at large.

Switzerland thus undertook to publish and disseminate Prof. Ghebali’s work in order to enhance the promotion of the OSCE by making knowledge about this co-operative security organization widely available. At the same time, it is providing the academic community with a valuable reference tool, which can serve as a reliable basis for further research. To this end, the project’s editorial board recommended that the hard copies, as well as downloadable E-publications, be disseminated to the public free of charge, as a courtesy of the Swiss Confederation.

In sum, this publication is intended to be a meaningful source of reference on the OSCE as well as a source of inspiration, providing the opportunity of reading about the OSCE’s achievements in the past and examining them in the light of the challenges that the near future may bring.

As the responsible head of the project and in the name of the team that completed this task, I have the privilege to deliver this contribution my country deci­ded to offer to our OSCE community. Switzerland may be small and neutral, but it remains an active and hopefully innovative OSCE participating State, which aims at strengthening the co-operative and inclusive approach to security in the Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic region.

Colonel Thomas W. G. Schmidt Counsellor, Politico-military Adviser Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE Vienna, July 2019  v

Acknowledgements The enormous and extraordinary task, undertaken by an outstanding team of professional translators and copy editors, of translating what is most certainly the opus magnum of my departed husband, the professor Victor-Yves Ghebali, is now complete.

Thanks to the unfailing engagement and support of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS), International Defence Relations, to whom I wish to express my sincere gratitude, as a much larger and diverse public audience has now access to the product of more than thirty years of observation, research, analysis and synthesis, widely acclaimed by political scientists and diplomats.

Not only am I grateful, I am also proud to see the compiled works of Victor-Yves Ghebali more widely disseminated, so that the complex mechanisms at play in international relations – especially as seen through the prism of multilateral negotiations, which my husband considered the keystone of world peace – might be better understood.

The logistics that had to be put into place in order to produce the three works henceforth available to English-language readers required considerable ­resources. Like in a symphony orchestra, each member of the team played his or her role perfectly. From my vantage point as a spectator, I can only stand up and applaud.

My appreciation is immense, particularly as concerns the efforts of Ms. Alice Němcová, the official co-ordinator of this huge project and, in my eyes, conductor of the orchestra. She alone knows the extent to which her task was an enormous challenge, which she was determined unswervingly to meet. She alone, thanks to the finesse of her linguistic skills, was in a position to so ably organize and co-­ ordinate the team of translators. And she alone, thanks to the quality of the exchange that she maintained with my husband for almost 20 years, could transpose into the English language the intellectual and literary spirit that never ceased to animate my husband’s mind.

May all those who immerse themselves into one of these three books, or into what now constitutes a whole trilogy, be enabled through the analysis of what has occurred in the quite recent past to create their own conceptual tools, capable of bringing about a “new détente”.

Anne-Marie Ghebali Geneva, October 2018 vi  vii

Preface More than twenty years have passed since the signature of the CSCE Final Act, during which time the face of Europe has completely changed. The continent’s separation into two blocs, the confrontation of two antagonistic systems, and the once exacerbated ideological struggles now belong in the past. Building on the shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, economic freedom, social justice and environmental protection, Europe has chosen the route of cooperation and partnership.

The CSCE has played an important role in this transition. By creating a place for dialogue and rules of behaviour which apply both to relationships between States and to the behaviour of each State towards its citizens, it has progressively adopted a position where cooperation has prevailed over confrontation. It has also contributed to developing the concept of all States’ joint responsibility for a shared European civilization.

The extension of freedoms and the aspiration towards greater humanity faces both new and old conflicts. On the foundations of social and economic instability, wars, non-respect for fundamental freedoms and violations of human rights, aggressive nationalism, racism, xenophobia and inter-­ ethnic tensions have developed. These are the new dangers which today weigh heavy upon the peace, security and well-being of the European continent. The international community is called upon to rise to the challenge and to provide firm, convincing responses to fight against the new barbarism.

Confronted with these opportunities and risks, the CSCE has reoriented itself towards rapid response, conflict prevention and crisis management. To deal with these new challenges, it created permanent structures and launched field missions. Institutionalization coupled with acute operationalization has changed the very nature of the CSCE, and it was only logical that the CSCE became the OSCE.

In 1996, Switzerland took over Chairmanship of the OSCE. It was in this role that I realized the point to which the OSCE had become operational, whether that be in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Chechnya, to cite but two examples. Without any doubt, the OSCE is now closer to the concerns and problems of the people, particularly those in unstable regions. However, to ensure that its efforts on the ground are successful, three necessary but by no means sufficient conditions must be respected: 1. The OSCE must strengthen its internal procedures and improve the performance of its working instruments; 2. The OSCE must develop a culture of cooperation with other security actors. Indeed, it must better coordinate its activities, notably with the United Nations, the Council of Europe, NATO, the WEU, and the CIS, with a view to reaching a more effective distribution of tasks between all these organizations; 3. It is essential that the 55 participating viii

States have the desire to translate diplomatic declarations into reality. Without the political will of the participating States, the OSCE as such will never manage to create the cooperative security area in Europe, for which we are calling with all our hearts.

This publication by Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali comes at an opportune moment. Not only does it continue the remarkable train of thought that this author previously presented in his work ‘The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973–1989’, but it provides an exhaustive overview of the six years during which the CSCE/OSCE adapted to the new political situation in ­Europe. Undoubtedly, this new book fills a gap, because although numerous articles have been published on the various aspects of the OSCE, a single analysis of the entire range of the OSCE’s activities was lacking until now. This report will be useful for practitioners, diplomats and military experts working with the OSCE and will also be greatly appreciated by readers who are interested in international security cooperation, since the OSCE would not exist without intense, sustained dialogue with the public, university researchers and non-governmental organizations. By publishing this meticulously compiled report written with a thirst for knowledge and understanding, Professor Ghebali has rendered a great service to the OSCE.

Flavio Cotti Federal Councillor Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE [1996]  ix

Foreword This is a fascinating book which succeeds in the incredible feat of being a treaty of international law, a history of the end of the Cold War, and an account of the birth of the dozen countries that emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. Professor Ghebali’s study is an indispensable document for those who wish to understand what happened in Europe over the past six years, as well as for those who want to take action to prepare a Europe of peace, freedom and growth.

The creation of the OSCE was one of the most brilliant diplomatic successes of the twentieth century. Its creation, which came with no great fanfare and at no great cost, is something of a miracle, not least given the conflicts of interest, particularly between Europe and the United States, which dominated the context. Professor Ghebali highlights this extremely well, drawing well-deserved attention to the outstanding quality of the first leaders of this organization: nothing can be born without being borne.

Nevertheless, at first sight it may appear that the OSCE has failed, because the former Eastern bloc remains a theatre for deadly conflicts, political disorder and economic chaos. This book shows, however, that without the OSCE, the situation would be even worse, and that, on the contrary, it would be even better if the competing institutions, starting with the United Nations, recognized the full range of the OSCE’s competences.

In a world where exponential demographic growth and economic development will continue to disrupt our borders, where striving for lost identities continues to splinter existing States into tribal micro-entities in Europe and elsewhere, the lessons of this patient, lengthy legal process, this flexible diplomatic machine must be drawn.

It will contribute, if this is still possible, towards producing a world which is both more diverse and more united, a condition of our very survival.

Jacques Attali State Councillor [1996] x  xi

Introduction Adopted at the apogee of the East–West détente, the Helsinki Final Act (1975) tasked the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with a formal mission focused on the immediate present and an implicit mission aimed at a distant future. The former was the development of diverse and in-depth ­cooperation between countries “irrespective of their political, economic or social systems”. The latter, conceived of from a perspective that everyone considered to be utopian, envisaged nothing less than overcoming the artificial division of Europe on the basis of Western values. In effect, in contrast to a certain preconceived idea, the Helsinki Final Act by no means reflected a philosophical compromise between two views of the world: it made no concessions in terms of either style or substance to Marxist ideology and was imbued with liberal values – often formulated, it has to be said, in a timid, oblique or ambiguous way and combined with multiple limits and restrictions. This result stemmed from the fact that, despite complaints from the USSR, it was prepared in line with basic conditions set by the Western countries. Stubbornly arguing against counterparts who were either reticent or sceptical to the end, the Soviets’ influence over the content of the Final Act was no more than defensive and negative, through the introduction of restrictive safeguard clauses or loopholes.

Exceeding even the most optimistic forecasts, the CSCE achieved its twofold challenge. Encapsulating the virtues of a global confidence-building measure, it contributed to the normalization, institutionalization and pacification of East– West relations. As a normative laboratory and the moral conscience of Greater Europe, it made a subtle – but real – contribution to the collapse of communism, thereby illustrating the relevance of what André Gide called “God’s share”: that which an artist unknowingly injects into a work of art. Initially, the participating States were unaware of or underestimated “God’s share” in the CSCE Final Act. They became aware of it in 1976, with the development – in the USSR and the popular democracies – of the phenomenon of the “Helsinki monitoring groups”. They realized its full potential through monitoring meetings and conferences which, by constantly revealing the disastrous assessment of communism in terms of human rights, weakened the internal and international legitimacy of the communist regimes. Perestroika did the rest. It speeded up the CSCE’s work to undermine communism until the end. The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), followed by the rapid collapse of communism in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, proclaimed that the sought-after objective of the Helsinki Final Act had been achieved. At this point, the CSCE participating States faced a critical choice: to either close the Helsinki process or to refound it with new missions and structures for the needs of the post-Cold War Greater Europe (which had become “whole and free”).

Naturally, the second option was chosen. On 21 November 1990, following an idea initially launched by Mikhail Gorbachev, the participating States signed the xii

Charter of Paris for a New Europe, an act which marked the end of the Cold War and which refounded a somewhat institutionalized CSCE. Given the growing impact of the shockwaves resulting from the collapse of communism, the “Paris process” was far from static. It was immediately, incessantly and constantly reworked, ultimately leading to the transformation of the CSCE into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 1 January 1995.

In terms of its composition, structures, work programme, functions and means of action, the current OSCE has little in common with the CSCE of the Cold War.

First of all, we will show that the OSCE represents a “Greater Europe” with geopolitical boundaries that extend even further than before. With the accession of the Republics of the former USSR, particularly those of Central Asia and the Caucasus, it incorporated States which were incontestably non-European (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan) or whose European nature was questionable (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia). Its geopolitical scope now extends from Vancouver to Vladivostok and it is an institution which is not only Euro-Atlantic but also Euro-Asian, within which Japan and the Republic of Korea hold observer status. In any case, the move from 35 to 55 participating States had the effect of considerably transforming the pan-European diplomatic system. It made the negotiation of the OSCE final texts more complicated and even more un­predictable than before. By introducing States which had become independent for the first time in their history, the OSCE was also confronted with e­ ntirely new problems, presenting striking similarities with the United Nations ­ during the ­ heroic period of decolonization. However, above all, it put an end to the ­global  ­cultural homogeneity that (setting aside the ideological fracture) marked the 35 founding members of the OSCE: alongside Turkey, there were now T ­ urkish-speaking Muslim countries and even, in the case of Tajikistan, Iranian s­ peakers.

We will then look at the consequences of the transformation of the OSCE from a simple forum to an international organization. Certainly, this organization is not founded on “politically binding” commitments and its institutions do not have international legal status. Nevertheless, the OSCE has political consultation bodies (Summits, Ministerial Council, Senior Council, Permanent Council), Review Conferences, specialized structures (Forum for Security Cooperation, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Economic Forum), associated bodies (Parliamentary Assembly in Copenhagen and the Court of Conciliation in Geneva), a central Secretariat (Vienna), external offices (Warsaw, The Hague), a Chairman-in-Office, a Secretary General, a regular budget, and a dozen “Missions of Long Duration” in the field. Moreover, the OSCE has declared itself to be a “regional agreement” in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and has regular and close working relations with the United Nations. It also cooperates with regional organizations (particularly the European Union and the Council of Europe), with certain third-party States in the Mediterranean and Asia (granted the status of  xiii

“Partners for Cooperation”), and with non-governmental organizations primarily interested in its human dimension activities.

We will also show how the traditional “basket” concept gave way to that of “dimensions”. The OSCE work programme now has a politico-military dimension, an economic dimension and a human dimension. Beyond mere semantics, this evolution reflects significant fundamental changes. Thus, the politico-military dimension (formerly the first basket without human rights) led to a new normative text that was superimposed onto the Helsinki Decalogue (the 1994 Code of Conduct) as well as to increasingly sophisticated generations of confidence- and security-building measures. With annual review meetings and its own central structure (Forum for Security Cooperation), it now includes a theme which previously was the exclusive remit of NATO and the Warsaw Pact: disarmament and arms control. Qualifying the economic dimension, the second basket still remains essentially virtual but is less neglected than it was during the Cold War period: it has an Economic Forum and the participating States are even seeking to integrate it into crisis and conflict management operations. As for the human dimension, or the former third basket plus human rights, it has several practical instruments (the Moscow Mechanism, biannual review meetings, specialized seminars) and its own secretariat providing technical assistance (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights). Significantly, the scope of the human dimension is no longer limited simply to human rights: it also includes multi- party democracy and the rule of law.

Lastly, we will highlight the important fact that crisis and conflict management has become a regular function of the OSCE. The OSCE is now authorized to undertake peacekeeping operations on its own behalf or on behalf of other international organizations. It has a whole series of instruments aiming at holding emergency political consultations (Berlin Mechanism), the peaceful settlement of disputes (Valletta Mechanism, Court of Conciliation and Arbitration), the clarification of unusual military activities (Vienna Mechanism), the examination of violations regarding the human dimension (Moscow Mechanism), and “Missions of Long Duration” responsible for crisis and conflict management. In short, in post- communist Europe the OSCE has (to varying degrees) the various functions defined by the United Nations Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

This book offers a critical yet constructive overview of the first six years of the OSCE in post-communist Europe. Although devoted to a qualitatively new institution, it is nonetheless a direct prolongation of our preceding book, on the CSCE during the Cold War period.1

1 See Victor-Yves Ghebali, The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973–1989 (Volume I). xiv

The first chapter is devoted to the refounding text of the OSCE, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (21 November 1990). It analyses its origins, formal content and weaknesses. It demonstrates that, due to a lack of political vision on the part of the drafters, the Charter of Paris was the founding document of an essentially ectoplasmic institution.

The second chapter looks at the institutional development of the OSCE. It analyses the various elements of the mechanism for political consultations (Ministerial Council, former Committee of Senior Officials and the former Permanent Committee, Summits and Review Conferences), the decision-making procedures, administrative structures (Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre) and the particular case of the Parliamentary Assembly. It does not include the Forum for Security Cooperation, the Economic Forum, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, or the High Commissioner on National Minorities – the roles of which are addressed in detail in the following chapters. It does, however, look at the relationship between the OSCE and the United Nations, regional international organizations and NGOs.

The third chapter looks at the expansion of the pan-European diplomatic system. It analyses the enlargement process which brought the OSCE’s composition from 35 to 55 participating States as well as the key consequences of this: the difficulties of integrating new participating States and the transformation of the role of group diplomacy. It also looks at the OSCE’s relations with the “Partners for Cooperation” in the Mediterranean region and Asia.

The fourth chapter is devoted to the politico-military dimension of the OSCE, and focuses on the Forum for Security Cooperation. It provides a detailed analysis of the work it accomplished between 1992 and 1994, paying particular attention to the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994) and the 1994 Vienna Document on Military Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

The fifth chapter looks at crisis and conflict management in the OSCE area, a central aspect of the book, and contains three distinct sections. The first section reveals the development of the operational capacity of the OSCE. The second section analyses the management of armed or potential conflicts affecting the geopolitical area of the former USSR (Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Chechnya, the Baltic States, Ukraine), not overlooking the “Russian peacekeeping operations”. The third section looks at the management of various aspects of the Yugoslav conflict, from the bumbling policy practised by the OSCE in 1991 and 1992 to the functions incumbent upon it under the Dayton Agreement (1995).

The sixth chapter looks at the economic dimension of the OSCE. The brevity of the chapter reflects the fact that developments in this area have essentially been  xv

limited to the annual Economic Forum (within the formal context of the Committee of Senior Officials/Senior Council), which is still trying to find its role.

The seventh chapter looks at the human dimension of the OSCE. It studies the institutional evolution of the OSCE and its instruments. Moreover, it pays particular attention to the theme of national minorities, which the OSCE addresses not only from a normative angle but also through preventive diplomacy, through the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Lastly, it analyses in detail the delicate issue of the relationship between the OSCE and the Council of Europe.

The eighth chapter analyses the evolution of the OSCE in 1996, the year of the Swiss Chairmanship.

It is our pleasant duty to thank the officials of the OSCE, notably Alice Němcová at the Prague Office Archives and Martin Alexanderson of the ODIHR for their assistance. A special mention also goes to the Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs and particularly the Swiss mission to the OSCE.

We are also indebted to the staff of the library of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, who provided valuable bibliographical and documentary assistance (particularly regarding United Nations documents), as well as to some of our students, Emeric Rogier, Marianne Ducasse and Isabelle Vonèche, who conscientiously corrected drafts of this publication.

Victor-Yves Ghebali Geneva, 1996 x vi  x vii

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms AEMI Annual exchange of military information AIAM Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Council BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation CAHMIN Ad Hoc Committee for the Protection of National Minorities CBM Confidence-building measures CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States CDE Conference on Confidence‑ and Security‑Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe CEI Central European Initiative CFE Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CiO Chairman-in-Office CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CPC Conflict Prevention Centre CSBM Confidence‑ and security‑building measures CSCE Conference on Security and Co‑operation in Europe CSCM Conference on Security and Co-operation in the ­Mediterranean CSO Committee of Senior Officials CWC Chemical Weapons Convention EAOC Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ECU European Currency Unit EEC European Economic Community EF Economic Forum EIB European Investment Bank ESDI European Security and Defence Identity EUREKA European Research Coordination Agency FOFA Follow-on forces attack FRG Federal Republic of Germany FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia FSC Forum for Security Co-operation GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDR German Democratic Republic GEMI Global exchange of military information HCNM High Commissioner on National Minorities IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ICC International Chamber of Commerce ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross x viii

IFOR Implementation Force IMF International Monetary Fund IMO International Maritime Organization INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces IOM International Organization for Migration IPU Inter-Parliamentary Union ITU International Telecommunication Union IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NACC North Atlantic Co‑operation Council NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPMS Non-participating Mediterranean State NPT Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OFE Office for Free Elections OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PA OSCE Parliamentary Assembly PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe PC Permanent Council PHARE Poland and Hungary Assistance for Reconstruction of Economy PIA Programme for Immediate Action PIC Peace Implementation Council PLO Palestine Liberation Organization RAPS Recently admitted participating States SAM Sanctions Assistance Missions SAMCOMM Sanctions Assistance Missions Communication Centre SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural ­Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium WEU Western European Union WHO World Health Organization  Chapter I   1

CHAPTER I

The Refoundation of the CSCE through the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (21 November 1990) On 21 November 1990, at the end of the first Summit since Helsinki (1975), the CSCE participating States solemnly signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. By institutionalizing the pan-European process (which until that point had had no permanent, formal structures) and defining the broad outlines of its new role in a Europe now “whole and free”, the agreement became the “refounding” act of a CSCE which, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, could justifiably claim to have achieved the concrete objectives of the Helsinki Final Act. This chapter will analyse the genesis, content and weaknesses of the Charter, which was the direct origin of what can be referred to as the “Paris process”, in other words, the CSCE/ OSCE in the post-communist era.

I. The Genesis of the Charter of Paris The crowning act of the Summit held in the French capital from 19 to 21 November 1990, the Charter of Paris, was a direct consequence of an idea originally put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev. Once the principle of a new pan- European summit had been accepted by the three diplomatic groups involved in the process (the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and the Neutral and Non-Aligned or “N+N” countries), the idea materialized in three stages – symbolized respectively by the cities of Vienna, New York and Paris.

1. The Idea of a Pan-European Summit The idea of a summit at which the CSCE participating States would identify and act upon the political and institutional consequences of the profound changes which had taken place in Europe since perestroika and the fall of the Berlin Wall was proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev on 30 November 1989 during a State visit to Italy. Immediately approved by President Mitterrand (at a press conference in Kiev on 6 December) and Chancellor Kohl (in the Kohl-Modrow joint declaration made in Berlin on 19 December), the idea was endorsed in principle by the twelve EU Member States on 20 January 1990.1 Less enthusiastically, the United States made its consent conditional on three criteria: consideration of the issue of regular free and democratic elections; definition of an agenda enabling the future summit to be a preparatory meeting for (rather than an alternative to) the Helsinki Follow-­up Conference scheduled for 1992; and, above all, the completion of the

1 This occurred during a special informal session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Dublin. 2   The Refoundation of the CSCE

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – so that the CFE Treaty would be signed during the Summit in question.2 On 13 February 1990, at a meeting in Ottawa held on the fringes of the Open Skies conference held to review progress on the CFE Treaty negotiations, the member States of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agreed in principle to “hold a CSCE summit meeting the same year”.3 The N+N countries came to the same conclusion at the close of their Ministerial meeting in Valletta held on 3 March 1990.4 Two capital cities competed for the honour of hosting the Summit. On 19 December 1989, Austria addressed the CSCE participating States with a note verbale making its case, emphasizing, in particular, that Vienna had been the location for the CFE negotiations. The next day, in a speech in Berlin, President Mitterrand announced that he would be putting Paris forward as a candidate. Strongly supported by its European partners as well as by NATO as a result of the political sway it held with the countries of Eastern Europe, France went on to prevail over Austria – which only had the support of the N+N countries and had to cope with the additional obstacle of the continuing diplomatic boycott of Kurt Waldheim by most of its CSCE partners. At an extraordinary meeting held in Brussels on 3 May 1990, the North Atlantic Council suggested that the Summit should be prepared in Vienna from July and held in Paris – with, in the interim, a meeting to be organized in New York during the opening of discussions at the United Nations General Assembly.5 On 5 June 1990, at a special meeting held on the sidelines of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, the CSCE Ministers for Foreign Affairs agreed to this plan. They decided to create a committee which would begin preparations for the Paris Summit in Vienna from 10 July, with the help of the Executive Secretary of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security- Building Measures. Among other things, these preparations were to include a Ministerial meeting in New York.6

2. The Vienna PrepCom The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) convened in Vienna from 10 July to 17 November 1990 – in other words, until two days before the Summit. It established the agenda for the Summit on 27 July 1990 and that of the Ministe­ rial meeting in New York on 24 September 1990.7 The fundamental role of the

2 These demands were formulated by the Secretary of State James Baker in a speech delivered in Prague on 7 February 1990 at Charles University (published by Agence Europe, Document Atlantique no. 66, 16 February 1990). 3 See NATO Communiqué issued as ICO-CS-04 (13 February 1990) on the CFE and the CSCE. 4 See Joint Communiqué issued at a Meetingin of the Foreign Ministers of CSCE Neutral and Non- Aligned States, held in Malta, 1–3 March 1990. 5 See Nouvelles Atlantiques, no. 2218 (4 May 1990), p. l. 6 See Additional CSCE Council of Ministers in Copenhagen on the Preparations for the CSCE Summit: Journal of the 5 June 1990, item 5. 7 See CSCE/GVA/Dec.1 (27 July 1990) and CSCE/GVA/Dec.2 (24 September 1990).  Chapter I   3

­ repcom was to draft the Charter of Paris, the text of which was agreed on P 17 November 1990.8 The corpus consisting of the Charter of Paris and its Supplementary Document was drafted exclusively on the basis of “non-papers” without official status. The drafting took place in a harmonious atmosphere marked by the Co-operative attitude of the Eastern European countries and the USSR. Nonetheless, three points gave rise to certain difficulties: the connection to be made between Declaration on Non-­aggression signed by 16 NATO and six Warsaw Pact State parties [together 22], and the Declaration on Friendly Relations signed by 35 States; the modalities for the participation in the Summit by the European Commission (to be represented by its President, Jacques Delors); and the opportunity to plan a procedure for the emergency meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials. Two incidents marred the completion of the preparatory work. In the first incident, Spain and the UK clashed, for the first time in the CSCE’s history, on the “colonial situation of Gibraltar”.9 The other, reflecting a well-established tradition, involved Turkey and Cyprus.10 For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the PrepCom invited the non-participating Mediterranean States to present contributions to the proceedings. Of the eight eligible States, only three responded to the call: Algeria, Egypt and Israel.11

3. The New York Ministerial The brief Ministerial in New York (1 and 2 October 1990) was the first meeting held by the CSCE in the United States,12 which had taken this initiative in order to confirm its affiliation with the Helsinki process and, further, its status as a ­European power – necessities resulting from the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat in Europe. Keen to underline the transatlantic connection which the CSCE reflected, the Americans took care to stress the “ground-breaking” nature of the meeting in New York: hence their insistence on a meeting at Ministerial level, with a concrete agenda, an executive Secretariat, a public session and, above all, a final communiqué – a rare occurrence for the

8 See PrepCom: Journal No. 30 of 16 and 17 November 1990, item 5. 9 Ibid., items 6 (d) and 6 (e). 10 Turkey contested the representation of Cyprus, ibid., item 6 (c). During the Paris Summit, on the basis of §79 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations(1973), the Turkish delegation demanded that the Republic of Northern Cyprus (a State recognized only by Ankara) be allowed to distribute a communication, in which it requested to participate in the CSCE negotiations, see CSCE/SP/Inf.1 (21 November 1990). 11 See PrepCom: Journal No. 15 of 4 September 1990 and Journal No. 19 of 24 September 1990. The three countries were given the floor on 24 September 1990, the day of the opening of the Meeting on Mediterranean Co-operation organized by the CSCE in Palma de Mallorca. 12 However, if one takes into account that in 1985 the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Human Rights was held in Ottawa, this was not, de facto, the first CSCE meeting held on the American continent. 4   The Refoundation of the CSCE

CSCE.13 The purpose of – if not perhaps even the pretext for – the meeting was to examine progress made on the preparatory work for the Summit, on the basis of a report which had been prepared “as a national contribution” by the Chairman of the PrepCom. The meeting adopted two communiqués. The first, which stressed the transatlantic connection, announced the adoption by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the agenda of the Paris Summit and confirmation of its date – while indicating that it was essential that a CFE Treaty be ready for signature at the Summit. The second was adopted in the form of a “Statement on the Crisis in the Gulf ”, condemning the invasion and occupation of Kuwait as an act jeopardizing global stability.

4. The Paris Summit With the exception of the point relating to the closure of the Summit, the agenda covered four precisely defined items. The first indicated that the speaker authorized to address the conference immediately after its official opening by the Head of State of the host country would be, in keeping with a tradition going back to 1973, the United Nations Secretary-­General (Perez de Cuellar). The second referred to the (public) statements, followed by (non-public) exchanges of views between the Heads of State or Government of participating States “regarding the new situation in Europe and the action to be taken in the further development of security, stability and co-operation, including the enhancement of the CSCE process”. The third mentioned the presentation of a “contribution” by the Secretary-­ General of the Council of Europe – a remarkably innovative move by the CSCE given that, up to that point, the Strasbourg institution had been refused by the Eastern bloc countries as being an “instrument of the Cold War”. The fourth dealt with the adoption and solemn signature of a final document or documents. An asterisk on the agenda specified (upon the insistence of the Americans) that the formalities relating to the signature of the CFE Treaty would be “agreed between the countries concerned”, in other words, exclusively between the 22 signatories to the Treaty, i.e., only a certain number of the CSCE participating States. This provision is indicative of the state of mind evident in Washington at this time, showing that the US authorities were still averse to abandoning the CFE/CSBM dichotomy too rapidly. Finally, it should be noted that the agenda of the Summit barely mentioned the adoption of a document on CSBMs: when the agenda was agreed, the prospects of completing such a document appeared uncertain.14

13 As far as we know, the CSCE issued only one formal communiqué and that was at at the end of its “Stage I” in Helsinki, (3 to 7 July 1973). 14 Nevertheless, the preparation of the “Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on CSBM Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna  Chapter I   5

The Paris Summit opened on 19 November 1990, after a separate ceremony specifically devoted to signature of the CFE Treaty. It ended on 21 November with the signature of the Charter of Paris by the Heads of State or Government of the 34 CSCE participating States,15 as well as by the President of the European Commission.16 In addition to this symbolic measure, the Summit took the concrete decision to set the time and place for the first meeting of the CSCE Ministerial Council, which was to take place on 19 and 20 June 1991 in Berlin.17 One incident momentarily disrupted the serenity of the meeting: the expulsion (at the request of the Soviet delegation) of representatives of the Baltic States who were attending the Summit as the “guests of honour” of the Executive Secretariat.

II. The Content of the Charter of Paris The document’s title, “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, resulted from proposals made by the twelve EU countries – in particular by France, which wanted to give the Paris text a political and symbolic value greater than that of the Helsinki Final Act.18 The Charter itself consists of three parts which are neither numbered nor (due to lack of time) preceded by a real preamble. Entitled “A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity”, the first part essentially consists of provisions of a general nature. The second part, entitled “Guidelines for the future” encompasses the provisions relating to the CSCE’s work in the post-communist era, while the third part, “New structures and institutions of the CSCE Process”, was devoted to the ways in which the CSCE was to be institutionalized. These three parts were the result of co-ordinated drafting work carried out by the Ambassadors of Sweden (Rolf Ekeus), Switzerland (Marianne von Grünigen) and Finland (Markku Reimaa), respectively.19

Meeting of the CSCE” (hereafter cited as the Vienna Document) was completed on 17 November 1990. 15 As a result of reunification of the two Germanies on 3 October 1990, the CSCE increased the number of its participating States from 34 to 35. 16 The Charter of Paris was signed by each of the twelve EEC countries individually, as well as by the then President of the Council of the European Communities – the Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti – and by the then President of the Commission of the European Communities, Jacques Delors. 17 See Paris Summit (1990): Journal No. 2 of 20 November 1990, p. 2. This decision was adopted by the PrepCom on the basis of a proposal made by Germany, see PrepCom: Journal No. 30 of 16 and 17 November 1990, item 5 (a). 18 During an intervention delivered at the PrepCom. on behalf of the EU countries on 4 September 1990, Italy referred to the possibility of a new “Charter for European Relations”. On 5 September, the French delegation also formulated the idea of a “European Charter”. See also the undated non-paper distributed by the Belgian delegation under the heading “Towards a Charter for Security and Co-operation in Europe”. 19 A fourth co-ordinator, Austrian Ambassador Martin Vukovic, intervened at an advanced stage of the discussions. 6   The Refoundation of the CSCE

Annexed to the Charter is a “Supplementary document to give effect to certain provisions contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe”. Its provisions relate to the second and, primarily, the third part. It should also be pointed out that the Charter was the subject of unilateral statements on the part of Canada, Finland, Turkey, Spain, the United Kingdom and Greece.20 The Charter of Paris can be analysed on the basis of three main themes: the new Europe, the CSCE’s programme in the post-communist era, and the institutionalization of the CSCE/OSCE.

1. The Parameters of the New Europe The theme of the “new Europe” can be considered as the synthesis of three ideas which were French in origin and which constituted the leitmotif of the Charter: democratic Europe, peaceful Europe, and reunited Europe. a) Democratic Europe In the spirit of the Copenhagen Document of 1990, the philosophy of which it reaffirms, the Charter of Paris sets out two main ideas and stresses that the new Europe must be built on democratic foundations. Firstly, it states that representative and pluralist democracy is now the “only system of government” acceptable on the continent.21 Secondly, it states that human rights are founded on the human condition itself and are necessarily guaranteed by the State under the rule of law,22 thus confirming the existence of a concept of human rights which was, from this point onwards, the sole valid concept of human rights in Europe, as well as of the relationship between the State and its citizens, namely, that the State should be at the service of its citizens and not the inverse. b) Peaceful Europe The Charter indirectly welcomes the dawn of a peaceful Europe by mentioning two texts drafted outside the OSCE: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the joint NATO/Warsaw Pact Declaration. Here is not the place for any commentary on the CFE Treaty, which is a particularly technical instrument. Suffice it to say that it corroborated the fact the USSR renounced its politico-military hegemony on the continent and that it was the first real multilateral disarmament agreement reached in the history of Europe. However, the second text does merit comment, because its inclusion in the Charter of Paris was one of the bones of contention at the PrepCom in Vienna. At the end of their London Summit on 6 July 1990, the NATO countries proposed to the Warsaw Pact countries a joint document in which the members

20 See PrepCom: Journal No. 30 of 16 and 17 November 1990, pp. 2–5. 21 See Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 19–21 November 1990 (hereafter cited as the Charter of Paris), under the heading on “Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law”, § 1. 22 Ibid § 2.  Chapter I   7

of the two alliances would proclaim their desire to cease to be adversaries and to abstain from any aggression – a document which the other countries of the CSCE would be invited to sign.23 Within the PrepCom, France was quick to state that the accelerated evolution of the political situation, given the disintegration of the blocs, required a declaration by 35 countries rather than just 22.24 Given the opposition of some and the scepticism of others (the N+N countries did not see the value of being party to a declaration of non-aggression), the French delegation proposed a “Declaration of Friendly Relations” between the CSCE countries. The Declaration of the 23 NATO/Warsaw Pact countries (which, following German reunification, were in fact now 22 in number) was ultimately to be dealt with by the Charter of Paris in the most understated terms: “We welcome the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States on the improvement of their relations.”25 Negotiated on the fringes of the PrepCom only between the countries concerned (but with a weekly report to the other CSCE States), the Declaration of Twenty-Two States was drafted without any major difficulties, thanks to the conciliatory attitude of the USSR, which agreed to use the NATO proposal as the basis for drafting and refrained from insisting upon a reference to naval disarmament. The Declaration was signed on 19 November 1990, at the same time as the CFE Treaty. c) Reunited Europe The Charter of Paris recognized that Europe was now “whole and free”.26 Four references merit particular attention in this regard. Firstly, the Charter notes the end of the division of Germany and welcomes the fact that “the German people have united to become one State in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in full accord with their neighbours.”27 This wording was retained at the request of Yugoslavia, which was keen at that time to specify that German unity had obtained the agreement of all CSCE States.28 Secondly, the Charter reaffirmed Europe’s cultural identity and recalled the “essential contribution of our common European culture and our shared values in overcoming the division of the continent”.29

23 See ‘Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance’, § 6, published in NATO Ministerial communiqué S/1/(90) 36, released by the London NATO Summit on 6 July 1990. 24 See statements delivered by the French delegation at the PrepCom on 20 July and 5 September 1990. 25 See Charter of Paris, under the heading “Friendly Relations among Participating States”, first part, § 6. 26 Ibid. section on “Unity”, § 1. 27 Ibid., § 2. 28 See statement delivered at the PrepCom by Ambassador Vladimir Pavićević, Head of the Yugoslav delegation on 14 November 1990. 29 See Charter of Paris, under the heading of “Guidelines for the future”, second part, section on “Culture”, § 1. 8   The Refoundation of the CSCE

Thirdly, the Charter clearly highlights (as requested by the United States and Canada) the fact that the CSCE encompasses a transatlantic connection, founded on an “abiding adherence to shared values and our common heritage”. This link is, moreover, presented as a “fundamental characteristic” of the Helsinki or “CSCE” process, underlying its past achievements and essential to its future.30 Fourthly, the Charter reaffirms the global dimension of the CSCE by presenting Europe as a continent open to dialogue with the outside world, standing alongside countries in other continents and supporting the United Nations as a peacekeeping and international security instrument.31 It also reaffirms the link between Europe and the countries of the Mediterranean.32

2. The CSCE’s Post-Communist Programme The Charter of Paris does not address the CSCE’s work programme in the post- communist era as it had been addressed in the past, by identifying three baskets (security, economic co-operation, and the human dimension), plus the Mediterranean question. It loosely mentions seven specific sectors of activity (the human dimension, security, economic co-operation, the environment, culture, migrant workers, and the Mediterranean) and introduces an entirely new element: the involvement of non-governmental organizations in the “structures” as well as in the activities of the CSCE.33 a) Security On the subject of security, the Charter makes three significant points. Firstly, it announces that the negotiations of the 22 States of the CFE and those of the 34 States on the CSBMs will continue, under the same mandates, until the opening of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (March 1992), the day after which the 22/34 dichotomy will cease to exist.34 Secondly, it confirms that CSCE States are committed to developing the political and legal mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.35 Thirdly, it proposes the principle of co-operation with a view to addressing new dangers to security, such as external support for territorial sepa­ ratism (a Yugoslav idea) and dangers to society such as terrorism and drug traf­ ficking.36 b) Economic co-operation On the subject of economic co-operation, the Charter of Paris restates the principles set out in April 1990 in the Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe: freedom, economic growth and prosperity (as

30 Ibid., first part, section on “Unity”, § 3. 31 Ibid., second part, section on “The CSCE and the World”, § 1. 32 Ibid., second part, section on the “Mediterranean”. 33 Ibid., second part, section on “ Non-governmental Organizations”. 34 Ibid., second part, section on “Security”, § 1. 35 Ibid., § 6. 36 Ibid., §§ 4 and 5.  Chapter I   9

well as their link to democratic freedoms), protection of the environment, and above all – in order not to support unrestrained capitalism – social progress and social ­justice, references inserted at the request of the Netherlands, the USSR and the Holy See.37 In addition, the Charter states that the movement towards a market economy is in the interest of all CSCE States, because it should enable the fruits of greater prosperity to be shared.38 At the same time, it reflects the growing place occupied by the theme of protecting the environment since the CSCE meetings in Vienna and Sofia in 1989.39 In addition to a reference (of Maltese origin) to the interests of “developing participating States”,40 the Charter asserts – in a sign of the times – that scientific and technological co-operation should move towards “a greater sharing of appropriate scientific and technological information and knowledge” with a view to overcoming the technological gap existing among participating States.41 Finally, it restates, in general terms, the relevance to CSCE States of the issue of migrant workers (which also relates to the human dimension).42 c) The human dimension The expression “human dimension” was first used in the 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting in order to encompass the substance of Principle VII (“Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”) of the Helsinki Decalogue and the third basket. The Charter of Paris introduces new elements touching on the human dimension and its policy instrument, namely, the Moscow Mechanism. The Charter introduces two new areas for co-operation – that of strengthening democratic institutions and that of protecting national minorities. To this end, the Charter anticipates the convening of two intersessional meetings: firstly, the Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions in Oslo in November 1991 and, secondly, the Meeting of Experts on National Minorities in Geneva, in July 1991.43 It should also be noted that the Charter establishes a formerly unthinkable distinction between the “free flow of information and ideas” and free movement and contacts among citizens,44 towards which the West had been very cautious for

37 Ibid., second part, section on “Economic Co-operation”, §§ 1–3. 38 This idea stems from a US non-paper dated 15 October 1990 containing the following statement: “Prosperity is not a fixed good to be parcelled out by governments. It is a commodity which expands through intensified economic activity to the benefit of all.” 39 See Charter of Paris, second part, section on “Environment”. 40 Ibid., section on “Economic Co-operation”, § 5. 41 Ibid., § 6. 42 Ibid., section on “Migrant Workers”. 43 Ibid., section on the “Human Dimension”, §§ 2 and 3. The mandate of the intersessional meetings is the subject of sections II.A and II.B and Annexes II and III of the “Supplementary document to give effect to certain provisions contained in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe” (hereafter cited as the Supplementary Document to the Charter of Paris). 44 See Charter of Paris, second part, section on the “Human Dimension”, § 5. 10   The Refoundation of the CSCE

fear of an influx of immigrants from the East. It is also worth noting that the Charter announces the agreement between CSCE States of the principle of the reciprocal establishment of foreign cultural centres, a goal previously pursued by the West which the USSR had, to that point, flatly rejected.45 The Charter also anticipates the significant development of the human dimension mechanism, indicating that this may involve the services of experts or a roster of eminent persons, to enable individuals to be involved in the protection of their rights.46 Finally, the Charter pays homage to the Council of Europe, a body which had long been considered in the East as an instrument of the Cold War, but which the CSCE now recognized as possessing “experience” in the fields of human rights and cultural co-operation.47 As a result, the Strasbourg institution was invited to contribute to the meetings in Oslo and Geneva, and later to the Symposium on Cultural Heritage (Cracow, May–June 1991), which at the time of the Charter had not been planned.

3. The Institutionalization of the CSCE/OSCE Prior to the Charter of Paris, the CSCE was nothing more than a process of continuous negotiations, with no headquarters, secretariat or even regularly scheduled meetings. The process took the form of irregular “follow-up conferences”, ad hoc “intersessional” meetings, and two specialized conferences (the Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the Conference on the Human Dimension).48 The Charter did not call into question this flexible and decentralized arrangement. However, it did add a political consultation mechanism as well as a number of permanent institutions. The Charter established a mechanism for regular political consultations comparable to those which had, to that point, been operated by the twelve European Union countries by way of “European political co-operation”. The mechanism designed to meet the needs of the CSCE had to function on three levels: the Heads of State or Government would meet in biennial summits at the Review Conferences, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would meet at least once a year as a Council and, finally, the Senior Officials would meet as a Committee.49 The political consultation mechanism required a certain administrative infrastructure. This is why the Charter of Paris established a Secretariat, which was given headquarters in Prague,50 as a tribute to the liberation of Eastern Europe and, in particular, to Vaclav Havel’s Czechoslovakia. This Secretariat was notable

45 Ibid., section on “Culture”, § 3. 46 Ibid., section on the “Human Dimension”, § 6. 47 Ibid., § 7. 48 For more details, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973–1989, (Volume I), chapter I. 49 See Charter of Paris, third part “New structures and institutions of the CSCE Process”, §§ 3–6. 50 Ibid., §10.  Chapter I   11

for its extremely restricted staff numbers, the national status of its personnel, and the purely administrative nature of its tasks. Apart from general services, it was only to include one Director and three administrators, none holding the status of international civil servant: all had to be diplomats seconded by their government for a period of only two or three years (so that all participating States could, through a process of rotation, be successively represented). Moreover, the tasks they performed were limited in scope, essentially consisting of providing administrative support to the meetings of the Ministerial Council and the Committee of Senior Officials, and, in addition, maintaining the archives, supplying the governments with documents and providing information to the public.51 Finally, it was significant that the Secretariat in Prague was to have no monopoly within the CSCE: the Summits, Review Conferences and intersessional meetings could continue to have ad hoc secretariats to which it would only provide support when needed. The Charter of Paris also instituted an Office for Free Elections, with a threefold mandate: to serve as a link between governments, parliaments and NGOs wishing to observe elections and the competent authorities in countries where these elections were to take place; to collate information on the schedule, procedures and results of the elections, to draw up observation reports on these elections and provide them upon request; and to organize and host meetings about electoral procedures and democratic institutions, at the request of CSCE States.52 Warsaw was chosen over Copenhagen as the headquarters of the Office for Free Elections, which was renamed Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in 1992. Similarly, the Charter established the Conflict Prevention Centre, the role of which was initially to provide support for the technical implementation of the CSBMs of the Vienna Document (1990) – while awaiting the assignment of tasks relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes.53 Finally, it should be noted that the Charter established the principle of a parliamentary assembly.54 Initially, it had been agreed that this parliamentary body would be the Assembly of the Council of Europe – which was duly opened to all the CSCE States on an equal footing. However, in the light of the negative reactions from the US Congress (which the Bush administration had not seen fit to consult), this solution was rejected. In terms of the political consultation mechanisms and permanent institutions, the structure attributed to the new CSCE corresponded fairly closely to the ideas put forward by the sixteen NATO States in the Declaration of their London Summit on 6 July 1990.55

51 See Supplementary Document to the Charter of Paris, section I, § E. 52 Ibid., section I, § G. 53 Ibid., section I, § F. 54 See Charter of Paris, third part, §14. 55 For an enumeration of the ideas concerning the institutionalization of the CSCE put forward between the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev and the adoption of the Charter of Paris, see Loïc 12   The Refoundation of the CSCE

Two final remarks should also be added. On the one hand, the Review Conferences were to be held biennially and for a limited duration – a maximum of three months, unless otherwise agreed.56 On the other hand, it was understood that from 1991 onwards, the CSCE States would organize a special meeting once a year devoted to assessing the implementation of the CSBMs of the Vienna Document.57

III. The Shortcomings of the Charter of Paris For analysts at the end of the twentieth century, the Charter of Paris appears to be a singularly disappointing text. It hardly bears comparison with the Helsinki Final Act – either as a political project for a Greater Europe or as an instrument for refounding the CSCE in a way adapted to the needs of the post-communist era. Negotiated in the euphoric climate of the summer of 1990, the Charter of Paris was (unlike the Helsinki Final Act) drafted purely “in the heat of the moment” and, consequently, had no long-term intent. Its political philosophy was based on the simplistic idea that the collapse of communism ipso facto opened the door to a “new era of democracy, peace and unity” in Europe. This triumphalism was in some respects understandable. However, expressed without any nuance or qualification, it had the disadvantage of making communism exclusively responsible for all Europe’s past and present ills. The vision of Europe moving towards democracy was not, at first sight, utopic: the collapse of communism had enabled many European peoples to finally exercise their right to self-determination. Moreover, all the countries of the continent had proclaimed their support for the values of the rule of law and for the same conception of human rights. However, the fact remained that the rule of law and pluralist democracy could not become reality through simple decree, but required a certain learning curve, during which accidents were, by definition, inevitable. The same was true of human rights. Practical respect for individual freedoms could be hindered by the lack of national democratic traditions and could be seriously constrained by the social costs of making the transition to the market economy. As for the conclusion of unprecedented agreements on disarmament, undoubtedly these confirmed that the global threat of nuclear or conventional war in Europe had disappeared. However, they fell short of definitively establishing peace on the continent. Overly concerned with the military dimension of security and in the euphoric wake of the collapse of communism, the drafters of the ­Charter of Paris paid but scant attention to new types of non-military risks

Bouvard and Bruce George, Groupe de travail sur le nouvel ordre de sécurité européen. Rapport spécial sur le Sommet d’Helsinki de 1992 (Brussels: Assemblée de l’Atlantique Nord, 1992), pp. 3–14 and 17–19. 56 See Charter of Paris, third part, §11. 57 This provision did not come from the Charter of Paris; its origin can be found in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting (1989): Concluding Document, section X, “Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting”.  Chapter I   13

(notably economic, environmental and humanitarian) which were already appearing on the horizon. More seriously, by failing to anticipate the re-awakening of ethnic nationalisms, they overlooked the possibility of civil conflicts. In other words, they failed to pay due attention to certain major lessons of European history. As an instrument designed to give the CSCE a new foundation, the Charter of Paris appears no less deserving of criticism. In fact, given the logic of its very short-term vision, it could provide no more than a general outline of the CSCE’s work programme and only cautiously define its structures. On this point, it should be noted that, as a result of the concerns expressed by many Western countries wishing to preserve the future of NATO, the CSCE was given no operational capacity in the field of conflict management. Ultimately, the Charter of Paris was the act of rebirth of an institution which was in itself unfinished – in teleological, programmatic, structural and operational terms. The euphoric optimism of the Charter of Paris was soon overtaken by events. Less than two years after the Paris Summit, the Heads of State or Government of the CSCE States, meeting in Helsinki (in July 1992), recognized and acted upon the consequences. They admitted the fact that while Europe was experiencing a “time of promise”, it was also a time that was heavy with “instability and insecurity”. In unusually frank diplomatic language, they declared that “economic decline, social tensions, aggressive nationalism, intolerance, xenophobia and ethnic conflicts” threatened stability in the region. Furthermore they evidenced serious violations of the CSCE’s human rights commitments (starting with those relating to national minorities), which were having an impact upon the peaceful development of societies –whether democratic societies or, in particular, societies on the path of democratization.58 Moreover, by implicitly recognizing the weakness of the mechanism created by the Charter of Paris, the Helsinki Follow- up Meeting (March–July 1992) decided to reshape the CSCE’s structures and action programme in the light of the new challenges facing post-communist Europe. After having been refounded in Paris, the CSCE/OSCE was thus to get a second lease of life in the very place where it first originated.

58 See Helsinki Summit (1992): Helsinki Summit Declaration of 10 July 1992, §§ 12 and 13. 14    Chapter II   15

CHAPTER II The Institutions of the OSCE One of the most striking differences between the CSCE of the Cold War period and the postcommunist era lies undoubtedly in its institutions. Until the end of 1990, the CSCE was nothing more than a sui generis process of continuous negotiations. Since then, the process has been institutionalized and transformed into a somewhat particular kind of international organization characterized by the absence of an international legal status, by structural decentralization, and by a prominent position being held by the Chairman-­in-­Office (CiO) of the Ministerial Council. Furthermore, another characteristic of the new organization is that of being in a state of constant institutional evolution. This chapter starts by presenting the milestones in the development of the CSCE/OSCE and then goes on to examine the evolution of the following elements and features: the political consultations mechanism; the permanent structures; the Parliamentary Assembly; and relations with international organizations (both intergovernmental and non-­governmental).

I. Milestones in the Institutional Development of the OSCE The Charter of Paris transformed the CSCE process into a permanent international organization in two ways. Firstly, it established a multilevel political consultation mechanism comprising the Permanent Council (PC), the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), and the Summits, coupled with what used to be known as “Follow- up Meetings” (now Review Conferences). Secondly, it created a number of permanent institutions (Prague Secretariat, Office for Free Elections, Conflict Prevention Centre). This initial institutionalization was “light” in character, that is to say: non-legal, non-bureaucratic and non-operational. The participating States were anxious to avoid transforming a process that had always been driven by the key principle of pragmatism into a rigid diplomatic structure, and therefore resolved not to model the new institution in the clay of international law. Following the example of the other texts that had been adopted until then by the CSCE, the Charter of Paris was only a politically (and not legally) binding instrument. Furthermore, to avoid creating yet another international bureaucracy, the participating States resolved not to give the institutionalized CSCE a heavily staffed secretariat or one with centralized tasks, hence their decision to create several structures that were light (no more than three or four officials each), decentralized (Prague, Warsaw, Vienna), and staffed by diplomats seconded from their national administration for short periods of time, in principle three years. The participating States also deliberately refrained from giving the CSCE any operational capacity, as the United States made it very clear that it wanted to avoid any measure that could, even at a later date, undermine the raison d’être of NATO. 16   The Institutions of the OSCE

Since that date, the timid construction established by the Charter of Paris has not ceased to evolve. Up until December 1994, the CSCE/OSCE’s institutional development went through several major phases.

1. The Decisions of the Berlin Council of Ministers (June1991) At the First Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers held in Berlin on 19 and 20 June 1991, several former “Eastern bloc countries” (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania) considered that a part of Europe was suffering from a “security deficit” and that the Charter of Paris had only partially institutionalized the CSCE. Therefore, they recommended immediate and substantial strengthening of the pan-European process. Pointing out that the CSCE had been institutionalized only a few months earlier, the European Community members recommended caution and patience. They thought it would be better to give the existing institutions time to prove their worth and leave the next Follow-up Meeting (Helsinki, March 1992) with the responsibility of drawing the appropriate lessons from actual events.1 While certain countries already had ideas about desirable reforms,2 France made it clear that it preferred the status quo. As Roland Dumas, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, put it: “Let us focus now on ensuring that what we have created works ... We should not create institutions for the mere pleasure of it, but for them to contribute effectively and tangibly to strengthening the security of all Europeans. I do not believe that we should go further than institutionalization. The CSCE should retain the flexibility that has made it a success.”3 However, the Council of Ministers endorsed the principle of the “further development of the CSCE institutions and structures” by assigning the CSO the task of preparing recommendations for the next meeting, scheduled for January 1992 in Prague.4 At the same time, on the basis of a proposal submitted by the countries of the European Community, it adopted a mechanism for convening CSO emergency meetings,5 known since then as the Berlin Mechanism. Lastly, it endorsed the principle of an “exchange of information and relevant documents among CSCE and the main European and transatlantic institutions”.6

1 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg delivered on behalf of the European Community and its Member States, p. 7. 2 See proposal by Belgium and the Netherlands: CSCE/3-CSO.1 (16 June 1991). 3 See original French version of the speech by Roland Dumas delivered at the CSCE Berlin Council of Ministers (1991), p. 4. 4 See Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 14 and Journal No. 2 of 20 June 1991, item 5 (d). The CPC was entrusted to prepare a draft report, which served as a basis for the chapter on “strengthening of the role of the Conflict Prevention Centre”. 5 See Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, Annex 2. 6 Ibid.  Chapter II   17

2. The Decisions of the Prague Council of Ministers (January 1992) To carry out the task assigned to it by the Berlin Council of Ministers, the CSO established an open-ended informal working group.7 The group’s work resulted in the Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, which was adopted by the Council on 30 January 1992 with immediate ­effect.8 The Prague Document introduced three changes to the institutional arrangements prescribed by the Charter of Paris. Firstly, it made the decision-making procedure more flexible by introducing the consensus minus one rule, which was to be applicable in the event of “clear, gross and uncorrected violations” of human dimension commitments.9 Secondly, it significantly extended the functions of the CSO,10 the Office for Free Elections (which became the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights),11 and, to a lesser extent, the Conflict Prevention Centre,12 while at the same time introducing a number of measures aimed at encouraging dialogue with the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.13 However, it did not endorse the French idea of authorizing the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to grant international status to the three CSCE offices in existence at the time. Thirdly, it empowered the CSCE to establish working relations with European and transatlantic organizations,14 and asked the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to prepare procedures intended to strengthen the CSCE’s co-operation with non-­ governmental organizations.15

3. The Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992) Institutional questions occupied a large part of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, which adopted a number of decisions in this regard. Firstly, the Follow-up Meeting decided to create two new institutions: the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)16 and the Forum for Security Co- operation (FSC).17

7 See 4th Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO): Journal No. 3 of 24 October 1991, item 5 (e). 8 See Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Decision No. 2 of 30 January 1992, “Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures” (hereafter referred to as the “Prague Document”). 9 Ibid., § 16. 10 See Prague Document (1992), §§ 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 19, 25 and 30. 11 Ibid., §§ 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15. 12 Ibid., §§ 26 to 39. 13 Ibid., § 41. 14 Ibid., §§ 40, 43 and 44. 15 Ibid., § 42. 16 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter II. For more details see further in this volume, Chapter VII, part III, section 3. ‘OSCE’S Preventive Diplomacy Approach’. 17 Ibid., Chapter VI. For more details, see further in this volume, Chapter IV, ‘Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC)’. 18   The Institutions of the OSCE

Secondly, it clarified or extended (going into more or less detail) the functions of the various existing institutions: the Summits, the Review Conferences (the new name for the Follow-up Meetings), the Council of Ministers (with the Chairman-in-Office being mentioned for the first time), the CSO (as an agent of the Council and the Economic Forum), and the Warsaw Office.18 Thirdly, it adopted certain administrative arrangements, mainly involving the creation of an informal Financial Committee of Experts (within the CSO) and the revision of the scale of distribution.19 Fourthly, the Meeting adopted directives concerning relations between the CSCE and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.20 Lastly, the Ministers mandated the CSO to study ways and means of enabling the three CSCE offices in Prague, Warsaw and Vienna to better accomplish their functions, while announcing that the participating States would, as requested by France, consider the relevance of an agreement granting an “internationally recognized status” to these three bodies.21

4. The Decisions of the Stockholm Council of Ministers (December 1992) Although held just a few months after the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the Stockholm Council of Ministers likewise paid special attention to institutional issues. Considering that in order to “meet new challenges” it was necessary to “add further to the improvements in the operational capacity of the CSCE”, the Ministers tasked the CSO with conducting a wide-ranging review of CSCE structures and operations with a view to making administrative arrangements to meet those needs.22 The Council did adopt two major decisions of immediate importance. Firstly, the Ministers decided to create the post of Secretary General23 and to combine the Prague and Vienna (but not Warsaw) offices into a single structure, under the direction of the Secretary General, at a location yet to be determined.24 Secondly, they endowed the CSO with a permanent seat and location by instructing the participating States to meet regularly in Vienna.25 In addition, the Ministers complemented the decisions with a number of measures aimed at: having a group of legal experts conduct a study on the relevance of granting an internationally recognized status to the institutions of the CSCE;26 strengthening the operational capacity of the Conflict Prevention

18 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapters I, III, VI and VII. 19 Ibid., Chapter XII. 20 Ibid., Chapter IV. 21 Ibid., Chapter I, § 25. 22 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 7, §§ 1 and 5. 23 Ibid., Annex l. 24 Ibid., section 7, § 6. 25 Ibid., section 7, § 5. 26 Ibid., section 7, § 7.  Chapter II   19

Centre (CPC);27 developing co-operation with the United Nations28 and with NGOs;29 and drawing up rules and procedures to improve the management of the CSCE’s financial and administrative resources.30

5. The Decisions of the Rome Council of Ministers (December 1993) At its meeting in Rome, the Council of Ministers adopted new institutional decisions calculated to supplement or further develop the decisions taken in Stockholm. The first concerned the establishment of a new political body, the Permanent Committee,31 which was a way of institutionalizing the weekly consultations held in the Austrian capital since the beginning of the year. The second concerned the establishment of a CSCE Secretariat in Vienna that integrated the Prague Secretariat (which was thus demoted to the status of an “office”) and the Conflict Prevention Centre.32 The new CSCE Secretariat was composed of heads of department who were now recruited through open competition “taking into account the diversity of the CSCE community,” thus introducing a measure of geographical distribution.33 The third decision involved the adoption of recommendations regarding the legal capacity and privileges and immunities of CSCE institutions.34 For the rest, the Council transferred to the Forum for Security Co-operation certain responsibilities formerly undertaken by the Consultative Committee of the CPC (now dissolved).35 It confirmed that the CSCE decision-making procedure would continue to follow the consensus rule, except for mechanisms activated by a limited number of participating States or by quorum.36 Lastly, it endorsed the pursuit of greater co-operation with the United Nations and with European and transatlantic institutions.37

6. The Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (December 1994) On the institutional level, the Budapest Review Conference’s claim to fame lies in its decision to transform the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with effect from 1 January 1995, and to give new names to the political consultation bodies, with the CSCE Council of Ministers becoming the OSCE Ministerial Council, the Committee of Senior Officials becoming the Senior Council, and the Permanent

27 Ibid., section 7, § 8. 28 Ibid., section 8. 29 Ibid., section 7, § 11. 30 Ibid., section § 9 and 10 and Annex 2. 31 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter IV, §§ 2 and 4 and chapter VII, § 7.1. 32 Ibid., chapter VII, § 8. 33 Ibid., chapter VII, § 10, second indent. 34 Ibid., chapter VII, §11. 35 Ibid., chapter VII, § 4. 36 Ibid., chapter VII, § 2. 37 Ibid., chapter VI. 20   The Institutions of the OSCE

Committee becoming the Permanent Council.38 However, the decision to change the CSCE’s name was symbolic, as it altered neither the purely political nature of its former commitments nor the status of its institutions.39

The institutional evolution of the CSCE/OSCE since the Charter of Paris

1991 – Adoption of the Berlin Mechanism (Berlin, June 1991) 1992 – Transformation of the Office for Free Elections into the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Prague, January 1992) – Extension of the responsibilities of the Committee of Senior Officials (Prague, January 1992) – Granting of executive powers to the Chairman-in-Office (Helsinki, July 1992) – Creation of the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities (Helsinki, July 1992) – Creation of the Forum for Security Co-operation (Helsinki, July 1992) – Adoption of the mandate of the Economic Forum as a specialized meeting within the Committee of Senior Officials (Helsinki, July 1992) – Creation of the post of Secretary General (Stockholm, December 1992) – Creation of the Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials (Stockholm, December 1992) 1993 – Creation of a Vienna-based Secretariat supported by an office in Prague and by the Conflict Prevention Centre (Rome, December 1993) – Transformation of the Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials into the Permanent Committee (Rome, December 1993) – Decision on legal capacity and privileges and immunities of the CSCE (Rome, December 1993) 1994 – Transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE and adoption of new names for the Council of Ministers (now the Ministerial Council), the Committee of Senior Officials (Senior Council) and the Permanent Committee (Permanent Council) (Budapest, December 1994)

The foregoing clearly shows that the organizational structure of CSCE/OSCE is still evolving.40

II. The Evolution of the Mechanism for Political Consultations This section will examine successively the evolution of the Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council, and the Summits and Review Conferences.

38 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, §§ 16, 17 and 18. 39 Ibid., chapter I, § 29, §§ 15–18, § 25. 40 For a more detailed analysis of the institutional evolution of the CSCE, see Th. J. W. Sneek, “The CSCE in the New Europe: From Process to Regional Arrangement”, Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 5, no. 5 (Autumn 1994), pp. 1–33.  Chapter II   21

1. The Ministerial Council (formerly the Council of Ministers) The Charter of Paris referred to the Council on three main issues only. It asserted that the Council would provide “the central forum for regular political consultations within the CSCE process”.41 It stated that the Council’s competence covered all issues related to the pan-European process,42 and that, in this respect, it was responsible for taking the appropriate decisions.43 It declared that it would meet “at least once a year”, with possible additional meetings;44 this formulation was the result of a compromise between the vision of a body holding frequent meetings and that of a body engaging in little activity. The 1992 Helsinki Decisions confirmed that the Council remained “the central decision-making and governing body” of the CSCE and that as such its mission was to ensure “that the various CSCE activities relate closely to the central political goals of the CSCE,”45 especially in the areas of crisis management, conflict prevention and peacekeeping operations.46 The 1994 Budapest Decisions also reasserted the Council’s role as the “central decision-making and governing body”.47 To date, the Council has held five regular meetings, in Berlin (19 and 20 June 1991), Prague (30 and 31 January 1992), Stockholm (14 and 15 December 1992), Rome (30 November and 1 December 1993) and Budapest (7 and 8 December 1995). In addition, it has held two additional meetings: one on the sidelines of the inauguration of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, for the purpose of admitting the Baltic States (10 September 1991),48 and the other during the inauguration of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.49 In total, the Council met twice in 1991, three times in 1992, and once in 1993 and 1995. There was no meeting in 1994. In the 1994 Budapest Decisions it was agreed that the Council would generally meet only once a year, at the end of the mandate of the respective Chairman-in-­ Office.50 Furthermore, it was understood that the Council would be able to make any amendment to the Budapest Decisions it deemed appropriate.51

41 Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), chapter I, part A, § l. 42 Ibid., first indent of § 2. 43 Ibid., second indent of § 2. 44 Ibid., § 3. 45 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter I, § 7. 46 Ibid., Chapter II, §§ 4, 5, 21, 29, 30, 38 and 39. 47 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 1. 48 As mentioned in the Journal of the day, this was not a Council “Meeting” per se, but rather a “Meeting of participating States representatives ... held at ministerial level.” 49 This was the first “Additional Meeting” of the Council of Ministers, convened to examine the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. 50 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 16. 51 See Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), § 20. See also Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 44. 22   The Institutions of the OSCE

The Ministerial Council stands under the authority of a Chairman whose powers have increased constantly. In the 1992 Helsinki Decisions, the participating States agreed “to enhance the working methods of the Council and promote effective consultation at its ­meetings.”52 While this resolution had been inspired by the fact that the role of the Council had hitherto been limited to endorsing proposals prepared and sub­ mitted to it by the CSO without any real discussion, it could hardly be translated into reality by a body composed of some fifty permanent members, which explains why the improvements in question were only ever going to apply to the ­Chairman-in-Office, an institution directly borrowed from European ­Community ­practice. The only reference to the CiO found in the Charter of Paris states that “the Chair throughout each meeting of the Council will be taken by the representative of the host country.”53 The internal guidelines concerning the procedures governing meetings of the Council of Ministers, drawn up in 1991 by the CSO, were hardly more specific, simply stating that a “brief factual summary of the conclusions reached in the course of the Council’s work is prepared under the responsibility of the Council Chairman” and that at the closing meeting “the Chairman of the Council reads out this summary as approved by the Council.”54 The 1992 Helsinki Decisions codified existing practice by stating that the CiO “will be responsible on behalf of the Council/CSO for the co-ordination of and consultation on current CSCE business” and that it would thus be his responsibility to “communicate Council and CSO decisions to the CSCE institutions and to give them such advice regarding these decisions as may be required.”55 Furthermore, it was stated that in carrying out his tasks, the CiO might be assisted by, among others, “the preceding and succeeding Chairmen, operating together as a Troika”, “ad hoc steering groups” and “personal representatives”.56 The Troika format, which was likewise borrowed from European Community practice, had already been experimented by the Czechoslovakian Chair of the

52 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter I, § 8. 53 See Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), chapter I, part A, § 5. 54 See Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Journal No. 2 of 20 June 1991, Annex 1. These procedures were established by the Second Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials: Decision No. 4, “Guidelines concerning the procedures governing Meetings of the Council of Ministers”, on the basis of a proposal submitted by the twelve European Community countries – CSCE/2-CSO.3 (24 May 1991). At the end of the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting these working methods were strengthened by the following provision: “the draft agenda for the meetings of the Council will be divided into items on which preliminary agreement, subject to final decision by the Council, has already been obtained by the CSO, and items which are subject to discussion and possible decision by the Council. When considering the latter items the Council will meet in restricted session, and the debate on these items may be based on keynote speakers.” See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992): Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, item 5 (c), p. 2. See also the “non-paper” submitted by the twelve EC countries at the 18th CSO Meeting on 11 December 1992. 55 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter I, §§ 12 and 13. 56 Ibid., Chapter I, §§ 14 and 22. These provisions were adopted on the basis of a proposal submitted by the twelve EC countries, initiated by Germany. See CSCE/HM/WG.1/8 (18 May 1992).  Chapter II   23

Council and could therefore be codified without any objections being raised. The participating States simply agreed that the CiO would report on Troika activities to the Council/CSO.57 However, the introduction of restricted ad hoc steering groups was slightly more problematic. The idea was suggested by Germany through a European Community proposal under the name of “steering groups”, to be created on a case-by-case basis for crisis management purposes. The small States, in particular Cyprus and Malta, were initially opposed to the idea, as they were concerned about creating a monopoly that would benefit the major powers and were reluctant to support any initiative that could lead to less political transparency inside the OSCE.58 Finally, the more modest format of “ad hoc steering groups” prevailed, subject to the condition that the CiO would “report comprehensively and on a regular basis to the CSO” on the activities of any ad hoc group that he might have had to create.59 It should be noted that the expression Personal Representatives was borrowed from United Nations practice, specifically from the custom that developed for the benefit of the UN Secretary-General. These arrangements call for two comments. Firstly, some of them required the introduction of working bodies with restricted membership in a process which until then had worked exclusively with plenary working bodies. Secondly, they grant the CiO direct responsibilities in crisis and conflict management and in peacekeeping operations60 which in a security institution are normally part of the remit of the Secretary General. In any case, the fact that the CiO has political powers of this kind (to the extent of reducing the function of the Secretary General to the administrative level) has become one of the most specific characteristics of the OSCE today. While the dominant role of the CiO within the OSCE has advantages, it also has disadvantages. Although it confers some diplomatic prestige to the OSCE in its dealings with third parties at a low bureaucratic cost, this benefit is offset by two disadvantages. Firstly, as an active Minister for Foreign Affairs, the CiO can be on duty for the OSCE only on a “part-time”61 basis at best, and, secondly, the annual rotation of a purely national Chair deprives the OSCE of the benefits of a genuine “institutional memory”. Far from questioning this balance of powers, the Budapest Conference confirmed it, with the following assertion: “Overall responsibility for executive action will remain with the Chairman-in-Office (CiO). The CiO will continue to take full advantage of his/her

57 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter I, § 15; see also Chapter III, §§ 9 and 39. 58 See Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 77–79. 59 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter I, § 21. 60 Ibid., Chapter III, §§ 20, 26, 35, 39, 43, 44 and 53. 61 A drawback compensated by the advent of the Troika. In terms of meetings held by the Troika in 1995, see DOC.503 (21 March 1995), INF/130/95 (13 July 1995), and INF/226/95 (23 October 1995). 24   The Institutions of the OSCE

mandate.”62 After having initially been conceived as a coordinator, the CiO in fact became the political executive arm of the OSCE.63

2. The Senior Council (formerly the Committee of Senior Officials) Within the organizational chart established by the Charter of Paris, the Senior Council (until 1994 the Committee of Senior Officials) was supposed to be primarily a body tasked with preparing the work of the Council of Ministers [later renamed the Ministerial Council], carrying out its decisions, reviewing “current issues” and considering “future work of the CSCE”, including its relations with other inter­national forums, with a view to making recommendations to the Council.64 The Charter of Paris was silent about the frequency of the CSO’s meetings; at the very most, it had envisaged the possibility of the Council of Ministers adopting a mechanism for convening CSO meetings in emergency situations.65 In January 1992, the Prague Council of Ministers enhanced the CSO’s powers in four respects. Firstly, the Committee of Senior Officials was raised to the level of a body responsible for the overview, management and co-ordination of all the activities of the CSCE between Councils of Ministers. By this token, it was granted the power to take all the appropriate decisions, acting as the “agent” of the Council of Ministers,66 and to assign tasks to the CSCE institutions (including the Conflict Prevention Centre), and to any “open-ended ad hoc groups of participating States with a precise mandate”.67 Secondly, it was agreed that in the context of crisis management and conflict prevention, “tasks may be delegated to the Chairman-in-Office of the Committee of Senior Officials”68 and that “the facilities of the CSCE Communications Network will be made available to the Chairman-in-Office for transmission of urgent messages.”69 Thirdly, the Committee of Senior Officials was authorized to consider issues related to the human dimension “whenever necessary”, to convene meetings of a short duration to address clearly defined issues, and to establish an annual work programme for the organization of human dimension meetings and seminars.70

62 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter 1, §19. 63 The CSCE Chairmanship was held by Germany from June 1991 to January 1992, the Czech and Slovak Republic from January to December 1992, Sweden from December 1992 to December 1993, and Italy from December 1993 to December 1994: Hungary chaired the CSCE until December 1994 – and the OSCE as of January until the end of December 1995. Switzerland took over the OSCE Chairmanship for all of 1996. 64 See Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), chapter I, part B, § l. 65 Ibid., chapter I, part C. 66 See Prague Document (1992), § 2. 67 Ibid., § 3. 68 Ibid., § 25. 69 Ibid., § 5. 70 Ibid., § 3.7, §§ 8 and 12.  Chapter II   25

Fourthly, the Committee of Senior Officials was authorized to convene periodically in Prague as the Economic Forum,71 starting in 1993. The 1992 Helsinki Decisions confirmed and expanded these responsibilities in the areas of the human dimension (Chapter VI), the economic dimension (Chapter VII), and, more importantly, crisis and conflict management, with the latter being embodied in a number of arrangements authorizing the Committee of Senior Officials to decide to dispatch rapporteur or fact-finding missions, to initiate or promote the exercise of good offices, mediation or conciliation, and to launch peacekeeping operations (Chapter III). The creation of the Permanent Committee (which became the Permanent Council in 1994), did not call into question the powers of the Committee of Senior Officials. The participating States considered that the CSO should continue to “lay down political guidelines and, when the Council [of Ministers] is not in session, take key decisions.”72 In the same vein, the 1994 Budapest Decisions stated that the Senior Council (“replacing the Committee of Senior Officials”) would still be responsible for discussing and setting forth the “policy and broad budgetary guidelines” of the OSCE.73 Given the extreme brevity of the meetings and the level of representation in the Ministerial Council, the Senior Council inevitably and necessarily gained constitutional importance. At the time of writing, however, it is legitimate to ask whether the functions of the Senior Council and the Permanent Council do not overlap. The Senior Council holds regular meetings and emergency meetings. With effect from January 1992, the Council of Ministers authorized the CSO to meet “at least every three months”.74 The 1992 Helsinki Decisions did not change this frequency. However, it became clear in the aftermath of Helsinki that reinforcing the CSO’s responsibilities represented a genuine obstacle to the effectiveness of its work.75 Therefore, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs meeting in Stockholm in December 1992 decided “to enhance the ability of the CSO to act as their agent” and (pending the outcome of the wideranging review specifically entrusted to the CSO) instructed the “representatives of participating States to meet regularly in Vienna in periods between sessions of the CSO,” under the chairmanship of the CiO, to conduct consultations on all issues pertinent to the CSCE, undertake preliminary discussion on items suggested for the agenda of the CSO by the CiO, and to ensure the implementation of decisions.76 This major decision resulted in

71 Ibid., § 19. 72 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VII, § 7.l, last sentence. 73 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 17, third sentence. 74 Prague Document (1992), § 3. 75 See Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath … (n. 58), p. 81. 76 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 7, § 5. 26   The Institutions of the OSCE

the transformation of the CSO into a quasi-permanent body known as the “Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials”. The subsequent decision taken in Rome by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, which institutionalized the Vienna Group as a “Permanent Committee”, did not phase out the Senior Council. Its continuing existence was confirmed by the Budapest Decisions of 1994, which, however, stated that the Senior Council would now meet “at least twice a year” in Prague, with an additional preparatory meeting held before the Ministerial and the annual meeting of the Economic Forum.77 Until 1994, the Senior Council (as the CSO) held 29 regular meetings, two of which (the 20th and 26th) were held as the Economic Forum. The regular CSO meetings were divided up over the years as follows:

Years Number of regular CSO meetings 1991 4 (1st to 4th) 1992 14 (5th to 18th) 1993 6 (19th to 24th) 1994 4 (1st to 4th)

The meetings of the CSO normally took place in Prague but occasionally elsewhere, as indicated in the table below:

Venue Number of regular CSO meetings Prague 17 (2nd, 4th to 7th, 15th to 17th, 19th to 23rd, 25th to 28th) Helsinki 7 (8th to 14th) Vienna 1 (1st) Berlin 1 (3rd) Stockholm 1 (18th) Rome 1 (24th) Budapest 1 (29th)

As mentioned above, although the Charter of Paris did not set any specific frequency for CSO meetings, it did give the Council of Ministers the task of examining the possibility of making arrangements for convening meetings in emergency situations. With this in mind, the Berlin Council of Ministers of 1991 adopted a “mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to emergency situations”.78 The Berlin Mechanism was modelled on the mechanism relating to “unusual military activities” introduced by the 1990 Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), which in turn was based on the Human Dimension Mechanism found in the Concluding Document of the

77 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter 1, §17. 78 See Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 6. See Annex 2 for the itemized procedures of the so-called Berlin (or emergency) Mechanism.  Chapter II   27

1989 Vienna Follow-up Meeting.79 Furthermore, save for a few points, the mechanism is closely modelled on the arrangements suggested by the twelve EU countries.80 That having been said, the Berlin Mechanism may be applied in the event of a serious emergency situation arising from “a violation of one of the Principles of the Final Act” or from “major disruptions endangering peace, security and stability”. The meeting cannot be convened immediately; it can occur only at the second stage of the procedure. Indeed, any OSCE State concerned about the development of such a situation may seek “clarifications” from the State or States involved, and may obtain all relevant information within 48 hours. This first phase is “multi-bilateral”, meaning that the request and the reply must be transmitted to all other participating States of the OSCE without delay. If at the end of such a procedure, the situation “remains unresolved”, any of the States involved may then request an emergency meeting with the sole requirement of having to state the reasons why the matter is urgent and why any other OSCE mechanism is not applicable. The procedure is interesting in that it does not require the consensus of all countries, but only thirteen of them (the requesting State and twelve others)81 within a maximum period of 48 hours. In other words, in such situations, the consensus rule is exceptionally replaced by a quorum representing about a third of the participating States.82 This is not contrary to established practice, since the Human Dimension Mechanism and the Mechanism concerning Unusual Military Activities necessitate only a unilateral request. At any rate, once the quorum is reached and recognized by the Chairman-in-Office, the meeting must be held within a period of 48 to 72 hours. At this stage, it is understood that “no judgement as to the facts nor any possible dispute as to the validity of the reasons offered for requesting the emergency convening of a meeting may be invoked for postponing or preventing the holding of an emergency meeting.”83 At the end of these discussions, the States may “agree on recommendations or conclusions to arrive at a solution” or decide to convene an extraordinary Ministerial Council meeting. The adoption of the mechanism met with some resistance from the USSR, which at the time wished to prevent the OSCE from raising the issue of the independence of the Baltic States. It was supported by Turkey, which had concerns related to Cyprus. After having insisted that the consensus rule should be

79 The Berlin Mechanism is not a substitute for the mechanism concerning unusual military activities. See § 3 of the Berlin Mechanism. 80 See CSCE/2-CSO.1 (23 May 1991). 81 This quorum was a compromise between the minimal (5) and maximal (18) required number of participating States needed to trigger the mechanism. 82 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, Annex 2, § 2.14 mentions that “procedures for convening meetings under this mechanism do not affect the rule of consensus in other circumstances.” 83 See Berlin Emergency Mechanism, § 2.7. See also second sentence of the preamble. This sentence was not mentioned in the final draft presented by the twelve European Community countries. 28   The Institutions of the OSCE

maintained for convening emergency meetings, the USSR and Turkey did not withdraw their objection until the meeting reached a compromise stating that in applying the mechanism, all the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs,84 and of the Charter of Paris, would be equally and unreservedly applied, with “each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.” In order to prevent any improper application, it was agreed that the meeting would be short (in principle, no longer than two days), that its agenda would consist of a single item, and that the Chairman would ensure that discussions did not depart from the subject on the agenda. At the time of writing, the Senior Council (as the CSO) has held four Emergency Meetings. The first two concerned the conflict in Yugoslavia.85 The other two were respectively devoted to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh (Prague, 26 and 28– 29 April 1993) and the specific situation of Bihac (Budapest, 28 and 30 November and 1 December 1994), also concerning the Yugoslavian conflict.

3. The Permanent Council (formerly the Permanent Committee) The Permanent Council (until 1994 the Permanent Committee) is the only political consultation body to have been created after the Charter of Paris. It is also notable in that it is the OSCE’s only permanent political body. Although the Permanent Committee was officially established by decision of the Council of Ministers meeting in Rome in December 1993, that decision actually concerned the institutionalization of an informal body, the Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials, which had itself been created by a decision adopted at the Stockholm Council of Ministers of 1992. The mandate of the Vienna Group was to conduct “consultations on all issues pertinent to the CSCE”, to undertake “preliminary discussion of items suggested for the agenda of the CSO by the Chairman-in-Office”, and to decide on matters necessary to ensure prompt and effective implementation of the decisions of the CSO.86 According to its ­Journal, the Vienna Group held 38 plenary weekly meetings, the first on 18 January 1993 and the last on 25 November 1993. The Permanent Council (PC) held its first plenary session (as the Permanent Committee) on 9 December 1993 in Vienna. Placed under the chairmanship of the CiO of the Ministerial Council, the PC is responsible for “the day-to-day operational tasks of the CSCE” and is expected to “conduct comprehensive and

84 See Berlin Emergency Mechanism, preamble, second sentence. This formulation was not included in the initial proposal made by the Twelve EEC countries. 85 Two Emergency Meetings on the ongoing conflict in Yugoslavia were technically convened under the auspices of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The first Meeting took place in Prague from 3 to 5 July 1991 and was followed by four “Additional Emergency Meetings of the CSO” also held in Prague on 8 and 9 August, 3 and 4 September, 10 October and 29 November 1991 – this manoeuvre allowed the Chairperson-in-Office to convene the additional meetings, without having to confirm at each time that the required quorum of countries had been reached. The second Emergency Meeting was held in Helsinki from 6 to 9 May. It resumed on 11 May and lasted to 12 May 1992. 86 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 7, § 5.  Chapter II   29

regular consultations” leading to appropriate decisions outside the sessions of the Senior Council, to which it reports. The PC holds preliminary discussions of items to be included on the agenda of the Senior Council, which continues to be the body tasked with “laying down political guidelines and taking key decisions between Council Meetings.”87 To sum up, the Permanent Council is a preparatory body for the Senior Council, in the same way as the latter is a preparatory body for the Ministerial Council. The real difference between the two bodies lies in their level of representation. While the PC is composed of ambassadors accredited in Vienna, the Senior Council is made up of officials from capitals. Some delegations have referred to this distinctive characteristic to justify the latter’s continued existence: “Whatever the progress accomplished in Vienna, it is important to retain a venue for arbitration and orientation where the capitals can be mobilized,” because “we need a special occasion to highlight the importance of issues, detach ourselves from the usual working centre and transport ourselves elsewhere, to Prague.”88 However, the fact remains that, unlike the European Union Political Committee, the OSCE Permanent Council appears to be incapable of preparing texts well enough in advance for them to be adopted by the Senior Council in Prague, which as a result has to repeat part of the work already done in Vienna. The problem of the level of representation could be easily resolved, for example, if the Permanent Council were authorized to hold two or three meetings a year in Vienna at the level of political directors of Ministries for Foreign Affairs assisted by the ambassadors accredited in Vienna – with the Senior Council being dissolved. However, this solution was not adopted by the Budapest Review Conference, which decided to keep the Senior Council while encouraging participating States to have themselves represented on the Council “at the level of political directors or at corresponding level”.89 Furthermore, it stated that the Permanent Council “can be convened for emergency purposes,”90 without going into any further detail. The Permanent Council calls for two last comments. Contrary to the terms of its mandate, the Council is not in fact authorized to conduct consultations on all issues pertinent to the CSCE: issues related to military security fall under the remit of the Forum for Security Co-operation. Out of a concern for better co-ordination, the Budapest Review Conference decided that the FSC, by retaining its autonomy and its decisionmaking capacity, “will be better integrated into CSCE political, conflict prevention and crisis management activities, thus allowing practical co-operation between the FSC and the Permanent Council in the

87 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VII, § 7.1. According to this text, “the Permanent Council may trigger the Moscow Human Dimension Mechanism and take follow-up action based on rapporteur’s reports” (ibid., chapter IV, § 5). 88 See statement by the Head of the French delegation, delivered at the Budapest Review Conference to a working group, on 2 November 1994. 89 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 17. 90 Ibid., chapter I, § 18. 30   The Institutions of the OSCE

consideration of current issues affecting military security.”91 Secondly, it should be noted that the 1994 Vienna Document clarified the competences of the Permanent Council in the framework of the procedure relating to unusual military activities.92

4. The Summits and Review Conferences This section will look at the Summits and Review Conferences together, reflecting the commitment made in 1991 in the Charter of Paris by the Heads of State or Government of the participating States that they would continue to come together at Summit level on the occasion of the Review Conferences then known as the “Follow-up Meetings of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe”. a) Summits During the Cold War period the CSCE held only one Summit, which was however a spectacular one: the Helsinki Summit (30 July to 1 August 1975). Since the collapse of communism the participating States have to date held three further meetings at the highest political level, in Paris (November 1990), Helsinki (July 1992), and Budapest (December 1996). The Paris Summit (19 to 21 November 1990), held one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, gave birth to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, a text which marked the end of the Cold War and brought about the institutionalization of the CSCE. Although the Paris Summit was endowed with great symbolic importance, it turned out to be characterized by euphoric illusions (generated by the disappearance of communism), and by a renovation of the CSCE based more on incantatory formulas than on operational realities. Drafted for the needs of a purely mythical Europe and based on a very short-term political vision, the Charter of Paris was rapidly overtaken by events as they unfolded. In contrast, the Helsinki Summit (9 and 10 July 1992) marked a return to reality. It adopted a political “Declaration” that was (for the first time) distinct from the “Decisions” of the preceding Follow-up Meeting. The Declaration took the form of a document entitled “The Challenges of Change”. Containing some fifty provisions, its text was remarkable for three reasons. Firstly, it asserted that the participating States were not only faced with “new challenges and opportunities” but also with “serious difficulties and disappointments”,93 taking the form of “economic decline, social tension, aggressive nationalism, intolerance, xenophobia, and ethnic conflicts”,94 including the fact that “for the first time in decades, we are facing warfare in the CSCE region,” with the “massive use of force to achieve hegemony and territorial expansion.”95 Secondly, it clarified the CSCE’s comprehensive and

91 Ibid., chapter V, § 17. 92 Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures (1994): § 16.2.2.4. 93 See Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 3. 94 Ibid., § 12. 95 Ibid., § 13.  Chapter II   31

co-operative concept of security.96 Thirdly, it declared its support for the “early, orderly and complete withdrawal” of foreign (Russian) troops from the Baltic States.97 It should be noted that before taking leave of each other, the participating States in the Helsinki Summit adopted a “Declaration on the Yugoslavian crisis” stressing the “first responsibility” of the Belgrade authorities, confirming the temporary suspension of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) and hinting at the possibility of sending CSCE missions into the Serbian provinces of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak.98 The Budapest Summit (5 and 6 December 1994) is the least conclusive of all the Summits that have been held to date. It resulted in three disappointing or barely substantial texts. The first text, entitled “Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era”, was a political declaration that simply summarized, in some twenty paragraphs, the main points of the decisions taken by the preceding Review Conference.99 The second text, the “Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Termination of World War II” (drafted at Russia’s request), expressed in purely formulaic terms the intention of participating States to “ensure that under no circumstances [would] barbarity have any place in the CSCE region” and to “intensify efforts in order to bring to an end all existing conflicts, and to spare future generations from the scourge of new wars in any form, including through education in lessons drawn from the history of wars.”100 The third text, the “Declaration on Baltic Issues”, welcomed the withdrawal of “foreign [Russian] troops” from the Baltic States and recalled that in order to promote good-neighbourly relations in the region, the CSCE had “a variety of means of co-operation and support, including a framework for consultation and dialogue, missions and assistance in the implementation of bilateral agreements.” It should be added that in the absence of a consensus, the Summit failed to adopt a declaration either on the Yugoslav conflict as a whole or on the specific situation of the Bihac zone, as Russia was hostile to any condemnation of the Serbians and blocked the draft texts submitted to the Summit on these issues.101 Furthermore, President Izetbegovic’s denouncement of the abandonment of Bosnia- Herzegovina and President Yeltsin’s evocation of the possibility of an era of “cold

96 Ibid., § 21. See also §§ 8, 23, 26 and 27. For more details see first two pages of Chapter IV, further in the volume. 97 See Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 15. 98 See Helsinki Summit (1992): Journal No. 2 of 10 July 1992, Annex. (The text of this Annex was first registered as CSCE/HS/l.) 99 § 5 was the most significant provision of this Declaration as it stresses that the “societal plagues of post-communist Europe (such as racism, chauvinism, xenophobia, antisemitism, ethnic tensions, economic and social instability) are indicators of participating States’ ‘failure’ to adhere to CSCE principles and honour their commitments.” 100 Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), § 5 and § 6, second indent. 101 Both drafts are attached as annexes to the Budapest Summit Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994. 32   The Institutions of the OSCE

peace” in Europe if NATO expanded to the East made the Budapest Summit into nothing short of a political fiasco. The practice that has been followed since 1992 of coupling Summits with Follow-­up Meetings [later Review Conferences] is certainly a good one, as it provides an opportunity for the work carried out by the Conferences to be confirmed with a declaration adopted at the highest possible political level. However, it is a fact that Summits are inordinately expensive as compared with their intrinsic results. Furthermore, as they are held relatively frequently (once every two years), they run the risk of becoming politically banal events with potentially far-­reaching consequences that should not be underestimated. The Budapest Review Conference appears to have recognized this problem, since it decided that the next Summit (Lisbon, 1996) would “decide on the frequency of future Summit meetings.”102 b) Review Conferences Two Review Conferences have been held since the collapse of communism, in 1992 [as a Follow-up Meeting] and 1994. Taking place at a time when conflicts raged in the former Yugoslavia and in certain regions of the former USSR, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (24 March to 8 July 1992) had the merit of taking a lucid look at the problems of the Greater Europe. At the end of its proceedings, it adopted a host of decisions aimed at: improving the functioning of the existing institutions or at setting up new ones (High Commissioner on National Minorities, Forum for Security Co-operation); endowing the CSCE with operational capacities in crisis and conflict management; developing human dimension activities; and reactivating co-operation in the areas within the scope of the second (economic and environmental) basket. In addition, it declared that the CSCE was a “regional arrangement” in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations; defined a “Programme for Immediate Action” on arms control and disarmament; laid the foundation for the Programme of Co-ordinated Support for recently admitted participating States; laid down the main outlines of a policy on relations with the outside world (Mediterranean countries, Japan, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs); and revised the scale of distribution. Overall, these measures represented a step in the right direction, except for the fact that the content of the texts on crisis and conflict management was generally vague, hesitant and even in some cases (notably in the mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the provisions for peacekeeping operations) accompanied by particularly restrictive safeguard clauses.103

102 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 15 on the place and date of the next Summit. The Lisbon Summit was to take place on 2 and 3 December 1996 and be preceded by a preparatory meeting from 25 to 29 November 1996. See Permanent Council: Decision No. 114 of 25 April 1996. 103 For more details see Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Les décisions de la Réunion d’Helsinki 1992 sur les Suites de la CSCE”, Revue de l’OTAN, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 3–8; Loïc Bouvard and Bruce George, Rapport spécial sur le Sommet d’Helsinki de 1992, North Atlantic Assembly (Brussels, 1992), pp. iii–54; and Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath ... (n. 58), pp. x–274.  Chapter II   33

It should also be mentioned that the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting noted in a special declaration of the Chair of the closing meeting that the Holy See, in keeping with its specific nature as a sovereign subject of international law pursuing specifically religious and moral (but not political) goals, intended now and in the future to refrain from participating in decisionmaking or executive action related to politico-­military measures – especially those concerning conflict management and peacekeeping. The declaration, which stated that this form of limited contribution to the CSCE’s work “should not be regarded as constituting a precedent,” did not meet with any objections from the other participating States.104 As for the Budapest Review Conference (10 October to 2 December 1994), its sole claim to fame was the single spectacular decision to transform the CSCE into the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), with effect from 1 January 1995. However, the results of the Conference’s proceedings were well below those of the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting for the simple reason that the global compromise that came into play in the Hungarian capital was one based on the lowest possible common denominator. What in fact happened at the Budapest Conference was a clash between three different concepts of the future of the OSCE as a pan-European institution. Russia defended a maximalistic approach recommending the transformation of the pan-European institution into a fully fledged international organization with a legal charter, an “Executive Committee” tasked with crisis management and “regional round tables” (Balkans, Mediterranean, etc.) with limited membership. The purview of such an organization would not have been restricted to preventive diplomacy. Firstly, as a regional arrangement as defined in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, it would have been given primary responsiblity for matters concerning stability and security in Europe. Secondly, on the basis of bilateral agreements providing for an appropriate division of labour, it would

104 See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992. This declaration was made following a request submitted by the Holy See: CSCE Communication No. 139 (5 June 1992). The Holy See has always believed its contribution to the OSCE could only be specific. In an interpretative statement relating to the principle of consensus issued during the Dipoli Consultations, the Holy See emphasized it would refrain from taking position on the issues concerning “certain problems of political nature” – without the possibility of construing such non-participation both as agreement or disagreement nor as an obstacle for consensus. See CESC/HC/5 (29 November 1972). The Holy See recalled its specificity at the New York Ministerial Meeting (1–2 October 1990), which notably adopted a declaration on the Gulf Crisis. During the drafting stage of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe on 29 October 1990, the Holy See declared it was not against the institutionalization of the CSCE, but it reserved its right to determine in what capacity it would continue to participate in the CSCE in the future – a position the Holy See reiterated during the first Meeting of the CSO held in Vienna on 28–29 January 1991, and at the Budapest Review Conference in 1994. See also the reactions of the Holy See regarding the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, CSCE Communication No. 158 (28 April 1992), and in relation to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see CSCE Communication No. 433 (28 December 1992). Regarding the policy of the Holy See towards the CSCE, see the article by Giovanni Barberini in Agiornamento Sociale, no. 38, (1987), pp. 149–191. 34   The Institutions of the OSCE

have been called upon to coordinate all the security institutions of the region, from NATO to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with the latter being politically linked to the CSCE in the same manner as the CSCE was already linked to the United Nations. The organization envisaged by the Russians would thus have had the formal authorization to act as a priority body for crisis management in the former USSR zone.105 For their part, the United States and a few other countries advocated a minimalist approach aimed at maintaining the CSCE as it was, subject to a number of limited-­ scale institutional readjustments.106 This approach was fundamentally driven by the concern to preserve the role of NATO in relation to an OSCE that was likely to gain more political “muscle”. It was also dictated by the will of the countries in question to oppose Moscow’s ultimate goal of blocking NATO enlargement and obtaining recognition of the CIS as the legitimate security instrument in Russia’s “nearby foreign areas”. Between these two extreme positions, there was a middle way that advocated moderate (limited, that is, but real) strengthening of the OSCE’s means of action. Supported by a fairly large number of participating States, this approach was reflected in two basic proposals. The first proposal, which came from the Austrian and Hungarian delegations, suggested the appointment of a “CSCE Adviser on Issues of Stability and Security” with a mandate comparable to that of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, that is to say, the appointment of a mediator/conciliator for the prevention of conflicts other than those involving national minorities.107 The second proposal, submitted by Germany and the Netherlands, sought to enhance co-ordination between the CSCE and the UN in the fields of conflict prevention and crisis management, while at the same time endowing the OSCE with the authority to call on other security organizations in the region for peacekeeping operations and the peaceful settlement of disputes.108 The idea of an adviser on issues of stability and security was extremely shortlived. However, certain elements of the German–Dutch proposal survived. A watered-down version was adopted and divided up in an arbitrary manner in the Summit Declaration and the Review Conference Decisions. As for the Russian

105 See DOC.433 (30 June 1994), DOC.490 (12 July 1994), DOC.621 (30 August 1994) and DOC.645 (2 September 1994). 106 See statement by the delegate of the United States, as delivered to Working Group 1 on 18 October 1994 and CSCE/BC.35, (25 November 1994). 107 The Austrian and Hungarian text was first submitted on 8 June 1994 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two countries (Ministers Mock and Jeszenszky) as a “non-paper” entitled “Roadmap from Vienna to the CSCE in Budapest” (excerpts of this text can be found in DOC.490 of 12 July 1994). The document became an official proposal supported by the delegations of Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia at the Budapest Review Conference. See CSCE/BC.2 (11 November 1994). 108 A “non-paper” entitled “Joint Agenda for Budapest” was circulated by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Germany and the Netherlands (Ministers Kinkel and Kooijmans) on 7 May 1994. Excerpts of this text can be found in DOC.490 (12 July 1994). This text was also used by the twelve EU countries in the formulation of an official proposal, CSCE/BC/WG.1/2 (16 November 1994).  Chapter II   35

ideas, their substance was barely retained; in fact, Russia obtained only a “shallow” concession (the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE), a vague promise (the development of a single security model for the twenty-first century), and a number of purely verbal political assurances, for example, that the OSCE would be “a forum where concerns of participating States are discussed, their security interests are heard and acted upon,” and that it would build “a genuine partnership among all participating States, whether or not they are members of security organizations”.109 In a nutshell, in Budapest it was the minimalist approach that prevailed. The Budapest Summit Declaration recognizes the “central role” of the OSCE as a security structure stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok and asserts the staunch determination of the participating States to ensure that it will play a “cardinal role in meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century”.110 However, an analysis of the Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference clearly shows that the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE was conceived more in formal than in real terms. The transformation did not imply any legal consequence: it altered neither the political nature of existing commitments nor the internationally non- legal status of existing institutions. Furthermore, it has not resulted in any institutional reform; lastly, it has led to no redefinition of functions.111 Concerning the last point, it should be noted that the Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference did contain a systematic listing of the “role” and “functions” of the OSCE. Drafted on the basis of an American proposal, this enumeration (the first of its kind in OSCE history) is little more than a wish list. The text attributes to the OSCE a number of functions in the three domains of security, the human dimension and the economic dimension. It states that the OSCE has the mission of fostering “the shaping of a common security area”.112 With this in view, it mentions, more or less clearly, two additional functions, one relating to crisis management (by using the techniques commonly known as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, with a special mention of preventive diplomacy),113 and the other consisting in providing military stability through arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional, global and subregional levels.114 It also vaguely acknowledges that these terms of reference include activities “in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and other areas of the human dimension”.115 It reasserts the pan-European institution’s responsibility for promoting intergovernmental co-operation in order to

109 See Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), § 7. 110 Ibid., § 3. 111 The Holy See made an interpretative declaration on the issue of the CSCE’s name change by recalling a statement made by the Chairman of the closing session of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. See Budapest Summit: Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994, p. 8. 112 Ibid., Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter 1, § 4. 113 Ibid., §§ 8 and 9. 114 Ibid., § 10. 115 Ibid., § 11. 36   The Institutions of the OSCE

“establish strong market-­based economies throughout the CSCE region.”116 More broadly, the text grants the OSCE functions as a forum (serving as the “forum for consultation, decision-­making and co-operation”)117 and encourages it to foster good neighbour­ly relations.118 Other more or less significant measures adopted in Budapest include those concerning the integration of human dimension and economic dimension activities in crisis and conflict management, the intensification of the OSCE’s political dialogue with non-participating Mediterranean States, and the preparation of an agenda for arms control.119 The Review Conferences [as the Follow-up Meetings], which were the backbone of the CSCE process during the Cold War period, have become significantly less important, for two obvious reasons, the first being the creation of the Permanent Committee/Council, a body which provides a permanent forum for the discussion of issues related to the implementation of OSCE commitments. The second reason is more decisive and has to do with the existence of specialized assessment exercises conducted every two years at the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) for the human dimension and every year within the Vienna Forum for the CSBMs. Is it now time for the Review Conferences to be discontinued? It seems the answer should be yes, so long as the functions of these conferences (critical asses­ sment of the implementation of existing commitments and adoption of measures aimed at improving such implementation, and at expanding and broadening the scope of the OSCE’s commitments) are safeguarded. This implies less costly, shorter and better-targeted specialized assessment exercises, all to be performed annually. The Budapest Review Conference considered it its duty to maintain the current modalities of implementation assessment. However, it made one innovation by stating that from that date onwards, “the review meeting before each Summit will be held in Vienna.”120

5. The Decision-making Procedures Any analysis of the CSCE/OSCE’s decision-making mechanism, whether in the context of the Helsinki process (1973–1990) or the so-called “Paris process”, is fraught with more difficulties than any other multilateral diplomatic forum.

116 Ibid., § 12. 117 Ibid., § 6. 118 Ibid., § 7. The text further describes the functions of the OSCE in even broader terms, such as, that it is “to ensure the implementation of the OSCE’s commitments” (§ 5) and to “confront new challenges and new risks” (§ 13). 119 For more details see Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Après la conférence de Budapest : l’Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe”, Revue de l’OTAN, vol. 43, no. 2, March 1995, pp. 24–27 and John Borawski, “The Budapest Summit Meeting”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 1 (1995), pp. 5–17. 120 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 25. The first review meeting to be held according to the new format was to take place in Vienna from 4 to 22 November 1996; see Permanent Council: Decision No. 114 of 25 April 1996.  Chapter II   37

These difficulties stem from the sui generis nature of the CSCE/OSCE, which after having been a totally pragmatic diplomatic exercise during the period of East– West détente was then institutionalized in a very particular manner. Under the Helsinki process, the OSCE’s decisions were adopted by procedures so specific that only the parties directly involved in the negotiations at the time could discuss them with any relevance.121 The advent of the Paris process further increased the complexity of the decision-making mechanism. The mechanism initially derived from four parameters linked to the sui generis nature of the Helsinki process. Firstly, the CSCE meetings were structured solely in the form of plenary122 bodies. The daily working sessions of these plenary meetings were presided over by a Chair designated on the basis of rotation, in French alphabetical order, of the participating States, starting from a letter drawn by lot.123 In an extreme application of the principle of the sovereign equality of States, the negotiations conducted in the official formal framework of the Helsinki process, thus, by definition, excluded the creation of restricted working bodies. In fact, however, such bodies were set up – on a purely informal basis – for the purposes of drafting the final text of the conferences. In the case of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting (1980–1983), informal and restricted coffee groups were created after a certain time for the negotiation of particularly delicate matters.124 Secondly, the CSCE Rules of Procedure stated that decisions were to be taken “by consensus”, with the term being defined as a procedure of non-objection, “the absence of any objection expressed by a representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question.”125 Such a procedure had obvious advantages. As a middle way between the majority principle (inapplicable in a Cold War context) and the unanimity principle (to which it was similar but not identical), consensus was a working method particularly suited to the spirit of the CSCE. It offered every participating State, regardless of its political clout, the power to object to any decision that might be contrary to its fundamental interests. But in certain borderline cases, it could cease to be a shield and become a weapon of blackmail in the hands of a delegation seeking to impose its particular views on the other parties to the negotiation. This

121 The writings of certain negotiators have, at various levels, provided some much desired clarity. In this respect, see Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (ed.), Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), p. 439; John T. Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1973–1975 (Duke: Duke University Press, 1985), pp. xi–292; Victor-Yves Ghebali and Benoît Junod, La Conférence de Stockholm sur le désarmement en Europe : les résultats de la première phase (Turin: GIPRI/Albert Meynier, 1990), pp. vii–238 – and especially Jan Sizoo and Rudolf Th. Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making: The Madrid Experience (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984), p. 348. 122 See Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations (1973), § 68. 123 Ibid., §§ 70–73. 124 See Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making ... (n. 121), pp. 159–161. 125 See Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations (1973), § 69. 38   The Institutions of the OSCE

technique of “consensus under threat of non-consensus” was at the origin of the psychodramas provoked by Malta at the CSCE between 1973 and 1983. Thirdly, the CSCE was supposed to take place “outside military alliances”, in other words, all States participating in the CSCE were supposed to be doing so as sovereign and independent States and in conditions of full equality.126 This important arrangement meant that, right from the start, the CSCE provided a diplomatic “breathing space” for USSR allies and represented a conducive forum for Neutral and Non-Aligned (N+NA) countries to exercise their good offices and act as mediators. On more than one occasion, CSCE negotiations, in particular those carried out in Geneva from 1973 to 1975 under “Stage II”, transcended the East–West divide and fostered the emergence of one-off and sometimes unusually interesting coalitions. That said, going beyond bloc policy had effects that were more symbolic than tangible. This was because the existing military alliances such as the Warsaw Pact and NATO could not be set aside and decision-­making by consensus necessarily implied the aggregation of individual interests. Although the CSCE was not designed to strengthen bloc politics, it could not ignore the weight of military alliances or the tactical requirements of group diplomacy. In this respect, it is noteworthy that while the participating States tended to consult within several informal “caucuses” (the five Nordic countries, the seven members of the Warsaw Pact, the nine N+NA countries, the ten – subsequently twelve – European Community countries, the sixteen NATO States, or the twenty-one market economy countries),127 they did form three well-defined diplomatic constellations: the East (Warsaw Pact), the West (NATO/European Community) and the neutral and non-aligned countries.128 Fourthly, contrary to the practice in conventional international organizations, decisions adopted through the Helsinki process between July 1973 (the ministerial opening phase of the CSCE) and January 1989 (closing of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting) were not divided into separate categories; they were all included in a single category. They had a single fundamental goal: preparing texts known variously as “Final Act”, “Concluding Document”, “Report” and so on. These texts were drafted according to a very specific procedure. At the Belgrade and Madrid Follow-up Meetings (1977–78 and 1980–83), for example, the subsidiary working bodies set up by the plenary were, at a given moment of the negotiation, transformed into “drafting groups”, which did not actually draft any texts. In Belgrade, drafting was inconceivable because of the USSR’s opposition to the very principle of a substantial document; in Madrid, the drafting groups merely took the work proposals that had already been through a first reading and subjected them to closer scrutiny. Once this re-review was completed, the drafting groups continued their sessions. However, these sessions were immediately put behind

126 Ibid., § 65. 127 See Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making… (n. 121), pp. 167–174. 128 With the exception of Monaco and the Holy See, each participating State was affiliated to one of these three groups.  Chapter II   39

closed doors, to allow the informal “contact groups” composed of the same experts to meet once again in order to carry out the real drafting work. Within the contact groups, the delegations were no longer seated behind official signs in alphabetical order of States. On opposite sides of the table, the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries clustered around the United States and the USSR respectively, with the neutral and non-aligned countries forming a third pole. They then set about the drafting work, on the basis of “non-papers” without official status, under the guidance of a permanent Chair (provided by the delegation of a country from the neutral and non-aligned group) known as “co-­ordinator” and in the absence of any member of the Executive Secretariat.129 An almost identical scenario played out at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE).130 On the eve of the collapse of communism, the CSCE’s drafting techniques and decision-making procedures were thus based on informal but increasingly ritualized rules. The institutionalization that transformed the CSCE into an international organization had two impacts on the decision-making mechanism. It resulted in multiple decision-making units and diversified the scope of decisions. Within the Helsinki process, the decision-making centre was not difficult to identify: it was located in the ad hoc plenary of each of the general or specialized conferences of the 1973–1990 period. The start of the Paris process radically changed this arrangement through the creation of the Council of Ministers (later Ministerial Council), the Committee of Senior Officials (Senior Council), and the Permanent Committee (Permanent Council). Furthermore, since the onset of the Paris process, the decisions have become increasingly diversified. After having thus far been purely programmatic (linked to the adoption of final texts, as at the time of the Helsinki process), the decisions now included other categories made necessary by the normal functioning of an international organization: administrative decisions (on matters such as the readjustment of the scale of distribution, accession of new participating States, or designation of office- holders such as the Secretary General or the High Commissioner on National Minorities); symbolic decisions (condemning the attitude of Serbia, suspending the membership of Serbia/Montenegro, and so on); and operational decisions (deploying “Rapporteur Missions”, “Missions of Long Duration”, or “Sanctions Assistance Missions”). Above all, however, broadening the composition of the CSCE added more red tape to the decision-making mechanism, especially given that the consensus rule continued to prevail even if it appeared to have been somewhat softened by “consensus minus one” and the “silence procedure”.

129 For more details see Sizoo and Jurrjens, CSCE Decision-Making … (n. 121), pp. 153ff. 130 See Ghebali and Junod, La Conférence de Stockholm sur le désarmement en Europe… (n. 121), p. 28 and p. 30, note 26. 40   The Institutions of the OSCE

In January 1992, “in order to develop further the CSCE’s capability to safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law through peaceful means,” the Council of Ministers decided that from then on, “appropriate action may be taken by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments. Such actions would consist of political de­clarations or other political steps to apply outside the territory of the State concerned.”131 This provision by no means remained a dead letter. On 12 May 1992, after naming Serbia and the Yugoslavian National Army as fundamentally responsible for the escalation of violence and destruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CSO decided that all its decisions relating to the Yugoslavian conflict would henceforth be taken in accordance with the consensus minus one rule, and in this case, without the consent of the Belgrade authorities.132 This same rule was applied by the CSO on 8 July of the same year in suspending the membership of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro).133 Later on, the “consensus minus one” rule was to be slightly softened, but on the specific point of peaceful settlement of disputes. In December 1992, the Council of Ministers adopted a basket of measures on the peaceful settlement of disputes, among which was a mandatory conciliation procedure at the submission stage (but not at the results stage), which was directly inspired by the United States. The use of the said procedure may be imposed by the Ministerial Council or the Senior Council on two States in dispute, which in theory opens up the way for decisionmaking on the basis of “consensus minus two”. Since the 1992 Helsinki Decisions, a new decision-making procedure has officially developed within the Ministerial Council, Senior Council and Permanent Council. Known as the “silence procedure”, it allows the Chairman-­in-­Office to consider as adopted decisions for which no objection has been expressed (in writing) within a specific period of time.134 The rule of “consensus minus one” and the silence procedure hardly changed the fundamental characteristics of the problem of decision-making. As regards the former, hardly any progress has been made: in theory, it would not be very difficult for a State facing potential suspension to find at least one ally and thus prevent the use of the “consensus minus one” rule. To all intents and purposes, the same can be said for “consensus minus two”, in respect of which the progress has been practically nil, since the silence procedure does not affect the consensus

131 Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 16. 132 See Second Emergency Meeting (1992): Journal of 12 May 1992, Annex “Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina”, § 5 (ix). 133 See 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 7 of 8 July 1992, Annex “Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, § 1. 134 Helsinki Summit (1992): Decisions, Chapter I, § 18. The decision to appoint the first CSCE Secretary General was subject to a silence procedure for this very reason.  Chapter II   41

principle in any way, merely being the application of the iron law of consensus from a distance. This is all the more regrettable since negotiations have become more complicated and more delicate owing to the break-up of the CSCE’s traditional diplomatic constellations. The group previously formed by the Warsaw Pact members did not survive the collapse of communism. This same factor and the divergences caused by the Yugoslavian crisis have shattered the group of neutral and non-aligned countries. Although the group of Western countries appears to be the sole survivor of the former Helsinki process, the absence of an adversary has resulted in a relaxation of its overall cohesion. Although European Union countries form the hard core of the Western group, they have decisive political weight only in the cases (now quite rare) in which they present a united front. At the time of writing, it appears that the fate of any relatively important decision hinges on an “entente” between EU countries and on the agreement (or at least non-objection) of the United States and Russia. At the present stage, fifteen participating States have the possibility of collectively calling the tune inside the OSCE. The era of Maltese psychodramas appears to be definitely over. Remarkably, however, the iron law of consensus has remained so unchanged that in July 1992, for instance, Liechtenstein, involved in a dispute with the Czech and Slovak Republics about the nationalization of certain Liechtenstein assets seized without compensation in 1945, was able to delay the closing of the 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. At the present stage, it is hardly possible for the consensus rule to be abolished outright. The best way of dealing with the issue would perhaps be to consider multiple decision-making procedures – consensus, consensus minus one, two- thirds majority, simple majority – to fit the type of decision to be made. Ideally, the consensus should not include the parties (nemo iudex in causa sua – “nobody can be a judge in their own case”) and should not be applied in case of the implementation of a resolution adopted by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

III. The Evolution of the Permanent Structures Since its institutionalization, the CSCE/OSCE has been progressively endowed with an administrative body (the Secretariat) and a number of specialized structures (Conflict Prevention Centre, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, High Commissioner on National Minorities, Forum for Security Co-operation). This section will deal with the Secretariat only.135 The CSCE began operations with a small administrative structure in Prague, but has been operating since 1993 with a more substantial Secretariat in Vienna. This section will successively analyse the roles of the Prague Secretariat; the Vienna Secretariat and

135 For further analysis of CSCE/OSCE structures and institutions, see further in this volume, Chapter IV on ‘Co-operative Security: The Forum for Co-operation and Security’, Chapter VII on the ‘The Human Dimension of the OSCE’ and Chapter VI on ‘The Economic Dimension of the OSCE’. 42   The Institutions of the OSCE

the CPC, now an integral part of the Vienna Secretariat; and the status of the CSCE institutions.

A. The Prague Secretariat (1991–1992) The Prague Secretariat was inaugurated by President Václav Havel on 20 February 1991. It was an administrative structure with three essential characteristics derived from the provisions of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Firstly, the Secretariat’s active staff was limited to one Director (Swedish Ambassador Nils Eliasson) and three Officers.136 The small staff can be explained by the governments’ concern to avoid any bureaucratization of the eminently pragmatic process that the CSCE had been until then.137 Secondly, the staff of the Prague Secretariat did not enjoy the same status as the officials of conventional international organizations. CSCE officials were diplomats seconded (and therefore financed) by their governments for a brief period: three years for the Director and two years for the Officers.138 This arrangement stemmed from the concern to keep the operating costs of the CSCE as low as possible,139 while at the same time allowing States to be represented in turn on the Secretariat, on the basis of an alphabetical rotation. Thirdly, the Prague Secretariat was not designed to handle political functions. Its tasks were limited to providing administrative support to Council of Ministers and CSO meetings; organizing a documentation service for the participating States; providing information about the CSCE to the general public (individuals, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, non-participating States); and providing support as appropriate to the Executive Secretaries of CSCE Summits, Follow-up Meetings and intersessional meetings.140 This shows that the Prague Secretariat was not conceived as the secretariat for the CSCE as a whole but, primarily, as a secretariat for the mechanism of political consultations; as at the time of the East– West divide, the CSCE’s specialized conferences were authorized to set up their own respective executive secretariats. In 1991, the Prague Secretariat was integrated into the Communications Network141 and given two additional functions. Firstly, the Report for the Geneva

136 See the Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), § E.3. 137 See Nils Eliasson, “The Future of the CSCE Secretariat”, The CSCE in the 1990s, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), p. 224. 138 See Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), §§ H.3 and H.3. See also 2nd Meeting of the CSO: Decision No. 2 of 24 May 1991, on “Staff Rules for the CSCE Secretariat, the Secretariat of the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Office for Free Elections”. 139 See Eliasson, “The Future of the CSCE Secretariat …” (n. 137), p. 224 140 See the Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), § E.1. The policy on document distribution to the public was changed and implemented through a more liberal release of CSCE official documents to the public thanks to a proposal made by Nils Eliasson. See CSCE Communication No. 142 (9 October 1991). 141 See Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 7.  Chapter II   43

Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (July 1991) assigned it the task of centralizing the voluntary information transmitted by governments about their national minorities and about their policy in this field.142 Secondly, the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (October 1991) authorized the Secretariat to “respond favourably to requests from NGOs for non-restricted documents of the CSCE.”143 On account of the increased frequency of the CSCE’s meetings and the broadening of its tasks, the administrative burden of the Prague Secretariat became significantly heavier. Rather than strengthening the Prague structure, the governments of the participating States chose to establish another structure in Vienna.

B. The Vienna Secretariat In December 1992, the Council of Ministers in Stockholm identified the necessity for – and further decided to establish – a post of Secretary General, at a venue to be determined, and to combine the Prague Secretariat and the CPC under his or her direction.144 One year later, in Rome, the Council of Ministers crossed a decisive line with the adoption of four significant decisions. Firstly, the Ministers decided that the CSCE Secretariat would be based in Vienna and not in Prague.145 Vienna was chosen on account of two advantages convincingly extolled by Austrian diplomats, namely, the city’s superior communication facilities and the presence of the CPC, FSC and PC. Another contributory factor to Vienna winning the day against Prague was the low level of interest in the CSCE from the Czech premier Václav Klaus, who was more interested in the EU and NATO. Secondly, the Ministers decided that the Vienna Secretariat was to be composed of the Prague Secretariat as a simple “office” and the CPC.146 In other words, the new administrative structure was not intended to absorb either the ODIHR147 or the services of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (The Hague), since no State wished to question the autonomy of these institutions. Thirdly, the Secretariat itself would be composed of departments tasked with conference, administration and budget services, and with providing support to

142 See Report of the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (1991), section VII, § 6. 143 See Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1991), § 43.6. 144 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, Annex 1 (“Secretary General of the CSCE”). 145 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VII, § 8. 146 The Prague Office was administered at the time by the Director of Conference Services located in Vienna and its tasks were limited to “servicing CSO meetings, maintaining the CSCE archives and distributing documents”. See 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 March 1994, decisions, item 5 (b), p. 3 147 The ODIHR was not integrated into the Secretariat because its host country, Poland, opposed the idea. The United States supported the Polish position as it thought that a less autonomous ODIHR would be more of a lightweight player, in comparison to the Council of Europe. 44   The Institutions of the OSCE

the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers [later the Ministerial Council].148 Fourthly, heads of departments would be recruited by “open competition”149 and not by secondment. The corresponding posts would be financed from the regular budget; however, as stated in the relevant document, “whenever possible, participating States may consider seconding their nationals who have been successful in obtaining positions.”150 Appointments to other positions in the CSCE Secretariat would be made by the Secretary General, “taking into account equal opportunity and the diversity of the CSCE community.”151 The post of Secretary General of the CSCE was created on the initiative of the European Community countries. In December 1992, the Stockholm Council of Ministers established the post formally, with a term of three years, renewable for one further term of two years.152 The mandate was drafted with a view to giving the Secretariat a fundamentally administrative function. The role assigned to the Secretary General is reflected in the provision stipulating that “the Secretary General will derive his/her authority from the collective decisions of the participating States.”153 That said, the Secretary General is expected to exercise two crucial functions. On the one hand, the Secretary General is the assistant of the Chairman-­in-­Office of the Ministerial Council. Furthermore, he or she is required to act “under the guidance of the Chairman-­in-­Office” and to act as the latter’s “representative”.154 The Secretary General must support the Chairman-­in-­Office in all activities aimed at fulfilling the goals of the OSCE, cooperate with the CiO in preparing and chairing meetings, and ensure the implementation of decisions taken by the latter. The Secretary General’s tasks also include assisting the CiO on matters related to external policies, especially to relations with NGOs.155 Lastly, the Secretary General will “answer for the effective performance of CSCE staff.”156 On the other hand, the Secretary General is, as at the United Nations, “the Chief Administrative Officer”. In this capacity, the Secretary General is to oversee the work of the Secretariat, the CPC Secretariat, and the ODIHR; assess (as already stressed) the effective performance of the staff; ensure economy in administrative management; and

148 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VII, § 8. 149 Ibid., § 10, second indent. 150 Ibid., § 10, fourth indent. 151 Ibid., § 10 third indent. See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 14/Corr.1 of 29 March 1994, Annex 2. For the Secretariat’s post classification and the salaries structure, see 29th Meeting of the Permanent Committee: Decision No. 1 of 21 July 1994. See also Journal No. 29 of 21 July 1994 and the interpretative statements made by France and Germany it includes, pp. 4–5. 152 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, Annex 1. 153 Ibid., Annex 1, § 1. 154 Ibid., Annex 1, § 5 i. 155 Ibid., Annex l, § 5 iii 156 Ibid., Annex l, § 5 ii.  Chapter II   45

advise “on the financial implications of proposals”.157 Lastly, the Secretary General’s responsibilities include preparing an annual (fact-based) report on the Organization’s activities.158 On the proposal of the Chairman-­in-­Office, the participating States nominated Wilhelm Höynck, a German career diplomat, as Secretary General of the CSCE, for a period of three years starting on 15 June 1993.159 In 1996, Wilhelm Höynck was succeeded by Giancarlo Aragona (Italy). The 1994 Budapest Decisions did not introduce any new elements other than the stipulation that the Secretary General was to participate in meetings of the Ministerial Troika.160

C. The Conflict Prevention Centre This section will review the origins, the initial mandate and the evolution of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). The proposal for a centre to “reduce the risk of war and prevent any surprise attack in Europe” was submitted by the Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary) in the early days of the Vienna negotiations on the CSBMs, well before the 1989 revolutions.161 It entailed taking a format already tried and tested in US–Soviet relations since 1987 and applying it to East–West multilateral relations.162 The centre in question was to have operated as an information and advisory body, as “a network of interconnected national centres using [at] the first stage the regular channels of communication link[s], telephone and telex, and at the second stage availing themselves of the services of the existing organizations, preferably a non-­governmental one based in a national country to establish a common data bank to have terminals in the national centres connected as one single central point.”163 The other CSCE countries objected to the project, considering it as barely achievable. However, in the following year the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) reintroduced the idea as its own, rephrased it in more ambitious terms and presented it in the political debate on the institutionalization of the CSCE – a topic

157 Ibid., Annex l, §§ 5 ii and 5 iv. 158 Ibid., Annex l, § 5 v. 159 See CSCE Communication No. 146 (7 May 1993) and No. 153 (17 May 1993). The proposal was made on the basis of a report of the open-ended ad hoc group on the establishment of the post of Secretary General of the CSCE. See CSCE Communication No. 134 (27 April 1993). Ambassador Höynck’s résumé was circulated in CSCE Communication No. 29 (27 January 1993). 160 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 20. 161 See CSCE/WV.2 (9 March 1989), item V.7, as well as statements by the delegation of Czechoslovakia delivered in Group A-2 on 18 October and 4 December 1989. 162 See document CD/815 of the World Disarmament Conference for the text of the USA/URSS Agreement of 1987 regarding the creation of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres in Washington and Moscow. Both Centres were instrumental for the implementation of the Washington INF Treaty and were to assure fast communication transmission in the event of an emergency. 163 See the text of the speech by Colonel V. Mohyla delivered to Group A-2 on 20 November 1989, p. 2. 46   The Institutions of the OSCE

that had suddenly become a priority in the meantime. The FRG argued that a Centre for Conflict Prevention operating as a subsidiary body of the future Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE would be far from superfluous, given that the dissipation of the Soviet threat had not completely removed the possibility of tensions or conflicts in Europe (stemming from the problems of national minorities, investment protection, cross-­border damage to the environment, and so on). In a written proposal submitted informally on 26 July 1990 to the PrepCom tasked with preparing the Paris Summit, the FRG suggested that such a centre could be authorized to intervene in any crisis situation deriving from a violation or threat of violation of the principles of the CSCE. In this respect, the Centre would carry out two main categories of functions: a military function involving oversight of the application of the CSCE’s CSBMs mechanism while facilitating the execution of certain elements of the regime created by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty); and a political function concerning in particular non-­military tensions or crises, where it would intervene as a body promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes, tasked with conducting Fact-­Finding Missions and investigations, offering its good offices, proposing concrete solutions with the assistance of mediators or conciliation commissions, and recommending an arbitral or jurisdictional mode of settlement to the parties. The German proposal was of interest to many countries (Austria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Hungary and others), especially to the USSR, for which a Centre for Conflict Prevention seemed to contain the seed for what could evolve into a collective pan-European security system. The other countries (with France and the United Kingdom at the forefront) were not opposed to the principle of the CPC; they simply questioned the appropriateness of entrusting such an entity with both political and military functions. Nevertheless, the proponents of the two schools of thought managed to reach a compromise. The participating States agreed that the Centre would be created for military purposes initially, on the understanding that its responsibilities could later be extended to include the political field. The role given to the Conflict Prevention Centre by the Charter of Paris essentially consisted of providing support to the implementation of the Vienna Document on CSBMs, adopted on 17 November 1990. In particular, the CPC was to help with the implementation of the five intrinsically new measures of the Vienna Mechanism. Firstly, it would serve as the forum for meetings organized about the clarification of unusual military activities. Secondly, it would be the channel for the annual exchange of information concerning military organization and manpower, major weapons and equipment systems and the military budget of CSCE participating States, as stipulated by the Vienna Document. Thirdly, it was to carry out functions (according to modalities yet to be determined) related to the operation of the Communications Network between the capital cities of CSCE countries. Fourthly, the Centre was to provide a forum for the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting that the CSCE countries were to organize starting from 1991. Fifthly, the Centre was to contribute to the management of the co-operation mechanism regarding “hazardous incidents of a military nature”.  Chapter II   47

All these arrangements defined the contours of the role to be played by the Centre in the initial phase of its activity. The Charter of Paris further stated that it might subsequently take on other functions, including, on an ad hoc basis and if the Council of Ministers so decided, functions in the field of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Centre’s structures consisted of a Consultative Committee and a Secretariat. The first was a plenary body comprising all participating States, generally represented by the heads of delegations to the Vienna negotiations on CSBMs. The Consultative Committee was tasked with: convening assessment meetings and other meetings stipulated by the mechanisms relating to unusual military activities; preparing seminars on military doctrine; supervising the Secretariat; and taking overall responsibility for the Communications Network used within the mandate of the Centre. As for the CPC Secretariat, its role was to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Consultative Committee, establish a military data bank based on the military information provided under the CSBMs, and publish yearbooks. Having started off as the most controversial CSCE institution, the CPC actually never ceased to enjoy this distinction, at least not until the beginning of 1994, when it became part of the Vienna Secretariat. Inaugurated on 18 March 1991 in the Austrian capital, the CPC was unable to evolve as rapidly and positively as the other CSCE bodies. It was hampered by the discrepancy existing between the ambition inherent in its name and the modesty of its actual functions. A genuine match between these two elements would have given it significant political powers. Had it been raised to the status of a special partner of the Council of Ministers, the CPC would naturally have become a rival to the CSO, a situation that would have been unfavourable to the latter, which did not have the advantage enjoyed by the CPC of being a permanent body.164 From the start, the CPC, like other permanent CSCE institutions, was attached to the Communications Network.165 In the remaining part of 1991, it experienced just two developments, both of fairly limited importance. Firstly, following a decision of the Berlin Council of Ministers in June, it became the nominating institution tasked with forming, if necessary, the ad hoc “institution” for the peaceful settlement of disputes set out in the Report of the Valletta Meeting and thus, the depositary of the list of experts described in Section V of the Report.166 Thus the idea contained in the Charter of Paris regarding granting the CPC a concrete role in the peaceful settlement of disputes led to “the assignment of a totally marginal task”.167 Secondly, in September 1991, the CSO designated the

164 For further reading on the rivalry between the CSO and the CPC, see Ettore Greco, “The Role of the CPC in the Security System of the CSCE”, The Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1,1994, p. 10. 165 See CPC Consultative Committee: Journal No. 3 of 16 April 1991. 166 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 8 and Annex 3. These provisions were adopted on the basis of a proposal made by the twelve European Community countries. See CSCE/2-CSO/6 (23 May 1991). 167 See Greco, “The Role of the CPC …” (n. 164), p. 10. 48   The Institutions of the OSCE

CPC as the institution tasked with receiving the information provided by the participating States about the CSCE arms embargo against all parties to the Yugoslavian conflict,168 a function which lost its significance following the legally binding embargo imposed immediately afterwards by the United Nations.169 The following year was first marked by the Prague Document (January 1992), which contained a fairly long section on enhancing the functions and working methods of the CPC. The provisions of this text expressed, in often generous and ambiguous terms, three essential ideas. Firstly, they provided for the enhancement of the functions of the CPC, which according to the Prague Document was to “serve as a forum in the security field wherein the participating States will conduct comprehensive and regular consultations on security issues with politico-military implications. In this context, any participating State may, in order to reduce the risk of conflict, promptly raise an issue which in its view has such implications.”170 The Consultative Committee of the CPC was given the authority to initiate and, with the assistance of the CPC Secretariat, execute “fact-finding and monitoring missions” in connection with the Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as regards Unusual Military Activities,171 on the understanding that the Consultative Committee would itself prepare “general guidelines for the implementation of its operational tasks”.172 It specified that, in addition to the existing support to the CSBMs, the CPC would fulfil other functions as regards “the implementation and verification of agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control, if so requested by the parties to these agreements and agreed upon by the Consultative Committee.”173 It further authorized the Consultative Committee to meet at least once a month and hold additional meetings, and to establish subsidiary working bodies, including open-­ ended ad hoc groups entrusted with specific tasks.174 Secondly, the provisions enshrined the subordination of the CPC to the CSO. According to the Prague Document, the Consultative Committee was to “serve as a forum ... for co-operation in the implementation of decisions on crisis management taken by the Council or by the CSO acting as its agent.”175 More significantly, it specified that the Consultative Committee would “execute any additional tasks” assigned to it by the CSO.176 In return, it stated that the

168 See 2nd Additional Emergency Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 4 September 1991, Annex. 169 See UN Security Council Resolution No. 713, adopted on 25 September 1991. 170 See Prague Document (1992), § 27. 171 Ibid., § 29. 172 Ibid., § 31. 173 Ibid., § 32. 174 Ibid., §§ 34 and 35. 175 Ibid., § 28. 176 Ibid., § 30.  Chapter II   49

Consultative Committee might at any time draw the attention of the CSO to a situation which it regarded as requiring the CSO’s consideration.177 Thirdly, they contained a veiled questioning of the future of the CPC as a security instrument within the CSCE. In this connection, the Prague Document stressed that the enhancement of the functions and working methods of the CPC was “without prejudice to later decisions on the structure of a new security/arms control forum and the relationship it may have to the CPC”,178 a provision inserted to reflect the opposition of the United States to the granting of negotiating functions to the CPC. In short, as elegantly stated by Ettore Greco, “the Prague Council did not eliminate all basic ambiguities concerning the role of the CPC; indeed some were actually accentuated.”179 Later on, the Decisions taken in Helsinki in July 1992 helped to perpetuate this ambiguity. The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting established a new institution (the Forum for Security Co-operation), to the detriment of the CPC,180 while at the same time conferring on the latter a number of responsibilities regarding crisis and conflict management181 and, more importantly, the design and implementation of CSCE peacekeeping operations.182 In December 1992, the Stockholm Council of Ministers authorized the CPC to organize seminars in the fields of early warning and peacekeeping183 and to strengthen its operational support for CSCE preventive diplomacy missions and peacekeeping activities.184 A year later, the Rome Council of Ministers decided to merge the CPC into the new CSCE Secretariat in Vienna185 – and thus put a definitive end to any nascent rivalry between the CPC and the CSO, and even between the CPC and the North Atlantic Co-operation Council.186

177 Ibid., § 33. Furthermore, it stated that the Chairman of the Consultative Committee and the Chairman of the CSO will maintain contact with each other (§ 37) and that the Chairman of the Consultative Committee or his representative will attend meetings of the CSO which are relevant to the tasks of the CPC (§ 38). These provisions stem from § 33, which implies that the CPC/CC may at any time draw the attention of the CSO to a situation which it considers requiring its consideration, as was the case for Kosovo. See CSCE Communication No. 177 (18 May 1992). 178 Ibid., § 27. 179 See Greco, “The Role of the CPC …” (n. 164), p. 11. 180 See Chapter IV in the volume. 181 Helsinki Summit (1992): Decisions, chapter III, §§ 3, 5, 9, 13 and 15. 182 Ibid., §§ 27, 34, 39, 41, 42 and 51. 183 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 6, § 5. 184 Ibid., section 7, § 8. See also 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 February 1993, item 5 (b) and Annex 2, as well as CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 4 of 18 February 1993, item 4 (a). 185 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VII, § 8. 186 The North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) was established during a Nato member states summit held in Rome in November 1991. The NACC consists of North Atlantic Alliance member States, including countries who used to be members of the Warsaw Pact. In relation to the competition between the CPC and NACC, see Greco, “The Role of the CPC …” (n. 164), p. 14. 50   The Institutions of the OSCE

Until its integration into the Vienna Secretariat, the CPC limited its day-to-day activities to managing the CSBMs regime and organizing seminars.187 However, its existence was not entirely devoid of action. Firstly, the CPC drew the attention of the CSOto the situation in Kosovo,188 and was subsequently tasked with conducting a “Fact-finding mission in the field” (May and June 1992).189 Furthermore, it established ad hoc working groups that enabled it to prepare the mandate for the CSCE Mission in Georgia190 and to issue recommendations on the financial modalities of peacekeeping operations,191 and guidelines for financing Missions of Long Duration.192 However, it is clear that the CPC made a somewhat limited contribution to the organization and implementation of the CSCE’s Missions.193 The current role of the CPC has been defined by the CSO as follows: “The Conflict Prevention Centre will be responsible for overall support of CSCE tasks in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, operational support of missions in the field, data bank and Communications Network. The CPC Director will also assist in the administration of the peaceful settlement of disputes and confidence and security-building measures, and will support activities of the Forum for Security Co-operation as required.”194

D. The Status of the CSCE Institutions At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992, the twelve European Community countries, at the instigation of France, submitted a duly drafted agreement granting legal status to the three existing CSCE institutions (Prague Secretariat, CPC, ODIHR) and conferring on their staff and the representatives of the participating States the privileges and immunities enshrined in the 1946 International Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.195 The idea was not enthusiastically received by the participating States,

187 The CPC organized workshops on topics such as conversion of military industry to civilian production (February 1992), armed forces in democratic societies (March 1992) and peacekeeping (June 1993). 188 See CSCE Communication No. 177 (18 May 1992). 189 See 11th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 20 May 1992, Annex 2, point 4. According to this decision, the CPC Consultative Committee was to dispatch a Fact-Finding Mission and it appointed Ambassador Peel of Canada, who visited military garrisons and most of the training zones in the region. See the full report of this mission in CSCE Communication No. 194 (8 June 1992). 190 See CPC Consultative Committee: Journal No. 29 of 21 September 1992, decisions, item 5 (c); Journal No. 31 of 28 October 1992; Journal No. 32 of 2 November 1992, decisions, item 5 (b); and Journal No. 36 of 23 November 1992, decisions, items (b), (c) and (d). 191 See CPC Consultative Committee: Journal No. 29 of 21 September 1992, decisions, item 5 (b). 192 See CPC Consultative Committee: Journal No. 38 of 9 December 1992, decisions, item 5 (b). 193 See Greco, “The Role of the CPC …” (n. 164), p. 13. 194 See 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 29 November 1993, decisions, item 5 (b), p. 4. 195 See CSCE/HM/WG.1/13 (15 June 1992). During the drafting stage of the Prague Document, the French delegation already circulated a “non-paper” that contained specific recommendations  Chapter II   51

which for the most part preferred not to confine the CSCE to a restrictive legal framework. Other countries, such as the United States, suspected France of using this proposal as an attempt to revive the idea of a treaty on pan-European security.196 In the end, the Follow-up Meeting simply indicated that the participating States would “consider the relevance of an agreement granting an internationally recognized status” to the CSCE institutions.197 On the basis of this vague, non-restrictive provision, the Stockholm Council of Ministers instructed the CSO to establish a “group of legal and other experts” to report on the issue at the next meeting of the Council.198 The ad hoc group met in Vienna in the period of September to November 1993. It studied two fundamental options: a legal instrument open to the signature of all participating States and a simple recommendation from the Council of Ministers urging the participating States to unilaterally take appropriate national measures. The first option had the merit of allowing the CSCE to benefit from a uniform regime among all its members and at the same time of responding to the concerns of States (France in particular) that were struggling to persuade their legislative authorities to finance an international organization without legal standing. But it also had the drawback of being contingent on a generally long and sometimes unpredictable procedure of formal ratification. As for the second option, it had the advantage of being flexible and the disadvantage of being heterogeneous with regard to its practical effects. At the end of its discussions, the working group stated its preference for the second option. It considered that the problem could be summarized as an issue of method and not of content: some countries were required by their Constitution to enter into a formal legal agreement, while others could take unilateral measures that were perfectly adequate.199 On the basis of the Group’s final report, the Rome Council of Ministers adopted three practical decisions along those lines. Firstly, it decided that, subject to their constitutional, legislative and other requirements, the participating States would confer on the CSCE institutions the legal capacity required for them to carry out their functions, in particular the capacity to enter into contract, acquire and sell movable and immovable assets, and to file lawsuits and be party to proceedings.200 Secondly, it decided that, subject to the same reservations, the participating States would assign to CSCE

aimed at the transformation of all three CSCE institutions into international organizations (9 January 1992). 196 Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath … (n. 58), pp. 113–114. 197 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter I, § 25. 198 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 7, § 7. See also 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 February 1993, p. 4; 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 June 1993, p. 4; and 24th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 29 November 1993, decisions, item 5 (d). 199 See CSCE Communication No. 254 (21 September 1993). See also, on the same subject, CSCE Communication No. 228 (22 September 1993), No. 258 (27 November 1993) and No. 311 (27 November 1993). 200 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decision No. 2, “Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities”, Annex 1. 52   The Institutions of the OSCE

institutions, the permanent diplomatic missions from the other participating States, their representatives and officials and members of CSCE Missions, diplomatic privileges and immunities comparable to those in force within the United Nations.201 Thirdly, it considered the possibility of the CSCE issuing identity cards to persons travelling on official business, which would, however, not replace ordinary travel documents.202 These arrangements were intended to grant the CSCE legal personality on the national level, but not under international law. The name change adopted by the Budapest Review Conference at the end of 1994, which transformed the CSCE into the OSCE, did not alter this situation. Finally, it is worth mentioning that, thanks to a Swedish initiative, the organization has had a logo since the beginning of 1993. The letters CSCE, and later OSCE, are written in white on a blue background to symbolize the links between the OSCE and the United Nations.203

IV. The Parliamentary Assembly The CSCE of the Cold War period had no parliamentary structure. This democratic shortcoming was somewhat compensated by the conferences on European co- operation and security held in the framework of the Inter-Parliamentary Union from 1973 to 1991.204 However, since the end of the Cold War the OSCE has had a Parliamentary Assembly, with a secretariat based in Copenhagen.205 However, it is not a statutory body of the OSCE. Like the North Atlantic Assembly with respect to NATO, the Parliamentary Assembly is a forum of parliamentarians from OSCE participating States. This section will review the creation of the Assembly, the results of its first three sessions (1992 to 1994) and its relations with the OSCE.

A. The Birth of the Assembly The idea of giving the CSCE a parliamentary arm came from the Americans. The idea was floated after the fall of communism, and gained momentum in the context of the institutionalization projects presented during the preparations for the Paris Summit. For the United States, a parliamentary assembly presented the dual advantage of strengthening the Euro-American dimension of the CSCE while

201 Ibid., Annex 2. 202 Ibid., Annex 3. 203 See 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 13 December 1992, decisions, item 5 (g), Annex 3; Stockholm Council of Ministers: Journal No. 2 of 15 December 1992; 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993; and the Canadian “non-paper” distributed during the 18th Meeting of the CSO (13 December 1992). See also the “CSCE Design Manual” in CSCE Communication No. 188 (28 June 1993). 204 For more details on this subject, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, The Conferences of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on European Co-operation and Security (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1993), p. 192. 205 Since the early 1970s an “Assembly of citizens of the countries involved [in] the Helsinki Process” (Helsinki Citizens Assemblies) had been set up in various countries and continued to function in parallel to the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.  Chapter II   53

helping to promote a democratic parliamentary system in the countries liberated from the yoke of communism. On 12 December 1990, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, declared in a speech delivered in Berlin that strengthening the CSCE did not just entail the introduction of new elements into each of its three baskets, but also the close and direct involvement of the members of parliament of the participating States in the pan-European process. While formulating the common position of the NATO countries in the run-up to the Paris Summit, the United States submitted a concrete proposal along these lines and succeeded in imposing it upon its allies. In the London Declaration on a “Transformed North Atlantic Alliance” (July 1990), the sixteen member countries of NATO endorsed the idea of “a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based in the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states.”206 A fact sheet issued in London at the same time by the White House press office specified, in particular, that the new Assembly “could make use of the Council of Europe’s building and Secretariat. The Assembly could contribute to democratic institution-building within the CSCE Community by facilitating contacts between democratic leaders of the participating countries. The Assembly could discuss issues of common concern, including the implementation of CSCE commitments.” A number of influential United States congressmen – such as Dante Fascell, then Chair of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the House of Representatives – immediately criticized this proposal. They argued that Congress had not been consulted on the issue by the Bush administration and that, in any case, the constitution of such an assembly fell within the competence of parliaments and not of governments.207 The Executive therefore backed down. Finally, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe confined itself to expressing a wish for “the creation of a CSCE parliamentary assembly, involving members of parliament from all participating States” and urging that “contacts be pursued at parliamentary level to discuss the field of activities, working methods and rules of procedure of such a CSCE parliamentary structure, drawing on existing experience and work already undertaken in this field.”208 At the Paris Summit, the Spanish Prime Minister offered to hold a meeting of the parliaments of the CSCE participating States in Madrid. Held on 2 and 3 April 1991, the meeting adopted a “Final resolution on the creation of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly”.209 The text provided for the establishment of an entity

206 London Atlantic Declaration, § 22. 207 See Dante Fascell, “The CSCE: Properly Homeless”, International Herald Tribune, 28 September 1990. 208 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), “New structures and institutions of the CSCE process”, § 22. 209 National proposals that served as a basis for the Madrid Document were compiled in a summary: Réunion des délégations parlementaires des pays participant à la CSCE (Madrid, les 2 et 3 avril 1991). Propositions (Madrid: Cortes Generales, 1991). For more details concerning this compilation and its content, see the Genton and Bayle Report presented to the French Senate during its second 54   The Institutions of the OSCE

distinct from the existing European parliamentary assemblies: the European Parliament, the North Atlantic Assembly, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU).210 It further stated that the Assembly would be open to the parliaments of all CSCE countries without distinction – and not only to parliaments formed through free elections, as advocated by Canada and Germany.211 Each parliament would have a number of representatives ranging between two and seventeen, depending on the population of the State concerned; not including the Holy See, the CSCE Assembly would be composed of a total of 245 parliamentarians from 33 countries divided into 9 categories.212 Furthermore, the Assembly would have a permanent secretariat (at a venue to be determined), but its annual meeting would be held each time in a different capital or city of a CSCE participating State.213 Its regular decisions would be adopted by a simple majority vote or (exceptionally) by a qualified majority vote; however, truly important decisions were to be taken by a “Committee of Heads of Delegation”, by consensus.214 Using the six official working languages of the CSCE,215 the Assembly would be authorized: to assess the implementation of the objectives of the CSCE; to propose a discussion on the subjects addressed during the meetings of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the biennial Summit of the CSCE; to encourage any measure that may further co-operation and security in Europe; to provide the parliaments of CSCE participating States with regular reports of its work; and to transmit its decisions to the Council of Ministers for its consideration.216 The Madrid Resolution left a number of issues unresolved (the permanent headquarters of the Secretariat, scale of financial contributions, the commission of the Assembly) for the Committee of Heads of Delegation to address at its first meeting.217 Since then, there have been three important developments. Firstly, the headquarters of the Secretariat for the Assembly has been fixed at Copenhagen, which finally won over Prague and Budapest. Secondly, in the light of new

ordinary session 1990–1991, Report No. 302, Annex to the minutes of the meeting held on 24 April 1991. See also Rafael Estrella, “La CSCE et la création d’une assemblée parlementaire”, Revue de l’OTAN, vol. 39, no. 5 (October 1991), pp. 23–26. 210 Madrid Document of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1991), preamble, second indent, and § 9. 211 In terms of the Holy See, which does not have a parliament, the last part of the first paragraph of the Madrid CSCE Parliamentary Assembly Resolution mentions that the status of “guests of honour” shall be granted to the representatives of this particular participating State. 212 See CSCE Madrid Parliamentary Assembly Resolution (1991), § 1. 213 Ibid., §§ 7 and 2. 214 Ibid., §§ 5, 6 and 13. 215 Ibid., § 8. 216 Ibid., §§ 4 and 5. Furthermore, § 5 enables the Assembly to approve “declarations”, “recommendations”, “proposals” or “reports” related to its activities in the course of its annual meetings. 217 See CSCE Madrid Parliamentary Assembly Resolution (1991), §§ 6, 7 and 10.  Chapter II   55

accessions to the CSCE, the number of parliamentarians was finally fixed at 312, as indicated by the table below. Lastly, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) was suspended from the Assembly following its suspension from the CSCE. Composition of the CSCE Assembly in 1994

Country Number of seats Total of the per country category A. United States of America 17 17 B. Russia 15 15 C. France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom 13 52 D. Canada, Spain 10 20 E. Belgium, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, 08 48 Ukraine F. Romania 07 07 G. Austria, Belarus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 06 78 Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Uzbekistan H. Bulgaria, Luxembourg 05 10 1. Slovak Republic, Yugoslavia 04 08 J. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, BosniaHerzegovina, 03 51 Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Georgia, Iceland, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldavia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan K. Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino 02 06 Total 52 countries – 312 seats

B. The Work of the Assembly As of the time of writing, the Assembly has had four meetings, in Budapest (1992), Helsinki (1993), Vienna (1994) and Ottawa (1995). Of all the OSCE participating States, only a few have ever been absent or have sent incomplete delegations. The available data is summarized below.

Participation at the CSCE Assembly

Years Number of Number of ­countries represented ­parliamentarians (out of 52) 1992 (Budapest) 47 244 (out of 308) 1993 (Helsinki) 45 220 (out of 312) 1994 (Vienna) 51 290 (out of 312)

The Assembly’s work is divided among three General Committees, which are designated as follows: political affairs and security; economic affairs, science, technology and environment; and democracy, human rights and humanitarian 56   The Institutions of the OSCE

questions.218 These three subject areas are dealt with in the first three chapters of the Final Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly (the fourth chapter of which gives the Assembly’s position on the former Yugoslavia).219 The Assembly’s Declarations contain numerous recommendations directly addressed to the CSCE bodies, in particular the Council of Ministers. An analysis of these declarations confirms a recurring phenomenon in the world of parliaments of international organizations: proposals made by parliaments go much further than official government positions. For instance, the Assembly has gone so far as to suggest that the Council of Ministers take the following steps: abandon the consensus rule;220 create a pan-European security committee221 and a defence counterpart to the Committee of Senior Officials;222 give a mandate to the High Commissioner on National Minorities to produce a report on the national minorities situation in all participating States;223 and develop “political links” with other European and transatlantic organizations, including NATO.224 With regard to the Yugoslavian conflict, the Assembly clearly assigned primary responsibility for the conflict to Serbia and Croatia,225 but also reiterated its call for the accession of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the CSCE as a full participating State226 and even insisted on the removal by Greece of its unilateral trade embargo on the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.227

C. The Assembly’s Relations with the OSCE From the outset, the CSCE political bodies reacted positively to the creation of the Parliamentary Assembly. At the Berlin Council of Ministers (June 1991), the Ministers for Foreign Affairs affirmed that they “look forward to the collective expression of the views of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly on security and co-­ operation in Europe and on the future development of the CSCE.”228 A year later,

218 This division of tasks according to the three dimensions was adopted at the Helsinki Parliamentary Assembly annual session in 1993, whereas the inaugural session, convened in Budapest a year earlier, was considered to have been just an “experimental” event. 219 See the Helsinki Parliamentary Assembly Declaration: CSCE (2) Plen.15 (9 July 1993); see also the Vienna Parliamentary Assembly Declaration: PA(94)7 (8 July 1994). At this point, the Parliamentary Assembly also adopted “Resolutions”. 220 See Helsinki Parliamentary Assembly Declaration (1993), Chapter I, § 13, and Vienna Parliamentary Assembly Declaration (1994), §§ 56–65. 221 See Helsinki Parliamentary Assembly Declaration (1993), Chapter I, §17. 222 Ibid., Chapter I, § 19. 223 Ibid., Chapter III, § 51. 224 Ibid., Chapter I, § 23. 225 Ibid., Chapter IV, § 2. 226 It is noteworthy that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Japan were registered as observers in the meetings of the Parliamentary Assembly until they respectively gained accession to the OSCE, one as a participating State and the other as a Partner for Co-operation. 227 Helsinki Parliamentary Assembly Declaration (1993), Chapter IV, § 30. See also the Vienna Parliamentary Assembly Declaration (1994), § 27. 228 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, Annex 4, last paragraph.  Chapter II   57

the Prague Council of Ministers (January 1992) stated that it was ready to establish active dialogue with the Assembly through the ChairmaninOffice.229 Lastly, in the Helsinki Summit Declaration (July 1992), the Heads of State or Government expressed their interest in the active participation of parliamentarians in the CSCE process.230 These good intentions did not remain merely symbolic. Firstly, the Chairman-­ in-­ Office attended the Assembly personally to answer questions from parliamentarians.231 This appears to be a well-established practice, which the Budapest Review Conference confirmed by clearly stating that the Chairman-­in-­ Office “will continue to maintain close contacts and an active dialogue with the Parliamentary Assembly (PA). The CiO will draw the recommendations of the PA to the attention of the Permanent Council and inform the PA on the activities of the CSCE.”232 Secondly, the CSO decided to extend the benefit of the arrangements of December 1993 relating to diplomatic privileges and immunities to the Missions established in co-operation between the Chairman of the Parliamentary Assembly and the Chairman-­in-­Office of the Council of Ministers – while urging the host countries of the PA’s meetings to guarantee “the appropriate privileges and immunities”.233 It should also be noted that the Assembly decided upon the linking up of its Secretariat to the CSCE Communications Network.234 As welcome as these measures are, they are still well below the wishes of the Assembly – which, for instance, wished to be associated with the actions of the High Commissioner on National Minorities,235 and to receive from the CSCE Chairman-­in-­Office reports on the consideration he or she has given to its resolutions and recommendations.236 In conclusion, on account of its non-governmental nature the Parliamentary Assembly is different, in its spirit and operation, from the statutory institutions of the CSCE in three respects.237 Firstly, it does not follow the principle of equality of States, since the weight of each country represented within it is proportional to its population. Secondly, it does not apply the consensus rule, since its decisions are

229 Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 41. 230 See the Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 41. 231 See statement of the Chairman-in-Office: CSCE Communication No. 198 (9 July 1993). See also CSCE Communication No. 22 (22 January 1993). 232 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 24. In return, the President of the Parliamentary Assembly is invited to hold speeches at the OSCE meetings, including Review Conferences. See 28th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 16 September 1994, decisions, item 5 (j). 233 See 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 March 1994, p. 4; see also 24th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 29 November 1993, p. 5, and the Rome Council of Ministers: Journal No. 2 of 1 December 1993. 234 See 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, p. 6. 235 See Helsinki Parliamentary Assembly Declaration (1993), Chapter I, § 29. 236 See Vienna Parliamentary Assembly Declaration (1994), § 43. 237 See Thomas M. Buchsbaum, “The 1993 Session of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 4 (1993), p. 27. 58   The Institutions of the OSCE

normally taken by a majority vote. Lastly, the Holy See, which is a fully fledged CSCE participating State, has the status of a “guest of honour” at the Parliament­ ary Assembly, because it lacks a national parliament.

V. The Evolution of Relations with International Organizations During the Cold War period, the CSCE’s policy towards the world of international institutions took two forms: limited collaboration with the United Nations System and (until perestroika) a systematic shutting out of the non-­ governmental organizations. The collapse of communism compelled the CSCE to deepen and expand its co-operation with intergovernmental organizations and to develop increasing ties with NGOs.

1. The OSCE and Intergovernmental Organizations Initially, the CSCE’s relations with intergovernmental organizations were limited to the context of the United Nations System. At the time of writing, these relations extend to embrace European and transatlantic organizations.

A. Relations with the United Nations The issue of the OSCE’s relations with the United Nations has never really posed a problem. Right from the beginning, it was agreed between the participating States that the Secretary-­General of the United Nations would be invited to attend the inaugural session (so-­called “Stage I”) of the pan-European process as the sole “guest of honour”.238 It was also understood that the working groups of the Conference tasked with drafting the future Helsinki Final Act might consult the “appropriate international organizations” – meaning global organizations and therefore ones that were part of the United Nations System.239 Kurt Waldheim, then Secretary-­General of the United Nations, did more than simply attend the inaugural session of the Helsinki process: he had the privilege of inaugurating the meeting on 3 July 1973 and of directly addressing the 35 participating States as the first speaker, right after the speech delivered by the host country.240 He was accorded the same privilege during “Stage III” of the process, in other words at the first CSCE Summit, held in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975.241 Inviting the Secretary-General to subsequent Summits and to Review Conferences (initially referred to as “Follow-up Meetings”) then became a customary practice. As an expression of the attachment of the participating States to the United Nations, this gesture gave the CSCE a certain “global dimension” and justified the official transmission of all the final texts of the CSCE (starting with the Helsinki Final Act) to the United Nations.

238 See Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations (1973), § 59. 239 Ibid., § 58. 240 See CSCE/I/PV.1 (3 July 1973), pp. 8–15. 241 See CSCE/III/PV.1 (30 July 1975), pp. 4–8.  Chapter II   59

Furthermore, in 1973, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and UNESCO were solicited to provide “contributions” to “Stage II” of the pan-European process. The Final Act institutionalized this practice by assigning to them the task of monitoring certain arrangements: the economic dimension in the case of the UNECE and culture/education for UNESCO. On this basis, the two institutions were routinely called upon to present “contributions” at the Follow- up Meetings and at inter-sessional meetings. Subsequently, other United Nations organizations were to be called upon to make contributions as well: the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This practice of extending a symbolic invitation to the Secretary-­General and the practical association of certain United Nations institutions addressed two concerns: firstly, that of the participating States as a whole, who all wanted to prove that the CSCE recognized the moral authority of the United Nations and had no intention of competing with it; and secondly, that of those Western countries who were concerned to avoid the duplication of institutional tasks and, above all, to block any attempts at institutionalization. Since the collapse of communism, relations between the OSCE and the United Nations have constantly evolved. It is an evolution that is still in progress, illustrated by the self-proclamation of the CSCE/OSCE as a “regional arrangement” in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and by the development of a pragmatic division of tasks between the two institutions regarding the management of regional conflicts. a) The self-proclamation of the OSCE as a “regional arrangement” At the time of its institutionalization, the OSCE unequivocally confirmed its global dimension by inviting the Secretary-­General of the United Nations to the Paris Summit (November 1990) as “guest of honour” – which gave Javier Pérez de Cuellar the opportunity to deliver a speech immediately after that of the French President François Mitterrand.242 The document produced by the Summit, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, solemnly reaffirmed the commitment of the participating States to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and expressed their full support for enhancing the role of the United Nations in the new configuration of international relations.243 For its part, the United Nations adopted an equally significant approach illustrated by a message, addressed to the Berlin Council of Ministers by Secretary-­General Pérez de Cuellar, recognizing the complementarity of the two international institutions and stressing the need to establish the “closest co-operation”244 between the two international institutions. In June 1991, at its inaugural meeting held in Berlin, the Council of Ministers decided to invite the United Nations Centre for Human Rights to contribute to the

242 See CSCE/SP/VR.1 (19 November 1990), pp. 7–13. 243 See the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), “The CSCE and the World”, § 1, p. 6. 244 CSCE/1-C/Ex.Sec.1 (19 July 1991). 60   The Institutions of the OSCE

Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities scheduled to meet the following month.245 This was a particularly meaningful gesture: it paved the way for collaboration between the CSCE and the United Nations in the hitherto carefully avoided area of human rights.246 Fairly quickly, a number of States judged it necessary to move well beyond the tradition which had developed during the Cold War period and to formally allow the CSCE to enjoy the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations (“Regional Arrangements”). This idea was raised by Malta at the Prague Council of Ministers (January 1992), but was poorly received by a number of delegations bent on preventing the CSCE from taking any step towards formalizing its legal personality.247 At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in the same year, Malta returned to the issue with a proposal (cosponsored by Germany) suggesting that the participating States declare the CSCE to be “the global regional arrangement for the peaceful development of Europe”.248 This time, several factors advocated for the principle of such an approach: the development of armed conflicts in the region; the need to endow the CSCE with conflict prevention and crisis management instruments; and the wish expressed by the United Nations Secretary-­ General to share the burden of collective security with regional organizations.249 Finally, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting and the Helsinki Summit adopted the Maltese idea but rephrased it in milder language. Firstly, the CSCE was recognized as “a regional arrangement” in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter, as such providing “an important link between European and global security”, and not as the privileged (if not exclusive) instrument for security in Europe. Secondly, it was stressed that “the rights and responsibilities of the United Nations Security Council remain unaffected in their entirety,”250 which was a superfluous specification inserted at the insistence of the United Kingdom; for the same reason, it was further stated that the peacekeeping operations which the CSCE might undertake would be carried out “in particular” within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations.251 Switzerland, the only participating State not at that time holding UN membership, unreservedly approved the self-proclamation of the CSCE as a “regional arrangement”. However, it declared in an interpretative statement that “should the Security Council, on the

245 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 11. 246 The invitation was all the more noteworthy because the initial mandate of the Meeting of Experts (as set forth by the Charter of Paris) did not mention the [UN-related] Centre for Human Rights. In this light, it can be said that the decision taken by the Berlin Council of Ministers brought an amendment to the Charter of Paris. 247 See Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath … (no. 58), p. 112. 248 CSCE/HM/WG.1 (18 May 1992) and CSCE/HM/WG.1/Add.1 (9 June 1992). 249 See UN: A/47/277- S/24111 (17 June 1992), “An Agenda for Peace”, § 15. 250 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter IV, § 2. See also the Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 25. 251 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 19.  Chapter II   61

basis of Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations, call on the CSCE to take enforcement action under its authority, Switzerland, as a Non-­member State of the United Nations, would have to decide on a case-­by-­case basis whether and in what manner it will take part in such action.”252 As the country holding the CSCE Chairmanship in 1992, Czechoslovakia undertook to take the appropriate steps in the light of this self-proclamation. Its efforts resulted in General Assembly Resolution 47/10 adopted on 28 October 1992, which recognized the need for enhanced co-operation and co- ordination between the two institutions.253 Since then, the issue of the relations between the CSCE and the United Nations has been on the agenda of the General Assembly and is dealt with in reports of the Secretary-­General.254 In 1992, the Stockholm Council of Ministers tasked the Chairman-in-Office of the CSO with exploring ways of strengthening co-operation with the United Nations and with establishing, without delay, regular contact with the United Nations Secretary-­ General to ensure that the two institutions are kept informed of reciprocal activities.255 When Sweden held the CSCE Chairmanship in 1993, the year was marked by the signing of a framework agreement between the CSCE and the United Nations. In 1994, the Budapest Review Conference adopted new decisions to emphasize the rapprochement with the United Nations. In the following sections, particular attention will be paid to the 1993 CSCE/ UN framework agreement and to the decisions adopted in Budapest. i) The CSCE/UN framework agreement of 1993 The framework agreement for co-operation and co-ordination concluded on 26 May 1993 between the CSCE Chairmanship-in-Office and the Secretariat of the United Nations brought the CSCE into a qualitative phase of its relations with the United Nations.256 In the text, the two organizations agree to “maintain close contact to ensure co-ordination, complementarity, possible mutual support and to avoid duplication in the planning and carrying out of activities,” essentially in the field of the prevention and political settlement of conflicts. To this end, it recommends regular contacts between the CSCE Chairmanship and the United Nations Secretariat, in addition to consultations on the preparation, initiation and implementation of fact-finding or peacekeeping missions – even extending to the possibility of joint reports and joint missions. The framework agreement also recommends that during the planning and deployment of its own peacekeeping operations the CSCE should, if the need arises, be able to

252 See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992): Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, p. 4. 253 For additional details on these debates, see A/47/PV.49 and A/47/PV.50 (11 November 1992). See also A/47/192 (14 July 1992). 254 See A/48/549 (2 November 1993) and A/49/529 (17 October 1994). See also A/49/PV.57 (15 November 1994). 255 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 8. 256 See CSCE Communication No. 166 (1 June 1993) and A/48/185 (same date). See also 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, decisions, item 5 (i), and CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 9 of 1 April 1993, item 4 (e), and Journal No. 14 of 27 May 1993, Annex 2. 62   The Institutions of the OSCE

benefit from the technical assistance and advice of the United Nations. Lastly, it states that the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of the participating State holding the Chairmanship will serve as the CSCE’s point of contact in New York and in Geneva, while the CSCE delegation of the participating State holding the Chairmanship, located in Vienna, will (together with the CSCE Secretary General and other CSCE institutions) serve as point of contact in the Austrian capital. In the same year, the General Assembly of the United Nations granted the CSCE the status of permanent observer to its proceedings.257 The framework agreement was preceded by an agreement, entered into in April 1993, on the co-ordination of preventive diplomacy activities of the two institutions in Macedonia.258 It was followed by an agreement assigning certain logistic support from the United Nations to the CSCE Mission in Sarajevo.259 ii) The decisions of the 1994 Budapest Review Conference At the Budapest Review Conference, the twelve EU countries (in agreement with the three new future EU members) submitted a key proposal on the development of relations between the OSCE and the United Nations. On the basis of the premise that the OSCE would act as the privileged peacekeeping and security instrument in its own region, the text contained a provision stating: “The participating States may jointly decide to cause a dispute to be referred to the United Nations Security Council on behalf of the CSCE, whenever in their judgement action by the Security Council may be required, in particular under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. This decision may be taken, if necessary, in the absence of the consent of the State or States party to the dispute.”260 This proposal was not appreciated by those countries which did not wish to allow the OSCE to either venture beyond the peaceful settlement of disputes, or apply the “consensus minus one” rule in security-related issues. For these same countries, it presented in any event the (intrinsic or aggravating) defect of indirectly supporting the Russian theses advocating the conversion of the OSCE into a legal organization intended to coordinate the other security institutions in the region.261 Owing to the difficulties linked to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Budapest Review Conference did not adopt, as it had planned to until the last moment, a

257 See UN: A/48/231 (10 September 1993) and UN General Assembly Resolution 48/5 adopted on 22 October. See also 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, decisions, item 5 (j). 258 See CSCE Communication No. 108 (15 April 1993). 259 See DOC.620 (30 August 1994). 260 See CSCE/BC/WG1/2 (16 November 1994). This proposal brought back to life certain ideas formulated in a German-Dutch “non-paper” (Kinkel/Koojimans) circulated during summer 1994. 261 The Russian Federation submitted a formal proposal, CSCE/BC/WG.3/10 (25 November 1994), which advocated that the CSCE should be “an entirely regional organization having respective legal foundation and governing bodies”.  Chapter II   63

specific text on relations between the OSCE and the United Nations.262 It merely stressed that: “As participants in a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, CSCE participating States will make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the United Nations Security Council,”263 which in fact added nothing new to paragraph 2 of Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations. However, the Budapest Summit Declaration went slightly further by asserting that “the CSCE will be a primary instrument for early warning,” and that the participating States might decide to refer a dispute to the United Nations Security Council only “in exceptional circumstances”, and given the conspicuous absence of a specification to this effect, without going over the heads of the parties.264 b) Co-operation between the OSCE and the United Nations on crisis and conflict ­management With respect to the management of regional conflicts, the interaction between the OSCE and the United Nations has been marked by an extremely pragmatic division of tasks, both in the political sphere of the former USSR and in that of the former Yugoslavia. i) Conflicts located in the space of the former USSR Managing the conflicts raging in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia), Moldova and Tajikistan has led to three very different ­scenarios.265 The first scenario is one in which the conflict is managed by the OSCE alone – with the moral and political support of the United Nations in the background. This category includes the conflict in Transdniestria (Moldova) and, in a more exemplary manner, that in Nagorno-Karabakh, where the OSCE is active on two fronts: peacemaking and peacekeeping. At the level of peacemaking, which takes place within the framework of the socalled Minsk Group, the United Nations provides total support: the Security Council endorses the political approach of the OSCE and the settlement solutions it proposes through resolutions, which are often prepared on the basis of reports addressed to the United Nations by the Chairman of the Minsk Group.266 The only discordant note stems from the fact that these resolutions

262 In the meantime, it was noted during the Budapest Summit that the text “CSCE and the United Nations” will be transmitted to the Permanent Council for further consideration and, after adoption, that it will be an integral part of the Budapest Summit Decisions. See Budapest Summit (1994): Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994, p. 4. 263 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 26. 264 See Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), § 8. For the text of the speech held by the Secretary-­ General Boutros-Ghali at the Budapest Summit, see UN press release SG/SM/94/217 (5 December 1994). 265 For more details on various conflicts, see further in this volume, Chapter V, part II on ‘Armed or Potential Conflicts in the Former USSR’. 266 See UN Resolutions 822 (30 April 1993), 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 October 1993) and 884 (12 November 1993). In these resolutions the UN Secretariat was to engage in the meetings of the 64   The Institutions of the OSCE

refer to “the Nagorny-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic”, while the OSCE texts use language carefully selected to avoid any preconceived bias about the future status of the disputed territory. In order to guarantee compliance with the ceasefire achieved through negotiations spearheaded by Russia in May 1994, the OSCE was seeking to set up its first peacekeeping operation. Russia, which was concerned about keeping all the political cards in its own hands, tried to ensure that any force sent would essentially comprise Russian troops. Faced with the disapproval of the other participating States, it switched tactics by challenging the OSCE’s mandate to autonomously decide (without the prior approval of the Security Council) on the deployment of a peacekeeping force. In December 1994, after difficult, lengthy negotiations, the Budapest Review Conference adopted an arrangement favourable to Moscow, asserting the will of the participating States “to provide, with an appropriate resolution from the United Nations Security Council, a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force following agreement among the parties for cessation of the armed conflict.”267 Turkey and Sweden accepted this referral to the Security Council only on the proviso that it would not curtail the intrinsic power of the CSCE to create a multinational force and would not constitute a precedent.268 It is noteworthy that the United Nations Secretariat has shown an inclination to place its experience at the service of the CSCE for the planning and deployment of what could be the first pan-European peacekeeping operation.269 The second scenario is that of a situation where one and the same conflict, namely, the Tajikistan conflict, is simultaneously managed by the OSCE and the United Nations using complementary but different methods, as follows. The Mission established by the OSCE in Tajikistan since February 1994 has a peacebuilding mandate primarily intended to consolidate the democratic foundations of the country on the political, constitutional, electoral and other levels. As for the activity of the United Nations, it can be considered as classic peacekeeping, implemented by the United Nations Mission of Observers in ­Tajikistan (UNMOT);270 in addition, however, and above all, it falls under peace­ making, as exemplified by the inter-Tajik peace talks organized under the auspices of the Secretary-­ General with the participation of the Russian Federation and the OSCE.271

Minsk Group. 267 Budapest Summit Decisions (1994): Chapter II, “Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, § 4. 268 See Budapest Summit (1994): Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994, pp. 7–8. 269 See UN: S/25600 (14 April 1993). 270 The establishment of UNMOT is substantiated in Security Council Resolution 968 (16 December 1994). 271 See UN: S/1994/542 (5 May 1994), S/1994/716 (16 June 1994), S/1994/893 (28 July 1994), S/1994/1102 (27 September 1994) and S/1994/1363 (30 November 1994).  Chapter II   65

The third scenario is one in which the OSCE and the United Nations manage two different conflicts taking place in the same country (which is the case in Georgia) – and with a low degree of co-ordination. Thus, the South Ossetia conflict is exclusively dealt with by an OSCE Mission mandated with the following tasks: “indirect” peacekeeping (monitoring the activities of the peacekeeping forces constituted by the two parties plus Russia); peacemaking (development, for South Ossetia, of a political status in full respect of the territorial integrity of Georgia); and peacebuilding (consolidation of democratic structures in Georgia).272 The Abkhazia conflict, on the other hand, is solely in the hands of the United Nations, which manages it through the dual resource of peacemaking (good ­offices between the parties) and “indirect” peacekeeping, the latter with the ­assistance of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).273 Although the OSCE has been associated (as an observer) with the peacemaking efforts in Abkhazia, until recently the UNOMIG has shown little enthusiasm to establish effective co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Georgia. It should also be noted that the United Nations Secretariat refused to follow up on the suggestion made by the OSCE Council of Ministers to appoint a special OSCE/ UN representative in charge of all the problems of Georgia.274 Whatever the nature or the extent of the division of labour between the global organization and the pan-European organization, settling conflicts situated in the political space of the former USSR in fact depends less on the United Nations or the OSCE than on Russia and the latter’s fluctuating policy towards its “near abroad”. This primary reality is clearly demonstrated by the “indirect” peacekeeping functions implemented in South Ossetia and in Moldova by the OSCE and in Abkhazia by the United Nations. With respect to Nagorno-­ Karabakh, the OSCE has even gone further: at the Budapest Summit, in order to harmonize their mediation efforts and those of Russia into a single coordinated effort, the participating States decided that the Minsk Group would now be co-chaired by the OSCE and Moscow.275 ii) Conflicts located in the space of the former Yugoslavia In the political space of the former Yugoslavia, the CSCE was confronted with two faits accomplis: firstly, right from the beginning, the European Community had monopolized the management of the Yugoslavian conflict through peacekeeping (undertaken by its Monitoring Mission) and peacemaking (at the International Conference on Yugoslavia sitting in The Hague); and secondly,

272 For the initial mandate of this Mission, see 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 2. For the wording of the revised mandate see Permanent Committee: Journal No. 14 of 23 March 1994, Annex 1. 273 The initial mandate of UNOMIG is described in UN Resolution 850 (24 August 1993) and its revised version can be found in Resolution 937 (21 July 1994). 274 See Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, “Regional Issues”, Georgia, § 4. 275 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter II, “Intensification of the CSCE activity concerning the conflict in NagorNo Karabakh”, § 1. 66   The Institutions of the OSCE

the United Nations was to take over these same functions in 1992, the first function in collaboration with NATO (the latter in charge of the monitoring of an aerial exclusion zone above Bosnia-Herzegovina and the use of airstrikes on behalf of UNPROFOR), and the second with the European Community (co- chair of the Geneva International Conference on the former Yugoslavia). After a process involving much trial and error, the CSCE undertook to deploy, starting from August 1992, a strategy essentially comprising the following elements: the organization of ad hoc Rapporteur Missions on the human dimension; the setting up of long-­term preventive diplomacy missions (in certain Serbian provinces and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia); and, especially, the establishment – in close co-operation with the European Community – of a complex mechanism designed to monitor and support compliance with the international embargoes decreed by the United Nations with respect to Yugoslavia.276 These various measures led the CSCE into increased interaction with the United Nations. It cooperated closely with the Security Council Sanctions Committee. It applied for the political support of the Security Council when Serbia refused to unconditionally renew the mandates of the Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina.277 It concluded agreements with the UN aimed at coordinating the preventive diplomacy efforts of its Mission to Skopje with those of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (April 1993) and at allowing its newly established Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina to benefit from the logistical support of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo (­August 1994). Finally, it should be noted that the co-operation between the OSCE and the United Nations is not limited to the political aspects of security. The OSCE continues to solicit contributions from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, even though the latter has lost the importance that it had during the Cold War period. It has established a permanent link with the United Nations Centre for Urgent Environmental Assistance.278 Through the intermediary of the ODIHR in Warsaw and/or the High Commissioner on National Minorities, it maintains regular working relations with the Centre for Human Rights,279 the High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR),280 the United

276 For more details, see further in this volume, Chapter V, part III section 2.D, ‘OSCE Missions to apply the United Nations sanctions’. 277 The Security Council responded to this by adopting Resolution 855 (9 August 1993). 278 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter VIII, § 14. See also CSCE Communication No. 395 (7 December 1992). 279 See UN: A/48/549 (2 November 1993), § 14 and A/CONF.157/PC.62/Add.10 (8 April 1993), pp. 8–9. 280 The UNHCR communicates with the Missions of Long Duration (in particular, those in Estonia, Lithuania and Tajikistan) through various channels and the CSCE is granted permission to access the UNHCR’s database.  Chapter II   67

Nations Development Programme (UNDP),281 and to a certain extent with ECOSOC.282

B. Relations with the European and Transatlantic Organizations Unlike the issue of the relations between the OSCE and the United Nations, that of the division of labour between the OSCE and the European, transatlantic and Euro-­Asian security organizations turned out to be fairly problematic right from the start – for the simple reason that it is central to the debate on the European security architecture. While the organizations involved are basically NATO and the WEU, the debate also includes, to varying degrees, the European Union (in the perspective of its foreign and common security policy), the Council of Europe (as an instrument of “democratic security”) and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The source of the problem stems from a persistent Franco-­American quarrel: while France, in order to minimize the weight of the United States in Europe and prepare a future for the WEU, is against any permanent functional link between the OSCE and NATO, the United States, in order to protect NATO, prefers not to give any “muscle” to the OSCE and at the same time seeks both to counter the twelve EU Member States’ attempts at collective expression within the Organization and to avoid a weakening of the human dimension, which would be to the advantage of the Council of Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, the OSCE has defined its relations with these organizations timidly and ambiguously. At its inaugural session in Berlin (June 1991), the CSCE Council of Ministers judged that the time had come to encourage the “exchange of information and relevant documents among [the] CSCE and the main European and transatlantic institutions” such as the European Community, the Council of Europe, NATO and – curiously – the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It decided that the procedure concerning this exchange should be considered by the CSO and reviewed after six months.283 The CSO defined the procedure in question in January 1992.284 It rapidly turned out to be disappointing. At the end of 1992, in an official communication addressed to the participating States, the Director of

281 See A/49/529 (17 October 1994), § 10. 282 In addition, the tripartite co-operation consisted of regular consultations of the CSCE, the Council of Europe and specialized agencies of the United Nations based in Geneva (CEE/UN, UNHCR and the Centre for Human Rights). See UN: A/49/529, § 11, and DOC.674 (8 September 1994). For further reading on the co-operation between the UN and the CSCE, see Felice Gaer, “The United Nations and the CSCE: Co-operation, Competition or Confusion?” in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 161–206; Th. J. W. Sneek, “The CSCE in the New Europe: From Process to Regional Arrangement”, Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 34–73; and Walter Kemp, “The OSCE and the UN: A Closer Relationship”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 1 (1995), pp. 22–31. 283 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 13. 284 See 5th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 10 January 1992, Annex 2. 68   The Institutions of the OSCE

the Prague Secretariat noted “the low degree of utilization” of the documents exchanged.285 Consequently, the CSO decided, at the beginning of 1993, to terminate the exchange of information and documents “in its current form”.286 In January 1992, the Prague Council of Ministers recognized that the problems of post-communist Europe called for multifaceted forms of co-operation and, therefore, “a close relationship among European, transatlantic and other international institutions and organizations”. This clearly implied that the CSCE should, as appropriate, draw upon their respective competences:287 the expression “and other international institutions and organizations” was adopted to justify the inclusion of institutions not tasked with security functions, namely, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Accordingly, the Council of Ministers asked the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to “study further ways and means of fostering such co-operation with a view to enhancing its effectiveness and to avoid duplication.”288 In the more immediate future, it was decided that the organizations concerned would be invited to “make contributions”, not to the regular proceedings of the CSCE, but “to specialized CSCE Meetings where they have relevant expertise” and to future seminars of the Conflict Prevention Centre.289 Lastly, the Ministers stated that they “would welcome if the organizations concerned would inform the Prague Secretariat annually of their current work programme and of the facilities available for work relevant to the CSCE.”290 Even though this was a minimal compromise, it had the merit of authorizing the CSCE to maintain working relations with European organizations (and therefore NATO); furthermore, it seemed to have the potential to soothe the Franco-American quarrel. However, at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting the opposition between France and the United States was such that the participating States merely reasserted the substance of the Prague compromise – with an additional specification to the effect that “the appropriate international organizations” might be invited, on a case-by-case basis, to attend CSCE meetings and seminars “as guests of honour with appropriate nameplates”.291 However, a measure of progress was achieved on a not unimportant aspect of the problem: it was agreed that the CSCE could undertake peacekeeping operations with the assistance or support of organizations such as the European Union, NATO, the WEU and the CIS.292

285 See CSCE Communication No. 424 (22 December 1992). For the list of the types of documents exchanged, see CSCE Communication No. 334 (4 November 1992). 286 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 February 1993, decisions, item 5 (i). 287 Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 10, first part. 288 Ibid., § 10, second part. 289 Prague Document (1992), §§ 43 and 40. 290 Ibid., § 44. 291 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter IV, § 5. 292 Ibid., Chapter III, § 52. As France wished, it was understood that the appeal to other organizations will proceed on a case-by-case basis and upon prior consultations with the participating States  Chapter II   69

At the Rome Council of Ministers (December 1993), the quarrel resumed between the United States, which wished to obtain a clear decision about the establishment of organic relations with NATO, and France, which did not. The meeting ended with another vague compromise, which recognized that “establishing forms for consultations and co-operation with other European and Transatlantic institutions and organizations is essential to encourage a sense of wider community.”293 The Chairman-­in-­Office was tasked with pursuing talks in this respect. There was no follow-up to these provisions. The Budapest Decisions (1994) merely asserted – once again in purely formulaic terms – the will of the CSCE to strengthen its co-operation with the organizations concerned, “while avoiding duplication of effort.”294 As for the Budapest Summit Declaration, it merely reasserted the CSCE’s decision to “pursue more systematic and practical co- operation” with these same organizations.295 In spite of the problems noted above, the overall results of the OSCE’s work with the European organizations are not as negative as one might imagine. Firstly, the OSCE routinely collaborates with the Council of Europe in the field of human dimension questions, and the initially tense relations between the two institutions have evolved into a rapport that is beneficially pragmatic. Secondly, the OSCE is compelled to develop certain ties with the CIS – particularly for the needs of the integration processes of the Republics of the former USSR and in order to harmonize its crisis management efforts with those of the Russian Federation. Thirdly, as a result of the Yugoslav conflict the OSCE has enhanced its interaction with the European Union – as demonstrated primarily by the provision of assistance for the application of sanctions (to which the EU provides significant logistical and financial support) and, furthermore, by the Stability Pact in Europe (of which the OSCE is the depositary and the instrument for follow-up assessment).296 The actual deficit is related to NATO, with which co-operation is practically non-­existent,297 even though the OSCE has accepted the request presented by the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee to connect to its Communications Network in order to receive information related to the CSBMs and CFE regimes.298

– and not the Secretariat – of these organizations, ibid., § 53. 293 Decisions of the Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VI, § 2. 294 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 26. 295 See Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), § 8. 296 See Permanent Council Decision No. 63 of 25 July 1995. Regarding the Stability Pact, see articles by Victor-Yves Ghebali published in the Défense nationale (50th anniversary edition, October 1994), pp. 67–77, and in the Trimestre du monde, no. 28 (1994), pp. 107–122. 297 See the report by Loïc Bouvard and Bruce George, La CSCE : la recherche d’une identité (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, 1994), §§ 58 and 59 (AL 224 PO/ES(94) 4). 298 See Permanent Council: Journal No. 1 of 15 December 1994, decisions, item 5(c), and Forum for Security and Co-operation: Journal No. 97 of 18 January 1995 and Journal No. 98 of 25 January 1995. 70   The Institutions of the OSCE

In short, the institutionalized OSCE has established a promising relationship with the United Nations while maintaining a distant and purely formal relationship with NATO. This can be explained as follows: as an organization seeking recognition from the United Nations, the OSCE has occupied a slot which was being essentially claimed by NATO (under pressure from the United States). During the Cold War period, the CSCE never had any difficulty in recognizing the moral and political authority of the United Nations. At the time of writing, it is seeking to become the latter’s special instrument in the vast area stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It is aiming for closer complementarity. The sluggishness and insufficiency of relations between the OSCE and the United Nations are not the fault of the OSCE – which clearly wants a closer relationship – but, rather, of the UN. By contrast, the OSCE and NATO are in a situation comparable to that of two communicating vessels. Awarding genuine operating powers to the OSCE would in one way or the other ultimately undermine NATO’s very raisons d’être. The maintenance of NATO means confining the OSCE to light security functions rather than heavy ones. In fact, the OSCE will remain in search of its identity so long as NATO – and, additionally, the WEU – have not clearly defined theirs. However, reforming NATO depends on the quality of relations between France and the United States, and the future of the WEU is still contingent on the demarcation of its own operational relations with NATO and the internal evolution of the European Union.

2. Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations Designed around an “autarkic” intergovernmental vision, the CSCE reached out – timidly – to NGOs in the last two years of the East–West period. Although co-­ operation between the OSCE and NGOs has been growing since the end of the Cold War, it has still not reached a certain critical threshold. NGOs were completely ignored during the preparation of the Helsinki process, yet they managed to play, indirectly, a certain role in the implementation of the commitments derived from this process. Firstly, NGOs specialized in monitoring CSCE commitments were spontaneously created by citizen groups in application of the right of individuals to know their rights and duties in the field of human rights and act accordingly, as mentioned in the Helsinki Final Act.299 Appearing in Moscow in May 1976, the phenomenon developed rapidly in Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia, Armenia and in the entire Eastern bloc – especially in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. Acting autonomously and sometimes in agreement, the “Helsinki Monitoring Groups” undertook to systematically identify human rights violations and to notify governments, the press and public opinion of OSCE countries. In this respect, two NGOs played a particularly striking role: the Moscow Helsinki Group, which managed, against all odds, to transmit more than 200 reports, letters and calls to the outside world

299 See Helsinki Final Act (1975), “Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States”, Principle VII.  Chapter II   71

before disappearing in 1982,300 and “Charter 77”, which the Czech authorities never managed to silence.301 In spite of the merciless repression, the monitoring groups did not disappear – new activists and new structures immediately stepped in their place. It should be noted again that the movement also developed in the West; NGOs of the same type (but with legal standing) sprang up in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, the FRG, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States – with the co-ordination of their activities handled by the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (­Vienna), established in 1982. Secondly, (pre-existing) NGOs advocating for the rights of the peoples or minorities of Eastern Europe exerted growing external pressure on CSCE Follow- up Meetings – erroneously described by the press as “human rights conferences”. There were genuine “counter-conferences” (open to public debates, press conferences, exhibitions of banned literary works, concerts, silent walks, hunger strikes, etc.) held on the sidelines of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting in 1980–1983 and the Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts in Bern (1986). A remarkable feature of these public counter-events (compared to the behind-closed-doors work of the CSCE) was their universal nature: a hundred or more NGOs from some twenty countries (including countries outside the Europe of Helsinki) or defending causes not related to the CSCE (national human rights leagues, pacifist movements, veterans’ organizations, religious organizations, etc.) showed up in Madrid; in the same spirit, the Bern counter-­ conference proclaimed – by condemning the fate of Nelson Mandela – that the fight for human rights was necessarily a universal struggle. The advent of perestroika allowed the CSCE to shed its intergovernmental skin in two stages: firstly, through the adoption of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting (15 January 1989) and, secondly, by means of the ­Document yielded by the Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension (29 June 1990). The Vienna Concluding Document introduced two innovations. Firstly, it stated that the participating States had invited two specific NGOs to make “contributions” – the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) was invited to the Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment, and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) was invited to the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe.302 Furthermore, it

300 For more details on the Moscow Helsinki Group founded by Yuri Orlov, see A Thematic Survey of the Documents of the Moscow Helsinki Group (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1981), 35 p., and The Moscow Helsinki Group: Ten Years (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 1986), 51 p. 301 For additional details on “Charter 77”, founded among others by Václav Havel, see H. Gordon Skjlling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. ­xv– 363. 302 Mention of the International Chamber of Commerce is also made in the Charter of Paris (1990). See section devoted to “Economic Co-operation”, last paragraph. 72   The Institutions of the OSCE

stated that any host country of a future CSCE meeting would now be obliged to provide access to any NGOs interested to take part in the CSCE’s public meetings, to grant unimpeded contact with official delegations, and to organize external events, including peaceful gatherings303 – which amounted to opening the proceedings of the CSCE to any interested NGO. It was on this basis that at the time of perestroika NGOs began to make increasingly noticeable appearances at various CSCE venues such as the Conference on the Human Dimension in Paris (30 May to 23 June 1989), the Sofia Meeting on Protection of the Environment (16 October to 3 November 1989) and the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe (19 March to 11 April 1990).304 In this momentum, and in the perspective of the Moscow Meeting, the Copenhagen Document (June 1990) would state – but solely for the benefit of NGOs concerned by the Conference on the Human Dimension – a number of arrangements regarding transparency and access to the works of the said Conference: issuance upon request of accreditation cards by the Executive Secretariat; unimpeded movement in the meeting rooms (except for those reserved to delegations and to the Secretariat); freedom of contact with the delegations and accredited representatives of the media; access to the official documents of the Conference and the possibility of transmitting communications to delegates. The interaction was not designed to be onesided: the Executive Secretariat was required to make available to the official delegates a regularly updated collection of information documents addressed to it by the NGOs.305 Since the end of the Cold War, the main instruments of the institutionalized OSCE have helped to strengthen ties with NGOs. The Charter of Paris (November 1990) accelerated the process of NGO recognition. In one of its sections specifically devoted to the issue for the first time in a CSCE final text, the participating States paid tribute to the major role played by NGOs in achieving CSCE objectives. Stating that they intended to further facilitate NGOs’ activities for the implementation of CSCE commitments, they stated that “these organizations, groups and individuals must be involved in

303 See Vienna Concluding Document (1989). These particular provisions were before all aimed at the USSR, which had hosted the Third Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. 304 For more details see, From Vienna to Helsinki: Reports on the Inter-sessional Meetings of the CSCE Process (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), pp. 28–30, 48–49 and 64. 305 See Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990), Annex (“Chairman’s Statement on the Access of Non-Governmental Organizations and the Media to Meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension”). This Annex was drafted on the basis of proposal CSCE/CHDC.39 (19 June 1990), proposal CSCE/CHDC.39 Add.1 (22 June 1990), Add.2 (25 June 1990), Add.3 (26 June 1990), Add.4 (27 June 1990) and Add.5 (27 June 1990). See also the Copenhagen Human Dimension Conference (1990): Journal No. 18 of 28 June 1990.  Chapter II   73

an appropriate way in the activities and new structures of the CSCE.”306 Regardless of a certain fuzziness (regarding the idea of involvement in the “structures” and not just the “activities”), these terms seemed to herald the granting of a formal consulting status to NGOs. At the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (10 ­September to 4 October 1991), two main approaches were proposed regarding the relationship between the CSCE and NGOs specialized in the field. The first approach, supported by the USSR, recommended awarding these NGOs an advisory status.307 The second, represented by the United States, Austria and other countries (including, even, the USSR), considered a number of practical measures aimed at enhancing transparency and facilitating access to the human dimension meetings of the CSCE on the basis of the liberal policy applied during the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities on 1 July 1991.308 Considering the objection of numerous delegations to the principle of an advisory status, the second approach won the day. Consequently, the Moscow Document (October 1991) merely formulated a set of pragmatic guidelines, which were not as bold as the Austro-American ideas.309 Firstly, it vaguely stated that governments will recognize as NGOs “those which declare themselves as such according to existing national procedures,” will facilitate the ability of such organizations to conduct their national activities freely on their territories,310 and will endeavour to seek ways of further strengthening “modalities for contacts and exchanges of views between NGOs and relevant national authorities and governmental institutions”.311 Next, it stated that, in future, NGOs will have the opportunity to distribute written contributions on specific issues of the human dimension of the CSCE to all delegations and to obtain non-­restricted CSCE documents from the Prague Secretariat.312 Lastly, it asked the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to consider establishing such guidelines – particularly in order to grant a common space to NGOs at human dimension meetings.313 At its Prague session (January 1992), the Council of Ministers judged that NGOs should be encouraged to play an enhanced role in the achievement of CSCE objectives and implementation of its commitments. The Ministers then urged the

306 Charter of Paris (1990), “Non-governmental organizations”. 307 See CSCE/CHDM.39 (26 September 1991). 308 See CSCE/CHDM.29 (25 September 1991); see also From Helsinki to Vienna … (n. 304), pp. 146– 148. 309 Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1991), [hereafter “Moscow Document”], §§ 43–43.7. For more details, see From Helsinki to Vienna … (n. 304), pp. 159–162 and pp. 172–173. 310 See Moscow Document (1991), § 43. 311 Ibid., § 43.1. This provision was inspired by a set of proposals tabled by a group of “Northern countries”, France and Yugoslavia. See CSCE/CHDM.16 (24 September 1991) and CSCE/ CHDM.16/Add.1 (26 September 1991). 312 Moscow Document (1991), §§ 43.5 and 43.6. 313 Ibid., § 43.7. 74   The Institutions of the OSCE

1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to develop opportunities and procedures for “meaningful non-­governmental organization involvement in the CSCE” and to give “possibilities for non-governmental organizations to communicate with CSCE structures and institutions”.314 At Helsinki, the discussion was extended to include the practical involvement of NGOs in all the activities of the CSCE, and not only in those regarding the human dimension. However, the substance of the debate was hardly different compared to Moscow: it still revolved around the double idea of the advisory status (a proposal put forward, this time, by some European Community Member States) and the pragmatic approach supported by the Austrian-­led group of countries.315 Based on the premise that the CSCE is “a process whose activities go far beyond formal relations among governments to involve citizens and societies of the participating States,”316 two sets of arrangement affecting non-governmental organizations were finally taken. First, the participating States undertook to grant NGOs unimpeded access to all plenary meetings, and if necessary to other meetings, as well as to Review Conferences [initially Follow-up Meetings], ODIHR seminars, the Economic Forum and other expert meetings317 – meaning all CSCE meetings other than those of the political bodies (Council of Ministers and the CSO) or regarding security issues (Conflict Prevention Centre and the Forum for Security Co- operation). Furthermore, the Ministers instructed the Directors of CSCE institutions and the Executive Secretaries of their ad hoc meetings to designate an “NGO liaison person”,318 a provision applicable to any NGO claiming to be such, with the exception of those which “resort to the use of violence or publicly condone terrorism or the use of violence.”319 Furthermore, the Helsinki Decisions clarified the conditions which the CSCE intended to use as the basis for involving NGOs in the implementation of the human dimension commitments. NGOs specialized in the matter would now be invited to make written presentations, and as appropriate, may be invited to orally address specific questions on the agenda of implementation meetings for human

314 Prague Council of Ministers (1992), final document, section VIII. 315 See CSCE/HM/WG/23 (15 June 1992) and CSCE/HM.4 (8 June 1992). For more details, see Rachel J. Brett, “Non-Governmental Organizations and the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3 (1992), pp. 22–24, and “NGOs and the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 1–5; Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath … (n. 58), pp. 188–126. See also Riva Groenik, “The CSCE and Non-Governmental Organizations”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 240–242. 316 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter IV, § 1. 317 Ibid., Chapter IV, § 15, second indent. 318 Ibid., Chapter IV, § 15 third indent. 319 Ibid., Chapter IV, § 16. Note that the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities may collect and receive information regarding his field of competence solely from the NGOs which neither practice nor advocate terrorism or violence. See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter II, §§ 23 and 25.  Chapter II   75

dimension commitments.320 In the course of such meetings, “no formal session will be scheduled in order to provide better opportunities for possible contacts with NGOs.” To this purpose, a hall at the meeting site will be placed at the disposal of NGOs.321 Subsequently, in December 1993, the Rome Council of Ministers asked the ODIHR to enhance co-operation and co-ordination with NGOs – in particular, by expanding its database to include the names of experts proposed by NGOs – and to receive information provided by NGOs having relevant experience in the human dimension field.322 In Budapest, in 1994, NGOs were (for the first time) admitted into a working group tasked, within a Review Conference, with human dimension issues. The participating States considered the experience positive. They recognized that the NGOs had, by contributing ideas and raising issues of concern during the debate, provided “a welcome addition to the implementation review” of human dimension commitments.323 They even declared that the experience of the Budapest Review Conference invites further consideration with regard to promoting within the CSCE “the dialogue between governments and NGOs of the participating States, in addition to State-­to-­State dialogue”.324 Consequently, they tasked the Secretary General of the CSCE with preparing (on the basis of the provisions of Helsinki 1992) a study on how participation of NGOs can be further enhanced.325 There and then, the Review Conference took a concrete decision by asking the CSCE Missions to designate a mission member to liaise with the ODIHR and with NGOs on human dimension issues.326 At the same time, it decided that the CSCE would use information from NGOs on specific issues such as the media, torture (and other cruel and inhuman treatments) and from Roma organizations.327 In the aftermath of Budapest, the Permanent Council decided to organize, in April 1995, an ODIHR seminar on the issue of “Building Blocks for Civic Society: Freedom of Association and NGOs”.328 In spite of an undeniable spirit of openness, the CSCE does not appear to have succeeded in establishing fully satisfactory working relations with NGOs. The main responsibility lies with certain governments which impeded the process of

320 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter VI, § 15. 321 Ibid., Chapter VI, § 16. See also CSCE Communication No. 185 and Corr.1 (24 June 1993). See also Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 7, last indent. 322 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, Chapter IV, §§ 2 and 4. 323 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 3, first two sentences. 324 Ibid., Chapter VIII, § 3, last sentence. 325 Ibid., Chapter VIII, § 17. Note that the study was not assigned to the ODIHR (as initially intended), but to the Secretary-­General – a provision indicating the will of the participating States to enhance the administrative authority of the Secretary-­General towards the OSCE institutions escaping its control to a certain extent. For the text of the Study on Enhancement of NGO Participation, see REF. SEC/212/95 (6 September 1995). 326 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 11, last sentence. 327 Ibid., chapter VIII, §10, third indent; § 20, last sentence; and § 23, second indent. 328 See Permanent Council: Journal No. 3 of 12 January 1995, decisions, item 5(c), p. 3. 76   The Institutions of the OSCE

such a collaboration through fear of an overly broad opening likely to legitimize the anti-establishment NGOs. Another reason could be due to the fact that NGOs act in an uncoordinated manner: they have not established (as with the United Nations or the European Union) specific co-ordination or liaison committees to strengthen their capacity to exert pressure on the OSCE.  Chapter III   77

CHAPTER III Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System During the Cold War period, the CSCE formed a diplomatic system of 35 “participating States” around which a handful of “non-participating Mediterranean States” loosely orbited. The end of the Cold War saw a remarkable growth in the number of dramatis personae in the CSCE process and the development of a new type of relationship with third countries.

I. Enlargement of the CSCE from 35 to 55 participating States Following the collapse of communism, around twenty countries asked to join the pan-European process. In the absence of statutory provisions governing the accession of new participating States, the CSCE generally received applicants on the basis of a written application containing two specific commitments: agreement to all the final texts of the organization and the invitation of a Rapporteur Mission responsible for a retrospective assessment of the legislation and practices in the applicant country regarding the standards set out in these texts. Initially consisting of 35 participating States (which became 34 on 3 ­October 1990, following German reunification),1 in 2000 the OSCE had a membership of 55. With the exception of Albania (which remained outside the pan-European process during the Cold War), the three Baltic countries (admitted after the aborted Russian putsch), and Andorra, the growth of the dramatis personae of the CSCE was the result of the disappearance of three federations of States: the USSR, ­Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

1. The Accession of Albania Albania was the only European State to reject the Helsinki process (which it judged as an American–Soviet attempt at “hegemony”) from the outset. It did not change its position on this matter until December 1989. In the wake of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and as the idea of a pan-European summit began to gain ground, the Government of Albania expressed its desire to become an observer and then, fairly quickly, a full member of the CSCE. In 1990, under the terms of paragraph 54 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations (1973), Albania obtained the status of observer at the ­Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, the Vienna negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and the Meeting on the Mediterranean of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in

1 The German Democratic Republic (GDR) officially ceased to be part of the CSCE on 2 October 1990 at midnight, during the Meeting on the Mediterranean of the CSCE, held in Palma de Mallorca. See the identical notes sent by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the GDR to the Executive Secretary of the Palma Meeting on 26 September 1990. 78   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

Europe.2 However, to its great displeasure, it retained the same status at the Paris Summit and subsequently, in 1991, at the Valletta Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, at the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States, and at the second and third Meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO).3 Observer status was not, therefore, granted to Albania once and for all, but from one meeting to the next, on a case-by-case basis. During the Paris Summit, the Albanian Government manifested its displeasure by informally communicating a statement to participating States on 20 November 1990, to the effect that Albania was already committed to implementing the principles of the CSCE and that it considered it “surprising and incomprehensible” to be deprived of the right to participate fully in the Summit, treatment which it deemed to be contrary to the very spirit of the pan-European process. The 34 participating States which made up the CSCE then found themselves split on the subject of Albania’s candidacy. Some of them (the Balkan States) believed that full accession could encourage the Albanian authorities to accelerate the country’s liberalization.4 However, others (United States) advocated a probationary period during which Albania could demonstrate its desire and ability to comply with the CSCE standards on human rights.5 This was also the opinion of the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe following a visit to Albania in August 1990, upon the invitation of the authorities in Tirana.6 The Commission issued an opinion favourable to accession only after having observed the first multi-party elections (March 1991), and in May 1991 it began holding hearings where leading non-communist figures, such as author Ismail Kadare and Sali Berisha, president of the Democratic Party, recommended that the country’s membership be accepted.7 Albania’s purgatory ended only on 19 July 1991, when the CSCE Council of Ministers decided by consensus, still under paragraph 54 of the Helsinki Recommendations (1973), to officially admit Albania to the CSCE.8 This accession was granted on the basis of two conditions imposed on the Albanian Government.

2 See Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension (1990): Journal No. 1 of 5 June 1990; Vienna negotiations on CSBMs: Journal No. 180 of 3 August 1990; and Meeting on the Mediterranean of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1990): Journal No. 1 of 24 September 1990. 3 See Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1991), § 2; Document of the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States (1991), § 1. See also 2nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 23 May 1991 and 3rd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 17 June 1991, item 5. 4 See the message sent on 25 October 1990 by the Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Balkan States to the Paris Summit (UN: A/45/701, Appendix II). 5 See Le Monde, 8–19 November 1990. See also Atlantic News, no. 2195, 21 February 1990, p. 4, no. 2201, 11 March 1990, p. 3, and no. 2221, 11 May 1990, p. 3. 6 See CSCE Digest, vol. 13, no. 6, September 1990 (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1990), pp. l–3. 7 Ibid., vol. 17, no. 2, March 1991, p. 3; no. 3, April 1991, pp. 1 and 2; and no. 4, May 1991, p. 4. 8 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 2.  Chapter III   79

Firstly, Albania accepted, in a formal written declaration, all commitments and responsibilities set out in the final texts of the CSCE and agreed to “act in accordance with their provisions”.9 President Ramiz Alia signed the Helsinki Final Act on 16 September 1991 in the Finnish capital and the Charter of Paris on 17 September of the same year in the French capital.10 Secondly, the Albanian Government agreed to invite a Rapporteur Mission to assess the state of implementation of CSCE standards in Albania and to assist and improve them further.11 This mission took place from 16 to 19 September 1991. While recognizing that major efforts had been made by the Albanian regime, with non- negligible results, the Mission considered in its Report that “more progress is still needed in some major areas.” From this perspective, it recommended the adoption of a new legal system, the total acquittal of former political prisoners, a revision of the criminal code (notably on the basis of the proportionality of sentences), the reworking of the Government’s intelligence services, the implementation of the right of national minorities to education in their own language, and the dissemination of CSCE texts in Albania.12 On the day of accession, the Parliament of Albania addressed a message of gratitude to the Council, stressing that the decision it had taken represented encouragement from the CSCE “to support Albania in her irreversible democratic and stabilizing process” and declaring that Albania “will be always [a] decent member in the great family of peoples of Europe.”13

2. The Accession of the Three Baltic States From May 1990, the governments of the three Baltic Republics (which were still under the Soviet yoke) issued a joint declaration expressing their wish to take part directly in the work of the CSCE. Given Moscow’s categorical opposition, their respective requests to attend, as observers, the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (June 1990), the Preparatory Committee to organize the Paris Summit (July–November 1990), the Cultural Symposium in

9 This statement, in fact a letter dated 18 June 1991, sent by Muhamet Kapllani, Albanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Hans-Dietrich Genscher, ChairmaninOffice of the Council of Ministers, is attached to the Berlin Council of Ministers: Journal No. 1 of 19 June 1991, Annex. It is also attached to the Berlin Summary of Conclusions (1991), Annex 1. Foreign Minister Genscher made a quick trip to Tirana on 15 June 1991 to ascertain Albania’s good intentions, see Atlantic News, no. 2332, 19 June 1991, p. 2 and Le Monde, 19 June 1991. 10 See CSCE Communication No. 108 (29 October 1991). 11 It should be noted that this invitation (which was imposed on Albania) is not mentioned in the Summary of Conclusions of the Berlin Council of Ministers, but in the letter (aforementioned) from Mr Kapllani to Mr Genscher. 12 Report of the Rapporteur Mission to Albania (16–19 September 1991), p. 8. The Mission consisted of about ten representatives from the CSCE institutions (the Chairman-­in-­Office of the Committee of Senior Officials, the Director and the Deputy Director of the Warsaw Office for Free Elections (the precursor of the ODIHR), the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Director of the CSCE Secretariat in Prague), a German diplomat, and academics and representatives from the Brussels Commission and the Council of Europe. 13 See CSCE/1-C/Inf.1 (20 June 1991). 80   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

Warsaw (May–June 1991) and the Council of Ministers in Berlin (June 1991) were all postponed. Representatives of the Baltic States were, however, able to attend plenary sessions (which were open to the public) of some of these meetings as non-official “hosts” of several delegations, particularly the Scandinavian delegations.14 Leading Baltic figures also participated in the inauguration of the Paris Summit (19 November 1990), as “guests of honour” of the Executive Secretariat. However, following a protest from Moscow (which had nonetheless initially agreed to such an arrangement), France found itself obliged to expel them.15 International recognition of the Baltic States, following the aborted coup d’état in the USSR in August 1991, immediately altered the situation, and the unconditional accession (in contrast to the case of Albania) of the three new States was decided on 10 September 1991, during a Ministerial meeting convened for this purpose by the Chairman-in-Office (CiO) of the CSCE Council of Ministers (Hans-Dietrich Genscher) in the Soviet capital, immediately prior to the opening of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension.16 The Baltic countries signed the Helsinki Final Act on 15 October 1991 and the Charter of Paris on 6 December of the same year.

3. Consequences of the Dissolution of the USSR The dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 raised fundamental issues for the CSCE. One of these was what would happen to the USSR’s seat in the CSCE. In this respect, the outcome was fairly self-­evident, and the substitution of Russia for the USSR was approved by the Committee of Senior Officials without discussion on 8 January 1992. The official minutes of the meeting indicate laconically that “before opening the meeting the Chairman welcomed the delegation of the Russian Federation, referring to the letter from the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation to the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council” on 7 January 1992.17 The other issue was whether the CSCE should be open to all new Republics without discrimination or only to specifically European countries. The Committee of Senior Officials decided in favour of the first option, recommending that the Council of Ministers consider that “all former Soviet republics are eligible for eventual full

14 See Riina Kionka, “The CSCE and the Baltic States”, Report on the USSR, vol. 47, no. 2 (23 November 1990), pp. 17–19, and Falk Lange, “The Baltic States and the CSCE”, Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. XXV, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 239–240. See also Atlantic News, no. 2333, 21 June 1991, p. 2. 15 See Le Monde, 18–22 November 1990. 16 On the accession of the Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, see the Moscow Additional Meeting held at ministerial level (1990): Journal of 10 September 1991. 17 See 5th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 8 January 1992, item 2. In accordance with a decision taken by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on 21 December 1991, the letter in question stated that Russia was to continue the membership of the former USSR in the CSCE, as well as in other international organizations, see CSCE Communication No. 10 (7 January 1992).  Chapter III   81

participation in the CSCE.”18 In line with the Albanian precedent, the Committee considered that the candidate countries should promise to fulfil the commitments contained in all the final texts of the CSCE (including the Vienna Document on CSBMs) and to invite a Rapporteur Mission to their country.19 It was on the basis of letters of accession, a model for which had been provided in advance by the Chairman-in-Office of the CSO, that the Council of Ministers decided on 30 January 1992 to admit ten new participating States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan – in other words, all the former Soviet Republics with the exception of Georgia, which was beset by civil war.20 With the exception of ­Kazakhstan (represented by Russia) and Turkmenistan (represented by Turkey), all the admitted Republics took part in the work of the Council of Prague.21 Setting aside the reservations in principle expressed by some countries (Austria, Cyprus), the idea of admitting the former Soviet Republics en bloc – something wanted by Moscow and strongly supported by Germany and the United States – was accepted effortlessly by the participating States.22 They believed that such an accession had the advantage of strengthening the cohesion of the emerging Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), compelling its members to agree to the CSCE commitments (including human rights, rule of law, market economy, transparency of military activities, and disarmament) and

18 See 5th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 10 January 1992, decisions, item 5 (d) and Annexes 3 and 4. See also 6th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 28 January 1992, item 5 (a). It should be noted that Belarus obtained observer status at the 5th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1, decisions, item 5 (b). At the 6th Meeting of the CSO, five Republics – Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Ukraine – were admitted as observers, see Journal No. 1, decisions, 5(d) and CSCE Communications Nos. 15, 29, 31, 34, 42, 48/1992. Armenia and Ukraine had, it seems, been knocking at the door of the CSCE since the Paris Summit, to no avail, see Le Monde, 23 December 1990. 19 The CSO also set an additional condition: the ratification of the CFE Treaty by States with territory in the Treaty’s zone of application. See 5th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 10 January 1992, item 5 (d) and Annexes 3 and 4; 6th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 28 January 1992, item 5 (a). 20 See Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 2. For the letters of accession, see the Prague Council’s Journal No. 1 of 30 January 1992, Annex 2. See also CSCE Communications regarding the accession of Armenia: Nos. 6, 24, 55/1992; Belarus: Nos. 27, 30, 33, 49/1992; Moldova: Nos. 11, 23, 52/1992; Kazakhstan: Nos. 58, 60, 60 Add./1992; Kyrgyzstan: Nos. 38 and 59/1992; Uzbekistan: Nos. 45, 48, 54/1992; Tajikistan: Nos. 44 and 56/1992; and Turkmenistan: Nos. 35 and 37/1992. 21 It should be noted that all these Republics would be admitted to the UN as fully-­fledged members only on 2 March 1992 (with the exception of Ukraine and Belarus, which had been members since 1945). 22 It should be noted, however, that Turkey demanded for a time that the accession of Armenia be subject to an upfront commitment to renounce territorial claims and terrorism, see Le Monde, 30 January 1992. Turkey eventually agreed to solve this problem through a direct channel on a bilateral basis. Greece, for its part, was reluctant to agree to a decision regarding the accession of several Turkic Republics to the CSCE, see Le Monde, 31 January 1992. 82   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

creating a connection between Greater Europe and Muslim countries upon which the Iranian State had its sights set. The CSCE did not send a Rapporteur Mission to each of these countries. For both financial and practical reasons, it brought the ten countries together into four groups: there was, therefore, a Mission to Armenia and Azerbaijan (12– 18 February 1992); a Mission to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (8–16 March 1992); a Mission to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (8–18 March 1992); and, finally, a Mission to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (31 March–6 April 1992).23 In addition to the accession of the ten former Soviet Republics, the Council of Ministers in Prague decided that unofficial consultations would be held in ­Helsinki “under the direction of the Chairman-in-Office of the CSO” during the Follow-up Meeting, with a view to establishing the modalities for a Programme of Coordinated Support for recently admitted States – “through which appropriate diplomatic, academic, legal and administrative expertise and advice on subjects relating to the CSCE could be made available.”24 This programme was the subject of Chapter XI of the Helsinki Summit Document 1992, “Challenges of Change”. Georgia was admitted to the CSCE only on 24 March 1992 (prior to its entry into the UN on 31 July 1993), after having agreed to commitments similar to those of the other former Soviet Republics and having invited a Rapporteur Mission to visit its territory.25 The Mission, which took place from 17 to 22 May, issued four recommendations: the election of a democratic parliament; granting of citizenship to non-Georgian-speaking populations; provision of coordinated technical assistance to Georgia by the competent international organizations (in terms of banking, finance and economy, justice, the civil service, etc.); and the control of arms held by the various political factions in the country.26

4. Consequences of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia The disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began with the proclamation of independence by Slovenia and Croatia (June 1991), Macedonia (September 1991) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (February 1992). From April 1992, the two remaining political entities (Serbia and Montenegro) constituted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

23 For the text of the four Reports, see CSCE Communications No. 119 (27 March 1992), No. 126 (7 April 1992), No. 127 (7 April 1992), No. 127/Rev.1 (9 April 1992) and No. 149 (24 April 1992). 24 See Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 19. 25 See Helsinki Additional Meeting of the Council of Ministers (1992): Journal, item 5 (b) and the Summary of Conclusions of 24 March 1992, § 2. See also CSCE Communications No. 80 (25 February 1992) and No. 86 (4 March 1992); and 9th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 19 March 1992, decisions, item 5 (b). 26 Helsinki Additional Meeting of the Council of Ministers (1992): Journal, item 6. At the time of decision-making, the delegation of Lithuania availed itself of § 79 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations and formulated the following interpretative statement: “that Lithuania’s voice in joining the consensus concerning the admission of Georgia as a participating State to the CSCE could not be interpreted as recognition of the Government of Georgia.” See also CSCE Communication No. 186 (29 May 1992), pp. 13–14.  Chapter III   83

On the CSCE level, the splintering of the SFRY resulted in the successive accession of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and, at a later stage, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – quite apart from the suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).27 a) The accession of Slovenia and Croatia In response to the application from Slovenia and Croatia, the Committee of Senior Officials could do no more than recommend to the Council of Ministers in January 1992 that the two Republics in question be granted the status of mere observer. In the meantime, it invited them to attend its own work in this capacity.28 The Yugoslav delegation attempted to oppose this decision but was dissuaded by various participating States (who let it be known that such an attitude would incite them to contest the validity of Yugoslavia’s own seat in the CSCE). It contented itself with issuing an interpretative declaration indicating that it had “taken note” of the recommendation by the Committee of Senior Officials.29 On this occasion, the US delegation formally stated that “the fact that the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia had been granted observer status in the CSCE does not in any way prejudice future decisions by the US or by other CSCE participating States regarding recognition of or full participation in the CSCE for individual Yugoslav Republics, nor the ultimate disposition of the Yugoslav seat in the CSCE.”30 Other participating States, namely Bulgaria (which had recognized the four candidate Republics) and Hungary (also speaking on behalf of Albania, Austria and Estonia), stressed that the status of Slovenia and Croatia within the CSCE represented a step in the right direction, but that the objective to be achieved remained the full and equal accession of all successor States to Yugoslavia. The recommendation from the Committee of Senior Officials was a compromise between States supporting a direct rejection and those recommending full accession. This compromise was not questioned by the Council of Ministers in Prague, which, on 30 January 1992, granted Slovenia and Croatia observer status “in the CSCE process”31 – that is to say, full observer status, valid for all procedural meetings, and not a limited or renewable status, as had been the case for Albania from June 1990 to June 1991. In reality, the full accession of the two Republics was only a question of time, and on 24 March 1992 the Council of Ministers

27 On this point, see further in this volume, Chapter V, part III, section 3.B ‘Suspension of membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro)’. 28 See 6th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 27 January 1992, items 5 (c) and 5 (d), p. 2. 29 See 6th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 27 January 1992, item 6. 30 Ibid., item 4. Turkey made a statement along the same lines, see item 6. 31 See Prague Council of Ministers: Journal No. 1 of 30 January 1992, item 3, and Prague Summary of Conclusions, § 3. In terms of steps taken by the two countries, for Slovenia see CSCE Communications Nos. 36, 93, 111 and 116/1992; for Croatia see Communications Nos. 29 and 37 as well as 115/1992. Slovenia had begun knocking at the door to join the CSCE since the Paris Summit. 84   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

granted Croatia and Slovenia the full status of participating States.32 They were, therefore, the first Republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to fully join the CSCE, before they even joined the UN.33 b) The accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina During its Sixth Meeting on 27 January 1991, the Committee of Senior Officials rejected the application submitted by Bosnia-Herzegovina, due to a lack of consensus. With the exception of Bulgaria, no CSCE State had yet recognized this country. The arbitration commission (known as the “Badinter Commission”) of the International Conference on Yugoslavia had decided shortly before that “the will of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina to constitute the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established.”34 However, when the attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina became more flagrant, the Committee of Senior Officials changed its tone. On 30 April 1992, it decided to admit Bosnia-Herzegovina as a participating State, on the condition that this was accepted by the Council of Ministers.35 On 2 July 1992, the participating States took another step forward by anticipating that “it is understood that the welcoming of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the Helsinki Summit by the President of the host country will be recognized as the formal confirmation of the accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a CSCE participating State.”36 c) The accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia The accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia gave rise to fierce opposition from Greece, a country which suspected the newly independent Republic of harbouring territorial ambitions towards it and which, moreover, went as far as refusing it the right to call itself “Macedonia”. In January 1991, the CSO rejected the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s application.37 From that point onwards, and for more than four years, all attempts by the former

32 See Helsinki Additional Meeting of the Council of Ministers (1992): Journal, item 5 (b) and Helsinki Summary of Conclusions, § 2. See also 9th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 19 March 1992, decisions, item 5 (c) and Annex 2. 33 Croatia and Slovenia were admitted to membership of the United Nations on 22 May 1992. It should be noted that the two countries did not have to invite Rapporteur Missions – at the end of December 1991, a mission of this type (such as the Fleiner-Gerster Mission) had already been sent to the six Republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, see further in this volume, Chapter V, part III, A. ‘Stepping aside for the European Union and the United Nations’. 34 See “On International Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and its Member States”, Arbitration Commission on the Conference on Yugoslavia: Opinion No. 4 of 11 January 1992, p. 4. 35 See 10th Meeting of the CSO: Journal, decisions, item 5 (c), Annex 3. 36 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 4 of 2 July 1992, p. 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina did not invite a Rapporteur Mission for the reason given in footnote 33 above. 37 See 6th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 27 January 1992, p. 2, item 5 (c).  Chapter III   85

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to access the CSCE met with the same fate, as a result of the refusal of Greece and (until June 1994) Albania.38 According to the opinion of the Badinter Commission, the country in question met the conditions of recognition formulated by the twelve members of the European Community on 16 December 1991. Moreover, it had amended its Constitution to state that “the Republic of Macedonia has no territorial claims against neighbouring states” such that the use of the name “Macedonia” could not “imply any territorial claims on another State.”39 The CSCE’s (forced) ostracism of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was counter to good political sense. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not only a UN Member State, but also the host of a preventive Mission of Long Duration established by the CSCE and a permanent representative of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Furthermore, the accession to the CSCE of the only former Yugoslav Republic to remain outside the war was in the interests of security and stability in the ­region. It should be noted that, despite everything, on 28 April 1993 the Committee of Senior Officials granted the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia observer status on the basis of paragraph 54 of the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations (1973);40 a Rapporteur Mission would take place as soon as possible to assess the situation in the country with regard to CSCE standards.41 Initially a “silent observer”, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was gradually permitted to take the floor at the CSO, the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Committee.42 The situation was only to change with the “Interim Agreement” between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, signed on 13 September 1995 at the United Nations headquarters. Through this instrument, Greece recognized

38 See CSCE Communications Nos. 40, 46, 67, 99, 199, 273, 328 and 394 (and Add.)/1992, Nos. 36, 70, 233, 270 and 294/1993, and Nos. 21/Rev. and 33/1994. See also 6th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 27 January 1992, item 5 (c); 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 29 June 1992, p. 2; 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 13 December 1992, p. 2; 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, pp. 3, 5 and 11; 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, pp. 2–3; 23rd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 22 September 1993, p. 2; 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 March 1994, pp. 2–3; 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 June 1994, pp. 2–4; 28th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 14 September 1994, p. 2; and 29th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 18 November 1994, p. 2. See also DOC.284 (30 May 1994), DOC.434 (30 June 1994), DOC.520 (18 July 1994), DOC.646 (5 September 1994), DOC.459 (15 March 1995), REF.PC/262/95 (13 June 1995) and REF.PC/598/95 (9 October 1995). 39 See “On the Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States”, Arbitration Commission: Opinion No. 6 of 11 January 1992, p. 6. 40 See 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, Annex 1 and decision 5(a). 41 For the Report of the CSCE Rapporteur Mission, see CSCE Communication No. 183 (24 June 1993). 42 See 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, pp. 2–3; 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 June 1994, pp. 2–4; Rome Council of Ministers: Journal No. 2 of 19 December 1993, p. 2; and Permanent Committee: Journal No. 26 of 30 June 1994, p. 2. See also DOC.434 of 30 June 1994. It should also be noted that prior to its accession by right to the CSCE, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was admitted to the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly as an observer. 86   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent and sovereign State and announced its intention to establish a liaison office in Skopje (Article 1); at the same time, it agreed not to oppose requests for accession that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitted to international institutions (Article 11.1).43 Consequently, the OSCE Permanent Council decided, on 12 October 1995, to admit the country under the temporary name of “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, while awaiting resolution of the dispute over the name “Macedonia”.44

5. Consequences of the Dissolution of the Czechoslovakian Federation During its Stockholm Meeting (1992), the Council of Ministers decided that the two successors to the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, which was to be dissolved at the end of December 1992, would be admitted to the CSCE from 1 ­January 1993 according to established practice – that is to say, after receipt of a model application letter agreeing to all CSCE commitments and inviting a ­Rapporteur Mission to assess compliance with these commitments in the territory of the two new States.45 Liechtenstein and Hungary, each of which had a dispute with the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, did not object to the accession of its two successors; they believed, however, that it was necessary to voice their respective reservations in formal special declarations. The first of these disputes was an after-effect of the Second World War and related to the nationalization of property of the reigning Liechtenstein family, which took place without compensation in 1945. Liechtenstein asked that the dispute be heard before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – a demand consistently rejected by Czechoslovakia and then by the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. The adoption of the Final Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co- operation in Europe (April 1990), one of the provisions of which recognized the “right to prompt, just and effective compensation in the event private property is taken for public use”,46 enabled the dispute to be referred to the CSCE. During the drafting of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (summer 1990), Liechtenstein restated its position – unsuccessfully – when the city of Prague was envisaged as

43 In return, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stated that nothing in its Constitution “can or should be interpreted as constituting or will ever constitute the basis of any claim by the Party of the Second Part to any territory not within its existing borders” (article 6.1). It also undertook to stop using “in any way the symbol in all its forms displayed on its national flag” (article 7.2). For the text of the Agreement, see UN: S/1995/794 (14 September 1995). 44 See Permanent Council (PC): Decision No. 81 of 12 October 1995. The decision was adopted by silence procedure and entered into force on 16 October 1992, see REF.PC/616/95. See also Permanent Council: Decisions No. 82 of 2 November 1995; Decision No. 92 of 30 November 1995, Annex, and Decision No. 97, Annexes 4 and 5 of 19 December 1995. 45 See Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 10. The text of the draft letter of accession can be found in the Stockholm Summary of Conclusions, Annex 3. For the letter of accession, dated 1 January 1993, see 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 2 February 1993, Annex 1. 46 Bonn Document (1990), preamble, third indent before last.  Chapter III   87

the headquarters of the CSCE Secretariat.47 In 1992, at the Follow-up Meeting, it went further (with no more success) by blocking until the last minute the consensus on the part of the final document which stated that the annual meeting of the Economic Forum would be held in Prague.48 In Stockholm, during adoption of the principle of admitting the two successors of the Czech and Slovak Republic, the President of the Council of Ministers made a formal declaration indicating that he had understood that one of the two new Republics was ready to enter negotiations, out of mutual interest and on the basis of international law, on the subject of any bilateral issues which, in the opinion of either party, remained to be resolved with the Principality of Liechtenstein.49 Liechtenstein immediately did the same, specifying that “the outstanding issues between the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic and the Czech ­ ­Republic and the Slovak Republic do encompass nationalization of property of ­Liechtenstein nationals seized without compensation in the years 1945 and thereafter.”50 To this, the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic responded, in its own name and in the name of its successors, that this was inadmissible, stating that “any informative talks, consultations or negotiations which might be conducted with the Principality of Liechtenstein cannot include the claims of property rights of the citizens of Liechtenstein, since Czechoslovak law does not regard these claims as juridically founded.”51 The dispute remained unaltered, despite attempts by Liechtenstein to reopen it during the accession procedure of the two new Republics to the UN.52 The second dispute was a direct descendent of the communist era and concerned the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros dam or, more precisely, implementation of the Treaty by which Hungary and Czechoslovakia had, in 1977, decided to share the Danube’s resources via hydroelectric stations erected largely in Gabcikovo (a region of Slovakia with a significant minority Magyar population) and in Nagymaros (to the north of Budapest). Initially instigated with the blessing of the USSR, this project had economic objectives (growth of energy production), political objectives (promotion of “fraternal co-operation” between two countries of the Comecon) and even military objectives (improving navigational capacity on the ­Danube).53 Following the collapse of communism, Hungary (which, under pressure from opposition ecological movements, had stopped work) asked the

47 See The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE, March 24–July 8, 1992 (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), p. 46. 48 See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992): Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, Decision 5(b), p. 2. See also Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 157–158. 49 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Journal No. 2 of 15 December 1992, item 6, p. 6. 50 Ibid., item 7, p. 6. 51 Ibid., item 7, pp. 6–7. 52 See UN: A/47/865 (12 January 1993). 53 See Vera Rich, “The Battle of the Danube”, The World Today, vol. 48, no. 12 (December 1992), p. 217. 88   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

­ zechoslovaks to abandon the entire undertaking. In support of its request, it C raised financial but above all ecological arguments: modifying the course of the Danube would gradually dry up the river bed, threatening the water table which encompassed around half of the drinking water of the country – not to mention disruption to navigation along the length of the Rhine-Main-Danube canal.54 After two years of fruitless negotiations, Hungary denounced the Treaty of 1977 in May 1992, despite opposition from the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.55 The Czech and Slovak Federative Republic refused to cede to Hungary’s request on the grounds that more than 90% of the project had been completed (at a cost of 21 billion crowns), that the alleged ecological risks were strongly exaggerated if not unfounded, and that the request of the Government of Hungary was, in fact, motivated by reasons of internal electoral policy. The process of dissolving the Czech–Slovak Federation contributed towards deterioration of the issue, in the sense that it turned into a bilateral dispute between Hungary and the future ­Slovak Republic, the outcome of which depended on the national-populist team led by Vladimír Mečiar. The Slovaks turned the issue of the Gabcikovo/­Nagymaros dam into an issue of national prestige: for them, it involved reducing the country’s energy dependence (81% of its energy needs were provided by Prague) while politically asserting itself against the Czech Republic and Hungary, which it considered to be overly concerned with the fate of Hungarian minorities in ­Slovakia.56 Keen to accelerate the completion of the project, and given the cessation of work on the Hungarian side, Slovakia decided to divert the main course of the Danube into its own territory – a measure which Hungary considered as unilaterally modifying (by around 10 kilometres) the border between the two countries that had been set by the Treaties of Trianon (1920) and Paris (1947).57 Given that it had felt that its sovereignty and territorial integrity had been attacked, Hungary sought to introduce the dispute to the CSCE: on 23 October 1992, it requested “clarifications” from the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic under the terms of the bilateral procedure set out in the Berlin Emergency Mechanism.58 Despite considering that the clarifications in question were “completely unsatisfactory”, the Hungarian authorities did not activate the multilateral provisions of this same mechanism.59 This attitude is explained by the fact that the European Community had, under the influence of Germany, made attempts at

54 See Karoly Okolicsanyi, “Slovak–Hungarian Tension: Bratislava Diverts the Danube”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 49, 11 December 1992, p. 50. 55 See Karoly Okolicsanyi, “Hungary Cancels Treaty on Danube Dam Construction”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 26, 26 June 1992, p. 50. 56 Other problems stemmed from the weight of the “water lobby” and the “construction lobby” in Slovakia. See George Schöpflin, “La Hongrie et ses voisins”, Cahiers de Chaillot, no. 7 (1993), p. 23. 57 See CSCE Communication No. 263 (8 September 1992). 58 See CSCE Communication No. 311 (25 October 1992). 59 See CSCE Communications Nos. 341 and 320 (27 October and 30 October 1992).  Chapter III   89

mediation, resulting in the London Protocol of 28 October 1992, setting out the parties’ agreement to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice. When the decision was taken by the Council of Ministers in Stockholm to admit the two successors of the Czech and Slovak Republic to the CSCE, Hungary issued a formal statement saying that although it joined the consensus around this accession, it believed it was necessary to draw attention to the need for the application, by all participating States, of the CSCE principles and commitments, particularly those of Principle V (the peaceful settlement of disputes) and Principle X (good faith in commitments assumed in line with international law) of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States (“Decalogue”) of the Helsinki Final Act.60 In other words, the Hungarian authorities expected that the provisions of the London Protocol would be fully respected by the two future Republics. The same declaration also made reference to application of Principle VII of the Decalogue (respect for human rights), concerning the treatment of Hungarian national minorities in Slovakia. Since then, the issue of the dam has been submitted to the Court in The Hague, and that of the Magyar minorities has given rise to an intervention by the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The accession of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic calls for a few more brief remarks. First, the Czech and Slovak authorities decided to agree that Slovakia would take over the role of member of the CSCE Troika that had belonged to the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic from 1 January 1993.61 Second, the two future Republics agreed before the CSCE to assume all the commitments contracted by the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic under the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1990 on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), with a view to guaranteeing the continuity of its implementation.62 Third, the financial contribution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, which represented 1% of the CSCE budget, would be split between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic up to a limit of 0.67% and 0.33% respectively.63 Fourth, the Rapporteur Mission (8–12 March 1993) responsible for assessing compliance with the CSCE values and commitments within the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic concluded that the transition to pluralist democracy and the market economy had not been affected by the disappearance of the Federation, but that in both new Republics the situation of the Romani remained problematic: hence the recommendation made to the Committee of Senior Officials to entrust the High Commissioner on National Minorities to conduct an examination of the issue.64

60 See Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Journal No. 2 of 15 December 1992, p. 5. 61 Ibid., p. 3. 62 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 63 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 February 1993, decision 5(c), p. 4. 64 For the text of the report, see CSCE Communication No. 114 (19 April 1993) and No. 114/Corr.1 (26 April 1993). The CSO took note of the report during the 21st Meeting of the CSO, see Journal No. 1 of 26 April 1993, decision 5(b), p. 3. 90   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

In sum, and as stressed by the representative of the Czech Government, “at a time when major conflicts and wars are raging in the CSCE area despite efforts to bring them to an end, at least one positive example may have been set, proving that the right to self-determination does not necessarily have to be accompanied by chaos, human suffering and even bloodshed, but on the contrary, that it can be based on respect for and in harmony with all the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.”65 The remark is true, with one qualification: the dissolution of the Federation took place from “above”, without consulting the populations involved.

6. The Consequences of CSCE Enlargement One of the consequences of enlarging the composition of the CSCE was that it highlighted the difficulties of integrating the newly admitted States and transformed the ground rules for the group’s diplomacy.

A. The Difficulties of Integrating New Participating States Given what was now a good number of States with no experience of its commitments, working methods and activities, the CSCE found itself faced with a new problem: how to integrate certain member countries as active participants. At the instigation of the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in July 1992 the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting adopted a Programme of Coordinated Support to recently admitted participating States aiming to provide them with diplomatic, scientific, legal and administrative assistance on subjects relating to the CSCE’s themes. The expression “recently admitted participating States” (RAPS) was understood to include all countries which had joined the ranks of the CSCE after the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Above all, it was aimed at certain Republics of the former USSR (those in Central Asia and the Caucasus) which had a structurally limited capacity to respond to the CSCE standards and whose lack of presence at meetings had proven to be politically vexing. The Programme of Support formulated concrete guidance for the then three permanent institutions of the CSCE – the Secretariat in Prague, the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It recommended that the civil servants in these institutions should offer their services to the RAPS during any missions they were conducting in the region.66 The Secretariat in Prague was to ensure that CSCE documents were duly distributed to the countries concerned.67 As for the ODIHR and the CPC, they were charged with organizing meetings and seminars adapted to the special needs of the RAPS, if possible on site.68 Co-ordination of all these activities fell to the ODIHR (under the general management of the Committee of Senior

65 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Journal No. 2 of 15 December 1992, p. 4. 66 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter XI, § 5. 67 Ibid., § 4. 68 Ibid., §§ 2 and 3.  Chapter III   91

Officials),69 stressing that the issues relating to the human dimension should form the heart of the Programme of Support. Depending on the case, expenses relating to their implementation were to be covered by the CSCE, by the governments acting individually (study and training programmes funded by the public authorities), or by the RAPS as host countries.70 In any case, the focus was on “enhancing knowledge on matters dealt with by the CSCE among, inter alia, civil servants, the media and the public at large.”71 In December 1992, the Council of Ministers in Stockholm decided in favour of expanding the CSCE’s activities into the territory of the RAPS. It asked the Chairman-in-Office, assisted by the members of the Troika, to consult the RAPS themselves on the measures to take to best implement the Programme of Support drawn up in Helsinki, and to carry out a programme of onsite visits to this end with the help of a team of CSCE experts.72 During 1993, the Chairman-in-Office (Margaretha af Ugglas) thus carried out visits to Central Asia (in April) and the Caucasus (in October).73 In Rome the following year (December 1993), the Council of Ministers took two additional decisions.74 Firstly, it charged the Secretary General with ensuring “continued effective follow-up” of the visits by the Chairman-in-Office to the Central Asian and Transcaucasian participating States. Secondly, it requested the ODIHR to strengthen its co-operation with the RAPS in the area of the human dimension. For its part, the CSO approved the idea of enabling civil servants in Central Asian countries to carry out short-term internships to the Secretariat in Vienna and to the ODIHR as well as to establish, for one year, a CSCE liaison office in the region.75 For its part, in December 1994 the Budapest Review Conference decided to continue the Programme of Coordinated Support through meetings and seminars organized by the ODIHR and the Secretary General, while evoking the possibility, of involving experts-at-large in the process of providing assistance to the RAPS, with a view to facilitating the work of the ODIHR.76 Since the launch of the Programme of Coordinated Support, three series of annual seminars have been organized specifically for the States in Central Asia.

69 Ibid., § 1. The ODIHR was also to act as a centre of information for relevant activities of the CSCE and the participating States as well as third-party international organizations such as the Council of Europe. 70 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter XI, § 8. 71 Ibid., § 2. 72 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 9. See also the Canadian–Dutch “non- paper” dated 23 November 1992. 73 See CSCE Communications No. 159 (25 May 1993) and No. 301 (19 November 1993). 74 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VIII, §§ 1 and 2. 75 See 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 15 June 1994, Annex 4. For previous positions of the CSO on the issue of recently admitted participating States, see 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 26 June 1993, Annex 3, and Journal No. 3 of 4 May 1994, Annex 3. 76 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, §§ 42 and 43 were primarily agreed upon on the basis of a proposal submitted by the United States: CSCE/BC/WG3/6 (17 November 1994), p. 2. 92   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

Moreover, an OSCE Liaison Office has been operating in Tashkent, in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) premises, since October 1995.77 Finally, as the result of financial support from some Western countries, the Central Asian countries are now practically all permanently represented in Vienna. With a view to multilateralizing this financial support, the Permanent Council established a voluntary contributions fund specifically aimed at improving the integration of RAPS within the OSCE.78 The activities undertaken by the OSCE for the benefit of the former Soviet Central Asian countries were, undoubtedly, necessary and judicious. Nevertheless, the question of their real impact must be seriously questioned, as these countries slide towards increased political authoritarianism which is scarcely compatible with the fundamental values of the human dimension of the OSCE.79

B. The Transformation of Group Diplomacy The phenomenon of group diplomacy is a direct product of consensus decision-­ making and clearly continues to take place within the OSCE. However, from the end of 1989, it has undergone significant transformations which are not limited to the disintegration of the Eastern group. Within the institutionalized OSCE, diplomacy takes place in a context marked by the rupture of the Neutral and Non- Aligned (N+NA) groups, the reconfiguration of the Western group and the emergence of new diplomatic constellations. a) The rupture of the N+NA groups The events marking the transformation of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall pushed the N+NA countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Malta, as well as Liechtenstein and San Marino) to reactivate their co-operation, which had loosened after the end of the Vienna Meeting on the future of the CSCE (January 1989), a successful exercise to which their good offices contributed in a significant way. During 1990 and until the end of the civil war in Yugoslavia, the members of the group met three times at Foreign Ministerial level – in Valletta (1–3 March 1990), Helsinki (1 and 2 November 1990) and Vaduz (16 and 17 May 1991), in order to coordinate their policy towards the CSCE. They thus managed to harmonize their views on a number of points: the holding of the Paris Summit; the institutionalization of the CSCE; the adoption of a mechanism to convene the Committee of Senior Officials in emergency sessions; the drafting of an integrated mandate on security (CSBMs/disarmament); granting the Conflict Prevention

77 For the first series of seminars, see CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 31 of 7 October 1993. For the Liaison Office, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 28 of 16 March 1995, REF.SEC/365/95 (22 November 1995) and SEC/248/96 (9 May 1996). 78 See Permanent Council: Journal No. 10 of 2 March 1995, decisions, item 5 (a). See also DOC.340/95 (28 February 1995), Permanent Council: Decision No. 23 of 2 March 1995 and REF.PC/70/95 (25 April 1995). 79 On Central Asian issues, see Peter Ferdinand (ed.), The New Central Asia and its Neighbours (London: Pinter, 1994), 120 p.  Chapter III   93

Centre with r­esources relating to the Valletta peaceful settlement of disputes mechanism; strengthening the Human Dimension Mechanism; establishing a mechanism aiming to facilitate the implementation of commitments relating to the pro­tection of national minorities, incorporating the Cyprus question onto the agenda of the CSCE; and, finally, continuing co-operation between N+NA countries within the pan-European process.80 Consequently, proposals which had gained the ­collective approval of the group were submitted to the Vienna negotiations on ­CSBMs, during the development (by the Committee of Senior Officials) of the agenda of the Council of Ministers in Berlin, and to the Meeting of Experts in Geneva on national minorities.81 The disintegration of the Yugoslav crisis into civil war was also to splinter the diplomatic unity of the N+NA countries. Indeed, it was Austria (and not a country from outside the group) which summoned the authorities in Belgrade to explain themselves, while setting in motion the consultation and co-operation mechanism concerning unusual military activities.82 The rupture came to a head in September 1991, when Austria decided to no longer host meetings of the N+NA group if the Belgrade authorities were represented. With or without the Yugoslav conflict, the sustainability of the group was uncertain. Firstly, the end of the Cold War had removed from the N+NA the possibility of playing their fundamental role in the CSCE: that of the “honest brokers” between East and West. Secondly, the N+NA group lost its intrinsic attraction for some of its own members, as was particularly the case for Austria, a country which believed it could reach its political objectives more easily and satisfactorily within the context of the Hexagon, a group of which it had been one of the founding members. Thirdly, the candidacy of most of the N+NA countries to the European Community, as well as Swedish and Finnish questions on the subject of the validity of the concept of neutrality, already in themselves marked the likelihood of an eventual splintering of the group. The failed attempt in September 1991 to rebuild the group solely on the basis of the participation of countries claiming to be neutral (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland) was fairly significant in this regard.

80 Regarding this last point, the Communiqué of Valletta affirmed that “The Ministers stressed the commitment of their countries to continuing and developing their co-operation within the CSCE process and ... expressed their preparedness to meet as frequently as possible” (third paragraph before the last), while the last paragraph of the Communiqué of Vaduz indicated only that “The Ministers emphasized the significance they attach to the continuing co-operation of the Neutral and Non-aligned countries in order to further the development of the CSCE process ... .” 81 For proposals on CSBMs, see CSCE/WV/WGA.3 (12 February 1990); for those on the Mandate for New Security Negotiations, see CSCE/3-CSO.3 (17 June 1991), and for the development of the Human Dimension Mechanism, see CSCE/REMN.1 (2 July 1991). 82 Austria (together with Italy) triggered the bilateral phase of the mechanism on 26 June 1991. Unlike Italy, Austria was not satisfied with Belgrade’s explanations and called for a meeting of all CSCE participating States. For more details, see further in this volume, Chapter IV, part II, section 3.E a), i), ‘Clarification of unusual military activities’. 94   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

b) Reconfiguration of the Western group The identity and cohesion of the Western group have not been negatively affected and it has now become the real centre of power in the OSCE. Yet the solidarity between the sixteen NATO States has clearly given ground to the solidarity between the twelve (and then the fifteen) Member States of the European Union, which now form the hard political core of the OSCE. It should be noted that since the Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment (November 1989), the final texts of the CSCE have expressly referred to, where appropriate, the European Union and its institutions and programmes.83 The Charter of Paris (November 1990) went further by recognizing the “important role of the European Community in the political and economic development of Europe”.84 Moreover, the State holding the six-monthly Presidency of the European Union officially represents it at meetings of the OSCE and sits with a sign with two titles on it.85 Since the Charter of Paris, the final texts of the CSCE refer to this State in its double capacity as national and European representative.86 However, above all, the OSCE now admits working documents presented by the State holding the Presidency, in the name of all Member States of the European ­Union.87 It should also be noted that the participation of the European Commission in the work of the OSCE has changed qualitatively. Until 1989, the Commission’s contribution had been essentially technical in nature: experts appointed by it were incorporated into the delegation of the State holding the Presidency of the Council during any negotiation on questions in the second basket (economic co- operation). From the Bonn Conference (1990), this contribution took a more specifically political dimension, with the direct participation of Commissioners such as the Vice-President Frans Andriessen and the President Jacques Delors. Although still part of the delegation of the State holding the Presidency, the

83 See Report of the Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment (1989), part I, § 3 and part II, § 2; Bonn Document (1990), section C, § 6; and the Report of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting on the Mediterranean of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1990), preamble, § 21, section B, § 1.2, first indent and section B, § 10.4, fourth indent. 84 Charter of Paris (1990), part II, section on “Economic Co-operation,” § 8. 85 From the Sofia Meeting to the Palma de Mallorca Meeting, the name of the country presiding and that of the European Community appeared on two different lines. Since the Paris Summit, the denominations fit on a single line with a slash in the middle. 86 See Report of the Valletta Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1991), preamble, § 1; Document of the Cracow Symposium (1991), preamble, § 1; Report of the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (1991), preamble, §§ 1 and 2; Moscow Document (1991), preamble, § 1; and Report of the Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions (1991), preamble, § 1. 87 Collective proposals were specifically submitted by the in Sofia, Bonn, Palma de Mallorca, Vienna (PrepCom of the Paris Summit), Geneva (Meeting of Experts on National Minorities), as well as at the second CSO Meeting and at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992) and the Budapest Review Conference (1994). See proposals submitted by the French Presidency: CSCE/SEM.32–34 (30 October 1989), Irish Presidency: CSCE/KWZEB.1 (19 March 1990) and CSCE/KWZEB.14 (6 April 1990); Italian Presidency: CSCE/RMP.1 (1 October 1990); Dutch Presidency: CSCE/ REMN.14 (11 July 1991); Luxembourg Presidency: CSCE/2-CSO.1 to 4, 6, 7 (23 May 1991).  Chapter III   95

Commissioners are mentioned in their own right in the OSCE texts. Above all, de facto, they acquire the same right as participating States to make a closing or opening statement.88 The Paris Summit was a major turning point for the Commission, due to the presence of President Jacques Delors and his signature of the Charter of Paris.89 Finally, it should be stressed that the CSCE had established with the European Community a fairly tight political co-operation during the Yugoslav conflict90 and agreed to act as a monitoring instrument of the Stability Pact, the first product of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The leading role of the twelve European Community members had, nonetheless, serious limitations. Firstly, the members did not automatically present a common front. Secondly, the rule of consensus remained unavoidable which, for example, explained the fact that the twelve Member States could not impose on the participating States the use of the European Currency Unit (ECU) to set and pay contributions to the CSCE.91 Last but not least, the United States remained rather reserved with regard to the collective role of the European Community within the CSCE.92 c) The emergence of new diplomatic constellations After the collapse of communism, new forms of subregional political and economic co-operation developed in Europe. The Declaration of the Helsinki Summit in 1992 set out four of these: the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Visegrad Triangle (now the Quadrilateral), the Black Sea Economic Co- operation, and the Central European Initiative (CEI),93 not to mention the more particular case of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).94

88 See Bonn Conference: Journal No. 16 of 16 April 1999 and Bonn Document (1990), § 4, as well as Palma de Mallorca Meeting (1990): Journal No. 1 of 24 September 1990 and Report of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting (1990), § 6. 89 The Charter of Paris was signed by each of the twelve Member States, the President-in-Office of the European Council and the President of the European Commission. The Helsinki Final Act (1975) was signed by each of the Member States, including Aldo Moro in his dual capacity as Prime Minister of Italy and President-­in-­Office of the European Community. 90 See further in this volume, Chapter V, part III 1. A. ‘Stepping aside for the European Union and the United Nations’ and same chapter, part III 2.D ‘The OSCE Missions to apply the United Nations sanctions’. 91 For details of this proposal, see CSCE/2-CSO.4 (23 May 1991). 92 See Palma de Mallorca Meeting (1990): Journal No. 19 of 18 October 1990, p. 3; Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (1991): Journal No. 13 of 18 July 1991 and No. 15 of 19 July 1991; and Geneva Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1992): Journal No. 10 of 23 October 1992. This was also the position of Turkey, see Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Journal No. 1 of 14 December 1992, pp. 2–3. 93 See Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 10, ninth indent; see also § 34. 94 The CIS is mentioned twice in the Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 10, eighth indent and § 20, second indent, and once in the Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 52. 96   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

With the exception of the Central European Initiative, none of these groups were collectively represented at CSCE meetings or conferences.95 It was in November 1989, at the instigation of Gianni De Michelis, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that four neighbouring countries belonging to NATO (Italy), the Warsaw Pact (Hungary), and the Neutral and Non-Aligned States (Austria, Yugoslavia) decided to strengthen their neighbourly relations and economic co-operation.96 Designed by Italy as a sort of counterweight to Germany’s growing power in the new Europe, this initial “quadrilateral” group later expanded into a Pentagon with the accession of Czechoslovakia (March 1990), and a Hexagon following the accession of Poland (July 1990). In November 1991, the Hexagon suspended Yugoslavia before adopting, in July 1992, the official title of the Central European Initiative. With the accession of Slovenia and Bosnia- Herzegovina (March 1993) as well as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (July 1993), the CEI encompassed ten members and five associated countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Ukraine, Belarus) which it anticipated fully admitting by 1996. It should also be noted that some of these activities were open to the participation of two sub-State entities: Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg.97 The Central European Initiative had no legal status and no secretariat. It was, nonetheless, a well-structured political group, with an annual President and national coordinators who met regularly at the level of Prime Ministers, Ministers and economic experts, and at inter-parliamentary level. In October 1995, it set itself rules of procedure with the adoption of the document entitled “Central European Initiative Guidelines and Rules of Procedure”. Although the CEI was not a trade bloc, it was, nonetheless, the case that economic co-operation was its fundamental raison d’être, as demonstrated by the existence of specialist working groups in the fields of the environment, transport, small and medium-sized enterprises, media, telecommunications, science and technology, migration, energy, emergency assistance in the event of natural catastrophes, tourism, statistics and agriculture.98 However, the CEI is also a framework for political consultation on questions relating to the European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and national minorities.99 At the CSCE, the members of the CEI

95 See also John Fitzmaurice, “Regional Co-operation in Central Europe”, East European Politics, vol. 16, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 380–400. 96 On the origins of the CEI, see Hanspeter Neuhold (ed.) The Pentagonal Experiment: New Forms of Co-operation in a Changing Europe (Vienna: Braumüller, 1991), pp. xiv–145. 97 For more details, see Gaetano Zucconi, “The Central European Initiative: History and Present Trends, December 1994” (this summary document was commissioned by the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs). 98 This included also culture and education. For more details on the economic activities of the CEI, see Zucconi, “The Central European Initiative …” (n. 97), pp. 6–9. See also Summary Report on CEI Activities in 1992, CSCE Communication No. 58 (22 February 1993), and CEI Annual Report 1993 (Budapest: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1993). For the final document of the 1995 Summit, see INF/213/95 of 10 October 1995. 99 In November 1993, members of the CEI adopted a “CEI Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights”, see Annex 8/b of CEI Annual Report 1993 (n. 98).  Chapter III   97

manifested themselves through the submission of collective texts, notably to the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States (1991), the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (1991) and the ODIHR seminar on national minorities (1993).100

Changes in the composition of the CSCE/OSCE, 1975–1996

Year States Total 1975 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, 35 France, FRG, GDR, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, ­Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, USSR, Yugoslavia 1990 3 October: Incorporation of the GDR by the FRG 34 1991 19 June: accession of Albania 38 10 September: accession of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 1992 30 January: accession of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 52 Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan 24 March: accession of Slovenia, Croatia and Georgia 30 April: accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina 8 July: suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 1993 1 January: dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic 53 Accession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia 28 April: observer status granted to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 1995 12 October: accession of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 54 ­(Permanent Council: Decision No. 81) 1996 25 April: accession of Andorra (Permanent Council: Decision No. 113) 55

II. The Development of Relations Between the OSCE and Third States During the Cold War, the CSCE was concerned with the Mediterranean region in only a pragmatic and limited way. Since the fall of communism, it has developed its relationships with non-European States in the Mediterranean, while building new relationships with some countries in the Asian continent (Japan and South Korea).

1. Relations with the Mediterranean Appearing on the initial agenda of the CSCE, at the request of Malta, the theme of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean was always considered to be of marginal importance for the vast majority of participating States. Since the end of the Cold War its importance has grown, slowly but surely, alongside the maturing of

100 See CSCE/SCHC.5 (29 May 1991), CSCE/SCHC.6/Rev.l (5 June 1991), CSCE/SCHC.7/Rev.1, CSCE/ SCHC.18/Rev.1, CSCE/SCHC.19/Rev.1 and CSCE/SCHC.28 (all dated 5 June 1991). See also CSCE/ REMN.2 of 8 July 1991 and CEI Annual Report 1993 (n. 98), Annex 8/c. 98   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

the project for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

A. From “Non-participating States” to “Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation” From the onset, the CSCE attributed the status of “non-participating Mediterranean State” (NPMS), lower than that of observer, to eight non-European countries bordering the Mediterranean: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, ­Tunisia and Israel. This status enabled these countries to provide simple oral and written “contributions” to the rare meetings of the pan-European process where issues of the Mediterranean were addressed. This is why for a long time (1973– 1986), the Republic of Malta, then controlled by socialist Prime Minister Dom Mintoff, attempted in vain, at the cost of frequent diplomatic “psycho-dramas”, to convince the CSCE to broaden the list of NPMS to the Gulf States and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), to enable the NPMS to hold full membership, and to give the European–Mediterranean dialogue an institutionalized structure. After Mintoff ’s departure, the issue of the Mediterranean lost its “pathological” character for the CSCE, but it continued nonetheless to appear regularly on its agenda. Until the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992, the status of the NPMS remained unaltered. The Report of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting (September– October 1990), devoted to protecting the Mediterranean ecosystems and to which all the countries in the region, with the exception of Libya, provided standard “contributions”, stressed that the “presence” and “contribution” of the NPMS had “marked a positive change.” As for the rest, however, it expressed only the vague intention of the CSCE States to broaden co-operation and strengthen relations with the NPMS.101 The Charter of Paris for a New Europe simply reiterated, in even more general terms, this declaration of intent,102 while the Maghreb countries (with the exception of Libya) continued to demand more equal participation or, at least, more concrete participation in the work of the CSCE.103 In the Declaration of the Helsinki Summit in 1992, the Heads of State or Government recognized that “the changes which have taken place in Europe are relevant to the Mediterranean region and conversely, economic, social, political and security developments in that region have a direct bearing on Europe.”104 At the same time, the Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting set out four

101 See Report of the CSCE Meeting on the Mediterranean (1990), preamble, §§ 15, 17 and 24. 102 See the three provisions included under the “Mediterranean” heading of the section “Guidelines for the future”. It should be noted that non-participating Mediterranean States were not invited to make “contributions” to the Paris Summit, but only to present their views to the Committee devoted to the Mediterranean. In fact, they had not submitted any “contributions” at the first CSCE Summit in Helsinki (1975). 103 Assembled for their Third Ministerial Conference held at Algiers in June 1990, the Mediterranean Non-Aligned countries (the Arab States with the status of non-participating Mediterranean States along with Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Malta) had reiterated their request for equal participation in the work of the OSCE, see A/45/357 (26 July 1990), p. 3. 104 See the Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 37.  Chapter III   99

measures (Spanish in origin) aiming to promote dialogue and co-operation with the NPMS.105 The first measure touched upon the CSO in corpore. It indicated that the CSO “would seek to relate issues regarding co-operation in the Mediterranean to the goals of the CSCE process and will examine, as appropriate, practical modalities for possible contributions to the CSCE by non-participating Mediterranean States.”106 This provision was what remained of a Spanish idea suggesting the establishment, within the CSO, of a “Mediterranean Forum” to which the NPMS could be called upon to participate by way of “contributions”.107 The words in italics show that the final compromise consists of a fairly low common denominator, particularly as only “co-operation” in the Mediterranean is mentioned, not “security”. The second measure concerned the Chairman-in-Office of the CSO, who was encouraged to “foster contacts” with the NPMS in order to establish “an effective information exchange”.108 The third measure concerned the CSCE Follow-up Meetings: access to them was now open on a permanent basis with a view to allowing the NPMS to present “contributions” specifically and exclusively addressing security and co-operation in the Mediterranean.109 In contrast to what had been suggested by Spain, it would not be possible (due to opposition from the United States) to grant NPMS the ability to submit “contributions” to the meetings of the Council of Ministers.110 The fourth measure anticipated the organization, in 1993, under the auspices of the CSO, of a brief seminar (five days) addressing issues relating to the environment, demographics and economic development. In contrast to previous practice, it was specified that the seminar did not establish a document containing the duties of the CSCE States.111 It should be specified that this slight progress was the result of negotiations between the United States and the Mediterranean countries of the European Community; they obtained the few concessions mentioned above, in exchange for granting particular status to Japan.112 Shortly after the end of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the NPMS sustained a serious disappointment when their request to submit “contributions” to the Vienna Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), which had just begun, was ­

105 During the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992), only four non-participating Mediterranean States (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) submitted “contributions” to Working Group 4. 106 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter X, § 1. 107 See Heraclides, Helsinki II and its Aftermath … (n. 48), pp. 162–165. 108 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter X, § 2. 109 Ibid., Chapter X, § 3. 110 See Heraclides, Helsinki II and its Aftermath … (n. 48), p. 165. However, the Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter IV, § 7 states in a general way that non-participating Mediterranean States “will continue to be invited to contribute to CSCE activities.” 111 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter X, §§ 4 and 6. The seminar took place in Valletta from 17 to 21 May 1993 and resulted in a Chairman’s Summary, see CSCE Communication No. 161 (26 May 1993). 112 See The Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE … (n. 47), p. 47. 100   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

rejected.113 In light of the insistent demands made by Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (followed at a later stage by Israel) in 1993, the CSO ended up approving the principle of inviting the NPMS to participate in meetings of the CSCE in general, including those of the Council of Ministers, and “to participate in meetings … on subjects for which they have a special interest.”114 It is important to note that the CSO specified that this decision in principle concerned the NPMS “which share CSCE principles and objectives,” a formula that had the effect of excluding Syria and Libya, which were suspected of terrorism.115 It was on this basis that the relevant NPMS (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia) participated in the work of the Council of Ministers in Rome in 1993.116 Another small step forward was made by the CSO when it charged the Chairman-in-Office (and the Secretary General) with initiating exchanges of information and opinions with the NPMS.117 In 1994, two new series of decisions were taken by the CSO and the Budapest Follow-up Meeting respectively. In March 1994, the CSO expressly limited the list of NPMS approved by the CSCE to five (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia) – thus making a clear distinction between them and Syria, Lebanon and Libya. It was understood that the five States in question would be regularly invited to meetings of the Council of Ministers and to the Follow-up Meetings, as well as to regular meetings with the CSCE Troika for reasons of political consultation, that their views on issues of common interest would be communicated to the CSCE countries, and that they would have access to all the CSCE’s official documents.118 In December 1994, the Working Group on the Mediterranean of the Budapest Review Conference had received, in a sign of the times, “non-papers” jointly by Israel and the Maghreb countries. The Review Conference then decided to further develop relations with the NPMS through two avenues: an informal contact group of experts regularly meeting as part of the CSCE Permanent Committee and high- level consultations led by the Troika and the Secretary General. It decided, among other things, to organize the first CSCE meeting on the Mediterranean on the theme of security: a seminar on the CSCE’s experience of CSBMs.119

113 See FSC: Journal No. 2 of 30 September 1992 and No. 5 of 21 October 1992. Non-participating Mediterranean States were not invited to submit “contributions” to the negotiations on CSBMs between 1990 and 1992. 114 23rd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 23 September 1993, Annex 4. For prior (ad hoc) decisions, see 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, and CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 29 of 16 September 1993, decision 5(a). 115 An idea adopted at the request of the United States, towards which the European Union was not very favourably disposed. 116 See CSO Vienna Group (1993): Journal No. 36 of 11 November 1993, No. 37 of 18 November 1993 and No. 38 of 25 November 1993. 117 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter IX. 118 See 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 March 1994, decision 5(c). See also Permanent Council: Journal No. 9 of 17 February 1994, decision 5(c). 119 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter X, § 2(b) and Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994, item 6 (c). The seminar took place in Cairo from 26 to 28 September 1995. See Permanent Council:  Chapter III   101

At the same time, given the progress that had been made in the Middle East peace process and the consistent rise in Islamic threats in the Mediterranean, the United States significantly relaxed its position. The repercussions of this were twofold. Firstly, in December 1994, NATO decided to open political dialogue with non-European countries in the region (initially with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, ­Israel and Mauritania), with a view to contributing towards the stability of the entire Mediterranean basin and of “dissipating any misunderstanding that may make the Alliance’s intentions appear to constitute a threat.”120 Secondly, the United Kingdom raised its objections to the subject on the principle of a global initiative from the European Union concerning the Mediterranean: the Conference, held in Barcelona on 27 and 28 November 1995 with eleven Mediterranean States and the Palestinian Authority, was the first direct result of this.121 For its part, at the end of 1995 the OSCE abandoned the lifeless term “NPMS” to replace it with the politically gratifying term “Mediterranean Partners for Co- operation” (MPCs).122 Within the present-day OSCE, the Mediterranean has ceased to be a marginal concern. The Mediterranean “Partners” are now involved in the development of the Security Model.

B. The project on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in the ­Mediterranean The idea of a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean was not a project specific to the CSCE. However, through its objectives and geopolitical scope, it connected with the issue of the CSCE’s relations with countries in the ­region. During the Cold War, no reflections on security in Europe could ignore the Mediterranean. It was both the southern flank of NATO (on which hovered the threat of the Soviet fleet) and the subject of permanent rivalry between the two superpowers on the explosive stage of the Israeli–Arab conflict. The collapse of communism had removed the Soviet danger and put the Middle East peace process back on track. It did not, however, abolish the Mediterranean perimeter. On the one hand, the Mediterranean remained the “gateway” to the Persian Gulf, a geographical reality brought back into perspective by the Gulf War. On the other,

Decision No. 42 of 18 May 1995 and Decision No. 58 of 6 July 1995; see also REF.PC/105/95 (5 May 1995), REF.PC/127/95 (11 May 1995), REF.PC/132/95 (12 May 1995), REF.PC/158/95/ Rev.1 (6 July 1995) and REF.SEC/288/95 (16 October 1995). 120 See Brussels Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (1 December 1994), Final Communiqué, § 19, Doc. M-NAC-2(94)116. See also North Atlantic Assembly, Co-operation and Security in the Mediterranean: Report of the Sub-Committee on the Southern Region, report by Rodrigo de Rato, AL 223 PC/SR(94) of 2 November 1994. 121 For the text of the Barcelona Declaration, see Documents d’actualité internationale, no. 2, 15 January 1996, pp. 59–62 and INF/4/96 (6 January 1996). 122 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 94 of 5 December 1995. See also REF.PC/247/95 (8 June 1995), REF.PC/360/95 (13 July 1995), REF.PC/664/95 (9 November 1995) and REF. PC/674 (13 November 1995). 102   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

the Mediterranean represented a fault line between a world of opulence and a world of poverty, between a secular area and an Islamic area beset by the sirens of religious fundamentalism. The contrast between the two coasts of the Mediterranean is striking. While the countries in the north face the problem of ageing populations and the cultural consequences of immigration, those in the south are confronted with a galloping demography – an imbalance which is aggravated by chronic underdevelopment, increasing poverty and concerning levels of food poverty, not to mention problems connected with the burden of debt, desertification and growing unemployment. This range of disparities has led to a double phenomenon: in the south, an often hate-filled rejection of the Western model (a model which is desired but perceived as inaccessible), accompanied by a return to reassuring traditional values; in the north, the feeling that the national identity is being attacked is increasingly reflected in xenophobic reactions. One side represents the modern, secular West as being responsible for all the ills of the Muslim world, while the other perceives the Muslim world as the source of a new threat to Western Europe, taking the place that Soviet communism formerly held. In sum, the political and cultural gap between the two banks of the Mediterranean grew both in the public imagination and in reality. The danger may not appear immediate; however, it remains that all the ingredients of a real time bomb are in place in the region. In December 1989, during the Paris Ministerial Meeting of the Euro-­Arab Dialogue, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Gianni De Michelis) stated that the time had come to extend the spirit of the Helsinki process to the Mediterranean and the Middle East.123 Shortly after, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, announced the same idea to the Ottawa Open Skies Conference, which opened in February 1990 and, in September 1990, addressed in this sense a concrete proposition to Italy, which then held the Presidency of the European Community.124 As the reaction from the other members of the EC was lukewarm (with the exception of France and Portugal), Italy and Spain decided to integrate their respective ideas into a shared platform destined for the CSCE meeting in Palma de Mallorca (24 September–19 October 1990). Although focusing on the protection and improvement of Mediterranean ecosystems, the Palma Meeting, according to the official agenda, also aimed to lead to an “exchange of views on the issues raised in opening statements, taking into consideration the provisions of Mediterranean chapters in the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document,”125 a formulation

123 The Mediterranean and the Middle East after the War in the Gulf: The CSCE (Rome: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1991), p. 13. 124 The contents of Francisco Fernández’s letter of 12 September 1990 are summarized in Atlantic News, no. 2254, 19 September 1990. See also article by Francisco Fernández Ordóñez, NATO Review, vol. 38, no. 5 October 1990, pp. 7–11. 125 See Vienna Concluding Document, Annex VII, item 3 for the agenda of the Palma de Mallorca Meeting on the Mediterranean (1990).  Chapter III   103

which in reality permitted a general debate on the question of security in the region. The Italian–Spanish “non-paper” on the CSCM was distributed to the delegations present at Palma de Mallorca on 24 September 1990.126 It asserted that Europe, in view of its history, could not allow itself to ignore the Mediterranean without denying its own cultural roots. It also invoked the argument according to which Europe could not consider itself secure as long as the Mediterranean continued to blame it for growing gaps in economic and demographic terms as well as in terms of values. Finally, it stressed that the invasion of Kuwait proved the need for a crisis prevention mechanism in the region and that, despite the end of the Cold War, the North–South dimension was fundamental for the construction of a new world order. The Italian–Spanish draft was the subject of a number of criticisms. Some delegations considered that it was unrealistic to assign to a CSCM the task of addressing the problems of the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Gulf: the region outlined by the “non-paper” encompassed a zone stretching from Iran in the east to Mauritania and Portugal in the west, and included the countries of the Black Sea, external maritime powers (United States, United Kingdom), and Palestine.127 Serious doubts were also expressed as to the applicability of such a geopolitical ensemble to a process which had been tailor-made for the specific requirements of East–West relations. It was said that while the CSCE should occupy itself with problems of an essentially ideological nature, and had been designed to overcome the artificial division of a culturally homogeneous continent, a CSCM should focus on real disparities of an economic and cultural nature. Moreover, while the CSCE was created in a previously stable and healthy region (recognition of the GDR, Soviet concessions on the status of Berlin, etc.), a CSCM would have to be created on uncertain ground due to the ongoing conflicts in Cyprus, Lebanon, Western Sahara and the Gulf (Iraq/Iran, Iraq/Kuwait), and given the Israeli–Arab conflict. Italy and Spain conceded the relevance of these objections but specified that the role of a CSCM was to determine the rules, rather than find immediate solutions to individual crises. The objective was to begin a process proposing a model of coexistence and stability, during which the instruments likely to promote solutions would be progressively defined. The CSCM would not imitate the CSCE: it would only be inspired by its spirit, procedures and principles. It would be global in composition (bringing together all the countries with interests in the

126 See The Mediterranean and the Middle East … (n. 123), pp. 62–69. See pp. 55–61 for the text of the statements made by Spain and Italy. 127 That was also the geopolitical approach of the Martinez Report: European security and threats outside Europe – The organization of peace and security in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, (Assembly of the Western European Union, Doc. 1271 of 13 May 1991). In addition, Italy later proposed to further extend the composition of a possible CSCM to the member States of the Pentagonal Initiative, see the Borderas Report: North Atlantic Assembly, AJ 236 CC/MB (92) of 4 November 1992, § 35. 104   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

­Mediterranean and its neighbouring regions), comprehensive in its mandate (inclusion of all relevant problems in a single entity) and progressive (taking a step- by-step methodology). The Italian–Spanish “non-paper” set out a CSCM structure divided into three baskets. The “security” basket would aim to promote a climate of peace on the basis of a political code of conduct (derived from the Helsinki Decalogue), military ­confidence measures, conciliation procedures and, at a later stage, an arms non-­ proliferation regime. The “economic basket” would aim to promote more balanced economic development and co-operation (“codevelopment”) as well as the shared management of South–North migration flows. The “human dimension” basket would be devoted to dialogue between cultures and the harmonization of values. The second basket was supposed to be the core of the CSCM: while the pan- European process had been built on an initial compromise between human rights and the inviolability of borders, the CSCM implied a compromise between economic development and the control of migration flows, as well as the phenomenon of fundamentalism. Warmly welcomed by some countries in Palma de Mallorca (Cyprus, Malta, Romania, Yugoslavia, France, Luxembourg, Portugal, Norway, USSR), the CSCM project was rejected by the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States.128 These countries were hostile even in principle to a conference on naval issues (likely to bring into question the presence of the US VP naval fleet in the region and to hinder the operational flexibility of NATO) and to the perspective of discussions involving Libya. Given the lack of consensus, the Report of the Palma Meeting concluded that “in the course of the Meeting a suggestion was made that, when circumstances allowed, a meeting outside the CSCE could take place that, inspired by experience of the CSCE process, could discuss a set of generally accepted rules and principles in the fields of stability, co-operation and the human dimension in the Mediterranean.”129 The failure of the Italian–Spanish CSCE project did not mark the end of the idea of a CSCM. After the Palma Meeting, two closely related processes were launched: an Intergovernmental CSCM limited to the western Mediterranean and an Inter-parliamentary CSCM. While approving the objectives of the Italian–Spanish project, France criticized its excessively wide scope and believed that a subregional approach would be more appropriate. Following the Palma de Mallorca Meeting, the French perspective started to take root. It began with the opening in Rome, on 10 December 1990, of a process limited to the western Mediterranean, the least unstable and least conflictual area of the region. The process brought together only ten countries: the members of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia), the European members of the western

128 See Financial Times, 26 September 1990, and Atlantic News, no. 2257, 28 September 1990. 129 See Report of the CSCE Meeting on the Mediterranean, Palma de Mallorca Meeting (1990), preamble, § 14.  Chapter III   105

Mediterranean (France, Italy, Spain), and Portugal and Malta – the latter as an associate participant.130 With the full accession of Malta (effective in 1991), the process was generally known as the “5+5 Conference”.131 The 5+5 Conference was a loose structure for “dialogue”, “consultation” and “co-operation”, based on regular Ministerial meetings (at least once per year) and the operation of several working groups (international financial resources for development, problems of food scarcity and desertification, debt, migration flows, and cultural heritage). Although the approach was one of global security (integration of various political, economic, cultural, human and ecological security parameters), it concentrated principally on the elements of the second basket of the Italian–Spanish project.132 The inaugural session in Rome was followed by a Ministerial meeting held in Algiers (26 and 27 October 1991). On this occasion, the “5+5” mentioned issues on the Middle East Peace Conference that was about to begin in Madrid, but did not go as far as issuing a joint position on the question.133 They also studied the idea (previously launched in Rome) of creating Mediterranean institutions such as a commercial and industrial database, a financial bank and a programme for science and technology (along the lines of EUREKA). But, above all, the “5+5” decided to hold a Summit of Heads of State or Government of the western Mediterranean countries in Tunis (at the start of 1992) and a meeting of the Ministers of Social Affairs on the problem of immigration. However, the undertaking was to come to an abrupt halt following the sanctions taken by the UN against Libya and the deterioration of the internal situation in Algeria. The failure of the 5+5 Conference was somewhat compensated by the launch of a different process. Upon the request of the Spanish Parliament, the Inter-­ Parliamentary Union (IPU), based in Geneva and bringing together the national parliaments, convened an inter-parliamentary CSCM in Malaga from 15 to 20 June 1992. During the Cold War, between 1973 and 1991, the IPU organized seven “inter-parliamentary European conferences on co-operation and security”, which aimed to provide the intergovernmental Helsinki process with the active support

130 Although not belonging to the western Mediterranean geographically speaking, Portugal was nevertheless included on the basis of a broader definition of the “Mediterranean”. Italy wished, in vain, for Greece and Egypt to also be admitted as observers. 131 The launch of the 5+5 process did not mean the end of the CSCM project. On 17 January 1991, France, Italy and Spain adopted in Lisbon a joint document on the CSCM which was published as a booklet in four languages (Spanish, French, English and Arabic) by the Oficina de Información Diplomática de Madrid. Regarding the common interests of the “three Latin sisters”, see Jean- François Coustillière, “Une politique de l’Europe latine en Méditerranée occidentale”, Défense nationale, no. 531 (May 1992), pp. 103–119. 132 For the agenda of the Rome Conference, see UN: A/C.2/45/14 (10 December 1990). For a commentary on this agenda, see Marc Bonnefous, “Nouvelle approche en Méditerranée occidentale”, Défense nationale, no. 532 (June 1992), pp. 79–85. 133 The member States of the Arab Maghreb Union wanted to issue a Euro-Arab communiqué on the Madrid Conference. But Spain objected, arguing that any premature stance would be counterproductive. 106   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

of parliamentarians from the Europe/North American region.134 In the light of the creation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, the Union considered that its role of providing parliamentary support was no longer required. In contrast, it believed, due to the political blockades surrounding the CSCM project, that such a role could be useful to the Mediterranean. In terms of composition, the Malaga CSCM differed both from the Italian– Spanish project and from the “5+5” project. Only parliamentarians from States bordering the Mediterranean could be granted the status of full participants: hence the non-invitation of Portugal. A restricted status of “associate participant” was granted to three naval powers (Russia, United Kingdom, United States) as well as to Palestine and several international parliamentary assemblies (including the European Parliament). All national parliamentary groups which were invited sent delegations to Malaga, with the exception of Algeria (due to the dissolution of its parliament), Israel (as a mark of protest against the status granted to Palestine), the United States (in solidarity with Israel), and Yugoslavia. The conference adopted a final document by consensus, which was structured into three baskets, addressed to all governments of the Mediterranean.135 Entitled “Regional Stability”, the provisions of the basket on security suggested the drafting of a charter to regulate trans-Mediterranean relations, the creation of a regional centre for stability in the Mediterranean (with the role of crisis management and the peaceful resolution of differences), the adoption of a package of terrestrial confidence-building measures, and a series of provisions aiming to transform the region into a zone which was free of weapons of mass destruction. The second basket drew up the broad outline of an economic programme including food security, debt reduction and joint management, the promotion of trade and industrial co-operation, encouraging foreign investment, the interconnection of transport and communication networks, and planned and integrated tourism management – fairly close to that of the defunct 5+5 Conference. It also set out provisions concerning migratory movements (migrant workers and refugees), protection of the environment, and science and technology, focusing on the key objectives of “codevelopment” and “partnership”. The third basket faithfully followed on from the experience of the CSCE. Affirming that human rights were an issue of international interest and that respect for relevant commitments by all States in the region in this field was a “subject of legitimate concern for these states”, it recommended that they plan the possibility to discuss “information” – on the basis of the model of the initial CSCE Human Dimension Mechanism – and to respond to “requests for information addressed to them by other States in the region” on these issues. It also recommended that the countries concerned should ensure that the existence and identity of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious

134 For more details, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, The Conferences of the Inter-Parliamentary Union on European Co–operation and Security, 1973–1991 (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993), pp. viii–183. 135 See A/C.1/47/8 (27 October 1992).  Chapter III   107

minorities living in their countries was preserved and that women were permitted to fully participate in public life and economic development. Held in an as yet inauspicious political context, the Malaga Conference had two major strengths. Firstly, it was the first pragmatic reflection that had been given to the intergovernmental CSCM project and proposed, in this spirit, a preliminary programme of action. Secondly, it inaugurated a cycle of inter-parliamentary conferences aiming to refine the issue of CSCM and to convince governments of the feasibility of the project.136 In conclusion, the current state of relations between the South and North basins is seriously inadequate given the scale of the issues and risks in the Mediterranean. The best way of neutralizing religious fundamentalism (which is, above all, the manifestation of serious economic and social frustrations) is economic co-operation focusing on opening up Western markets and creating local jobs. The economic development of the Maghreb is the key to democracy in the South basin and to stability across the entire Mediterranean. In contrast to a common preconception, the imperatives of the political stability and economic development of the Maghreb do not boil down to pure altruism. In other words, they do not represent a wasted development, for common sense reasons. Firstly, economic, social and cultural challenges are not, by definition, subject to military- style responses. Secondly, the relations between the two basins of the Mediterranean do not (even in economic terms) come down to a zero-sum game.

2. Relations with Asia (Japan and South Korea) Since the collapse of communism, the OSCE has established close relations with Japan and a certain level of co-operation with South Korea. An institution comprising States located in an area extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok could not, by definition, overlook Japan: some countries in the CSCE wanted to involve the Japanese authorities in the pan-European process, with a view to trilateral economic co-operation (United States/Europe/Japan).137 Inversely, Japan could not remain indifferent. It was particularly interested in any CSBMs or weapons control regime concerning the Asian regions of Russia and the Asian Republics of the former USSR. The question of a partnership between Japan and the CSCE was raised by Italy as early as 1991. During the Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Berlin, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Gianni De Michelis) stressed that post- communist Europe should not be inward-looking. Having recalled that, until this point, only non-European countries in the Mediterranean had occasionally been invited to contribute in a limited manner to the work of the CSCE on the Mediterranean, he considered that it was now appropriate to go further and closely involve Japan in the pan-European process. He specified that:

136 The second Inter-parliamentary CSCM took place in Valletta in November 1995. 137 See Theresa Hitchens and George Leopold, “Japan Edges Closer to CSCE”, Defense News, 10 April 1992, pp. 3 and 37. 108   Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System

Japan is not only an adjacent State to the CSCE; it is a major player in the world political and economic scene, and its impact on the very nature of European stability is evident and destined to grow. We should look for new and special forms of associating Japan to the CSCE – commensurate with its importance – if necessary, going beyond present procedural arrangements.138 The Italian proposal did not attract much enthusiasm. However, given Italy’s insistence, the Council of Ministers ultimately agreed to add to the Summary of Conclusions (which had previously been established by the CSO) a paragraph specifying that the CSCE should remain open to dialogue and co-operation with the rest of the world, that it had noted the interest that the other countries had in the CSCE, and that it mandated the CSO to study this idea and report to a later meeting of the Council.139 At the Council of Ministers in Prague (January 1992), the Italian Minister once again raised the issue. Consequently, the Helsinki Follow- up Meeting was charged with recommending “practical ways to establish a flexible dialogue between the CSCE and interested non-participating States or groups of States, for example through contacts between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials.”140 At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the case of Japan was strongly supported not only by Italy, but also by the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. Various liaison formats were envisaged to this end, from the fairly liberal concept of “associate member” (United States) to the more restricted status of “special observer” (Finland) or “special guest” (European Community).141 None of these proposals prevailed and a consensus was not reached. Ultimately, it was agreed that Japan would be invited to participate “in meetings of the CSCE” – a very broad formulation explicitly including Summits, the Council of Ministers and the CSO. 142 It was also agreed that Japan could present “contributions” (but without taking part in drafting and adopting decisions) on issues of direct interest to it or on subjects where it strove to cooperate with the CSCE.143 The status thus granted to Japan was clearly more advantageous than that ­recognized up to that point for the NPMS – the difference being that the non-­ participating Mediterranean States were invited only on a case-by-case basis to certain CSCE events, while Japan could claim a right to a permanent invitation to all the organization’s activities. The Helsinki Decisions justified this privilege in three arguments: the interest Japan had shown in the CSCE; its compliance with the principles and objectives of the CSCE; and, above all, its active commitment in the context of European co-operation organizations144 – which referred,

138 Contribution by Italy to the Berlin Council of Ministers, § 7 (18 June 1991). 139 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 19. 140 See Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 45. 141 See Heraclides, Helsinki II and its Aftermath… (n. 48), pp. 114–117. 142 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter IV, § 10. 143 Ibid., Chapter IV, § 11. Japan is also specifically mentioned in the Budapest Summit (§ 18, first indent). 144 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter IV, § 9.  Chapter III   109

without naming it, to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).145 In August 1992, the Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials decided that Japan would henceforth participate in the informal ad hoc group responsible for examining the means of pursuing the objectives of the CSCE’s Missions of Long Duration to Serbia.146 At the end of the same year, the Permanent Committee decided to invite Japan to attend its plenary sessions and to present contributions.147 It should also be noted that Japan benefited from observer status at the CSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly. In April 1994, representatives of the Republic of South Korea expressed the country’s interest in following the example of Japan by participating in the work of the CSCE.148 The CSO responded favourably to this approach and invited South Korea to attend the Budapest Review Conference of 1994 as an observer, as well as to take part in the Budapest Summit; at the same time, it decided that South Korea would have access to the CSCE’s official documentation and would henceforth be invited, on an ad hoc basis, to the seminars and specialized meetings in which it had a particular interest.149 In December 1995, the OSCE granted Japan and the Republic of Korea (as for the countries of the Mediterranean) the status of “Partners for Co-operation”.150

145 With this in mind, Australia and New Zealand would theoretically be justified in claiming a status similar to that of Japan. 146 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 26 of 26 August 1993, decision 4(a). 147 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 3 of 21 December 1993, decision 5(b). Japan attends the sessions of the Permanent Council (since January 1993) and the CSBMs Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings, see FSC: Decision No. 8/95 of 13 March 1995. 148 See DOC. 91 (21 April 1994). See also DOC.191 (May 1994) and DOC.528 (20 July 1994). 149 See 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 15 June 1994, Annex 5. In the Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), the Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the CSCE’s readiness to cooperate with the Republic of South Korea in areas of common interest, see § 18, second indent. See also REF.PC.260/96 (18 April 1996). 150 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 94 of 5 December 1995. 110    Chapter IV   111

CHAPTER IV Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC) The East–West era saw the CSCE develop a ground-breaking concept of security, the most notable feature of which was a comprehensive approach that inextricably linked security’s political and military dimensions (reflected in the Helsinki Decalogue and the CSBMs regime respectively) to its economic and human dimensions. Since the end of the Cold War, this concept has been reasserted and, to some extent, developed. While the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) introduced no real innovations, the Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992 made the concept of security deriving from the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 more explicit in three respects. Firstly, the Declaration recalled the principle of the comprehensive and indivisible character of security. This approach to security links the maintenance of peace to respect for human rights and the rule of law, to economic, environmental and scientific co-operation, to peaceful relations between States, and to regional political stability. Similarly, it links the stability of democratic societies to co- operation in fighting terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime.1 Secondly, the Declaration asserted that security required multiple forms of solidarity, thus recalling, among other things, the traditional links between the security of Europe and that of the Mediterranean region.2 In addition, it recognized that subregional co-operation served the purpose of uniting all CSCE participating States and promoting “comprehensive security”.3 It also affirmed the contribution made by cross-­border (“transfrontier”) co-operation (involving local communities and authorities) to “overcoming economic and social inequalities ... and fostering good-neighbourly relations among States and peoples”.4 Thirdly, by declaring that “no State in our CSCE community will strengthen its security at the expense of the security of other States,”5 the Declaration postulated that security could only be achieved by means of co-operation. This is the light in which we are to see the Forum for Security Co-operation, an institution reflecting the transition of the CSCE/OSCE from the Cold War era to the post-communist period. The Forum put an end to the unwritten rule which since the 1970s had tacitly relegated the OSCE to the negotiation of CSBMs and prohibited it from

1 See Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), §§ 8, 21, 23, 26, 27 and 28. 2 Ibid., §§ 37–40. See also Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter X. 3 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), § 34. 4 Ibid., § 35. See also Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter IX, “OSCE and Regional and Cross- Border Co-operation”. This text was drafted on the basis of a proposal submitted by the twelve EC Member States and cosponsored by Austria, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic: CSCE/HM/WG1/14 (14 June 1992). 5 Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 23. 112   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

involvement in conventional disarmament, which was the exclusive preserve of negotiations between members of military alliances (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks, later the CFE negotiations). In other words, the FSC is an instrument that integrates the various components of the OSCE’s politico-military security programme: arms control, disarmament, CSBMs, and standards of conduct. This chapter will examine the establishment of the FSC, assess its work from 1992 to 1996, and consider how it evolved in the wake of the Budapest Review Conference of 1994.

I. The Establishment of the Forum Section I will consider the Forum for Security Co-operation’s genesis, functions, structure, and “variable geometry” zonal approach.

1. The Genesis of the Forum When the Cold War and bipolarity in Europe ended, the unwritten rule according to which the CSCE was excluded from conventional disarmament and its role in security was limited to confidence-building measures lost its relevance. In the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (21 November 1990), the CSCE States recognized that the profound politico-military changes that had occurred in Europe, reflected in the Vienna Document on CSBMs (17 November 1990) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (19 November 1990), opened new possibilities for common efforts in the field of military security.6 After pointing out that the negotiations on CSBMs and on conventional armed forces in Europe, conducted by 34 and 22 participating States respectively, would be continued under their respective mandates and concluded by March 1992 (the opening date of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting), the CSCE States made this proclamation: “Following a period for national preparations, we look forward to a more structured co-operation among all participating States on security matters, and to discussions and consultations among the thirty-four participating States aimed at establishing by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all participating States.”7 Despite the rather cautious and vague wording (imposed by the United States, which was leading a rearguard action), this statement of intent made it clear that the days of the 34/22 dichotomy were numbered. Seven months later, at the first meeting of the Council of Ministers (Berlin, 19 and 20 June 1991), the CSCE participating States decided to hold informal preparatory consultations in Vienna, beginning in September of the same year,

6 For a more in-­depth analysis of these instruments, see the following articles by Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Le Document de Vienne sur les et de sécurité”, Défense nationale, no. 251, June 1991, pp. 113–123, and “Le Traité sur les Forces armées conventionnelles en Europe”, Revue générale de droit international public, October–December 1991, pp. 833–856, as well as “Les avatars du Traité sur les Forces armées conventionnelles en Europe”, Arès, vol. XIII, no. 1, pp. 18–25. 7 See Charter of Paris (1990), “Security”, § 1 and section on “Guidelines for the future”.  Chapter IV   113

with a view to establishing new negotiations on disarmament and CSBMs in 1992, at the close of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.8 The Austrian capital was the natural choice of venue: Vienna was already hosting both the CFE-1A and the CSBMs negotiations, not to mention the fact that the representatives of the States parties to the said negotiations were in principle the same as those attending the meetings of the Advisory Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre. Opened on 17 September 1991, the consultative process was at an advanced stage when it was brought to an end on 19 March of the following year, and a more or less complete draft mandate (although still containing bracketed provisions) was sent to Working Group 2 (Security) of the Helsinki Summit, the outcomes of which were to include Chapter V – entitled “CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation” – of the 1992 Helsinki Decisions.

2. The Functions of the Forum The FSC was not designed as a mere negotiating body, but as a more innovative and versatile structure. The text adopted in Helsinki gives it three specific functions: negotiation, Co-operative dialogue, and reducing the risk of conflicts. a) Negotiation The function of negotiation was the one that had been envisaged by the Charter of Paris. It implied opening “a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building” (§ 8 of Chapter V), in other words, the broadening and deepening of the dynamic created by the two CFE agreements, the Vienna Document 1992, and the Open Skies Treaty.9 The “Programme for Immediate Action” adopted on the basis of a British proposal was contained in Chapter V of the Helsinki Decisions and identified “six main measures to be negotiated”, as follows: – The harmonization of the regime of international instruments applicable to conventional armed forces in Europe, in particular obligations “concerning the exchange of information, verification and force levels” (§ 46. A.l.); – The improvement and further development of the CSBMs of the Vienna Document 1992 (§ 46.A.2); – The negotiation of new CSBMs, including “stabilizing measures” (which might be “of a constraining kind”), designed “to address force generation capabilities of active and non-active forces” (§ 46.A.3);

8 See Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 15. This provision was based on a proposal put forward by the Neutral and Non-Aligned countries: CSCE/3-CSO (17 June 1991). During the Prague Council of Ministers (30–31 January 1992), CSCE participating States resolved that the informal preparatory consultations had to be accelerated and their conclusions transmitted to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting by its opening on 24 March 1992, see Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 12. 9 Set aside the Treaty on Open Skies (concluded between the NATO member States and the former members of the Warsaw Pact), there also exists a “CSCE Declaration on the Treaty on Open Skies”, adopted on 24 March 1992. See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992): Journal No. 1 of 24 March 1992. 114   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

– The development of a new regime for the Global Exchange of Military Information encompassing armaments, equipment and personnel in conventional armed forces, as well as the production of military equipment, separate from other information exchange regimes and not involving limitations, constraints or verification (§ 46.A.4); – The establishment of co-operation “in respect of the strengthening of multilateral non-proliferation regimes” and the establishment of a “responsible” approach to armaments transfers” (§ 46.A.5); and – The negotiation of regional reduction or limitation measures (§ 46.A.6). Chapter V also urged the CSCE participating States to negotiate “effective, concrete and militarily significant” measures (§ 24), “provided, if appropriate, with suitable forms of verification” (§ 42). In practical terms, Chapter V aimed at reducing or keeping the level of armed forces “to a minimum commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and beyond,” that is to say, at the global level, and also, where necessary, at the regional level (§ 11). b) Co-operative dialogue Co-operative dialogue involves “consultation, goal-oriented continuing dialogue and co-operation in the field of security” (§ 15). After long controversy over the question of whether Co-operative dialogue should have objectives at all, the term “goal-oriented continuing dialogue” was finally adopted in order to emphasize that discussions could turn into negotiations and lead to concrete agreements. The very word “Forum” aptly conveys the spirit of this function, to which the Programme for Immediate Action also assigned six fields of application: – Transparency in force planning (§ 46.B.7); – Defence conversion (§ 46.B.8); – Co-operation in respect of non-proliferation (§ 46.B.9);10 – Development of military contacts, liaison arrangements, co-operation and exchanges between the armed forces (§ 46.B.10); – Consideration of regional security issues (§ 46.B.11); and – Consultations aimed at enhancing security co-operation, through such means as “the further encouragement of responsible and Co-operative norms of behaviour on politico-military aspects of security” and the establishment of a code of conduct governing the participating States’ mutual relations in the field of security (§ 46.B.12). c) Conflict prevention The provisions of the FSC’s mandate on conflict prevention are particularly vague. The Helsinki mandate affirms the participating States’ intention to “further the process of reducing the risk of conflict” (§ 8), but without going beyond the cryptic

10 The subject of non-proliferation is even mentioned two times in the Forum’s Programme for Immediate Action of the FSC. The Helsinki Summit Declaration also refers to it twice in §§ 17 and 33.  Chapter IV   115

statement (in paragraph 21) that they “will make every effort to prevent conflict and give full effect to relevant provisions.” Even the very principle of this last of the Forum’s functions had not gained unanimous agreement, either during the informal preparatory consultations or in Helsinki. Some States argued that a Forum with two “pillars” (negotiation and dialogue) was quite sufficient.11 In fact, the real problem lay elsewhere: the implementation of the third “pillar” required – or normally required – an extension of the powers of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). However, some countries (mainly the United States) were hostile to the development of a structure liable to compete with NATO. Chapter V of the Helsinki Summit Document 1992 sets out the participating States’ decision to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation “with a strengthened Conflict Prevention Centre” (§ 9). However, a simple analysis of the provisions referring to the CPC reveals that this was just a gratuitous statement: paragraph 22 of the mandate merely affirms that the participating States “will [i.e., at some unknown point in the future] further enhance the [in fact non- existent] capability of the CPC to reduce the risks of such conflicts through relevant conflict prevention techniques.” On the subject of such techniques, the Programme for Immediate Action itself only makes an obscure reference (§ 46.13): “Without prejudice to other tasks of the CPC or to the competence of the Committee of Senior Officials in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, the Consultative Committee [of the CPC] will, particularly in the light of experience gained in the execution of its own tasks, maintain under consideration the need for improvements in relevant techniques.” To sum up, the idea of giving the FSC a third function was only ever retained for the sake of form, as is confirmed by the unusual fact that the heading “Conflict prevention” in the Programme for Immediate Action is not – unlike the other two (A. Arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building; B. Security enhancement and co-operation) – designated with a letter.

3. The Structure of the Forum Initially, the Forum was created as a hybrid body, unequally composed of a “Special Committee” and a “Consultative Committee” (for the existing and future tasks of the CPC), the former being provided with a clear mandate and the latter with an insubstantial one.12 The Special Committee meets either “for negotiations on arms control, dis­ armament and confidence- and security-building” or “for consideration of,

11 A “non-paper” dated 27 November 1991 and circulated at the Vienna negotiations on CSBMs by various NATO member States (Belgium, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) represents this particular trend quite well. 12 The Forum for Security Co-operation is thus quite different from the Economic Forum, which is merely a specialized body of the Senior Council (formerly the Committee of Senior Officials); see Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter VII, § 22. For more details see further in this volume, Chapter VI, part II ‘The Economic Forum’. 116   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

goal-­oriented dialogue on and, as appropriate, elaboration or negotiation of proposals for security enhancement and co-operation” (§ 30). The functions of negotiation and dialogue are thus performed by a Special Committee that sits separately in the form of a common plenary assisted by working bodies open to all participating States (§ 34) – except in the case of purely regional matters, which may require the establishment of small working bodies (§ 37). The conflict prevention function fell to the Consultative Committee as the body responsible for “existing and future tasks of the CPC” (§ 31). However, the CPC had neither specific functions for the prevention of conflicts nor responsibility for Co-operative dialogue. The only competence assigned – though somewhat dubiously – to the CPC related to co-operation in the field of verification.13 In order to ensure coherence, it was foreseen that the representation of the CSCE participating States on the Special Committee and the Consultative Committee would “in principle be assured by the same delegation and that appropriate meetings [would] be held as necessary for organizational purposes” (§ 32). In addition, both Committees would use the same premises in Vienna (§ 44) and enjoy access to “common conference services” provided by an Executive Secretary to be nominated, in the old CSCE tradition, by the host country (§ 43). In other words, Austria, and not the CPC, as should have logically been the case, was to provide the Forum’s secretariat. Following the integration of the Conflict Prevention Centre into the OSCE General Secretariat in Vienna (decided upon by the Council of Ministers in Rome in December 1993), the Forum inherited many of the functions relating to CSBMs formerly carried out by the CPC’s Consultative Committee: holding annual meetings to assess the implementation of CSBMs; discussing and clarifying information exchanged under CSBMs; assuming responsibility for the implementation of CSBMs; and preparing seminars on security issues of the same type as the seminars on military doctrine.14

4. The Forum’s Zonal Approach According to Chapter V of the Helsinki Decisions of 1992, each measure to be negotiated in the Forum “will have an area of application according to its nature” (§ 28), which implied the existence of not just one but of several zones of application. An analysis of the Programme for Immediate Action allows us to identify four zones, in decreasing order of scale. As the first zone relates to “the conventional armed forces and facilities of the participating States both on the territory of all the participating States and beyond” (second sentence of § 46.A), it can be referred to as the global zone. The

13 This was indeed done in a dubious manner, considering the provisions mentioned in § 46.14 and in the section on “Conflict Prevention”, in which the CPC is not mentioned at all; the same applies for § 23, which in substance is quite similar to § 46.14. 14 The responsibility to convene meetings which are to be organized under the Vienna Mechanism on Unusual Military Activities was passed on to the Permanent Committee, see Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter VII, § 7.3.  Chapter IV   117

Programme for Immediate Action contains measures relating to two specific elements whose implications are global by definition: the Global Exchange of Military Information and co-operation in respect of non-proliferation (§§ 46.A.4 and 46.A.5). The second zone relates to “all participating States” without exception (§ 46.B), that is, to the entire territories of the CSCE/OSCE participating States from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It is applicable to the measures negotiated with regard to force planning, defence conversion, military contacts, and the code of conduct (§§ 46.B.7, 8, 10 and 12). The third zone consists of “the territory of the participating States in Europe or in Asia” (first sentence of § 46.A) or, in other words, the territories of all participating States with the exception of North America (United States and Canada).15 This zone roughly corresponds to the zone of application for CSBMs – with some variations depending on whether one is considering the problems of the harmonization of international instruments, or the improvement of CSBMs contained in the Vienna Document, or the implementation of further stabilizing and confidence-building measures. In the first case, the mandate indicates that the harmonization of international regimes “will apply to the areas of application in respect of which the obligations have been undertaken” (second sentence of § 46.A.1), that is to say, to the zones of application set out in the Vienna Document 1992 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). In the second case, namely, the necessary development of the Vienna Document, the zone of application is obviously the one set out therein (§ 46.A.2). With regard to the third case (the most important of all since it relates to stabilizing and confidence-building measures), the situation is more complex. In this respect the mandate gives a dual indication. On the one hand, it lays down the principle that the measures will apply within the zone of application set out in the Vienna Document (third sentence of § 46.A.3). On the other hand, the mandate considers a possible extension of the zone, stating that participating States with conventional armed forces stationed in parts of their extra-European territory adjacent to the zone of application of the CSBMs may, on a voluntary basis, offer “assurances” in respect of such forces, if they consider them relevant to the security of other participating States (last sentence of § 46.A.3). This provision must be interpreted in the light of the fact that the issue of the exact scope of the zone of application for the CSBMs regime caused specific difficulties following the disintegration of the USSR and the accession to the CSCE of all the former Soviet republics. Under the provisions on countries with territory extending beyond Europe adopted in the 1983 Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting

15 Note that the French text of this mandate refers to the participating States “situés en Europe et en Asie”, whereas the English version mentions “the territory” of participating States in Europe or in Asia. 118   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

(which were reaffirmed by the Vienna Document 1992 and 1994), the accession of Kazakhstan implied a theoretical extension of the Russian zone of application to a strip 250 kilometres long along the Russian-Kazakh border, i.e., beyond the Urals. However, Russia indicated that it would comply with such an obligation only if the territories of the United States and Canada were also subject to the CSBMs regime. This, however, was rejected by the Americans, much to the displeasure of France, which wanted a part of Siberia adjacent to the Urals to be included in the regime.16 The five Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union also fall under provisions relating to countries with territory outside Europe, but with an additional complication: like Turkey, they share borders with non-participating States (Iran, Afghanistan, China) and are therefore exempt from any obligation to notify relevant changes. Upon their accession to the CSCE (in January 1992), the five republics committed themselves to applying the CSBMs regime and thus to negotiating, in Vienna, “specific provisions” on the delimitation of the zone concerning them. On account of the Central Asian republics’ lack of representation in the Vienna negotiations (which ended in March 1992), this delimitation never actually took place. At the end of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992, three countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, France) delivered interpretative statements on the mandate of the Forum. The two Asian republics simply recalled that the issue of the determination of the zone of application of CSBMs in their respective territories remained an entirely open question.17 France, on the other hand, announced that it made its acceptance of possible stabilizing and confidence- building measures subject to the granting, by the participating States with conventional forces stationed outside the CFE Treaty zone, of assurances to provide genuine guarantees of non-circumvention.18 Ultimately, it can be argued that the present difficulties essentially stem from the fact that the zone defined by the Vienna Document was never – any more than that of the Helsinki Final Act or the Madrid Document – actually delineated on a map.19 Finally, in line with the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Forum’s mandate foresees regional measures to address the twofold concern of resolving certain local disparities and avoiding circumvention of global obligations.20 It specifies that such reduction and limitation measures may, as appropriate, be applied in relation to certain regions or border zones – it being understood that the zone of application will encompass the territory or part

16 See Basic Reports, no. 21 (10 April 1992), p. 2. 17 See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992): Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, pp. 2–3. 18 Ibid., p. 7. 19 For more details, see the analysis by Jean-Claude Joseph, “Les zones d’application des mesures militaires adoptées par la CSCE”, Défense nationale, no. 542 (May 1993), pp. 139–149 and no. 543 (June 1993), pp. 107–117. 20 In § 25 of the mandate it is mentioned that “all measures negotiated in the Forum will be developed in a way which precludes circumvention.”  Chapter IV   119

of the territory of participating States involved in a regional measure (§ 11 and § 46.A.6). Particularly relevant here are the stabilization measures in respect of military forces and the new CSBMs designed to ensure greater military transparency (§ 14). Consideration and negotiation of regional measures form an integral part of the activity of the FSC (§ 35), in open-ended working groups (§ 36) or even in working groups formed of a limited number of participating States, should the Special Committee so decide (§ 37). The benefit of these provisions is both that they preserve the Forum’s integrity and also take account of the security interests of all OSCE participating States.

II. The FSC Balance Sheet for 1992–1994 The Forum for Security Co-operation was opened on 22 September 1992 and promptly granted Japan observer status – but refused to do the same for the non- European States of the Mediterranean region.21 The Forum established two working bodies to deal with issues relating to negotiation and to Co-operative dialogue respectively.22 From the outset, it focused on two specific elements drawn from its Programme for Immediate Action: the Code of Conduct and the harmonization of instruments concerning CSBMs/conventional disarmament. Without waiting for concrete results on these two themes, whose negotiation proved more challenging than expected, the Forum moved forward in other areas. In November 1993, it was able to adopt four texts: on military contacts and co-operation, on stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations, on conventional arms transfers and, finally, on defence planning. Subsequently, in November/December 1994, in parallel with the Budapest Review Conference, the Forum adopted texts relating to the Global Exchange of Military Information, non-proliferation, the Code of Conduct, and an updated version (the second of its kind) of the Vienna Document on CSBMs.

1. The Texts of 1993 The texts are four in number.

A. The Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation On the basis of a proposal made by the NATO countries and a Russian working document,23 the Forum had no difficulty – given the theme’s non-controversial nature – in developing its “Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation”.24 The section on military contacts only proposed a range of standard measures applicable “on a voluntary basis and as appropriate” related to matters such as contacts between military institutions or sporting and cultural events between

21 See FSC: Journal No. 5 of 21 October 1992. 22 Nevertheless, there were practically No differences between texts relating to negotiation and those relating to Co-operative dialogue. 23 See CSCE/FSC/SC.9 (27 January 1993) and CSCE/FSC/SC/B.1 (2 May 1993). 24 See FSC: Journal No. 49 of 24 November 1993, Annex 1. 120   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

members of the armed forces of OSCE States. It did not introduce anything new in relation to paragraph 34 of the Vienna Document 1992 – with the exception of a provision (from Russia) concerning the possibility of “exchanges of visits of naval vessels and air force units”,25 a confidence-building measure in the field of “independent naval capabilities”. The section on military co-operation, on the other hand, did introduce a number of new elements. It established a politically binding regime of visits to military facilities and to military formations, the terms of which were virtually the same as those governing visits to air bases under paragraphs 20 to 33 of the Vienna Document 1992. It also envisaged purely voluntary measures such as joint military exercises (a Russian idea); the invitation of observers to military activities carried out below the threshold observable in accordance with the Vienna Document 1992; and the provision of national experts (on matters of defence and security) to any interested State (i.e., those in the process of restructuring their armed forces along democratic lines).26 The Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation was incorporated into the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994, in which it forms paragraphs 30 to 30.16.

B. The Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations The second text adopted by the Forum is without doubt the most significant from a purely political pespective. Directly inspired by a proposal made by NATO countries,27 it offers a rich range of CSBMs: “measures of transparency” (extraordinary exchange of military information, including on irregular forces); notification of certain military activities normally not required by the Vienna Document 1992; notification of plans for acquisition and deployment of major weapons and equipment systems); “measures of constraint” (disengagement of operating forces, establishment of demilitarized zones, cessation of military flights over specified areas, deactivation of certain weapon systems); “measures of contact” (establishment of direct lines of communication between the capitals and/or operational headquarters, etc.); and, finally, “measures of verification” (inspections, aerial observation, etc.) involving the intervention of third parties.28 These are “stabilizing measures”, a type of CSBM specifically designed for temporary application, in times of crisis, in intra-state and interstate regional situations. The interest of this catalogue of measures lies in the way in which it confirms the integration of CSBMs into crisis management, a process which had already begun under the heading “Risk Reduction” of the Vienna Document 1990. Indeed, the stabilizing measures expressly aim to “supplement and enhance the

25 See “Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation”, section I, second indent. 26 Ibid., section II. 27 See CSCE/FSC/SC.15 (21 April 1993). 28 For the full text on “Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations”, see FSC: Journal No. 49 of 24 November 1993, Annex 2.  Chapter IV   121

capabilities outlined in Chapter III of the Helsinki Summit Document 1992”,29 i.e., the provisions related to early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. The measures are intended to facilitate decision-making in the relevant CSCE bodies for temporary application and in support of the political process of crisis resolution, in particular in co-ordination with peacekeeping operations: “Their effective implementation presupposes either that an armed conflict has not yet broken out or that a cease-fire has been established.”30 The catalogue of stabilizing measures defined a new generation of CSBMs characterized by its scope of application (limited to “localized” regional situations), its recipients (including sub-State actors and third parties) and its purpose. Its major flaw is that it does not propose politically binding measures, but only voluntary agreements. Indeed, the adopted text makes this clear: “The catalogue does not commit any participating State to agree to the adoption of any of the measures contained therein in a given situation”; furthermore, their application was to require, in accordance with the rule of consensus, “the prior consent and active support of the parties involved in a particular crisis situation”.31 Such provisions are fundamentally unsatisfactory. Firstly, they allow the States involved to be both judges and litigants. Secondly, they give any third State the possibility of blocking the application process. Moreover, it should be noted that some States (Austria, Hungary, Poland) only consented to the catalogue while at the same time affirming that the “consensus minus one” rule (applicable in the human dimension) would in future also apply in conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes.32 Interspersed with compromise formulas of extreme ambiguity (in particular as regards the zone of application of the stabilizing measures),33 the catalogue adopted by the Forum is characterized by an often esoteric wording that one would have thought had disappeared from OSCE usage at the demise of communism. This is explained by the fact that the negotiation of the text was a difficult and tense exercise between Russia – which was hostile to any provision likely to hamper Russian military interventions (abusively referred to as “peacekeeping operations”) in the so-called “near-abroad” – and all the other delegations of the Forum. Although the catalogue of stabilizing measures lacks real concrete significance, it has a certain intrinsic interest in that it gives parties to regional crises wishing to avoid escalation a range of ready-to-use measures. Its value must be assessed in relation not so much to the overall framework of the CSBMs as to the instruments of crisis management which the OSCE has been attempting to develop since the collapse of communism.

29 See FSC, “Stabilizing Measures …” (n. 28), first indent. 30 Ibid., § I.7. 31 See FSC, “Stabilizing Measures …” (n. 28), §§ 1.3 and 1.6. 32 See FSC: Journal No. 49 of 24 November 1993, pp. 2–3. 33 See FSC, “Stabilizing Measures …” (n. 28), §§ 1.8 and 1.11. 122   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

C. Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers Originally linked to the issue of non-proliferation, the topic of conventional arms transfers was introduced to the CSCE by Canada in 1991. It subsequently resulted in an independent text,34 negotiated on the basis of proposals put forward by the NATO member States and co-sponsored by a dozen other countries.35 The instrument adopted by the FSC serves the twofold purpose of transparency and restraint. It reaffirms the commitment of the OSCE States to contribute to the effective implementation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms established in 1991, and stresses the need for “effective national mechanisms for controlling the transfer of conventional arms and related technology and for transfers to take place within those mechanisms.”36 Its key provision, however, only requires States to “promote ... due restraint” in the transfer of conventional arms and related technology and, where appropriate, exercise such restraint by means of an “effective national control mechanism”.37 Directly inspired by the common criteria for arms exports agreed between the twelve member States of the EU in 1991 and 1992,38 the Principles adopted by the Forum are relatively flexible recommendations for action and abstention. Some of the recommendations advocate that the participating States will “in considering proposed transfers, take into account” – in addition to the overall regional context – respect for human rights in the recipient country, its record of compliance with regard to international commitments, its legitimate domestic and international security needs (a concern of Turkey), and its “objective of the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources”.39 As for the others, they recommend that participating States “avoid” transfers likely to have negative repercussions on, among other things, the exercise of human rights, the security of other States and of territories whose external relations are the internationally acknowledged responsibility of another State (including EU countries), the application of United Nations or CSCE sanctions, regional stability or the fight against terrorism, or likely to “prolong or aggravate an existing armed conflict”.40 The text adopted by the Forum only commits governments to “reflect” these recommendations in their relevant “policy documents” and – only secondarily – to “consider” assisting other participating States in establishing national

34 See FSC: Journal No. 49 of 24 November 1993, Annex 3. 35 See CSCE/FSC/SC.16 (28 April 1993). See also CSCE/FSC/SC.6 (18 November 1992), section II. 36 See “Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers”, §§ 3(f ) and 3(e). 37 See “Principles …” (n. 36), first sentence. 38 These criteria can be found in Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 6 (1991), pp. 19–20 and Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 6 (1992), p. 18. 39 See “Principles …” (n. 36), § 4(a). 40 See “Principles …” (n. 36), § 4(b). Upon the request of the European Union the text advised against transfers inclined to pose a threat to the security “of territories whose external relations are the internationally acknowledged responsibility of another State.” See FSC: Journal No. 49 of 24 November 1993, p. 2.  Chapter IV   123

mechanisms for controlling the transfer of conventional arms.41 The only commitment expressed in terms of the slightest clarity is one regarding the exchange of information, within the FSC, about national legislation and practices in the field of transfers of conventional arms.42 Owing to the importance of the issue for France, the French representatives made an interpretative statement on the text, proposing to restrict the definition of the phrase “transfer of conventional arms and related technology” to war material (excluding strategic items such as those prohibited by the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls, CoCom); to assess the problem of misappropriation of the human and economic resources of the importing country conditional on a well-measurable factor (the level of overall military expenditures), not a subjective one; to legitimize the provision on “consent to re-export on the part of the first exporter”; and finally, to exclude any reference to specific cases from the exchange of information.43 In short, it is clear that the text leaves considerable freedom of interpretation to arms-exporting countries, which was why Sweden (which in the course of the negotiations frequently challenged the arguments put forward by the major exporters, namely, France, the United Kingdom and Germany) made an interpretative statement regretting the weakness of the provisions on human rights.44

D. Defence Planning The fourth text, entitled “Defence Planning”, represents a significant development of the section on “Information on military budgets” (§ 16) of the Vienna Document 1992, which established an annual and detailed exchange of information on military budgets for the forthcoming fiscal year, based on the Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures adopted by the United Nations in 1980. In addition, it urged the participating States, upon explicit bilateral request, to provide “clarification” on the budgetary information exchanged – it being understood, moreover, that the questions and answers could be transmitted to all CSCE States. In relation to these provisions, the FSC text introduces two innovations.45 Firstly, it greatly expands the nature of the information subject to annual exchange. This information now includes defence policy (military strategy and doctrine, and procedures for defence planning) as well as the size, structure, training and equipment of the armed forces – including (although on a voluntary basis) paramilitary forces, much to the displeasure of Russia.46 Participating States are also required to provide information on their defence expenditure for the

41 See “Principles …” (n. 36), §§ 5 (a) and 5(b). 42 See “Principles …” (n. 36), § 5(c). 43 See FSC: Journal No. 49, pp. 4–5 and Annex 6. 44 Ibid., p. 4. In 1995, the Forum arranged a workshop on the principles, see FSC: Decision No. 10 of 26 April 1995 and Decision No. 14 of 19 July 1995. 45 See FSC: Journal No. 49 of 24 November 1993, Annex 4. 46 In this regard, see section on “Defence Planning”, § 3.1. 124   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

preceding fiscal year, the forthcoming fiscal year, the two fiscal years following the forthcoming fiscal year, and the last two years of the forthcoming five fiscal years.47 Secondly, it complements the bilateral clarification mechanism with two multilateral measures: an annual meeting to discuss issues relating to defence planning (as part of the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting on CSBMs), and study visits – on a voluntary basis – arranged by CSCE participating States to facilitate meetings between officials involved in defence planning.48 These new provisions, which were aimed at increasing the transparency of the participating States’ medium- and long-term intentions, were drawn up on the basis of a proposal by the NATO countries.49 Initially, this proposal presented difficulties that were technical rather than political in nature. Some States, starting with Hungary, argued that the methodology advocated by NATO (five-year planning period) did not take into account the fact that the defence systems of the new democracies were being reorganized. The solution adopted was to make the fourth and fifth years of the planning period subject to less stringent requirements. Other countries (notably Sweden) stressed that the United Nations model instrument had been designed to promote a better understanding of arms expenditures worldwide and that its usefulness as a tool of analysis for understanding CSCE States’ comprehensive security policy was limited. A demonstration seminar (held between 31 March and 2 April 1993 within the Forum) including a fictitious exchange of information contributed significantly to removing the obstacles encountered in preparing the final text. At the express request of Russia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was among the participants.50 The text on defence planning was incorporated into the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994, in which it forms paragraphs 15 to 15.9. Finally, the texts adopted by the Forum in November 1993 call for two sets of remarks. Firstly, the heterogeneous nature of the texts should be emphasized. While two (Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation, Defence Planning) were relevant to the “classic” issue of the CSBMs, the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfer was clearly a normative text, and the fourth (Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations) was a contribution by the Forum to conflict prevention and crisis management techniques developed within the OSCE since the end of the Cold War. Secondly, the practical scope of the texts in question is somewhat limited. For example, the Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation was soon to be

47 Ibid., §§ 4 and 5. 48 Ibid., §§ 7 and 8. 49 See the joint proposal, CSCE/FSC/SC.3 (21 October 1992), and the Dutch working paper, CSCE/FSC/SCB.3 (17 June 1993). 50 See FSC: Journals No. 13 of 16 December 1992; No. 18 of 17 February 1993; No. 22 of 17 March 1993; and No. 23 of 2 March 1993.  Chapter IV   125

superseded by a more elaborate and politically more interesting programme that had been set up within NATO in January 1993: the “Partnership for Peace”. The Catalogue of Stabilizing Measures was doubtless original and innovative, but its paradigmatic value hardly compensated for its purely optional nature. The Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers ultimately boiled down to an expression of pious hopes that gave carte blanche to the arms-exporting countries. The text Defence Planning represented a qualitative leap forward in terms of transparency, in a field, moreover, which had never before been the subject of international co-operation – not to mention that it also made a contribution to the goal of democratic control of military forces; however, its immediate effects were hardly significant because the new participating States’ military arrangements were still in the process of being reorganized. Above all, the four texts adopted in 1993 were to show that the Forum had not remained inactive between the Summits of Helsinki (1992) and Budapest (1994).

2. The Texts of 1994 Once again, the texts are four in number, the two most significant being the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on CSBMs.

A. Global Exchange of Military Information The text on the Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI) was drawn up on the basis of a proposal from the sixteen NATO countries and, secondarily, a Russian proposal.51 As a direct result, a new system for the exchange of military information was added to the existing regimes in this field (CFE Treaty, CFE-1A agreement, Vienna Document 1994). However, the specific feature of the text resides in the fact that it is more global than the others in two respects – the extent of the information required and its geographical zone of application. Firstly, then, the new regime is distinctive on account of the nature and extent of the information it requires. It relates to the holdings of major weapon and equipment systems that are in service with conventional armed forces,52 including equipment that entered into service through national production or through imports in the previous calendar year.53 It also relates to personnel in their conventional armed forces (active duty, reserve, conscripts, troops to UN and CSCE missions)54 as well as the command structure.55 In more concrete terms, the

51 See CSCE/FSC/SC.11 (10 March 1993), CSCE/FSC/SC.10 (17 February 1993) and CSCE/FSC/SC.10 Corr.1 (18 May 1993). 52 Which excludes systems that are still subject to only trials and assessments; see “General Exchange of Military Information” (GEMI), § 3, second sentence. 53 See GEMI, §§ 6.1 and 6.2. 54 Ibid., §§ 2.3.1–2.3.5. 55 Ibid., §§ 2.1–2.2.3. It is noteworthy that the inclusion of a provision concerning armed forces assuming the functions of national security in times of peace, even if on a purely voluntary basis, was ruled out. See a “non-paper” without a registered origin, dated 11 November 1994. 126   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

scope of the information required goes beyond that of the CFE Treaty. Most notable is the inclusion of naval armaments. The GEMI regime may not have gone as far as Russia would have wished;56 nevertheless, it required information on surface warships greater than 400 tons fully loaded displacement (the NATO countries had advocated a lower threshold of 100 tons) and on submarines greater than 50 tons submerged.57 Secondly, the new regime is distinctive for its zone of application, which covers the participating States’ armaments and conventional armed forces personnel both on their “territory” and “worldwide”.58 In other words, the GEMI regime is applicable throughout the OSCE area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok (i.e., including North America and Siberia, for the first time in the history of the CSBMs regime) and anywhere in the world – including conventional forces stationed in any non- OSCE country. On account of these two distinctive characteristics, the GEMI regime has not been subjected to “limitations”, “constraints” or even a rudimentary “verification”.59 It was, however, agreed that each participating State may ask for “clarifications” from any other participating State concerning the application of this regime – which, would, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.60 It should be noted that while this provision allows requests for clarifications, it does not expressly oblige the State thus approached to act on them. Two other characteristics of the regime (periodicity and procedure) remain to be mentioned. The exchange of information must take place annually: it must take place no later than 30 April and reflect the situation as of 1 January of the current year.61 In addition, information must be provided in an “agreed format”,62 i.e., standardized, and use the OSCE Communications Network.63 Endowed with politically binding status (like the CSBMs of the Vienna Document 1994), the GEMI regime entered into force on 1 January 1995. At this preliminary stage, the regime may be regarded as having three advantages. Firstly, it has expanded (operationally and geographically) the very concept of the exchange of military information. Secondly, it increases the transparency of conventional military power in the OSCE area. Finally, it

56 See CSCE/FSC/SC.10, §§ I and IV.2. 57 See GEMI, §§ 3.8 and 3.9. 58 See GEMI, § 1, first sentence. 59 See GEMI, § 1, second sentence. This provision reiterated only the text included in the “Programme for Immediate Action”, §46.A.4, last sentence. 60 See GEMI, § 7.1. 61 See GEMI, § 1, third sentence. 62 See GEMI, § 8.1. See also FSC: Decision No. 7/95 of 8 March 1995. 63 See GEMI, § 8.2. See Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Decision No. 1, § 6. In the course of the adoption of the final text, Turkey emphasized that it wished to see the GEMI regime equally applied to “other forces of any importance from the military point of view” that do not correspond to the definition “conventional armed forces”, see FSC: Journal No. 94, p. 2. For various stages of text editing, see also DOC.117, DOC.131, DOC.234, DOC.515 and DOC.662/1994.  Chapter IV   127

contributes to a better understanding of the participating States’ actual military capabilities beyond the OSCE area. At the same time, however, the GEMI regime raises two questions, namely: Does the agreed level of disaggregation allow a real qualitative leap in the direction of the goal of transparency? And does this regime not make the necessary (but already more than challenging) task of harmonization more difficult?

B. Principles Governing Non-Proliferation Initially linked to conventional arms transfers (introduced by Canada at the OSCE in 1991), the topic of non-proliferation was included “as a matter of priority in the work programme for the post Helsinki arms control process” by the Prague Council of Ministers on 30 January 1992.64 The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting took appropriate action by including non-proliferation in the Forum’s Programme for Immediate Action (PIA).65 Within the FSC, the topic was the subject of two successive proposals for work submitted by a group numbering almost half of the participating States and including all the NATO countries but not Russia or Ukraine.66 In November 1993, the negotiating process was nearly completed when a finalized text was sent to the Council of Ministers, which was then meeting in Rome. No decision was taken because of the conduct of Ukraine, which made its acceptance conditional on prior security guarantees and material compensation (in the form of economic assistance)67 – which, incidentally, had the effect of hardening Russia’s stance. Negotiations resumed within the Forum and then again at the Budapest Review Conference.68The final text of the Principles Governing Non-Proliferation was incorporated into the Budapest Document 1994, in which it forms Chapter VI in the Decisions. The text is based on the premise that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and of missiles to deliver them, poses “a threat to international peace, security and stability”69 – i.e., a threat that extends beyond the boundaries of the OSCE area. Its unique and

64 See Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Decision No. 1, “Declaration of the CSCE Council on Non- Proliferation and Arms Transfers”, § 6. See also Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 17 and Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 5. 65 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter V, “Programme for Immediate Action”; the subject of co- operation in the field of non-proliferation appears in the Annex. In § 5 it is referred to as a topic of negotiation and in § 9 as a topic of Co-operative dialogue. See also Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), §§ 17 and 33, as well as FSC: Journal No. 12 of 9 December 1992. 66 See CSCE/FSC/SC.6 (18 November 1992) and CSCE/FSC/SC.6 Add.1 and 2, as well as CSCE/FSC/ SC.24 (17 November 1993) and CSCE/FSC/SC.24 Add.1. 67 See statement delivered by Anatoly Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, at the Rome Council of Ministers (30 November 1993). 68 See CSCE/BC.12 (23 November 1994). The final text was adopted on 5 December 1994, see FSC: Journal No. 94, p. 3. 69 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VI, “Principles Governing Non-­Proliferation”, part I, preamble. 128   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

fundamental objective is to strengthen the international norms created through the multilateral regimes already established. With regard to nuclear weapons, the text stresses the importance of universal adherence to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and of the NPT’s indefinite and unconditional extension.70 It recommends enhancing the IAEA capabilities that directly concern the implementation of NPT commitments.71 It advocates, in measured words, improving national nuclear export control policies, within the framework of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.72 Finally, it supports the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,73 and the future negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.74 On the strengthening of regimes to prevent the proliferation (acquisition, development, production, stockpiling, and use) of chemical and biological weapons, the text merely recommends adherence to the relevant international treaties (1925 Geneva Protocol, 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention)75 and expresses support for the efforts of the Australia Group.76 Finally, on the control of the transfer of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (including their components and technology), the text simply expresses support for the directives of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).77 The only provisions contained in the 1994 Principles that are in some way operational are those requiring the participating States to “reflect” the recommendations of the text in their national legislation, regulations and procedures governing non-proliferation and to exchange information within the Forum,78 to “promote” international efforts to redirect scientists and engineers to peaceful endeavours,79 and, finally, to take appropriate action to prevent their nationals from engaging in activities not in conformance with the Principles.80

70 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VI, “Principles Governing Non-­Proliferation”, part II, “Nuclear”, second and third indents. 71 Ibid., fourth and fifth indents. 72 Ibid., sixth indent. 73 Ibid., seventh indent. Requesting that China respect the nuclear moratorium, like the other four powers of the UN Security Council, was the topic of a Swedish proposal that was further dismissed, see CSCE/BC.1 (11 November 1994). 74 See “Principles …” (n. 70), section II, “Nuclear”, last indent. 75 See “Principles …” (no. 70), section II, “Chemical and Biological”, three first indents. 76 Ibid., last indent. 77 See “Principles …” (no. 70), section II, “Missile Technology”, one and only paragraph. For a short critical analysis of the various international regimes mentioned above, see the Aarts Report, Arms Export Policy, Assembly of the WEU, Doc. 1305 of 30 April 1992. 78 See “Principles …” (no. 70), section III, first and second indents. 79 Ibid., third indent. 80 Ibid., fourth indent.  Chapter IV   129

The normative nature of the Principles governing non-proliferation is essentially symbolic. The text reflected the participating States’ concerns about a global challenge which since the end of the Cold War had become less controllable than ever before. It resembles a cry of alarm denouncing a scourge against which the OSCE, as such, is powerless. Now, at the end of the twentieth century, it is a fact that “some thirty second-rank countries are – or will soon be – in a position to use rudimentary missiles to blackmail more powerful States which will find it difficult to respond by threatening them with nuclear weapons.”81

C. The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security Of all the instruments that originated from the work of the FSC, the Code of Conduct is undoubtedly the most important, on account of its content and the fact that it represents, in a sense, an update of the Helsinki Decalogue (1975), which was until then the only CSCE normative text that had not been updated in the light of the post-Cold War order. The Code of Conduct was the final embodiment of the idea put forward by France of a pan-European security treaty that would codify the CSCE’s existing security norms and spell out new commitments tailored to the challenges of the post-communist era. Mooted within NATO, the idea was dismissed entirely by the United States, which was opposed to any instrument that could – directly or indirectly – jeopardize NATO’s very raison d’être.82 Nor was it favourably received when it was given informal consideration at the Prague Council of Ministers in January 1992. Ultimately downsized to the modest level of a “politically binding” politico- military code of conduct, the idea was formally submitted by France and Germany to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992 and was co-sponsored by a dozen countries, including Russia.83 Although criticized by Washington, the proposal was retained and integrated as part of the FSC mandate.84 The negotiation of the Code within the Forum began in November 1992 and ended on 3 December 1994 in the framework of the Budapest Review Conference. Its final version constitutes Chapter IV of the Budapest Decisions. The following section provides analyses of the Code’s negotiation and content. a) The negotiation of the Code The FSC negotiated the Code on the basis of three sets of proposals. First, Poland, Austria and Hungary put forward (individually or jointly) proposals putting forward comparatively far-reaching ideas concerning inter- and intra-State

81 Jacques Isnard, Le Monde, 27 December 1994. 82 See The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE, March 24–July 8, 1992 (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), p. 32. 83 See CSCE/HM/WG2/1 (11 May 1992) and CSCE/HM/WG2/1 Add.1 (16 June 1992). 84 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter V, § 46.B.12. 130   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

norms.85 Next came proposals submitted (for the first time at the CSCE in the field of security) not by NATO but by the European Union;86 these proposals were co-­ sponsored by all members of the Alliance, with the exception of the United States – which was reluctant to endorse a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) initiative in such a field – and Turkey, which, as a country where the military establishment plays an overwhelmingly large role in political life, could hardly favour norms for the democratic and civilian control of the armed forces. Finally, an individual proposal somewhat different from the others was put forward by ­Turkey; it was a text phrased in fairly general terms that basically emphasized ­peripheral issues such as drug trafficking, environmental protection, and rights of ­migrant workers.87 Also remarkable was the absence of formal and syste­ matic contributions from Russia or the United States during the background ­negotiations. The relevance and wealth of the elements contained in all these proposals were indisputable: together, they contained ample material for a Code that was to be innovative and substantive – in terms of inter-State norms, intra-State norms and monitoring arrangements. From the outset, however, and right through until the opening of the Budapest Review Conference, the discussions regularly stumbled over two major matters of principle. Firstly, the participating States disagreed on the scope of the concept of security. The question was whether it was right to approach the Code from the point of view of comprehensive security (i.e., also taking into account the human and the economic dimensions of the CSCE, as advocated by Austria and Hungary) or just from that of politico-military security in the traditional and therefore narrower sense of the term. The first option was conceptually more interesting, but also more challenging, even though the existing draft proposals seemed likely to allow an acceptable formalization. On the other hand, given the mandate and time allowed for the negotiations, the second alternative was more realistic. The issue remained open almost until the very end of the drafting process. Finally, the narrow option prevailed, as demonstrated by the title and the content of the Code’s final version. Secondly, the question arose of the respective places to be occupied in the Code by the reaffirmation of existing norms and the formulation of new norms. The States with little enthusiasm for intra-State norms of conduct (concerning such matters as the use of armed forces for internal security purposes, the relationships between territorial integrity and self-determination, or national minorities) insisted that emphasis should be placed on the CSCE acquis. This was opposed by numerous delegations which were eager to limit the reaffirmation of the acquis to the bare minimum and to incorporate it in the Code’s preamble. Behind this

85 See proposals by Poland: CSCE/FSC/SC.5/Rev.1 (18 November 1992), Austria, Hungary and Poland: CSCE/FSC/SC.17 (5 May 1993). See also proposals submitted by Austria and Hungary: CSCE/FSC/SC.22 (15 September 1993) and Hungary alone: CSCE/FSC/SC.25 (23 February 1994). 86 See CSCE/FSC/SC.7 (16 December 1992) and CSCE/FSC/SC.21 (30 June 1993). 87 See CSCE/FSC/SC.8 (16 December 1992).  Chapter IV   131

apparently technical disagreement, what was resurfacing was the old debate on non-intervention in internal affairs of States. In the end, the emphasis was put on the acquis: a good third of the Code consists of (mostly declaratory) reminders, reaffirmations or confirmations.88 The development of a “code” normally stems from a concern for systematization based on the past but focused on the future. It involves a synthesization of the acquis and a demonstration of original creativity. In 1992, when the FSC undertook to draw up a code of conduct, the axiological acquis accumulated by the CSCE since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act (1975) was considerable.89 Yet the fact is that the authors of the 1994 Code repeated the error committed by the originators of the Paris Charter (1990), namely, that of formally reaffirming the validity of previous CSCE texts as a whole while singling out, in a selective and unjustified manner, certain principles and commitments that did not make any genuinely new contribution. While the Code was supposed to rationalize and improve on the achievements of the past, it suffers from a clear lack of in-depth and original reflection on the CSCE acquis. After being modified with endless alterations and numerous deletions made up until the very last minute in Budapest, the Code finally lost all logical structure. The text begins with a short preamble, which is shallow in that it neither clarifies the objectives or the raison d´être of the Code nor gives clear definitions of such key concepts as “comprehensive security” and “co-operative security”. It is followed by 42 operative paragraphs which are haphazardly structured into ten untitled sections with content that is sometimes fragmented. Section I (§§ 1–5) consists essentially of mere generalities, out of which nevertheless emerges the principle of solidarity and emergency consultations. Section II contains a single provision of Turkish origin on terrorism (§ 6). Section III brings together two heterogeneous provisions – one on the equal value of all the principles of the 1975 Decalogue (§ 7), and the other on non-assistance to States violating the principle of non-use of force (§ 8). Section IV groups together several mostly declaratory provisions on certain military aspects of security (§§ 9–14). Section V contains two declaratory statements on arms control (§§ 15 and 16). Section VI deals in general terms with conflict prevention and crisis management (§§ 17–19). Section VII, which is the section with the most substance and innovative content in the entire Code, addresses the issue of the democratic

88 The Code reaffirms or reconfirms the integrity of the principles and commitments contained in the final texts of the CSCE (§§ 1 and 7); the concept of global security (§ 2); the notion of the indivisibility of security (§§ 3 and 15); the principle of the sovereign equality of States (§§ 4, 10 and 11); the condemnation of terrorism and the necessity of international co-operation to fight all its forms (§ 6); the individual and collective right to self-defence (§ 9); the right of the States to be or not to be a party to alliance treaties as well as the right to neutrality (§ 11); the commitment of the CSCE participating States relating to arms control, disarmament and the CSBMs (§§ 15 and 16); and, finally, the commitment of all the States regarding crisis and conflict management (§§ 17 and 18). 89 See Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Les valeurs de la Grande Europe, produit du laboratoire politique de la CSCE”, Relations internationales, no. 73, Spring 1993, pp. 63–80. 132   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

political control of armed forces (§§ 20–23). Section VIII, which likewise contains real substance and original matter, addresses the issue of the democratic use of armed forces (§§ 34–37). Section IX contains a single provision on monitoring the implementation of the Code (§ 38). Section X contains the text’s final clauses (§§ 39–42). b) The content of the Code The Code of Conduct can be assessed from three different angles – intra-State norms, inter-State norms, and monitoring arrangements. i) Inter-State norms of conduct Given that the Code was to constitute an indirect, but crucial, update of the Helsinki Decalogue, there was a considerable amount at stake in this respect. While the Decalogue was doubtless not obsolete in the full sense of the word, the fact remains that it had been tailor-made between 1973 and 1975 to strengthen exchanges between States commonly described as having different “political, economic or social systems”. Seasoned with ambiguities and polished balances, it was no longer suited to the current situation. Put another way, the CSCE had a normative compass that no longer pointed North for the simple reason that North had shifted – the threats and challenges to security in Europe having become less and less military in origin, and the conflicts (latent or overt) having acquired an increasingly intra-State dimension. The Decalogue was crying out for an update – an aggiornamento – starting with better links between the various principles, in particular between territorial integrity and self- determination of peoples, and between respect for human rights and non- intervention. The idea was that the Code should serve as a new normative compass in the form of a “codicil” to the Decalogue, without the latter having to be amended. However, the Code does nothing of the sort. Analysed in terms of its provisions on inter-State norms of conduct, it can hardly be compared (one way or another) to the Decalogue. Lacking the latter’s density, preciseness and forward- looking vision, it is far from a “Helsinki Decalogue II”. Intended to provide a systematic listing of the rights and duties of CSCE participating States in the area of comprehensive and co-operative security, the Code only fulfilled this intention in a very imperfect manner, reflected in no more than five rudimentary elements. The first element is the duty of participating States to hold emergency consultations in the event of a threat of aggression. The Code affirms that the participating States “are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as a result.” It commits CSCE members to consulting promptly “with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its individual or collective self-defence” and to considering jointly “the nature of the threat and actions  Chapter IV   133

that may be required in defence of their common values.”90 Although the word “aggression” is not specifically mentioned here, it can nevertheless be reasonably deduced from the references to “solidarity” inserted in the text at the request of Poland.91 The second element is the duty of participating States not to provide assistance to or support States that are in violation of their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.92 Rather than committing themselves to help the victim of an act of aggression, the CSCE participating States took the easy way out and chose merely to deny support to the aggressor. The third element is the duty of participating States to offer their mediation and humanitarian assistance in the event of an armed conflict. In this respect, the Code stipulates that the participating States will “seek to facilitate the effective cessation of hostilities and seek to create conditions favourable to the political solution of the conflict,” and continues by stating they “will co-operate in support of humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering among the civilian population, including facilitating the movement of personnel and resources dedicated to such tasks.”93 The first sentence certainly has the merit of frankness: it clearly conveys the participating States’ reluctance to enforce peace in the event of an armed conflict. Nevertheless, a commitment to merely seek a political solution verges on the ridiculous. Read in this spirit, the subsequent sentence (clumsily inserted into this context) makes the overall effect even worse: it implies that the CSCE States were compensating for their lack of political determination during the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia by launching themselves into humanitarian activity. The fourth element affirms the prohibition of any one participating State from imposing its military domination upon another. The Code commits each member of the CSCE to maintaining “only such military capabilities as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account its obligations under international law”, also bearing in mind the “legitimate security concerns” of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability.94 Here the Code does no more than offer a watered-down reminder of the military sufficiency rule enshrined in the 1990 CFE Treaty.95

90 See the Code of Conduct (1994), § 5. 91 See CSCE/FSC/SC.5/Rev. l (18 November 1992), section V.11. The Austro-Hungarian proposal was even more explicit, referring specifically to cases of “armed aggression”, see CSCE/FSC/SC.22 (15 September 1993), pp. 4–5. 92 See the Code of Conduct (1994), § 8. 93 Ibid., § 19. 94 Ibid., §§ 12 and 13. 95 See the CFE Treaty, Article VI, the objective of which is to ensure that No single party signatory to the Treaty possess more than “approximately one-third” of the ceilings for armament and equipment set forth by Article IV.1. For more details, see by Victor-Yves Ghebali’s article on this 134   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

Finally, paragraph 14 of the Code commits the CSCE States to stationing their armed forces on the territory of other participating States only on the basis of freely negotiated agreements with the host countries. This provision, which was inspired by the difficulties suffered by the Baltic States with Russia, was of particular interest to certain other participating States such as Moldova and Ukraine. ii) Intra-State norms of conduct Contrary to all expectations, in this field the Code actually demonstrated a certain measure of audacity. Its most interesting provisions are undoubtedly those relating to the democratic political control of the armed forces, with the latter being defined quite broadly to include military, paramilitary and internal security forces, as well as intelligence services and the police. After starting with the premise that democratic control of the armed forces is an indispensable element of democracy at the national level as well as of stability and security in the CSCE area (§ 20), Section VII guarantees the primacy of constitutionally established authorities over armed forces at all times, in connection with the latter’s behaviour both abroad (respect for humanitarian law: §§ 29 and 30) and at home (political neutrality in national life: § 23). It also specifies the fundamental rights and duties of members of the armed forces (§§ 23, 27, 28 and 30–33). Moreover, it prescribes restraint and transparency of information in participating States’ military expenditure and defence programmes (§ 22). Section VII’s most significant provisions concern paramilitary forces. Each participating State must ensure that “its paramilitary forces refrain from the acquisition of combat mission capabilities in excess of those for which they were established” (§ 26) – which in particular prohibits States from using paramilitary forces to circumvent international arms control obligations. Furthermore, any participating State that is unable to exercise its authority over such forces from now on has the option of seeking consultations within the CSCE to “consider steps to be taken” (§ 25). Section VIII is equally remarkable. Dealing with the use of the armed forces, it subordinates – in peacetime as well as in time of war – the organization of armed forces (at the level of command, recruitment, training and equipment) and military policy and doctrine to the requirements of international humanitarian law (§§ 34 and 35). Particular mention should be made of paragraph 36 on the use of armed forces for internal security. This provision states that such missions must be decided upon in conformity with constitutionally established procedures and subject to the rule of law. But, and above all, it prescribes that recourse to force must be exceptional (if it “cannot be avoided”), non-disproportionate (“commensurate with the needs for enforcement”) as well as respectful of civilians and their

subject in the Revue générale de droit international public, no. 4, October–December 1991, pp. 833– 855.  Chapter IV   135

property.96 Shortly after the close of the Budapest Review Conference, this provision was tragically violated by the Russian armed intervention in Chechnya. Finally, it should be pointed out that paragraph 37 goes so far as to prohibit the use of armed forces in order to “limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of their human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups [or] to deprive them of their national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity.” In spite of its undeniable merits, this provision lays itself open to criticism for a reason that is very revealing of the state of mind prevailing in many participating States, as it carefully avoids making direct reference to the principle of self-determination of peoples or to “national minorities”. Contrary to suggestions made during the negotiations, it does not expressly prohibit the use of armed forces to limit the peaceful exercise of peoples’ rights to self- determination, or national minorities’ (peaceful and legal) calls for constitutional changes. Similarly, it does not expressly prohibit the use of armed forces in order to modify internal borders or to displace populations without their consent.97 iii) The monitoring of the Code To a large extent, the value of a normative instrument depends on its monitoring mechanism. In the present case, however, paragraph 38 only vaguely states that, if requested, a participating State should provide “appropriate clarification regarding its implementation of the Code”, though it is understood that “CSCE bodies, mechanisms and procedures will be used to assess, review and improve if necessary the implementation of this Code.” In other words, the plan of a special monitoring mechanism was rejected. This is all the more regrettable given that realistic and practical ideas were indeed put forward to this end. In a Polish-Austrian-Hungarian proposal, two types of procedures were suggested for two different situations. In case of doubt as to whether the Code had actually been violated, the participating States were to be able to activate a clarification procedure and (should the doubts persist) to establish a rapporteur mission empowered to recommend solutions, if necessary without the consent of the State concerned. In the event of a serious violation of basic norms of the Code, emergency meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO, after Budapest “Senior Council”) would have been called with a view to recommending solutions or to appealing to the Ministerial Council – still, if necessary, without the consent of the State concerned; as a last resort, either of

96 Imposing an obligation upon participating States to inform the CSCE of such specific cases was mentioned in the text of the Coordinator (29 November 1994) and further considered by the plenary. 97 See CSCE/FSC/21 (30 June 1993), pp. 14–15 and CSCE/FSC/SC.22 (15 September 1993), pp. 18– 19. 136   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

these bodies could have brought the matter to the attention of the United Nations Security Council.98 The reluctance of the participating States with regard to effective monitoring arrangements is generally reflected in the provisions of paragraph 41, which states somewhat timidly that the States “will seek to ensure that their relevant internal documents and procedures or, where appropriate, legal instruments reflect the commitments made in this Code.” However, unlike certain other texts adopted by the CSCE/OSCE since the end of the Cold War (including the 1991 Valletta Report on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes), the Code of Conduct cannot– without doing it an injustice – be called an “empty shell”. Nevertheless, the fact remains that its shell is insufficiently filled. There are numerous fundamental matters which the Code regrettably does not mention (or at best mentions in an elusive and cryptic way), for example: the linking of the CSCE’s security functions to those of the United Nations, the CSCE’s place within the institutional architecture of European security,99 the dialectical relationship between the principle of the territorial integrity of States and the principle of self-determination of peoples, the security challenge posed by the problem of national minorities, or the application of the Code’s provisions to relations with non-member States. Two main points may serve to explain the weaknesses of the Code. From a political point of view, the reason seems clear: the governments did not sin through lack of imagination but through lack of will. From a technical point of view, one may wonder whether the OSCE is capable of negotiating its final texts as efficiently as it did during the Cold War. With the increasing number of participating States, the consensus mechanism really turns into the iron law of the lowest common denominator. Perhaps the appointment of a “Special Rapporteur” (following, for example, the practice of the UN Commission on Human Rights) would have enabled the Budapest Review Conference to prepare for the Summit’s approval a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security worthier of its title.

D. The Vienna Document 1994 on CSBMs The Forum for Security Co-operation has proceeded to a further updating of the CSBMs regime, with the Vienna Document 1994 superseding the Vienna Document 1992 – just as the latter had itself replaced the Vienna Document 1990.100 In doing so, the FSC faced a threefold task: harmonizing to the greatest extent possible the various existing procedures (which had been superimposed on each other cumulatively) with a view to alleviating the bureaucratic burden of

98 See CSCE/FSC/SC.l7 (5 May 1993). 99 In this respect, the Code of Conduct affirmed only that the CSCE States “will continue to develop the institutions and additional arrangements and reinforcing mutually including the European and transatlantic organizations …” (§ 4). 100 The Vienna Document (1990) reproduced much of the Stockholm Document of 1986, set aside the section on refraining from the threat or use of force.  Chapter IV   137

the participating States; adapting certain provisions in order to reflect the discussions of the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings; and developing the Vienna Document 1992 as prescribed by the Programme of Immediate Action.101 Adopted on 27 November 1994 by the FSC, sitting in Budapest,102 the Vienna Document 1994 entered into force on 1 January 1995. While it does not actually contain any new CSBMs, it has introduced many improvements to the existing ones. a) Annual Exchange of Military Information (AEMI) Three new developments are to be mentioned here. Firstly, it is now required (on the basis of an idea proposed by Sweden) that the information be presented “in such a way as to distinguish units from formations”.103 Secondly, the provisions on “Information on military budgets” (§§ 16 to 16.2 of the Vienna Document 1992) were simply replaced by provisions of the text on Defence Planning adopted by the Forum in 1993.104 Thirdly, participating States which (for one reason or another) have not exchanged annual information in accordance with the agreed provisions are now required to explain the reason for their non-compliance at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and to provide an expected date for their full compliance with this commitment.105 Against the wishes of Finland, the landing craft of amphibious formations and units were not included among the equipment systems subject to exchange of information. For this reason, the Finnish delegation approved the final version of the Vienna Document 1994 solely on the condition that discussions on this issue would continue after the Budapest Summit – arguing that “landing craft are non- defensive equipment and specially used, like military transport aircraft, for surprise attacks,” and that their inclusion would increase the transparency required for militarily significant equipment.106 Moreover, contrary to Sweden’s wishes, permission was not given for military information exchanged between participating States to be made accessible to the general public.107 b) Risk reduction For the first time under the CSBMs regime, the Vienna Document 1994 provides for the association of the Permanent Council (PC) with the mechanism for consultation and co-operation on unusual military activities – with the PC serving as the forum for the multilateral meetings to be convened in this regard.

101 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter V, § 46.A.2. 102 See FSC: Journal No. 94 of 28 November to 3 December 1994, p. 2. 103 See Vienna Document (1994), § 10.1. 104 Ibid., §§ 15–15.9. 105 Ibid., § 147.3. 106 See FSC: Journal No. 94 of 28 November to 3 December 1994, p. 5. 107 See DOC.264 (25 May 1994). 138   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

Furthermore, the PC “will use all its competences to contribute to a solution” to the problem which led to the triggering of the mechanism;108 this general and vague provision was ultimately preferred to the idea of the Council establishing a Fact-­Finding Mission and adopting, on the basis of its recommendations, appropriate measures to address the concerns about relevant unusual military activities. The change made to the co-operation mechanism for hazardous incidents of a military nature is minimal: for example, matters relating to such incidents are to be discussed within the Special Committee of the FSC instead of the Conflict Prevention Centre;109 nevertheless, the CPC remains the custodian of the list of national points to be contacted in the event of a hazardous incident.110 No substantial changes were introduced to the regime for the voluntary hosting of visits that are intended to dispel concerns about military activities, the idea of making such visits mandatory (put forward by the Visegrad Group and Ukraine) being rejected. To sum up, the section Risk Reduction of the Vienna Document 1992 did not make way for new mechanisms – such as the one (proposed by Estonia) for enabling a participating State on whose territory foreign troops are stationed against its will to obtain information about them and to observe them.111 c) Contacts The regime of visits to airbases was only changed with respect to certain details. The section Military Contacts of the Vienna Document 1992, on the other hand, was entirely replaced by the Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation adopted by the FSC in November 1993.112 Finally, the subsection “Demonstration of new types of major weapons and equipment systems” underwent some changes, including the added statements that the demonstration should take place no later than one year after the deployment, that it could be carried out on the territory of another participating State, and that the invited State may freely decide whether to send military and/or civilian visitors.113 d) Prior notification of certain military activities The notification regime was readjusted at three levels – the threshold for notifi­ cation, the nature of notifiable activities, and the scope of information to be notified. Firstly, regarding the threshold for notification of land-based and combined military activities, the numerical parameter (9,000 troops) and the organic parameter (divisional structure) remained unchanged. On the other hand, the

108 See Vienna Document (1994), §§ 16.2.2.2 and 16.2.2.4. 109 Ibid., § 17.3. 110 Ibid., § 17.1. 111 See CSCE/FSC/SC.18 (19 May 1993). 112 See Vienna Document (1994), §§ 30–30.16. 113 Ibid., §§ 31, 32 and 35.  Chapter IV   139

equipment parameter (250 battle tanks) was extended with two additional options: 500 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) or “250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket-launchers” (100 mm calibre and above).114 Secondly, heliborne landings are now subject to notification in the context of combined military activities whenever they involve at least 3,000 troops, by the same token as amphibious landings and parachute assaults.115 Thirdly, it should be noted that the scope of the information required for prior notification has been extended, in order to reflect the adjustments to the threshold for the notification of equipment and heliborne landings.116 e) Observation of certain military activities The observation regime essentially underwent adjustments fairly symmetrical to those of the notification regime, namely, the addition of two options to the equipment parameter,117 and the inclusion of heliborne landings.118 The initial gap between the observation and notification parameters was not closed: the threshold for observation remains at 13,000 troops (as against 9,000 for notification) and 300 battle tanks (as against 250 for notification). However, the two additional equipment parameters (500 ACVs and 250 artillery pieces) are identical for observation and for notification. In other words, the Vienna Document 1994 only introduced a partial equalization of the thresholds for observation and notification. f ) Annual calendars The annual calendar regime did not undergo any significant reworking. The ­Vienna Document 1994 merely added two new elements to the list of mandatory information to be included in each annual calendar: the number of military activities to be reported and the activity number.119 g) Constraining provisions No substantive changes were made to the regime of constraining measures, in the context of which no consensus was reached on the idea of introducing new equipment systems parameters (armoured combat vehicles). The only new element in the Vienna Document 1994 is a provision requiring each participating State to give notification that it does not plan to carry out military activities such as those subject to constraining provisions.120

114 Ibid., §§ 38.1.1 and 38.3.1. The Visegrad countries and Ukraine initially proposed a threshold of 300 armoured combat vehicles. See CSCE/FSC/SC.13 (31 March 1993), § II.2. 115 See Vienna Document (1994), §§ 38.2 and 38.2.1. 116 Ibid., §§ 42.1.4, 42.2.1, 42.3.4 and 42.3.5, as well as § 42.1.1. 117 Ibid., § 45.4. 118 Ibid., § 45.2. 119 Ibid., §§ 61.1 and 61.2. 120 Ibid., § 67. 140   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

h) Inspection and evaluation Regarding the inspection regime, the Vienna Document put an end to the obligation imposed on participating States requesting an inspection to state the reasons for such a request – an obligation which had in fact never really been respected. As paragraph 73 (replacing paragraph 78 of the Vienna Document 1992) baldly puts it: “Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.”121 At the same time, and essentially for practical reasons, the Vienna Document 1994 introduced a new provision requiring any participating State that has accepted three inspections in a calendar year (i.e., that has exhausted its passive quota) to inform all the other participating States.122 Furthermore, it contains a provision requiring the host State to mention in its reply which language or languages will be used during the inspection,123 and a provision establishing (for the first time) the principle of a standard format for inspection reports to be circulated to all participating States.124 As in the case of inspection, the Vienna Document 1994 requires each participating State that has exhausted its passive evaluation quota during the course of a calendar year to inform all the other participating States.125 The Vienna Document 1994 allows members of the evaluation team the use not only of their personal binoculars and dictaphones but, henceforth, also of their own “maps and charts, photo and video cameras”.126 Finally, it requires that any request for evaluation specify the working language or languages the visitor State wishes to use during the evaluation.127 i) Communications In the section Communication, the Vienna Document 1994 incorporated the content of Annexes II and III of the Vienna Document 1992 relating to the issue of working languages to be used when transmitting messages through the Communications Network. In addition to this essentially technical modification, it reaffirmed that the Network was not intended solely for communications concerning CSBMs but also “other CSCE-related matters”.128 The only genuine innovation is the establishment of a plenary Communications Group chaired (on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office) by a representative of the Secretary General; this group, which is to meet twice a year (or more as necessary), is responsible for

121 This is the reason why §§ 82, 84 and 90.1 of the Vienna Document (1992) were removed. 122 See Vienna Document (1994), § 74.1. 123 Ibid., § 86. 124 Ibid., § 103. 125 Ibid., § 107.1. 126 Ibid., § 129. 127 Ibid., § 111.6. 128 Vienna Document (1994), § 138.  Chapter IV   141

monitoring the functioning of the Network and for considering improvements to it, using options made available by progress in communication technologies.129 j) Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) The contribution made by this section of the Vienna Document 1994 essentially relates to the division of tasks between the Forum for Security Co-operation and the Conflict Prevention Centre. The organization of the AIAM, a task previously performed by the CPC, is now the responsibility of the FSC,130 which is also responsible for examining suggestions made during AIAMs aimed at mproving the implementation of CSBMs.131 As for the CPC, its role is to provide the FSC with a summary of such suggestions,132 and above all a factual survey of the information exchanged under CSBMs – the latter to be submitted to the participating States for confirmation or appropriate correction one month prior to the AIAM.133 On the subject of ensuring the implementation of CSBMs, the Vienna Document 1994 remained somewhat cautious and timid. It states that “the participating States will, as necessary, consider in appropriate CSCE bodies how to ensure full implementation” of the arrangements of the CSBMs regime.134 Moreover, it asserts that participating States that have failed to comply with the requirement to exchange annually military information will be required to explain the reasons for their non-compliance at the AIAM and to provide an expected date for their full compliance with the said commitment.135 Furthermore, the Document points out that any participating State receiving a bilateral request for clarification concerning the application of agreed CSBMs will “promptly” give relevant explanations.136 Finally, it provides that any participating State may “request assistance” in implementing CSBMs from any other participating State,137 meaning, without their being named, most of the former Soviet republics. All these provisions fall well short of those that had been proposed by the Visegrad Group together with Ukraine, which included: meetings of States directly concerned, ad hoc CSCE meetings to clarify particular cases, Fact-Finding Mission, and the application of the “consensus minus one” rule in case of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSBM commitments.138

129 Ibid., §§ 144–144.3. See also FSC: Decision No.3/96 of 8 May 1996. 130 Ibid., § 147, subsection 1, first sentence. 131 Ibid., § 147, subsection 1, second sentence. 132 Ibid., § 147, subsection 2. 133 Ibid., § 147.1 and Annex V. 134 Ibid., § 149. 135 Ibid., § 147.3. 136 Ibid., § 135. 137 Ibid., § 147.2. 138 See CSCE/FSC/SC.13 (19 May 1993), section 1 and 1.2. 142   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

k) Voluntary CSBMs The Vienna Document 1994 recommends two politically non-binding CSBMs, which are subject to bilateral and regional as well as to multilateral application.139 The first encourages participating States to provide neighbouring participating States with information on certain military activities not notifiable under the regime of the Vienna Document 1994 and carried out close to their common ­border.140 Similarly, the second encourages participating States to invite others, particularly their neighbours, to military exercises which are not observable under the Vienna Document 1994.141 In both cases, the participating States concerned are recommended to provide the CPC with information on the implementation of these voluntary CSBMs.142 l) Annexes The Vienna Document 1994 includes five annexes. Three of the annexes (I, III, and IV) do not contribute anything new. Annex I reaffirms the validity of the zone of application for CSBMs on the basis of the mandates of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting (1983) and the Vienna Document 1992;143 Annex III reiterates the CSCE’s stance on the implementation aspects of CSBMs in the case of contiguous areas of certain participating States which share frontiers with non-European non-participating States;144 and Annex IV confirms that participating States will take into consideration practical problems which newly independent States recently admitted to the CSCE may initially encounter when implementing CSBMs.145 In contrast, Annexes II and V introduce a number of innovations. Annex II concerns the standardization of procedures applicable to the regime of visits to airbases, to the demonstration regime for new major weapons and equipment systems, and to the observation regime; the standardization relates to the time periods for invitations, their content and replies to them, the sharing of costs between the invited State and the host State, and some of the duties of the invited State. Annex V clarifies the division of labour between the FSC and the CPC regarding the implementation of CSBMs.

139 See Vienna Document (1994), § 136. This provision stems from a proposal submitted by the Visegrad countries and Ukraine, see CSCE/FSC/SC.13, section 1.4. 140 See Vienna Document (1994), § 136.1. 141 Ibid., § 136.2. 142 Ibid., § 137. 143 Annex I of the Vienna Document (1992) was reproduced in its entirety in the 1994 version of the Vienna Document. 144 Annex IV of the Vienna Document (1992) was reproduced as Annex III in the 1994 version of the Vienna Document. 145 Annex V of the Vienna Document (1992) was reproduced with a few amendments as Annex IV in the 1994 version of the Vienna Document.  Chapter IV   143

3. The CSBMs Regime: Assessment and Prospects The CSCE/OSCE has seen three successive generations of CBMs/CSBMs: those of the regimes of Helsinki (1975–1986), Stockholm (1986–1990) and Vienna (since 1990). Established by the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the first generation of CSBMs, originally known as confidence-building measures (CBMs), was implemented at a time when the military situation in Europe was characterized by the permanent presence, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, of substantial armed forces with the capacity and readiness to launch offensives. On account of its rudimentary nature, the Helsinki regime had several weaknesses. Firstly, the CBMs were not interdependent: notifiable military manoeuvres were not necessarily observable (nor were observable military manoeuvres necessarily notifiable). Secondly, the Helsinki regime did not define the key concepts in relation to military activities (“manoeuvre” and “movement”) and did not lay down the duties of the host country in relation to observation. Thirdly, the Helsinki CBMs related to what one might call à la carte commitments: with the exception of the prior notification of military manoeuvres involving 25,000 or more troops (a politically binding commitment), all other commitments were politically voluntary. Fourthly, the parameters relating to prior notification of military manoeuvres (high threshold for notification, short notification notice, restriction of the zone of application in favour of the USSR and Turkey) were such that the only compulsory CBM of the Helsinki regime was ultimately of little military significance. After the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, the Helsinki regime was followed by a generation of CSBMs that were politically binding, militarily significant, applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals (that is to say, encompassing the entire European territory of the USSR) and, above all, accompanied by adequate forms of verification. The Stockholm Document (1986) perfected the parameters of the Helsinki notification and observation regimes, while at the same time also introducing qualitatively new measures: annual calendars, constraints and, above all, mandatory inspection. The end of the Cold War created a favourable situation for the establishment of another generation of CSBMs, which was given concrete form in the Vienna Document 1990. The document incorporated all the provisions of the Stockholm Document,146 under a new numbering. In terms of actual substance, its contribution was twofold. Firstly, amendments were made to the regimes of notification, observation, annual calendars, constraints and inspection; and secondly, new CSBMs were put into operation, notably relating to the annual exchange of military information, risk reduction (crisis management), direct communications and evaluation. Less than two years later, the Vienna Document 1990 was replaced by the Vienna Document 1992, in which numerous amendments

146 Set aside the purely declarative sections related to the non-use of force, whereby the Vienna Document (1990) simply reaffirmed and validated the contents of the Stockholm Document (1986). 144   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

(in form or substance) were made to the provisions of virtually all sections of the Vienna Document 1990 – in particular with regard to non-active military formations, lower thresholds for notification and observation, multinational inspection teams and, most importantly, constraints. The Vienna Document 1992 also introduced entirely new elements related to, inter alia, the voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities, the demonstration of new types of major weapons and equipment systems, and the zone of application of CSBMs in the territory of the States that came into being with the disintegration of the USSR. In its turn, the Vienna Document 1992 was replaced by the Vienna Document 1994. The innovations it introduced include: additional arrangements for defence planning and for military contacts and co-operation; additional thresholds for equipment within the notification and observation regimes; the inclusion of heliborne military activities; the standardization of procedures with regard to visits for contact purposes and observation visits; the elimination of the obligation for requests for inspection to be backed up with reasons based on “doubt” as to compliance with the agreed CSBMs; and the establishment of a Communications Group responsible for monitoring the operation of the Communications Network. These various generations of CSBMs have given rise to five categories of measures, respectively intended to promote transparency, contact, constraint, verification, and crisis management.

A. Transparency CSBMs The function of transparency CSBMs is to increase the predictability of States’ policies and military intentions by means of appropriate information, establishing what may be referred to as the “basic minimum level of confidence”. In the context of the OSCE, the objective of transparency covers military activities as well as military forces and capabilities. a) Transparency of military activities The Western approach was based on the consideration that certain military activities might (on account of their frequency, scale and location) cause a state of insecurity and tension, or could have been used by the Soviets for purposes of intimidation. In this regard, transparency CSBMs could be used to confirm the non-threatening nature of such routine activities; to defuse situations liable to lead to miscalculations and bad judgements; and thus, to prevent or mitigate the risks of escalation – at that time (the 1970s) a war in Europe seemed less likely to be triggered through deliberate aggression than by a fatal assessment error. For the West, CSBMs were essentially aimed at “reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation.”147 Transparency CSBMs adopted by the CSCE first concerned military activities in the field, before later being directed at their planning.

147 Helsinki Final Act (1975), part 2, “Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament”, preamble, § 4.  Chapter IV   145

i) Military field activities In accordance with the CSBMs regime of the Vienna Document 1994, three categories of (national or multinational) military activities are currently subject to prior notification: land activities (independently or in combination with air or naval components); amphibious, heliborne and airborne activities; and lastly, land transfers and concentrations.148 Any activity falling within one or the other of these categories is notifiable insofar as it is conducted “in the field” as a “single activity” (i.e., under a single command) “in the zone of application for CSBMs”.149 While the concept of “field” has not been explicitly defined, it has been tacitly admitted that it ­excludes barracks and directly adjacent training areas, but that it includes manoeuvre areas.150 The zone of application for CSBMs includes: the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, as well as the neighbouring sea area and air space (insofar as the activities affect Europe’s security and, at the same time, are directly related to notifiable land-based military activities) – as well as a delimited strip 250 kilometres long on either side of borders of participating States whose territory extends beyond Europe.151 This being the case, the OSCE prior notification regime has three basic features. The first feature is the requirement for prior notice, which at present must be given at least 42 days in advance.152 The second feature is the notification threshold. Regarding independent or combined land-based military activities, the notification threshold involves numerical parameters (9,000 troops), equipment parameters (250 battle tanks), and structural parameters (division, or equivalent formations in brigades/ regiments).153 Notification takes place either on the basis of the numerical or the equipment parameter; but in either case the structural parameter is indispensable: in other words, a land-based military activity involving 9,000 troops or 250 battle tanks is notifiable only if it is to take place in a divisional structure or in an equivalent structure of at least two brigades/regiments, not

148 Vienna Document (1994), §§ 38.1, 38.2 and 38.3. 149 Ibid., § 38. 150 See Jean-Felix Paganon, “Le régime de notification des MDCS de Stockholm”, La Conférence de Stockholm sur le désarmement en Europe : les résultats de la première phase (Geneva: GIPRI Foundation/Turin: Meynier, 1990), p. 51. 151 In principle, this territory spans bordering territories shared, on the one hand, by Russia and Turkey and, on the other, by Russia and Kazakhstan. The accession to the CSCE of former Soviet republics in Central Asia considerably complicated the definition of the CSBMs zone of application. An attempt to describe this zone in a somewhat cryptic wording can be found in the Vienna Document (1994), Annexes I and III. For more details on this issue, see Jean-Claude Joseph, “Les zones d’application des mesures militaires dans le processus de la CSCE”, Défense nationale, no. 543 (June 1993), pp. 109ff. 152 See Vienna Document (1994), § 36. 153 Ibid., § 38.1.1. 146   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

necessarily subordinate to the same division.154 Fixed in 1992, these parameters have not been changed since – a further lowering of the parameters being considered by all the participating States as not likely to reinforce the militarily significant value of approved CSBMs. However, in 1994 it was decided to expand the range of the equipment threshold by adding two new parameters: “at least 500 AVCs [armoured combat vehicles]” or “at least 250 self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocketlaunchers” (100 mm calibre and above).155 For amphibious, heliborne and airborne military activities, the notification threshold is purely numerical: 3,000 men.156 The third feature is the material content of the notification, i.e., related to equipment. It must be the subject of a diplomatic communication addressed in writing (in a standard format) containing 28 pieces of information concerning the troops engaged, the equipment deployed, and the phases of the military activity in question.157 ii) Planned military activities (annual calendars) Since the entry into force of the Stockholm Document of 1986, the prior notification regime for military activities in the field has been strengthened by the so-called “annual calendars” regime, which requires prior notification of notifiable military activity programmes within the zone of application for CSBMs for the following calendar year.158 The advantage of the calendar regime is that it enables States to immediately distinguish between unexpected military activities and routine exercises. The calendars are exchangeable (in a standard format) by 15 November each year. They must contain 11 pieces of information for each of the various military activities listed chronologically.159 It should be noted that these calendars are provisional documents provided for guidance only and, therefore, adjustments can be made to them. Amendments should normally be communicated no later than when the corresponding military activity is notified.160 However, the cancellation of a military activity initially included in a calendar or its reduction to a level below notification thresholds requires that the other participating States be immediately informed.161

154 It should also be noted that there is a “sub-threshold” for notification concerning air forces specifically, worded as follows: “in the course of the activity, 200 sorties or more of aircraft other than helicopters will be flown.” See Vienna Document (1994), § 38.1.2. 155 Ibid., § 38.1.1. 156 Ibid., § 38.2.1. 157 Ibid., §§ 40–44.2. 158 Ibid., § 59. 159 Ibid., §§ 61.1–61.11. 160 Ibid., § 62. 161 Ibid., § 63. As to the information relating to the unscheduled military activities, they are to be reported “as soon as possible”, see § 64.  Chapter IV   147

b) Transparency of military forces and capabilities In this regard, the 1994 Vienna regime contains provisions for the periodic exchange of information on military forces, plans for the deployment of major weapons and equipment systems, and military budgets.162 i) Military forces A system for the annual exchange of information on the military forces of the participating States was instituted as early as 1990, specifically on the forces’ organization (command structure), personnel (number of troops) and major weapon and equipment systems: battle tanks; helicopters; armoured combat vehicles (including vehicle look-alikes); anti-tank guided missile launchers; and artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers (100 mm calibre and above).163 Only military forces in the zone of application of the CSBMs are concerned – which exempts the United States and Canada from any obligation regarding forces stationed elsewhere than in Europe. The term “military forces” is not explicitly defined in the Vienna Document 1994, but Section I clearly refers to land, amphibious and air forces, therefore excluding naval forces. The exchange of information must be completed in an agreed format no later than 15 December of each year,164 that is, one month after the annual calendars have been communicated. The Vienna Document regime calls for three remarks in this respect. Firstly, the required level of disclosure for information is that of the brigade/regiment or equivalent level165 – whereas the CFE Treaty regime involves a detailed exchange of information down to the level of an independent battalion/squadron. Secondly, the required information relates both to active and non-active combat formations and units. Thirdly, in the specific case of air forces, the Vienna regime covers naval aviation based on land, which the USSR had refused to include in the legal regime of the CFE Treaty.166 In December 1994, the OSCE adopted a regime on the Global Exchange of ­Military Information (GEMI), which had the direct effect of adding a new mechanism for the exchange of military information to the existing regimes (CFE Treaty, CFE-1A, Vienna Document 1992). A specific aspect of the GEMI regime, however, is that it is more comprehensive than the others on two counts

162 This does not account for the exchange of purely technical data related to weapon systems and equipment of major importance, such as weight w/o load, track width, number of seats, etc. See Vienna Document (1994), §§ 11–12.11. This is not an exchange of information based on annual submissions, as it was performed once at the end of 1992. After this year, newly admitted States were expected to provide this information by 15 December 1995 or later. 163 See Vienna Document (1994), section 1. 164 For more on the format of the notifications, see Vienna Meeting of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (1991): Decision No. 1 of 6 March 1991. 165 See Vienna Document (1994), § 10.1.1. 166 Naval aviation was nevertheless included in a politically binding declaration separate from the CFE Treaty. 148   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

– in the extent of the information required and in the geographical zone of application for the information.167 ii) Plans for the deployment of major weapons and equipment systems The OSCE has introduced an obligation for the annual exchange of information on plans for the deployment of major weapons and equipment systems (covered by the AEMI regime) and on aircraft and helicopters within the zone of application for the CSBMs – which once again exempted American and ­Canadian forces stationed outside Europe. The information must be provided no later than 15 December of each year in the agreed format required for information on military forces.168 iii) Military budgets Since 1990, the CSCE participating States have been required to exchange information on their annual military expenditures in an agreed format, ­ which was in fact the “Standardized Instrument for Reporting of Military Expenditures” adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1980.169 Owing to the diversity of national practices, the Vienna Document 1992 did not set a specific deadline for the exchange: it merely defined the exchange within a variable period on the basis of the principle “no later than two months after the military budget has been approved by the competent national authorities”170 – it being understood, moreover, that any participating State could ask for “clarification” of the information provided within a period of two months following the receipt of the information.171 These initial provisions were ­replaced in 1994 by an entirely new text developed within the Forum for ­Security Co-­operation and entitled “Defence Planning”.

B. CSBMs Contacts The function of the CSBMs contacts is to establish genuine communication between States in order to achieve a better understanding of mutual intentions and thus to raise the level of confidence previously established through transparency CSBMs. In this context, the OSCE has adopted provisions on visits to airbases, demonstrations of new types of major weapons and equipment systems, a multi-­ faceted programme of military co-operation, and seminars on military doctrines. a) Visits to airbases The regime of visits to air bases is innovative in that it has for the first time introduced a specifically aerial measure within the framework of CSBMs, which

167 See FSC: Journal No. 94 of 28 November–2 December 1994. 168 See Vienna Document 1994, §§ 15–15.4. 169 See UN Resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980. Regarding the genesis, the development and the first applications of the Instrument within the UN framework, see UN: A/970/ Rev.1; A/31/222/Rev.1; A/32/194/Add.1; A/35/479; A/S-12/7 and A/40/421. 170 See Vienna Document (1992), § 16.1. 171 Ibid., § 16.2.  Chapter IV   149

obliges any participating State with air combat units (i.e., units the majority of organic aircraft are combat aircraft and which are therefore subject to annual exchange of military information) to arrange visits for all other participating States to an airbase of its choice on which such units are located.172 These visits are therefore not visits on request. Furthermore, they are not designed to allow genuine observation, but rather to “view” and “gain an impression” of the base’s current activities and the approximate number of air sorties. Each State has the obligation to arrange a visit of at least 24 hours every five years. b) Demonstrations of new types of major weapons and equipment systems Major weapons and equipment systems (those subject to annual information exchange on military forces) are subject to “demonstration” if new types (but not new versions) of such systems are introduced in the zone of application for ­CSBMs. This obligation is borne by the “first” participating State to deploy new systems – that is, it does not apply if another participating State has already arranged a demonstration of the same type of major weapons and equipment systems. In addition, this obligation is to be honoured “at the earliest opportunity”, but not later than one year after deployment.173 c) Military co-operation The provisions of the Vienna Document 1990 (and later of the Vienna Document 1992) on military co-operation were hardly innovative. They recommended the development of contacts between people (senior military and defence representatives and the like) as well as between military institutions – and the development of exchanges and social contacts between such academics, researchers, experts and so on. Building on the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation, the participating States included a full Programme of Military Contacts and Co- operation in the Vienna Document 1994. d) Military Doctrine Seminars To date, two seminars on military doctrines have been organized in the context of the Vienna negotiations on CSBMs. The first seminar (16 January to 5 February 1990), unprecedented in the history of relations between military alliances, allowed CSCE chiefs of staff and other experts to discuss issues relating to the structure and organization of the armed forces, military activities and training, and military budgets and planning.174 No final text was adopted at the close of the seminar, but the seminar’s

172 See Vienna Document (1994), §§ 19–29. See also FSC: Decision No. 2 of 24 April 1996. 173 Ibid., § 31. The demonstration can also be carried out on the territory of another participating State, see § 32. 174 The text of the written speeches presented at the workshop became the subject of several volumes published in March 1990 by the Institut für Militärische Sicherheitspolitik und der Landesverteidigungsakademie in Vienna. See also Peter Almquist, “The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar: Flexible Response vs. Defensive Sufficiency”, Arms Control Today, vol. 20, no. 3 (April 1990), pp. 21–25, and Admiral Dieter Wellershoff, “Premier succès dans les négociations MDCS. Le séminaire sur doctrine militaire”, Revue de l’OTAN, vol. 38, no. 2, April 1990, §§ 10–16. 150   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

deliberations inspired two proposals which found expression in the Vienna Document 1990: the annual exchange of military information on military budgets and the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting on CSBMs. A UN document assessed the impact of the Seminar as follows: “The then members of the Warsaw Treaty ­Organization used the opportunity to question NATO countries regarding their doctrine of forward defence and their emphasis on the concept of the Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA), which many regarded as being offensive in nature. The result was that many of the NATO countries gained a clearer picture of, and confidence in, the military changes that were then under way in Eastern Europe. Similarly, the NATO members gained a better understanding of why the FOFA concept could have represented a concern to Eastern Europe.”175 Taking place just before the NATO Summit in Rome, the second Military Doctrine Seminar (8–10 October 1991) did not break new ground but was notable in that it took place without any major disagreements.176

C. CSBMs of Constraint Measures of this kind are qualitatively different from those oriented towards predictability or contacts. They are at the interface between the fields of CSBMs and disarmament in the generic sense of the latter term. Known as “measures of constraint” at the OSCE, they seek to impose restrictions on the organization and conduct of military activities in peacetime – so as to limit States’ freedom and capacity to launch any possible surprise attacks. Initially put forward by Yugoslavia and Romania in 1973–1974, the idea for such measures was supported by the Neutral and Non-­Aligned (N+NA) countries at the Stockholm Conference (1984–1986). Arguing that the threatening character of military activity was directly related to the size of military personnel, firepower, mobility and offensive capability of the forces involved, the N+NA countries considered that measures to limit the increase in military activities and to reduce the number of such activities were necessary. The Warsaw Pact countries went even further by advocating arrangements for significant reductions in the scope, frequency, duration and equipment of military activities in Europe, and for limitations upon their simultaneity in time and geographical proximity. The NATO countries did not welcome these two demands. They argued that, given the specific nature of their military training practices (motivated by unavoidable geostrategic disadvantages), such measures would have a negative impact on them alone.177 In view of the insistence of the N+NA countries (whose support was needed for the other elements of the negotiation), the NATO countries

175 A/47/394 (22 September 1992). 176 The text of the written speeches presented at the second workshop became the subject of three volumes published in November 1991,(Vienna: Institut für Militärische Sicherheitspolitik und der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1991). 177 Regarding the argumentation by the West, see Robert D. Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Constraining Group Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact”, International Security, vol. 14, no. 3, Winter 1989–1990, pp. 91ff.  Chapter IV   151

eventually accepted the principle of constraint measures – but only on the basis of a skilful distinction between “heavy” constraints that restricted the States’ military freedom of action “light” constraints which substantially did not.178 Ultimately, paragraphs 59–62 of the Stockholm Document merely imposed time constraints (i.e., light constraints) directly related to the annual calendar regime: an obligation to enter any notifiable military activity involving more than 40,000 troops in the annual calendar two years in advance; the illegality of any notifiable military activity involving more than 75,000 troops and not included in the annual calendar two years in advance; and the illegality of any notifiable military activity involving between 40,000 and 75,000 troops and not included in the annual calendar one year in advance. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (1 July 1991) radically altered the nature of the problem, so much so that it was possible for “heavy” measures of constraint to be adopted by the CSCE. The Vienna Document 1992 contains in this respect two categories of provisions (also included in the Vienna Document 1994). Firstly, it prescribes a reduction in the annual number of military activities involving a certain number of personnel or equipment, thus limiting national military activities involving more than 40,000 troops or more than 900 battle tanks to once every two years;179 at the same time, it limits the number of national military activities involving between 13,000 and 40,000 troops or between 300 and 900 battle tanks to a maximum of six times a year,180 it being understood that no more than three of these activities may each involve more than 25,000 troops or more than 400 tanks.181 Secondly, it prescribes a reduction in the annual number of military activities that may be carried out simultaneously with a certain number of personnel or equipment. In other words, it limits to a maximum of three the number of simultaneous national military activities liable to involve more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks each.182

D. CSBMs of Verification The function of the verification CSBMs is self-evident: they serve to confirm (or not, as the case may be), by methods of direct access to military activities or forces, the validity of information mainly reported under the transparency CSBMs. Within the OSCE framework, verification is carried out by the following threefold method: the observation of military activities upon invitation, the inspection of

178 See statement made by the French delegation at the plenary session on 2 October 1984; the text is attached to an article by Victor-Yves Ghebali, et désarmement en Europe, “Problèmes politiques et sociaux” collection, no. 557 (Paris: La Documentation française, 1987), p. 22. 179 See Vienna Document (1994), § 65.1. Such information must be communicated to all participating States and entered into the annual calendar two years in advance, see § 66. According to § 68, a military activity of this type is prohibited, unless it has been the subject of a notification covering the two-year time span. 180 Ibid., § 65.2. 181 Ibid., § 65.2.1. 182 Ibid., § 65.3. 152   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

military activities on request without right of refusal, and the evaluation of military formations/units upon request with right of refusal. a) Observation of military activities Any participating State carrying out a (national or multinational) military activity of a certain size is required (at the time of the activity’s notification) to invite each of the other participating States to observe the activity through the eyes of two observers of its choice.183 The observation serves the specific purpose of allowing the observers to confirm that the said military activity is non-threatening and is carried out in accordance with the indications provided by the notification.184 The host State is required to put the observers in direct contact with the personnel of the forces engaged in the military activity being observed, so that they can “get an impression of the flow of the entire activity.”185 However, the host State is not required to permit observation of restricted locations, installations or defence sites.186 The OSCE observation regime has three main weaknesses. Firstly, not all notifiable military activities are necessarily observable: the notification threshold for land-based activities is 9,000 troops or 250 combat tanks, but the thresholds for observation is 13,000 troops or 300 tanks; similarly, amphibious or airborne activities are subject to notification whenever they involve at least 3000 men, but are subject to observation from 3,500 troops. In 1994, the participating States considered that there was no need for the observation and notification thresholds to be equalized. However, the two equipment parameters added to the notification threshold (at least 500 AVCs and at least 250 artillery pieces, 100 mm calibre and above) were inserted as they stood into the observation regime,187 which ultimately resulted in a partial equalization of the respective thresholds for observation and notification. Secondly, observation starts when the agreed threshold is met or exceeded and ends when the threshold is no longer met.188 In other words, and given the differentiation between the thresholds for observation and notification, observation does not necessarily start when the notifiable activity commences. Lastly, observation does not cover troops’ dislocation phase nor their return to garrisons since, for some countries, such phases correspond to demobilization operations which the N+NA countries intended to exclude from both notification and observation.189

183 Ibid., §§ 45, 46 and 48. 184 Ibid., § 55. 185 Ibid., § 55.6. 186 Ibid., § 54. 187 Ibid., § 45.4. 188 Ibid., § 50. 189 Regarding this particular issue, see Christian Mertc, La Conférence de Stockholm sur le désarmement en Europe : les résultats de la première phase (Geneva: GIPRI Foundation/Turin: Meynier, 1990), pp. 68–69.  Chapter IV   153

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of observable military activities has been considerably reduced. As a result, the observation regime is now on hold in favour of the inspection regime. b) Inspection of military activities The adoption of an inspection regime in 1986 represented a conceptual and political breakthrough. It reflected the first positive development of the Soviet ­Union’s stance vis-à-vis the principle of mandatory verification in the field of arms control and made it possible to link CSBMs to the whole problem of mandatory verification. Within the OSCE, inspection is mandatory upon simple request in the zone of application for CSBMs: the requested State is required to respond favourably to any request within 24 hours; and the inspection team (limited to four inspectors, two of whom may be non-nationals of the inspecting State) must be able to enter the territory of the receiving State within 36 hours of the request being sent.190 The inspection may be carried out from the ground and/or the air,191 for a maximum period of 48 hours192 from the arrival of the inspectors.193 No participating State is obliged to accept more than three inspections per calendar year, each one of them carried out by a different participating State.194 The receiving State is required to grant inspectors access, entry and unobstructed survey in the area to be inspected, except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally restricted (but the number and extent of which should be as limited as possible and should not be used to prevent inspection of notifiable activities), military and defence installations, naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft.195 However, it is clear that the latitude allowed to inspectors is significantly broader than that given to observers. Initially, any request for inspection had to be based on doubt as to compliance in CSBM implementation,196 including notifiable but not notified military activity or notified but non-observable military activity. Paragraph 82 of the Vienna Document 1992 called for a statement of reasons for any request for inspection. However, since the beginning (1987), requests for inspection, as a general rule, had been made without any doubt or reason being stated. Inspection became a routine procedure – a sort of observation on demand (about which the N+NA countries had constant reservations). Drawing on the consequences of common practice, and considering that observable military activities were becoming scarce, the participating States decided to abolish the provisions referring to “doubt”. Without further ado, paragraph 73 of the Vienna Document 1994 was

190 See Vienna Document (1994), §§ 72, 77, 84 and 89. 191 Ibid., § 81. 192 Ibid., § 88. 193 Vienna Document (1994), § 88. 194 Ibid., §§ 74 and 75. 195 Ibid., § 79. 196 See Vienna Document (1992), § 78. 154   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

thus made to run as follows: “Any participating State will be allowed to address a request for inspection to another participating State within the zone of application for CSBMs.” c) Evaluation of military units/formations The evaluation regime is intended to provide a certain measure of verification of the data provided during annual exchanges of information concerning military forces as well as major weapons and equipment systems. While there could be no comprehensive verification on account of the large volume of the said information, what was possible was overall (random) verification on the basis of visits to a number of (both active and non-active) formations and units at their normal peacetime locations. Within the OSCE framework, each participating State is required to allow any other participating State to visit some of its land, amphibious and aerial formations and units on request submitted giving a five-day notice. The visit (carried out by up to two evaluators) must take place on a single working day and last a maximum of 12 hours.197 The evaluation regime has two main weaknesses. The first is that the requested State is entitled to refuse a visit: the response to an evaluation request may be negative on the ground that the unit/formation is unavailable or absent from its normal peacetime location.198 The second is the low level of quotas, which are passive in nature, as in the case of inspection. Each participating State is required to accept one evaluation visit per calendar year for every 60 units (or one visit for countries with less than 60 units); any State with more than 900 units (15 x 60 – which was the case of the USSR in 1990) will not have to accept more than 15 visits per calendar year.199

E. CSBMs for Crisis Management Since the collapse of communism, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the USSR, the relevance of the OSCE CSBMs has been called into question for two main reasons. Firstly, the security of post-communist Europe is affected by problems in which the military factor no longer plays a predominant role; and secondly, today’s armed conflicts are intra-state conflicts. It was thus natural that the idea of using CSBMs for crisis management purposes should arise. At the present stage, the OSCE has only taken preliminary steps in this direction. Firstly, the Vienna Document 1990 (revised in 1992 and 1994) introduced CSBMs for crisis management in a special section entitled “Risk Reduction”. Secondly, in November 1993 the FSC adopted a (politically non- binding) package of “Stabilization Measures for Localized Crisis Situations”.

197 See Vienna Document (1994), § 124. 198 Ibid., §§ 106, 110, 116 and 117. 199 Ibid., § 107.  Chapter IV   155

a) CSBMs for “risk reduction” These three measures concern unusual military activities, hazardous incidents of a military nature, and visits to dispel concerns about military activities. i) Clarification of unusual military activities The expression “unusual military activities” refers to military activities outside the annual calendar. Any participating State concerned about an “unusual and unscheduled” activity by the military forces of another participating State outside its normal peacetime location is entitled to present a request for explanation to the State in question. The responding State is requested to give “answers” and “explanations” within 48 hours. After examining the reply (or even at the outset), the requesting State may request either a bilateral meeting or a meeting of all participating States within the forum of the Permanent Committee/­Council (but initially held at the CPC), also within two days.200 It should be noted that the initiation of this mechanism is not based on an objective parameter (numerical, material or organic), but on the completely subjective criterion of “concern”. Since its establishment, the Mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities has been invoked on three occasions, all of which were associated with the Yugoslav crisis: – On 27 June 1991, Austria and Italy submitted to the Yugoslav authorities’ individual requests for clarifications concerning unscheduled military activities carried out by the Belgrade troops along their respective borders. Judging the Yugoslav answer unsatisfactory, Austria called for a meeting of all the participating States. This took place on 1 and 2 July 1992 at the Conflict Prevention Centre (Vienna). Following difficult discussions, the Advisory Committee adopted a compromise text entitled “Chairman’s Statement”, which, contrary to Austria’s wishes, did not contain a reprimand for Belgrade.201 – On 26 August 1991, Hungary submitted to Belgrade a request for clarification concerning repeated violations of its airspace and movements of Yugoslav troops along its border. Dissatisfied with Belgrade’s response, the Hungarian Government called for a bilateral meeting. At the end of the meeting (1 and 2 September 1991), a joint report was drawn up in which Yugoslavia expressed, inter alia, regret for the violation of the Hungarian airspace, and stated that it would take measures to prevent the repetition of such occurrences in future.202 – On 8 April 1992, Yugoslavia in its turn asked Hungary for clarification concerning possible military activities involving Croatian and Hungarian forces – an allegation that was at once denied by Budapest.

200 Ibid., §§ 16–16.2.2.4. 201 See 5th Meeting of the Conflict Prevention Centre Consulting Committee: Journal No. 6 of 1 and 2 July 1991. 202 Such incidents were going to happen again and consequently, on 30 October 1991, Hungary addressed a verbal note to the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre regarding an aircraft from Belgrade dropping bombs on Hungarian territory. See Note Verbale No. 11/CPC/HUN/1991. 156   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

ii) Clarification of hazardous incidents of a military nature The OSCE also has a procedure (not a “mechanism” in the technical sense) aimed at preventing and mitigating the effects of hazardous incidents of a military nature. Under this procedure, any participating State whose military forces are involved in an incident of this type should spontaneously report and clarify the incident at the earliest opportunity; any participating State affected by such an incident is also entitled to request clarification as appropriate, the response to which should be prompt. For this purpose, all participating States have been asked to designate a national point of contact to be contacted immediately in case of need.203 The procedure as regards hazardous incidents ­involves the use of the OSCE Communications Network and the Conflict Prevention Centre (as the repository of the list of national points of contact), as well as the Special Committee of the Forum for Security Co-operation (as the forum for discussion). iii) Dispelling concerns about military activities. During negotiations to improve the Vienna Document 1990, three countries (France, United Kingdom and Bulgaria) submitted a joint proposal to develop a Mechanism for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities. The proposal provided that any participating State could (on its own initiative or in response to “concerns” expressed by another participating State) invite defence attaches accredited to its capital to “take part in tours to areas in which there may be a cause for security concern about security.”204 The Vienna Document 1992 retained the general principle of the proposal, while extending the scope of visits to “military activities” in general and placing particular emphasis on the optional nature of such visits for the host State. The Vienna Document 1994 confirmed these provisions without making substantive amendments.205 b) Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations In November 1993, the Forum for Security Co-operation adopted a package entitled Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations. Arising from a proposal by NATO countries,206 this package offered a wide range of CSBMs: measures of transparency (extraordinary exchange of military information, including information concerning irregular forces; notification of certain military activities normally not required by the Vienna Document 1992; notification of plans for acquisition and deployment of major weapon and equipment systems);

203 See Vienna Document (1992), §§ 17–17 .4. It is noteworthy that the issue of prevention and management of dangerous incidents of a military nature was not a new topic. Various bilateral instruments (especially an American–Soviet agreement) already existed; for instance, the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (1972), or the Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (1989). 204 See CSCE/WV.27 (11 December 1991). 205 See Vienna Document (1994), §§ 18–18.2. 206 See CSCE/FSC/SC.15 (21 April 1993).  Chapter IV   157

measures of constraint (disengagement of operating forces, establishment of demilitarized zones, cessation of military flights over specified areas, deactivation of certain weapon systems); contact measures (establishment of direct lines of communication between the capitals and/or operational headquarters etc.); and, finally, verification measures (inspections, aerial observation, etc.) involving the intervention of third parties.207 The CSBMs implemented during the period 1975–1989 introduced a certain transparency to the European military scene (and hence better understanding and a higher level of predictability). This was an unprecedented phenomenon, not only in a field that had been previously taboo in East–West relations (as had human rights), but, in fact, also in the history of relations between military alliances in times of peace. At the same time, they facilitated the development of an ongoing dialogue between the military forces. Transparency and communication resulted in a significant change in military attitudes as much in the East as in the West. In the East, and in particular in the USSR, this change was indisputable. As early as 1977, only two years after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the application of the first CBMs, the Soviets recognized that these measures (which they had initially condemned as spying instruments) did “contribute to a certain extent to confidence-building and to military détente.”208 During the following decade (from 1986), under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, they took the decisive step of introducing into the CSBMs mechanism a compulsory inspection regime on request and without the right of refusal by the requested State: and the successful conduct of the first such field inspections is known to have accelerated the development of the verification regime of the Washington Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF). In any case, the CBMs/CSBMs were correctly implemented by the Warsaw Pact countries, except for a few rare cases.209 Without being as marked, the change in attitudes was no less real in the West. The experience of CSBMs transformed Western perceptions of USSR and Warsaw Pact military practices. Moreover, the acceptance by the NATO countries of at first “light” and then “heavy” measures of constraint was a development of no mean significance. As recognized by France, CBMs/CSBMs have contributed to “loosening up certain antagonisms” and to “erasing certain aspects of the Cold

207 See FSC: Journal No. 49 of 24 November 1993, Annex 2, “Stabilisation Measures”. 208 This text was submitted by the USSR to the Belgrade Follow-up Meeting (1977), see CSCE/BM/5 (24 October 1977). For more on the position the USSR adopted towards the CSBMs, see UN: A/45/397 (26 March 1990), pp. 15–17 and A/CN.l0/142 (8 May 1990). 209 The only significant violations of provisions contained in the CSBMs were military exercises conducted by the USSR in Poland. First, Soyuz 81, deployed at a crucial moment of the Polish crisis (this was by definition a notifiable activity, which was not notified), and then Zapad 81, conducted in the vicinity of the Polish border (this activity was partially notified). See Michael Holmes, Le respect des mesures propres à accroître la confiance : d’Helsinki à Stockholm (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1990), p. 5. 158   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

War” in Europe.210 The CSCE/OSCE process itself was a comprehensive CBM, a long and slow lesson in mutual psycho-political pedagogy in which the issue of CSBMs was of major importance (as was that of human rights). Despite the termination of the Cold War, CSBMs have not lost their raison d’être. In the multi-polar Europe of the post-communist era, the objective of transparency in military activities, forces and capabilities remains entirely relevant. The same applies to the objective of human contacts between the armed forces of the participating States and direct communication between their centres of political decision-making. The objective of verification has, arguably, a structural value in the sense that verification is an indispensable guarantee for any confidence-building process. As for the objective of moderation, it is becoming (with the steady decrease in the number, scope and frequency of military activities) less relevant, but nevertheless remains an essential indicator of the level of military activities in peacetime – the exceeding of which could act as a kind of warning light. The adoption of new CSBMs is now certainly no longer a priority. Currrently, the participating States have two main concerns with regard to CSBMs. The first is to improve effective implementation. Most notably, the participation of the States admitted to the OSCE since the disintegration of the USSR (in particular the States of Central Asia) leaves a certain amount to be desired; although the reasons for this are more financial and practical than political, this does nevertheless weaken the general potential of the Vienna Document regime. The second concern was to promote greater use of CSBMs in the event of “political bad weather”, that is to say, a time of tensions or conflicts at the regional level. Improved implementation requires technical measures, the adoption of which should not be problematic. On the other hand, in the absence of political will on the part of governments, it is less certain whether CSBMs will be integrated into the field of crisis management.

III. The Evolution of the Forum since the Budapest Review ­Conference The Budapest Review Conference of 1994 took two sets of decisions concerning the Forum for Security Co-operation, one regarding its functioning and the other regarding its mandate.

1. The Functioning of the Forum After two years in operation, it was apparent that the FSC (established in 1992) had certain weaknesses. Accordingly, at the Budapest Review Conference, a number of delegations submitted a collective text envisaging reforms designed to improve the working methods of the FSC and to follow up on the commitments

210 See statement by the French delegation, as delivered to the 1992 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting held under the auspices of the Conflict Prevention Centre Consultative Committee in Vienna (11 November 1992).  Chapter IV   159

deriving from its activities.211 The Budapest Review Conference contented itself with confirming that the Forum would maintain the autonomy and decision- making power within the CSCE that it still possesses, while recommending the establishment of practical co-operation between the Forum and the Permanent Council – as matters relating to military security (arms control) are not within the competence of the otherwise comprehensive jurisdiction of the Permanent Council. It should be noted that the Vienna Document 1994 entrusted the FSC (rather than the CPC) with the task of organizing the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings and also of considering suggestions made during AIAMs for improving implementation of CSBMs.212 In January 1995, the Forum took action fully in line with the proposals made at the Budapest Review Conference, deciding to appoint co-chairmen, rotating on a monthly basis, tasked with preparing draft agendas for each meeting and bringing to the attention of the FSC (on the basis of factual information provided by the CPC) all issues concerning the implementation of commitments binding on the participating States.213 The decision was also made to set up an informal working group to prepare the AIAM.214

2. The Mandate of the Forum The Budapest Review Conference of 1994 renewed the FSC’s Programme for Immediate Action, while instructing the Forum to study the foundations for a new arms control programme including CSBMs. Moreover, it also decided that the OSCE would initiate discussions on a security “model” for the twenty-first ­century.

A. The Extension of the Programme for Immediate Action (PIA) The PIA agenda as drawn up in the Helsinki Summit Document 1992 contained twelve themes, eight of which resulted in final texts agreed in 1993 and 1994, as shown in the table below. Two options were considered. The first implied incorporating these texts into the Vienna Document 1994 – in the operative part and/or as annexes. The second option was to include them in a compendium of all the OSCE/CSCE commitments on military security. On account of the heterogeneous nature of the texts, a median solution was preferred. Two (those relating to Defence Planning and the Programme for Military Contacts and Co- operation) were incorporated into the Vienna Document 1994. Two others (the Code of Conduct and the Principles Governing Non-­Proliferation) made up Chapter IV and VI of the Budapest Decisions respectively. The remaining texts (Global Exchange of Military Information and Stabilizing Measures for Localized

211 See CSCE/BC.43 (25 November 1994). 212 See Vienna Document (1994), § 147. For the mandates of the two FSC working groups, see FSC: Decision No. 9 of 5 April 1995. 213 See FSC: Decision No. 2 of 11 January 1995. 214 See FSC: Journal No. 97 of 18 January 1995 and Journal No. 105 of 15 March 1995. Moreover, as of 1995 the former FSC Special Committee was renamed the “Forum for Security Co-operation”, see FSC: Decision No. 1 of 11 January 1995. 160   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

Crisis Situations) were merely listed in the Annex to Chapter V of the Budapest Decisions, along with the Vienna Document 1994.

Status of the FSC’s Programme for Immediate Action

Working topic Adopted texts Harmonization of obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and CSBMs (Helsinki Summit Document 1992, § 46.A.l.) Development of the Vienna Document 1992 Vienna Document 1994 (2.XII.1994) (§ 46.A.2.) New stabilizing and confidence-building measures to address force generation capabilities of active forces (§ 46.A.3) Global Exchange of Military Information Global Exchange Of Military Information (§ 46.A.4) (28.XI.l994) Non-proliferation and international armaments Principles Governing Conventional Arms transfers (§§ 46.A.5 and 46.A.9) Transfers (25.Xi.1993) Principles Governing Non-­Proliferation (5.XII.1994) Regional security measures and issues (§§ 46.A.6 and 46.A.11) Force planning (§ 46.A.7) Defence Planning(25.XI.1993) Defence conversion (§ 46.A.8) Military co-operation and contacts (§ 46.A.10) Programme for Military Contacts and Co-operation (25.XI.l993) Norms of behaviour on politico-military aspects Code Of Conduct On Politico-­Military Aspects of security (§ 46.A.12) Of Security (3.XII.1994) (*) Conflict prevention and crisis management Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis techniques (§ 46.A.13) Situations (25.Xi.L993) Verification of arms control, disarmament and CSBM agreements (§ 46.A.14)

(*) Adopted on the expiry date of the silence procedure [under which the decision was taken].

Of the five working points that did not lead to any concrete results, the most important was undoubtedly the first, namely, harmonization of obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and CSBMs (CFE Treaty, CFE-1A agreement, ­Vienna Document 1992), which the Forum had put at the top of its priorities from the outset, together with that of norms of behaviour on politico- military aspects of security. In the case of the “harmonization of obligations” the aim was to d ­ evelop – on the basis of the CFE Treaty as the instrument with the highest standards – a regime for exchange of information, limitations, verification and institutional follow-up applicable to all participating States, whether Parties to the CFE Treaty or not. Harmonization was justified by the desirability of rationalizing the cost-­effectiveness of somewhat heterogeneous and sometimes redundant procedures, as well as the need to create a pan-European maximum security area on the basis of a set of unique rights and obligations. Considered from a technical angle, the exercise of harmonization nevertheless generated  Chapter IV   161

political and military r­ eservations on the part of the neutral States. They argued that harmonization under the CFE regime would be unfair to States that had exclusively or essentially non-­active armed forces and whose defensive posture required a significant infrastructure of permanent structures and storage sites. National thresholds set at too low or fairly rigid levels would be detrimental to the States’ response capacity in times of crisis given the time required for reactivation. In addition, overly intrusive verification procedures would weaken the effectiveness of decentralized defence systems. Attempts by Russia to use this harmonization initiative to diminish (if not undermine) the commitments of the CFE regime introduced a new issue into the debate.215 On account of the nature and scope of the difficulties, the Forum focused its attention on one of the issue’s inherent elements: the exchange of information. Despite intensive efforts, the FSC was unable to submit an approved text to the Budapest Review Conference.216 This failure can be attributed to the reluctance of neutral countries (other than Austria), to Russia’s ulterior motives with regard to the CFE Treaty, and to the cautiousness of certain Western countries (such as the United States) who were anxious to avoid any weakening of the said Treaty. For the rest, it should be pointed out that the topic of regional security gave rise to nothing more than fairly preliminary discussions and that the other topics (defence conversion, new stabilizing and confidence-building measures, verification) were not the subject of formal proposals nor even general discussions at the Forum. Although some delegations at Budapest (notably the Netherlands) considered that the PIA needed to have the “dead wood” cut out of it, the Review Conference did not follow this path, preferring instead to state, rather vaguely, that the Forum “will continue its work in accordance with its mandate and where appropriate develop new approaches to the terms therein, taking into account the specific characteristics of the armed forces of individual participating States.”217 The ­Budapest Review Conference thus refused to take a sharp knife to the PIA, or even

215 The issue of harmonization in the framework of the FSC became the focus of four basic proposals. The first was submitted by the Visegrad countries: CSCE/FSC/SC.1 (7 October 1992); the second by NATO countries: CSCE/FSC/SC.2 (14 October 1992); the third by Austria: CSCE/FSC/SC.4 (28 October 1992); and the fourth by the Russian Federation: CSCE/FSC/SC.12 (24 March 1993). For more proposals of a more specialized nature, see NATO countries: CSCE/FSC/SC/A.1 (24 March 1993) and Russian Federation: CSCE/FSC/SC.27 (8 June 1994). In terms of the exchange of military information, as well as verification, see proposals submitted by Sweden: CSCE/FSC/ SC/A.2 (7 July 1993) and CSCE/FSC/SC/A.2 Corr.1 (6 September 1993), and by NATO countries: CSCE/FSC/SC.28 (28 September 1994). 216 For the evolution of the draft of the text circulated by the Coordinator, see DOC.99 (20 April 1994), DOC.150 (27 April 1994), DOC.179 (9 May 1994), DOC.222 (11 May 1994), DOC.346 (9 June 1994), DOC.359 (16 June 1994), DOC.361 (16 June 1994), DOC.386 (22 June 1994), DOC.437 (1 July 1994), DOC.480 (6 July 1994), DOC.523 (20 July 1994), DOC.607 (25 August 1994), DOC.608 (25 August 1994) and DOC.688 (8 September 1994). 217 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter V, § 1. The English version of this caption, “armed forces of individual participating States”, emphasizes the defensive capabilities of each individual State and does not speak of collective defence. 162   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

to clarify whether the formal texts resulting from the Forum’s work exhausted the topics concerned or whether these were still open, that is, subject to further ­negotiation. Nevertheless, the Budapest Review Conference came to the conclusion that greater attention should be given to two sets of problems in the immediate future. Firstly, it recommended that the FSC should endeavour to improve existing ­CSBMs – addressing the content of the regime (implying “if appropriate” the ­adoption of new measures to “meet new challenges”), and its effective implemen­ tation.218 Secondly, it considered that the Forum should pay special attention to “regional security problems (including crises)” in a flexible manner, “in ways appropriate to each case.”219 Within the Forum, the discussion of regional issues had indeed been moving at a very slow pace. The PIA envisaged the discussion of such issues, as well as the negotiation of suitable measures for “regions” or border areas,220 through open-ended working groups or, as the case might be, working groups of limited size.221 On this basis, the three Baltic States submitted a first work proposal. Focusing on an approach that was more functional than geographical (i.e., defining a region as “a group of participating States or parts of the territories of certain participating States”), the work proposal advocated the establishment of exclusively open-ended working bodies in order to identify the “regions” on the basis of the existing security needs and challenges.222 Cyprus, for its part, submitted a proposal introducing regional security factors such as a dispute between several States of the same geographical area, the regional repercussions of the internal destabilization of a State, and any “source of concern” to neighbouring States.223 Finally, Poland presented a proposal offering a catalogue of specifically regional CSBMs.224 None of these steps led to any concrete outcome. At the Forum, the discussion on regional issues focused on the problem of the (open or restricted) composition of regional bodies – a problem raised by States wishing either to preserve the integrity of the principle of indivisibility of security, or to avoid engaging in embarrassing subregional political discussions. Curiously enough, the Budapest Decisions did not repeat the indication in the Budapest Declaration that the Summit mandated the Forum “to address spe­ cific regional security problems, with special emphasis on longer-term stability in

218 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter V, § 2. 219 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter V, § 3. 220 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter V, § 46. A.11 and § 46.A.6. 221 Ibid., §§ 35–38. 222 See CSCE/FSC/SC.9 (16 June 1993). 223 See CSCE/FSC/SC.20 (23 June 1993). This proposal was redrafted in a more concise wording and submitted once again at the Budapest Review Conference (1994), see CSCE/BC.37 (25 November 1994). 224 See DOC.385 (22 June 1994). The FSC has since held a workshop on arms control in the OSCE region; for the agenda and modalities, see FSC: Decision No. 13 of 24 May 1995 and Decision No.15 of 19 July 1995.  Chapter IV   163

South-Eastern Europe.”225 The idea of involving the CSCE in drafting the military arrangements required for any future comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav conflict, which had been put forward by Hungary at the opening of the Forum (September 1992), was received favourably by a number of participating States, including Turkey, the United States and Austria. At the conclusion of its meeting in Rome in December 1993, the Council of Ministers instructed the Forum to consider this proposal, which has since born real fruit in the form of the Dayton Agreement.226

B. Towards a New Arms Control Programme The Budapest Conference entrusted the Forum with the task of establishing a “framework” setting out the goals and methods for the development of a new arms control “programme” to build, maintain and improve stability and security in the CSCE region.227 Five guidelines were issued in this regard. Firstly, the framework’s approach was to be comprehensive, in order to address the diverse challenges and risks to military security in the CSCE region.228 Secondly, the framework was to have the effect of strengthening the existing network of security commitments between the participating States.229 This directive, in a sense, was derived from the issue of harmonization, as is also indicated by the important provision stating that nothing should affect the integrity of the CFE Treaty, which for the Forum was to remain the cornerstone of security and stability in Europe.230 Thirdly, the framework must be flexible, in order to allow for the adoption of measures that might vary in order to address the particular needs of individual States or regions as well as the community formed by the CSCE;231 in any case, this flexibility would be aimed at promoting complementarity between regional and CSCE-wide approaches.232 Fourthly, the framework was to be based on the CSCE’s Co-operative and comprehensive approach to security – and, therefore, was to aim at greater coherence

225 See Budapest Summit Declaration (1994), § 11, last sentence. 226 See Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § 1.1.7. See also the Austrian “non-paper” issued at the end of an informal meeting of the FSC in Vienna on 24 March 1994, “Host Country Summary of the First Informal FSC Meeting on Point 1.7 of the Rome Ministerial Decisions”. See further Chapter V in this volume, part III, section 3, ‘Provisions of The Dayton Agreement Relating to the OSCE’. 227 This decision was inspired by a proposal submitted to the Budapest Review Conference (1994) by France, Germany and Poland: CSCE/ BC.15 (24 November 1994). Note that Poland had previously submitted a more systematic and ambitious proposal to the FSC, see CSCE/FSC/SC.29 (7 September 1994). 228 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter V, § 4, second sentence. 229 Ibid., § 4 third sentence. 230 Ibid., § 6. 231 Ibid., § 4, fourth sentence. 232 Ibid., § 5, first sentence. 164   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

between the arms control activities and CSBMs and the overall goals of the CSCE.233 Fifthly, the framework was to allow for the development of a new arms control agenda excluding neither CSBMs for the “military forces of all participating States”234 nor disarmament measures.235

3. Towards a Security Model for the Twenty-First Century At the instigation of Russia, the Budapest Review Conference acknowledged that the time had come for the OSCE to develop a “common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first century”. However, the modalities of the exercise foreseen for this purpose were envisaged in vague and prudent terms. Chapter VII of the Budapest Decisions 1994 hardly specified the meaning or practical scope of the word “model”, merely stating that the objective was to devise a “concept of security”.236 Chapter VII also pointed out that the Model would draw its inspiration from the “CSCE principles” and from the provisions of the Charter of Paris and the Challenges of Change, or Helsinki Summit Document 1992 relating to “common and comprehensive security”, while recalling that, since the end of the Cold War, the CSCE had contributed to “Co-operative security” in the whole CSCE region.237 The Budapest mandate did not commit the participating States so much to develop a security model as to launch “a broad and comprehensive discussion” on all aspects of the issue.238 Moreover, it asserted, the debate “will not affect the inherent right of each and every participating State to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve.”239 This meant that the intended exercise could not hamper the ongoing efforts towards the enlargement of NATO. The text omitted any reference to the “European architecture” and did not mention that the other regional security organizations would contribute to the process. Despite these reservations and limitations, the decision taken by the Budapest Review Conference was far from insignificant. Indeed, if successfully carried out, this exercise could stimulate the participating States to finally formulate the OSCE’s security goals with a certain degree of precision and to realistically adjust its means for these clearly formulated purposes. In a nutshell, the Model could result in the OSCE being endowed with a security identity (which it had lacked

233 Ibid., § 5, second sentence. 234 Ibid., § 4, third sentence. Turkey did not manage to have “all the militarily significant non-nuclear forces” taken into account here. 235 Ibid., § 4, fourth sentence. 236 Ibid., chapter VII, second subsection, point C, first indent. 237 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VII, first subsection, first and second sentences. One could consider that the terms “common security” and “Co-operative security” are practically equivalent. 238 Ibid., second subsection, first indent. 239 Ibid., first subsection, last sentence.  Chapter IV   165

since the end of the Cold War), while at the same time introducing a certain degree of clarification with regard to the “architecture” of European security. No reference to the FSC was made in the Budapest mandate. It was announced that the discussions would take place at a special seminar (to be held in Vienna in the autumn of 1995) and at a meeting of the Senior Council before the next regular Ministerial Council in late 1995.240 The Budapest mandate also stressed the role of the Senior Council in deciding, on the basis of a progress report by the Chairman-in-Office, on the “modalities for the further discussion and possible work on the model” – it also being understood that the results of the exercise would be presented at the forthcoming Lisbon Summit.241 Discussions on the Model were initiated in March 1995 at the first meeting of the newly named Senior Council (ex-Committee of Senior Officials).242 In the summer of 1995 the Permanent Council decided to delegate the issue to an informal open-ended group and determined the agenda and practical arrangements for the Vienna Seminar243. Held on 18 and 19 September 1995, the seminar gave rise to rich exchanges of ideas.244 On the basis of the work done thus far, the Budapest Ministerial Council of December 1995 considered that the exercise could move to “a more operational phase”, and decided that the issue of the Model would be kept on the Senior Council’s agenda until the 1996 Summit in ­Lisbon, would then be dealt with by a “Security Model Committee” operating under the auspices of the Permanent Council, and would be the subject of further ­seminars.245 From the outset, discussions on the Model exposed deep differences of opinion regarding the fundamental aspects of the issue. The vast majority of participating States dismissed the ambitious idea of negotiating a “new European security order” the principles of which would be set forth in a Charter containing security guarantees. They also opposed making the OSCE’s security commitments legally binding. Likewise, they objected to any reinterpretation (total or partial) of the Helsinki Decalogue, in particular any reinterpretation calling into question the equality of the Principles or defining a new articulation between Principle IV (Territorial integrity of States) and Principle VIII (Self-determination of peoples). Lastly, and most importantly, they refused to let the Model suggest any hierarchy amongst the region’s security organizations or even give them specific roles. This last point was the most sensitive, as it affected the problem of Russian opposition

240 Ibid., second subsection, third and fourth indent. 241 Ibid., second subsection, last indent. 242 See 1st Meeting of the Senior Council (1995): Journal No. 2 of 31 March 1995, Annex, p. 2. See also 3rd Meeting of the Senior Council (1995): Journal No. 2 of 27 October 1995, Annex 2, pp. 1–2. 243 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 65 of 25 July 1995 and Decision No. 67 of 24 August 1995. 244 For the summary of the works yielded by the Vienna Workshop, see REF.PC/568/95 (5 October 1995). 245 See Budapest Ministerial Council (1995): Decision No. 2 of 8 December 1995 on a “Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the Twenty-First Century: A New Concept for a New Century”. 166   Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security ­ Co-operation (FSC)

to NATO enlargement and, furthermore, Franco-American disagreements concerning NATO/WEU interaction and the relationship between NATO and the OSCE. On the other hand, the participating States found that they could at least agree on the basic concept for the Model, on the need for a preliminary security risks and challenges inventory in the OSCE area, and, finally, on the principle of improving OSCE co-operation with existing security organizations. At the present stage, the status of the question is as follows. With regard to the basic concept for the Model, the participating States agreed that it should be based on a concept of Co-operative, undivided and comprehensive security – which does not indicate any apparent innovation in relation to the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), the Helsinki Summit Document (1992) and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994). On the basis of a draft submitted by the Hungarian Presidency, the participating States drew up an informal list of security risks and challenges (politico-military, human, economic, social and environmental) affecting the OSCE area.246 Finally, the participating States considered that the solutions that might be envisaged in the Model to address the said risks and challenges should take into account not only the OSCE’s own resources, but also those offered by all the organizations, structures and security arrangements operating on the Continent (from the United Nations to the Stability Pact). In this context, it was suggested that the strengthening of co-operation between the OSCE and other bodies should be based on the principles of “comparative advantage”, complementarity, synergy and internal development under conditions of full transparency and ­democracy.247

246 Elements of this informal list drawn up by the Hungarian Chairmanship can be found in REF.PC/418/95 (24 August 1995), REF.PC/418/95 Rev.1 (15 September 1995) and Rev.2 (4 December 1995), as well as in REF.PC/497/95 (18 September 1995). The list incorporated contributions made by the European Union: REF.PC/103/95 (5 May 1995) and REF.PC/272/95 (14 June 1995), as well as by Hungary, Poland and Slovakia: REF.PC/273/95 (14 June 1995). 247 See REF.PC/92/95 (3 May 1995) for a list of subjects discussed. See also reports on progress made by the Hungarian Chairmanship: REF.PC/369/95 (19 July 1995), REF.PC/567/95 (2 October 1995), REF.PC/575/95 (3 October 1995), REF.PC/619/95 (17 October 1995) and REF. MC/14/95 (4 December 1995). For reports delivered by the Swiss Chairmanship, see REF.PC/91/96 (2 February 1996), REF.PC/117/96 (14 February 1996), REF.PC/91/96 Add.1 (11 March 1996), REF.PC/255/96 (17 April 1996) and REF.PC/432/96 (3 July 1996).  Chapter V   167

CHAPTER V The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts During the Cold War period, the CSCE had no operational capacity whatsoever. The Helsinki Final Act certainly anticipated the development of a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes and gave the military confidence-building measures (CBMs), among other functions, the role of reducing the risk of an “accidental” war in Europe. Prior to the collapse of communism, however, no such method of peacefully settling disputes had emerged. As for the CBMs regime, it essentially served to confirm the non-threatening nature of military activities carried out as routine exercises during peacetime.1 The Helsinki process thus confined itself to providing participating States with a forum for dialogue and an instrument for drafting standards, without ever managing crises or conflicts.2 Only from the end of the Cold War onwards did the newly institutionalized CSCE gradually begin to equip itself with a range of instruments to manage crises and conflicts. This chapter looks at the stages in the development of the CSCE’s operational capacities in this area, before analysing how it responded to armed or potential conflicts affecting the geopolitical areas of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia.

I. Development of the CSCE’s Operational Capacities Within the context of the institutionalized CSCE/OSCE, the theme of peace in the OSCE area is frequently addressed on the basis of a threefold distinction between “conflict prevention”, “crisis management” and “peaceful settlement of disputes”

1 However, the provisions relating to observation and inspection add a certain operational dimension to the CBMs/CSBMs. 2 The OSCE has never intervened in the management of the Cyprus conflict. Since 1975, however, there has been an ongoing controversy between Turkey (which refuses to give the Republic of Cyprus the right to represent all Cypriots at the OSCE) on the one hand and Cyprus and Greece on the other hand. For the caveats and interpretative statements formulated by the three States concerned, see Co-ordination Committee of the second stage of the CSCE: Journal No. 83 of 21 July 1975; CSCE/III/1 (31 July 1975); CSCE/III/2 (1 August 1975); Belgrade Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 66 of 5 August 1977; Madrid Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 318 of 20 July 1983 and Journal No. 319 of 21 July 1983; Budapest Cultural Forum: CSCE/CFB/R.5 (17 October 1985), pp. 27–39; Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe: Journal No. 379/Rev. 2 of 19 September 1986; Vienna Follow-up Meeting: CSCE/WT/ VR.7 (7 November 1986), pp. 47–57; Palma de Mallorca Meeting on the Mediterranean: CSCE/ RMP/Inf. 4, 5 and 6 (18 and 19 October 1990); PrepCom of the Paris Summit: Journal No. 30 of 16 November 1990; Paris Summit: CSCE/SP/Inf. 1 (21 November 1990); Valletta Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Journal No. 4 of 19 January 1991 and Journal No. 19 of 8 February 1991; CSCE/PSDV/Inf.1 and 2 (17 and 18 January 1991); Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage: CSCE/SCHC/Inf. 1 and 2 (7 June 1991); Berlin Council of Ministers: Journal No. 3 of 20 June 1991, pp. 1–2,; Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992 pp. 3–4, 8–9; Geneva Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Journal No. 10 of 23 October 1992, pp. 2–4; Stockholm Ministerial Council: Journal No. 1 of 14 December 1992, item 7 (a), and Journal No. 2 of 15 December 1992 item 7 and Budapest Summit: Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994, pp. 5–7. 168   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

(or even “resolution of conflicts”?). This distinction is highly unfortunate. It suggests the existence of three clear-cut situations (“conflicts”, “crises”, “disputes”) subject to three very specific approaches relating to “prevention”, “management” and “settlement/resolution”. The concepts of “conflict” and “dispute” are usually interchangeable, except that the latter belongs to the vocabulary of international law. As for the concepts of “crisis” and “conflict”, these are interdependent and may be two (successive) stages in the same reality. A crisis is a situation marked by varying degrees of tension, but where armed force has not yet been used systematically or on a large scale. When force is deployed both systematically and on a large scale, a “crisis” becomes a “conflict”. A crisis may therefore sometimes be the preliminary stage of an armed conflict, which is quite simply a crisis which has degenerated into war. The distinction between “prevention”, “management” and “settlement/ resolution” is equally difficult to justify. Situations affecting stability and peace can be “managed” either preventively (prior to the use of force) or a posteriori (after the use of force). Any successful “prevention” is, in principle, equivalent to a settlement/resolution. While any successful “prevention” is per se equivalent to a settlement or resolution, “prevention” and a posteriori “resolution” may be considered as two sequential and complementary forms of “management” – one for potential conflicts and the other for open conflicts. Deriving from preventive diplomacy techniques, the prevention of potential conflicts is in fact no more than the management of crises at an early stage, involving the existence of an early warning mechanism and the adoption of early action. As for the resolution of conflicts which are already under way, referred to in UN language as “peacemaking”, this may be undertaken either using procedures based on co-operation between the parties, or using coercion (armed or unarmed) towards the party judged to be guilty of aggression. While the former constitutes peaceful resolution/settlement of conflicts (or “disputes”, when judicial or arbitral channels have been used), the latter constitutes peace enforcement. To stay with UN terminology, a peaceful resolution/settlement process may be supplemented by a peacekeeping ­ mechanism aiming at stabilizing the situation on the ground and supported by a peace­building mechanism designed to lay sustainable foundations for a paper- based political settlement. The CSCE was somewhat reluctant to become involved in crisis and conflict management. The West was keen both to find a new role for NATO and to define the conditions for operational complementarity between the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, and hence made the CSCE’s “operationalization” conditional upon prior clarification of the new framework for European security. Thus, for a period, the CSCE remained hostage to Franco-American disagreements on this issue. Under the pressure of the events in Yugoslavia and the outbreak of armed conflicts in the countries of the former USSR, the participating States resigned themselves to endowing the CSCE with operational capacities – but with definite limits and no overall vision. This process was slow and arduous, and consisted of three main stages.  Chapter V   169

1. The Preliminary Arrangements of 1991 In the CSCE’s first year as an institutionalized body, and as the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) established by the Charter of Paris was beginning its activities, the participating States took two small steps forward by developing a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes and by establishing a mechanism for emergency political consultations within the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO).

A. The Valletta Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (February 1991) The idea of a pan-European system for peaceful settlement of disputes (PSD) was proposed by Switzerland as early as 1973 and was immediately added to the CSCE’s permanent work programme. However, prior to the collapse of communism, none of the projects submitted to this end ever came to fruition. Should this have come as a surprise? The PSD system was developed on the assumption of two essential conditions: international relations which were exempt from the structural threat of the use of force between the States in question and a consensus between them on the primacy of international law. However, these conditions barely existed in a Europe which was divided into blocs, living under the threat of mutually assured destruction and which fundamentally disagreed not only on the universality but even on the very essence of the rules of international law. Given the security concerns in Europe at the time, the protection inherent in a possible pan-European PSD system could only ever be marginal in comparison with the guarantees provided by NATO or the Warsaw Pact. In reality, the adoption of such a system was only of interest to States outside the blocs, which, being small States, traditionally relied upon international law to defend their interests. The neutral and non-aligned CSCE States (N+NA States) had – as “beggars” rather than “choosers” – nothing to offer in return to the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which represented two thirds of the participating States. Within the CSCE, the subject of PSD was only addressed in vague afterthoughts: from the first Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Montreux, 1978) to the second (Athens, 1984), States of the West and East blocked mutually unacceptable proposals. The West knew how to score points by casting the members of the Warsaw Pact (with the exception of Romania) as a single group of States hostile to the idea of unilateral appeal to an external body and binding decisions emanating from it. 3 In the wake of perestroika, the USSR’s about-turn on international law and PSD rekindled hope of a breakthrough by the CSCE.4 Two provisions in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting adopted in January 1989 appeared to offer promising prospects in this regard. The first stated that the participating States “accept, in principle, the mandatory involvement of a third party

3 For further details, see Victor-Yves, Ghebali: The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973–1989, (Volume I), chapter III. 4 On the new Soviet position, see A/43/829 (22 September 1989) and A/44/585 (2 October 1989). 170   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

when a dispute cannot be settled by other peaceful means.”5 Swiss in origin, this wording was adopted thanks to support from the N+NA States and the USSR, but without great enthusiasm from the western States in general or the United States in particular.6 The second provision announced the convening of a new Meeting of Experts (to be held in Valletta in January/February 1991), tasked with establishing a preliminary list of categories of disputes likely to be subject to a PSD with the mandatory involvement of a third party, as well as the related procedures and mechanisms.7 Nevertheless, the idea of binding third-party decisions featured on the mandate of the Meeting of Experts only as a simple working hypothesis.8 The fragility of the consensus reached in Vienna in 1989 was to become apparent as early as 1990. During the drafting of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the twelve member countries of the European Union set out their differences on the theme of PSD, while other countries (United States, Turkey) confirmed their restrictive stance on the subject.9 Ultimately, the Charter of Paris confirmed the participating States’ desire to “not only seek effective ways of preventing, through political means, conflicts which may yet emerge, but also define, in conformity with international law, appropriate mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise.” Consequently, the participating States reaffirmed their commitment to “seek new forms co-operation in this area, in particular a range of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including mandatory third-party involvement.”10 By using the plural and only mentioning the third party in passing, this wording appears to reflect a certain reluctance towards the provisions of the Vienna Concluding Document. In the troubled international context of the Gulf War, the Valletta Meeting of Experts (15 January to 8 February 1991) confirmed the reality of these doubts.11 The experts dismissed the Swiss proposal (which proposed a mandatory

5 Vienna Follow-up Meeting (1989): Concluding Document, section on “Principles”. 6 The United States insisted that the caveat “in principle” be added. 7 Vienna Follow-up meeting (1989): Concluding Document, section on “Principles”, § 7. 8 Ibid., § 7, third-to-last sentence. 9 While Germany wished to assign a PSD role to the future Conflict Prevention Centre and France proposed instituting a “High Council”, other countries (Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) were in principle opposed to new institutions because they were concerned about the possible duplication of efforts; in addition, the United Kingdom was not prepared to accept more than a simple conciliation procedure on a voluntary basis. See Gerard J. Tanja: “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the CSCE: Bridge over Troubled Water”, Helsinki Monitor, 4/1 (1993), p. 24. 10 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), “Guidelines for the future”, section on “Security”, § 6. 11 Regarding the work of the Valletta Meeting of Experts, see Charles Leben: “La création d’un Organisme CSCE pour le règlement pacifique des différends”, Revue générale de droit international public, 95 (1991), pp. 857–880; P.H. Kooijmans: “The Mountain Produced a Mouse. The CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, Leiden Journal of International Law, 5/1 (February 1992), pp. 91–97; Hélène Ruiz Fabri: “La CSCE et le règlement pacifique des différends: l’élaboration d’une méthode”, Annuaire français de droit international, XXXVII (1991), pp. 297–314; and Lucius Caflisch: “Règlement pacifique des différends en Europe: la Procédure de La Valette et les perspectives d’avenir”, in Etudes de droit international en l’honneur de Pierre Lalive (Basel/ Frankfurt: Helbling & Lichtenhahn, 1993), pp. 437–456.  Chapter V   171

conciliation procedure for disputes of any kind and a mandatory arbitration procedure for certain categories of dispute)12 in favour of the less restrictive German-Italian proposals.13 Criticisms of the Swiss proposal demonstrated that “fears concerning the large Western countries’ fidelity to PSD were all too well founded: with Soviet opposition no longer an issue, large States’ apparent preference for a ‘heavy duty’ system [gave way] to their traditional aversion to PSD involving the mandatory involvement of a third party.”14 The Gulf War was to exacerbate this trend: given Turkey’s strategic importance for military operations, western States were hardly inclined to put pressure upon it when it was notoriously hostile to the binding procedures of PSD on account of its many disputes with Greece.15 Entitled “Provisions for a CSCE Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, the substantive part of the Final Report of the Valletta Meeting offers States involved in the pan-European process the possibility of submitting (under very strict conditions) bilateral disputes to a CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism. This Mechanism was not a permanent institution. It could only intervene (upon unilateral request) on a case-by-case basis, using a register of qualified persons – for which the CPC was ultimately to become the depositary – from within which the parties to the dispute would, by common agreement, choose persons to be called to form the Mechanism.16 Besides the fact that it in no way covered civil disputes (currently the most common in Europe), the Valletta Procedure was disappointing for four main reasons. Firstly, the Procedure was merely residual in nature. It offered no additional possible recourse for parties in the event of other procedures failing. Section III unequivocally affirms that the procedure does not apply if the dispute has previously been dealt with, or is being addressed under some other procedure for the settlement of disputes, or is covered by any other process which parties to the dispute have accepted. One of the experts at Valletta rightly said that it was “absurd (...) to exclude a dispute from the Valletta Mechanism simply because it had been subject to a procedure which had no result or because it was likely to be subject to such a procedure in the future,” and “even more absurd to exclude a

12 See CSCE/PSDV.1 (15 January 1991) and CSCE/PSDV.1/Add.1 (18 January 1991). 13 The German-Italian proposal, CSCE/PSDV.6 (31 January 1991), which was co-sponsored by five other countries of the European Union, made a distinction between the disputes affecting peace and stability in Europe (dealt with by the CSO) and all other disputes (which have to undergo an ad hoc conciliation procedure). The American proposal: CSCE/PSDV.3 (28 January 1991) suggested a “facilitation” procedure closer to assistance than mediation. The meeting also gave consideration to a French proposal: CSCE/PSDV.5 (30 January 1991) that included the idea, submitted during the development of the Charter of Paris, of a “High Council”, as well as other proposals submitted by different groups of European Union States: CSCE/PSDV.2 (25 January 1991) and CSCE/PSDV.7 (1 February 1991). 14 See Caflisch, “Règlement pacifique …”, (n. 11), p. 445. 15 Ibid., p. 442. 16 Berlin Council of Ministers (1991): Summary of Conclusions, § 8 and Annex 3. 172   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

dispute simply because it could be or had already been the subject of negotiations or consultations.”17 Secondly, the Procedure was very limited in its scope of application. In contrast to the recommendations of the Vienna mandate, the Valletta Report did not list the disputes for which a unilateral request was admissible but, rather, listed those which were inadmissible. The first paragraph of Section XII thus expressly excludes disputes involving questions relating to “territorial integrity” (including, therefore, border disputes), “national defence”, “title to sovereignty over land territory” or “competing claims with regard to the jurisdiction over other areas” (marine and air spaces). These exceptions were retained at the request of countries wishing to preserve their freedom to conduct nuclear testing (France) or wishing to avoid certain of their bilateral disputes being referred to the CSCE, including disputes relating to the continental plateaux of the Aegean Sea (Turkey), Ulster (United Kingdom) and Gibraltar (United Kingdom and Spain).18 As the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe admitted, “this self-judging clause, contained in Section XII, guts the mechanism of the power to deal with the most pressing issues between and within the participating States.”19 It is notable that the CSCE Dispute Settlement Mechanism cannot be established or continued (when it has already been established) if any of the parties “considers”, i.e., even simply alleges, that the dispute relates to one of the four categories mentioned above. Section XII thus does more than simply limit the ratione materiae scope of the procedure, that is to say, the extent to which it can decide on the matter in hand: it deprives the Mechanism of even the jurisdiction to decide upon whether it has jurisdiction.20 The participating States thus appear to have wanted to go back to “practices from the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries, which consisted of excluding from conventional PSD commitments conflicts which were likely to challenge the vital interest, independence or honour of the contracting States.”21

17 See Caflisch, “Règlement pacifique … ” (n. 11), p. 450. 18 Ibid., p. 442, and Leben: “La création d’un Organisme CSCE…” (n. 11), § 21, p. 864. After the Valletta Meeting, the expression “competing claims with regard to jurisdiction over other areas” was the subject of two interpretative statements. On the one hand, Greece – while considering the exceptions to Section XII, § 1, regrettable because they “reduce the possibility of using the mechanism effectively” – declared that it accepted the particular expression “in the terms it is written and solely in those, without any further qualification”, see the Valletta Meeting of Experts: Journal No. 19 of 8 February 1991, p. 3. On the other hand, Turkey declared that it accepted the particular expression “subject to the condition that it is construed by definition to comprise the areas listed hereinbelow: internal waters, territorial sea, all kinds of contiguous zone, continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, other areas of this kind as well as national airspace”, ibid., p. 4; see also Turkey’s interpretative statement during the Stockholm Council of Ministers adoption of a “directed” conciliation procedure, see Stockholm Council of Ministers: Journal No. 1 of 14 December 1992, item 7 (b). 19 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the CSCE Process (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1991), p. 12. 20 See Caflisch: “Règlement pacifique” (n. 11), p. 451. 21 Ibid., p. 452.  Chapter V   173

Thirdly, the Valletta mechanism can normally only be endowed with limited competences. Its role is to assist the parties in finding suitable procedures for the settlement of the dispute (Section VII) and, but only secondarily, to help the parties find a solution to it (Section XI). In both cases, the “general or specific comments or advice” provided by the mechanism have no binding value. As the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe recognized, “ironically, the primary function of the Valletta mechanism is not to resolve disputes, as its name might lead to believe. On the contrary, it is designed to be a less intrusive intermediary step that would facilitate the resolution of disputes by the parties themselves without actually being involved in the dispute resolution process.”22 The Valletta procedure excluded any form of arbitration. Some lawyers likened it to an “informal conciliation procedure”.23 Others position it more accurately “in the grey area (...) between good offices and mediation”; indeed, “it goes beyond good offices in the sense that suggestions may be presented to the parties, while ‘good offices’ in its strict sense consists only of bringing one party together with another. It falls short of mediation which, generally, culminates in recommendations on the underlying dispute.”24 Fourthly, the process of establishing, i.e., activating the CSCE Mechanism is unduly complex and somewhat random. Even a moderately attentive reading of Section V of the Valletta Report reveals the extreme complexity of the process, which could, as a result of the possibility of the parties challenging the inclusion of the experts, lead to the establishment of a downright spectral CSCE Mechanism (consisting of a single individual) or one paralysed on account of having an even number of members.25 In any case, the provisions of Section V enable the recalcitrant party, at best, to slow down the procedure and, at worst, to block it completely. It should also be noted that nothing in the text adopted in Valletta indicates the way in which the Mechanism should be established in the particular case of a dispute involving more than two parties.26 Clearly, the Valletta Procedure “in no way resembles a major European system for settling disputes.”27 Unattractive on account of the narrowness of its scope of application and the complexity of its practical modalities, it has to this day remained unused – despite a minor amendment adopted by the Ministerial Council in December 1992, which shortened the timescale within which the

22 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (n. 19), p. 18. 23 Leben: “La création d’un Organisme CSCE …” (n. 11), p. 877 (§ 70). 24 Caflisch: “Règlement pacifique … ” (n. 11), p. 448. 25 Ibid., p. 447. 26 The sole reference to the matter comes in an asterisk relating to Section V, § 3, that contains the following laconic note: “The problems arising when the parties are more than two will require further consideration”. In this respect, the reference in Section IV to “other party or parties to the dispute” is irelevant. 27 Leben: “La création d’un Organisme CSCE” (n. 11), p. 878 (§ 75). 174   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

parties to a dispute had to reach a CSCE Mechanism agreement from three to two months.28

B. The Berlin Mechanism for Calling Emergency Meetings of the CSO (June 1991) The Berlin Mechanism is mentioned here only by way of a reminder. It should simply be recalled that it enabled participating States to hold emergency political consultations on the conflict in Yugoslavia on several occasions in 1991.29

2. The Key Arrangements of 1992 During the Prague Meeting of the Council of Ministers, the participating States agreed in principle on certain provisions concerning the strengthening of the CSCE’s operational capacities, which provisions the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting would further develop in its Decisions.

A. The Recommendations of the Prague Document (January 1992) During its second Meeting (30 and 31 January 1992), the CSCE Council of Ministers adopted the Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures. Section VI of this document opens with a provision stating that “the capabilities of the CSCE to engage in crisis management and conflict prevention and resolution should be improved.”30 Consequently, the Council addressed four recommendations to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, which (on account of significant differences in points of view between participating States) were very largely formulated in indirect, cautious and even vague terms. Firstly, the Council requested the Follow-up Meeting to study the possibilities for improving certain crisis and conflict management instruments, namely: fact- finding and rapporteur missions; monitor missions; good offices; counselling and conciliation; and dispute settlement.31 Since its institutionalization, the CSCE had occasionally made use of these instruments on a pragmatic basis; by virtue of the Moscow Mechanism for the human dimension and the Valletta Report on the peaceful settlement of disputes, it in fact had quite an array of instruments at its disposal by this stage. Secondly, the Council expressly requested that the Conference discuss the question of peacekeeping. It recommended that the Conference “give careful consideration to possibilities for CSCE peacekeeping or a CSCE role in peacekeeping,”32 a formulation which placed the idea of giving the CSCE the ability to undertake peacekeeping operations independently, on a par with that of

28 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisin No. 1 of 14 December 1992, Annex 1, was adopted following a Swiss-U.S. proposal. For the list of experts appointed on the basis of Section V of the Valletta Report, see alos REF.SEC/149/95 (12 July 1995). 29 See Chapter II in this volume, ‘The Institutions of the OSCE ‘, (n. 85). 30 Prague Council of Ministers: Decision No.1, § 21 (30 January 1992). 31 Ibid., § 22. 32 Ibid., § 23.  Chapter V   175

allowing the CSCE only to mandate other international organizations in the region (NATO) to do so. Thirdly, concerning the institutions to be vested with crisis and conflict management roles, the Council considered that the “tasks” involving, in each case, a “precise mandate” and “arrangements for reporting back”, might be delegated to the Chairman-in-Office of the CSO, the Consultative Committee of the CPC or to “open-ended groups of participating States of an ad hoc character”.33 The Consultative Committee of the CPC was given new functions, particularly to act as a forum for consultation and co-operation in conflict prevention, and in addition to serve as a forum for co-operation in the implementation of decisions on crisis management taken by the Council of Ministers or the CSO,34 to decide upon and execute fact-finding and monitoring missions,35 and to draw the CSO’s attention, at any time, to any situation which it might regard as requiring the latter’s consideration.36 Fourthly, with regard to the binding or non-binding nature of the decisions on the management of crises and conflicts, the Council stated that “provision should be made for the further operational implementation with the CSCE of decisions by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials.”37 This paragraph reflected, in obscure terms, the opposition between supporters and opponents of a CSCE endowed with the capacity to take binding decisions, or at least to ensure real follow-up to its decisions.38 Notwithstanding the reference to “peacekeeping”, the recommendations in the Prague Document aim less to grant the CSCE new operational capacities than to improve the use of existing instruments. Moreover, they introduced (for the first time in the CSCE’s history), the somewhat specious distinction between “crisis management” and “conflict prevention and resolution”. Finally, the extreme caution of the wording reveals the existence of only the barest of consensus between participating States on the subject of crisis and conflict management.

B. The Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992) The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (24 March to 8 July 1992) embarked upon a vast debate on the CSCE’s operational capacities relating to crisis and conflict management. It took place on the basis of two working proposals, from Hungary39 and the United Kingdom40 respectively. Submitted in manifest breach of the rules

33 Ibid., § 25. Initially, certain States had proposed that the groups have limited membership. 34 Ibid., § 28. See also § 27. 35 Ibid., § 29. 36 Ibid., § 33. 37 Ibid., § 24. 38 This provision only related to the decisions of the Council of Ministers and the CSO. With regard to the CPC, another provision stated, even more vaguely, that the Consultative Committee “will develop guidelines for the implementation of its operational tasks”, ibid., § 31. 39 CSCE/HM/WG1/3 (15 April 1992). 40 CSCE/HM/WG1/4 (30 April 1992). 176   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

on community solidarity regarding the harmonization of foreign policy, the UK text was later superseded by a relatively similar proposal which received the official stamp of approval from the twelve countries of the EU.41 The debate resulted in a multitude of provisions about various aspects of crisis and conflict management, recorded in Chapters II and III (and particularly in the first Chapter) of the ­Helsinki Decisions 1992. Chapter III formed the central element of these provisions, and was entitled “Early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management (including fact-­ finding and rapporteur missions and CSCE peacekeeping), peaceful settlement of disputes”. This catch-all title was far from fortunate. Firstly, it confirmed the specious distinction previously introduced by the Prague Document between “conflict prevention” and “crisis management”. It then replaced the concept of “conflict resolution” (also a product of the Prague Document) with that of “peaceful settlement of disputes”. Finally, it placed the concept of “early warning” on a par with that of “conflict prevention”, even though the former only constituted one aspect of the latter. The internal structure of the Chapter further increases the confusion through redundant headings successively devoted to “early warning and preventive action”, “political management of crisis [sic]”, “instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management” and, finally, “peaceful settlement of disputes”. This confusion reflects that of the initial proposals from Hungary and the United Kingdom. Thus, the Hungarian text included a jumble of provisions on “early warning” and “early action” with a view to “conflict prevention”; on “concerted action” with a view to “preventing conflicts and resolving crises”; and on the CSCE’s “capacity for action” with regard to the “collection of information”, “conflict resolution”, “maintaining stability in conflict zones” (“peacekeeping” operations), and “operational control”. The flaw in the UK text was that it only addressed potential conflicts, which were described as “disputes which have the potential to develop into armed conflict”. At first glance, the text proposed by the twelve countries of the European Union may appear as confused as the Hungarian text: it proposed a whole package of measures relating to “conflict prevention”, “crisis management” and the “resolution of disputes”. However, its provisions were formulated from a position that was better thought-out than that behind the Hungarian text and more diverse than that underlying the British text; they were the following: the identification of potential conflicts with a view to avoiding their escalation into crises; the settlement of “disputes” or “crises” through peaceful means; and the consolidation of stability in situations of (potential or existing) armed conflict by means of peacekeeping operations. Ultimately, setting aside its disordered and illogical structure, Chapter III of the Helsinki Decisions 1992 clearly addresses the entire issue from the three angles defined in the text from the twelve EU member countries: the prevention of potential conflicts, the settlement of conflicts, and peacekeeping.

41 CSCE/HM/WG1/9 (26 May 1992) and Rev. 1 (3 June 1992).  Chapter V   177

a) Conflict prevention Chapter III establishes an early warning mechanism regarding prevention. This covers “situations [...] which have the potential to develop into crises, including armed conflicts.”42 Its ambition is not, therefore, limited simply to the management of pre-conflicts, which is what crises actually are, but also what one might call pre- crises. The text does not specify whether the mechanism is limited to international crises and conflicts or whether it also covers (as the British proposal and, subsequently, the proposal of the twelve member countries of the EU suggested), civil crises and conflicts. Given the reference in paragraph 17 to peacekeeping operations, however, it could well be considered that it encompasses both categories.43 Early warning is supposed to take place following “in-depth political consultations, within the structures and institutions of the CSCE”, including the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings for CSBMs (AIAMs) and the Human Dimension Implementation Meetings.44 The CSO (Senior Council from 1994), acting as the agent of the Ministerial Council, is the central element of the prevention mechanism.45 It may be requested to intervene (through the CiO) by any party to a dispute, by a group of 11 participating States not party to a dispute, by the High Commissioner on National Minorities, by the CPC, or even on the basis of the Human Dimension Mechanism (Moscow Mechanism) or the Valletta Principles and Provisions.46 At the preventive intervention stage, the role of the CSO essentially consists of promoting steps by the State or States concerned to avoid any action which could aggravate the situation and, where appropriate, recommend other procedures and mechanisms to settle the dispute peacefully.47 The CSO is also empowered to seek independent advice and counsel from external experts,48 and may establish fact-finding and rapporteur missions.49 This general mechanism is supplemented by a specialized instrument for the prevention of conflicts involving issues of national minorities: the High Commissioner on National Minorities.50

42 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 3. 43 Ibid., Chapter III, § 17: “CSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States.” 44 Ibid, Chapter III, § 3. 45 Ibid., Chapter III, § 4. 46 Ibid., Chapter III, § 5. This list leaves out “NGO submissions”, an idea suggested by Hungary. The quorum of 11 States that are not party to the dispute is a compromise that is closer to the proposal by the European Union countries (12 States) than to the Hungarian proposal (5 States). 47 Ibid., Chapter III, § 6. 48 Ibid., Chapter III, § 7. The idea of legal opinions, which was raised during the negotiation, was not adopted. 49 Ibid., Chapter III, § 12. 50 For additional details, see further in this volume, Chapter VII, part III, section 3 ‘OSCE’S Preventive Diplomacy Approach’. 178   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

b) Conflict resolution If preventive action remains unsuccessful or has not been duly undertaken, the CSO may conclude that “concerted CSCE action is required”. It may, therefore, decide upon various measures such as establishing a “framework for a negotiated settlement”, dispatching a rapporteur or Fact-Finding Mission, or initiating or promoting the exercise of good offices, mediation or conciliation,51 or even, as a supplementary measure, a peacekeeping operation.52 To this end, the CSO may also delegate certain tasks to the Chairman-in-Office (who may designate a personal representative), to the CSCE/OSCE Troika, or to a small ad hoc steering group, as well as to the CPC or other CSCE/OSCE bodies.53 Regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting had given consideration to a French-German draft legal agreement and certain proposals (American and British in origin) relating to the conciliation procedures. Owing to a lack of time (but, in reality, an absence of consensus), the Follow-up Meeting confined itself to convening a meeting in Geneva specifically tasked with negotiating a “comprehensive and coherent set of measures”, including the setting up of a “court of conciliation and arbitration within the CSCE”.54 c) Peacekeeping operations The subject of peacekeeping operations, more than that of the High Commissioner on National Minorities or the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, was to be a thorny issue during the negotiations on strengthening the CSCE’s operational capacities. On the issue of the CSCE’s status with the United Nations and the twofold reform of NATO and the Western European Union, it created a division between Member States of the EU and NATO with the additional complication “that there were too many countries involved in support of peacekeeping but with differing views on various aspects of it.”55 The peacekeeping debate took place on the basis of two texts: a proposal ­submitted by a politically heterogeneous group of participating States led by ­Norway,56 and a painstakingly drafted proposal from the twelve countries of the European Union.57 Ultimately, it gave rise to paragraphs 17 to 56 of Chapter III of the Helsinki Decisions in 1992. Now that the key details of this development are

51 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 8. The provisions concerning the Fact-Finding Mission and the rapporteur missions originate from a proposal by Austria, Poland and Slovenia: CSCE/ HM/WG1/10 (4 June 1992). This text indicated that the goal of these two mission categories was to “gather the information necessary to clarify a situation and, if appropriate, to give advice on the possible solution of a problem”. 52 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 17. 53 Ibid., Chapter III, § 9. 54 Ibid., Chapter III, §§ 57–62. 55 See Alexis Heraclides: Helsinki-II and its Aftermath. The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 90. 56 See CSCE/HM/WG1/1 (6 April 1992). The particular group comprised 14 participating States. 57 See CSCE/HM/WGl/9 (26 May 1992) and Rev.1 (3 June 1992).  Chapter V   179

known,58 it suffices here to address the three stumbling blocks of the negotiations: the sharing of roles between the CSCE and the other organizations in its area, the nature of the CSCE’s peacekeeping operations and, finally, the practical organization of these operations. i) The sharing of roles between the CSCE and other organizations in its area According to the Prague Document, the major question to be answered at Helsinki on crisis management and conflict prevention instruments was whether the CSCE should be mandated to autonomously launch peacekeeping operations (PKOs) or whether it should only be empowered to request other organizations in the region (with more substantial resources) to undertake such operations in its name. The idea of an autonomous role for the CSCE in this field was first mentioned, and received with near unanimous scepticism, during the drafting of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, in autumn 1990.59 It became somewhat more substantial when the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, publicly endorsed it during the Moscow Human Dimension Conference (September–October 1991), then during the Prague Ministerial (January 1992) and, a fortiori, after the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia.60 When the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting began discussions on the issue, around fifteen participating States were already prepared to sign up: the Visegrad countries (Hungary, ­Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia), the neutral countries (Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland), some members of NATO (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway), and Estonia, Slovenia and Ukraine.61 However, keen to bestow peacekeeping tasks on NATO itself (in order to revitalize an Atlantic alliance that had been disconcerted by the disappearance of the Soviet enemy), some large countries, supported by the Netherlands and Turkey, expressed a diametrically opposed view. In a working document on the general issue of “dispute resolution”, the United Kingdom expressed its position as follows: “If the Council, or the CSO acting as its agent, consequent upon the request of a participating State or group of participating States, considers that activity to maintain stability is required which is beyond the capacity of the

58 See The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, March 24-July 8 1992 (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), pp. 18–20; Gajus Scheltema: “CSCE Peace­keeping Operations”, Helsinki Monitor, 3/4 (1992), pp. 7–17; and Heraclides: “Helsinki-II and its Aftermath …” (n. 55), pp. 89–100. 59 See “The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting…”, (n. 58), p. 18. 60 Ibid., p. 18: “Proposals for CSCE military forces (...) began to seem less academic after fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991. Dissatisfaction among some non-European Community States that they could not participate fully in the EC force there was joined to the desire that the CSCE, representing all of a unifying Europe, be able to solve Europe’s problems without recourse to external bodies such as the UN.” 61 See CSCE/HM/WG1/1 (6 April 1992). This proposal had been preceded by a “non-paper” of 10 January 1992 from the three countries of the Visegrad Group (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland), Austria and Canada. Canada, traditionally a supporter of UN PKOs, had the first concrete ideas on the question, see CSCE Communication No. 200 (6 December 1991). 180   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

CPC to carry out, it may decide that the despatch of a peacekeeping force is necessary. In such cases, it may request a group of CSCE participating states, which by virtue of their membership of certain international organizations, such as NATO or the WEU, possess the required military structures or experience, to make resources available. Participation in such operations will be open to other CSCE States.”62 The United States expressed an even clearer opinion that “the CSCE would provide the mandate, drawing as appropriate on NATO’s considerable operational capabilities [...]. Such an approach [...] would offer the best chance for most effectively meeting the challenge of providing for peacekeeping in Europe.”63 An additional element associated with this already difficult confrontation was the issue of France’s long-standing concerns over “American hegemony” in Europe, which were reinforced by the prospect of NATO being transformed into the “armed wing” (exclusive or priority) of the CSCE, to the added detriment of the emergence of a “European security and defence identity” within a revitalized Western European Union. The development of the CSCE’s peacekeeping competences was also at the heart of an external Franco-American row over the reform of NATO and its relations with the Western European Union, which was seeking operational resources. The Franco-American row was the subject of a preliminary arrangement within NATO. In June 1992, at the end of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, the sixteen Ministers for Foreign Affairs made a statement (as France had called for) in favour of the operational development of the Western European Union “as the defence component of the European Union and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance.”64 At the same time, they confirmed (in keeping with the United States’ position) that “the Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE” and that they were “prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise,” also

62 See CSCE/HM/WG1/4 (30 April 1992), § 18. At the plenary meeting of 3 April 1992, Ambassador Paul Lever had already outlined the British position in the following terms: “We acknowledge that peacekeeping operations, though in a sense an instrument of last resort, are an important means to maintain stability. Procedures and criteria should be developed whereby the CSCE can decide on the need to set up a peacekeeping operation. But we do not believe that the CSCE should have its own army. Nor that it needs to replicate the Peacekeeping Division of the UN Secretariat. Other bodies or groups of nations have the requisite resources and experience for peacekeeping operations. The CSCE should be prepared to turn to them in the first instance. But we would not see this delegation of peacekeeping as in any way exclusive and could envisage the involvement of forces of countries not belonging to those bodies or groups of nations.” 63 U.S. Delegation: Discussion Paper (13 May 1992). 64 See the final Oslo NATO Communiqué: Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (92) 51 (4 June 1992), §§ 7 and 8.  Chapter V   181

stating that “this will be done without prejudice to possible contributions by other CSCE countries and other organizations to these operations.”65 This arrangement opened the door, in Helsinki, to a compromise authorizing the CSCE to directly undertake peacekeeping operations and, when needed, call upon the resources of other regional organizations, which meant simul­ taneously retaining both elements of the alternative proposed in the Prague ­Document. The Helsinki compromise, however, leaned more towards the French than the American position. First of all, it attributed to NATO neither a monopoly nor even a privileged role: it authorized the CSCE to request organizations “such as” the European Community, NATO and the WEU “to make their resources available in order to support it [the CSCE] in carrying out peacekeeping activities,” and to ask the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to “support peacekeeping in the CSCE region.”66 It also imposed no obligation upon the CSCE to seek external support: decisions to seek the support other organizations “will be made on a case-by-case basis” and after “prior consultations with the participating States which belong to the organization concerned,”67 rather than with the organization itself. Finally, it safeguarded the CSCE’s right of political control: the organizations requested would execute “defined and mutually agreed tasks” on the basis of a “mandate”;68 their contributions would “not affect” the procedures for the establishment, conduct and command of CSCE peacekeeping operations,69 and would not undermine the principle of all participating States (whether or not members of the

65 Ibid., § 11. Almost simultaneously, the Western European Union likewise announced its own decision to support, on a case-by-case basis, possible peacekeeping operations of the CSCE, (Saint Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, 19 June 1992, § 2). 66 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 52. The reference to the European Union (at the time, the “European Community”) was justified by the activities – pertaining to the peacekeeping role – undertaken by the “Control Commission” for the ceasefire in Yugoslavia. Russia proposed the reference to the CIS during the final moments of the negotiation. 67 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 53, third sentence. The rest of the paragraph indicates that the participating States “will also take into account the consultations by the Chairman-in- Office regarding prospective participation [by a participating State] in the mission, in light of the envisaged size of the operation and the specific character of the conflict. “It introduces a practical ambiguity that provides the Chairman-in-Offfice with enough space to maneuver and at the same time, the CSCE can address another organization directly”, quoted from Loïc Bouvard and Bruce George, Special report on the Helsinki Summit 1992 (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, 1992), p. 41. In 1993, the NATO member countries would make it clear that their individual participation in the PKOs “will remain subject to national decision”. See Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Athens, M-NAC-1 (93) 38 of 10 June 1993, ­§ 6). 68 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 55. 69 Ibid., Chapter III, § 54; see also § 56. 182   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

organization in question) being eligible to take part in CSCE peacekeeping operations.70 ii) The nature of the CSCE’s peacekeeping operations The CSCE was authorized to undertake peacekeeping operations as a “regional arrangement” in the sense of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. The decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting thus not only obliged it to duly take into consideration the United Nations’ responsibilities as a global organization, but also to carry out its peacekeeping operations in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and, in particular, within the framework of Chapter VIII, “Regional Arrangements”;71 in return, the CSCE could draw upon the experience and expertise of the United Nations when planning and implementing its peacekeeping operations.72 The CSCE/OSCE is bound to keep the UN Security Council fully informed (through the Chairman- in-Office) of its peacekeeping activities,73 albeit without claiming a monopoly on peace­keeping in its area: it may decide “because of the specific character of an operation and its envisaged size” to refer the matter to the United Nations Security ­Council.74 That being the case, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting defined the type of peacekeeping operations that the CSCE could conduct from a perspective typical of the UN: “A CSCE peacekeeping operation, according to its mandate, will involve civilian and/or military personnel, may range from small-scale to large-scale, and may assume a variety of forms including observer and monitor missions and larger deployments of forces.”75 This provision clearly presents the well-­established distinction within the UN between groups of (unarmed) military observers and forces consisting of lightly armed civilian and/or military ­contingents. The CSCE/OSCE’s peacekeeping operations may be used to supervise and help maintain ceasefires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid and to assist refugees.76 This list paints a fairly comprehensive picture of the tasks normally assigned to what are known as the UN’s “first generation” peacekeeping operations. It is confirmed by the three main criteria on the basis of which

70 Ibid., Chapter III, §§ 35 and 54 – provisions accepted in response to concerns from Ireland (Member State of the European Union but not a member country of NATO). 71 Ibid., Chapter III, § 19, first and second sentences. 72 Ibid., Chapter III, § 19, last sentence. 73 Ibid., Chapter III, § 20. 74 Ibid., Chapter III, § 21. 75 Ibid., Chapter III, § 18, last sentence. 76 Ibid., Chapter III, § 18 last sentence. The Canadian idea of assigning functions concerning the protection of minorities and the integrity of borders to the PKOs was not adopted, see CSCE Communication No. 200 (6 December 1991). The same was true for the idea proposed by Norway, in concert with other States, of deploying PKOs “in cases of … gross and consistent breaches of CSCE principles, commitments and provisions”, see CSCE/HM/WG1/1 (6 April 1992).  Chapter V   183

CSCE peacekeeping operation are to be carried out (no enforcement, the consent of the parties directly concerned, and impartiality),77 and is further backed up by the provision according to which the fundamental role of the CSCE/OSCE’s peacekeeping operations is to “supplement the political process of dispute resolution” or to “help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a ­political solution,”78 in other words, as a measure to support a peacemaking ­process.79 One key additional element is that CSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken “in cases of conflict within or among participating States”.80 In other words, the peacekeeping mechanism is (in contrast to that adopted in Helsinki for the prevention and resolution of conflicts) expressly applicable to civil conflicts (which is the priority field of action for “second generation” UN peacekeeping operations) as well as to international conflicts. iii) Organization of CSCE peacekeeping operations The CSCE can be involved in a peacekeeping activity “only (...) when all parties concerned have demonstrated their commitment to creating favourable conditions for the execution of the operation, inter alia, through a process of peaceful settlement and their willingness to co-operate.”81 In this regard, the participating States set singularly restrictive conditions that are in any case more draconian than those required by the United Nations. Prior to taking a decision to launch a peacekeeping operation, three fundamental criteria (originally proposed by the UK) must be simultaneously met: establishment of an effective and durable ceasefire; agreement on the necessary Memoranda of Understanding with the parties concerned; and provision of guarantees for the safety “at all times” of the personnel involved.82 Once these conditions have been noted by the Ministerial Council or the CSO, the operation may be launched “as soon as possible” (in other words, not immediately) on the basis of a “clear and precise mandate”, taking into account the “financial implications” involved.83 It was also understood that the CSCE’s peacekeeping operations “cannot be considered a substitute for a negotiated settlement and therefore must be understood to be limited in time.”84 Commenting on these provisions,

77 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, §§ 22–24. See also § 37: “Parties concerned will be consulted about which participating States will contribute personnel to the operation.” 78 Ibid., Chapter III, § 17. 79 Thus, the fact that peacekeeping is also considered “an important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management” (ibid., § 17) does not seem, in principle, to authorize the CSCE to undertake a PKO as a preventive measure. Very early on, Canada had suggested the idea of assigning a preventive function to the PKOs, see CSCE Communication No. 200 (6 December 1991). 80 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 17, first sentence . 81 Ibid., Chapter III, § 30, introductory sentence. 82 Ibid., Chapter III, § 30. 83 Ibid., Chapter III, §§ 31–33. 84 Ibid., Chapter III, § 25. 184   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe pointed out, with commendable frankness, that they were effectively “built-in impediments which may prevent CSCE peacekeeping from ever occurring” and that, on the whole, “while taking steps toward peacekeeping, the CSCE is, thus far, clearly unready to take on the role of policeman in Europe.”85 The CSCE may initiate PKOs if one or more participating States make such a request to the CSO through the Chairman-in-Office.86 The decision to launch an operation must be taken by the Ministerial Council or the CSO acting in its name, by consensus.87 As for the operation itself, the mandate for which may be prepared by the CPC,88 it must be carried out under the “overall political control and guidance” of the CSO.89 The Council/CSO regularly reviews operations under way in order to take any necessary decision related to the operation’s conduct with due consideration being paid to political developments and developments in the field.90 During negotiations on the modalities for conducting PKOs, the issue of the chain of command was particularly difficult to resolve.91 The participating States examined three main options. Most of them were in favour of attributing operational control to an ad hoc group established in Prague under the authority of the Chairman-in-Office. Others preferred this responsibility to be exercised from Vienna, by the CPC. Others still (including the Netherlands) recommended a pragmatic approach, varying on a case-by-case basis. The formula ultimately agreed upon confirmed the pre-eminence of the CiO, to whom operational management would fall, “assisted by an ad hoc group established at the CPC”.92 Furthermore, as chair of the ad hoc group, the CiO would be accountable to it and would receive, on behalf of the ad hoc group, the reports of a “Head of Mission” (rather than a Commander).93 The ad hoc group was responsible for providing operational support to the mission, controlling its deployment and acting as a permanent point of contact (24 hours a day) for the Head of Mission.94 Meanwhile, the role of the CPC was to

85 See“The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting …”, (n. 58), p. 19. 86 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 26. 87 Ibid., Chapter III, § 29. 88 Ibid., Chapter III, §§ 27 and 34. 89 Ibid., Chapter III, § 28. 90 Ibid., Chapter III, § 38. 91 See Scheltema: “CSCE Peace­keeping Operations …”, (n. 58), p. 15. 92 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 39, first sentence. 93 Ibid., Chapter III, § 39 second sentence. The head of mission must be appointed by and is accountable to the CiO (ibid., §§ 43 and 44). 94 Ibid., Chapter III, § 40. It was decided that the ad hoc group would consist of representatives of the countries of the OSCE Troika and of those providing personnel or making a significant practical contribution to the PKO (§ 39, third sentence): This arrangement is intended to bar conflicting parties from joining the ad hoc group.  Chapter V   185

ensure continuous liaison between the PKO and all participating States.95 All in all, the unduly excessive number of entities responsible cannot be overlooked: the Chairman-in-Office, the ad hoc group, the CSO, the CPC, and the Head of Mission. With regard to the question of financing PKOs, the participating States decided upon the principle of dividing the costs between them, on the basis of the “CSCE scale of distribution”.96 At the request of the Republic of Malta (which was concerned, as were many other small countries, not to have to shoulder an excessive financial burden), it was decided that at the start of each calendar year, the CSO would set “a reasonable ceiling” for the cost of PKOs to which the scale of distribution would be applied, and that beyond this limit, “other special arrangements” would be negotiated and agreed to by consensus.97 In the style of the United Nations, it was also agreed that a start-up fund might be established to cover the initial costs of an operation.98 The CPC was charged with submitting to the CSO (by the end of 1992) a recommendation with regard to the financial modalities of these arrangements.99 Financial accountability for PKOs (including the regular submission of financial reports to participating States), however, fell to the Chairman-in-Office.100 In conclusion, it should be noted that the provisions drafted by the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting give the CSCE no coercive capacities. In other words, it set out mechanisms for managing crises and conflicts that are based on simple persuasion and thus ultimately depend for their satisfactory functioning solely on the goodwill of the parties.

3. The Complementary Provisions of 1992 Two new elements have been introduced since Helsinki 1992: the development of ad hoc crisis and conflict management techniques and the adoption of the Stockholm “package” on the peaceful settlement of disputes.

A. The Development of Ad Hoc Techniques for Crisis and Conflict Management As of the time of writing (1996), the provisions adopted in Helsinki have had virtually no practical impact. However, in order to manage the crises and conflicts that have broken out in its geopolitical area, the CSCE has developed ad hoc techniques in the form of long-term field missions. Since September 1992, on the basis of simple ad hoc decisions from the CSO and/or the Permanent Council, the CSCE has established around ten missions,

95 Ibid., Chapter III, § 41. 96 Ibid., Chapter III, § 47, first sentence. It was also agreed that contributions could be provided on a voluntary basis (§ 48). 97 Ibid., Chapter III, § 47, second and third sentences — were adopted on the basis of a Maltese “non-paper” on 24 June 1992. 98 Ibid., Chapter III, § 50. The payments made by the participating States to this fund would be deducted from their shares of the costs relating to the operation. 99 Ibid., Chapter III, § 51. 100 Ibid., Chapter III, § 49. 186   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

sometimes referred to as “Missions of Long Duration”.101 Set up in Serbia/ Montenegro (Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Bosnia- Herzegovina and Chechnya, the missions were intended to perform a wide range of functions: maintaining liaison between the parties to a conflict; fact-finding, good offices and mediation; early warning and conflict prevention; and technical assistance services (information, advice, expertise). In one way or another, these functions all stem from what contemporary UN discourse refers to as “preventive diplomacy”, “peacekeeping”, “peacemaking” and “peacebuilding”. Four of the eight missions currently under way (in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine) operate on the basis of a preventive diplomacy mandate.102 The other missions (in Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina) essentially focus on “peacebuilding” activities by providing technical assistance to the parties to the conflict and also to NGOs and citizens of the host country. This technical assistance is given in the form of information, advice and expertise, largely in relation to human rights, the protection of national minorities, freedom of the media, and democratic elections. In other words, it is directly linked to the human dimension of the CSCE’s work, demonstrating that the link between the human dimension and crisis and conflict management is predominantly forged through peacekeeping. In Georgia and Moldova, the missions are also responsible for creating a negotiating framework conducive to finding a political settlement to the conflict. To date, however, the results regarding peacemaking have been far from conclusive – and for good reason, as no attempt at a peaceful settlement between recalcitrant parties can hope to succeed without credible and effective pressure. The only means the CSCE has to influence the parties to a conflict is persuasion. The CSCE can only hope to succeed, therefore, in cases where spontaneously, the parties prefer the option of a negotiated and guaranteed solution (in terms of practical execution) through an impartial third party to that of maintaining the status quo.103

101 For more detail on each of the different missions, see futher in this volume, Chapter V, part II, section 1.B ‘Georgia’; 1.C ‘Moldova; 1.D ‘Tajikistan’; 1. E ‘Chechnya’; in addition see part II, section 2. A. b) ‘The role of the “Minsk Group’; section 2. B. b) ‘The UN and the CSCE vis-a-vis the conflict in Abkhazia’ and part III section 2.B. b) ‘CSCE Missions of Long Duration’, as well as part V, sections III.B. b and 2. C. c) ‘The CSCE’s mission in Skopje’. See further in Chapter V of this volume, part II section 1.F ‘Russian “peacekeeping” operations’. 102 The mandate of the Missions of Long Duration in Serbia (1992–1993) included a preventive diplomacy element. 103 In addition, it should be noted that the CSCE manages the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict through a defined group of States (the Minsk Group) in March 1992, on the basis of a decision taken by the “Council of Ministers”. This decision foreshadowed one of the provisions that the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting would adopt to empower the Council of Ministers and/or the CSO to establish, on a case-by-case basis, restricted “ad hoc steering groups” (but including the Troika) to manage crises and conflicts. For the management of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; See also further in this volume, Chapter V, part II, ‘Armed or potential conflicts in the former USSR’.  Chapter V   187

Finally, it should be noted that some missions are also mandated with tasks which could be called “indirect peacekeeping”, the monitoring of the Russian peacekeeping forces in Moldova and Georgia (South Ossetia) being two examples.

Missions of Long Duration, 1992–1995 (*)

Host country Deployment Authorized Headquarters (in italics) personnel and offices Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 8 September 1992 to 40 members Kosovo: Priština, Pec, (Serbia, Montenegro) 28 June 1993 Prizren; Vojvodina: Subotica; Sandjak: Novi Pazar; Belgrade (shared by all three) The former Yugoslav Republic September 1992 8 (plus two Skopje of Macedonia external members) Georgia 3 December 1992 17 members Tbilisi, Tskhinvali Estonia 15 February 1993 6 members Tallinn, Kohtla-Järve, Narva Moldova 25 April 1993 8 members Chişinău, Tiraspol Latvia 19 November 1993 7 members Riga Tajikistan 19 February 1994 8 members Dushanbe Bosnia-Herzegovina 31 October 1994 5 members Sarajevo Ukraine 24 November 1994 6 members Kiev, Simferopol Chechnya 20 April 1995 12 members Grozny (*) Source: SEC/212/96 of 19 April 1996

B. The Stockholm “Package” for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (December 1992) At its meeting in Stockholm in December 1992, the CSCE Council of Ministers adopted a package of measures relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes, consisting of a Convention establishing a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, a twofold conciliation procedure (optional and “directed”), and provisions aiming to enhance the Valletta Procedure.104 a) The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE Having missed an opportunity in Valletta, the CSCE took another step in the field of the peaceful settlement of disputes at the instigation of France, a country whose reservations towards compulsory jurisdiction were nevertheless well known. It did so on the basis of a French proposal for a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration launched in 1991, outside the Quai d’Orsay, by a leading politician close to President Mitterrand: Robert Badinter, President of the French Constitutional

104 On this last point, see footnote 28 in the current chapter. 188   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Council and also President of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia operating under the auspices of the European Union. The “Badinter Project” was designed around the idea that a Greater Europe based on the values of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris required the establishment, within the CSCE, of a permanent jurisdiction responsible for preventing and resolving international conflicts in a flexible way through conciliation and arbitration. Such a jurisdiction, Badinter claimed, would confirm the primacy of international law within Greater Europe, strengthen the prestige of the CSCE and avoid a new tragedy on the continent such as that seen in Yugoslavia.105 At the close of their meeting in Prague (30 and 31 January 1992), the CSCE Council of Ministers “took note of a proposal to invite a high-level group of legal experts from CSCE participating States to elaborate a draft statute for a CSCE conciliation and arbitration body, taking into account the work already done within the CSCE,” and “welcomed the intention to submit this draft to the Helsinki Follow-­up Meeting.”106 The Convention was drafted in several major stages. In February and March 1992, a group of around a dozen international experts (none of them North Americans) was convened personally by Robert Badinter. The group prepared a draft Convention establishing a compulsory conciliation procedure and an optional arbitration procedure. Submitted to the Helsinki Follow-­up Meeting as a Franco-German draft, the text in question was co-­ sponsored by around fifteen other countries, including the Russian Federation.107 The discussion which followed took place at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting within an informal working group with open-ended membership (11 and 12 May 1992),108 which however did not reach a consensus on the draft. Several countries expressed reservations towards any binding PSD procedure (United States, United K ­ ingdom, Turkey) or stressed the inopportuneness of creating new institutions (­Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Portugal, among others).109 To

105 Robert Badinter laid out his ideas in two short articles (“Pour une Cour de la Grande Europe”, Le Monde, 21 June 1991, and “Pour une Cour européenne de conciliation et d’arbitrage”, Le Monde, 25 June 1992), in an interview with Libération (4 October 1991) and in a lecture entitled “L’Europe du droit”, see Journal européen de droit international, 4/1 (1993), pp. 15–23. For more on the origin of the Badinter project, see Alain Pellet, “Notes sur la Cour de conciliation et d’arbitrage de la CSCE”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE. Dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Cahiers du CEDIN, 8; Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 189–217. 106 Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 21. The proposal was jointly submitted by France and Germany. 107 See CSCE/HM/WG I /2, 9 April 1992 (guidance note) and CSCE/HM/6, 3 July 1992 (text of the proposal). 108 See the “non-paper” of 22 May 1992 entitled “Informal Open-Ended Working Group on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Chairman’s Report to WG I”. 109 The other objections against the draft Convention were: the distortion of the very nature of the OSCE that would result from introducing a legal system into a purely political process; the development of two de facto categories of members (those who would be bound by the Convention and those who would not); the duplication of existing jurisdictions such as the  Chapter V   189

scupper the draft ­Convention, some of them even went so far as to issue counter-­ proposals recommending optional conciliation procedures (United Kingdom) or “directed conciliation” (­United States). Finally, the Helsinki Conference recognized the “significant progress made on issues relating to creating a conciliation and arbitration court within the CSCE, enhancing the Valletta Mechanism and establishing a CSCE procedure for conciliation including directed conciliation, for which proposals were submitted.”110 Consequently, with a view to reaching “early results”, it was decided to convene a CSCE meeting in Geneva with a first round (in October 1992) to negotiate “a comprehensive and coherent set of measures”111 which would be submitted to the Council of Ministers in Stockholm in December 1992 for approval and, as appropriate, be opened for signature.112 The real negotiations took place at the Geneva Meeting on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, from 12 to 23 October 1992,113 and led to a draft Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE.114 The Convention was officially approved by the Stockholm Ministerial on 14 December 1992.115 The text of this instrument calls for four series of remarks.116

International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration without any “added value”; and, finally, the “exorbitant” costs that the operation of a new Court would entail, see Tanja, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the CSCE” (n. 9), pp. 27–28, and Pellet, “Notes sur la Cour” (n. 105), pp. 195–198. 110 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter III, § 58. 111 Ibid., Chapter III, § 61. It was also understood that the Council of Ministers and the CSO “could play an important role, in particular by encouraging wider use of conciliation” (§ 60). 112 Ibid., Chapter III, § 62. 113 The draft Convention proposed in Geneva was co-sponsored by the same countries that had done so in Helsinki – along with three others (Spain, Portugal and Armenia), see CSCE/RPDG. 2/ Rev. 1 (15 January 1991) and CSCE/RPDG. 2/Rev.1/Add. 1 (21 October 1992). 114 See Geneva Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Decision No. 1 of 23 October 1992. At the conclusion of the meeting, the United Kingdom issued, on behalf of the Twelve (as Luxembourg had done at the Valletta Meeting of Experts: Journal No. 19 of 8 February 1991, p. 3, an interpretative statement specifying that “all disputes concerning matters for which the Community is competent would be left outside the scope of application of the different procedures on which we have agreed [at the Meeting].” Asserting that the Community was not per se a participating State of the OSCE, the United States declared that it did not accept such an interpretation “which could be construed to reduce the requirements and commitments of individual EC States to the CSCE”. See the Geneva Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Journal No. 10 of 23 October 1992, pp. 4–5. Turkey adopted the same attitude, through a similar interpretative statement issued during the opening of the Stockholm Convention for signature, see Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Journal No. 1 of 14 December 1992, item 7 (a). 115 See Stockholm Council of Ministers: Journal No. 1 of 14 December 1992, and the Stockholm Council of Ministers : Decision No.1 of 14 December 1992 on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. The following day, the Chairman-in-Office declared the Convention open for signature; see ­Stockholm Council of Ministers: Journal No.2 of 15 December 1992, item 7 (b). 116 See Lucius Caflisch, “Vers des mécanismes pan-européens de règlement pacifique des différends”, Revue générale de droit international public, XCVII/1, January–March 1993, pp. 16–36 ; Tanja, “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the CSCE” (n. 9), pp. 30–33; Pellet, “Notes sur la Cour” (n. 105), pp. 189–217; and Pierre-Michel Eisemann, “La Convention de Stockholm 190   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Firstly, the Stockholm Convention established a mechanism which was subsidiary to those already in existence, as is made clear by the provisions grouped within Article 19 under the title “Safeguarding the Existing Means of Settlement”. As its preamble states, the mechanism was in no way intended to impair other existing institutions or mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the European Court of Human Rights or the Court of Justice of the European Communities,117 not to mention the European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes concluded on 29 April 1957 under the auspices of the Council of Europe.118 It was, therefore, a far cry from Robert Badinter’s ambitious vision. Secondly, the regime established by the Stockholm Convention did not in any sense represent a legal or political breakthrough. While the conciliation procedure could be requested by means of a unilateral application, its proposed conclusions remain optional.119 Conversely, the decisions of the arbitration procedure are binding,120 but may only be implemented through ad hoc agreement or on the basis of unilateral statements made in advance as by virtue of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice.121 Furthermore, optional recognition of the arbitration as compulsory may exclude, as in the Valletta Procedure, disputes concerning territorial integrity, national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to jurisdiction over other areas.122

relative à la conciliation et à l’arbitrage au sein de la CSCE. Quelques remarques iconoclastes”, likewise in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE. Dimension humaine et règlement des différends (n. 105), pp. 219–229; Michael Lucas and Oliver Mietzsch, “Peaceful Dispute Settlement and the CSCE”, in The CSCE in the 1990s, pp. 99–108 and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, “Le mécanisme de règlement pacifique des différends au sein de la CSCE adopté à Stockholm”, Annuaire français de droit international, XXXIX (1993), pp. 899–918. 117 See the Stockholm Convention, § 4 of the preamble. 118 Modelled on the General Act of Geneva (1928, revised in 1949), the 1957 Convention adopts the outdated distinction between legal disputes (liable to legal settlement or settlement through arbitration) and political disputes (subject to conciliation proceedings). Open only to members of the Council of Europe, it was ratified by 13 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland) and signed by five more (France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Turkey). Since it went into effect (30 April 1958), it has practically been unenforced. At the Geneva Meeting, the Council of Europe presented a “contribution” on the 1957 Convention which implied that it was possible to revise the Convention in order to make its agreement more binding on a larger number of States. 119 The establishment of a conciliation commission can be called for through a unilateral request (art. 22, § 1) or by agreement between the parties (art. 22, § 4). In neither of the two specific cases will the commission’s report be obligatory (art. 25, §§ 3 and 4). 120 The arbitration award is “final” and not subject to appeal; however, a request may be made to interpret or revise it (art. 31, §§ 3 and 4). 121 See the Stockholm Convention, article 26, §§ 1 and 2, . 122 Ibid., §. 2. This provision was retained following early efforts by the British, who sought to reduce the Convention’s overall ambit as much as possible, see Caflisch, “Vers des mécanismes pan- européens” (n. 116), p. 17. In fact, it is less an exclusion clause analogous to that of the Valletta regime than a provision limiting the scope of reservations, see Pellet: “Notes sur la Cour” (n. 105), p. 211). In this connection, the Stockholm Convention “may not be the subject of any reservation  Chapter V   191

Thirdly, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration is a very light type of structure. It resembles more closely the Permanent Court of Arbitration than it does the International Court of Justice.123 It is in fact no more than a pool of conciliators and arbitrators, headed by an Office and a modestly sized court registrar service. Conciliation is conducted by a Commission established for each dispute and, similarly, arbitration is carried out by an Arbitral Tribunal established to assess each dispute: “Together, the conciliators and arbitrators shall constitute the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration.”124 Fourthly, the jurisdiction set out by the Stockholm Convention is not a body of the CSCE, but a Court established “within” the CSCE. The Convention is only binding upon CSCE States which have agreed to accept the obligations and commitments resulting from it.125 The running costs of the Court are split exclusively between the Parties, on the basis of a special financial Protocol.126 Finally, and above all, no provisions of the Convention authorize the Court to issue consultative opinions.127 Nonetheless, the Court is well and truly connected to the CSCE/OSCE political system: its office must present an annual report on its activities to the Ministerial Council (via the CSO);128 its Registrar must give notice to the CSCE/OSCE Secretariat of any request for conciliation or arbitration, for immediate

that it does not expressly authorize” (art. 34) – which refers back to the aforementioned articles 26, § 2, and 19, § 4 (provision authorizing States to make, at the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, a reservation in order to ensure that the mechanism established by the Convention is compatible with other means of dispute settlement resulting from international undertakings entered into by these States). 123 On the technical differences between the Court established within the OSCE and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, see Pellet: “Notes sur la Cour …” (n. 105), pp. 202–203. 124 See the Stockholm Convention, article 2, § 3. 125 See the Stockholm Convention, article 38 (adopted under pressure from the United States), which confirms that “[in] conformity with international law … nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted to establish any obligations or commitments for CSCE participating States that are not parties to this Convention if not expressly provided for and expressly accepted by such States in writing.” In fact, considering article 34 of the Vienna Conventions of 1969 and 1986 regarding the law of treaties, such a precaution was superfluous. 126 Provided for in the Stockholm Convention, article 13, the Financial Protocol was developed by an open ended, informal ad hoc committee and adopted by the CSO in April 1993. See Geneva Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Journal No. 10 of 23 October 1992, decision 5(c); 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, the decision 5(d) and 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993 decision 5(m )and Annex 4. See also CSCE Communications No. 430 (23 December 1992), No. 11 (12 January 1993), No. 42 (2 February 1993), No. 59 (23 February 1993) and Add. 1, plus No. 80 (11 March 1993). For more on the development of the Protocol, see Pellet: “Notes sur la Cour …” (n. 105), pp. 201–202. 127 Art. 30 of the draft of the Convention submitted in Geneva authorized the Court to give advisory opinions at the request of the Ministerial Council or the CSO. This was categorically opposed by the USA, see Caflisch, “Vers des mécanismes pan-européens”, pp. 16–17, and Pellet: “Notes sur la Cour …”, (n. 105), p. 197. The provision was eventually removed and the issue referred to the CSO, but No subsequent action was taken; see Geneva Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Journal No. 10 of 23 October 1992, decision 5(a). 128 See the Stockholm Convention, article 14. 192   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

transmission to the participating States;129 proposed amendments drafted by any State party must be communicated by Sweden (as the Depositary) to the CSCE Secretariat;130 and, more significantly, amendments to the Convention as well as to the financial Protocol must be adopted (by consensus) by the Ministerial Council.131 Participating States which are not party to the Convention thus receive certain benefits without any quid pro quo.132 Opened for signature on 15 December 1992 (during the Stockholm Ministerial), the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration of Disputes within the CSCE entered into force on 5 December 1994. By mid-1996, it had received 35 signatures, including 21 that were followed with ratification, notably by large countries such as Germany, France and Italy, but not the Russian Federation.133 Countries which have to date not ratified the Stockholm Convention include (as anticipated) the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey, as well as various States of the CIS and the European Union.

129 See the Stockholm Convention: art 15. A report on the particular procedures relating to each dispute will be forwarded to the CSCE art 25., § 5 and article 32). 130 See the Stockholm Convention: article 35, § 2. The notifications and communications to be made by the Depositary are transmitted to the CSCE Secretariat and to the Registrar of the Court, article 37. 131 See the Stockholm Convention, article 35, § 3, and the Financial Protocol, article 13. 132 It is also worth noting that conciliation and arbitration are possible (by way of agreement) between one or several States that are party to the Convention and one or several participating States that are not a party to it. See the Stockholm Convention, article 20, article 21, § 3, and article 26, § 1 . See also the Financial Protocol, article 2, § 3. 133 Four States Parties (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Greece) have already issued, optional declarations of acceptance of mandatory arbitration in accordance with § 2, article 26. Six States Parties (Germany, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Poland, Switzerland, Austria) have raised concerns – pursuant to article 19, § 4 – to ensure the compatibility of the mechanism put in place by the Stockholm Convention, along with other mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes resulting from other commitments linking each of them. See INF/260/95 (24 November 1995).  Chapter V   193

States bound by the Stockholm Convention, June 1996 (*)

State Date of ratification/accession l. France 13 August 1993 2. Monaco 14 October 1993 3. Croatia 4 November 1993 4. Sweden 25 November 1993 5. Poland 9 December 1993 6. Switzerland 23 December 1993 7. Cyprus 16 February 1994 8. Slovenia 11 May 1994 9. Liechtenstein 15 July 1994 10. Denmark 23 August 1994 11. Germany 29 September 1994 12. Italy 5 October 1994 13. San Marino 18 November 1994 14. Finland 20 February 1995 15. Tajikistan 24 March 1995 16. Hungary 2 June 1995 17. Greece 24 August 1995 18. Austria 14 November 1995 19. Ukraine 12 December 1995 20. Uzbekistan 24 January 1996 21. Romania 22 May 1996 */ Source: OSCE, document INF/90/96 (3 June 1996)

Signatory States: Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bosnia-­ Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation (15 December 1992); Canada, Slovakia (31 March 1993); Iceland (14 September 1994). Non-signatory States: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Holy See, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Spain, Turkmenistan, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro).

The premises of the Court, with a headquarters in Geneva, were inaugurated in April 1995.134

134 See draft of the Convention adopted in Geneva, article 10 § 1, which does not specify where the Court would be located. At the time, the location was a matter of dispute between Italy (Venice) and Switzerland (Geneva). The issue was decided in favour of Geneva by the CSO, which altered the provision in question, shortly before the Stockholm Council of Ministers: Journal No. l of 11 December 1992 and 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No.1 of 11 December 1992, item 6. Switzerland had offered to cover the costs of the Court premises. See also CSCE Communication No. 330, (3 November 1992). In a sense, the selection of Geneva was the crowning achievement 194   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

In contrast to the Valletta Mechanism, which, as Alain Pellet rightly noted, was “manifestly destined not to be used,”135 the Stockholm Convention mechanism was no mere exercise in window-dressing. It established a generalized reconciliation procedure which was binding at the time of the request and was applicable to multilateral as well as to bilateral disputes.136 That said, it clearly does not constitute a “breakthrough” in the field of the peaceful settlement of disputes, nor is it evidence of progress towards a “Greater Europe of Law” or perhaps: towards the “grande Europe du droit” (“greater Europe of the rule of law”?) envisaged by Robert Badinter (see p. 187, note 105). It represents a modest step which, as Professor Eisemann writes, “arises more from the wish to make a political gesture than a real legal need.”137 The real value of the Stockholm Convention does indeed lie elsewhere, namely, in the fact that it was the first legal text to appear in the political temple of the CSCE. The Convention pushed the CSCE into a new era in its own development, albeit at the cost of a certain rupture in the unity of the CSCE’s commitments, with the potential of encouraging a “CSCE à la carte” or (to repeat Alain Pellet’s turn of phrase), a “two-speed” CSCE.138 b) The optional conciliation procedure and the “directed” conciliation procedure At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the principle of a legally binding Convention was only retained in the context of a “package” combining the possible adoption of such a convention with two procedures focused on conciliation, one, which originated with the UK, being an optional conciliation procedure and the other, American in origin, creating a “directed” conciliation procedure. Finalized in ­October 1992 at the end of the Geneva Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the two procedures in question were formally adopted in Stockholm by the Council of Ministers in December 1992. The UK-inspired text is entitled “Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission”.139 Its objective is to supplement the Valletta Procedure with a procedure whereby a dispute may be submitted to a conciliation commission on the basis of ad hoc

of Swiss diplomacy’s commitment to establishing a judicially binding procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the time of writing, Robert Badinter was serving as President of the Court, with Hans Dietrich Genscher in the role of Vice-President. 135 See Pellet : “Notes sur la Cour …” (n. 105), p. 196. 136 See the Stockholm Convention: article 20, § 1, and article 28, § 2. According to Pellet, this innovation can be explained by the fact that the drafters of the Convention were mindful of cases like those of the succession of States in Yugoslavia or the CIS, which could only be resolved on a multilateral basis, see “Notes sur la Cour…”, (n.105), pp. 204–205. 137 Eisemann: “La Convention de Stockholm…”, (n. 116), p. 229. Eisemann makes the following point (p. 228): “It is far from certain that the mechanisms the Stockholm Convention put in place meet a real need. The existing procedures are more than enough to satisfy the needs of the international community in terms of the peaceful settlement of disputes, and there is little to be expected from conciliation and arbitration institutions, which seem to be unnecessarily complex and lacking in flexibility.” 138 Pellet: “Notes sur la Cour …” (n. 105), p. 215. 139 See Stockholm Council of Ministers: Decision No. 1 of 14 December 1992, Annex 3. For the successive versions of the British proposal, see Annexes 3 and 4 of the non-paper of 22 May 1992  Chapter V   195

agreements or, in advance, on the basis of a unilateral request where the parties have made prior reciprocal declarations accepting the conciliation.140 Without a doubt, this procedure has the merit of being much simpler than the Valletta Procedure, but it does not go far beyond it. It does not imply the existence of a permanent structure,141 nor does it have a binding effect on the parties, and it does not apply to multilateral disputes. In some regards, it even falls short of the Valletta Mechanism: it is not really compulsory at the application stage and the reciprocal declarations agreeing to conciliation may be subject to almost unlimited reservations. The text adopted in Stockholm does, however, contain two fairly original provisions. The first states that if a report from the Conciliation Commission is not accepted by both parties within a specific time period, it may be transmitted to the CSO by the Director of the CPC,142 though the provision does not specify the possible consequences of this being done.143 The second establishes (regardless of whether a dispute has been referred to the Commission) that “a participating State may at any time [...] declare, either generally or in relation to a particular dispute, that it will accept as binding, on condition of reciprocity, any terms of settlement proposed by the Commission.”144 Entitled “Provisions for Directed Conciliation”, the mechanism drafted on the basis of the American points of view definitely presents a certain degree of originality.145 It authorizes the Council of Ministers or the CSO to require (“direct”) two CSCE participating States to use conciliation to help them resolve a dispute that they have been unable to settle within a reasonable amount of time.146 There is an element of constraint in the sense that the decision to “direct” the conciliation is taken without recourse to the two States in question.147 In other words, directed conciliation authorizes a decision to be taken on a “consensus minus two” basis. However, the Council and the CSO are not entirely free to act as they wish. Neither of the two bodies in question may prescribe conciliation if the dispute is being considered in the context of another peaceful settlement procedure, if it falls within a peaceful settlement procedure outside the CSCE (including negotiation)

entitled “Informal Open-Ended Group on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Chairman’s Report to WG 1” and CSCE/RPDG.1/Rev.1 (19 October 1992). 140 See “Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission”, Sections I to III. 141 The Conciliation Commission (for which the Director of the CPC acts as Secretary) is an ad hoc body created to respond to the needs of all parties on the basis of the list of experts put together for the purpose of responding to the Valletta mechanism (ibid., Sections V and XVII). 142 Ibid., Section XI. 143 Caflisch: “Vers des mécanismes pan-européens” (n. 116), p. 31 144 See “Provisions for a CSCE Conciliation Commission”, Section XIV. 145 See Stockholm Council of Ministers: Decision No.1, Annex 4, (14 December 1992). For successive versions of the basic proposal, see CSCE/HM/WG1/11 (15 June 1992) and CSCE/RPDG.3/Rev. 3 (22 October 1992) 146 “Provisions for Directed Conciliation”, § l. 147 Ibid., § 4: “The parties to the dispute may exercise any rights they otherwise have to participate in all discussions within the Council or CSO regarding the dispute, but they will not take part in the decision by the Council or the CSO directing the parties to conciliation.” 196   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

or, most significantly, if either of the parties raises exceptions retained under the Valletta mechanisms, namely, “territorial integrity, or national defence, title to sovereignty over land territory, or competing claims with regard to the jurisdiction over other areas”.148 As with the Valletta Procedure and the UK-inspired procedure, the “directed conciliation” mechanism has no binding effect and does not cover disputes with multiple parties. Moreover, it does not create a new procedure: the Council and the CSO may “direct”, depending on the case, that the parties to the dispute use the procedure defined by the “Provisions for a Conciliation Commission of the CSCE” or the conciliation procedure set out in the Stockholm Convention.149 In adopting the Stockholm “package”, the Council of Ministers underlined that nothing stated in it would in any way affect the “unity of the CSCE principles, or the right of participating States to raise within the CSCE process any issue relating to the implementation of any CSCE commitment concerning the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, or relating to any other CSCE commitment or provision.” It also specified that the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes established within the CSCE would be re-examined at the Review Conference in Budapest (1994) and would then be subject to periodic review, as appropriate.150

II. Armed or Potential Conflicts in the Former USSR From 1992 onwards, the CSCE found itself progressively involved in the management of eight conflict situations involving the successor States to the USSR: five armed conflicts (in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan and Chechnya) and three situations which called for preventive diplomacy measures (in Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine). With the sole exception of Nagorno- Karabakh, these conflicts were all managed through field missions.

1. The Management of Armed Conflicts These conflicts were situated in the European part of the former USSR (Moldova), in Central Asia (Tajikistan) and above all in the Caucasus where, in a manner of speaking, conflict spread like wildfire across almost the entire region (Nagorno-­ Karabakh, Georgia, Chechnya). These conflicts shared certain obvious features: they all (with the exception of Tajikistan) arose in the context of secession; they all involved Russia as an indirect or (in the case of Chechnya) direct stakeholder; and in all cases the CSCE’s efforts to manage them were simultaneously supported or supplemented by the UN.

148 Ibid., § 5. With regard to this provision, Turkey formulated an interpretative statement specifying that the expression “jurisdiction over other zones” meant “jurisdiction over maritime zones”. See Stockholm Council of Ministers: Journal No. 1of 14 December 1992, item 7 (b). 149 Ibid., §§ 2 and 3. 150 Stockholm Council of Ministers: Decision No. l, §§ 6 and 7, (14 December 1992). The Budapest Review Conference did not adopt any new decision pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes.  Chapter V   197

A. Nagorno-Karabakh From 1998, the issue of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh gave rise to a conflict which was both internal (territorial secession) and international (opposition between Azerbaijan and Armenia). This section will analyse the facts behind this conflict, which the CSCE managed through a restricted group of participating States known as the “Minsk Group”. a) Facts about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict The territories which make up Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia were conquered by Tsarist Russia over the course of the nineteenth century, to the detriment of Iran and Turkey.151 Between 1922 and 1936, they formed (with Georgia) the Transcaucasian Federation, before each territory was granted the status of a fully- fledged Republic within the USSR — a status which they held until the collapse of communism. Azerbaijan included a majority Armenian enclave which, on 7 July 1923 was granted the status of an autonomous region (Oblast): Nagorno-Karabakh. With both the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis laying claim to the region by virtue of being its “original inhabitants”, Nagorno-Karabakh (which has a surface area of 4,440 km2) was assigned by Moscow to Azerbaijan as a means of placating the “peoples of the Orient” and maintaining a good relationship with Turkey, which was favourable to Azerbaijan. The issue was complicated by the fact that, in the eyes of the Armenians, the Azeris were simply “brothers” (with the same language and same religion) of the persecuting, genocidal Turks. Nonetheless, under the ­effect of the Pax Russica, animosity between the two peoples remained essentially latent until perestroika.152 In 1989, there were 188,000 people living in ­Nagorno-Karabakh, of whom 145,000 were Armenians, 40,000 were Azeris and 3,000 were Russians. In February 1988, the Parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh asked Moscow to merge the territory with the Soviet Republic of Armenia. Gorbachev rejected the request for fear of establishing a precedent which could lead to the USSR’s administrative boundaries being brought into question. However, in July of the same year, the local Parliament itself decided to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia under the name of “Artsakh”. A climate of civil war took hold of the territory, with the two factions engaging (with equal savagery) in mutual operations of “ethnic cleansing”. Moscow then decided to assume direct

151 Under the Treaty of Gulistan, signed on 13 October 1813, Iran ceded northern Azerbaijan to Russia; in accordance with the Treaty of Turkmenchay, signed on 10 February 1828, it surrendered its claims to eastern Armenia. At the Berlin Congress of 1878, Turkey handed the Armenian provinces of Kars and Ardahan over to Russia. See Romain Yakemtchouk, “Les conflits de territoire et de frontière dans les Etats de l’ex-URSS”, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. XXXIX, 1993, p. 410. 152 In fact, the first petition calling for Nagorno-Karabakh to be joined with Soviet Armenia was submitted in May 1963: see Roger Caratini, Dictionnaire des nationalités et des minorités en URSS, (Paris, Larousse, 1990), p. 37. We should also note that there is an Azerbaijani enclave in ­Armenia: Nakhichevan. 198   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

administration of Nagorno-­Karabakh, while Azerbaijan imposed a comprehensive economic blockade on Armenia (which it accused of supporting the secessionists). Following Moscow’s failed coup, Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself a Republic on 2 September 1991 – to which the Azerbaijan Parliament responded by cancelling the territory’s autonomous status on 26 November. Following a referendum in which 99% of votes cast were in favour (December 1991) and general elections, Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence on 6 January 1992.153 To this day, no State recognizes this independence – including Armenia, which claims to have no territorial ambitions regarding Azerbaijan.154 In the widespread war which developed from 1989 onwards, the odds were not in the Azeris’ favour. Supported by Yerevan, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh had more motivated troops and the active support of a rich and influential diaspora. Moreover, given the genocide committed towards the Armenians in 1915, Turkey could not allow itself to take military action to support Azerbaijan. At any rate, Azerbaijan found itself crippled by internal power struggles fuelled by Russia – which had an interest in encouraging the centrifugal forces that would better ensure its control over the region. The Armenian forces won significant victories in two stages. In March 1992, they conquered the district of Latchin, thus breaking down the “barrier” separating Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia and dismantling the Azerbaijani blockade against it. In April 1993, they extended military operations into Azerbaijan itself (in the province of Kalbajar) and succeeded in annexing the western and southern flanks of Nagorno-Karabakh. At the end of the same year, the Armenian forces found themselves in possession of not only the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh but also 20% of Azerbaijani territory (some 10,000 km2). A precarious lull in hostilities has prevailed in the region since the ceasefire which came into force on 12 May 1994. b) The role of the “Minsk Group” When Armenia and Azerbaijan were admitted to the CSCE in January 1992, the Council of Ministers decided that the two countries would host a “Rapporteur Mission”, charged with identifying the progress needed to meet the commitments arising from their participation. The Council also tasked the Mission with u ­ rgently submitting, within 21 days, an interim report on the situation in Nagorno-­ Karabakh, to be addressed to the Committee of Senior Officials.155 The Mission, which took place from 12–18 February 1992, submitted its report on

153 We note that on 1 December 1989 the Supreme Council of Armenia voted with the Artsakh National Council in favour of Nagorno-Karabakh’s unification with Armenia. In May 1990, the inhabitants of Artsakh took part in the first Armenian parliamentary election. See the report by Pfuhl and Solé Tura on the “Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly [referred to from hereon as PACE] Doc. 7182 (17 October 1994), p. 5. 154 See Anahide Ter Minassian, “L’Arménie et le conflit du Haut-Karabagh”, Le Caucase post-soviétique. La transition dans le conflit, Mohammad-Reza Djalili (ed), (Brussels, Bruylant, 1995), p.68. 155 See Prague Council of Ministers: Journal No 2 of 31 January 1992.  Chapter V   199

24 February.156 The CSO approved the provisions which urged, primarily, the continuation of a dialogue between the parties, under the auspices of the Chairman-in-Office.157 In the light of the escalation of the military conflicts, the CSO – which met shortly afterwards – recommended that the CSCE should, as soon as possible, provide the parties with an ongoing forum for negotiations and, simultaneously, should dispatch a second Mission. Consequently, it suggested that the Council of Ministers should hold an “additional meeting” (i.e. outside its regular sessions) with a view to taking the necessary measures.158 At the end of its “additional meeting”, held in Helsinki on 23 March 1992, the Council of Ministers agreed that it was incumbent upon the CSCE to play a “major role” in establishing peace in Nagorno-Karabakh.159 It then agreed on the principle of an international conference under the auspices of the CSCE which should be a “an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis”.160 The Conference took place in Minsk, Belarus, and brought together only eleven States: the two countries directly affected (Armenia, Azerbaijan), neighbouring CSCE countries (Russia, Turkey), the countries in the CSCE Troika (Czechoslovakia, Germany, Sweden), and Belarus, the United States, France and Italy. It was additionally agreed that the “elected and other representatives of Nagorno-­ Karabakh” would be invited as “interested parties” by the Chairman of the conference, after consultation with the States participating in it.161 The words “elected representatives” referred to the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh and the word “others” referred to the Azeris in the same territory. Responsibility for convening the Minsk Conference and appointing a Chairman fell to the Chairman- in-Office of the Council of Ministers.162 The arrangements agreed by the Council of Ministers were innovative in two respects. On the one hand, they gave the CSCE responsibility for fully managing a conflict. This was undoubtedly a first as, when faced with the Yugoslav conflict, the CSCE had simply yielded to the European Union and the UN, ultimately ­contenting itself with a fairly marginal role.163 Moreover, establishing a restricted conference was unprecedented within the CSCE: all its meetings (including sessions of subsidiary working groups) were held in plenary. The format of a restricted

156 See CSCE Communication No 79 Annex (24 February 1992). 157 See 7th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No 2 of 22 February 1992, Annex 1. The report also recommended that a ceasefire, an embargo on arms and humanitarian corridors be implemented. 158 See 8th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 13 March 1992. 159 Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council, Helsinki (1992): Summary of conclusions, §6, third subparagraph. 160 Ibid., § 8. 161 Ibid., § 9. 162 Ibid., final sentence of § 8 and final sentence of § 9. For additional terms of the procedure of the Minsk Conference, see 10th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 29 April 1992, Annex 5. 163 For further details, see further in this volume, Chapter V, part III, section 1. A. ‘Stepping aside for the European Union and the United Nations’. 200   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

conference was seemingly explained by the indifference of most CSCE States towards the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. It should be noted that the CSCE primarily saw its role from the point of view of mediation. Its clear objective was to resolve the crux of the conflict rather than to seek to calm the fighting. In other words, and to use the vocabulary of the UN, it opted for peacemaking without envisaging peacekeeping measures.164 This was a questionable approach, in the sense that it assumed that the conflict would not deteriorate and, consequently, that the parties were well-disposed towards reaching an overarching compromise with the help of a third party whose role would be to overcome their mutual distrust and to convince them of the advantages of a negotiated and internationally guaranteed compromise. The CSCE adopted this approach without the slightest political clout or means of exerting diplomatic pressure. Any ill will or intransigence from either or both of the parties and the exercise would be doomed to failure. Indeed, as the Armenian military made inroads, the precarious nature of the option taken by the CSCE soon became clear. Given that the priority was the cessation of military hostilities, peacekeeping became unavoidable. In autumn 1992, the CSCE began plans to establish a “Monitoring Mission” alongside preparations for the Minsk Conference. However, neither the Conference nor the Mission have yet seen the light of day. The Minsk Conference has never been convened. Nonetheless, from June 1992 onwards, its appointed Chairman (Italian ambassador Mario Raffaelli) organized a number of official and unofficial preparatory meetings between the eleven countries concerned – meetings known as the “Minsk Group for the preparation of the Minsk Conference”. One of the immediate barriers to convening the Conference was the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities within the negotiations. From the onset, Azerbaijan made it clear that, as far as it was concerned, the solution to the conflict could involve neither territorial nor border modifications but human rights safeguards165 – because “there is no non- Azerbaijani land in Azerbaijan”.166 Azerbaijan only agreed to the principle of the participation of “interested parties” in the negotiation by expressly reaffirming, in an interpretative statement, that “Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and any representation of any kind of its inhabitants could only jeopardize this fact”.167 Obviously, Armenia did not share this point of

164 The idea of authorizing the OSCE to undertake peacekeeping operations was subject to different points of view within the institution. In this respect, consensus was only reached in July 1992, with the adoption of Chapter III of the 1992 Helsinki Summit Decisions. 165 See 7th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 28 February 1992. 166 See p. 1 of the text entitled “Concerning the position of Azerbaijan Republic in relation to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan”, which was circulated at the Stockholm Council of Ministers, December 1992. 167 Initially, Azerbaijan went so far as to argue that the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh would only be able to participate in diplomacy as part of the Azerbaijani delegation: See 1st Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council in Helsinki: Journal of 24 March 1992, p.3.  Chapter V   201

view nor did, to an even greater extent, the Armenians in the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-­Karabakh, who protested against their restricted status by boycotting most of the initial meetings of the Minsk Group. Indeed, within the Minsk Group, it was decided that the “interested parties” would participate in the negotiations on an equal footing with the States only within the working groups and not in the p ­ lenary sessions, where they would only be able to express their point of view through the intermediary of the Chairman.168 The military successes of the Armenian forces were to trigger a new obstacle to convening the Minsk Conference: from this point onwards, Azerbaijan demanded, as a prerequisite, withdrawal from the occupied territories and return of the refugees. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh flatly opposed this: for them, any unilateral concession was inconceivable prior to the start of the Conference, in other words, before the start of the negotiations charged specifically with resolving all the issues posed by the conflict. The launch of a Monitoring Mission was to prove equally problematic.169 Deprived of both carrot and stick, the CSCE could not persuade, far less oblige, the parties to accept an end to the hostilities. Three factors further complicated the situation. Firstly, there was a gap between Stepanakert’s maximalist (and purely military) point of view and Yerevan’s more realist (and purely diplomatic) perspective.170 Secondly, in both enemy camps there were unofficial groups who had an interest in prolonging the hostilities: the heads of local militia and mafia clans reaped lucrative rewards from trafficking arms, fuel, hostages, prisoners of war and the mortal remains of victims of the conflict. In his last report submitted to the Council of Ministers as Chairman of the Minsk Group, Ambassador Raffaelli recognized that the groups in question “live and prosper on the conflict. (...). War is their business. Ceasefire puts them out of business. Some of these groups have the ability to sabotage a ceasefire. Some have ways of putting pressure on the authorities of their own party, which are therefore obliged to cover up their actions”.171 Thirdly, the Azerbaijanis’ inflexible position in the negotiating process is also worth mentioning. Analysis of the official documents clearly reveals that Azerbaijan expected less a compromise from the CSCE and more recognition of the legitimacy of its cause. For Azerbaijan, the role of the CSCE was to put an end to the aggression it was facing and to guarantee a return to the status quo ante: “the

168 See CSCE Communication No. 279, Report of the President of the Minsk Group, p. 2, (16 September 1992). 169 See CSCE Communication No 285; “Draft Deployment Plan for a CSCE Monitoring Mission” (17 September 1992); CSCE Communication No. 305; “Draft Plan for a CSCE Monitoring Mission to Nagorno-Karabakh” (20 October 1992) and CSCE Communication No 127, “CSCE Preparatory Mission to the Area of Conflict Dealt with by the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh” (26 April 1993). 170 In one of his reports to the UN, Ambassador Raffaelli emphasized that the attitude of the leaders of Stepanakert was “governed by military, rather than diplomatic, considerations” (UN S/26184, 28 July 1993). 171 See Report of the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh of 29 ­November 1993, p. 2. 202   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

very fact of conducting peaceful negotiations with the aggressor legitimizes brute force and recognizes the annexation of the territory of the sovereign Azerbaijan Republic (...) It is only once the aggression has ceased that a process of peaceful negotiation can begin. There is no place for compromise when it comes to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State and the rights of its citizens.”172 In short, Azerbaijan wanted to ensure that justice be served rather than a compromise, however favourable, be reached. All told, the CSCE succeeded in alienating itself from both parties – those supporting the principle of the territorial integrity of States and those supporting the principle of the self-determination of peoples.173 This regrettable situation clearly resulted both from the little the parties knew about the nature of the CSCE and its real limits. As Ambassador Raffaelli stated in his last report in November 1992, “one particular aspect of the Minsk process has been the difficulty experienced by the parties to the conflict in the past – and to some extent this still applies today – in fully understanding the role of the CSCE.”174 At this stage, it should be noted that the approaches taken by the CSCE were constantly endorsed and assisted by the United Nations. In May 1992, Armenia, concerned by the effects of the Azerbaijani blockade and by the deterioration of the military situation in the region, decided to urgently call upon the Security Council,175 which, until April 1993, confined itself to expressing a distant interest through declarations made by its President in office – declarations which entrusted the Secretary General with the task of studying the situation and with the means of supporting the CSCE’s mediation efforts.176 Following the inroads made by the Armenian military into Azerbaijan, a close political relationship began to develop between the Security Council and the CSCE. The Security Council adopted several successive resolutions on Nagorno­ Karabakh, the content and sometimes even the wording of which were directly inspired by reports submitted to the UN by Ambassador Raffaelli on the

172 See UN S/1994/688, p. 5, (9 June 1994). 173 See CSCE Communication No. 301, Report by the Chairman of the CSCE Council on her visit to the Transcaucasian Participating States, § 18 (19 November 1993). 174 Ibid., pp. 1 and 2. See also CSCE Communication No 281, for the Conclusions and Recommendations see pp. 6–8 and § 7 (21 October 1993). In a move that was typical of this unfamiliarity, Azerbaijan attempted to arrange an emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers by making a simple request to the Chairman-in-Office and called for an emergency meeting of the CSO without going through the regulatory phase of bilateral clarifications: See CSCE Communication Nos. 102, 111, 116 and 117 (6, 16, 17 and 20 April 1993), as well as Third Emergency Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 26 April 1993. 175 See UN S/23896, (11 May 1992). 176 See UN S/23904 (12 May 1992), S/24493 (26 August 1992), S/24721 (27 October 1992), S/25199 (29 January 1993) and S/25539 (6 April 1994). See also S/25600 for the Report of the Secretary-­ General announcing the UN’s provision of all required technical assistance to the future CSCE Observation Mission (14 April 1993). We note that, in response to a complaint by Azerbaijan accusing Armenia’s armed forces of having used chemical weapons in combat, the Secretary-­ General created a mission of experts, whose findings came back negative, see UN S/24344 (24 July 1992).  Chapter V   203

development of negotiations within the Minsk Group.177 The Minsk Group regarded its proposed resolution (a “Calendar” of measures to be taken simultaneously by the parties) as “measures aiming to apply the resolutions of the Security Council”. Insofar as the UN resolutions put pressure on the parties to end the fighting and to resume negotiations within the CSCE peace process, this symbiosis was certainly welcome. It did, however, mean that there could be no discrepancies between the two institutions’ positions. Yet, while the CSCE texts avoided any language anticipating the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh, texts from the Security Council referred to the area “in and around the Nagorny Karabahk region of the Azerbaijani Republic” and to the “Armenians of the Nagorny Karabakh region of the Azerbaijani Republic”.178 In 1993, the Minsk Group (or rather, all its members other than the parties to the conflict) succeeded in drafting a “Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council Resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993) and 874 (1993)”. This timetable provided for the cessation of military activities, withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territories, lifting of the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan, the launch of a CSCE Observation Mission and the convening of the Minsk Conference with a view to agreeing on the definitive status of Nagorno- Karabakh.179 The timetable was never to be acted upon, and the CSCE finally decided to change its approach. This shift was inspired by the recommendations of the Report of the Mossberg Mission (6–14 October 1993)180 as well as by the Report by the Chairman-­in-Office of the Council of Ministers following a visit to the region (24–27 October 1993).181 The CSCE recognized the need to establish a Mission of Long Duration at Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert, with a view to establishing direct contact with the parties, monitoring the actions of the unofficial forces and opening the way up to a “Fact-Finding Mission” – which was to be the first pan-European peacekeeping operation.182 During its meeting in Rome (December 1993), the Council of

177 See Security Council Resolutions 822 (30 April 1993, 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 October 1993) and 884 (12 November 1993). Resolutions 853 and 874 closely reproduce Ambassador’s Raffaelli’s suggestions. 178 See Resolution 853, § 9 and Resolution 874, preamble to §§ 3and 4, as well as Resolution 884, §2. On behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia denounced the unfortunate nature of such wording, see S/26614 (22 October 1993). See also CSCE Communication No. 281, p. 10 (21 October 1993). 179 See S/26732 for the timetable (15 November 1993). For previous versions of the timetable see S/26522, (1 October 1993), and S/26718, (10 November 1993). The timetable was revised in order to take into account the objections of Azerbaijan, which felt it unduly elevated the status of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, disregarded the existence and rights of Azeri who had been expelled from the territory and did not guarantee the evacuation of the occupied territories see S/26556 and S/26595, (respectively dated 8 and 19 October 1993). 180 See CSCE Communication No. 281, for the Report by Swedish Ambassador Mathias Mossberg, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office (21 October 1993). 181 See CSCE Communication No. 301, for the Report by Margaretha af Ugglas (19 November 1993). 182 See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Mossberg Report (n.180), § 14. The Control Mission itself had to be preceded by a preparatory “Verification Mission”: See also the Permanent Committee: Journal No. 20 of 19 May 1994. 204   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

­ inisters was on the point of taking such a decision. It failed to do so as the result M of the Azerbaijani veto, in response to Armenia’s refusal to accept a reference to the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in the text of the decision.183 Furthermore, and above all, the CSCE decided to combine its mediation efforts with those of ­Russia.184 Two years after audaciously addressing the resolution of the conflict, the CSCE succeeded in adopting the approach which would, undoubtedly, have been the most appropriate from the start. On 1 February 1994, the Swedish Ambassador Jan Eliasson took over from Ambassador Raffaelli as Chairman of the Minsk Group. He adopted a particularly active approach from the very start of his mandate. At the end of an unofficial meeting of the Minsk Group in Prague on 14 and 15 April 1994, Eliasson succeeded in getting the parties to the conflict to adopt the principle of confidence-building measures aiming, in particular, to encourage them to respect the provisions of humanitarian law (banning any offensive action against civilians, the use of certain weapons, pillage, etc.), to establish direct lines of communication between their headquarters (including command posts), and to keep the Minsk Group informed about the military forces in the ­area.185 When Russia agreed to a ceasefire under his leadership on 13 May 1994, Ambassador Eliasson endeavoured to work with the envoy from Moscow (Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, the special representative of President Yeltsin for Nagorno-­Karabakh) on a draft agreement aiming to ensure the truce was observed through an international force combining troops from CSCE countries with ­Russian and/or CIS troops.186 The steps taken by Ambassador Eliasson during the summer of 1994 demonstrate the existence of agreements between the parties around three key points: the attribution of a central role to the OSCE in the negotiation of a political settlement, the need for close co-ordination of the mediation efforts that were under way (CSCE and Russia) and, finally, the establishment of an observer force with as international a composition as possible.187

183 See Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Journal No. 2 of 1 December 1993, pp. 3–5. 184 In his report of November 1993, Ambassador Raffaelli stated that “Russia undoubtedly has a lot to offer to the parties. Apart from its knowledge of the language, the environment and the background, Russia can provide something which, it seems, is welcomed by all the parties to the conflict: an interposition or separation force” (n. 177) p. 4. 185 See UN: S/1994/687 (20 June 1994), pp. 4–6. 186 Ibid., pp. 2 and 3. The ceasefire, which was de facto agreed to on 12 May 1994, was made official on 27 July through a military agreement that committed the three parties (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh) to respecting the truce until a political agreement is reached, see DOC.647 ( 2 September 1994). Since then, the truce has been renewed many times. 187 See S/1994/1106, (28 September 1994) for Ambassador Jan Eliasson’s report to the President of the UN Security Council.  Chapter V   205

At this promising stage, Russia (under the influence of its military hierarchy) made a U-turn.188 Keen to keep full control of all the political cards, it demanded that the international force be essentially made up of Russian troops. Faced with opposition from other CSCE States, Russia argued that the CSCE had no competence to decide on the use of a peacekeeping force without the prior approval of the UN Security Council. In December 1994, following difficult negotiations, the Budapest Review Conference adopted a compromise which was favourable to Russia, in a text entitled “Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-­Karabakh conflict”. This compromise contained two essential elements. Firstly, the Budapest Review Meeting agreed to “harmonize [...] into a single co-ordinated effort” the mediation and negotiation activities relating to the Nagorno-­Karabakh conflict, while making a specific and glowing mention of the “crucial contribution of the Russian Federation.”189 To this end, it directed the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers to name a co-chairman for the Minsk Conference — that is to say, placing the CSCE and Russia on an equal footing at the head of the diplomatic negotiation process. The co-chairmen were appointed to jointly preside over the Minsk Group meetings, to jointly report to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, and to regularly brief the Permanent Council of the CSCE on the progress of their work.190 More fundamentally, their role was to consolidate and maintain the ceasefire that was in place, to encourage the conclusion of a political agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict and to promote the implementation of confidence-building measures, particularly in the humanitarian field.191 Secondly, the Budapest Review Meeting confirmed the “political will” of participating States to “provide a multinational CSCE peacekeeping force” to be organized on the basis of Chapter III of the Helsinki Summit Document 1992 “and in a manner fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations”.192 This decision was, nevertheless, subject to three conditions: the conclusion of a political settlement, the submission of an official request from the parties, and the adoption by the UN Security Council of a prior resolution to this end.193 The Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers was authorised to make the necessary arrangements, with the political assistance of the Minsk Group and the administrative support of the CSCE Secretary General, on the basis of recommendations for a “high-level planning group”.194 He was also charged with

188 See Elisabeth Fuller, “The Karabakh Mediation process: Grachev Versus the CSCE”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no 23, June 1994, pp. 13–17. 189 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, Chapter II, section 1, §§ 1 and 2. 190 Ibid., Chapter II, section 1, § 3. 191 Ibid., Chapter II, section 1, § 4, second sentence. 192 Ibid., Chapter II, section 1, § 4, third sentence. 193 Ibid., Chapter II, section 1, § 4, second sentence. Once these conditions are met, the Permanent Council has to decide how to organize the peacekeeping operation. 194 Ibid., Chapter II, section 1, § 4, fourth sentence. 206   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

seeking the technical support of the UN Secretariat and the political support of the Security Council.195 The establishment of the co-chairmanship was certainly a welcome step. However, making the peacekeeping operation conditional on the prior approval of the UN Security Council could hardly be considered as such. Indeed, the provisions of Chapter III of the Helsinki Summit Document 1992 laid solid foundations for the CSCE’s competency concerning peacekeeping: once the requirements of these provisions are met, the CSCE needs no other external authorization to act. The provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter follow similar lines: Article 53 only requires regional agencies to request prior approval for coercive actions, which do not cover the peacekeeping operations envisaged by the CSCE.196 After the decisions taken in Budapest, the CSCE/Russian co-chairmanship was established197 and the mandate of the first future pan-European peacekeeping operations began to develop with the help of the high-level planning group198 and the support of the UN Secretariat. Despite sporadic incidents, the truce appears to be generally respected. Yet discrepancies still exist between the parties’ positions on the subject of the political settlement and the CSCE’s representation in the region. It should also be noted that on 22 April 1995, Heikki Talvitie (the Finnish Under-Secretary of State) replaced Ambassador Jan Eliasson as co-chair of the Minsk Conference.

B. Georgia In the context of the Tsars’ expansion policy, Georgia represented not only the key to the Caucasus but also an outpost in the Muslim world and a gateway to the Black Sea.199 Initially, Georgia asked Russia for protection against the Turks — following which the 1783 Treaty of Friendship was signed, authorizing Moscow to take control of the country’s foreign policy. Russia subsequently annexed Georgia in 1801. In the wake of the October Revolution, Georgia experienced a brief period of independence (1918–1921) before being conquered by the Red Army and then reuniting with Armenia and Azerbaijan to form the Transcaucasian Federation (1992–1936). From 1936 onwards, it became a full Republic of the USSR within which it held, until the collapse of communism, a unique position:

195 Ibid., Chapter II, section 1, § 4, last two sentences. 196 In Budapest, some participating States (Turkey and Sweden) accepted the reference to the Security Council as long as it does not infringe on the authority of the CSCE to establish a multinational force and does not set a precedent for the relations between the CSCE and the UN: See Budapest Summit: Journal No 2 of 6 December 1994. 197 For the first reports by the co-presidents of the Minsk Conference at the Security Council, see S/1995/249 (31 March 1995), S/1995/321 (20 April 1995) and S/1995/558 (11 July 1995). 198 See in particular DOC.235/95 (15 February 1995), DOC.397/95 (16 March 1995), DOC.523/95/ Corr.1 (23 March 1995) and REF.PC/52/95 (11 April 1995). 199 See Patrick Karam and Thibaut Mourgues, Les guerres du Caucase. Des tsars à la Tchétchénie, Paris, Perrin, 1995, p. 223.  Chapter V   207

“the quality and historical duration of its culture was, for Russia, the antithesis of a misunderstood central Asia”. Moreover, “for the Georgians, Russia, which was originally their protector against the Ottomans and Persians, was only secondarily and in an incidental way, their oppressor.”200 When it became independent on 9 April 1991, following a referendum organized on 30 March of the same year, Georgia had a population of around 5.4 million inhabitants, of which 30% were from ethnic minorities. This situation was the result of the fact that it included an autonomous Republic, Adjara, and an autonomous region (Oblast), South Ossetia, both administrative entities created by the Soviet Government with a view to neutralizing Georgian nationalism through the superposition of different ethnic groups. Georgia was the last of the Republics of the former USSR to join the CSCE (24 March 1992) and the UN (31 July 1992), bringing with it two inter-ethnic conflicts: that of South Ossetia and that of Abkhazia. The first was managed by the CSCE and the other by the UN (with a certain symbolic participation of the pan-European organization). a) The CSCE and the conflict in South Ossetia Formerly an independent kingdom, Ossetia was annexed by tsarist Russia in 1774 (the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca), before being annexed by Georgia itself. After the October Revolution, the Soviet Government, keen to keep Georgian and Ossetian nationalism in check, joined the southern part of Ossetia to Georgia in April 1922. As for the northern part of Ossetia, it first became an Autonomous Region (Oblast) of Russia, then, from 1936 onwards an Autonomous Russian Republic.201 According to the Soviet census in 1989, South Ossetia (capital: Tskhinvali) had around 100,000 inhabitants, of which 30,000 were Georgian and 70,000 were Ossetian. Historically, the Ossetians had wanted to be reunited with their 600,000 compatriots in North Ossetia (capital: Vladikavkaz). The Ossetians and the Georgians are different ethnic groups speaking different languages (Ossetian falls within the Iranian family of languages, while Georgian is a Caucasian language). One latent dispute divided the two peoples. For the Georgians, the Ossetians were not one of the founding ethnic groups of the three- millennium Georgian nation: they only set foot in Georgia at an indeterminate date in the sixteenth century.202 Moreover, and above all, Georgia reproached the Ossetians for having helped the Russians to put an end to the Georgian independence of 1918–1921. Meanwhile, the South Ossetians accused the Georgians of assimilationism and even cultural genocide. Having lain dormant under communism, Ossetian separatism suddenly reared its head from the onset

200 Ibid., p. 229. 201 In 1938, in order to separate the Ossetians even further, the Soviet regime replaced the Latin alphabet by the Georgian Alphabet in the South and the Cyrillic alphabet in the North (ibid., p. 345). 202 For many Georgians, there was No “South Ossetia” but rather a territory called “Samachablo” situated in the Georgian region of Shida Kartli: see Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Soviet Union, (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co- operation in Europe, 1993), p. 155. 208   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

of perestroika, under the effect of the intolerant nationalism of Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhourdia.203 In 1989, tensions mounted in South Ossetia due to discussions in the Georgian Supreme Soviet on draft laws aiming to promote the official use of the Georgian language (to counter the effects of Russification) and to reorganize the powers of local Ossetian institutions (to strengthen the position of the Georgian minority in the region). In November 1989, the Ossetian members of parliament, supported by a Popular Front (Ademon Nykhas), demanded that the Tbilisi authorities transform the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia into an Autonomous ­ Republic, putting it on equal footing with Adjara and Abkhazia. Given the immediate reaction of the Georgians (who even organized provocative demonstrations in Tskhinvali promoting the Georgian character of the region) and the adoption in August 1990 of Georgian legislation banning any political party opposed to maintaining the territorial integrity of the country from participating in the parliamentary elections (targeting Ademon Nykhas), the Ossetians decided to bypass the consent of Tbilisi. In September 1990, they declared the “sovereignty” of South Ossetia and in December 1990 they organized their own parliamentary elections which were boycotted by the Georgian minority. The new Georgian Government, drawn from Zviad Gamsakhourdia’s nationalism movement, immediately annulled the results of the Ossetian election and the status of the Autonomous Region of South Ossetia. As the result of the central government’s refusal to engage in any dialogue, the conflict degenerated into armed conflict from January 1991. This was to turn against Tbilisi for two reasons. Firstly, the Soviet troops stationed in Georgia provided direct support to the Ossetians,204 and secondly, the Tbilisi Government faced an armed challenge which was to result in the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia. Ultimately, on 22 December 1991, the Ossetian Parliament proclaimed the region’s independence, confirming it on 19 January with a 90% positive vote in a referendum – again boycotted by the Georgian minority. Called to take power in March 1992 by the very same people that had provoked Gamsakhourdia’s downfall, Eduard Shevardnadze could do little more than take stock of the critical state of affairs: the effective secession of Ossetia, the armed counter-offensive by Gamsakhurdia’s supporters, and the threat of Abkhazian secession. Clearly, the situation could not be resolved without Moscow’s help. Shevardnadze resigned himself to accepting Russian “mediation”. On 24 June 1992 in Sochi, he concluded an agreement with Boris Yeltsin, putting an end to the military conflict in South Ossetia. Co-signed by the representatives of South ­Ossetia and North Ossetia, the “Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-­Ossetian Conflict” decreed a comprehensive ceasefire, combined with the withdrawal of armed forces to either side of a separating corridor protected by

203 For more on Gamsakhurdia, one of the founders of the Georgian Helsinki Group in 1976, see Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199) p. 226ff. 204 On the politics of Moscow with regard to the insurrection, see Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199) pp. 362–364.  Chapter V   209

the joint peacekeeping forces (Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia). Monitoring compliance with these arrangements fell to a quadripartite Control C­ ommission.205 A few months after its accession to the CSCE, Georgia requested the organization’s intervention. On the basis of the conclusions of a Fact-Finding Mission and the recommendations of a personal representative of the Chairman- in-Office of the Council of Ministers who visited the area (Hungarian Ambassador István Gyarmati), the CSO decided on 6 November 1992, to establish a Mission of Long Duration in Georgia.206 Operational from 3 December 1992, the Mission operated on the basis of agreements concluded by the CSCE with the Georgian Government (23 January 1992) and with the South Ossetian authorities (1 March 1993).207 It was based in Tbilisi; an office would be opened in Tskhinvali when satisfactory security conditions were established (in reality, when the South Ossetians had agreed to it). Strengthened several times, the Mission now includes 17 members of staff (nine civilians, including experts in human rights, and eight soldiers) managed by a personal representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers.208 Two additional members were to be added once the office in Tskhinvali had been established.209 In any case, the number of staff is higher than that of any other CSCE mission currently underway (four to ten members). Initially adopted for a period of three months, the mandate of the Mission was prolonged at more or less regular intervals and at the time of writing was extended to 31 March 1997.210 Its annual budget for 1996 is some 18 million Austrian schillings.211

205 For the text of the Agreement, see CSCE Communication No 228, Annex II, (5 August 1992). 206 For more on the steps of this decision, see 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 5 of 3 July 1992, Annex, see also CSCE Communication No. 228, “Report of the Fact-Finding Mission” (5 August 1992), as well as 16th Meeting of the CSO: of Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 2 and CSCE Communication No. 339, the “Draft Terms of Reference for a CSCE Monitor Mission in Georgia/Ossetia”, (3 November 1992). 207 A protocol on the assistance that Russia would provide to the Mission (via Russian troops in South Ossetia) was developed, but it seems it was not signed: see 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No 3 of 13 December 1992, Annex 1 and CSCE Communication No. 408 (11 December 1992). 208 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, Annex 4 and Permanent Committee: Journal No. 14 of 29 March 1994, Annex. 209 See Permanent Council: Journal No. 9 of 23 February 1995, item 5 (d), Journal No. 18 of 27 April 1995, item 5 (a) and Journal No. 21of 18 May 1995, decision 5 (c). 210 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, Annex 4 ; 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2, Annex 1, 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 March 1994, Annex 2; Permanent Committee: Journal No. 10 of 24 February 1994, item 5 (a); Journal No. 14 of 29 March 1994, Annex 1; Journal No. 34 of 22 September 1994, item 5 (a) and Annex 3 and Permanent Council: Journal No. 9 of 23 February 1995, item 5 (d) and Permanent Council Decisions No. 70 of 14 September 1995 and No. 122 of 23 May 1996. 211 See 29th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 18 November 1994, Annex 2, p.11. For previous budgets, see CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 3 of 11 February 1993, Annex 1; CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 29 of 16 September 1993, Annexes 1and 24th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 29 November 1993, Annex 2, p. 4. In addition see Permanent Committee Journal No. 12 of 17 March 1994, item 5 (a) and Annex; Journal No. 15 of 14 April 1994, item 5 (b) and Annex, 210   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

In addition to the general role of making contact with the population and maintaining the CSCE’s “visible presence” in the region, the mandate of the Mission (which was broadened in March 1994), gave it three fundamental roles: peacemaking, “indirect” peacekeeping and peacebuilding.212 Featuring in the initial mandate and reaffirmed in the wider mandate, the peacemaking function consisted of offering services concerning good offices and mediation. Firstly, it aimed to restore trust between the parties in order to encourage them to renew dialogue: the Mission thus organized direct meetings between representatives of Georgia and the two Ossetias which, in 1994, led to the signature of a joint agreement on practical co-operation (fight against organized crime, restoration of rail and road communications, economic restructuring, and issues relating to housing and refugees) and on the convening of the quadripartite Control Commission established by the Sochi Agreements.213 Secondly, the Mission attempted to draft mutually acceptable terms for the political settlement, on the basis of the principle of the territorial integrity of States. It should be noted that the CSCE adopted an unambiguous position in this regard. In December 1993, the participating States affirmed that “the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia must be preserved.”214 In December of the following year, they reaffirmed that the conflict resolution under way in Georgia must be based on the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country “within its internationally recognized borders,” while stressing that the “interests of the multi-ethnic population in the areas of conflicts must also be taken into ­account.”215 It is from this perspective that the Mission recommended that South Ossetia be granted the broadest possible political autonomy within the Georgian State. To better understand the impact of such a response, the Mission organized round tables for Georgian policy makers (November 1994) and then Ossetian policy makers (December 1994). The Mission subsequently succeeded in bringing together both parties at the same round table (Vladikavkaz, March 1995).216 Since then, mindsets appear to have changed, at least on one side. Thus, the Georgians now accept their share of responsibility for the outbreak of the fighting and three of the four main political parties now accept the idea of granting Ossetia autonomous status which is not only cultural (as during the Soviet era), but also

Journal No. 35 of 20 September 1994, item 5 (a) and Annex 3, as well as Permanent Council: Decision No. 97 of 19 December 1995, p. 3. 212 For the initial mandate, see 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 2; the expanded mandate can be found in the Permanent Committee: Journal No 14/Corr. of 29 March 1994, Annex 1. Besides these major functions, the Mission also facilitates the action of the humanitarian NGOs in the region, see DOC.272, p. 3, (20 February 1995) and links to the UN’s activities in Georgia. 213 See DOC.1071, Secretary-General’s Annual Report 1994, p. 5 (14 November 1994). 214 Rome Council of Ministers (1993), Decisions, section 1, § 2.1. 215 Budapest Summit (1994), Decisions: chapter II, “Georgia”, § 1. 216 See DOC.375 (7 March 1995)  Chapter V   211

political. In contrast, in Tskhinvali (where power appears to lie less with the representatives of the official authorities than with the extremists at the head of the security forces), the South Ossetians have remained inflexible. They continue to demand recognition of their full independence and of their right to merge with North Ossetia, which has responded in a lukewarm way to this idea.217 Despite everything, however, the two parties have reached an agreement on the opportunity of establishing a committee of historians responsible for shedding light on the direct origins of the Ossetian-Georgian conflict.218 The CSCE mission, however, had no exclusivity with regards to peacemaking. This role was also assumed by the quadripartite Control Commission, to whom the Sochi Agreements entrusted the management and control of the collective peacekeeping forces. Convened on 31 October 1994 in Moscow, the Commission decided to extend its remit to all aspects of the Ossetian-Georgian conflict, including the political settlement. The CSCE Mission was involved in the Commission’s activities (plenary sessions and working groups) and noted that the Commission had become “the main potential instrument for the settlement of the Georgian South Ossetian conflict” and that a clarification of the respective peacemaking roles was now needed.219 The second role of the Mission relates to “indirect” peacekeeping. Initially, the Mission was charged with maintaining a simple liaison with the Peacekeeping and Law Enforcement Forces consisting of three Georgian, Russian and Ossetian battalions (each with 500 soldiers) under Russian command and deployed at 40 points in the security zone established between Georgia and South Ossetia.220 The mandate, which was broadened in March 1994, prescribed that the Mission would observe the tripartite forces with a view to verifying that their activities were being carried out in full compliance with the principles drafted by the Council of Ministers in Rome concerning peacekeeping operations by a “third party”.221 In exercising this function, the Mission observed that the 1992 ceasefire was still being upheld, but that discipline was deteriorating within the Georgian and Ossetian contingents (acts of insubordination, thefts, hostage taking, etc.).

217 The caution on the side of the North Ossetians can be attributed to the contentiousness between them and the Ingush. It is worth remembering that in 1957, amid de-Stalinisation, the Autonomous Chechen-Ingush Republic (dissolved in 1944 after the collective deportations of Chechens and Ingush) was re-established with its original borders — the only exception was the region of Prigorodny (9,000 km2), which remained attached to North Ossetia. Ingushetia is still seeking the return of this region. The issue is complicated by the fact that Prigorodny is largely populated by South Ossetians. For further details, see Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199) pp. 209–212 and 354–356. 218 See OSCE Mission to Georgia: Activity Report for the Period from 15 February through 1 March 1995, p. 4. 219 See DOC.272, § 2.2, (20 February 1995). The Commission established specialised working groups for peacekeeping, economic issues and refugees. 220 For further details, see DOC.720, (15 September 1994). 221 The wording targets Russia’s military operations in the “near abroad”. For additional details, see further in this chapter: part II. F. Russian “peacekeeping” operations”. 212   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Essentially, it certified that the activities of the collective peacekeeping forces were complying with the CSCE standards and that the Russian military command was co-­operating satisfactorily with the Mission representatives. With regard to peacebuilding, the Mission endeavoured to contribute towards the stabilization of the political situation by promoting human rights and strengthening the democratic structures of civil society across the whole of Georgia and not only in South Ossetia. Such a role did not feature in the initial mandate. It was assigned to the Mission by the enlarged mandate, adopted in March 1994 through application of a decision of the Council of Ministers in Rome anticipating the broadening of the responsibilities of the Mission with a view to the “promotion of respect for human rights in the whole of Georgia” and “rendering of assistance for the development of legal and democratic institutions and processes, including the elaboration of a new constitution for Georgia.”222 The Mission took on this specialized function in close partnership with the ODIHR. The ODIHR organized human rights information and training sessions for government officials, educators, religious leaders, etc.223 It was involved in the process of elaborating the Georgian constitution by contributing, through its advice and technical opinions, to reducing the prominence given to the Soviet legal legacy in the text.224 It also encouraged the Georgian Government with its plans to establish a regional court of human rights within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States.225 As for the Mission itself, it above all supported the work of Georgian NGOs and monitored the evolution of the human rights’ situation in the country. The most notable of these activities was the active observation of the “­Domukhovsky Group” court case in Georgia in 1995.226 b) The UN and the CSCE vis-a-vis the conflict in Abkhazia Abkhazia was under Ottoman rule since the sixteenth century and was annexed by tsarist Russia in 1864, after more than half a century as a Protectorate. In 1921, the communist authorities united Abkhazia and Georgia. In 1930, with a view to better controlling Georgian and Abkhazian nationalism, the authorities removed

222 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, section I, § 2.4. Previously, the Council of Ministers had recognised the need “to support the stabilization of the situation within Georgia and the development of democracy and a market economy, which would create favourable conditions for the peaceful resolution of the conflict”, see Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 1,”Georgia”, § 1. See also Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions: Chapter II, “Georgia”, § 4. 223 See CSCE Mission to Georgia: Activity Report for the Period 16–30 November 1994, pp. 4 and 5. 224 See DOC.356, Report of the CSCE/ODIHR Expert Working Group on the Georgian Constitution, (10 May 1994). See also OSCE Newsletter, vol. 2, No. 1, January 1995, pp. 5 and 6. 225 See OSCE Mission to Georgia: Activity Report for the Period 1–15 February 1995, pp. 3 and 4. The idea of such a court had been raised by President Shevardnadze in his closing speech at the 1994 Budapest Summit. 226 Trial of 19 people accused of political terrorism (the majority of them supporters of the deposed president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia), at the end of which two persons were sentenced to death. For further details, see DOC.432 (10 March 1995) and DOC.447 (13 March 1995).  Chapter V   213

its status as a federal entity and “demoted” it simply to the level of the Autonomous Republic of Georgia. The basic tenets of the Abkhazian conflict differ from those of the Ossetian conflict in two ways. Firstly, and in contrast to the case of the Ossetians, the Abkhazians were a statistical minority in their own region: following the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878, two-thirds of the population fled to Anatolian Turkey and Greece.227 A century later, only 17% (according to the Soviet census of 1989) of the population were Abkhazians, compared to 47% Georgians, 18% Armenians and 13% Russians. Secondly, and also in contrast to the Ossetians, the Abkhazians were historically one of the founding peoples of Georgia, alongside the Georgians, the Mingrelians and Meskhetians. The Georgians and the Abkhazians differ, however, on the subject of the nature of the historical links between the two peoples. From the seventh to the tenth centuries, there is evidence that Abkhazia dominated a large part of Georgia, confirmed by the fact that Arab historians of the time used the name “Abkhazia” for the entire Western Caucasus. It has also been proven that the Kingdom of Abkhazia survived its absorption into the Kingdom of Georgia, at the cost of the massive conversion of its subjects to Islam. The Georgians, however, nonetheless believe that Abkhazia was, generally, an integral part of the Kingdom of Georgia. In contrast, the Abkhazians contest this point of view, focussing on the Abkhazia kingdom’s periods of independence.228 Whatever the case, from the tsarist era onwards, the Abkhazians declared themselves more favourable to the Russians than the Georgians, by virtue of the point of view that “better a distant administration than the tutelage of neighbours always suspected of trying to absorb you.”229 Keen to better preserve their identity which was threatened by the constant cultural pressure of the Georgians, when the new Soviet Constitution was adopted in 1977, the Abkhazians demanded unification with the Russian Federation. Their demand was rejected by the Soviet people who, in 1978, nonetheless granted them certain benefits – including over-representation within the Abkhazian Parliament: 28 seats for the Abkhazians compared to 26 for the Georgians and 11 for other ethnic groups. This solution satisfied no-one: the Abkhazians considered it insufficient and the Georgians thought it was unduly discriminatory towards them. Much like the Ossetian problem, Abkhazian separatism was encouraged by the developments in Georgian nationalism. When Georgia declared its “sovereignty” from the USSR (March 1990), Abkhazia did so shortly afterwards (August 1990) – an act which the Georgians considered null and void. Georgian independence

227 Initially, Abkhazians comprised 90% of the population in Abkhazia. See Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199), p. 306. 228 See Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199), p. 306. 229 Ibid., p.307. 214   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

became effective (April 1991) and on 23 July 1992 (without the support of the Georgian members of parliament), the Abkhazian Parliament declared the independence of Abkhazia. Neither Shevardnadze nor the Abkhazian leaders wanted an armed conflict. Nonetheless, armed conflict was to break out in the shape of the Georgian civil war which opposed the supporters of Shevardnadze and those of Gamsakhurdia which had diminished in Abkhazia. Gamsakhurdia’s supporters kidnapped leading Abkhazian political figures. Dispatched with a view to reducing the insurgencies and protecting communication routes with Tbilisi, a detachment of the Georgian national guard undertook, on the purely personal initiative of its head (the Minister for Defence, Tengiz Kitovani) to bomb the Abkhazian Parliament and to dissolve it in August 1992. This marked the starting point of the armed phase of a conflict which had ­similar consequences to the Ossetian one. Initially, the Abkhazian conflict was settled with the victory of the secessionists who, after just over a year of fighting and with the help of external volunteers (from Russia, Transdniestria, Armenia and, above all, North Caucasus), obtained, in September 1993, control of the whole of ­ Abkhazia, which they subjected to a veritable process of “ethnic cleansing”. The conflict also enabled Russia to deploy “peacekeeping” forces in Abkhazia (by means of the ceasefires successively conducted under its authority on 3 ­September 1992, 27 July 1993 and 14 May 1994) and to become a key actor in the political settlement. Lastly, it obliged Georgia, which had been backed into a corner in both military and political terms, to place itself under Russian tutelage: handing over military bases to Moscow and integrating Georgia into the CIS and its collective security regime was the price that the President Shevardnadze had to pay to be able to militarily eliminate Gamsakhurdia and to obtain recognition from Russia of its territorial integrity.230 On the international scale, the Abkhazian conflict fell under the auspices of the UN rather than the CSCE. Aware of the issue from the autumn of 1992 (i.e. before the establishment of the CSCE Mission in Georgia), the UN reacted extremely prudently before embarking on operations on the former USSR’s territory for the first time.231 After a period of uncertainty, the UN decided to manage the conflict through the use of peacemaking from May 1993 and peacekeeping from August 1993. The Swiss Ambassador Edouard Brunner’s nomination as the Secretary-­ General’s Special Envoy to Georgia in May 1993 marked the starting point for the UN’s efforts with a view to settling the basis of the Abkhazian conflict.232 After a few months of exploratory surveys, the Special Envoy obtained the agreement of

230 For Russians and Georgians alike, Abkhazia is a region of particular strategic importance: See Catherine Dale, “Turmoil in Abkazia: Russia Responses”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 34, 27 August 1993, pp. 49–55. 231 The first reaction of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was to take measures aimed primarily at obtaining information about the situation on the ground. See UN S/24633 (8 October 1992), S/24794 (11 November 1992) and S/25188 (28 January 1993). 232 See UN S/25756, 11 May 1993.  Chapter V   215

the parties on the principle of talks which would take place under the auspices of the United Nations, with Russia as “facilitator”, and the participation of the OSCE.233 The first talks began on 1 December 1993, on an agreement anticipating an end to hostilities, the exchange of prisoners, the return of refugees and displaced persons and the creation of a group of experts on the status of Abkhazia.234 Since then, negotiations have advanced extremely slowly, due to the particular difficulties raised by the issue of the repatriation of refugees and the territorial integrity of Georgia.235 The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons was, at first sight, a purely humanitarian problem: the conflict had led to the exodus of more than 300,000 people – three-quarters of the total population of Abkhazia.236 However, it also posed challenges of a political nature. As a minority in Abkhazia, the separatists deliberately provoked the departure of non-Abkhazian populations, with a view to changing the ethnic composition of the region. Moreover, they practiced a policy of granting Abkhazian nationality and material amenities to foreign volunteers who had fought alongside them, enabling them to settle. This was why the Abkhazian authorities refused to agree either on the number of people who could be authorized to return to their homes or on a precise repatriation schedule. Similarly, the Abkhazian party refused to recognize the territorial integrity of Georgia (reaffirmed by the UN Security Council in October 1993)237 and only agreed to negotiate with Tbilisi on the basis of the principle of the peoples’ right to self-determination. Confirming its determination in this regard, on 26 ­November 1994, the Abkhazian Parliament adopted a Constitution conferring on ­Abkhazia the status of a “Sovereign Democratic State” – while declaring that it had been arranged that a union would be formed with Georgia consisting of the two equal entities.238 At the time of writing, both parties had agreed to the idea of creating some form of union, but radically differed on how this should be applied in practice: the Georgians have opted for a federal formula, while the Abkhazians are thinking in terms of a confederal link.239

233 See UN S/26646, 27 October 1993. See also S/26023, 1 July 1993 §§ 2−11. 234 See UN S/26875, 15 December 1993. See also CSCE Communication No. 321, (7 December 1993). 235 For an account of how the negotiations developed, see UN S/1994/80, §§ 5−17, (25 ­January 1994), S/1994/529, §§ 2−7, §§13−17 and Annexes II and III, (3 May 1994); S/1994/583, Annex II, (17 May 1994), S/1994/725, §§ 7 and 8 (16 June 1994); S/1995/10, §§ 2−16 and 39−41, (6 ­January 1995); S/1995/181, §§ 2−15, 35 and 36, (6 March 1995) and S/1995/342, §§ 2−8, 13, 42−44, (16 May 1995). See also the Report of the CSCE Representative of the Geneva (Georgian-­ Abkhazian) Negotiations submitted to the CSO in March 1994. 236 See The United Nations and the Situation in Georgia, Department of Public Information/1693, New York, April 1995, Reference paper, p. 14. 237 Security Council Resolution 876, (19 October 1993). 238 The Security Council disapproved of this initiative by the Abkhazians, see UN S/PRST/1994/78, (2 November 1994). 239 UN S/1995/181, §§ 4 and 5 (6 March 1995) and S/1995/342, §§ 4 and 5, (1 May 1995). See also DOC.256, (17 February 1995). On the nature of the Georgian concessions, see S/1994/317 (21 March 1994) and S/1994/1333, p.8, (23 November 1994). 216   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Alongside the peacemaking efforts, in August 1993, the Security Council established a modest United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), charged with monitoring and consolidating the ceasefire which took place under the aegis of Moscow on 27 July of the same year.240 The large-scale outbreak of fighting, which ended with the total conquest of Abkhazia by the separatists, rendered the UNOMIG mandate null and void and raised the question of another type of UN operation aimed at the safe return of populations who had fled the region and whose opinion had to be taken into account during any referendum on the status of Abkhazia. At the instigation of Moscow (which wanted to legitimize the intervention of its troops in Abkhazia), the parties to the conflict declared themselves favourable to the “deployment in the conflict zone of United Nations peacekeeping forces or other forces authorized by the United Nations” with, regardless of the format agreed, the participation of a Russian contingent.241 Russia also put the UN under ­pressure in this regard, in a request submitted jointly by Presidents Yeltsin and Shevardnadze and in a joint declaration by the CIS.242 Secretary-­General Boutros-Ghali (who had envisaged, among other practical options, that of a Russian contingent not exceeding 30% of the total forces) considered that the conditions conducive to a UN peacekeeping operation had not been met.243 Indeed, while Georgia had been favourable to the idea of a force being deployed across the entire conflict zone, capable of ensuring the safety of refugees returning to their homes, the Abkhazian authorities would only accept a force stationed along the demarcation line and refused the presence of an international civil police force in the area under their control.244 Overwhelmed by the political management of some fifteen peacekeeping operations, the funding of which was posing difficulties, the Security Council did not come to a decision upon the issue. Under these conditions, Russia decided to go ahead without the UN. Through an “Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces”, signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994, ­Russia obtained the authorization from the parties to the conflict to deploy some 3,000 soldiers from the CIS “peacekeeping force” (but only Russian forces to begin with) in a buffer zone which was 48 km long and 12 km wide on either side of the Enguri River which separates Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia.245 Russia justified its initiative in detail. In a letter to Secretary ­General Boutros-­ Ghali on 21 June 1994, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Andrei Kozyrev)

240 Security Council Resolution 858, (24 August 1993). 241 See UN S/1994/32, (14 January 1994). 242 See UN S/1994/125 (14 February 1994) and S/1994/476 (20 April 1994). 243 See UN S/1994/80, § 22, (25 January 1994) and in particular S/1994/529, §§ 21−30, (3 May 1994). 244 See the article by Armand Gaspard, published in Journal de Genève, 4 April 1994. 245 Text of the Agreement: UN S/1994/583, (18 May 1994). The definition of the zone was a compromise between the Georgian point of view, which favoured deployment across the territory of Abkhazia, and the Abkhazian point of view, which favoured deployment on the Abkhaz- Georgian border. See the article by Jan Krause, published in Le Monde, 17 May 1994.  Chapter V   217

explained that sending military forces into the field was the only way of avoiding the resumption of hostilities and of retaining the chances of a political settlement in Abkhazia. He also stressed that this was an operation undertaken by the CIS, based on an “advance contingent” of Russian troops for a limited period. Finally, he specified that the operation would be carried out under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations: the CIS would not supplant the UN in Abkhazia but would closely co-operate with the expanded mandate of the UNOMIG to establish “a special fund for voluntary contributions [which] would help to attract a wide range of States to the peacekeeping effort”.246 Following reassurance from the Secretary-­General Boutros-Ghali at the end of delicate negotiations with Moscow on the subject of the freedom of movement of UNOMIG within and outside the area in which the CIS forces were to be deployed, the Security Council modified the UNOMIG’s mandate in July 1994.247 Authorized to include staff up to 136 military observers, UNOMIG was charged with monitoring observation of the ceasefire, compliance with the security zone, the neutralization of heavy arms left by the belligerents at certain identified places, and the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia. It was also charged with investigating cases of violation and with trying to resolve the differences relating to such incidents and had the authority to “observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement [signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994]”: in short, much like the CSCE in South Ossetia, the UN was involved in “indirect” peacekeeping.248 As in South Ossetia, the Russian troops in Abkhazia agreed to the constraints of international control. Boutros Boutros-Ghali could, therefore, report that the UNOMIG and the CIS forces were lending assistance, organizing joint patrols and regularly exchanging information – in other words, co-operation and co- ordination between them was satisfactory.249 However, the region remains endemically insecure due to organized crime which UNOMIG does not have the means to eradicate.250

246 See UN S/1994/732, (21 June 1994). 247 See Resolution 937 of 21 July 1994. For the negotiations with Moscow, see UN S/1994/529/ Add. 1 (9 June 1994), S/1994/714 (16 June 1994) and S/1994/725 (16 June 1994). 248 Involvement decided on by the Security Council with lukewarm enthusiasm: When Resolution 937 (cited above) was adopted, New Zealand summed up the situation by stating that “it is [not] a good precedent for a neighbouring State to play such a predominant role in such a force”: S/PV.3407 (Provisional), p. 7, (21 July 1994). 249 See UN S/1995/181, §§ 31 and 34, (6 March 1995) and S/1995/342, §§ 36 and 38(1 May 1995). The mandate of the CIS forces ran until 19 July 1996, see S/1996/371, Annex I, (23 May 1996) and that of UNOMIG until 12 July 1996, see Security Council Resolution No. 1036 adopted, (12 January 1996). 250 While he recognized that the co-operation between UNOMIG, the Georgian Government and the authorities of Abkhazia was satisfactory overall, the Secretary-General recognized that “both sides have criticized UNOMIG, the Georgians for not protecting the returnees in the Gali region and the Abkhaz for not preventing armed elements from infiltrating the security zone on the west bank of the Inguri, although neither UNOMIG’s mandate nor its strength enable it to do either task”, see S/1995/342, § 22, (1 May 1995). 218   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

The result of all this is that the CSCE and the UN both independently manage one of the two conflicts which make post-communist Georgia the “sick man of the Caucasus”251 – a situation which is all the more unjustified in that this separate management shares the same aim (preservation of the territorial integrity of Georgia) and similar methods. Responsibility for this appears to fall to the UN: for bureaucratic reasons, the UN has rejected most propositions for co-ordinated work that the CSCE has put forward. When the CSCE decided to establish a Mission of Long Duration (November 1993), the UN had not yet fully engaged in Georgia. This is why the CSO asked the head of the Mission to manage the Abkhazian conflict as well as the Ossetian conflict and to regularly exchange information and to co-ordinate its work with the UN.252 At its meeting in in Stockholm in December 1992, the Council of Ministers recognized even more clearly the need for a “rational division of labour” and charged the head of the Mission with working out the practical modalities for co-ordinating efforts between the two international institutions.253 With the recommendations taking time to materialize, the CSO issued a reminder in February and in April 1993.254 When the UN engaged itself fully in the management of the Abkhazia conflict, the CSCE suggested officially – and on several occasions – three practical forms of co-operation and co-ordination: CSCE participation in the negotiation process in Abkhazia and UN participation in the negotiation process in South Ossetia;255 the presence of CSCE liaison officers in the UNOMIG and UN liaison officers in the CSCE Mission to Georgia;256 and the nomination of a joint Special Representative at high level with a mandate to “address the whole range of problems facing the country”.257 The UN Secretariat responded to these various propositions with little interest or even negatively. At the time of writing, the situation appears as follows. On the political level, the CSCE is actively participating (in partnership with the UN and

251 Le Monde, 27 July 1995: According to Roger Cans, “the former Switzerland of the USSR has become the sick man of the Caucasus”. 252 See 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 2, §§ 2 and 3. Thus, the mandate of the Mission covered the whole of Georgia, although it focused on managing the Ossetian conflict. 253 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): section 1, “Georgia”, §§ 3 and 4. 254 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, Annex 4 and 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, item 5 (c). 255 See 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 March 1994, Annex, § 7. The CSO also suggested that “two conferences [be held] under the auspices of the United Nations and the CSCE devoted to the resolution of these conflicts [the Ossetian and the Abkhaz] under United Nations and CSCE Chairmanship respectively”, see 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, Annex 1; see also Budapest Review Conference (1994): Decisions, Chapter II, “Georgia § 5. 256 See 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, Annex 1. See also CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 26, item 4 (b), third indent, (26 August 1993), and 23rd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 22 September 1993, Annex, as well as Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, section I, § 2.2 and 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 3 March 1994, Annex, § 7. 257 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, section I, § 2.5. This idea was advanced by the Swedish Chairmanship, see CSCE Communication No. 301, § 8, (19 No.vember 1993).  Chapter V   219

Russia) in negotiations concerning the status of Abkhazia, but nothing indicates (to our knowledge) a comparable involvement of the UN in the peacemaking process being carried out under the auspices of the CSCE in South Ossetia. In the field, interaction appears to be improving: the (late) establishment of a UNOMIG liaison bureau in Tbilisi appears, finally, to be facilitating an exchange of information between the UNOMIG and the CSCE Mission to Georgia;258 in contrast, the CSCE has not been able to open a liaison bureau in Sukhumi (Abkhazia).259 It is perhaps regrettable that approach to managing the conflict which is ruining post-communist Georgia is neither integrated nor does it involve operational co-operation as is, notably, the case in Macedonia. As a result of the success of the presidential and parliamentary elections in November 1995 and the adoption of a federal Constitution, Georgia finally appears to be leaning towards stability for the first time since the collapse of communism. Nonetheless, it remains a devastated country. Despite some progress, the South Ossetian conflict has not been resolved,260 while the conflict in ­Abkhazia has reached a stalemate.261 Furthermore, the situation in Chechnya appears to have introduced a new political dimension into the Caucasian imbroglio: having made Moscow (which bombs Chechnya from Georgian bases) aware of the inconvenience of indulging in doublespeak about territorial integrity, it may oblige the Ossetians and Abkhazians (friends of the Chechens) to be less intransigent, or even more moderate in their demands of the Georgian State. It would appear, however, that these positive factors are insufficient to put an end to the woes of Georgia, the restoration of whose territorial integrity depends on the goodwill of Moscow and whose economic development is largely dependent upon the return of Abkhazia.262

C. Moldova A principality founded in the Middle Ages, Moldavia extended from the Carpathian mountains to Dniester and the Black Sea. Subjugated by the Ottoman Empire in 1504, at the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1806–1812 it fell partially into tsarist Russian hands, with signature of the Treaty of Bucharest. Russia annexed the western part of Moldavia (known as “Bessarabia”) and undertook to Russify it.

258 See S/1995/10, § 22, (6 January 1995) and S/1995/181, § 21, (6 March 1995). In February 1994, the Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia openly declared that “the United Nations continues to refuse to be represented in Southern Ossetia” (see GEO/PRC/4, p. 17, 17 February 1994). 259 The obstacles arise from both the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Abkhaz authorities, see DOC.272/95 (20 February 1995) and the rather unco-operative attitude of UNOMIG, which refused to provide the OSCE staff in Sukhumi with office space in UN buildings, as they had requested for security reasons. Also see DOC. 722, (16 September 1994). 260 See REF.SEC/115/95 of 20 June 1995. 261 See UN: S/1996/5 (2 January 1996). In addition, Adjara has de` facto autonomy in all domains except Foreign Affairs, Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199), p. 297. 262 See Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199), pp 298 and 299; pp. 336 and 337. “The economic crisis cannot be resolved with the return of Abkhazia, in particular the dam on the Ingouri River, whose turbines are located in Abkhazia” (ibid., p. 297). 220   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Later, in 1859, the rest of the territory, going by the name of “Moldavia”, was united with the Principality of Wallachia to form Romania – a country whose independence was established by the Treaty of Bucharest in 1878. In the wake of the Russian Revolution, Bessarabia proclaimed its independence and joined ­Romania (1918), a step never recognized by the USSR. In 1924, the USSR declared the Ukrainian region of Transdniestria (on the left or western bank of the Dniester) as the “Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic” (MASSR) within Ukraine. In 1940, executing the secret clauses of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, it retrieved Bessarabia (and, at the same time, annexed the north of Bucovina). It then transformed the MASSR into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, in other words, a full member of the USSR. The new entity did not encompass the whole of Romanian Bessarabia (the right bank of the Dniester) and the MASSR: portions of southern Bessarabia and northern Bucovina were, for strategic reasons, reconnected to Ukraine. The invasion of the USSR by Nazi Germany enabled Romania to take back possession of Bessarabia until 1944. However, with the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, Romania once again lost Bessarabia, which was integrated into the USSR (within its 1940 borders) and was subjected to a systematic policy of Russification.263 As the result of perestroika, Moldavia proclaimed its “sovereignty” on 23 June 1990. The day after the failed coup in Moscow on 27 August 1991, it proclaimed its independence. From 1989, under nationalist pressure, the authorities of the new Republic, now known as Moldova, adopted certain measures (re-establishment of the Latin alphabet, promotion of Romanian as the official language, adoption of the three colours of the Romanian flag, etc.), illustrating their intention to join the country to Romania. However, Moldova was a multi-ethnic nation: its 4.3 million inhabitants included (according to the Soviet census of 1989), 64.5% Romanians, 13.8% Ukrainians, 12.9% Russians and 3.5% Gagauzians. The spectre of the Romanianization of the country sparked separatist movements in Gagauzia (August 1990) and Transdniestria (September 1990). Essentially economic in origin, Gagauzian separatism manifested itself peacefully and (with the support of Turkey) succeeded in finding a political solution within the Moldavian state in 1994.264 In contrast, the Russian-speaking separatism on the left bank of the

263 See Vladimir Socor, “Moldavian Lands between Romania and Ukraine: The Historical and Political Geography”, Report on the USSR, vol. 2, no. 46, 16 November 1990, pp. 16–18. 264 The Gagauz (Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians) were concentrated in the southern part of the country, where (with about 150,000 inhabitants) they comprised only 40% of the population. On 19 August 1990, they proclaimed a Soviet Socialist Republic of Gagauzia in the principal town (proposed as the capital) of Comrat. Their gesture was mainly motivated by the desire to stop being second-class citizens as they lagged behind in terms of economic development, education and health at the national level. The absence of ethnic disputes with the Moldovans enabled the moderates on both sides to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the basis of an autonomous status that was voted by the Moldovan Parliament on 23 December 1994 and entered into force on 14 January (see DOC.326 of 27 February 1995). Following public consultation, the Gagauz returned to the Moldovan fold, thus becoming the first people to enjoy such a status in ex-communist Europe (see REF.OD/4/95, 1 April 1995). On the Gagauz problem,  Chapter V   221

Dniester developed violently and remains intact to this day. This section will analyse information about the conflict in Transdniestria (the modern-day incar­ nation of the Bessarabian question) as well as the role of the CSCE Mission to ­Moldova. a) Facts about the Trandniestrian conflict Four key remarks shed light on the nature of the conflict. Firstly, Transdniestria (Nistru in Moldavian, Pridenstrovia in Russian) never belonged to Romania. As indicated earlier, it was part of Soviet Ukraine (as an Autonomous Republic within it) before being reunited with Romanian Bessarabia to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. Within this territory, which measures 4,000 km2 and which is home to 780,000 inhabitants (according to the Soviet census of 1989), Moldavians of Romanian ancestry only make up 40% of the population, compared to 53% of Russian-­speakers – 28% Ukrainian and 25% Russian. Secondly, the Russians on the left bank of the Dniester only represented a small part of the Russian-speaking population of Moldavia. 75% of Russians in the country found themselves on the right bank of the Dniester and lived alongside the rest of the population without any major problems.265 Thirdly, the majority of the industrial resources of this essentially agricultural country were concentrated in Transdniestria. Although it only represented 12% of the territory and 17% of the population, it produced 35% of the country’s ­revenue.266 Lastly, the Russian-speaking population of Transdniestria included a large number of Russian civil servants and officers who had settled there with their families following the Russification policy implemented by Moscow. From the 1950s onwards, Russians were effectively encouraged to move to Transdniestria where they filled most of the management positions in industry and government.267 The presence of the officers is explained by the fact that the region fell within the (strategically important) military district of Odessa. For the Russian-­speakers, the integration of Moldova into Romania brought with it the unacceptable prospect of the Socialist way of life and its related privileges being brought into question. Hence, the conflict on the left bank of the Dniester was less

see Vladimir Socor, “Gagauz in Moldavia Demand Separate Republic”, Report on the USSR, vol. 2, no. 36, 7 September 1990, pp. 8–13; Cassandra Cavanaugh, “Conflict in Moldova: The Gagauz Factor”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 32, 14 August 1992, pp. 11–17, and Vladimir Socor, “Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: A Precedent for Eastern Europe”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 33, 26 August 1994, pp. 20–28. See also the Report by Lord Finsberg on Moldova’s application for membership in the Council of Europe, see Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly [PACE] Doc.7278 (18 April 1995), pp. 13 and 14. 265 See Gerald B. Solomon, Peacekeeping in the Transniester Region: A test case for the CSCE, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, 1994, document AL 228 PC [94] 6, p. 3. 266 See CSCE Communication No. 281, p. 14, § 3, (16 September 1992). 267 Ibid., p. 2. 222   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

ethnic in nature than political and ideological. Its key issue was not the self- determination of peoples.268 On 2 September 1990, the Russian-­speakers declared the “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic”. With the support of the Soviet Union’s 14th Army, stationed in Tiraspol (the “capital” of the new Republic), they gradually established their own institutions and inflicted a military defeat on the Government’s as yet embryonic forces, culminating in June 1992.269 Besides Russia, there were two other States which could not remain indifferent to the issue of Moldova’s territorial integrity: Romania and Ukraine. For Romania, Moldova’s declaration of independence was not an end in itself, but the prelude to unification of the Romanian people within a single State.270 As for Ukraine, it was concerned by the humanitarian consequences of the conflict (the influx of ­refugees into its territory), by the fate of the significant Ukrainian minority living in Moldova, by the territorial disputes re-opened by Romania (on the subject of North Bucovina and South Bessarabia), by Transdniestrian support for the Crimean separatists, and above all by the military presence of Russia at its south- west ­border.271 In March 1992, a Commission including Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Romania was established with a view to resolving the emerging conflict. However, it quickly emerged that Moscow intended to hinder rather than use the quadripartite process. Under these conditions, and given the military escalation, the Moldovan Government had no choice (much like Georgia when faced with a similar situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia) other than to accept Russia’s conditions. On 21 July 1992, the Moldovan President Mircea Snegur and President Boris Yeltsin signed an “Agreement on the Principles for a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Dniester Region of the Republic of Moldova”, establishing

268 See Pal Kolsto, Andrei Edemsky and Natalya Kalashnikova, “The Dniester Conflict : Between Irredentism and Separatism”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 45, No. 6, 1993, pp. 973–1000, Neil V. Lamont, “Territorial Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: The Moldovan Case, 1991–March 1993”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 6, No. 4, December 1993, pp. 576–612, Neil Melvin, “Moldova Looks Back to the Future”, The World Today, vol. 50, no. 6, June 1994, pp. 102 and 103, as well as Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, pp. 42 .; “Moldova and the New Bessarabian Question”, The World Today, vol. 49, no. 7, July 1995, pp. 135–139; “Eurasia Letter: Moldova with a Russian Face”, Foreign Policy, No. 97, Winter 1994/1995, pp. 106–120. 269 See Solomon, (no. 265) p. 5. 270 Upon Moldova’s proclamation of independence, the Romanian Government officially declared that “[t]he proclamation of an independent Romanian State on the territories annexed by force as a consequence of the secret provisions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact constitutes a decisive step towards the peaceful removal of the harmful effects of the Pact on the rights and interests of the Romanian people”, see A/46/384 (27 August 1991). See also Dan Ionescu, “Romanian Concern over the Conflict in Moldova”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 18, 1 May 1992, pp. 46–51. 271 See Bohdan Nahaylo, “Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, No. 18, 1 May 1992, pp. 39–45 and “Moldovan Conflict Creates New Dilemmas for Ukraine”, ibid., 15 May 1992, pp. 1–8. See also William Crowther, “Moldova after Independence”, Current History, vol. 93, No. 585, October 1994, p. 346.  Chapter V   223

a ceasefire and a security zone on both banks of the Dniester (225 km long and an average of 12 km wide), and provided for the deployment of tripartite peacekeeping forces (six Russian battalions of 2,400 men and three Moldavian and Transnistrian battalions each of 1,200 men) under the supervision of a Joint Control Committee in Bendery (Transdniestria).272 b) The CSCE Mission to Moldova Following Moldova’s accession to the CSCE (30 January 1992), a Rapporteur Mission was sent to assess the situation in the country with regard to the pan- European principles. In its report, it recommended, notably, that “the CSO [should] keep developments in Transdniestria under review and that the Chairman in Office of the CSO be authorized to call special meetings in this matter if the need should arise.”273 However, prior to the defeat of the Chisinau troops, the Moldavian Government only addressed the CSCE to ask it to take note of its desire to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.274 It was not until an appeal had been launched by the participants to the quadripartite process that the CSO invited the Chairman- in-Office of the Council of Ministers, in July 1992, to put forward propositions on the subject of managing the conflict.275 In response, the Chairman-in-Office appointed Adam Rotfled (Director of SIPRI) as his Personal Representative, mandated with examining, in consultation with the parties, the modalities of the issue.276 In February 1993, on the basis of recommendations by Mr Rotfled, the CSO decided to establish a CSCE Mission to Moldova.277

272 For the text of the Agreement, see UN S/24369 (6 August 1992) and CSCE Communication No 224 (29 July 1992). The representatives of Tiraspol were, it seems, present at the signing of the Agreement: see CSCE Communication No 281, p. 9 (16 September 1992). Regarding the current level of forces, see REF.SEC/110/95 (19 June 1995). 273 CSCE Communication No. 126, p. 28, (7 April 1992). 274 See CSCE Communications No. 133, (13 April 1993); No. 182, (20 May 1992) and No. 204, (24 June 1992). At the same time, the Moldovan Government addressed the UN: see documents S/24041 (31 May 1992), S/34138 (22 June 1992), S/24185 (25 June 1992) and S/24369 (6 August 1992), the latter document called for a group of military observers to be dispatched. 275 See 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 4 of 2 July 1992, Annex. In their communiqué from Istanbul on 25 June 1992, the countries of the quadripartite process had requested that the OSCE “promote actively a settlement of the conflict through mediatory activities as well as through continuous monitoring of the human rights situation”, all while expressing their wish that the UN could play “a more active peacemaking role … in the process of political settlement of the problem”, see UN S/24230, 2 July 1992. Prior to this call, the CSO had confined itself (upon Moscow’s request) to encouraging the quadripartite efforts to settling the conflict, see 10th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 29 April–1 May 1992, p.4, and 11th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 19 May 1992, Annex. 276 See 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, p.2. See also CSCE Communication No. 258 (7 September 1992). 277 For the text of the final report by Adam Rotfeld, see CSCE Communication No. 38 (2 February 1993). For interim reports, see: CSCE Communications No. 281, (16 September 1992), No. 281/Add. 1 (5 November 1992) and No. 281/Add. 2 (11 December 1992), as well as No. 3 (2 February 1993). See also Adam Rotfeld, “In Search of Political Settlement — The Case of the Conflict in Moldova”, The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE, edited by Staffan Carlsson, Stockholm, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994, pp. 100–137. 224   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Based in Chisinau, the Mission became operational on 25 April 1993 with eight members of staff. Its status was governed by a Memorandum of Understanding with the Moldovan Government and the Transdniestrian authorities – who only authorized it long after an office was established in Tiraspol (February 1995). In 1996, its budget was eight million Austrian schillings. Initially established for a duration of six months, its mandate has since been regularly renewed – twice to date, until 31 December 1996.278 The Mission was responsible for exercising three key functions relating respectively to peacemaking, “indirect” peacekeeping and peacebuilding.279 With regard to peacemaking, it was incumbent upon the Mission to help the parties to the conflict to negotiate a formula to liberally define the status of Transdniestria within the context of the territorial integrity of the Moldovan State as well as to support negotiations with a view to an agreement on the “early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops”, in other words, Russia’s 14th Army which was stationed in Transdniestria. The Mission had the merit of putting the parties to the conflict in direct contact and of beginning discussions on the subject of the status of Transdniestria on the basis of a form of territorial autonomy (more or less inspired by that of the Alto Adige, the Spanish Basque country and the Åland Islands) proposed in November 1993.280 The process reached a turning point when, on 28 April 1994, the Moldovan President (Mircea Snegur) and the Transdniestrian President (Igor Smirnof ) signed a declaration on the general principles of a political solution and a framework for negotiation. In July 1994, expert groups were established with a view to examining the status of Transdniestria. The Moldovan Government was firmly determined to concede to Transdniestria direct management of all its affairs (other than foreign policy, defence, currency and borders) in line with the new Constitution of July 1994, Article 11 of which confirmed that “places on the left bank of the Dniester River may be assigned special forms and conditions of autonomy, according to the special statutory provisions adopted by organic law”. However, the Transdniestrian party considered that such a formula was insufficient, its preference being purely and simply independence or (at a push) a confederal relationship between equal and sovereign States.281 The Tiraspol authorities made it clear that they could

278 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 28 of 9 September 1993, and Permanent Committee: Journal No. 15, of 14 April 1994 and Journal No. 41 of 14 November 1994, as well as Permanent Council: Decision No. 54, of 29 June 1995, Decision No. 85 of 9 November 1995 and Decision No. 121 of 23 May 1996. 279 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, Annex 3, decision 5 (b), and CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 7 of 11 March 1993, Annex 1, as well as 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 21 April 1993, decision (k). 280 For further details regarding the proposed wording, see CSCE Mission to Moldova: Report No. 13, (12 November 1993). 281 The Moldovan Government wished to negotiate on the basis of a “Draft Law on a Political Status for the Special Transdniestrian Self-Administered Region of the Republic of Moldova”, while the opposing party proposed a “Treaty on the Delimitation of Powers between the State Organs of the Republic of Moldova and the Pridniestrovian Moldovan Republic (PMR)”, see CSCE Mission to  Chapter V   225

envisage for Transnistria a formula which was comparable to that governing the relationship between Tatarstan and the Russian Federation, on the condition, however, that such a formula be combined with appropriate internal and international guarantees. Internal, in other words, constitutional-type guarantees were not the problem. The Moldovan Government accepted the idea that Transdniestria could freely decide on its future in the event that Moldova merged with another State. However, the question of international guarantees was a more complex and thorny issue. Such guarantees could be provided by Russia and Ukraine as well as by the CSCE. However, for the Tiraspol authorities, the only adequate guarantee was the maintenance of Russia’s 14th Army in Transdniestria. At the end of 1995, the negotiation continued to do no more than mark time. Tiraspol’s intransigence was all the more regrettable given that the threat of Moldova’s annexation to Romania (the direct cause of the secession) had disappeared. Having realized that the restoration of the country’s territorial integrity was a prerequisite to the renunciation of a union with Romania, the leaders in Chisinau made clear their desire to remain on the separatist path and to draw closer to Russia. This policy was based on simple realism. Firstly, any definitive political settlement to the conflict would necessarily pass through Moscow. Secondly, Moldova is also heavily dependent on Russia for trade, energy supplies and raw materials.282 Lastly, the prospect of becoming a simple rural province of a politically centralized Romanian State which was, moreover, facing economic difficulties, was hardly appealing. In March 1994, a consultative referendum (i.e. with no binding effect) confirmed the preference of more than 95% of the ­Moldovan population for independence and against unification with Romania. To the great displeasure of Bucharest, Moldova now held that the existence of a specifically ­Moldovan identity justified the concept of “one people, two States”. The Constitution of July 1994 legalized the change in direction of Moldovan policy by proclaiming the “permanent neutrality” of the country (Article 11) and by designating Moldovan – and not Romanian – as the official language (Article 13).283

Moldova: Report No. 19, (15 September–3 October 1994). See also the Finsberg Report, (n. 263) §§ 59−71. 282 See Vladimir Socor, “Isolated Moldova Being Pulled into Russian Orbit”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no 50, 17 December 1993, pp. 9–15. In October 1993, Moldova decided to join the CIS and its economic union – a decision that the new Moldovan parliament ratified in April 1994. 283 In Romania, all political groupings are in favour of reunification: “irredentism is the sine qua non of political viability in Romania” (Charles King, “Moldova and the New Bessarabian Questions”, (n. 268), p. 136. Bucharest has reproached Moldova for calling its official language Moldovan (when in fact it is nothing other than Romanian) and for permitting Russian to become the language of the country as well, see Le Monde, 3 August 1994. Romania barely has any means to exert pressure on Moldova. If they insist too forcefully on the goal of reunification, they run the risk of strengthening Hungary’s claim on Transylvania. For further details, see Vladimir Socor, “Why Moldova does not Seek Reunification with Romania”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 5, 31 January 1992, pp. 27–33, and “Moldovan-Romanian Relations Are Slow to Develop”, ibid., vol. 1, no. 26, 26 June 1992, pp. 38–45. See also Charles King, “Eurasian Letter... ”, (n. 268) pp. 116–118. 226   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

The question of withdrawal of Russia’s 14th Army set Chisinau and Moscow against one another, with Tiraspol in the background. Stationed at Tiraspol since 1945, at the time of Moldova’s independence, the 14th Army consisted of some 10,000 troops, largely career officers.284 It represented an elite and powerfully armed corps under the politicized command of General Yuriy Netkachev who was then replaced by the popular General Alexander Lebed (until June 1995) and which is led, at the time of writing, by General Valery Evnevitch.285 Article 4 of the Russian-Moldovan Agreement of 21 July 1992 posed the principle of a withdrawal of Russian troops through bilateral negotiation, which was particularly difficult. Moscow maintained that the withdrawal of its troops could not be taken lightly. Firstly, the early departure of an army which played a stabilizing role in the region would trigger the resumption of hostilities. Secondly, and as was the case for the units stationed in the Baltic States, the question involved non-negligible socioeconomic elements: the fate of the large number of soldiers (80–90% of the staff ) holding the status of permanent resident in Transdniestria, the pensions of retired soldiers in the country, and the rehousing of soldiers repatriated to Russia. Lastly, Moscow emphasized the logistical difficulties of bringing back to Russia large quantities of weapons which, additionally, had to pass through Ukraine. For their part, the Moldovans argued that the 14th Army was a permanently destabilizing factor. In principle, it represented a foreign occupying force stationed without the consent of the host country,286 and by arming and supporting the separatists, it had committed a direct act of aggression against Moldova. Moreover, it continued to meddle in the internal affairs of the country and to harm the nation’s sovereignty – notably by organizing (without notification) large-scale military manoeuvres, by incorporating Russian residents within it and, further,

284 On the 14th Army, see Report No. 7 (29 July 1994) of the Mission, as well as the analyses by Vladimir Socor, “Russian Forces in Moldova”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no 34, 28 August 1992, pp. 38–43; “Russia’s Fourteenth Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova”, ibid., vol. 1, no 36, 11 September 1992, pp. 41–48 and “Russia’s Army in Moldova: There to Stay?”, ibid., vol. 2, no 25, 18 June 1993, pp. 42–49. See also the Solomon Report, (n. 265) p. 5, § 15 and Charles King, “Moldova and the New Bessarabian Questions”, (n. 268), pp. 138 and 139. The 14th Army has subsequently been restructured as an operational group and reduced to approximately 6,500 men, see REF.SEC/110/95, (19 June 1995). 285 On General Lebed, see Vladimir Socor, “Russia’s Army in Moldova: There to Stay?” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, No 25, 18 June 1993, pp. 46–48. See also Laure Mandeville and Dominique Derda, “Entretien avec Alexandre Lebed. Le proconsul de Transnistrie”, Politique internationale, No 67, Spring 1995, pp. 89–101. 286 It is worth noting that, in the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration, the OSCE States came out in favour of eliminating certain issues left over from the Cold War, such as the “stationing of foreign armed forces on the territories of the Baltic States without the required consent of those countries” (§ 15). In this regard, Moldova issued an interpretative declaration that it was also subject to the provisions of § 15 of the Declaration; see Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No 50 of 8 July 1992, pp.6 and 7. We also note that § 14 of the OSCE’s Code of Conduct (1994) affirms that a participating State can station its armed forces on the territory of another participating State only on the basis of a freely negotiated agreement that conforms to international law.  Chapter V   227

by authorizing General Lebed to stand for election and to sit in the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet.287 After ten series of tight negotiations, a “Convention on the Legal Status, Procedure and Calendar for Withdrawing Military Units Temporarily on the Moldovan Territory” was initialled on 10 August 1994 and signed on 21 October of the same year.288 Despite the efforts of the Moldavan party, the CSCE’s Mission was not authorized to take part in the negotiations, even as a simple observer. The Russian party only agreed to provide information on progress which had been made from the penultimate series of negotiations.289 The withdrawal schedule was set (in line with Moscow’s wishes) for three years after the entry into force of the Convention, it being understood that practical evacuation measures would be synchronized with the political settlement of the conflict, i.e. a decision on a special political status for Transdniestria which was mutually satisfactory to both parties. Positively welcoming the conclusion of the Convention, the Budapest Review Meeting nonetheless interpreted the concept of synchronization as meaning that the withdrawal and the political solution were “two parallel processes which will not hamper each other”. Simultaneously, it suggested that the mandate of the CSCE Mission could be enlarged in such a way as to enable it to monitor the process of the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces.290 At the time of writing, Moscow refuses to allow the CSCE play such a role. The Russo-Moldovan agreement met with a hostile reception from the separatists. They left the negotiating table before the finalization of an instrument which, they believed, barely involved them because it ignored their vital interests: “The Transdniestrian people who have been living and developing together with the troops of Russia for more than 20 years, who endured the bloody tragedy of the war in 1992, consider that the staff of the Russian troops is an unseparable part of the Transdniestrian people”.291 The Tiraspol authorities set about ruining the impact of the agreement, notably through a Decree of 2 February 1995 forbidding the departure from Transdniestria of “machinery, equipment, goods and other material resources acquired by the 14th Army” by organizing on 26 March a referendum (with 93% positive votes) on their maintenance.292

287 See UN S/24041 (30 May 1992), S/24138 (26 June 1992), S/25321 (22 February 1993) and S/26452 (16 September 1993). See also CSCE Communications No 133 (13 May 1992), No 182 (20 May 1992) and No 74 (5 March 1993). It should be noted that the relationship between the 14th Army and the authorities of Transdniestria, which was initially cordial in nature, eventually deteriorated following accusations of corruption that General Lebed made against the officers from Tiraspol. See Charles King, “Eurasian Letter...” (n. 268) pp. 113 and 114 and the Finsberg Report, (n. 263) p. 18, § 83. 288 See CSCE Mission to Moldova: Report No 16 (16 August 1994). See REF.PC/667/95, (9 November 1995) for a list of documents that supplement the Russia-Moldova Convention. See also Le Monde, 12 August 1994. 289 See DOC.58 (11 April 1994). 290 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, Chapter II, “Moldova”. 291 See CSCE Mission to Moldova: Report No. 16, Annex 3, (16 August 1994). 292 See Finsberg Report, (n. 263) §§ 82 and 86. 228   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

The 1994 Convention was ratified by Moldova, but not by Russia: the State Duma clearly stated its support for the separatists. On 26 April 1995, the Duma adopted a resolution on the inadmissibility of the withdrawal of the 14th Army. On 17 November, it went further, demanding that President Yeltsin consider Transdniestria as a zone of strategic interest to Russia, study the question of the recognition of the Republic of Transdniestria and, in the meantime, immediately establish a Russian consulate in Tiraspol. At the same time, it decided to send observers to the referendum organized by the authorities in Tiraspol on the subject of the accession of Transdniestria to the CIS.293 With regard to indirect peacekeeping, the CSCE Mission was charged with a task of observation, consisting of collating military and other information on the situation in the area, investigating incidents that took place in the field, and assessing their political impact. From a military point of view, this task was inconceivable without the co-operation of the Joint Control Commission established by the Agreement of 21 July 1992. The Moldavan party immediately pronounced itself in favour of this type of co-operation, the principle which had, moreover, been approved within the same Joint Commission in June 1993. In practice, however, the Russian party and the Transdniestrian party were opposed – thus making it impossible to verify the military potential of Transdniestria, in particular inside the security zone forbidden to the CSCE.294 In December 1993, the CSCE Council of Ministers urgently recommended that the parties authorize the Mission “to participate in the meetings of the Joint Control Commission and to move freely in the security zone”.295 After more than a year of negotiations, in July 1994, the CSCE Mission saw the first signs of satisfaction with the signature of an agreement on the principles of bilateral co-operation in the security zone. This Agreement recognized the Mission’s right to freedom of movement within the security zone, but granted it only limited access (“one or two times a month”) to the weekly meetings of the Joint Commission.296 The situation only began to improve from May 1995, when the Mission received authorization in principle to participate in all the Joint Commission meetings; since then, co-operation generally appears to be taking place smoothly.297 Finally, with regard to peacebuilding, the Mission is responsible for providing consultative services to Moldova on human rights, national minorities, “evolution towards democracy”, and the repatriation of refugees. Immediately, the Mission

293 See A/50/770-S/1995/971 (20 November 1995). 294 “Dniester forces have been using military facilities that had been vacated by the 14th Army in the security zone to train - illegally recruited - soldiers; they have also reinforced existing fortified positions in the security zone and built new ones, so that what was supposed to be a demilitarized area has become a military stronghold under suspicious authority”, see Solomon Report (n, 265) p. 12, §34. The OSCE Mission confirmed the pertinence of this analysis in its report: REF.SEC/110/95, p. 4, (19 June 1995). 295 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § 1.3.2. 296 Ibid. 297 See OSCE Mission to Moldova Reports No. 7 (31 May 1995) and No. 18 (29 September 1995).  Chapter V   229

interpreted these terms as giving it the right to take the country down the road of the State of Law, fully respecting its multi-ethnicity.298 In practical terms, this involved helping Moldova to draft a democratic Constitution, to review its legislation on language, and to organize multi-party free elections – tasks which required the indispensable support of the ODIHR. As in South Ossetia and Tajikistan (and in contrast to the general practice of the UN), peacebuilding was not conceived of as an attempt at “post-conflict” reconstruction, but as a direct and parallel support to peacemaking. On these grounds, the Mission was not entirely unprepared. It had a systemic analysis of the situation as the result of a Rapporteur Mission which took place in February 1993, on the request of Moldova under the Moscow Mechanism on the Human Dimension. The final Mission report contained fairly specific recommendations on protecting national minorities and legislation on the use of languages and citizenship.299 In partnership with the ODIHR, the Mission fulfilled its task in a relatively conclusive manner across the whole country, with the exception of Transdniestria. Wishing to democratize the structures in Moldova and to access the Council of Europe, the Chisinau Government fully co-operated with the diplomats and CSCE experts. This was not the case for the Tiraspol authorities who, as nostalgic enthusiasts of the former Soviet model, subjugated the media, strengthened Russification of the region (notably through the reintroduction of the ­Cyrillic alphabet in Romanian schools) and openly violated fundamental freedoms. In this difficult context, the CSCE Mission attempted, with little success, to appease the question of Transdniestrian schools and to ease the fate of the convicted members of the “Ilașcu group”.300 In conclusion, since the proclamation of independence, Moldova has taken steps towards democracy, as evidenced by the multi-party elections (February 1994), the adoption of a democratic Constitution (July 1994), granting the Gagauzian minority what was considered by many to be the ideal autonomous status (December 1994), and entry into the Council of Europe (July 1995). The dialogue between Moldova and Transdniestria continues, both between political leaders and between the experts.301 Contact between the populations on both

298 See CSCE Mission to Moldova: Report No. 8 (15 July 1993). 299 See Report of the CSCE Human Dimension Mission to the Republic of Moldova (January 30– February 4, 1993), pp. 18–20. 300 Ilie Ilașcu and five other militants of Moldova’s Christian Democratic Popular Front, which favours the country’s reunification with Romania, were arrested in June 1992 by the authorities of Tiraspol, who accused them of terrorist acts and of murder; held in degrading conditions, the members of the group faced an almost entirely illegal trial that concluded, in December 1993, with Ilie Ilașcu receiving a death sentence. For the OSCE’s intervention, see CSCE Communication No. 210, declaration by the Swedish Chairmanship (28 July 1993) and No. 329, Report from the Special Mission in Tiraspol and Chisinau to Examine de Criminal Case of the Ilașcu u Group (of 29 July 1993), supplemented by another report dated 20 February 1994. 301 In this regard, we note the declaration of 5 July 1995 on the non-use of force, signed at the summit between Snegur and Smirnov to which the parties had invited Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE to guarantee the future status of Transdniestria. 230   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

sides of the river is developing on all levels: apart from certain control points within the security zone, the freedom of movement of people is generally satisfactory. Despite these positive factors, settlement of the conflict on the left bank of the Dniester does not yet appear to be within reach. Firstly, the three-year period planned for the withdrawal of Russian troops has not yet begun, as a result of the Duma’s refusal to ratify the 1994 Convention. Secondly, Moscow has not entrusted the CSCE with the crucial task of supervising the withdrawal and/or destruction of some 40,000 tonnes of weapons in Moldova. Last but not least, Tiraspol’s intransigence is sustained by the incendiary positions taken by a Duma which is more nationalist than ever.

D. Tajikistan Due to the accession of former Soviet Central Asian States which became independent for the first time in their history, the CSCE could not remain indifferent to the civil war which devastated Tajikistan in 1992 and which involved Afghanistan from 1993. The Tajik affair was, however, to confront the pan-European organization with a new case in point: a State which was practically stripped of national identity and a conflict which the UN had been entrusted to managed. This section will analyse information about the Tajik conflict and the role of the CSCE Mission to Tajikistan. a) Facts about the Tajik conflict Tajikistan proclaimed its independence on 9 September 1991. It entered the international scene with a considerable handicap: the country was an artificial product of Moscow’s nationalities policy, and could not claim to have a true national macro-identity. The “Tajik” ethnonym was completely invented by the ­Soviet regime:302 from 1924 the Persian-speaking Sunnis of Turkish-speaking Central Asia were known as “Tajiks”. In 1924, Moscow established an ­Autonomous Republic of Tajikistan within Uzbekistan; on 5 December 1929, it made it a full USSR Republic. However, the Tajik territory was made up of an mixture of regions which differed in their ethnic composition and historical evolution: the industrial region of Leninabad (included to give a certain economic foundation to the new Republic) which was, for geographical reasons, entirely open to Uzbekistan; the agricultural region of Gharm, upon which Moscow had imposed the intensive monoculture of cotton; and the mountainous (and difficult to access) region of Gorno-Badakhshan, populated by Pamiris with a highly specific language and religion.303

302 See Valentin I. Bushkov, “Tadjikistan quelques prémisses de la crise”, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI), no. 18, 1994, p. 17. On the Tajik “ethnic group”, see Ludmila Chyr, “Central Asia’s Tajiks: Self-Identification and Ethnic Identity”, State, Society and Religion in Central Asia. A Post-Soviet Critique, edited by Vitaly Naumkin, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1993, pp. 246–250. 303 Julien Thöni, The Tajik Conflict. The Dialectic between Internal Fragmentation and External Vulnerability, 1991-1994, Geneva, Programme for Strategic and International Security Study, 1994 (“PSIS Occasional Paper” No. 3, 1994), pp. 16–18. Located on the border with Afghanistan,  Chapter V   231

Surrounded by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan and China, Tajikistan appears to be a splintered country with tortuous borders (because they were decided upon arbitrarily) and mountainous terrain. 94% of the roads connecting the central regions to the northern and south-eastern provinces are often impracticable during the winter. In any case, it does not correspond to the historical territory of the Persian-speaking populations: Samarkand and Bukhara, the cradles of Persian culture, do not belong to Tajikistan but to their Uzbek neighbour which, as a result, includes more than a million “Tajiks”.304 Lacking a macro-identity, Tajikistan evolved around the local divisions of a traditional clan-based society, where power was personalized and fragmented, the split between public and private affairs was vague, and the use of force was an integral part of the political process. Four clans shared the country: the L ­ eninabadis in the north (known as “Khujand” since independence); the Kulobis in the south (on the Afghan border); the Gharmis in the south-east; and the Pamiris in the autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan in the east. It should be noted that during the Soviet era, the monopoly of power was constantly held by the ­Leninabadis, helped (from the 1970s onwards) by the Kulobis as their political “clients”, which gave rise to the systematic marginalization of the Gharmis and Pamiris.305 Three other parameters aggravated this impaired sense of identity. Firstly, ­Tajikistan was one of the poorest and least industrialized of the former Soviet Republics. It was the only one whose population lived below the poverty line;306 as a result, it had always remained (and was to continue to remain) highly dependent upon economic assistance from Moscow.307 Secondly, nearly 40% of its population were from ethnic minorities: the Soviet census of 1989 recorded 23.5% Uzbeks, 10% Russian-­speakers and 4.2% diverse ethnic groups – compared to 62.29% of Tajiks. Three regions of the country were heavily populated with Turkish speaking Uzbeks, namely Khujand (31.3%), Gisar (45%) and ­Qurghonteppa (31.9%).308 Thirdly, on the eve of its independence, the country found itself under the yoke of a managing elite which was one of the most conservative and entrenched in the USSR.309 The response to perestroika was as negative here as the anti-Gorbachev coup d’état of August 1991 was positive.

Gorno-Badakhshan, with a population of only 200,000 inhabitants, covered half of the country’s surface area. 304 The fact that Bukhara and Samarkand were surrounded by rural zones with a majority Uzbek population seems to be precisely what motivated Tajikistan’s initial constitution inside the Autonomous Republic of Uzbekistan, see Barnett R. Rubin, “The Fragmentation of Tajikistan”, Survival, vol. 35, no. 4, Winter 1993–94, p. 74. 305 Ibid., p. 75. The Leninabadis and the Kuliabis make up 60% of the country’s population, see Thöni (n. 303) p. 22. 306 See Guissou Jahangiri, “Le Tadjikistan, éléments pour la constitution d’une nation”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 20, 1992/IV, p. 156. 307 See Rubin, (n. 304) p.73. 308 Ibid., pp. 74 and 75. 309 Ibid., p. 76. 232   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Similar to the other ­Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Tajikistan resigned itself to independence rather than striving for it: marked by “national-Sovietism”, the Tajok nomenklatura saw it essentially as a means of controlling the democratization process and of conserving their power.310 At the time of independence, several opposition forces (essentially composed of Gharmis and Pamiris) had already contested the governing power: the R ­ astakhiz (resurgence) nationalism movement, which supported a return to the origins of the (Persian) Tajik culture, the Democratic Party which strove for the political de- Sovietization of the country, the Islamic Renaissance Party which fought for the restoration of Islamic values (but without going as far as advocating fundamentalism), and the Lali Badakhshan (“Rubies of Badakhshan”) who demanded greater autonomy for Gorno-Badakhshan.311 Initially, from September 1991 to May 1992, the fights took place on the political battlefield. Under the pressure of a united opposition, the Supreme Soviet found itself obliged to ban the Communist Party and to organize presidential elections. But the victory of Rahmon Nabiyev (a member of the Khujand clan) on 27 November 1991, enabled the nomenklatura to retain power, to lift the ban on the Communist Party and to adopt measures aiming to gag the opposition. Alongside anti-communist demonstrations and counter- demonstrations organized by the government, tensions mounted dangerously. The creation of a national unity government (on 11 May 1992) brought only fleeting peace. The clans from Khujand and Kulob refused to accept the new government. The bloody trial of strength began in Dushanbe and extended to the south of the country. Sitting in an extraordinary session in Khujand (formerly Leninabad), on 16 November 1992, the Parliament put an end to the national unity government and placed Emomali Rahmonov (from the Kulob clan) at the head of the country. The war raged on, interspersed with atrocities committed by both sides. As the result of military assistance provided either directly by Moscow or under the guise of the CIS, the war ceased at the end of 1992, with the victory of the Kulobis/Khujandis over the Gharmis/Pamiris.312 The war’s toll was high: according to UNHCR estimates, there were some 30,000 deaths and 500,000

310 See Olivier Roy, “L’Asie centrale et le national-soviétisme”, Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, vol. XCVI, 1994, pp. 178 and 179. 311 See Rubin, (n. 304) p.76. 312 For further details, see Keith Martin, “Tajikistan: Civil War Without End ?”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 33, 20 August 1933, pp. 18–29; Guissou Jahangtri, “Anatomie d’une crise : le poids des tensions entre régions au Tadjikistan”, Cahiers d‘études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (CEMOTI), no. 18, 1994, pp. 37–71; Bess Brown, “La guerre civile au Tadjikistan”, Le Tadjikistan à l’épreuve de l’indépendance, Mohammad-Reza Djalili and Frédéric Grare (eds), (Genève Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1995, pp. 97–107. On the politics of Russia with respect to the conflict in Tajikistan, see Thöni (n. 303) pp. 46–49, and Catherine Poujol, “Quelques réflexions sur l’implication russe dans le conflit tadjik”, in Le Tadjikistan à l’épreuve de l’indépendance,(see above) pp. 109–119.  Chapter V   233

displaced persons (of which 60,000 had taken refuge in Afghanistan), not to mention the migration of 300,000 non-­Tajiks to countries in the CIS.313 Two important points should be made about the Tajik war. Firstly, besides their unquestionable ideological differences, the fight for power did not set the “neo- communists” against a heterogeneous coalition of democrats/nationalists/ Islamists. It could be said that “democracy” and “Islam” were nothing more than superficial issues. This was, above all, a clan-based and regional confrontation, motivated by significant political differences and exacerbated by ancient economic and social resentment. The civil war essentially took place between the Kulobis (with the Khujandis taking a back seat) and the Gharmis/Pamiris; the Tajiks took sides depending on their personal geographic origin. The conflict proved to be even more deadly as the rival factions drew upon the significant stock of weapons abandoned by the Soviet army during the evacuation of ­Afghanistan in 1988–1989, and took advantage of the weapons trafficking which existed along the Tajik-Afghan border (1,387km) which had become permeable since the collapse of the USSR. Secondly, the defeat suffered by the opposition did not put an end to the civil war but led to its internationalization. Labelled as “­Islamists”, the defeated side were expelled (by entire villages) towards the north of Afghanistan, where they formed pockets of resistance on the border. With the active assistance of Kabul and the discreet encouragement of Pakistan, they began fighting against Dushanbe from April 1993. Since then, small armed groups continuously infiltrate the country and regularly harass the Russian troops charged with ensuring (under the Dushanbe–Moscow bilateral agreements or those concluded within the CIS) Tajikistan’s internal and external security. Afghanistan (which has a significant Tajik ethnic minority of between three and four million people), considers itself to have a duty of “humanitarian assistance” towards populations which are linguistically, ethnically and religiously very close.314 Meanwhile, Russian fears have been confirmed in relation to the danger of fundamentalist Islam. b) The CSCE Mission to Tajikistan When the Tajik conflict degenerated into civil war, the Dushanbe Government addressed the United Nations rather than the CSCE. Emphasizing that the intensification of armed conflict in the south of the country risked the disintegration of the State and repercussions on the neighbouring CIS countries, it requested, in October 1992 the “support and assistance” of the UN in settling the conflict and stabilizing the situation in the country.315 The UN’s immediate response was to establish a small team of political, military and humanitarian specialists in Dushanbe. Known as UNMOT (United ­Nations

313 See DOC.330, § 1.1, (28 February 1995). See also Mohammad-Reza Djalili and Frédéric Grare, “Le Tadjikistan : convoitises et enjeux régionaux, le rôle de l’Afghanistan, du Pakistan et de l’Iran”, Le Tadjikistan à l’épreuve de l’indépendance, (n. 312) pp. 121–133. 314 See UN S/26145 (22 July 1993). 315 See UN S/1994/24699 (14 April 1994) and S/1994/24741 (20 April 1994). 234   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Mission of Observers in Tajikistan), it became operational from 21 January 1993;316 its role was to monitor the situation on the ground and to co-ordinate international assistance. In the view of the Secretary-­General, this small unit (five international civil servants assisted by seven local officers) was meant to constitute a “ground core for any possible more extensive United Nations participation in the regional efforts in Tajikistan in the future.”317 As a result, the UN began work fairly quickly in Tajikistan with regards to peacemaking and then peace­keeping. Thus, the Secretary-­ General appointed a “Special Envoy for Tajikistan” responsible for encouraging the establishment of a ceasefire between the parties and assisting them with beginning negotiations for a political solution to the conflict.318 Organized under the auspices of Uruguayan diplomat Ramirez Piriz- Ballon, the negotiations between the Dushanbe regime and the Tajik opposition only opened in April 1994.319 They developed extremely slowly, with a certain number of States from the CIS (Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and from outside the CIS (Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan), and with the CSCE as an observer.320 At the end of a first series of “Inter-Tajik Talks on National Reconciliation” (Moscow, 5–12 April 1994), the parties agreed that the negotiations would cover three inseparable clusters of issues: political issues, humanitarian issues (refugees and displaced persons) and constitutional issues (State structures).321 Devoted to the issue of ending the conflicts, the second round of talks (Tehran, 18– 28 June 1994) only concluded with an agreement on “the terms of the ceasefire and the cessation of other hostile acts”.322 On the basis of this definition, a provisional ceasefire agreement was signed in Tehran on 17 September 1994 and the principle of a Joint Commission to monitor it was agreed upon.323 At the end of the third series of talks (Islamabad, 20 October–1 November 1994), the parties decided to extend the ceasefire until 6 February 1995 and signed a Protocol on the Joint Commission.324 Taking account of this progress, the Security Council accepted the Secretary-­ General’s proposal to establish an integrated civil and military operation in Tajikistan, in other words to move onto the peacekeeping phase. While keeping the same name, the UNMOT took on a significantly broader role, consisting of helping

316 Initially, the Secretary-General sent a Fact-Finding Mission to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (September 1992), which was followed by a good offices mission to the different countries in the region (November 1992). See The United Nations and the Situation in Tajikistan. DPI/1685, New York, UN Department of Public Information, April 1995, p. 2. 317 See UN S/25697 (29 April 1993) and S/26743, § 16 (14 September 1993). 318 See UN S/25697 and S/25698, 29 April 1993. 319 The first Special Envoy was Ambassador Ismat Kittani, see UN S/25697 of 29 April 1993. 320 As of 1995, the OSCE held this status alongside the Organization of the Islamic Conference. 321 See UN S/1994/542 (5 May 1992), Annexes II and III. 322 See UN S/1994/893 (28 July 1994), Annex. 323 See UN S/1994/1080 (21 September 1994) and S/1994/1102 (27 September 1994). 324 See UN S/1994/1253 (4 November 1994) and S/1994/1363 (30 November 1994).  Chapter V   235

the Joint Commission to accomplish its task by investigating alleged violations of the ceasefire, offering its good offices to the parties on the ground, and co-­ ordinating its activities with the CSCE Mission to Tajikistan, with the collective peacekeeping forces and the CIS, and with the “forces deployed along the border”, in other words the Russian border guards deployed against Afghanistan. The UNMOT was established for a period of six months, although it was understood that any extension beyond 6 February 1995 would depend upon the continuation of the ceasefire and the parties’ demonstration of their will to reach a political settlement.325 To date, the ceasefire has been prolonged on several occasions, until 26 February 1996326 and the UNMOT until 15 December 1996.327 During the fourth series of talks (Almaty, 22 May–1 June 1995), the parties finally addressed the constitutional structures of the State, but without success.328 The impasse was broken in July 1995 during a direct meeting in Tehran between the President of Tajikistan (on an official visit to Iran) and the head of the Tajik opposition, which led to a joint declaration.329 Indirect discussions, organized under the aegis of the UN Special Envoy in August 1995, reached more concrete results: the signature by the two leaders of a “Protocol on the Fundamental Principles for establishing Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan”, notably stating that inter-Tajik negotiations would take place continuously.330 In December 1992, during its Stockholm session, the CSCE Council of Ministers expressed its concern over the situation in Tajikistan. Aware of the role that the UN already played, it abstained from taking any decision involving the direct intervention of the CSCE: it made do with tasking the CSO with paying particular attention to the issue, given the “need for close co-operation with the efforts of the United Nations”.331 A short time later, the United States addressed the CSO, indicating that human rights violations committed in Tajikistan were threatening the stability of the Eurasian region and that it reserved the right to trigger the appropriate CSCE mechanisms.332 Tajikistan retorted that the state of affairs was due to uncivilized power struggles initiated by the opposition: it recalled that it had already requested the UN to objectively analyse the situation in this regard and had even requested a CSCE mission to the country.333 Consequently, at the start of 1993, the CSO requested that the (Swedish) Chairman of the CSCE send a personal representative who, accompanied by a ODIHR officer, would study the

325 See the Security Council Resolution 968 (16 December 1994). 326 See UN S/1995/799, § 7 (16 September 1995). 327 See Resolutions 999 (16 June 1995), 1030 (14 December 1995) and 1061 (14 June 1996). 328 For a detailed report on the fourth series of talks, see REF.SEC/95/95, 7 June 1995. See also UN S/1995/460 (5 June 1995) and S/1995/472, §§ 2−8, (10 June 1995). 329 See UN S/1995/799, § 3 (16 September 1995). 330 See UN S/1995/720 (21 August 1995) and S/1995/1024 (8 December 1995). 331 Stockholm Council of Ministers (192): Decisions, section I, “The Republic of Tajikistan”. 332 See CSCE Communication No. 426, (22 December 1992). 333 See CSCE Communication No. 14, (15 January 1993). 236   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

situation in the country, while consulting closely with the UN team on the ground.334 In his Report, the Personal Representative (Turkish Ambassador Ali Hikmet Alp) recognized that the “UN Mission in Dushanbe is well established and active”. Given this initial information and the fact that certain neighbouring countries did not belong to the CSCE, he reasonably concluded that “in view of the present UN involvement, the CSCE should not take the lead in this process, but should take initiative for joint actions, co-operation with the UN and provide support for the UN efforts.”335 The CSO endorsed this point of view. Starting from the premise that the CSCE had a supporting role to play to the United Nations, it charged the ODIHR with encouraging the creation of democratic institutions in Tajikistan and requested that its own Vienna Group study the possibility of, provisionally, sending a representative of the pan-European organization.336 This Mission was entrusted to a regional specialist: Olivier Roy. At the end of his investigation, he considered that it would be a mistake to make the objective of consolidating the Tajik State conditional on an agreement with the armed opposition and the countries of the region. Although complementary, the two objectives merited being addressed in a distinct way, at risk of unfairly reducing the conflict to an ideological difference between two factions. In other words, he stated that if the UN intended to promote the diplomatic negotiation process from abroad, it remained for the CSCE to play the card of democratic stabilisation on the ground. Consequently, he made two key recommendations: firstly, any CSCE intervention would naturally need to be closely co-ordinated with the UN; and secondly, international assistance to Tajikistan should be conditional upon a programme of reforms guaranteeing, in the short term, the cessation of flagrant violations of human rights, in the medium term the democratization of political life in the country (freedom of the media, multi-party-system), and the longer-­ term organization of truly free elections.337 On 1 December 1993, the Council of Ministers in Rome took the step of deciding to establish a CSCE Mission to ­Tajikistan to work in co-operation and co-ordination with the UN.338 Established in Dushanbe, the CSCE Mission began operations on 19 February 1994. Renewed since then every six months, its short mandate currently extends to 31 December 1996.339 Consisting of an initial staff of four

334 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, decision 5(e). 335 See CSCE Communication No. 126, (25 April 1993), p. 8. 336 See 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, decision 5 (d). 337 See CSCE Communication No. 293, (11 November 1993). See also CSO Vienna Group: Journals No. 16 of 10 June 1993, decision 4 (a); No. 29 of 16 September 1993, decision 4 (d) and Journal No. 33 of 21 October 1993, item 4 (b). 338 See the Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § 4 of Section II. 339 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 26 of 30 June 1994, decision 6 (e), Journal No. 28 of 14 July 1994, decision 5 and Journal No. 41 of 14 November 1994, as well as Permanent Council: Decision No. 47 of 1 June 1995; Decision No. 86 of 16 November 1995 and Decision No. 126 of 20 June 1996.  Chapter V   237

members, the Mission now has seven staff.340 Its annual budget in 1996 was eight million A ­ ustrian schillings. The Council of Ministers assigned the Mission a peacebuilding mandate, drafted in extremely general terms. On the ground, this mandate was reflected in three key practical roles. The first aims to encourage a climate of trust between the various actors in civil ­society.341 The second role was to address the protection of human rights.342 Initially, the Mission confined itself to recording cases of violations which it observed, contact the authorities in question (Interior, Security, Procurator) and report particularly serious situations to the OSCE bodies. Subsequently, and on request of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, it took over responsibility for part of the role which the UNHCR had held to that point in Tajikistan. In July 1995, the Permanent Council entrusted the Mission to “follow the human rights situation of returning refugees and internally displaced persons in Tajikistan, to draw the attention of the Tajik authorities on relevant problems relating to these groups, with a view to facilitating their reintegration into Tajik society, and to report on this matter on a regular basis.” To this end, it authorized the Mission to establish three branch offices in the south of the country (Kurgan-Tube, Shaartua and Dusti).343 The third and most important role, consisted of encouraging the establishment of democratic structures in the country.344 Evidently, its effectiveness depended upon one fundamental condition: the co-operation of the host country. Such co- operation was, generally, lacking in 1994–1995. The Dushanbe Government developed a draft Constitution and a law on the presidential elections, without seeking to consult the Mission and without even taking into account the suggestions it made with the support of the ODIHR (which had, furthermore, been translated into Russian) on the subject of the two texts in question. Moreover, the Government disregarded the opinion of the Mission which advised against holding the constitutional referendum and the presidential elections on the same day. In July 1994, the Chairman of the Permanent Committee expressed the

340 Permanent Council: Decision No. 59 of 6 July 1995. 341 The mandate formulated in Rome indicated that the Mission would “maintain contact with and facilitate dialogue and confidence-building between regionalist and political forces in the country”. 342 The mandate adopted at the Rome Ministerial Council indicated that the Mission would “actively promote respect for human rights” and “promote and monitor the adherence to CSCE norms and principles”. 343 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 59 of 6 July 1995 and Decision No. 26 of 9 March 1995. The HCR had six offices in Tajikistan, a country where it started its operations in January 1993. Since it is not a humanitarian agency, the OSCE only took up what pertained specifically to human rights among the activities of the UNHCR in Tajikistan. For further details, see DOC.1164 (15 December 1994) and DOC.330 (28 February 1995). 344 In this relation, in the Georgia mission’s mandate adopted at the Rome Ministerial Council it is mentioned that “the responsibilities of the CSCE Mission should be widened to include […] the rendering of assistance for the development of legal and democratic institutions and processes”. 238   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

OSCE’s discontent by officially indicating to the Tajikistan Minister of Foreign Affairs the major flaws in the draft Constitution (lack of guarantee for freedom of association, the right to form political parties and the independence of the judiciary), stressing the need for a “more confident relationship between the Tajik authorities and the CSCE [...] on the basis of recognition by the authorities of the important contribution the Mission can offer in the democratization and national reconciliation process”.345 As for the Head of Mission (Olivier Roy), he felt that “while it may be considered that the Constitution, despite its faults, could be worse, the electoral law is totally anti-democratic in the sense that it forbids de facto any opposition (and not only armed opposition) from presenting candidates (...)”. He recommended refusing the invitation sent by Dushanbe to the CSCE to monitor the elections in November 1994 for various reasons, starting with the simple fact that “we cannot monitor non-democratic elections”.346 The collaboration between the Mission and the authorities involved in preparing the law for the election, in February 1995, of the members of the Majlis-i Oli (Parliament) was no more satisfactory,347 despite an appeal from the CSCE Permanent Council urging “the competent Tajik authorities to improve further and adjust the electoral law and the electoral process in such a way as to allow the election of a truly representative Parliament.”348 Once again, the CSCE refrained from monitoring the electoral consultation.349 It was only in April 1995 that the Tajik Government officially assured the CSCE that it would submit the measures deemed necessary by the CSCE in relation to the electoral code, the right of association, freedom of the media and protection of human rights through a specific institution to its Parliament.350 To date, the CSCE has achieved mixed results in Tajikistan. Fundamentally, this is due to the fact that the leaders in place are barely inclined towards a democratization of the State which, obviously, would put an end to their political monopoly. Already a difficult task in itself, peacebuilding becomes at best thankless when, as is the case here, there is no national reconciliation. In the absence of such reconciliation, peacebuilding takes place, in a manner of speaking, in a vacuum; at best, it may encourage the establishment of “Potemkin” style democratic institutions.351

345 See DOC.529 (20 July 1994) See also Journal No. 36 (6 October 1994) of the Permanent Committee (decision 5a). 346 See DOC.866 (6 October 1994) 347 See DOC.1139 (6 December 1994) and DOC.355 (2 March 1995). See also 28th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 16 September 1994, p. 5. 348 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 8 of 12 January 1995. 349 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 26, of 9 March 1995. 350 See REF.PC/80 (27 April 1995) and Permanent Council: Journal No. 22 of 22 May 1995, p. 3. 351 On peacebuilding, see Gareth Evans, Co-operating for Peace. The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. (London, Allen & Unwin, 1993, Chapter 4); Les Nations Unies et la restauration de l’Etat, Yves Daudet (ed). (Paris, Pedone, 1995), p.190; Alvaro de SOTO and Graciana del Castillo, “Obstacles to Peacebuilding”, Foreign Policy, no. 94, Spring 1994, pp. 69–83, and Eva Bertram, “Reinventing Governments. The Promise of United Nations Peace Building”, Journal of Conflict  Chapter V   239

E. Chechnya The conflict in Chechnya is different from the other armed conflicts which broke out in the geopolitical area of the former USSR (Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan) for two reasons. Firstly, this conflict did not take place in the “near abroad”, but within the territory of the Russian Federation itself: by directly confronting Moscow with the dilemma of the territorial integrity of States/self- determination of peoples, it involved Russia as a national actor rather than simply a regional one. Secondly, the profound issues it raised were essentially internal in nature: it did not raise questions about the problem of the reconstitution of the empire but about maintaining Russia on the path to democracy. In this section, facts about the Chechnya conflict and the role of the OSCE’s “Assistance Group” to Chechnya will be analysed. a) Facts about the Chechen conflict Begun by the tsarist regime in 1785, the conquest of North Caucasia took no less than three quarters of a century, due to fierce opposition from the Chechen people.352 Indeed, in contrast to the case of Central Asia, the pacification of the region remained incomplete: until the Revolution of 1917, Russia was obliged to maintain Chechnya under military administration.353 The severity of Russian colonization pushed as much as a fifth of the indigenous population to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire.354 To overcome the defiant populations, the Russians – and then the Soviets – undertook to modify the ethnic composition of the region (through the introduction of Cossacks to whom land was distributed) and by alienating Islamic culture, notably by replacing the Arabic alphabet by an alphabet (Latin and then Cyrillic) which was “inadequate for making the glottal sounds of Chechen”.355 Chechnya was initially integrated into the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Gorskaya) in January 1921 and became an autonomous region (Oblast) in November 1922, before merging with the Oblast of Ingushetia

Resolution, vol. 39, no. 3, September 1995, pp. 387–418, as well as S/24111-A/47/277, “An Agenda for Peace”, section VI (17 June 1992) and A/50/60-S/1995/1, “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace”, section III.C (3 January 1995). See also Olivier Brenninkmeijer, “Tajikistan’s Elusive Peace”, The World Today, vol. 52, no. 2, February 1996, pp. 42–45. 352 Derived from the name of the first conquered settlement in the North Caucasus, Russia designated all the tribes in the self-proclaimed “Nakhchuo” region as “Chechen”. See Helen Krag and Lars Funch, The North Caucasus. Minorities at a Crossroads, London, Minority Rights Group International, 1994, p. 20. 353 See Marie Bennigsen Broxup, “Le Caucase du Nord : conflits ethniques ou guerre coloniale?”, Le Caucase postsoviétique. La transition dans le conflit, Mohammad-Reza Djalili (ed), (Brussels, ­Bruylant, 1995, Axes collection no.13) p. 10. 354 Today the descendants of these immigrants number between 1 and 2 million people living in Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. See Krag and Funch, (n. 352) p. 11. 355 Patrick Karam and Thibaut Mourgues, (n. 199), p. 161. 240   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

(January 1924) and forming with it, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, within Russia, with Grozny as its capital (December 1936).356 This Republic was only to exist only fleetingly. Following the collective deportation in Siberia and Central Asia, the Chechens, Ingush and others from the North Caucasus (Balkars and Kalmyks) accused by Stalin in February 1944 of collaborating with the Nazi occupiers, it was dissolved and split between the neighbouring political entities.357 A third of the population perished during the operation. In Kazakhstan, the survivors received a hostile welcome and were treated as pariahs. Conceived on the basis of an exclusively ethnic criterion and applied with systematic rigour, the deportation now clearly looks like genocide.358 Exonerated in 1956 amid de-Stalinization, the Chechens and the Ingush gradually reclaimed their ancestral lands – more than 20% of which they found to be occupied by Russians and largely stripped of traces of their collective memory. On 9 January 1957, the Soviet authorities re-established Chechnya-Ingushetia as an Autonomous Republic within Russia.359 Long suppressed, the nationalist aspirations of the Chechens began to develop freely with perestroika. This soon led to a demand for independence, headed by a charismatic leader: a Major-General in the Soviet Air Force, Dzhokhar Dudayev.360 Rapidly rising to power, he was elected President of the Republic on 27 October 1991 and proclaimed the independence of Chechnya-Ingushetia on

356 See Krag and Funch, (n. 352) p. 12. The Ingush, a tribe that shares its macro-ethnic origins with the Chechens, differentiated themselves from the latter in particular by not opposing resistance to Russian conquest. The designation “Ingush” was used by Russia to refer to the nomadic tribes around a small village named “Angusht”. See Roger Caratini: Dictionnaire des nationalités et des minorités en URSS, (Paris, Larousse, 1990), p. 91. 357 The break-up was only formally recognised with the publication of a decree adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Russia on 25 June 1946, see Caratini (n. 356)., pp. 92 and 93. 358 “The deportations (...) can be said to be genuine genocides because ethnicity was the sole criteria [sic] for selection, and practically nobody from the selection was spared. Some were taken not only from their national territory but also from the Soviet republics, and those at the front were deported after the war”, see Krag and Funch, (n. 352) p. 13. 359 The Chechens and the Ingush (as well as the other deported peoples of the Caucasus) were rehabilitated by a decree adopted on 24 November 1956 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR. See Christopher Panico: Conflicts in the Caucasus. Russia’s War in Chechnya, London, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism,“Conflict Study”, no. 281, 1995, p. 21, note 20. In November 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR endorsed a declaration recognising the “illegal and criminal” character of the acts undertaken against the deported peoples; in April 1991, a Russian law officially rehabilitated the peoples concerned: see Nina Bachkhatov and Andrew Wilson: Tchétchénie. Histoire d’un conflit, (Brussels, GRIP, 1995 “Dossiers du GRIP”, no, 295), p. 13. 360 Born in 1944, and promptly deported to Kazakhstan, Dzhokhar Dudayev (styled in its native form as “Djokhar Doudi Mousi”) was the first Chechen to rise to the rank of general in the USSR. In the Soviet Army, secret instructions forbade the appointment of a Chechen to such a rank for a long time, and “a communiqué from the Ministry of Defence revealed the existence of this measure in 1987 by declaring it proscribed, which permitted Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Afghan, to become the first Chechen general in 1989”, in Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199), p. 166. Although belonging to a minor local clan, General Dudayev also derived his prestige from the fact that he had commanded a division of strategic nuclear bombers in Estonia.  Chapter V   241

1 November. For very specific reasons, the Ingush refused the secessionist route and opted to stay within the Russian Federation.361 As for General Dudayev, he based his independence policy on Islam (which had experienced a revival in Chechnya) as well as on the “Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus”.362 For Moscow, Chechen secession was unacceptable for three reasons. Politically, independence threated to trigger analogous initiatives – destabilizing not only for the North Caucasus but for the Russian Federation which encompassed 89 legal “subjects” (republics, districts, territories and oblasts). Strategically, the North Caucasus was a key area, enabling Russia to influence Transcaucasia as well as Turkey and Iran: Moscow’s incessant demands (since March 1993) related to revising the provisions of the CFE Treaty relating to the “flank area” illustrates this constant concern.363 Economically, the Chechen oil resources (60 million tons) were not in themselves a gold mine, but Chechnya was an unavoidable route for oil coming from Azerbaijan or Central Asia. However, the Chechen crisis took place alongside the negotiation, by an international consortium, of an immense contract worth eight billion dollars, involving Russia and Turkey on the exploitation of Azeri oil in the Caspian Sea – “the Persian Gulf of the 21st century”: control of the region was, therefore, crucial in order to convince the consortium of the potential to transport oil via a new oil pipeline leading to the Russian ports on the Black Sea via Grozny, instead of taking the Mediterranean route favouring the Turks.364

361 Ingushetia was keen on ingratiating itself with Moscow in order to regain the Prigorodnyi region, which was originally a part of its territory but the Soviet power had granted to North Ossetia (an integral part of the Russian Federation) after the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. In a referendum on 30 November 1991, the Ingush people voted in favour of remaining in the Russian Federation. See John Colarusso, “Chechnya: The War without Winners”, Current History, vol. 94, no. 594, October 1995, p. 331. 362 The Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was created in Sukhumi on 2 November 1991 by 13 ethnic groups representing the people (and not the governments) of the region; the epithet “mountain” disappeared from the official title when other groups, like the Cossacks, were later allowed to join. The idea of a Confederation was raised by the Abkhazians in conflict with the Georgian nationalists; the movement proved to be efficient, in this regard, by contributing volunteers to the Abkhaz victory in 1992, see Karam and Mourgues, (n. 199), pp. 176 and 178. Born as a movement for colonial emancipation, the Confederation gradually became more moderate in its attitude towards Moscow; see Krag and Funch (n. 352), p. 30 and the article by Marie Jego in Le Monde, 14–15 January 1996. 363 Art. V of the Treaty forbids Russia from reinforcing the North Causasus’s military potential. On this technical issue, see Richard. A. Falkenrath, “Resolving the CFE Flank Dispute”, Arms Control Today, vol. 25, no. 4, May 1995, pp. 15 and 20, and S. Oznobitschev, “Renegotiating CFE. A Russian View”, Bulletin of Arms Control, no. 16, October 1994, pp. 19–22. 364 A pipeline via Russia also had the big advantage of enabling Moscow to keep Azerbaijan under its control and counter Turkey’s influence. In October 1995, the (predominantly Anglo-British) consortium opted for two pipelines – one through Russia and the other through Turkey: For more on this compromise that both strengthened the role of Ankara in the region and spared Moscow, see Robert V. Barylski, “Russia, the West and the Caspian Energy Hub”, The Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 217–232; Janri Kachia, “Caucase : le vrai-faux contrat du siècle”, Politique internationale, no. 70, Winter 1995–1996, pp. 39–51; Nor Dolay, “Grandes manœuvres pétrolières dans le Caucase”, Le Monde diplomatique, July 1995, pp. 14–15. On the issue of the 242   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

To heal the abscess, Russia practiced a policy of both conciliation (negotiations with Dudayev) and destabilization (economic blockade, active support for the opposition, armed raids).365 After three years, this strategy proved to be useless, and it launched a massive military attack against the secessionist republic on 11 December 1994. 1994. Triggered by the “party of war” (one of the two factions fighting within the Russian National Security Council), the decision was clearly taken in haste and was poorly calculated. Its proponents appear to have been inspired by the belief that a rapid military victory would boost the popularity of President Yeltsin.366 Moreover, they believed that it would not incite the West (preoccupied by Russia’s stability) to end its economic assistance to sanction the re-establishment of order in a notoriously mafia-ridden Republic.367 In any case, the Russian offensive met with dogged resistance. The progress of Moscow’s troops took place at the cost of the destruction of Grozny and the indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations which included in their ranks numerous Russian citizens.368 After a year, Russia’s military losses exceeded those that took place during the Afghan conflict of 1979–1989.369 b) The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya Taking place just a few days after the end of the Budapest Summit, Russia’s military intervention in Chechnya raised serious political questions relating to its compliance with certain commitments agreed within the context of the OSCE, namely the Vienna Document on CSBMs from 1994 and, above all, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Thus, the transfer of Russian troops to Chechnya had not been notified, as prescribed in Paragraph 38.3 of the Vienna Document.370 More fundamentally, the provisions of the Code relating to

Caspian Sea, see Henne-Jüri Uibopuu, “The Caspian Sea: A Tangle of Legal Problems”, The World Today, vol. 51, no. 6, June 1995, pp. 119–123. For Russia’s position, see A/49/475, 5 October 1994. 365 See Colarusso, (n. 361), p. 331. 366 See Michael McFaul, “Eurasia Letter. Russian Politics after Chechnya”, Foreign Policy, No 99, Summer 1995, p. 152, and the article by Mikhail Gorbachev (“La malédiction tchétchène et l’échec de Boris Eltsine”) in Le Monde, 4 March 1995. In fact, the decision appears to have been taken during ... a drinking binge: “Grachev’s birthday is on or about New Year’s Day. A reliable source reported that, in a scene worthy in its debauchery of Stalin and his cohorts, the power ministers had held a party for Grachev. In drunken exuberance they decided that for Grachev’s birthday present they would annihilate Grozny. The bombardment of the Chechen capital began shortly afterward...”, see Colarusso, (n. 361), p. 334. Bachkhatov and Wilson confirm this testimony (n. 359), p. 43), while pointing out that the decision to invade Chechnya raised concerns from Andrei Kozyrev and Yevgeny Primakov (ibid., p. 41). 367 Regarding Moscow’s skilfully maintained myth of the Chechen regime’s mafia-like nature, see Colarusso, (n. 361), p. 332, as well as Bachkhatov and Wilson, (n. 359), p. 24. 368 Beyond their intrinsic military value, the Chechens had a large stockpile of weapons thanks to the materiel that the Soviet Army had left behind in 1991–1992 (see Bachkhatov and Wilson, (n. 359), p. 46). 369 Ibid., p. 59. For a political, economic, social and humanitarian overview of the war, see Bachkhatov and Wilson, (n. 359), p. 59. 370 § 38.3 of the 1994 Vienna Document requires the notification of the “engagement of formations of land forces of the participating States in a transfer from outside the zone of application for  Chapter V   243

the execution of internal security missions by the armed forces had barely been respected. Paragraph 37 of the Code stipulates that “if recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating State will ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement” – while clearly specifying that “the armed forces will take care to avoid injury to civilians or their property”. As it happens, the OSCE’s questions were all the more legitimate, as Paragraph 38 of the Code clearly states that “if requested, a participating State will provide appropriate clarification regarding its implementation of the Code”, it being also understood that the bodies, mechanisms and procedures of the Organization would be used to “assess and review” this implemen­tation. Initially, Moscow adopted a relatively open attitude to the OSCE’s questions, for two clear reasons. Firstly, the OSCE did not take on the role, as it had during the Cold War, of accuser: no participating State contested the purely internal nature of the problem and the need for it to be settled in strict compliance with Russia’s territorial integrity. Secondly, it had no interest in alienating itself from the only European security forum in which its place was uncontested and within which it could better counter the enlargement of NATO. Consequently, it recognized that the Vienna CSBMs regime was applicable to the Chechen crisis.371 Above all, it authorized the OSCE to conduct on-site visits while the military operations were fully underway.372 Conducted from 23–29 January 1995 under the leadership of Ambassador István Gyarmati (Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE), an initial mission concluded that there had been a disproportionate use of military force in Chechnya (indiscriminate bombing), that captured Chechen fighters were poorly treated, and that the situation was turning into a humanitarian catastrophe. A short time later, the Permanent Council approved the recommendations drafted by the Gyarmati Mission, both on the political level (a solution negotiated with OSCE support, organization of free elections, the deployment of new Fact-Finding Missions and groups of experts) and on the humanitarian level (ceasefire, mobilization of the international community with a view to large-scale assistance, ICRC access to all detained persons).373 A second mission (22 February to 1 March 1995), consisting of human rights experts, recommended that Moscow take practical measures to facilitate the entry of humanitarian aid to Chechnya, establish a regional body responsible for investigating human rights violations, and plan the establishment of a local government on the basis of free elections.

CSBMs to arrival points 21 in the zone, or from inside the zone of application for CSBMs to points of concentration in the zone, to participate in a notifiable exercise activity or to be concentrated”. 371 At the 1995 CSBM Implementation Assessment Meeting, specifically in response to the questions posed by Sweden, Russia agreed to proceed with military operations in Chechnya. See DOC.467, 15 March 1995. 372 See Journal No. 3 (12 January 1995) of the Permanent Council, pp. 5 and 6. 373 See Permanent Council: Journal No. 6 of 2 February 1995, pp. 3 and 4. 244   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Following the bilateral approach taken by the Hungarian Chairman-in-Office in mid-March 1995, Moscow accepted the principle of a long-term OSCE presence in the region affected by the Chechen affair as well as the involvement of the Organization in the political settlement process. Taking account of this goodwill, the Permanent Council entrusted Ambassador Gyarmati with the task of establishing the Russian authorities the practical modalities of OSCE/Moscow co- operation – while ostensibly reaffirming its support for Russia’s territorial integrity.374 It was on the basis of the Gyarmati Report that the Permanent Council decided, on 11 April 1995, to establish an “OSCE Assistance Group” for Chechnya.375 Officially, the OSCE’s presence in Chechnya should not have been through a “Mission” as in Georgia and elsewhere but (to take account of the host country’s powerful status) through an “Assistance Group” responsible for working “in conjunction with the Russian federal and local authorities, and in full conformity with the legislation of the Russian Federation”. Definition of the practical roles to be assigned to the Group was the subject of laborious negotiations with Moscow. Eventually, a consensus was reached on the subject of a mandate which fundamentally combined peacemaking and peacebuilding. Regarding peacemaking, the Assistance Group’s mandate was to “promote the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization of the situation in the Chechen Republic in conformity with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and in accordance with OSCE principles” and to “pursue dialogue and negotiations, as appropriate, through participation in ‘round tables’, with a view to establishing a ceasefire and eliminating sources of tension”. Through its convoluted and prudent wording, this formulation made it clear that the OSCE had a direct role to play in the political settlement of the conflict. With regard to peacebuilding, the terms of the mandate were less vague. It authorized the Assistance Group to “help foster the development of democratic institutions and processes, including the restoration of the local organs of authority”, to “assist in the preparation of possible new constitutional agreements and in the holding and monitoring of elections”, as well as to “support the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the rule of law, public safety and law and order”. Finally, it should be noted that the mandate also assigned the Assistance Group certain additional tasks concerning the promotion of and respect for human rights (notably through the establishment of facts concerning their violation) and humanitarian tasks consisting of providing international assistance to victims of the crisis wherever they may be located and to ensure the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the crisis region. As a counterpart to this mandate, which was broadly worded in line with its demands, Russia recognized that the Assistance Group should be able to “enjoy, while taking due account of the personal safety of its members and accompanying

374 See Permanent Council: Journal No. 12 of 16 March 1995, pp. 3 and 4. 375 Permanent Council: Decision No. 31 of 29 March 1995 and Decision No.35 of 11 April 1995. The Gyarmati Report was circulated as REF.CIO/1/95 (28 March 1995).  Chapter V   245

persons, all possible freedom of movement on the territory of the Chechen Republic and also on the territory of neighbouring subjects of the Russian Federation, if so required for the performance of its tasks.” It also accepted, albeit in oblique terms, that the Assistance Group could communicate with the secessionists; the mandate stated in this regard that the Group was authorized to “establish appropriate forms of co-operation and contact with civilian and military representatives in the crisis region, and also with individual citizens and groups of citizens wishing to enter into contact with the Group and/or with its members”. Established in Grozny with an initial staff of six diplomats (which has since doubled), the Assistance Group came into operation on 26 April 1995. Initially, it could claim promising success. As part of a dialogue which took place on its own premises, it encouraged the conclusion of a Protocol (12 June 1995), which was shortly transformed into a truce agreement (30 July). Countersigned by the OSCE, the agreement in question planned an immediate ceasefire, the release of all detained persons, the gradual withdrawal of the troops, the disarmament of irregular units and the establishment of a Special Observation Commission including the OSCE.376 In the light of the deep mutual mistrust between the parties concerned, however, the process soon ground to a halt. The occurrence of terrorist-­type attacks and the gradual resumption of military operations brought the situation back almost to its starting point. At the same time, the Assistance Group started to be the subject of tendentious accusations and intimidation which limited its freedom of movement and even put the personal safety of its members into danger. Arguing that the very presence of the OSCE team was contributing to encouraging demonstrations by supporters of General Dudayev and disturbing public order, the mayor of Grozny (Beslan Gantamirov) decided, through a Decree taken on 29 September 1995, to suspend the activities of the Assistance Group while awaiting clarification of the circumstances of gunfire which took place near the Mission.377 At one point, heavily armed municipal militiamen surrounded the premises and threatened the OSCE diplomats with arrest. On another occasion, on 8 October 1995, an explosive projectile damaged the roof of the Mission.378 Hostility towards the OSCE team did not only come from the local (non-separatist) Chechen authorities, but also from certain representatives of Moscow. Thus, the plenipotentiary of the

376 The agreement was signed by the representatives from Moscow, the supporters of General Dudayev and representatives of the non-separatist Chechens, as well as the OSCE. For the text of the main reports addressed by the Group to the OSCE Chairmanship before the agreement was finalised on 30 July 1995, see the evolution in REF.CIO/6/95, REF.CIO/10 through 12/95, REF.CIO/15 and 16/95, REF.CIO/20/95, REF.CIO/25/95, REF.CIO/29/Corr.1/95, REF.CIO/33, REF. CIO/36/95, REF.CIO/38/95 and REF.CIO/42/95. See also REF.PC/293/95, (22 June 1995). 377 See REF.CIO/76/95 (3 October 1995 and also REF.CIO/77/95( 4 October 1995). For the official reaction of the OSCE, see Permanent Council: Journal No. 38 of 5 October 1995, the Chairman’s statement. For more on Beslan Gantamirov, see Bachkhatov and Wilson, (n. 359), p. 25. 378 See the REF.CIO/79/95, 9 October 1995. See also REF.CIO/80/95 (12 October 1995) and REF. CIO/88/95 (30 October 1995). For the official reaction of the OSCE, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 78 of 9 October 1995. 246   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Russian Presidency at the Grozny talks (Oleg Lobov, President of the Russian National Security Council) informed the Assistance Group that, in order to continue to operate in the area without danger, it should avoid coming into contact with unknown persons and to notify Moscow of all movements on the ground – as well as approving, in a public declaration, Moscow’s plans to impose a state of emergency upon Chechnya. The Head of the OSCE team rightly deduced from this that “for all intents and purposes, the conditions for the normal functioning of the OSCE mission are seriously impeded, in both practical and political terms”.379 Consequently, in October 1995, the Permanent Council decided to “reduce temporarily, until further notice, the actual strength of the Assistance Group in Grozny”380 – in other words, to block the return of the two members of the team who were on leave at the time and not to proceed with any new nominations. At the end of 1995, the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya appeared to have exhausted its possibilities. As Russia had refused to negotiate with the secessionists, following the installation of a henchman (Dokou Zavgaev) after the fraudulent presidential elections of December 1995 in Chechnya, the peacemaking role had lost its credibility. Similarly, the military option dominating Moscow stripped the peacebuilding function of any relevance. Co-operation between a guilty major party and an international organization is certainly not a regular occurrence. The OSCE, the only security institution authorized to intervene in Chechnya, could legitimately congratulate itself on this. Nonetheless, the Russian military operations (whether in the form of the mission to “re-establish constitutional order” or a “colonial war”) led – and continue to lead – to the massacre of civilian populations, in flagrant violation of the obligations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their second additional Protocol of 1977.381 The establishment of the Assistance Group to Chechnya was undoubtedly a positive step. It assumed the good faith of Russia which had been credited with the desire to reach a political compromise with the separatists. The systematic use of the military option modified this initial situation: through its presence, the Assistance Group effectively condoned the crushing of Lilliput by Gulliver – to, moreover, almost total international indifference. It should be stressed that, to date, Russia has emerged from this relatively unscathed. Firstly, the “cauldron” of the Caucasus has not exploded, as the Chechens predicted. Secondly, the reactions of the Muslim world were – both within and outside the Commonwealth of Independent States – moderate. Last, but not least, the West placed Russia’s territorial integrity above everything else, even humanitarian considerations. Believing that a certain number of prior conditions had been met (establishment of an OSCE mission in Chechnya,

379 See REF.CIO/79/95, (9 October 1995). 380 Permanent Council: Journal No. 39 of 9 October 1995, Chairman’s statement. 381 See Nicolas M.L. Bovay, “The Russian Armed Intervention in Chechnya and its Human Rights Implications”, The Review of the International Commission of Jurists, no. 54, June 1995, pp. 29–56.  Chapter V   247

establishment of a ceasefire, opening of political negotiations and the free passage of humanitarian aid), the European Union normalized its relations with Moscow through a political and commercial partnership agreement signed in Brussels on 17 July 1995.382 Similarly, the Council of Europe made a concession concerning its basic principles by admitting Russia on 25 January 1996.383 The West continues to appear to strive for the dawn of a democratized and peaceful Russia. The Chechen affair, however, tends to illustrate the inanity of this vision. Ignoring the lessons of centuries past (the wars of the Caucasus) and those of the immediate past (the Afghan conflict), Russia has embarked upon an adventure which appears to herald a new step in its post-communist evolution. It wanted to rise to the Chechen challenge by employing methods which barely differed from those practiced during the Soviet era. Similarly, it moved away from the path of democracy both internally and internationally. On the one hand, it could be said that the democratic experience of Yeltsin’s Russia was buried in Chechnya.384 On the other, Moscow has become involved in a colonial type war: although, as noted by an American editorial writer, a war of this kind cannot, by definition, be won, without mentioning that “the problem with colonial wars is that they tend to produce revolutions at home”.385 In short, the prospect of a democratized ­Russia similar to Germany or Japan after the Second World War appears distant.

F. Russian “Peacekeeping” Operations The management of armed conflicts in the territories of the former USSR has confronted the OSCE with the problem of Russia’s so-called “peacekeeping” operations under the cover of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moldova, Georgia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia) and in Tajikistan. In October 1993, in a memorandum on strengthening OSCE effectiveness, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Andrei Kozyrev) suggested that “granting official status, within the framework of the CSCE, to the peacekeeping forces of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States” either by decisions on a

382 See Le Monde, 19 July 1995. 383 Initially, the intervention in Chechnya led to a suspension of the review of Russia’s application to the Council of Europe by the latter’s Parliamentary Assembly (2 February 1995), see Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly [PACE] Resolution 1055 (1995) and Directive No. 506 (1995). For the Muehlemann Report, see also PACE Doc.7230 (31 January 1995) and for the Bindig Report, PACE Doc.7231, (2 February 1995). The Assembly resumed its review of the proceedings in September 1995: see Resolution 1065, as well as the Muehlemann Report, see PACE Doc.7372 (11 September 1995) and Bindig Report, PACE Doc.7384 (15 September 1995). For the rest of the proceedings, see the new Muehlemann Report, PACE Doc.7443 (2 January 1996), and Addenda A through D. See also Daniel Tarschys, “La Russie au Conseil de l’Europe : une concession à la Realpolitik?”, Le Monde, 7 February 1996, and Evelyne Gelin, “L’adhésion de la Russie au Conseil de l’Europe à la lumière de la crise tchétchène”, Revue générale de droit international public, 1995, no. 3, pp. 623–638. 384 See Karam and Mourgues, Les guerres du Caucase… (n. 199), p. 204. 385 William PFAFF, “Russia Ought to Know that Colonial War is No Longer Won”, International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1996. 248   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

case-by-case basis or by the introduction of a general provision to be adopted by the Council of Ministers.386 Moscow put forward two justifications in this regard. Firstly, the military operations in question aimed to put an end to the armed confrontation and to establish stability in a zone within the competence of the OSCE – an institution which had expressly admitted, in the Helsinki Decisions of 1992, that the CIS peacekeeping mechanism could be asked “to support peacekeeping in the CSCE region”.387 Secondly, the financial implications of this stabilization would be a heavy burden for Russia as a country transitioning to a market ­economy.388 Some OSCE countries welcomed the principle of such an idea which, in their eyes, offered the advantage of enabling the OSCE to exercise a certain level of control over Russia policy towards the CIS Republics. However, other countries (the Baltic States, Ukraine, Turkey, Norway, Czech Republic, etc.) believed that the Russian suggestion was dangerous in the sense that it aimed to legitimize a “Russian Monroe Doctrine”. During the Rome session (30 November – 1 December 1993), the Council of Ministers examined the issue as part of a debate on the “Further Development of the Capabilities of the CSCE in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management”. At the end of the discussions, it decided – in esoteric language – on the possibility of considering “on a case-by-case basis and under specific conditions, the setting up of CSCE co-operative arrangements in order inter alia to ensure that the role and functions of a third party military force in a conflict area are consistent with CSCE principles and objectives.”389 The term “third party military force” was agreed in order to avoid explicitly mentioning Russia and, consequently, to avoid any possible misunderstanding around the issue of it being issued a blank cheque. The CSO and the Permanent Committee were issued with the task of developing the practical details of the planned arrangements on the basis of a certain number of fundamental criteria: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State hosting the third party military force, consent of the parties involved in the conflict, impartiality of the force, multinational composition of the force, its operation on the basis of a clear mandate, transparency of the force’s activities, establishment of an “integral link” between the raison d’être of the force and a political process for conflict resolution, and, lastly, provisions relating to a plan for the “orderly withdrawal” of the force.390

386 See CSCE/FSC/SC.23, §5, (28 October 1993). Shortly before, Russia had made a similar suggestion to the UN: see International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1993. See also Suzanne Crow, “Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, pp. 33–38. 387 1992 Helsinki Decisions, Chapter III, § 52, second sentence. 388 According to a joint declaration by Russia’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, the expenses related to the peacekeeping operations within the CIS, just for the period between June 1993 and March 1994, totalled some 26 billion roubles: text in the Puig Report on “European Security: crisis prevention and management” (WEU Assembly Document 1418, pp. 12 and 13). 389 Rome Ministerial Council (1993): Decisions, § 11.2. 390 Ibid., § 11.3.  Chapter V   249

Despite intense diplomatic efforts by the Italian Chairman, no consensus could be reached.391 This failure may be explained by the fact that many countries expressed reservations about the compromise formulae suggested by the Chairman — notably on the subject of the composition of the third party military force and the degree of control that the OSCE should have. Was it essential that third forces “shall be open to multinational participation” or “must have a multinational character”? Should the principle according to which “in special cases, personnel provided by the parties to the conflict can be used in a balanced way in support of the activities of the Forces” be agreed upon or rejected? Similarly, should mechanisms destined to ensure the “transparency” or “full transparency” of the third force’s activities be planned? Should the Joint Commission within which the OSCE exercised its political control operate “with the central involvement of a representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and the command of the Forces and the participation of representatives of the parties to the conflict” or, rather, “under the chairmanship of a representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE and with the participation of the command of the forces and of representatives of the parties to the conflict”? Moreover, as Russian foreign policy became increasingly nationalist, Moscow’s interest in a third party military force declined – even more so because raising the profile of the CIS within the OSCE could open the door to similar demands from NATO. Whatever the case, the Budapest Review Meeting noted this failure; it contented itself with confirming the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in Rome, while tasking the Senior Council and the Permanent Council with monitoring the study in question.392 Should the lack of any multilateral solution to the problem raised by Russia at the end of 1993 be regretted? This question calls for two remarks. The first is that the military forces deployed by Russia in the CIS only fell within the concept of “peacekeeping” through a misuse of language. First of all, the use of these forces did not respond to a request from all parties to the conflict: in Moldova and Georgia (South Ossetia/Abkhazia), the intervention was not requested by the host country, but was accepted as a last resort in order to end the armed confrontations that were disadvantaging them due to Moscow’s support – while in Tajikistan, they were Moscow’s response to a unilateral request for military assistance made by the existing government. Secondly, their composition was not truly multinational: in Moldavia and South Ossetia, the forces which were deployed were tripartite – i.e. they consisted of Russian contingents flanked by contingents from the parties to the conflict; although the forces were, in principle, multinational in Tajikistan (Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), in reality they were exclusively Russian, as was, moreover,

391 See 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 March 1994, decision 5 (e) and 29th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 18 November 1994, p.3. For the text proposed by the Italian Chairmanship as a basis for discussion in 1994, see DOC.107, DOC.224 and DOC.300 (+Rev. 1 to 11). See also the comments from Turkey: DOC.218 (12 May 1994), Estonia: DOC.223 (17 May 1994), Russia: DOC.570 (18 August 1994) and Ukraine: DOC.574 (18 August 1994). 392 See the Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, Chapter III. 250   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

the case in Abkhazia. Finally, impartiality was not their guiding principle. In Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the deployment of foreign troops let to consolidating the fait accompli, i.e. the victory of the secessionists. In Tajikistan, their mission was to impose peace: it consisted of supporting the government in place against both internal and external threats.393 It is important to note, furthermore, that the terminology uses the expression mirotvorcheskiye operatsii (peacebuilding operations) rather than operatsii po poderzhaniyu mira (peacekeeping operations).394 The second remark is that Moscow’s reference to the CIS masked the exclusively Russian objectives. It aims to legitimize, in the eyes of the outside world, the idea of a natural and special response by Moscow in the region previously formed by the USSR and now significantly referred to as the “near abroad” (blizhneye zarubezehye) of the Russian Federation. According to the new Russian military doctrine, adopted in November 1993, national security may require interventions outside the national borders to avoid or manage the destabilizing consequences of conflicts situated on Russia’s periphery – notably in the form of peacekeeping operations deployed within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Founded on 8 December 1992 by the tripartite Minsk Agreement (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine) with a view to facilitating the dissolution of the USSR, the CIS certainly has developed since then: it includes 12 member States (all the Republics of the former USSR with the exception of the three Baltic States), with a complex structure (Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Council of Defence Ministers, Council of Commanders-in-Chief of the Border Guards, Human Rights Commission, Economic Court, etc.) and adopts decisions on political, economic, social, cultural, ecological and other issues. Nevertheless, it continues to appear to be an inconsistent institution, with near non-existent results – particularly in security where none of its decisions have ever been acted upon: at the time of writing, it does not appear likely (despite Moscow’s manifest will) to transform into a “new Warsaw Pact”.395 In sum, “peacekeeping” in the near abroad countries

393 For further details, see Roy Allison: Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States. “Chaillot Papers”, no. 8, (Paris:WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1994), pp. v-63; Michael ÜRR, “Peacekeeping — A New Task for Russian Military Doctrine”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1994, pp. 307–309, and James Greene, “The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS”, ibid., April 1993, pp. 156–159. See also Suzanne Crow, “The Theory and Practice of Peace-Keeping in the Former USSR”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 37, 18 September 1992, pp. 31–36, and “Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping”, ibid., vol. 2, no. 15, 9 April 1993, pp. 28–32, and especially Isabelle Facon, “La conception russe du maintien de la paix”, Défense nationale, February 1996, pp. 67–83. It should be noted that Roy Allison wrongly claims (see above - pp. 4 and 5) that the forces deployed in Moldova were quadripartite. 394 On this point, see Allison, (n. 393) p. 2. 395 The security instruments adopted within the framework of the CIS mainly include the Kyiv Agreement of 20 March 1992 on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS, the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security of 15 May 1992, the Moscow Decision of 16 March 1994 on the creation of a permanent consultative commission for peacekeeping in the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, see DOC.180 (9 May 1994) and the Almaty Memorandum of 10 February 1995 related to peacekeeping and stability in the  Chapter V   251

is not an end in itself, but a means of maintaining an influence on policy and of promoting the geo­strategic interests of a major power in the name of a “Russian Monroe ­doctrine”.396 One response to all this is that Moscow plays a stabilizing role in a region where the West neither can nor wants to intervene. The argument is only valid as long as Russia continues on the road to democratic reform and practices no systematic anti-Western foreign policy.397

2. Preventive Diplomacy Since the end of the Cold War, preventive diplomacy has become one of the watchwords of the international security institutions.398 Despite certain significant efforts (in Macedonia), this pressing need does not appear to have really taken root in the United Nations. In contrast, since the Helsinki Decisions of 1992, it has been a central element of the CSCE’s strategy and is becoming a

CIS, see A/50/120, 27 March 1995). For more on the Russian efforts to promote the CIS on the global and pan-European scale, see Suzanne Crow, “Russia Promotes the CIS as an International Organization”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, pp. 33–38. See also Michael R. Lucas, “The Search for Security in Greater Europe: The Russian Federation, the CIS and the International Organizations”, Transitions (Brussels), vol. XXXVI, 1995/1&2, pp. 166–219 and Allison, (n. 393), pp. 31–35. See also Anne de Tinguy, “La CEI et les organisations internationales: une communauté euro-atlantique existe-t-elle ?”, Le Courrier des pays de l’Est, nos. 397 and 398, March–April 1995, pp. 141–151. 396 Regarding the debate surrounding Russian policy on the “near abroad”, see Alain Besançon, “L’enjeu imperial”, Le Monde, 8 October 1993; Suzanne Crow, “Russian Peace-Keeping Defense, Diplomacy, or Imperialism?”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 37, 18 September 1992, pp. 37–40; Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Sajvetz, “The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the Near Abroad”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 75–90; Bohuslav Litera, “The Kozyrev Doctrine – A Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine”, Perspectives, Prague, vol. 4, Winter 1994/95, pp. 45–52; Vladimir Shustov, “Peacekeeping in the CSCE The Russian view”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 2, 1994, pp. 7–10; Maxim Shashenkov, “Russian Peacekeeping in the ‘Near Abroad’”, Survival, vol. 36, no. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 46–69 and John W.R. Lepingwell, “The Russian Military and Security Policy in the Near Abroad”, ibid., pp. 70–92. Anne de Tinguy, “La Russie en Transcaucasie : chef d’orchestre ou médiateur ?”, Le Caucase postsoviétique. La transition dans le conflit, p. 151 ff., and Fred Halliday, “The Empires Strike Back? Russia, Iran and the New Republics”, The World Today, vol. 51, no. 1, November 1995, pp. 220–222. 397 It should be noted that, despite the absence of a general formal decision on the issue of ‘third- party’ peacekeeping operations, the OSCE practically found itself obligated to cooperate with the Russian forces deployed in Georgia and Moldova: Because the OSCE Missions in these two countries have “indirect” peacekeeping functions (to observe the conduct of Russian forces on the ground) mentioned in their mandates. 398 For further details, see B.G. Ramcharan, The International Law and Practice of Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp.viii-185; Gareth Evans: Cooperating for Peace. The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (London: Allen & Unwin, 1993), chapters 5 and 6, Emeric Rogier, “Espoirs et réalité de la diplomatie préventive”, Le Trimestre du monde, vol. IV, no. 28, pp. 161–183, and Margaretha af Ugglas, “Conditions for Successful Preventive Diplomacy”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE, (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 11–32. See also UN: “An Agenda for Peace” S/24111-A/47/277 section III, (17 June 1992) and “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace” A/50/60-S/1995/1, section III.A. (3 January 1995). 252   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

routine activity in the Baltic States and Ukraine (as well as in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

A. The Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania proclaimed their independence in 1918 in the wake of the Russian Revolution after being annexed to the newly founded Russian Empire in the eighteenth century (after the defeat of Sweden recognized by the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 and the partition of Poland). Although this independence was recognized by Lenin’s regime in 1920, it proved to be relatively short-lived: in 1940, under the terms of the Secret Additional Protocol to the German-Soviet Treaty of 23 August 1939 (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), the USSR simply annexed the three sovereign States. While some countries, among them Sweden, Switzerland and Great Britain, recognized this annexation (either de jure or de facto), others, such as the United States and the Vatican never accepted the fait accompli and authorized Baltic diplomatic and consular missions to continue to operate within their territories.399 In any event, the three Baltic States were subject to a systematic policy aiming to suppress their national identity, featuring, among other measures, collective deportations, massive introduction of Slav populations and cultural repression. Perestroika led to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania trying to free themselves from Soviet control. In March 1990, the parliaments of the three Baltic States declared their independence. Arguing that this was a re-establishment of independence which had been illegally abolished by a foreign power and not an act of secession, they demanded that Moscow declare both the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the 1940 annexation null and void. The Soviet authorities, however, considered the declarations of independence to be unconstitutional: in other words, the ­Gorbachev regime preferred to stay within the realms of constitutional rather than international law.400 Adopting a hard-line approach, it imposed an economic blockade on Lithuania and in January 1991 even went as far as using armed force. Although well-disposed towards the Baltic cause, the States of the West did not wish to add to Mikhail Gorbachev’s internal difficulties and, above all, wanted to avoid widespread instability in the USSR; as a result, they reacted half-heartedly. However, the failure of the Moscow putsch organized by the conservatives in the summer of 1991 dispelled whatever scruples they may still have had, which immediately opened the door to international recognition of the three Baltic States (21 August) and their accession to the CSCE (10 September).401 As a result of these accessions, the CSCE was to find itself exercising an entirely new role:

399 For further details, see Romain Yakemtchouk, “Les Républiques baltes en droit international”, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. XXXVII, 1991, pp. 265ff 400 For further details, see Romain Yakemtchouk, “Les Républiques baltes et la crise du fédéralisme soviétique”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLII, no. 4/6, 1990, pp. 207ff. 401 See Graham Smith (ed.), The Baltic States. The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Basingbroke: Macmillan, 1994), pp. xii-214.For more on the accession of the Baltic States to the CSCE, see Chapter III part I.1.2 ‘Accession of the Baltic States further in this volume’.  Chapter V   253

preventive diplomacy. In this spirit, it undertook to give its backing to the negotiations on the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic States and to defuse tensions relating to the status of the Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia. a) The problem of the withdrawal of the Russian troops stationed in the Baltic States As soon as they had re-established their independence, the three Baltic States gave absolute priority to the issue of the withdrawal of some 150,000 Soviet troops (who had become Russians after the dissolution of the USSR) on their respective territories – around 70,000 in Latvia, 45,000 in Estonia and 40,000 in Lithuania.402 Perpetuating the occupation which had begun in 1940, the presence of foreign troops stationed without any legal basis was an affront to national sovereignty and, as a result, an obstacle on the road to full independence. Moreover, these military forces represented a permanent threat both in military and po­litical terms: not only did Moscow refuse to communicate information on the state of forces in the “North Western Group of Forces” (the new name, since ­November 1991, for the Baltic Military District), but it began incessantly moving the troops and equipment. Furthermore, given that the officers in the occupying army had publicly questioned the legitimacy of the Baltic States’ independence, subversive initiatives by the stationed units could not be ruled out. Lastly, the presence of the troops was discouraging foreign economic investment and having disastrous consequences in the ecological field. In short, for the three Baltic States, the withdrawal of the foreign troops was a security requirement as much as a necessity related to sovereignty. Bilateral negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian troops began on 31 January 1992, shortly after the Russian Federation took official charge of the Soviet forces stationed in the Baltic. At first, Moscow recognized the principle that these were “foreign military forces” and that their departure could begin without delay.403 However, this apparent goodwill faded very quickly. Russia realized that by withdrawing its troops from the region, it would lose access to some six hundred kilometres of coastline. With access to the Baltic only through the enclave of ­Kaliningrad situated on the border of Lithuania and Poland, it would find itself in a strategic situation comparable to that prior to the expansion carried out under Peter the Great. In addition, the socioeconomic issues arising from the need to construct accommodation for the repatriated troops and funding the pensions due to retired military staff would constitute a heavy financial burden

402 These figures are taken from Les besoins des pays baltes en matière de sécurité. Procès-verbal du Séminaire organisé par l’Assemblée de l’Atlantique Nord et le Parlement de Lituanie dans le cadre de l’Initiative Rose-Roth, Vilnius-Lituanie, 16-19 décembre 1991, AJ 58 SEM (92) 3, (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, 1992), pp. 15, 18 and 27. For a slightly lower estimate (130,000 soldiers), see Dzintra Bungs, “Soviet Troops in Latvia”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 34, 28 August 1992, p. 19. See also Douglas L. Clarke, “Former Soviet Armed Forces in the Baltic States”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 16, 17 April 1992, pp. 43–48. 403 See UN: S/23591 (14 February 1992), and Dzintra Bungs, “Progress on Withdrawal from the Baltic States”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 25, 18 June 1993, p. 50. 254   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

for a State whose economy was in near free fall. Lastly, given the multi-ethnic composition of the Baltic States, the question of the withdrawal of troops was intrinsically linked to the general debate about the fate of the Russian-speaking minorities in various parts of the former USSR and was to become (on account of the one-upmanship of an ultra-nationalist opposition which considered the three Baltic States as belonging to Russia’s sphere of vital interests) a significant issue in the power struggle going on in Moscow.404 Unable to backtrack from withdrawing its troops (for reasons of political credibility in the eyes of the West, whose economic assistance Russia considered crucial),405 the Russian Government strove to delay the withdrawal by any means possible and, above all, to make a maximum amount of money out of it. It thus imposed upon the Baltic States a number of conditions for the withdrawal, which were of four different kinds: strategic (maintenance of Russian bases, guarantees on free movement to and from Kaliningrad), political (renunciation of any claims on the administrative territorial modifications carried out by the USSR, granting of legal status to Russian troops during the withdrawal procedure), economic (abandonment of any claims for damages caused by half a century of Soviet occupation, financial compensation for fixed military installations which were not dismantled, participation in the construction of accommodation for soldiers repatriated to Russia, payment of pensions to retired soldiers wishing to stay where they were), and humanitarian (granting of citizenship to Russian-speakers living in the Baltic States).406 On this last point, Moscow decided to “play the humanitarian card” for all it was worth: in May 1992, Russia sent a memorandum to the Council of Europe alleging “massive violations of human rights” in the Baltic States and subsequently sent reports with claims that of “apartheid” and “ethnic cleansing” were taking place in these same countries.407 Faced with Russia’s threatening demands, the three Baltic States decided to use the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (24 March to 8 July 1992) as an opportunity to internationalize the issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops in the context of the CSCE. In Helsinki, the three Baltic States argued that their military dispute with ­Russia was not simply a bilateral issue: it threatened the very stability of the Baltic and, as a result, concerned the principle of the indivisibility of security in Europe. Consequently, in a non-paper dated 6 May 1992, they recommended the direct

404 On this point, see Stephen Foye, “Russian Politics Complicates Baltic Troop Withdrawal”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 46, 20 November 1992, pp. 30–34. 405 On 2 July 1992, the U.S. Senate had decided to link U.S. economic assistance to the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States: see Dzintra Bungs, “Soviet Troops in Latvia” (n. 401), p. 25. 406 For the nine prerequisites set by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Kozyrev, see Bungs, “Progress on Withdrawal …” (n. 402), pp. 50 and 52. See also the declaration made by Ambassador Vorontsov at the UN General Assembly: A/47/PV.72 (11 December 1992), pp. 21–26. 407 In September 1992, Andrey Kozyrev would go so far as to raise the prospect of a trusteeship system for the Baltic States within the framework of the UN, see the article by Thomas L. Friedman in the International Herald Tribune, 24 September 1992.  Chapter V   255

participation of the CSCE in the bilateral negotiation process with Russia, specifying that “negotiations on the withdrawal of the ex-Soviet troops ... should be brought under the auspices of the CSCE as soon as possible and should be kept under its scrutiny in order to contribute to a speedy, constructive and mutually agreed upon completion of the negotiations before the end of the Follow-up Meeting.”408 In practical terms, it recommended the immediate appointment of “representatives” of the CSO Chairman to carry out good offices and mediation with the parties, to report regularly to the Follow-up Meeting on progress made with the negotiations, and to present the Helsinki Summit with a timetable for complete withdrawal. Keen not to exacerbate the internal difficulties facing President Boris Yeltsin, many countries hesitated to support the initiative of the three Baltic States. Nevertheless, encouraged by an informal group of participating States (“Friends of the Baltics”) led by the Nordic countries, the Baltic States threatened to oppose any final document which failed to mention the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops.409 The compromise which was finally reached (thanks to the Nordic countries managing to make it acceptable to Moscow) was that the Baltic issue should be mentioned in the Helsinki Summit Declaration and not in the Decisions of the Follow-up Meeting. Consequently, paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Declaration was worded in the following terms: “Even where violence has been contained, the sovereignty and independence of some States still needs to be upheld. We express support for efforts by CSCE participating States to remove, in a peaceful manner and through negotiations, the problems that remain from the past, like the stationing of foreign armed forces on the territories of the Baltic States without the required consent of those countries. “Therefore, in line with basic principles of international law and in order to prevent any possible conflict, we call on the participating States concerned to conclude, without delay, appropriate bilateral arrangements, including timetables, for the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of such foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic States.” The text referred to Russia only obliquely, through wording such as “foreign armed forces”, “foreign troops” and the “participating States concerned”; however, it expressed unequivocal political support for the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic States, which are specifically mentioned. Although it did not say that the stationing of Russian troops was illegal, it did say that it took place without the “required consent” of the host countries. While it did not demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the troops, it voiced its support for timetables ensuring an “early, orderly and complete” withdrawal. In sum, for all

408 See above cited “non-paper” dated 6 May 1992, § 3. 409 See The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, March 24–July 8, 1992 (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in ­Europe, 1992), pp. 48–49. See also the declaration made by the Head of the Latvian delegation at the Helsinki Review Conference during its plenary meeting on 13 May 1992, as well as Le Monde, 9 July 1992. 256   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

the prudence of its language, paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration lent the Baltic cause the CSCE’s collective legitimization. Furthermore, it gave a multilateral dimension to the issue of the Russian-Baltic negotiations (which had to that point been strictly bilateral), and now held Russia accountable to the CSCE. The Baltic States, however, found the compromise reached by the CSCE in July 1992 to be insufficient, both in form and substance.410 It was partly under the effect of this disillusionment that they turned, the following month, to the UN General Assembly and asked for the inclusion of a supplementary item on the agenda of its 47th session, entitled “Complete withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territories of the Baltic States”.411 At the end of a plenary debate, the General Assembly adopted a resolution supporting the efforts undertaken in the framework of the CSCE on the basis of paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration and urging the UN Secretary-­General to use his good offices to facilitate the bilateral negotiations around issues related to the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic States.412 This resolution had the virtue of giving the CSCE’s commitments in paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Declaration global impact. At the same time, it recognized that it was incumbent upon the CSCE (and not the UN) to assume the leading role in the region, thereby marking the first pragmatic role-sharing between the UN and the CSCE in the field of security since the CSCE’s self-proclamation as a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.413 During the General Assembly debate, Latvia clearly specified that the three Baltic States “do not expect the United Nations to assume a primary role in the effort to remove the foreign military forces from their territories. Rather, the Baltic

410 At the Helsinki Summit (1992), Estonia openly declared that the hopes that had been placed in the OSCE had “yet to be fulfilled”, see CSCE/HS/VR.2 (9 July 1992), p. 19. For its part, Lithuania held that the language of § 15 was too weak, see CSCE/HS/VR.4 (10 July 1992), pp. 64–65, and it also issued an interpretative declaration in this regard, see the Helsinki Summit (1992): Journal No. 2 of 10 July 1992, pp. 3–4. In addition, with respect to § 15, Moldova released an interpretative statement to note that the paragraph’s provisions were equally applicable to the withdrawal of foreign troops in Moldova, given that it was faced with a similar situation as the one in the Baltic States, see the Helsinki Review Conference (1992): Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, p. 6. It should also be noted that Estonia adopted a position similar to that of Moldova when the CSO had adopted a declaration on Yugoslavia recommending an end to negotiations on the fate of the armed forces on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were not subject to its authorities, see 10th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 29 April 1992, pp. 8–9. 411 See A/47/191 (14 August 1992); a few months later, Russia would add an additional item entitled “Mass violations of human rights and freedoms in Latvia and Estonia”, A/47/247 (10 November 1992). In December 1991, the three Baltic States sent a joint letter to ask for the UN to intervene in order to reduce the threat posed by the presence of Soviet troops on their territory, UN: S/23287(13 December 1991). 412 See General Assembly Resolution 47/21 of 25 November 1992, as well as A/47/PV.72 (11 December 1992). 413 For more on this self-proclamation, see Helsinki Summit (1992): Decisions, § 18.  Chapter V   257

States envision the role of the United Nations to be a complementary one to that already assumed by the CSCE.”414 The question of the withdrawal of the Russian troops was indeed constantly being addressed by the CSO, the CSO Vienna Group and the Council of Ministers. In November 1992, within the CSO, Lithuania condemned Moscow’s U-turns and demanded that the CSCE intervene more actively in the Russian-Baltic issue.415 In December 1992, at the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Stockholm, the participating States began a first collective examination of the implementation of paragraph 15, at the end of which they “expressed concern” that relevant agreements on the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of foreign troops had yet to be concluded; furthermore, they agreed that the CSCE should continue to monitor the issue very closely, and noted that the four countries in question were henceforth committed to regularly submitting information to this effect/to relevant CSCE bodies to this end.416 In April 1993, Estonia (speaking on behalf of the three Baltic States) stated in the CSO that it noted that a number of participating States – including the Russian Federation – had expressed their opinion that the withdrawal of Russian troops “cannot be conditioned by any issues of a different nature, inter alia, by human rights issues”.417 In December 1993, the Rome Council of Ministers welcomed the evacuation of Lithuania, but recalled that the commitments of paragraph 15 remained to be honoured in relation to Estonia and Latvia.418 In March 1994, within the framework of the CSO, Estonia protested against Russia’s official position in a written submission connecting the withdrawal of Russian troops with “issues of a different nature”.419 In June 1994, the CSO once again recalled the commitments made in paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration.420 Finally, in December 1994, the Budapest Summit noted the total withdrawal of foreign troops from all the Baltic States, while offering the CSCE’s services to States in the region to consolidate security and co- operation in the Baltic region.421 In short, the CSCE exercised gentle but continuous pressure on Russia until it fully met the objectives set out in paragraph 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration.

414 A/47/PV.72 (11 December 1992), p. 8. The UN’s contribution was limited to a mission of good offices by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the four countries concerned, see A/48/501 (15 October 1993), as well as the second General Assembly Resolution 48/18 of 15 November 1993 on this issue and A/48/PV.55 (24 November 1993). See also A/49/419 (22 September 1994) and A/49/PV.79 (7 December 1994), pp. 1–8. 415 See 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 5 November 1992, p. 3. 416 See Stockholm Ministerial Council (1992): Decisions, section 1, “The Baltic States”. 417 See 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, p. 5. 418 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § 1.5. 419 See 25th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 March 1994, p. 5. 420 See 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 15 June 1994, decision 5(d). 421 See Budapest Summit (1994), Declaration on Baltic Issues. Earlier, the CSO had also taken note of the “withdrawal of the Russian troops from the territories of the Baltic States” see 28th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 15 September 1994, p. 3. 258   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Beginning in 1992, the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in the Baltic States was slow and chaotic until 1994. Interspersed with abrupt suspensions422 and political intimidation from Moscow (such as, for example, the inclusion of Latvia among the States formerly part of the USSR in which Russia officially announced that it wanted to establish military bases),423 the withdrawal of troops was the subject of separate negotiations between Russia and each of the three Baltic States. The first to meet with success, the Russian-Lithuanian negotiations, resulted in an arrangement concluded during the Summit between President Yeltsin and the Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis held in Moscow on 8 September 1992.424 While Russia agreed to withdraw troops from Lithuania no later than 31 August 1993, Lithuania committed itself to contributing towards the construction, within the Oblast of Kaliningrad, of accommodation for the families of some 3,000 mariners withdrawn from the Baltic States. The deadline represented a compromise between the Lithuanian request for withdrawal to begin at the end of 1992 and the Russian position, according to which evacuation was not technically possible before the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany and Poland (scheduled for the end of 1994), if not indeed before 1997 or even 2002 for certain units. Lithuania’s agreement to contribute towards housing the Russian soldiers came in response to one of Moscow’s main concerns and implicitly confirmed that Vilnius did not question that the Kaliningrad enclave belonged to the R­ ussian Federation.425 In addition to Lithuania’s manifest flexibility,426 two other factors may explain Moscow’s relatively conciliatory attitude. Firstly, the Russian bases in Lithuania had no strategic importance comparable to that of Skrunda (Latvia) or Paldiski (Estonia). Secondly, the

422 Thus, on 29 October 1992, President Yeltsin issued a decree to halt the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States in order to ensure the three countries concerned sign agreements on the ‘social protection’ of the Russian soldiers and their resident family members, see Le Monde (31 October 1992). Subsequently, on 20 October 1993, Russian authorities halted the withdrawal of forces stationed in Lithuania in response to demands for compensation to the tune of 146 billion dollars, which Vilnius made because of the ecological and other damage caused by 50 years of Soviet occupation, see UN: A/48/348 (25 August 1993), and headlines in Le Monde, 24 August 1993. 423 Latvia appeared in the Russian presidential decree issued on 5 April 1994. Moscow subsequently explained that this inclusion was the result of a “technical” error. See DOC.59 (14 April 1994). 424 See Nouvelles atlantiques no. 2454, 25 April 1993, p. 3. 425 Regarding the enclave of Kaliningrad situated on the Polish-Lithuanian border (and formerly the northern region of eastern Prussia known under the name Koenigsberg), see Magdalene Hoff and Heinz Timmermann, “Kaliningrad: Russia’s Future Gateway to Europe?”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 36, 10 September 1993, pp. 37–43, and Raymond A. Smith, “The Kaliningrad Region: Civic and Ethnic Models of Nationalism”, Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. XXIV, no. 3, Fall 1993, pp. 233–246. See also the “Kaliningrad-Russia in the Baltic” special report published in the Moscow journal International Affairs (1995/6). 426 This flexibility was rewarded by the handover of four Russian ships meant to enable it to have its own national navy: see Le Monde, 10 September 1992, and Nouvelles atlantiques no. 2454, 11 September 1992, p. 3.  Chapter V   259

“massive violation of human rights” argument could not be used against Lithuania, whose liberal legislation on citizenship had facilitated the effortless integration of some 9 per cent of the Russian-speaking population.427 These factors notwithstanding, it is a striking fact that the ­withdrawal of troops was achieved in line with the planned timescale (31 ­August 1993),428 despite the absence of a proper legal agreement – the principle of which had, moreover, been recognized during the Yeltsin/Landsbergis Summit in Moscow. Developed during the Summit between President Yeltsin and President Guntis Ulmanis of Latvia held in Moscow on 30 April 1994, the Russian-Latvian compromise was concluded in the form of an indivisible “package” of five instruments: an agreement on the withdrawal of troops, an agreement on the Skrunda radar station, and no fewer than three agreements on the social protection of Russian soldiers and members of their families (one agreement valid during the withdrawal period, one applicable after the withdrawal, and a special protocol to the latter text).429 In exchange for agreeing to withdraw all its troops by 31 August 1994, Russia extracted substantial concessions from the Latvians. Firstly, Latvia had to grant a provisional legal status to the forces stationed on its soil. While the Treaty of 30 April 1994 obliged Russian troops to abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of the host country, it required Latvia to allow the troops in question to continue their activities and to prevent any hostile acts towards soldiers and members of their families. It committed Russia to communicating to the government in Riga the number of troops stationed, to providing quarterly information updates on progress with respect to withdrawal, and to respecting Latvian legislation on protection of the environment; similarly, it prohibited Russia from increasing the numbers of troops or from introducing new units or sub-units; from stationing weapons of mass destruction or arms prohibited under international conventions; and from destroying military equipment on site or, furthermore, from transferring or selling arms to entities or individuals without the consent of the host country. In contrast, it committed Latvia to accepting (under certain conditions and within certain limits) the continuation of exercises and military manoeuvres on its territory, and to paying Russia “fair” compensation for certain immovable property which had been built or purchased by the Russian forces. Although it established a regime which was time-bound and which addressed the strictly technical requirements of withdrawal, the Treaty was psychologically costly for Latvia in that in a certain sense it amounted to “legalizing the illegal”, namely, more than half a century of Soviet occupation.

427 See Saulius Girnius, “Progress in Withdrawal of Troops from Lithuania?” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 34, 28 August 1992, p. 33. 428 See UN: A748/386 (10 September 1993). 429 See Dzintra Bungs, “Soviet Troops in Latvia” (n. 401); “Russian Troop Withdrawal from Latvia: An Update”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 49, 11 December 1992, pp. 28–32, and “Russia Agrees to Withdraw Troops from Latvia”, (ibid., vol. 3, no. 22, 3 June 1994), pp. 1–9. Text of the instruments was published in DOC.248 (19 May 1994). 260   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Secondly, Latvia broadly satisfied one of Moscow’s fundamental claims by making real commitments on the social protection of Russian soldiers and members of their families. Thus, it agreed to grant soldiers who had retired since 28 ­January 1992 (the date when the forces were transferred to Russian jurisdiction) and wished to continue to live in Latvia, the right to remain in Latvia, retain full ownership of their goods, and acquire social housing in the event of privatization, and, above all, the possibility of obtaining Latvian citizenship. It was also understood that pensions paid by Moscow would be tax-free,430 and that a joint Russian-Latvian committee would be responsible (in co-operation with the CSCE) for examining any possible complaints from Russian-speakers. In addition, Latvia agreed to pay a fixed sum for the construction of accommodation for staff repatriated to Russia and to help Moscow raise the additional funds for this purpose from third-party States and international organizations.431 Thirdly, Latvia resigned itself to the maintenance of the Skrunda radar station under Russian control until the year 2000 (instead of 2004 as Moscow had demanded) in return for annual financial compensation of five million dollars (rather than two million as originally proposed).432 An early warning anti-ballistic missile (ABM) station built in the 1960s and situated 150 kilometres west of Riga, ­Skrunda was particularly important because it covered a portion of the sky not covered by Russian-based surveillance systems.433 However, the Agreement on the Legal Status of the Skrunda Radar Station during its Temporary Operation and Dismantling concluded in Moscow on 30 April 1994 did not present Russia with a blank cheque: in fact, the text, which could not be extended or amended (Article 19), imposed numerous constraints. Thus, it expressly specified that the station was not to have the status of a military base but, rather, of a military installation falling within Russian civilian control (Article 2, § 2) and placed under the authority of an Administrative Director (Article 5, § 1), and was to be intended strictly for the observation of extra-atmospheric space (Article 2, § 3). Furthermore,

430 See Moscow Agreement of 30 April 1994, article 2, § 2, and article 7 devoted to the social protection of servicemen stationed in Latvia after the withdrawal. These provisions concerned 22,320 individuals, according to Section II of the Protocol to the Agreement. 431 See article 4, second-to-last paragraph, and article 6 of the Moscow Agreement of 30 April 1994, aimed at the social protection of Russian servicemen stationed in Latvia until their country’s withdrawal. See also the Moscow Treaty of 30 April 1994 regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia, article. 7, § 4. Several countries, including the Nordic nations and the United States, made a financial contribution in this respect. 432 The Agreement authorized Russia to use Skrunda for four years, starting from the date of withdrawal of the Russian troops (31 August 1998), and required that it dismantle the station at its own cost in the 18 months that followed (between 1 September 1998 and 29 February 2000), see previously mentioned agreement: article 16, § 2. At the same time, it authorized Latvia to destroy, at its own expense, a gigantic 19-storey building on which construction started in 1986 that was never completed because Latvia became independent in 1991, see article 16, § 5; the destruction of this building, nicknamed “monster” by the Latvians, was financed by the U.S. Pentagon and took place on 4 May 1995, see Nouvelles atlantiques no. 2715, 10 May 1995, p. 4, and INF/43/15 (26 April 1995). 433 See A/748/501, 15 October 1993 (§ 34).  Chapter V   261

the Agreement prohibited Moscow from modernizing Skrunda or changing its technical functions or parameters (Article 2, § 4), set a precise ceiling on the number of staff authorized at the station, namely, 599 military experts and 199 civil servants (Article 6), and obliged Russia to respect Latvian legislation on the protection of the environment (Article 11, § 1). Moreover, it authorized Latvia to undertake – with the participation of foreign experts – inspections relating to the environmental effects of the station’s operation (Article 11, § 4), also recognizing Latvia’s right to visit the station at any time, simply by giving notice of its intention to do so (Article 5, § 6). Finally, it committed Russia to submitting to the UN Security Council a formal declaration guaranteeing that no provision of the Agreement would be used to the detriment of Latvia’s sovereignty or security interests.434 It should also be noted that throughout the negotiations, Riga refused to make ­comparable concessions in relation to the naval base in Liepāja or the base in ­Ventspils, which was (according to Moscow) specialized in the surveillance of space objects.435 Because Estonia was economically less vulnerable than Latvia in relation to Russia, the Russian-Estonian compromise turned out to be the most arduous of the three. It was only concluded on 26 July 1994, at the Summit held in Moscow by President Yeltsin and President Lennart Meri of Estonia. To ensure that the evacuation of Estonia should take place at the same time as that of Latvia, Estonia agreed to concessions to Moscow which were comparable to those already agreed by Latvia. Firstly, Estonia agreed, through a treaty, to grant the Russian forces temporary status and to enable the families of soldiers to remain in Estonia for a maximum period of one year after the withdrawal was complete.436 Secondly, it agreed, also through a treaty, to grant social benefits to retired Russian soldiers and members of their families (around 52,000 people) wishing to remain in ­Estonia – on the condition that the retired persons were aged 63 or over and had retired before Estonia became independent. This involved issuing residence permits to applicants meeting these criteria, excluding, however, persons who (according to the Estonian Government) represented a threat to the security of the country on account of their prior activities within the Soviet secret services.437 This twofold concession facilitated the drafting of an arrangement concerning the Paldiski naval base: in a special agreement signed in Moscow on 30 August 1994, Russia agreed to dismantle the two nuclear reactors installed at this submarine base before 30 September 1995.438 The commitment was honoured within the timescale and the base was transferred to Estonia on 26 September 1995.

434 This declaration was made to the Security Council on 27 July 1994, see A/49/344-S/1994/1008. 435 According to Latvia, the Ventspils base rather served the purpose of monitoring communications from Northern Europe, in particular between the Scandinavian States. Regarding the Latvian position on Liepāja and Ventspils, see A/48/501 (15 October 1993), §§ 32 and 35. 436 See A/49/419 (22 September 1994), § 10. 437 Ibid. 438 Ibid. § 11. For more on Paldiski, see A/48/501 (15 October 1993), §§ 20 and 21. 262   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

It should be noted that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the three Baltic States was neither observed nor certified by the CSCE (or by any other international institution). However, implementation of the Russian-Latvian Agreement of 30 April 1994 on the Skrunda radar station involved the CSCE’s active support, which is referred to specifically by two provisions in the text. Firstly, with a view to the monitoring and co-ordinating of the Agreement’s implementation, the Agreement established a joint Russian-Latvian Committee also including representatives of an international organization common to both parties (Article 14, § 1). Secondly (Article 15, § 1), it provided for the CSCE being made responsible for carrying out inspections.439 In June 1994, Latvia and Russia jointly requested that the CSCE assume the roles arising from these provisions.440 In the same month, the Chairman-in-Office was requested to appoint a Representative and a Deputy to the Russian-Latvian joint commission – it being understood that the Representative would be based at the CSCE Mission to Latvia and would keep the Mission fully informed of the commission’s activities in order to ensure transparency, having recourse to the Mission for assistance if necessary.441 The issue of inspection, however, was more delicate to resolve and it was only in February 1995 that the Permanent Council adopted the text of a Mandate concerning the CSCE inspection regime for the Skrunda radar station, accompanied by an annex relating to the “Rules and Modalities for the Implementation of Inspections”.442 The Mandate placed the inspection teams under the control and authority of the Chairman-in-Office, who was charged with building a team for each inspection on the basis of a list of names (30 maximum) proposed by the CSCE States and approved by the Parties to the Skrunda Agreement. A preliminary inspection was to take place to verify the basic data about the station provided by Russia. Subsequently, two periodic inspections and two exceptional inspections (without right of refusal) could be carried out each year – plus one inspection to be carried out three days after the operational closure of the station and an inspection to be carried out on the day the Skrunda Agreement came to an end.443 Clearly, the three Baltic States approached the negotiations with no shared negotiating position. Indeed, although they formed a geographic unit and had experienced the same fate within the USSR, they presented real cultural differences: while Estonian belongs to the Finno-Ugric family of languages,

439 “Periodic inspections by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe shall be requested in order to monitor the implementation of this Agreement”. Without making any explicit reference to the OSCE, §§ 2 and 6 of the same article provide for challenge inspections and additional periodic inspections, respectively. 440 See CSCE Communications No. 30 (15 June 1994). 441 See 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 15 June 1994, decision 5 (e), and Permanent Committee: Journal No. 26 of 30 June 1994, Annex. 442 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 9 of 23 February 1995, Annex 1 and the appendix to the Annex. For subsequent versions of the text, see DOC.491 (12 July 1994) and DOC.660 (6 September 1994) and DOC.660 Rev. 1 −Rev. 6. 443 The first inspection carried out by the OSCE took place 28–30 August 1995. See REF.PC/5/95 (27 March 1995) for the preliminary data that the Russian Federation provided to the OSCE.  Chapter V   263

Latvian and Lithuanian are Indo-European; moreover, having long been under German rule, the Estonians and most Latvians are Lutherans, whereas the Lithuanians are Catholics. Consequently, according to one US analyst, relations with Russia tend to be approached in moral terms by the Lithuanians, in legal terms by the Latvians and in intellectual terms by the Estonians.444 In any case, their bilateral disputes with Russia did not stem from one and the same scenario. Firstly, the populations of Latvia and Estonia were 42 and 30 per cent Russian- speaking respectively, compared with a figure of only 12 per cent in Lithuania: as a result, the problem of preserving the national identity was not felt equally keenly in Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. Secondly, while Lithuania – which had expanded after its annexation through the addition of the former Polish region of Vilnius (1939) and the former German territory of Memel (1945) – was first and foremost concerned by the militarization of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad,445 Latvia and Estonia’s problems with Russia were territorial. Indeed, during changes to the administrative borders of the USSR made in 1945 to the benefit of Soviet Russia, the Soviet authorities removed from Estonia three quarters of the region of Pechory and part of the east of Narva (representing 5 per cent of the total surface area of Estonia and 6 per cent of its population), and likewise deprived Latvia of the Jaunlatgale area (2 per cent of its total surface area and two per cent of the country’s population).446 These objective conditions inclined the authorities in Riga and Tallinn to be less flexible in their negotiations than those in Vilnius and pushed Moscow to be more inflexible towards Latvia and Estonia than towards Lithuania.447 Despite taking place amid acrimony and tension, the withdrawal of the Russian troops who had occupied the Baltic States since 1940 was a positive event. Firstly, it resolved one of the last problems inherited from the Second World War, the solution to which, moreover, raised significant technical difficulties. According to Moscow, “between March 1992 and August 1994, more than 100,000 military

444 Paul A. Goble, “The Baltics: Three States, Three Fates”, Current History, vol. 93, no. 585, (October 1994), p. 332. 445 Russia is categorically opposed to any suggestion that Kaliningrad be demilitarized. See DOC.1106 (24 November 1994) and the Masseret Report on The Baltic Assembly (WEU Assembly, document 1460, 22 May 1995, §§ 47 and 48). On the territorial expansion of Lithuania, see Yakemtchouk, “Les Républiques baltes en droit international...” (n. 399), p. 286. 446 See Yakemtchouk, “Les Républiques baltes en droit international...” (n. 399), p. 286. In 1953, 700 square kilometres were taken from Estonia and transferred to Russia (see Dzintra Bungs, “Seeking Solutions to Baltic-Russian Border Issues”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 13, 1 April 1994, p. 28). In November 1994, Russia refuses to change the border line and Moscow unilaterally sets the Russian–Estonian border on the administrative line of 1945, arguing that the Tartu Treaty of 2 February 1920 and the Riga Treaty of 11 August 1920, (in which Soviet Russia recognized Estonia’s and Latvia’s borders at the time), had been nullified because of the countries’ annexations to the Soviet Union in 1940. For further details, see Bungs, pp. 25–32, and CSCE Communications No. 136 (14 April 1992), No. 66 (2 March 1993) and No. 201 (14 July 1993), as well as the (written) declaration by the Latvian delegate to the CSO Vienna Group on 15 July 1993. See also DOC.426 (29 June 1994) and UN: S/26104 (15 July 1993). 447 See CSCE Communications No. 66 (2 March 1993) and UN: S/26104 (19 July 1993). 264   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

personnel were redeployed from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to Russia; some 30,000 families of military personnel, totalling approximately 105,000 individuals, also left; 41,500 pieces of equipment and some 700,000 tonnes of supplies were withdrawn and 230 ships departed from Baltic ports.”448 Secondly, it confirmed Russia’s clear willingness to renounce the Soviet policy of European territorial expansion, a development which was all the more significant in that it emanated from a superpower in the throes of a “post-imperial identity crisis”.449 For the post-communist Baltic States, the CSCE will retain the merit of having been being the first international institution to have admitted them and to have come down in favour of the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed on their territories. While the CSCE’s contribution to the withdrawal was certainly indirect and limited, it was nonetheless real: in § 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration, the CSCE engaged its political credibility and made Russia sign up to an obligation of “early, orderly and complete” withdrawal. In December 1994, it gave the Baltic States the satisfaction of an addition provision, inserting into the Code of ­Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security a provision stipulating that a participating State could only station armed forces on the territory of a third State in accordance with a freely negotiated agreement with the host country and in accordance with international law.450 b) The issue of the status of the Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia Much as the Baltic States had internationalized the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops in order to increase pressure on Russia, Russia decided to give the issue of the Russian-speaking populations living in these same countries a multilateral spin. Although its approach was certainly not devoid of tactical considerations in the sense that by playing the human rights card it managed to delay the withdrawal of the troops, it was essentially motivated by the desire to protect the formerly Soviet, Russian-speaking populations whom citizenship legislation enacted in Estonia and Latvia (but not Lithuania) had transformed

448 See UN: A/49/PV.79, 7 December 1994. See also Hélène Le Deunff, “Le retrait des troupes russes des Etats baltes”, Arès, vol. XV, no. 1, 1996, pp. 51–61. 449 The wording is from Max Jacobson, who recalls that Russia’s history has always been that of a country believing its own safety depends on territorial expansionism, “A Baltic Test of Real Change in the Russian Psyche”, International Herald Tribune, 27 January 1994. 450 See the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, § 14.  Chapter V   265

into foreigners or stateless persons.451 The dispute that put Russia in conflict with Estonia and with Latvia was submitted to the UN and the CSCE.452 With a view to demonstrating their good faith, the two countries took the initiative of submitting their contested legislation for international examination. In September 1992, Latvia therefore invited a UN expert mission to investigate the allegations of violations of human rights on its territory.453 At the same time, Estonia invited a CSCE mission to visit the country under the Moscow Mechanism on the human dimension in order to examine the compatibility of its legislation with generally recognized human rights standards;454 in October of the same year, it also invited the UN to begin a similar inquiry to the one already under way in Latvia.455 These different procedures gave rise to similar conclusions. Thus, the UN mission in Latvia concluded that there was no evidence of flagrant or systematic violations of human rights in this country (the individual cases reported were limited and were not linked to a discriminatory policy), but that some regulations and administrative practices appeared to reveal discrimination against certain elements of the population and gave rise to a climate which was unfavourable to harmonious inter-ethnic relations.456 For its part, the UN mission in Estonia reported that it had discovered no proof of discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity or religion, but that the Russian-speaking communities “felt considerable anxiety about the future and, on the part of some members of the Estonian community, the desire to turn back the clock to the pre-1940 years, notwithstanding the fact that in the intervening period two generations of residents of non-ethnic Estonian origin have grown accustomed to living in Estonia and perceive Estonia

451 Only 9.4% of Lithuania’s population was Russian (the number had been 2.5% in 1923), while Belarusians accounted for 1.7% and Ukrainians for 1.2%. On 4 September 1989, the country adopted a rather liberal citizenship law. Entering into force on 11 December 1991, the text permitted the smooth and rapid integration of individuals of non-Lithuanian origin who had been living in the country for at least two years. For further details, see Dagmara Vallens, “The Law on Aliens in the Baltic States”, The Review of the International Commission of Jurists, no. 54, June 1995, pp. 6–12. During his first visit to the Baltic countries, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities recognized that the inter-­ethnic relations in Lithuania were not problematic in nature, see the letter that Max van der Stoel sent to the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs on 5 March 1993: CSCE Communications No. 124 (23 April 1993). In May 1993, Lithuania was easily admitted into the Council of Europe; see the Banks Report, PACE Doc. 6787 (2 March 1994) and the Opinion submitted by Rapporteur Oehry, PACE Doc. 6811 (13 April 1993). 452 It was also submitted indirectly to the Council of Europe, shortly after Latvia and Estonia applied for membership of this organization. 453 See A/47/476 (22 September 1992). The mission was undertaken from 27 to 30 October 1992. For the summary of conclusions reached by the mission, see A/47/748 (2 December 1992). 454 The mission was undertaken from 2 to 5 December 1992. See Report of the ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation Invited by the Republic of Estonia. The request was made on the basis of the Moscow Mechanism (1991), § 4, which stipulates that “a participating State may invite the assistance of a CSCE mission (...) to address or contribute to the resolution of questions in its territory relating to the human dimension of the CSCE”. 455 Regarding the Fact-Finding Mission (7–11 February 1993), see A/48/511 (26 October 1993). 456 See A/47/748, §§ 23 to 25. 266   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

as their homeland.”457 Furthermore, it indicated that the Estonian Constitution and the relevant legislation were compatible with the general principles of the human rights instruments, but that the practical application of the laws in question (in particular concerning language, where the criteria required were too rigid) were an issue.458 As for the CSCE, it concluded that “the Constitution of Estonia as well as other laws examined by the mission meet the international standards for the enjoyment of human rights. Certain shortcomings need to be overcome by filling gaps in the legislation and by strengthening the judiciary and the administration. This process is under way.”459 Russia, however, persisted in accusing Estonia and Latvia before the United Nations. In November 1992, alleging that the “discriminatory policies and ­practices” of the two countries contravened generally recognized international standards, it requested the inclusion of an additional item on the agenda of the 47th session of the General Assembly on the issue of “Mass violations of human rights and freedoms in Latvia and Estonia”.460 At the end of a debate on the issue, which had been redefined in a more neutral way (“Situation of human rights in Estonia and Latvia”), the General Assembly adopted a resolution which was to a certain degree along the lines desired by Russia. The text noted “the existence of certain problems which involve large groups of population in Estonia and Latvia” and recommended that the States concerned intensify their efforts on a bilateral level, to resolve “concerns with regard to the situation of the Russian-speaking population,” on the basis of generally accepted norms of international law in the field of human rights.461 Given that the UN’s fact-finding missions had demonstrated that there were no human rights violations in Latvia and Estonia, Latvia argued that there was no valid reason to justify a new examination of the issue by the General Assembly in 1993.462 However, on account of the insistence of the Russians (for whom Estonia and Latvia were conducting “velvet-gloved ‘ethnic cleansing’” and “deportations” in contempt of the recommendations from international organizations),463 the issue was kept on the agenda of the 48th session of the General Assembly starting that year. The subsequent debate gave rise to a new resolution which restricted itself to noting the “existence of unresolved issues that involve large groups of population of different ethnic origin” and to deciding to consider the question at a future session (i.e., to withdraw the issue from the immediate agenda), it being understood that the Secretary-General would keep the Member States informed

457 See A/48/511, §§ 15 and 93. 458 Ibid., §§ 87 and 88. 459 Report of the ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation Invited by the Republic of Estonia, § 68. 460 See A/47/247 (10 November 1992). 461 Resolution 47/115 (16 December 1992). 462 See A/C.3/48/16 (22 November 1993). 463 See A/C.3/48/18 (24 November 1993).  Chapter V   267

about the human rights situation in Estonia and Latvia.464 Since then, Russia has restricted itself to making unilateral statements (through communications distributed to the General Assembly) on the two Baltic States’ policies towards their Russian-speaking populations.465 The CSCE could not remain indifferent to the plight of the Russian-speaking populations and the development of the Russo-Baltic controversy. It responded in an original way through Missions of Long Duration in Estonia and Latvia. c) The OSCE Mission to Estonia According to the Soviet census of 1989, Estonia had 1,562,000 inhabitants, of which 34.9 per cent were Russian-speakers (Russian: 30.3 per cent; Ukrainian: 3.1 per cent; Belarusian: 1.5 per cent), generally concentrated in the north-east of the country near Saint Petersburg. While rural areas remained largely Estonian, the population of several towns (including Sillamäe, Paldiski, Kohtla-Järve and Narva) had become up to 90 per cent Russian-speaking.466 This situation resulted from the policies of “denationalization” and industrialization implemented by the Soviet authorities through a massive inflow of immigrants who had, moreover, no obligation to learn the language of the country. After the restoration of independence, the Estonians undertook to stop, or even undo, the effects of half a century of Russification. On 26 February 1992, Estonia therefore brought the Law on Citizenship of 1938 back into force. Through this law, citizenship became the exclusive right of persons who had held it on 16 June 1940, and of their descendants. It was consequently denied to Russian-speakers who had come to the country after the Soviet occupation, including those who had been born and lived there for half a century. With the exception of foreign soldiers on active service, former members of the USSR’s security and intelligence bodies and those found guilty of serious crimes or without any regular legal income, non-Estonians could acquire citizenship through naturalization. Two essential conditions were required: a minimum of two years’ permanent residence and knowledge of the Estonian language, which had become the national language through a law of 18 January 1989.467 It should be noted that the requisite length of permanent residence applied from 30 March 1990. Given that applications could not be processed in less than a year, this provision had the practical effect of preventing Russian-speakers wishing to become Estonian from participating in the country’s

464 See Resolution 48/155 (20 December 1993). 465 See A/49/57 (3 January 1994), A/49/220 (8 July 1994), A/49/221 (8 July 1994), A/49/298 (8 August 1994), A/49/304 (9 August 1994), A/50/76 (31 January 1995), A/50/131 (5 April 1995), A/50/139 (17 April 1995), A/50/267 (30 June 1995) and A/50/483 (28 September 1995). 466 See A/48/511 (26 October 1993), §§ 21 and 23. Close to 50% of the population of Tallinn, the capital, were Russian-­speakers. Before the country was annexed in 1940, Russians in the strict sense of the word had comprised only 8% of the country: see the Bratinka Report on Estonia’s application for Council of Europe membership (Doc. 6810 of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, 14 April 1993), § 34. 467 See A/48/511 (26 October 1993), §§ 30, 31, 34 and 46. 268   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

first post-communist national elections, which were scheduled for September 1992. In addition, there was the aggravating factor that in accordance with a law of 10 February 1993 applicants had to sit an exam aimed at testing their ability to write, understand and speak Estonian.468 Given that the Estonian national identity was inseparable from a language spoken nowhere else, this provision was not illegitimate and, in itself, could not be accused of being draconian. However, in the particular context of a country in which several regions were overwhelmingly populated with Russian-speakers, its sudden introduction (without prior consultations) had profoundly negative effects. The tensions resulting from the citizenship policies applied in Estonia and Latvia coincided with the appointment of the first CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who immediately made two successive visits to the region (January and March 1993). Concerning Estonia, in April 1993 he drafted a long series of recommendations for the Estonian Government’s attention aimed at encouraging the harmonious integration of Russian-speakers into the life of the country.469 In particular, he suggested that citizenship be automatically granted to Russian-speaking children born in the country, that the linguistic demands be restricted to “conversational” ability, and that certain categories of people (invalids and those over the age of 60) be exempt from the language exam. However, the Riigikogu (Parliament) only agreed to the final point and amended the language law accordingly. Shortly after Estonia’s accession to the Council of Europe (May 1993), the Riigikogu adopted certain legal texts that broadened the gap with the Russian- speaking population still further: the Local Government Organization Act of 2 June 1993 and the Aliens Act of 8 July. The first text authorized Russian-speakers (now non-citizens) to vote, but not to stand for election, thus depriving them of the ability to participate in local government, even in regions where they formed the absolute majority. The second text provoked a greater emotional response. Indeed, in its original version, the Aliens Act obliged Russian-speakers who had settled in Estonia since the Soviet occupation to apply for a residence and work permit within a year, or else leave the country. The procedure which was established was not simply a formality, because it offered no guarantee that the documents certifying permanent registration in the records of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Estonia would be automatically replaced by new documents. The Act stated that applications would be rejected (without any right of appeal) from anyone who worked or had worked for foreign intelligence or security services, anyone who had worked in the armed forces of a foreign State (in which case the rejection also applied to family members), and from persons who did not comply with the “constitutional order and legislation” of the country or, further, who had

468 Ibid., § 51. 469 For the text of the recommendations and the Estonian Government’s reaction, see CSCE Communications No. 124 (23 April 1993).  Chapter V   269

committed acts which were damaging to Estonia’s national interests and international reputation. Renewable every five years, the residence permit could be withdrawn or not extended for these same reasons (but in these cases with the possibility of appeal). It should be noted that one of the conditions necessary for the granting of these permits was that applicants had to be in receipt of a regular, lawful income amounting to sufficient means of subsistence – a condition which was difficult to meet in the north-east of the country, which was affected by severe unemployment.470 In short, Russian-speakers were to live in fear of being expelled (whether they applied for naturalization or not). The Aliens Act was adopted on 21 June 1993, leading President Yeltsin to state that Estonia’s leaders had apparently “forgotten” about certain geopolitical and demographic realities, and that Russia had the means to remind them of these realities.471 The national and international outcry was such that the Estonian President suspended promulgation of the law and decided to submit it for an expert opinion to the Council of Europe and the HCNM. The conclusions of the two international institutions were consistent. They recognized that although the law did not depart from other legislation in force in Europe and did not discriminate against future immigrants, it nonetheless violated the acquired rights held by the Russian-speaking population as a result of half a century of continuous residence. They also considered that, given the vague and ambiguous nature of some of its provisions, the law was open to various interpretations which could pave the way for arbitrary decisions.472 As a result of these objectively irrefutable criticisms, the Riigikogu resigned itself to re-examining the Act. It introduced a distinction between new immigrants and those living in the country before 1 July 1990, with a view to ensuring that applicants from the latter group were subject to a more flexible procedure. In particular, the new version provided for the granting of temporary residence permits to Russian-speakers and indicated that their applications would not be included in the annual immigration quotas (set at 0.1 per cent of the total population of the country). It also authorized Russian-speakers to appeal to the courts against any refusal to issue or extend a residence of work permit. The Aliens Act finally came into force on 8 July 1993.473 Although more flexible than the first version, the text nonetheless retained the same basic philosophy. The Russian-speaking population reacted by organizing a referendum on “regional national autonomy” in the (non-Estonian) cities of Narva and Sillamäe, on

470 The Law did not even specify whether unemployment benefits would be considered a source of legitimate and sufficient income. 471 See A/48/223 (25 June 1993). 472 See Ann Sheehy, “The Estonian Law on Aliens”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 38 24 September 1993, p. 9. For criticism of these details by the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, see CSCE Communications No. 192 (2 July 1993). 473 For the text of the Law, see A/48/259 (12 July 1993). 270   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

16 and 17 July 1993.474 The crisis was defused, thanks, in part, to the intervention of the HCNM, who obtained assurance from Tallinn that there would be no use of force, and agreement from the Russian-speaking organizations that they would continue to act strictly within the laws of the land.475 Established by the CSO from December 1992 following a Swedish initiative, the CSCE Mission became operational on 15 February 1993.476 Initially planned for a period of six months, it has been prolonged on several occasions, most recently until 31 December 1996.477 With six staff, it exercises its mandate across the entire territory of Estonia, although its activities focus on the north and north- east. Based in Tallinn, it also has offices in Narva and Kohtla-Järve – where Russian-speakers make up the overwhelming majority of the population. In 1996 the Mission’s budget stood at some 4.3 million Austrian schillings.478 As an instrument of preventive diplomacy, the fundamental objective of the Mission to Estonia is to encourage inter-ethnic dialogue and understanding with a view to integrating the Russian-speaking population into the civil life of the country. This being the case, the Mission has three main roles: information, good offices/mediation, and support for democratic structures. As with any diplomatic representation, the Mission’s primary concern is to collect information. It submits regular reports to the CSCE on the political, economic and social situation of the host country. Primarily interested in the status and situation of the non-indigenous population, it pays great attention to the analysis of the relevant national legislation and its implementation. Carrying out these practical tasks requires constant and close liaison with the Estonian authorities

474 While overwhelmingly positive, the result of these consultations was weakened by lower-than- expected turnout: 55% in Narva and 61% in Sillamäe (Le Monde, 21 July 1993). On the Narva issue, see Philip Hanson, “Estonia’s Narva Problem, Narva’s Estonian Problem”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 18, 30 April 1993, pp. 17–23. 475 See the communiqué published in Tallinn on 12 July 1993 by the HCNM. Two new laws (one on citizenship and the other on language) entered into force on 1 April 1995. Although they concern new immigrants in particular, they were forcefully denounced by Moscow, see A/50/267 (30 June 1995). A further source of friction with Tallinn was the “discrimination” that the Moscow Orthodox Church faced vis-à-vis the Orthodox Church, which was presided over by the Patriarch of Constantinople, see A/49/386 (15 September 1995), p. 8, and A/49/483 (28 September 1995), § 7). 476 The idea of establishing the Mission, see CSCE Communications No. 338 (3 November 1992) was officially put forward by Sweden, which held the CSCE Chairmanship at the time. The CSO established the Mission in December and set its terms of reference in February 1993, see 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, decision 5 (a); CSCE Communications No. 399 (9 December 1992) and 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 13 December 1992, Annex 2. For the Mission mandate, see 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 February 1993, Annex 1. The Mission operates on the basis of a memorandum of understanding concluded with the host country on 15 February 1993, see CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 8 of 25 March 1993. 477 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 18 of 24 June 1993, decision 4 (d); Permanent Committee: Journal No. 5 of 20 January 1994, decision 5 (a), and Journal No. 25 of 23 June 1994, decision 5 (a) and Permanent Council: Decisions No. 1 of 15 December 1994, No. 48 of 13 June 1995, No. 90 of 30 June 1995 and No. 119 of 9 May 1996. 478 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 97 of 19 December 1995, p. 3.  Chapter V   271

(both on the local and the national level) and with the various actors in civil society such as political parties, the media, NGOs and trades unions. In short, the Mission operates as a political antenna and an early warning mechanism, monitoring changes in inter-ethnic relations in Estonia. In addition, the Mission mediates between the various parties involved in order to dispel emerging tensions or, at the very least, to prevent them from reaching a critical level. It informs those who inquire about the exact nature of their rights under the legislation in force and the possibility of lawfully asserting them. This role, which combines information with practical legal assistance, is one of considerable importance: it often makes it possible to resolve difficulties deriving from an insufficient circulation of information or a lack of transparency in administrative practices.479 The Mission also provides advice to the Estonian authorities – either on its own initiative (as, for example, on the subject of the revision of the Aliens Act),480 or upon direct request. It should be mentioned in this regard that one of the members of the Mission is specifically attached to the governmental commission established (under the Russo-Estonian Agreement of 26 July 1994) to issue residence permits to retired Russian soldiers and members of their families.481 Moreover, the Mission is responsible for supporting the mediating role of the HCNM in Estonia. Lastly, it works more directly by establishing structures for dialogue within the context of seminars which it organizes. In this multi-faceted and delicate role, the Mission sometimes finds itself exposed to criticism not only from the Russian-speaking but also the Estonian population.482 Lastly, the most ambitious role of the Mission is to contribute towards the reconstruction of civic society in Estonia. Designed to bear fruit in the longer term, it seeks to tackle the deep-rooted causes of the tensions, rather than to remedy their

479 According to the first Head of the Mission to Estonia, “the work of the Mission has resembled that of a legal assistance bureau, information office, consulate or ombudsman’s office. On many occasions, the Mission has been able to help individuals by getting in touch with the appropriate Estonian authorities. As a minimum, the offices of the Mission served as safety vents, places to which people could turn with queries and complaints (...). Somewhat unexpectedly, the work of the Mission expanded towards direct involvement in assisting and advising individual human beings, mostly members of the disoriented non-citizen population”, Klaus Törnudd, “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy — The Case of Estonia” in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 77–78. 480 Ibid., p. 82. 481 In accordance with the agreement signed between Russia and Estonia on 26 July 1994 on the social protection of Russian military pensioners in Estonia, article 2, § 2 (“a representative of the CSCE shall be invited to the work of the Government Commission which will make recommendations on the issuance of residence permits”), Estonia suggested to the OSCE that one of the members of the Mission in Tallinn be given this task, see DOC.713 (15 September 1994). For the positive response from the OSCE, see 28th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 16 ­September 1994, decision 5 (g). 482 See Timo Lahelma, “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy” — The Case of Estonia (August 1993-June 1994) in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy, (n. 479), p. 91. 272   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

symptoms. Here, peacebuilding is an indispensable addition to the technique of preventive diplomacy itself, aiming as it does at the development and consolidation of democratic structures in Estonia – while awaiting the handover of the Mission’s functions to local institutions.483 In this context, the Mission does not act alone. It is supported by the ODIHR and co-operates with the Council of ­Europe – notably on establishing a language training system for the country’s Russian-speakers. d) The OSCE Mission to Latvia A multi-ethnic State with 1,900,000 inhabitants in 1935, Latvia had a population of some 2,600,000 when its independence was restored. Between its annexation by the USSR and its liberation, the ethnic structure of the country was radically transformed: Latvians formed 77 per cent of the population in 1935 but only 52 per cent in 1991, compared to 42 per cent Russian-speakers, a large number of whom were soldiers. The Latvians had even become a minority in the seven biggest cities in the country, including in their capital. As in Estonia, this was the result of the denationalization policy deliberately applied to the Baltic States by the Soviets, and to the importation of foreign labour for the purposes of the country’s industrialization. It was also explained (in reference to the military population) by the fact that Riga was the headquarters of the important Soviet military district of the Baltic. In any event, the Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians in Latvia received a variety of benefits (notably in terms of employment and housing) without being obliged to learn the indigenous language. After the restoration of independence, Latvia’s ultra-nationalists regarded the Russian-speaking populations as a threat to their national identity and security. Firstly, they felt that their numerical preponderance in certain regions was an obstacle to the renaissance of the Latvian language and culture; secondly, the presence among the Russian-speakers of a high number of former members of the Soviet armed forces, police and intelligence services was a potentially destabilizing factor.484 Because the ethnic composition of the country had been artificially modified by the occupying forces, it was now considered important to redress the situation through appropriate legislation. On 15 October 1991, the Latvian Supreme Council adopted the Resolution on the Renewal of the Rights of Citizens and the Fundamental Provisions for Naturalization. Under the terms of this text, citizenship was automatically attributable only to those who held nationality on 17 June 1940 and their descendants. For the others (some seven hundred thousand in number), naturalization was an option under strict conditions: a minimum of 16 years of continuous residence, conversational fluency in the Latvian language, knowledge

483 On the concept of peacebuilding, see footnote 351 of the current chapter. 484 Some sources mentioned around 20,000 military pensioners and some 41,000 former officials in the KGB and the Interior Ministry: see Human Rights and Democratization. Latvia (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1993), pp. 16-17.  Chapter V   273

of the basic principles of the Constitution, renunciation of the former nationality, and a pledge of loyalty to the Republic.485 It was on this already restricted basis that the new Saeima (Parliament) adopted, at its first reading on 25 November 1993, a Citizenship Law featuring even stricter parameters – notably annual naturalization quotas to be set by the Government and approved by the Parliament (0.1 per cent of the total number of Latvian citizens, i.e., fewer than 2,000 per year) and timescales delaying the submission of applications by age group to the year 2000.486 Such provisions, which legally marginalized some 700,000 people, were clearly aimed at transforming Latvia into a mono-ethnic State: in its version of 25 November 1993, Article 9 of the Citizenship Law stated in no uncertain terms that the naturalization quotas took into account the demographic and economic situation of the country to “ensure the development of Latvia as a single- nation state”.487 Given the increasing pressure exerted by Moscow on the international level, Latvia resigned itself to submitting its legislation to examination by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities488 and, principally, the Council of Europe, at the doors of which it had been knocking in vain since September 1991, and which had already admitted the other two Baltic States on 14 May 1993. At the end of new readings (9 and 21 June 1994), the Parliament adopted the final text of the Citizenship Law on 22 July 1994. In its new version, the Citizenship Law reduced the length of required residence – as suggested by the CoE and the HCNM – to five years.489 However, it placed the bar higher in terms of linguistic knowledge: it required applicants for nationality to prove (in the context of an exam) their ability to “completely” understand Latvian of a social and official nature, to be able to express themselves “freely”, to “converse and answer questions regarding topics of a social nature”, to fluently read and understand “any instructions, directions and other texts of a social nature” and even to be able to “write an essay on a topic of a social nature”. Moreover, although the Citizenship Law adopted in 1994 no longer included the idea of annual naturalization quotas (deemed to be unacceptable by the Council of Europe), it nonetheless established temporary restrictions on the process of examining applications for naturalization, which had the effect of staggering the

485 See A/47/748 (2 December 1992), § 7. 486 See the Espersen Report, § 30, for more on Latvia’s application for Council of Europe membership, see PACE Doc. 7169, (6 October 1994). 487 ,Ibid., p. 35. 488 For the full version of the High Commissioner’s recommendations, see CSCE Communications No. 124 (23 April 1993) and No. 8 (31 January 1994). 489 According to section 12, the other conditions for granting citizenship were knowledge of the basic principles of the Constitution and of constitutional law, knowledge of the national anthem and the history of Latvia, proof of a legal source of income, swearing an oath of loyalty to the Republic and renouncing any former citizenship (an act supported by a document attesting to the loss of this former citizenship). Section 21, item 2 exempted permanently disabled individuals from taking a language fluency test. 274   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

process over a certain period (1996–2003) depending on priorities connected with the age and place of birth of applicants.490 Despite the imperfection of the text and the lack of complementary legislation on the rights of those who became stateless as a result, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a favourable opinion on Latvia’s accession to the organization in Strasbourg. Given the understandable resentment resulting from half a century of occupation and forced Russification, it recognized that “the Latvians have good reasons and the right to protect their own identity as well as they can” and seen in this light “the new act is as generous as it could be and that in due course it will do justice to all those whose presence, originally, has been forced upon the Latvian people.”491 It also asserted that ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights by Latvia (following its accession to the Council of Europe) would in itself constitute appropriate legal protection for anyone residing on Latvian territory.492 In a declaration published by its Chairman-in-Office on 26 July 1994, the CSCE stated that, in its opinion, the adoption of the Citizenship Law covered “many of the suggestions” of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. As such, it could be considered as “an important step towards a settlement of inter-ethnic relations in Latvia” – to which end the CSCE was, moreover, ready in “every way available to co-operate” with the Latvian ­Government.493 In contrast, Russia’s reaction was entirely negative. For Moscow, the Citizenship Law flouted a “major part” of the recommendations formulated by the CSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Union.494 It aimed to “legitimize the idea of establishing a mono-ethnic State in Latvia”.495 Russia claimed that it was “manifestly discriminatory” in nature, and that it contravened Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (concerning the right to citizenship), Article 24 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 7 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (concerning a child’s right to citizenship).496 Nor did Russia confine itself to restating that the only equitable solution to the problem was to automatically accord Latvian citizenship to all Russian-speakers who had decided to reside in the country

490 Art. 14 established a timetable for the successive consideration of applications from Latvian- born residents aged between 16 and 20 (1996), up to 25 (1997), up to 30 (1998), up to 40 (1999) and then from all other residents who were born in Latvia (2000) or had arrived in the country as minors (2001) or when they were older than 30 (2002) and finally, all other individuals (2003). The CSCE High Commissioner suggested that the quota system be replaced by a stepwise but relatively short naturalization process (1994–1998), see CSCE Communication No. 8 (31 January 1994). 491 For the Opinion on the application by Latvia for membership to the Council of Europe, see PACE Doc.7193 (8 November 1994) p. 3. 492 Ibid., p. 4. Latvia joined the Council of Europe on 10 February 1995. 493 For the text of the declaration, see the Espersen Report, (n. 486), Annex 8. 494 See the statement by President Yeltsin dated 31 July 1994, A/49/298 (8 August 1994). 495 See A/49/220 (8 July 1994). 496 A/49/220 (8 July 1994) and A/49/304 (9 August 1994).  Chapter V   275

permanently: it issued statements that were threatening in tone. Believing that Latvia had destroyed the positive results of the settlement on the withdrawal of Russian troops, President Yeltsin stated that Moscow could not “view with equanimity a situation in which, in a neighbouring country, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians are placed in an essentially humiliating situation” and that the Russian Federation was prepared to “protect and extend patronage to” all ethnic Russians in Latvia and elsewhere.497 The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kozyrev, went even further, stating that the “danger inherent in this kind of behaviour is obvious” and “such a policy can only bring misfortune both to one’s own and to neighbouring ­peoples.”498 In September 1993, on account of the positive experience at the start of the Mission to Estonia, the CSO Vienna Group approved the Chairman-in-Office’s idea of appointing a personal representative responsible for making recommendations on the subject of “a possible CSCE presence and further engagement in Latvia”, where, “in the context of the overall objective of encouraging the full realization of CSCE principles, norms and commitments there are matters requiring CSCE attention.”499 This decision did not garner the enthusiasm of the Latvian representative, who asserted that a permanent CSCE presence might give credence to the idea that human rights were not being respected in the country; he also considered that establishing a Mission must be counterbalanced by more active CSCE involvement in the process of withdrawing the Russian troops.500 However, the CSO immediately created the Mission to Latvia,501 the mandate of which was established by the CSO Vienna Group shortly afterwards.502 Based in Riga, the Mission operated on the basis of a memorandum of understanding signed with the host country on 13 December 1993. After having initially had four members of staff, it now has seven.503 Created for a period of six months, it has been regularly renewed, most recently until

497 A/49/298 (8 August 1994). 498 A/49/304 (9 August 1994). 499 CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 28 of 9 September 1993, decision 4(d). 500 See the written text of the Latvian delegate’s speech to the CSO Vienna Group on 9 ­September 1993. In response, Russia issued an interpretative declaration that excluded “the possibility of intruding into the consideration of issues which pertain exclusively to bilateral relations between Russia and Latvia”. See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 29 of 16 September 1993, item 5. 501 See 23rd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 23 September 1993, Annex 3. Text of the Report of the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE: CSCE Communication No. 260 (23 September 1993). 502 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 31 of 7 October 1993, Annex 1. 503 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 3 of 21 November 1993, decision 5a, and Journal No. 29 of 21 July 1994, decision 5(b). 276   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

31 December 1996.504 Its budget for 1997 stood at some seven million Austrian schillings.505 The Mission to Latvia became operational on 19 November 1993. As a tool of preventive diplomacy, it has two essential functions: information and good offices/mediation. The first function obliges it to gather information and report on developments relevant to “the full realization of CSCE principles, norms and commitments” in Latvia. The very generality of this obscure formulation had the merit of not restricting the Mission’s information role to inter-ethnic questions. Indeed, the formulation was specifically designed to authorize the Mission to keep the CSCE informed of changes in negotiations on the withdrawal of Russian troops still stationed in Latvia – in other words, progress towards implementing § 15 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration of 1992. The second role, which consists of addressing citizenship issues and other related matters, set out two obligations: firstly, to provide the Latvian Government and authorities with advice on such issues and, secondly, to provide information and advice to institutions, organizations and individuals with an interest in a dialogue on these issues. The Mission has thus monitored the legislative process in Latvia closely. Through its informal and patient recommendations, it contributed towards relaxing as far as possible the provisions in the Citizenship Law of 22 July 1994 and those in the Law on Non-Citizens of 12 April 1995. At the time of writing, it is continuing to subject the implementation of the legislation to careful monitoring, particularly the exams for checking the linguistic ability of applicants for naturalization. In 1994, it collated direct and detailed information on more than a thousand complaints – which helped it to show the Latvian authorities that the real problem was within the Ministry of the Interior’s ­ Department of Citizenship and Immigration, whose practices were clearly discriminatory in nature. In 1995, it once again highlighted the fact that the Department had not put an end to these practices, which, for example, consisted of refusing to register requests from non-citizens or of not implementing judicial decisions made in non-citizens’ favour. It should also be noted that following the withdrawal of the Russian forces the Mission was given an additional task, namely, that of examining complaints submitted by Russian-speakers to the Joint Committee established by the Russo-Latvian Agreement of 30 April 1994 on the social p­ rotection of retired members of the Russian armed forces and their families.506 Lastly, the Mission to Latvia participates in language training activities for Russian-­speakers.

504 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 18 of 15 May 1994, decision 5a; and Permanent Council: decisions No. 2 of 15 December 1994, No. 46 of 11 January 1995, No. 88 of 23 November 1995 and No. 132 of 27 June 1996. 505 See Permanent Council: Decision 150/97 of 19 December 1996, p. 7. 506 The Agreement stipulated that matters relating to its application “may be submitted by either Party for joint consideration (...), as well as by the representative or representatives of the CSCE. Persons to whom this Agreement applies may also submit for consideration (...) appeals on matters involving their rights” (art. 2, § 3). Following a joint Russian-Latvian request, the  Chapter V   277

To conclude, the use of preventive diplomacy in Estonia and Latvia has been largely successful. Both of these Missions contributed, in their own way, to defusing ethnic tensions. Success was not necessarily guaranteed. As small countries whose annexation had resulted in the massive – and deliberate – alteration of their ethnic composition, Estonia and Latvia had no obligation, given the state of positive international law, to grant citizenship to the direct descendants of their oppressors either automatically or unconditionally.507 Conversely, given their numbers and the nature of their material and moral concerns as well as Moscow’s thundering support, the Russian-­ speaking populations had the means to start a violent trial of strength with the governments in Riga and Tallinn. The CSCE was able to convince all sides that returning the countries to the situation of 1940 or maintaining the privileges of the Soviet era were unrealistic expectations. The calming presence of the Missions enabled the Latvians and Estonians to realize that the massive expulsion of non-indigenous people was not a desirable option and the Russians to admit that the time had come to adapt to the national specificities of the host countries. The neutrality of the Missions did the rest. The Baltic States felt reassured as they could demonstrate to the international stage that the CSCE had observed no massive violations of human rights on their territories, while the Russian-speakers met with attentive, obliging and generally efficient representatives in both Missions. For the Baltic States, the Russian-speakers no longer appear to be members of some nostalgic communist “fifth column” aiming to sabotage Estonia and Latvia’s re-found independence, and the Russian-­speakers themselves now display a more positive attitude towards the Baltic States, principally for reasons related to the economy.508 Broadly speaking, the Missions to Estonia and Latvia met the objectives for which they were created. The question now arises as to whether it is appropriate to end their activities or to change the terms of their mandates in such a way as to focus on the objective of good neighbourly relations between the countries in the region.

OSCE accepted this duty. See CSCE Communications No. 30 (15 June 1994); 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 15 June 1994, decision 5 (e); Permanent Committee: Journal No. 26 of 30 June 1994, Annex; and Permanent Council: Journal No. 9 of 23 February 1995, Annex 2 see Permanent Council: Decision No. 17. See also DOC 192 and Rev. 1–2 (8 February 1995). This request nominated the Head of the Mission in Latvia as representative. The Representative and his deputy (also a member of the Mission) were tasked with carrying out their additional duties from the Mission premises and in conjunction with the Mission, all under the direct responsibility and control of the Chairman-in-Office. Initially, the Permanent Committee considered nominating individuals who, like those nominated to implement the Skrunda Agreement, would sit on the Mission without being members. 507 Regarding the problem of the legal effects of State succession in terms of nationality, see A/CN.4/467 (17 April 1995). 508 See Richard Rose and William Maley, “Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic States?”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 28, 15 July 1994, pp. 26–35, and William Maley, “Does Russia Speak for Baltic Russians?”, The World Today, vol. 51, no. 1, January 1995, pp. 4–6. 278   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

B. Ukraine The biggest federated State in the USSR (after Russia) in terms both of surface area and of population, Ukraine declared its independence on 24 August 1991 in the wake of the failed putsch by Soviet conservatives. With 90.32 per cent of the population voting for independence in a referendum organized on 1 December 1991, the situation very quickly led to a dispute with Russia (as the successor State to the USSR) over the control of strategic weapons deployed in Ukraine, the partition of the Black Sea fleet, the role of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the status of the Crimean peninsula.509 In addition to these political issues, the dispute reflected the extreme difficulty Moscow had in accepting the independence of an entity traditionally referred to as “Little Russia”. According to Soviet historiography (which remained relevant despite the collapse of the USSR), Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians hail from the same common stock (one single “old Russian nation” nationality: drevnerusskaya narodnost), which had become diversified after the destruction of the medieval principality of Kiev by the Mongols in the thirteenth century and consolidated on account of Ukraine becoming subject to various foreign rulers (Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Austria). However, “Little Russia” was not simply a founding element of the cultural heritage of the Muscovite Empire: for the Russians it was (as indicated by the meaning of the word ukraina) a frontier region with special military significance, a “bread basket”, and an important seaboard that provided Russia with access to the Mediterranean and the Balkans through the Black Sea. Nonetheless, Ukraine boasted a more complex historical past, in the sense that the country had long lived under the twofold influence of East and West. Until the eighteenth century, it was customary to distinguish between the Ukrainians who were integrated into the Russian State and those who lived under Polish rule.510 The influence of the east was the result of vital requirements. Lacking natural borders to defend it against invaders, Ukraine decided (at the end of a long war with Poland) to place itself under Moscow’s protection through the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 8 January 1654; two centuries later, as a result of the break-up of Poland, western Ukraine was, in turn, integrated into Russia. Despite this evolution, Voltaire expressed the reality of the situation when he said: “Ukraina has always aspired to freedom”.511 During the nineteenth century it became, as did other European nationalities, progressively more aware of its own identity.

509 For further details, see Romain Yakemtchouk, L’indépendance de l’Ukraine (Brussels: Institut Royal des relations internationales, 1993), pp. 115–258. 510 Roger Portal, Russes et Ukrainiens (Paris: Flammarion, 1970, “Questions d’histoire”, 20), p. 110. 511 “Ukraine has always aspired to freedom; but being hedged in by Russia, the dominions of the Grand-Seignior, and Poland, it was obliged to seek a protector (who is, of course, a master) in one of those States. First it put itself under the protection of Poland, who treated it too much as a subject-state; then they appealed to the Russians, who did their best to reduce them to serfdom”. Voltaire, History of Charles XII, King of Sweden, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1908), p. 156.  Chapter V   279

Under Soviet rule, Ukraine was the object of particular attention from Moscow. With a view to accelerating the construction of socialism, the central authorities encouraged a certain “Ukrainization” of the political, economic and cultural life of the country, something which would have been unthinkable under the tsars.512 Similarly, it granted Ukraine (as it had Belorussia), the right to join the United Nations and other international organizations in its own right. At the same time, however, it unceremoniously supressed any displays of “bourgeois nationalism”. In short, within the USSR, the Ukrainian national problem was not eradicated: it simply remained beneath the surface. The Russo-Ukrainian dispute of the post-Soviet era focused on the issue of the status of Crimea. It was with a view to responding to this that the CSCE decided to establish a preventive diplomacy mission to Ukraine. The following sections will consider facts about the Crimean question and the role of the OSCE Mission to Ukraine. a) Facts about the Crimean question Following a series of armed conflicts with Turkey, Russia annexed Crimea in 1783. There it established the naval base of Sevastopol, which in the following century became one of the main bones of contention in the Crimean War (1854–1856). Within the legal context of the USSR, the peninsula was granted the status of a Russian “Autonomous Republic” (1921–1945) before becoming, in 1946, a simple Oblast. On 28 April 1954, the USSR’s Supreme Soviet transferred Crimea to Ukraine. Nikita Khrushchev presented this transfer as a symbolic gesture to mark the commemoration of the three hundredth anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty of Union, additionally justifying it using arguments both geopolitical (the peninsula formed a natural extension of southern Ukraine) and economic (Crimea was highly economically dependent on Ukraine).513 After being made more sensitive by the nuclear catastrophe of Chernobyl in April 1986 and under the stimulating influence of perestroika, national Ukrainian feeling focused its attention directly on Crimea, where Russians formed 67 per cent of the population.514 In response to the declaration of sovereignty made by Ukraine on 16 July 1990 (which established the primacy of the laws of Kyiv over those of Moscow), in September the Crimean parliament requested the Soviet and Russian legislatures to repeal the decision of 1954 whereby the peninsula had been put under the authority of the Ukrainian Government. In a referendum organized in January 1991, moreover, the Crimean population declared itself in favour of the restoration of Crimea’s autonomy within the USSR (January 1991). Nor was this reaction due solely to the ethnic composition of Crimea: the peninsula was home to significant Soviet naval bases, was a favourite holiday destination for

512 See Portal, Russes et Ukrainiens, (n. 510), p. 79, and Yakemtchouk, L’indépendance de l’Ukraine,(n. 509) p. 34. 513 See Yakemtchouk, ibid., pp. 86–90 and 205. 514 According to the census of 1989, Crimea had 2.5 million inhabitants, 67.04% of whom were Russian and only 25.75% Ukrainian. 280   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

the Soviet nomenklatura, and remained particularly defiant of perestroika.515 On 12 February 1991, in an attempt at conciliation, the Verhovna Rada (the Ukrainian Parliament) granted Crimea the status of an Autonomous Republic within the State of Ukraine. The declaration of Ukrainian independence (24 August 1991) led to a deterioration of the situation and immediately drove the Russians in Crimea into a state of intransigence.516 In September, they declared Crimea’s “sovereignty” within Ukraine.517 In February 1992 the peninsula declared itself to be the “Crimean Republic” and in May declared its independence, subject to a referendum planned for August 1992. The Ukrainian Parliament reacted by declaring the independence unconstitutional and giving the Crimean parliament in Simferopol until 20 May to revoke its action. Although Simferopol complied, demanding in exchange a new division of powers between itself and Kyiv, on 21 May 1992 the Duma in Moscow intervened, under pressure from nationalist members of Parliament, with a resolution declaring that the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine had been carried out in violation of the Russian Constitution and had been legally invalid since its adoption.518 For its part, in June 1992 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a law extending Crimea’s autonomy, on the condition that the Crimean Constitution be aligned with Ukraine’s and the referendum be cancelled. In July 1992, the Crimean parliament suspended the planned referendum and made the necessary revisions to the Constitution. The crisis appeared to have been averted, at least internally, on the basis of a modus vivendi which preserved the territorial integrity of Ukraine and at the same time enabled Crimea to hold a broad remit in various fields, excluding security and foreign affairs.519 This pragmatic compromise proved to be fleeting: in January 1994 it was shattered with the election of Yuriy Meshkov as President of the Republic of Crimea. Head of the pro-Russian party, the express objective of which was Crimean independence followed by its integration into the Commonwealth of Independent

515 See Frank Umbach, “The Crimean Question”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 1994, p. 195. 516 On the evolution of this deterioration, see Svetlana Svetova and Roman Solchanyk, “Chronology of Events in Crimea”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 19, 13 May 1994, pp. 27–33. 517 It was in Crimea that the referendum on Ukraine’s independence received the lowest positive results (54% of the 65% of the votes cast). 518 In the Duma, the issue of Crimea was raised in January 1992 by Vladimir Lukin (president of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Economic Relations) and, in particular, by nationalist deputy Sergey Baburin. See Roman Solchanyk, “The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Moscow”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 40, 9 October 1992, p. 7. See also A/47/260 (8 June 1992). 519 See Taras Kuzio, Russia-Crimea-Ukraine. Triangle of Conflict, “Conflict Studies” No. 267, (London: RISCT, 1994), p. 22. In 1993, a Ukrainian decree authorized Crimea to constitute itself as a free economic zone. For further details on the process that led to the modus vivendi of 1992, see the analyses by Roman Solchanyk, “Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation over Crimea”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 8, 21 February 1992, pp. 26–30; “The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Simferopol”, ibid., vol. 1, no. 33, 21 August 1992, pp. 13–16; “The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Moscow”, ibid., vol. 1, no. 40, 9 October 1992, pp. 6–10, and “Crimea’s Presidential Election”, ibid., vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, pp. 1–2.  Chapter V   281

States, Meshkov took various initiatives which considerably strained relations with the central government. He proceeded to appoint a Russian citizen as Prime Minister (the economist Yevgeny Saburov), instituted Moscow time in the region, called once more for the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops, prohibited Crimean recruits from serving anywhere other than on the peninsula, called upon the population to boycott the national Ukrainian elections of March 1994 and, above all, in May 1994 re-enacted the Constitution of 1992 which stipulated that relations between Simferopol and Kyiv should be governed by international treaties – in the same way as those between sovereign States.520 The reaction of the Ukrainian Government was firm but non-emotional, its main concern still being to avoid the use of force, which was likely to burn its bridges with the Crimeans and lead to Moscow’s direct intervention in the conflict, as had been the case in Moldova, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In January 1994, between the two rounds of the presidential elections in Crimea and in anticipation of Meshkov’s victory, the parliament in Kyiv voted in favour of a constitutional amendment authorizing the President to annul any act which was not in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine. The following month, it adopted a resolution setting limits on the peninsula’s autonomy (banning it from entering into direct political contact with foreign States, adopting its own citizenship, having autonomous military forces, creating a monetary and financial system, etc.) and ordering the parliament in Simferopol to bring the Crimean Constitution and laws into line with those of Ukraine.521 In May 1994, it demanded that the decision on the restoration of the Crimean Constitution of 1992 be annulled; otherwise, the Government of Ukraine would take over direct administration of the region. Once again, the establishment of a new joint working group averted a bloody show of strength. Finally, on 17 March 1995 the Ukrainian Parliament abolished the Crimean Constitution, certain Crimean laws, and the position of President of the Republic of Crimea – though without abandoning the principle of the peninsula’s autonomy.522 On the same day, it adopted a law on the temporary status and competences of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea until the adoption of a new Ukrainian Constitution – notably stating that the Prime Minister of Crimea was to be appointed/dismissed by the Supreme Council of Crimea in agreement with the Ukrainian President.523 Subsequently, the “Constitutional Agreement” on the “fundamental principles of organization of state power and of local self-government”, adopted on 8 June 1995 in Kyiv, stated that Crimea was an “autonomous administrative-regional entity” able to make decisions in a

520 See Ustina Markus, “Crimea Restores 1992 Constitution”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 23, 10 June 1994, pp. 9–12. See also DOC.255 (24 May 1994). 521 See Roman Solchanyk, “Crimea’s Presidential Election”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, p. 4. 522 See DOC.495 (20 March 1995), REF.PC/35/95 (6 April 1995) and INF/69/95 (5 May 1995). 523 See the Masseret Report on Ukraine’s application for Council of Europe membership in PACE Doc.7370 (7 September 1995), § 50 and the Opinion on the application by Ukraine for membership of the Council of Europe in PACE Doc.7396 (26 September 1995), p. 9. 282   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

discretionary way on “matters falling within its competence under the Constitution of Ukraine and laws of Ukraine”.524 Finally, on 1 November 1995 the Crimean parliament adopted a Constitution unequivocally stating that the peninsula was part of Ukraine.525 This positive development was made possible by the conjunction of a number of factors: the erosion of Yuriy Meshkov’s popularity under the effect of unfavourable economic realities, a split in the independence movement (following the emergence of a conciliatory trend), the installation of Russian troops in Chechnya and, finally, the détente which had arisen between Ukraine and M ­ oscow since the victory of Leonid Kuchma in the presidential elections in the summer of 1994.526 b) The OSCE Mission to Ukraine Following a visit to Ukraine in May 1994, the High Commissioner on National Minorities considered that the priority of preventing ethnic conflict in the region required the CSCE to intervene, by, for example, sending a team of experts in economics and constitutional law to advise the Ukrainian Government.527 Ukraine approved of this suggestion in principle and also indicated that it was inclined to accept the establishment of a CSCE Mission of Long Duration on its territory.528 In May 1994, when tensions between Kyiv and Simferopol reached their peak as the result of Yuriy Meshkov’s initiatives and looked likely to lead to an ­Abkhazia- or Yugoslavia-type scenario, the CSCE’s Permanent Committee confirmed the CSCE’s “readiness to contribute to the easing of tension and to the strengthening of peace and stability in the area, through the use of appropriate CSCE institutions or mechanisms, such as the sending of a personal representative of the Chairman-­ in-Office”.529 The adoption of this initial decision immediately led to a legal controversy which to an extent revealed Moscow’s ulterior motives. In an interpretative statement, Russia said that the point at issue was a “sovereign Republic of Crimea as part [note the absence of the word ‘integral’] of Ukraine”. In this connection, it understood the term “sovereign” to mean a “republic enjoying the sum total of rights and obligations determined by the sovereign will of the people”, in political, economic, social, cultural and humanitarian terms; accordingly, “sovereignty” required the resolution of differences by peaceful means and without pressure or diktat. The statement only admitted Crimea’s belonging to Ukraine in a vague and

524 See Masseret Report mentioned above, § 52. 525 See Natalie Nougayrède’s article in Le Monde, 5–6 November 1995. 526 On 9 June 1995, Ukraine and Russia signed an agreement at the Sochi Summit, which in principle divided up the Soviet flotilla in the Black Sea. 527 See the letter that Max van der Stoel addressed to Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 15 May 1994, in CSCE Communication No. 23 (7 June 1994). 528 Ibid., for the undated reply by A.M. Zlenko, Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to Max van der Stoel’s letter mentioned above. 529 Permanent Committee: Journal No. 22 of 26 May 1994, decision 5 (a).  Chapter V   283

ambiguous way, stressing that the concept of “sovereign republic” would not prejudice the principles of the “territorial integrity and inviolability of the existing borders of the State(s) of which that republic is a part,”530 with the use of the plural clearly referring to Russia as well as to Ukraine. Ukraine immediately responded that the decision by the Permanent Committee confirmed its territorial integrity while at the same time anticipating measures aimed at dispelling tensions within one of its regions, in line with Ukraine’s Constitution and legislation. It later reacted more directly by recalling, in another interpretative statement, that the concept of sovereignty was not applicable to autonomous entities which, on an administrative and regional level, were an integral part of a sovereign State: because it had no status as a subject of international law, the Crimean Republic could not invoke the right to self-determination.531 For its part, the CSO clearly reaffirmed “its commitment to support the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine, in accordance with CSCE principles”. Accordingly, it made two decisions: firstly, to send to Ukraine experts on constitutional and economic matters to facilitate the dialogue between the central government and the Crimean authorities “concerning the autonomous status of the Republic of Crimea within Ukraine and, in particular, to formulate specific recommendations towards the solution of existing problems with due regard to the fundamental principles of the Constitution of Ukraine”; and secondly, to create (on the basis of a proposal from the Troika) a CSCE Mission to Ukraine with a view to helping the experts in question to achieve their goals.532 The Mission’s mandate was established by the Permanent Committee in ­August 1994.533 Ukraine only agreed to it on the condition that the Head of Mission would consult the host country’s authorities on the choice of staff, who, it was moreover agreed, would not include “citizens of neighbouring countries”.534 Consisting of six authorized staff, the Mission went into operation on 24 ­November 1994. Based in Kyiv with an office in Simferopol, it works on the basis of a memorandum of understanding signed with the host country on 24 January 1995. Initially established for a period of six months, it has been regularly renewed, most recently until 31 December 1996.535 The budget of the mission stood at 5.6 million Austrian schillings in 1996. The basic aim of the Mission to Ukraine is to prevent tensions and improve mutual understanding in the Crimean peninsula. It has a typical preventive diplomacy mandate with three aspects.

530 Ibid., p. 3. 531 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 23 of 2 June 1994, p. 3. 532 See 27th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 15 June 1994, Annex 2 and decision 5 (c). 533 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 31 of 25 August 1994, Annex. 534 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 535 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 42 of 21 November 1994; Permanent Council: Decisions No. 55 of 29 June 1995; Decision No. 91 of 3 November 1995 and Decision No. 131 of 27 June 1996. 284   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

The first of these is information-gathering aimed at providing the OSCE with regular reports on changes in all aspects of the situation related to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. As with the other CSCE Missions, it is carried out on the basis of close and permanent contacts with the various actors in public life, notably official authorities (at all levels), political institutions, ethnic communities and NGOs. The second is good offices/mediation, notably in the form of recommendations addressed to the appropriate authorities with a view to resolving current issues. The third is the long-term consolidation of Crimea’s economic and human rights foundations. The Mission is responsible for supporting the experts on constitutional and economic matters sent by the OSCE during their time in Ukraine, following up on their work and developing economic programmes (on the basis of their recommendations). It is also responsible for preparing special reports on the protection of human rights and national minorities and for monitoring and highlighting issues related to the freedom of the media. The mandate of the Mission to Ukraine has two traits that distinguish it from the CSCE’s other preventive diplomacy missions. Firstly, as required by the extensive “human dimension” component of the mandate, it involves constant co-­operation with the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Secondly, it includes (for the first time in the history of the CSCE/OCSE) objectives relating to the economic dimension, which are, moreover, combined with those of the human dimension. During the first year of its existence, the Mission strove to promote dialogue by organizing – in co-operation with the HCNM – two specialized round tables. Held in Locarno (1–14 May 1995) and partly funded by Switzerland, the first round table facilitated calm discussions between around fifteen senior civil servants and parliamentarians from Ukraine and Crimea on legal, economic and other aspects of autonomy in the peninsula. The conclusions of this exercise appear to have contributed towards the compromise reached at the end of the year between Kyiv and Simferopol. The second round table was organized in Yalta (20–22 September 1995), and was devoted to the return, resettlement and integration into Crimea of Tatars who were still living at the locations to which they had been deported. As one expert analysing the situation in Crimea put it at the end of 1993: “The potential for an Abkhaz-style crisis in the Crimea exists.”536 To this day, the peninsula remains a sensitive hotspot. Firstly, it is uncertain how long the fragile compromise so laboriously established between the Ukrainian central government and the Russians of Crimea will last, as it is vulnerable to possible demonstrations of one-upmanship by extremists in both camps. Secondly, the internal dimension of the Crimean problem is not limited to the (fundamental) issue of Russo-Ukrainian relations: it also includes the complicating

536 Kuzio, Russia-Crimea-Ukraine … (n. 519), p. 19.  Chapter V   285

factor of the relations with the Crimean Tatars.537 Thirdly, the anti-Ukrainian initiatives from the Duma in Moscow, one of the culminations of which was the statement of 9 July 1993 declaring Sevastopol an integral part of the Russian Federation,538 contribute to keeping the secessionist option open for many Russians in Crimea. Fourthly, despite adopting a more flexible and balanced foreign policy, the second post-­communist President of Ukraine (Leonid Kuchma) has not really settled the dispute between Moscow and Kyiv. In reality, Moscow considers the independence of Ukraine as purely provisional.539 From this perspective, Russia is a potential threat for a country which is vulnerable on two accounts: its ethnic composition (22 per cent of Ukraine’s 52 million inhabitants are Russian) and its extreme economic dependence on Moscow (illustrated by an energy debt exceeding three billion dollars). On the basis of all this, it is clear that the secession of Crimea would herald the end of an independent Ukraine – an eventuality which would be even more serious given that, geostrategically, Ukraine is a useful counterweight to the possible renaissance of a post-imperial Russia.

III. The Yugoslav Conflict Immediately after Tito’s death in May 1980, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) entered a process of political turbulence which, eleven years later, culminated in its violent disintegration. After the death of its founder, the edifice of federal Yugoslavia continued to stumble along. However, the contagious

537 Accused by Stalin of collective collaboration with their Nazi occupiers, the Crimean Tatars were expelled en masse from their homeland in 1944 and deported to Siberia and Central Asia ­(Uzbekistan). During and after this operation, more than 100,000 people (46% of the population) perished under appalling circumstances. After Khrushchev had acknowledged the falsity of the accusation in his famous secret report of 1956, the Crimean Tatars undertook a systematic campaign for rehabilitation by the Soviet authorities, with the support of Andrei Sakharov. This campaign was constantly repressed, despite the passage of a rehabilitation decree in 1967. For more details, see Ann Sheehy and Bohdan Nahaylo, The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans and Meskhetians. Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities (London: Minority Rights Group, 1980, 2nd edition), p. 28. The Tartars were only able to resettle in Crimea thanks to perestroika. However, the hostile welcome they received was exacerbated by the erasure of their cultural traces (destruction of mosques, cemeteries etc.). At present, they represent about 8% of the population of Crimea, which has a total population of 2.5 million. Politically organized, they are calling for the creation of an autonomous ethno-territorial entity and funding to resettle the Tatars who are still dispersed across the former USSR. This objective naturally leads them to oppose, along with the Ukrainians, the secession of Crimea. See Andrew Wilson, “Crimea’s Political Cauldron”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 45, 12 November 1993, pp. 6–8, and Susan Stewart, “The Tatar Dimension”, ibid., vol. 3, no. 19, 13 May 1994, pp. 22–26. 538 Faced with this provocation, Kyiv turned to the UN. In response, the Security Council adopted a statement reaffirming the territorial integrity of Ukraine and noting that the Duma’s decree did not reflect the official position of the Russian Federation: see UN: S/26118 (20 July 1993). See also S/26075 (13 July 1993), S/26100 (16 July 1993), S/26109 (19 July 1993) and CSCE Communication No. 202 (16 July 1993). 539 See Roman Solchanyk, “The Politics of State Building: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 46, no. 1, 1994, pp. 47–68. 286   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

effect of Soviet perestroika, which affected the six federal republics in very different ways, led to a fundamental debate on the need to reform the federal structure. Favourable to political multi-partyism and the market economy, Croatia and Slovenia recommended increasing the extensive decentralization introduced by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 to the advantage of the republics, with a view to transforming the SFRY into a confederation. In contrast, Serbia and Montenegro believed that decentralization had already gone too far and that the federal powers should be strengthened. However, for Bosnia-Herzegovina (an ethnic microcosm of Yugoslavia) and Macedonia (for whom the status of “Socialist Republic” within the SFRY was a guarantee against the “four wolves” of the region: Serbia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece), it was crucial that the Federation should be preserved. At heart, however, the debate was really about refocusing federal power in Serbia’s favour, as was revealed in 1986 in the Memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.540 As a result, and also under the effect of the nationalism re-emerging throughout the SFRY, Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence in June 1991. Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, for whom there could be no question of remaining in a Yugoslavia under Serbian hegemony, did the same in September 1991 and February 1992. The bloodshed that followed was the consequence of Serbia’s policy of ethnic nationalism, which in a flagrant abuse had vested itself with the attributes of the Yugoslav Federation.541 The first major hitch in the calm following the Cold War, the Yugoslav conflict officially began on 25 June 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. It was to haunt the European conscience for more than four years, taking barbaric forms thought to have been things of the past since 1945: on the Serbian side, “ethnic cleansing” practices were a systematic objective rather than a consequence of the fighting, which was concentrated in Croatia and, above all, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Faced with a war which represented a direct challenge to its fundamental principles, the CSCE initially reacted by pursuing a course of trial and error (1991–1992). Aware that the other international organizations were taking control of managing the conflict, for several years it contented itself with playing a marginal but original part (1992–1995), before being called upon to

540 Centred on the crisis of Yugoslav society, the Memorandum, which Slobodan Milošević took over when he rose to power in Serbia, was a virulent condemnation of the Federal Constitution of 1974. The Constitution was held responsible for the “republicanization of economies”, the insidious transformation of the Federation into a cowardly “union of States” and the breakdown of the national unity of the Serbian people as a result of an “internal federalization” that gave exorbitant prerogatives to Serbia’s autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The Memorandum also argued that the system in place favoured Serbia’s economic backwardness, the cultural assimilation of Serbs living in Croatia and a genuine “anti-Serb genocide” in Kosovo. For the text of the Memorandum, see Dialogue, no. 2/3 (Supplement), September 1992, pp. 3–27. 541 On the origins of the conflict, see Paul Garde, Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie (Paris: Fayard, 1992), p.444. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 194 and John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 87.  Chapter V   287

assume, from 1996, significant roles under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Dayton Peace Accords”).

1. The Trials and Errors of 1991–1992 Shortly before the start of the civil war, on 20 June 1991, the CSCE Council of Ministers – meeting in Berlin for its first session – adopted a declaration unequivocally supporting “the unity and territorial integrity” of Yugoslavia.542 The concern of nearly all governments was to avoid the break-up of the country, which was likely to destabilize the Balkans and encourage the disintegration of the USSR. When civil war broke out, the CSCE found itself anything but ready to respond to such a situation. First of all, at this point it had no express competence to manage crises or conflicts.543 Secondly, the provisions of its Decalogue (which had been unchanged since 1975) did not permit it to adopt a position acceptable to all participating States on a conflict which so radically opposed the principle of the territorial integrity of States with that of the self-determination of peoples: the participating States were split between those who favoured the former principle (such as the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Greece) and those who preferred the latter (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy and others).544 Finally, the twelve members of the European Union – at the time involved in negotiating the Maastricht Treaty – decided to make the Yugoslav affair a test of their own ability to adopt a common foreign and security policy. On 27 June 1991, following the first armed hostilities, the bilateral phase of the procedure relating to the Vienna Mechanism on unusual military activities was triggered upon the request of Austria and Italy. Considering Belgrade’s clarifications insufficient, Austria set in motion the multilateral phase of the procedure. At a special meeting held at the Conflict Prevention Centre on 1 and 2 July 1991, the participating States adopted a short, neutrally formulated text which recommended the cessation of hostilities, but without blaming Belgrade (contrary to Austria’s wishes).545 Subsequently and until summer 1992, the CSCE (through decisions of the CSO, the Council of Ministers and the Helsinki Follow- up Meeting and Summit) essentially gave way to other international bodies: the European Union and then the UN. Its only significant reaction was to suspend the

542 In a gesture of deference to Belgrade, the text in question, which deals with a question that had not initially been included in the agenda, was not inserted into the “Summary of Conclusions” of the 1st Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers in Berlin but into Journal No. 2, Annex 3. The Statement on the Situation in Yugoslavia was subsequently included in the printed bulletin containing the outcomes of the Berlin Council’s work. 543 Such competence would only be granted to them by the 1992 Helsinki Decisions. 544 See Eric Remacle, La politique étrangère européenne de Maastricht à la Yougoslavie (Brussels: GRIP, “Les dossiers du GRIP”, no. 167, 1992), pp. 32–33. 545 See 5th Meeting of the CPC’s Consultative Committee: Journal No. 6 of 1–2 July 1992. See chapter IV part3, section E. a., subsection ii) Clarification on dangerous incidents of military nature. 288   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

membership of Yugoslavia, which by that time consisted only of Serbia and Montenegro.

A. Stepping aside for the European Union and the United Nations. At the request of the twelve member States of the European Union, the ­Berlin Mechanism was activated (for the first time since it was adopted) on 3–5 July 1991.546 On this occasion, the CSO planned to send observers with a view to encouraging a ceasefire and a good offices mission to contribute towards the resumption of political dialogue between the parties.547 This plan failed for two reasons. Invoking the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States, Belgrade expressed its reluctance to internationalizing a conflict with two “secessionist” republics within the CSCE – an attitude of which the USSR approved, being keen not to create a precedent which could be invoked by the Baltic States, which were already claiming independence for themselves. Simultaneously, while the CSO was discussing the possible ways in which the CSCE could intervene, the twelve EU countries announced that they had achieved a ceasefire in Slovenia which would be overseen by a Monitoring Mission acting in the name of the Union. Subject to the iron law of consensus and confronted by the fait accompli carried out by the countries forming its own political hard core, the CSCE could do no more than give way and support the European Union’s initiative.548 In ­August 1991, it once again ventured to offer its good offices to the parties,549 but went back on the offer when the International Conference on Yugoslavia was convened at The Hague, under the auspices of the European Union.550 From that point onwards, the Conference in the Hague became, for the CSCE, the “forum where the Yugoslav crisis will have to be solved”.551

546 In accordance with the existing provisions, the implementation of the Berlin Mechanism was preceded by a bilateral request for “clarification” from Austria and Luxembourg. In 1991, in Prague, the CSO held its first Emergency Meeting (3–5 July), which would be followed by four additional Meetings (8–9 August, 3–4 September, 10 October and 29 November). In 1992, the CSO organized its Second Emergency Meeting (6–9, 11–12 May) in Helsinki. In 1994, in Budapest, the CSO devoted another Emergency Meeting to the situation in Bihać (28 November, 30 November and 1 December). 547 See 1st Emergency Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 3 July 1991, Annex 1, “Urgent Appeal for a Cease-fire”, and Journal No. 2 of 4 July 1991, Annex 1, “Offer of a CSCE Good Offices Mission to Yugoslavia”. 548 See Emergency Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 4 July 1991, Annex 2, “Mission in Yugoslavia”. In fact, the federal authorities in Belgrade preferred an intervention by the EC: CPE/PRES/ HAG.310 (5 July 1991). See also the Financial Times, 6–7 July 1991. 549 See 1st Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 9 August 1991, Annex 2, “Assistance to Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia”. 550 See 2nd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 3 September 1991, Annex, “Statement on the Ceasefire in Yugoslavia”. 551 See 4th Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 24 November 1991, Annex, “Support for United Nations Action on Yugoslavia”, § 14.  Chapter V   289

A pragmatic partnership not anticipated by the drafters of the Charter of Paris quickly developed between the CSCE and a European Union which was rashly monopolizing the twofold task of peacekeeping and peacemaking. The Brioni Agreement of 7 July 1991 (which put an end to the war in Slovenia) was the first illustration of this partnership. Under the heading of “Command Structure and Supervision”, Annex II of the Agreement stated that the Head of the Observer Mission would submit a daily report, through the Prague CSCE Secretariat to the Committee of Senior Officials.552 Moreover, in line with arrangements between the Union and Belgrade, certain participating States, none of which had occupied Yugoslavia during the Second World War, were authorized to participate in the ceasefire observer mission: Canada, Sweden, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.553 Finally, the Conference on Yugoslavia kept the CSCE informed of its activities with the Chairman of the CSO acting as an intermediary.554 It is interesting to note that the two international institutions considered that one was acting on the basis of a “mandate” – in fact something informal, if not fictitious – emanating from the other.555 When the European Union realized that it was incapable of managing the conflict between Serbia and Croatia, it passed on the torch not to the CSCE but to the UN, which then launched the first peacekeeping mission in Europe since the end of the Cold War: the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The CSCE had no difficulty in acquiescing and approved the deployment of UNPROFOR.556 In 1992, it was called upon by the UN Secretary-General to directly contribute

552 For reports that the Mission periodically addressed to the OSCE, albeit not on a daily basis, see CSCE Communications No. 102 (8 August 1991), No. 104 (15 August 1991), No. 105 (21 August 1991), No. 108 (26 August 1991), No. 143 (10 October 1991), No. 4 (3 January 1992), No. 74 (17 February 1992), No. 113 (19 March 1992), No. 174 (14 May 1992), No. 209 (30 June 1992), No. 237 (14 August 1992), No. 280 (15 September 1992) and No. 421 (21 December 1992). 553 See Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 8 August 1991, Annex, “Appeal for a Ceasefire”, final paragraph, and Journal No. 2 of 9 August 1991, Annex 1, “Monitor Mission to Yugoslavia”, § 6. See also 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3, “Decisions on Former Yugoslavia”, § 12. 554 See 2nd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 4 September 1991, Annex 2, “Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia”, final paragraph; and 3rd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 10 October 1991, Annex “The Situation in Yugoslavia”. See also CPE/PRES/ HAG.580 (14 August 1991). 555 For example, see European Community statement P.73/91 (6 August 1991, § 8); and 4th Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 29 November 1991, Annex “Support for United Nations Action on Yugoslavia” § 2. See also UN: S/23155 (18 October 1991), Joint Declaration by the EC, USSR and USA, § 6. Regarding the Twelve’s management of the Yugoslav conflict, see John Zametica, “The European Community and the Yugoslav Crisis” in Hans Binnendijk and Mary Locke (eds.), The Diplomatic Record, 1991-1992 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 53–68. See also Bernard Brigouleix, “Paris, Bonn et l’ex-Yougoslavie : histoire d’un malentendu ?”, Documents. Revue des questions allemandes, vol. 51, no. 1, 1996, pp. 37ff. 556 See 4th Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 24 November 1991, Annex, “Support for United Nations Action on Yugoslavia”. See also 1992 Prague Ministerial Council (1992): Summary of Conclusions, third subparagraph of item 7; and 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3, “Decisions on Former Yugoslavia”, § 4. 290   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

towards the peacekeeping operation by establishing a mechanism for monitoring heavy weapons in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The CSCE rashly agreed to this request, but ultimately could not honour it because of a lack of consensus amongst the participating States on the modalities.557 When the Conference on Yugoslavia gave way to a new negotiating forum under the twofold aegis of the European Union and the UN – the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, established through decisions taken in London in August 1992 and held in Geneva – the CSCE was involved only as an observer.558 However, the CSCE could not totally abdicate responsibility in the face of a conflict which, as the CSO saw, had created a situation in which its principles were “constantly violated and international peace and security threatened”.559 On the level of principles, the CSCE declared any modification of the territorial status quo by force to be illegitimate. The CSO formulated its position in this regard with increasing firmness, but with a significant delay as compared with the European Union. It began by simply condemning the war as a means of pursuing national policy, recalling that it was “inadmissible” to “use force to achieve poli­ tical objectives”.560 It then extended its condemnation to modifications to borders, stating that “no territorial gains or changes within Yugoslavia brought about by violence are acceptable.”561 Having placed internal and external borders on the same level, it took a decisive step by affirming the determination of the CSCE States never to recognize a change to borders (whether internal or external) through force,562 a conclusion which the European Union had already reached three months previously.563 Finally, in accordance with the Stimson Doctrine (1932), it recalled that no change imposed by force “will be recognized as legal”

557 For the UN’s request and the OSCE’s immediate response, see CSCE Communications No. 233 (12 August 1992) and No. 246 (28 August 1992). In Vienna, the CSCE formed an open-ended ad hoc Group to examine the matter, but its deliberations were clearly not conclusive, see 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, Annex 1, “Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, § 7. 558 For the first information communicated by the Geneva Conference, see CSCE Communications Nos. 257, 283, 299, 307 (+ Add. 1 and Add. 2), 350, 358, 360, 374, 388 and 393 of 1992. The Conference ceased to exist on 31 January 1996, see 1st report UN: S/24795 (11 November 1992) and the final report: S/1996/4 (2 January 1996). 559 See 4th Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 29 November 1991, Annex, “Support for United Nations Action on Yugoslavia”, § 3. 560 See 1st Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 9 August 1991, Annex 2, “Assistance to Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia”, § 5; and 2nd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 4 September 1991, Annex 2, “Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia”, § 8. 561 See 2nd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 3 September 1991, Annex (“Statement on the Ceasefire in Yugoslavia”, § 3). 562 See 3rd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 10 October 1991, Annex (“The Situation in Yugoslavia”, § 5); and 5th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 8 January 1992, Annex 2 (“Declaration on Yugoslavia”, § 14). See also 1992 Prague Ministerial Council (1992): Summary of Conclusions, item 4, § 7, third “dash”. 563 See P.73/91(6 August 1991) for the Ministerial Declaration of The Hague.  Chapter V   291

and specified that the deployment of any UN peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia should under no circumstances “endorse the seizure of territory by force”.564 Moreover, the CSCE announced a weapons embargo. In September 1991, a few months after the European Union and a few weeks before the UN, it recommended that its participating States should, for the duration of the conflict, stop or refrain from supplying weapons or military equipment to all parties concerned, and take the necessary measures to prevent any transfer of weapons. The CPC was ­responsible for centralizing information submitted to it by governments in this ­regard.565 In relation to the human dimension, the CSO clearly recalled that the issues relating to human rights and national minorities, democracy and the rule of law “do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.”566 Consequently, it stressed the responsibility of all parties to the conflict to exert their full political control over all armed forces, whether regular or irregular.567 Condemning the war crimes committed against civil populations, it warned that the authors of such violations would be held “personally accountable under international law for their actions,”568 and stated that the conflict should not be used to change the “ethnic composition” of the different areas of the country.569 On a more practical level, later in October 1991, it created a “Rapporteur Mission” for the human ­ dimension – the first of its kind – charged with gathering information on the situation concerning human rights and national minorities in the six Yugoslav ­republics. The CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia was established by the CSO on the request of the United States. In so doing, the CSO referred to the existence of the (newly adopted) Moscow Mechanism, but without invoking the provisions of paragraph 13 which, nonetheless, gave it express competency in this

564 See 4th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 22 October 1991, Annex 3,“ The Situation in ­Yugoslavia”, § 3. See also 4th Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 29 November 1991, ­Annex, “Support for United Nations Action on Yugoslavia”, § 10. 565 See 2nd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 4 September 1991, untitled annex. 566 See 3rd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 10 October 1991, Annex 1, “The Situation in Yugoslavia”, § 8. 567 See 1st Emergency Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 3 July 1991, Annex 1, “Urgent Appeal for a Cease-fire”, § 3; 1st Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 8 August 1991, Annex, “Appeal for a Ceasefire”, § 7; 2nd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 4 September 1991, Annex 2, “Negotiations on the Future of Yugoslavia”, § 5; and 3rd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 10 October 1991, Annex 1, “The Situation in Yugoslavia”, § 17. 568 See 3rd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 10 October 1991, Annex 1, “The Situation in Yugoslavia”, § 19; and 4th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 22 October 1991, Annex 3, “The Situation in Yugoslavia”, § 10. See also Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, item 7, § 7; and 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3, “Decisions on former Yugoslavia”, § 9. 569 See 3rd Additional Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 10 October 1991, Annex 1, “The Situation in Yugoslavia”, § 25. See also 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, Annex 1,“ Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, § 4. 292   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

regard.570 The text of the decision indicated that the Mission would become operational at a date agreed after consultation with Yugoslavia. However, the United States asserted, without objection from the other participating States, that each of the Republics concerned should give their prior consent to the Mission’s visit (as well as to its date) and that the reference to “Serbia” should be understood as including the former autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina.571 Entrusted to the Swiss professor Thomas Fleiner-Gerster (accompanied by representatives of the Warsaw Office of the CSCE, the EU, and the Conference on Yugoslavia), the Mission was deployed in two stages. Following an initial field visit (17–20 December 1991 and 7–10 January 1992), the Mission reported that the federal structures of Yugoslavia had disintegrated – with the exception of the Yugoslav national army which, escaping all constitutional control, was practising a policy which was in violation of human rights, namely, forcibly conscripting recruits from the former Yugoslav republics.572 It considered that human rights violations had (except in Slovenia) become common practice – particularly in Serbia.573 It believed that the explosive situation in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Sandjak and, above all, Kosovo, merited “ongoing monitoring” from the CSCE. It also recommended that the CSCE plan Follow-up Missions on the role being played by the media which in Serbia and Croatia were actively contributing to stirring up inter-­ethnic hatred and had become real vectors for war.574 At the end of the second visit (3–9 May 1992), carried out in the same republics with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was embroiled in warfare, the Mission condemned the practices of “ethnic cleansing”. It reaffirmed that urgent action was required to put an end to the media war. It also recommended the establishment of permanent observers to Kosovo and the organization of a census aiming to determine the ethnic composition of Macedonia.575

570 See 4th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 22 October 1991, Annex 2 “CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia”. 571 Ibid., p. 2. 572 See CSCE Communication No. 41, 1992, p. 5. 573 Ibid., pp. 11–12. With regard to Slovenia, the report stated that, “despite certain shortcomings, the situation of human rights and protection of minorities (...) may be considered rather satisfactory” (ibid., p. 14). 574 Ibid., p. 15 (§§ 4 and 5). With regard to the media, the report stated that the “facts are distorted, data falsified and sometimes atrocities invented in order to contribute to an atmosphere of mutual hatred” (ibid., § 8). For further details and comments from the FRY, see DOC.479 (17 March 1995) and UN: E/CN.4/1995/54 (13 December 1994). See also Reporters Sans Frontières, Les médias de la haine (Paris: La Découverte, 1994), p. 164; Filip David, “The Media in Dark Times: A View of the Media in Serbia”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, 1994 (Special Issue), pp. 41–49, and Dusan Reljic, “A Mediator Between the Mass and the Power: Media and National Chauvinism”, Balkan Forum, Skopje, vol. 2, no. 3, September 1994, pp. 171–183. 575 See CSCE Communication No. 189, 1992, pp. 13–14. See also 7th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 28 February 1992, Annex 2, “CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia: Follow-up Mission”.  Chapter V   293

B. Suspension of Membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/­Montenegro) The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began a process of disintegration with the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia (June 1991), Macedonia (September 1991) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (February 1992) – in other words, of four of its six constituent entities. In 1992, the CSCE admitted Slovenia and Croatia as participating States (24 March 1992), then Bosnia-Herzegovina (30 April 1992), leaving only Macedonia aside.576 Despite the break-up of the SFRY and the accession of three of the four new States resulting from this process, “Yugoslavia” continued to formally be part of the CSCE. Nevertheless, the question of its continued membership was soon raised, as the result of two new developments: firstly, the extension of the war – at Belgrade’s instigation – to Bosnia-Herzegovina and, secondly, the advent of the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (FRY), consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. The conflagration in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to questions being raised about “Yugoslavia”, which was now under Serbian control. At the end of a special plenary session of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting held on 15 April 1992, the participating States condemned the attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s independence and territorial integrity by the Yugoslav National Army under Serbian control and the irregular Serbian forces supported by it. The participating States demanded that Serbia cease to support such actions, the continuation of which was a flagrant and massive violation of the CSCE’s commitments. This condemnation was coupled with a stark warning: membership of the CSCE required full respect for all its commitments, including the principle of territorial integrity.577 Although the “Yugoslav” delegation felt that the text of the condemnation was “one-sided and unbalanced”, it did not oppose its adoption, leaving this up to the “conscience and responsibility” of the other delegations.578 The proclamation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the national Parliament in Belgrade on 27 April 1992 led to a direct debate on the succession of the SFRY within the international organizations. At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, some CSCE States (Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Albania) believed that the proclamation finalized the SFRY’s process of disintegration and, consequently, had the effect of placing the new State on equal an footing with the five other former ­Yugoslav republics: in other words, the SFRY had ceased to belong to the CSCE and it was incumbent upon the FRY to apply for accession through the proper channels as all the other co-successors had done.579 Other participating

576 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was granted observer status on 28 April 1994 but was only fully admitted on 12 October 1995. See also in this volume Chapter III, section 4 c) ‘Accession of the fYRoM’. 577 See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 17 of 15 April 1992, annex. 578 Ibid., p. 2. Croatia, Austria and Hungary jointly stipulated that the reference to the “principle of territorial integrity” was also applicable to the territory of Croatia. 579 See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 29 April 1992, pp. 1–3. See also 20th Meeting of the CPC’s Consultative Committee: Journal No. 23 of 24 April 1992, p. 2. 294   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

States (those that were members of the European Union) considered that the proclamation of the FRY had not resolved the problem of the automatic succession of the SFRY to the CSCE but that, given that the question was the subject of negotiations between all the concerned parties within the Conference on Yugoslavia, a cooling-­off period was needed before any decision might be taken on the subject.580 The United States adopted a similar position.581 In contrast, Russia clearly expressed its opposition to any measure to expel or suspend “Yugoslavia” by stating that this would compromise attempts to peacefully settle the Yugoslav conflict.582 In May 1992, because “the authority of the legitimate government of Bosnia-­ Herzegovina [was being] violated through continuing aggression” from the ­Yugoslav National Army and the irregular forces supported by Serbia, the CSO solemnly declared that there was “clear evidence of gross violations of CSCE commitments”.583 The CSO was, however, unable to draw the logical conclusions of this statement. It debated at length a draft declaration submitted by the European Union stating that it was incumbent upon the Conference on Yugoslavia to come to an agreement on the issue of succession to the SFRY and specifying that any procedural provision which the CSO took in the meantime would not prejudge in any way the outcome of the Conference. On account of Russia’s opposition, the draft in question was not adopted, but was nonetheless recorded for information purposes in the Journal.584 During an Emergency Meeting called during the same month on Austria’s request with the support of around twenty States, the CSO succeeded in adopting a position which was both strong and more practical. Stating that “the pattern of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSCE commitments by the authorities in Belgrade and by the JNA is now unmistakably established”, it decided that all measures relating to the Yugoslav conflict would, until 30 June 1992, be taken without the delegation of “Yugoslavia”, i.e., in accordance with the new procedure of “consensus minus one”.585

580 See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 29 April 1992, p. 2. 581 Ibid., p. 3, and 20th Meeting of the CPC’s Advisory Committee: Journal No. 23 of 24 April 1992, p. 2. 582 Ibid. Soon afterwards, the Russian delegation made an official statement that it would not communicate to Moscow any proposal by the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting that, contrary to the OSCE’s established rules, makes reference to particular States or events, see Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: revised version of Journal No. 21 of 6 May 1992, p. 1. 583 See 10th Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 29 April–1 May 1992, Annex 4, “Declaration on Bosnia- Herzegovina”. The “Yugoslavia” delegation immediately considered this text one-sided and unfair but did not object to it being adopted (ibid., pp. 7–8). 584 Ibid., decision 5 (b) and Annex 2, “Proposal for a Chairman’s Statement on Yugoslavia”; see also pp. 2–3 and 6–7. 585 See 2nd Emergency Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 6–12 May 1992, Annex, “Declaration on Bosnia-Herzegovina”. The decision was taken on the basis of consensus minus one: ibid., decision 5 (b) and item 6. For the reaction from “Yugoslavia”, see A/46/917 (14 May 1992).  Chapter V   295

The decisive step was taken with the CSO’s decision of 8 July not to admit any “Yugoslav” representation to the Helsinki Summit on 9 and 10 July and to any later meetings until 13 October 1992 – a timescale set to test the goodwill of Milan Panić, the new federal Prime Minister (and a US citizen).586 In fact, the Yugoslav delegation (anticipating such an outcome) had itself made the first move by announcing on 29 June 1992 that, given the “one-sided and biased approach” taken by the CSCE to the issue, it would not participate in the Helsinki Summit.587 The suspension was solemnly confirmed by the Helsinki Summit in a special declaration specifying that this measure would be reviewed in the light of the compliance of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE – without prejudicing the future status of the State in question, “which will be considered [by the CSO] as soon as possible”, taking into account the opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the EC Con­ ference on ­Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission) and the deliberations within the UN.588 The opinions issued by the Badinter Commission on 4 July 1992 were clear. They boiled down to three key conclusions: firstly, “the process of dissolution of the SFRY referred to in Opinion No. 1 of 29 November 1991 is now complete”;589 secondly, “the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a new state that cannot be considered the sole successor to the SFRY”;590 and thirdly, “the SFRY’s membership of international organizations must be terminated … and none of the successor states may thereupon claim for itself alone the membership rights previously enjoyed by the former SFRY”.591 These opinions were immediately rejected by the FRY, which, moreover, denied the Badinter Commission’s general competence in the most categorical terms.592 The UN, meanwhile, adopted a particularly ambiguous position. In ­September 1992, the Security Council stated in Resolution 777 that the SFRY had

586 See 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 7 of 8 July 1992, Annex (“Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”). The previous month, the CSO had set up a Steering Group tasked with studying the issue of “Yugoslavia” participating in the Helsinki Summit. See 12th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 10 June 1992, Annex, “Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, § 7 (a). 587 See 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 29 June 1992, p. 2. 588 See Helsinki Summit: Journal No. 2 of 10 July 1992, Annex, “Declaration on the Yugoslav Crisis”. One of the reasons for confirming the suspension was that (§ 1) “the violence and aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia continues” and that (§ 8) “for several months the authorities in Belgrade have been in clear, gross and uncorrected violation of CSCE commitments”. 589 See Badinter Commission: Opinion No. 8 (4 July 1992). 590 Ibid., Opinion No. 10 (4 July 1992). 591 Ibid., Opinion No. 9 (4 July 1992). 592 Belgrade argued that the Badinter Commission had not been established for arbitration in compliance with international law, and that its opinions had been taken as “judgements” and served as a basis for making political decisions pertaining to the Yugoslav conflict, see UN: S/26038 (4 July 1992, see also S/1994/398 (5 April 1994), p. 3. Regarding the Badinter Commission, see the articles published by Alain Pellet in l’Annuaire français de droit international (1991, pp. 329–348; 1992, pp. 220–238; 1993, pp. 286–304) and Journal européen de droit international (vol. 3, no. 1, 1992, pp. 178–181). 296   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

ceased to exist. Rejecting the claim that the FRY would automatically assume the continuity of the SFRY within the United Nations, it consequently recommended that the General Assembly should decide that the FRY must submit a request for accession to the UN. At the same time, however, it recommended that it decide that the FRY “shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly.”593 The General Assembly immediately reacted accordingly by adopting Resolution 47/1.594 The Security Council’s decision was paradoxical on two counts. Firstly, it stated that the SFRY no longer existed as a State, but it did not abolish it as a member: the Yugoslav flag and official plaque remained at the UN. Secondly, it considered that the FRY must submit an application through the correct channels (thus implying that the FRY was not yet a UN member), while depriving the FRY from participating in the work only of the General Assembly and not all UN organs. This double contradiction was the price the West paid for the compromise required to avoid the Russian veto. Russia, in fact, obtained three major concessions: the non-abolition of the founding Member State seat occupied by the SFRY, the non-expulsion of the FRY from this same seat occupied by it de facto since the disintegration of the SFRY, and the limitation of the scope of the sanction implemented against FRY (which was, moreover, not definitive) only to the work of the General Assembly. While agreeing to UNSCR 777, Russia stated in no uncertain terms that the decision to suspend the participation of the FRY from the work of the General Assembly “will in no way affect the possibility of participation by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the work of other organs of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council, nor will it affect the issuance of documents to it, the functioning of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations or the keeping of the nameplate with the name Yugoslavia in the General Assembly Hall and the rooms in which the Assembly’s organs meet.”595 In other words, the West did not succeed in removing the FRY from the UN, but only in suspending its participation in a partial way and for an indeterminate length of time. Dissatisfied with this lame compromise, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina demanded a legal explanation from the UN Secretary-­General of the paradoxical practical consequences of Resolution 47/1. They specified that “if we find no satisfactory legal grounds in your statement, we reserve the right to request formally at that time that you act in your capacity as the chief executive of the United Nations, and order the flag of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia lowered from the honourable mast of the United Nations; the

593 See Resolution 777 (19 September 1992), which was adopted unanimously but with three abstentions (China, India, Zimbabwe); for the reaction by the FRY, see UN: S/24577 (19 ­September 1992). Previously, the Security Council had stated that the position supported by the FRY was not acceptable to all its members. see preamble to Resolution 757 (30 May 1992). 594 See Resolution 47/1 (22 September 1992), adopted by 127 votes to 6 (African countries and Yugoslavia) and 26 abstentions (notably, Brazil, Mexico, India). 595 UN: S/PV.3116 (19 September 1992), pp. 4–5. China expressed a similar view (ibid., pp. 14–15).  Chapter V   297

name-plaque of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia removed from the General Assembly Hall and all its organs, and the seating organization of that august body adjusted accordingly.”596 In response, the UN Legal Counsel stressed that Resolution 47/1 related to an issue which was not foreseen by the provisions of the Charter on belonging to the organization, namely, the consequences of the disintegration of a Member State in the event of a disagreement on this subject between the immediate successors to the State in question or between other Member States: hence the absence, in the Resolution, of any reference to Article 5 or Article 6 of the Charter on the respective procedures on suspension and expulsion of a Member State. The Legal Counsel stated that the only practical consequence of Resolution 47/1 was that the representatives of the FRY could no longer participate in the work of the ­General Assembly. Further maintaining that the Resolution “neither terminates nor suspends Yugoslavia’s membership in the Organization”, the Legal Counsel confirmed the Russian interpretation and consequently justified that the flag and official sign of the former Yugoslavia would be maintained. The only new element put forward was to specify that non-participation in the work of the General ­Assembly included its subsidiary organs, and conferences and meetings convened by it.597 This specification was immediately contested by the FRY, which considered that its exclusion should remain limited to the plenary sessions and the work of the seven main Committees of the General Assembly.598 Nevertheless, taking advantage of this opening, the West succeeded, in April 1993, in convincing the ­Security Council to recommend to the General Assembly to decide to extend the FRY’s non-participation to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in other words, to a large number of economic, social and humanitarian bodies,599 a recommendation which the General Assembly immediately followed.600 Since then, the FRY has continued to actively demonstrate its presence at the UN, but has no power to participate in the organization’s work,601 creating a situation which is less clear than that obtaining at the CSCE, where the

596 A/47/474 (27 September 1992). See A/47/478-S/24599 (29 September 1992), for the reaction of the FRY. 597 A/47/485 (30 September 1992). 598 A/47/523 (12 October 1992) and A/0.1/47/6 (16 October 1992). See also for Croatia UN: S/1994/198 (19 February 1994), for FRY UN: S/1994/398 (5 April 1994) (FRY) and for Slovenia A/50/364-S/1995/726 (22 August 1995). 599 See Resolution 821, adopted unanimously on 28 April 1993 by the Security Council, with abstentions from Russia and China. 600 See Resolution 47/229, adopted on 29 April 1993 by the General Assembly with 107 votes and 11 abstentions (including Russia and China). 601 The Yugoslav Permanent Mission to the UN is actively engaged in frequent communications to express Belgrade’s official position on various subjects, see for example: A/C.5/48/31 (23 November 1993), A/49/311 (15 August 1994), A/49/428 (23 September 1994), A/C.3/49/10 (24 October 1994) and A/50/385 (29 August 1995). 298   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

express suspension of its membership enabled it to be excluded.602 Furthermore, it should be noted that the Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) specified that the economic sanctions imposed upon the FRY should be lifted, but not that its status within the UN or the OSCE should be restored.

2. The CSCE’s Strategy Prior to the Dayton Agreement (1992–1995) Faced with the spread of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CSCE reacted by deploying, from August 1992, a strategy consisting of organizing human dimension rapporteur missions, charged with evaluating the behaviour of the belligerents on the ground, establishing preventive diplomacy Missions in the FRY and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, establishing a mechanism for monitoring compliance with UN sanctions in the countries neighbouring the FRY, and creating a Mission to Sarajevo.603 The implementation of these measures required collaboration (which was more or less close depending on the case) with the European Union, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe (including the High Commissioner for Refugees) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).604

A. Human Dimension Rapporteur Missions In the second half of 1992, the CSCE sent three successive “Rapporteur Missions” – the Thomson Mission, the Corell/Türk/Thune Mission, and the Blackwell ­Mission.605 a) Thomson Mission In August 1992, the CSO established a Rapporteur Mission responsible, in co-­ ordination with the ICRC and the UN Human Rights Commission, for conducting an inspection within the shortest possible time of the alleged places of detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.606 Led by the British Ambassador Sir John Thomson, it took

602 The OSCE reaffirmed the continued suspension of the FRY, see 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1, “Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, § 7; 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3, “Decisions on former Yugoslavia, § 9; 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 13 December 1992, decision 5 (a); 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, p. 10; and 23rd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 21 September 1993, p. 4. In 1993, the FRY made the renewal of the mandate of the long- term Missions operating in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina conditional on its reintegration into the OSCE, but the OSCE was not swayed by such blackmail. 603 This strategy took shape between August and November 1992. See 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, Annex 1 (containing four decisions); 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1 (five decisions); and 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3 (eight decisions). 604 See 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1, “Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, § 9. 605 It should be noted that the OSCE now uses the word “Rapporteur” in the plural and no longer in the singular. 606 See 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, Annex 1, “Decision on Human Rights Situation”, second-to-last paragraph.  Chapter V   299

place from 19 August to 4 September 1992 with the support of diplomats from Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States. On the basis of information published by the ICRC, or provided by Bosnians both Muslim and Serb, it visited nineteen alleged places of detention. The Mission’s report was damning. It started by stating that, in a region that had formerly been an oasis of ethnic cohabitation, the members of the Mission had been witness to the “laceration of the concept of a common European civilization”.607 Confirming the hideous reality of “ethnic cleansing”, it recognized that “this is not an impersonal war: it is a civil war between communities for territorial expansion and ethnic supremacy.”608 It specified that “despite the existence of warlords, the bulk of the evidence points to the responsibility of acknowledged leaders. The Mission believes that, in general, leaders exercise effective control over their military and civilian structures. Contrary to what is usually accepted, the so-called uncontrolled elements are marginal. They exist but their importance has been exaggerated by various leaders who find them a convenient explanation for numerous barbarities.”609 Touching upon the concrete subject of the Mission, the report stated that “it is impossible to escape the conclusion that most prisoners are innocent people who have been seized as hostages to promote ethnic cleansing” and that “the largest number of these [civilians] appear to be in Serb places of detention.”610 In conclusion, the members of the Mission made two series of recommendations. Firstly, as a priority, they recommended the evacuation of the detention centre in Trnopolje (near Prijedor) and the creation of a quadripartite Commission (one Muslim, one Serb, one Croat and a representative of the CSCE) responsible for supervising the unilateral release of all prisoners and helping them register their complaints with the ICRC. Secondly, they implored the CSCE to directly condemn the ethnic cleansing and to make a statement in favour of maintaining the mission and extending its activity to Serbia.611 The CSO did not approve the first series of these recommendations and only made part of the report immediately public (the descriptive sections). It restricted itself to a verbal reaction expressing its “abhorrence” of the ethnic cleansing practices, declaring null and void “the enforced sale or donation of property which has occurred in areas of conflict” and reaffirming their “rejection of forced changes in borders or the ethnic composition” carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina and other parts of former Yugoslavia.612

607 See CSCE Communications No. 269 (25 April 1993), p. 4. 608 Ibid., p. 4. 609 Ibid., p. 9. 610 Ibid., pp. 8 and 10. 611 Ibid., pp. 15–18. 612 See 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1, first and second dashes of § 8 of the “Decision on Humanitarian Questions”. On the issue of ethnic cleansing, see Mirko Grmek, Marc Gjidara and Neven Simac, Le nettoyage ethnique. Documents historiques sur une idéologie serbe (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 340 and Norman L. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia − The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing” (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), pp. xiv — 247. 300   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

b) The Corell/ Türk/Thune Mission In parallel with the Thomson Mission, in August 1992 the United Kingdom (supported by almost all of the European Union and the United States) launched the Moscow Mechanism procedure regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia – in this case paragraph 12 concerning the case of particularly serious threats of violations of the CSCE’s human dimension commitments. Bosnia- Herzegovina being inaccessible because of the war, the Mission – consisting of Ambassador Hans Corell (nominated by the authors of the request), Ambassador Helmut Türk (nominated by the two governments directly concerned) and Gro Hillestad Thune (nominated by the two main Rapporteurs) – limited its investigation to Croatia, from 30 September to 5 October 1992. Its mandate was, in principle, to investigate information on atrocities against the unarmed populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and to make recommendations on the imputability of such acts.613 The Mission confirmed the reality of the acts in question and the continuation of ethnic cleansing. While recognizing that the parties to the conflict were committing serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, it stressed that “on the Serbian side, such violations of generally accepted international norms seem to form part of an officially tolerated or even supported systematic policy.”614 One of the main recommendations of the report stressed the need to urgently convene a committee of experts responsible for preparing a draft treaty on the creation of a special international tribunal to rule on certain war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.615 At a later stage, the Tribunal was established by the UN, at The Hague, and began its work on 17 November 1993.616

613 The mandate also considers the possibility of inspecting zones threatened by ethnic cleansing and of investigating the allegedly arbitrary arrests of Serbs in Croatia: see CSCE Communications No. 342, p. 7 (3 November 1992). 614 Ibid., p. 1. For the Croatian Government’s comments on the Mission’s report, see CSCE Communication No. 349 (5 November 1992). 615 See 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3,“CSO Decision on Personal Accountability for Crimes Committed in Former Yugoslavia”; 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 13 December 1992, decision 6 (a); 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, decisions 5 and 6; CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 4 of 18 February 1993, decision 4(b); and 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 26 April 1993, p. 2, and No. 2 of 27 April 1993, decision 5 (a). 616 The principle of an international tribunal was laid down in Resolution 808 adopted on 22 February 1993 by the Security Council. The Tribunal’s statutes, which were formulated by the Secretary-General on the basis of a French draft, see UN: S/25266 (10 February 1993), an Italian draft: S/25300 (17 February 1993) and a draft submitted by the three OSCE Rapporteurs: S/25307 (18 February 1993), were adopted with Resolution 827 on 25 April 1993. For further details, see Alain Pellet, “Le Tribunal criminel international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie. Poudre aux yeux ou avancée décisive?”, Revue générale de droit international public, 1994/1, pp. 7–59, and Karine ­Lescure, Le Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (Paris: Montchrétien, 1994), p. 203 p.  Chapter V   301

c) The Blackwell Mission In November 1992, the CSO charged Ambassador Thomson with appointing some members of his Mission to investigate allegations from the Government in Sarajevo relating to the detention of Muslim prisoners in Serbia in places which had not been inspected by the Mission.617 This task fell to the US Ambassador J. Kenneth Blackwell, a Swedish diplomat, and a representative of the European Union. Conducted in a hostile environment between 13 and 18 January 1993, the investigation was short-lived. The Mission concluded that “the Rapporteurs have not been able to verify the existence of any places in the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. However, they have not been able to visit all the sites indicated on the list, nor have they been able to conduct a sufficiently thorough investigation in some of the locations. Consequently, the Rapporteurs are not in a position to exclude entirely the possibility that there are places of detention in the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.”618 Despite the CSO’s wishes, the Blackwell Mission was not renewed.619 The Blackwell Mission marked the end of a certain kind of intervention on the human dimension. Indeed, after one final initiative which was not followed up, the CSCE sent no further ad hoc Rapporteur Missions.620 Given the regular activities carried out by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission for the former Yugoslavia (Tadeusz Mazowiecki), which boasted greater expertise and resources, this decision was sensible.621

617 See 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3 “Thomson Mission”. 618 CSCE Communication No. 39 (2 February 1993). 619 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, decision 5; and 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 26 April 1993, p. 2. 620 On 30 June 1993, the CSO decided to send to the FRY a Rapporteurs Mission whose duty would be “to investigate fully reports of human rights violations in Serbia-Montenegro, in particular the beating and imprisonment of Vuk and Danica Drašković and the reported banning of the Serbian Renewal Movement” The experts were appointed, but the Mission could not be carried out because of the refusal by the authorities in Belgrade. See 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 1 July 1993, Annex 3, section 2. 621 On the basis of Resolution 1992/S-1/1, adopted on 14 August 1992 following the first special session of the Commission on Human Rights, Tadeusz Mazowiecki submitted four successive reports on the human rights situation in Yugoslavia: E/CN.4/1992/S-I/9 (28 August 1992), E/CN.4/1992/S-I/10 (27 October 1992), A/47/666-S/24809 (17 November 1992) and E/CN.4/1993/50 (10 February 1993). Subsequently, and until he resigned (July 1995), he submitted (in accordance with Resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993) “periodic reports”: E/CN.4/1994/3 (5 May 1993), E/CN.4/1994/4 (19 May 1993), E/CN.4/1994/6 (26 August 1993), E.CN.4/1994/8 (6 September 1993), E/CN.4/1994/47 (17 November 1993), E/CN.4/1994/110 (21 February 1994), E/CN.4/1995/4 (10 June 1994), E/CN.4/1995/10 (4 ­ August 1994), A/49/641-S/1994/1252 (4 November 1994), E/CN.4/1995/54 (13 December 1993), E/CN.4/1995/57 (9 January 1995), E/CN.4/1996/3 (21 April 1995), E/CN.4/1996/6 (5 July 1995) and E/CN.4/1996/18 (22 August 1995). See also K.E. Kenny, “Formal and Informal Innovations in the United Nations Protection of Human Rights: The Special Rapporteur on the Former ­Yugoslavia”, Austrian Journal of International Law, vol. 48, 1995, pp. 19–77. Elisabeth Rehn (­Finland) has since taken up the torch. 302   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

B. Preventive Diplomacy in Serbia (Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina) In June 1992, while it was seriously envisaging the suspension of the FRY, the CSO took the decision in principle to send an “exploratory mission” to the Serbian provinces of Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina within two weeks. It was to be “exploratory” in the sense that its mandate would examine the contribution that the CSCE could make (through missions of short or long duration) to supporting the work of the Conference on Yugoslavia.622 Arguing that the decision did not mention the authorities in Belgrade, but only the local authorities of the targeted regions, the delegation of the FRY expressed its opposition to the sending of the exploratory mission.623 Not without difficulties, the FRY finally gave its consent – after having received an official request addressed to Belgrade and after having had it specified that the mandate of the exploratory mission would be strictly limited to human rights.624 Led by the Swedish Ambassador Jan af Sillén, the exploratory mission took place from 2 to 8 August 1992. Reporting that the situation in the regions visited was “serious” and, in some cases, “alarming”, it made a series of recommendations, the most significant of which was to recommend the establishment of Missions of Long Duration in the FRY.625 The CSO immediately decided to “establish, in co-­w operation with the relevant authorities, a continuous presence in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, in the form of Missions of Long Duration.”626 It subsequently specified that the missions would co-operate with the Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the ICFY’s Working Group on Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities, would co-ordinate their activities

622 See 12th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 10 June 1992, Annex “Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, § 7 (b). We should note that, shortly before, a Fact Finding Mission, organized by the Conflict Prevention Centre and led by Canadian Ambassador David Peel, had visited the military garrisons and training areas in Kosovo and its border crossings with Albania (28 May–2 June 1992); it found that the level of military activity in Kosovo was not out of the ordinary, but that the prevailing political situation in the territory was potentially explosive. For more details, see Report of the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center Fact-Finding Mission to Kosovo, see CSCE Communications No. 194 (8 June 1992). See also CPC’s Consultative Committee: Journal No. 24 of 15 May 1992, Annex, and Journal No. 25 of 20 May 1992, Annex; CSCE Communication No. 177 (18 May 1992); and 11th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 20 May 1992, pp. 2–3. 623 See 12th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 10 June 1992, p. 2. For its part, Russia specified that it was understood that the missions planned by the OSCE would be sent to “regions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (idem). 624 See CSCE Communications No. 198 (20 June 1992), No. 201 (23 June 1992), No. 202 (23 June 1992), No. 205 (25 June 1992), No. 207 (26 June 1992) and No. 216 (17 July 1992). For Albania’s reaction, see CSCE Communication No. 200 (23 June 1992). See also 13th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 7 of 7 July 1992, Annex, “Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials”, §§ 5, 7 and 8. 625 For the text of the report: CSCE Communication No. 236 (13 August 1992). The other recommendations included sending a CPC mission to Sandjak and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (once nominated) to the former Yugoslavia. 626 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, Annex 1, “Decision on Missions of Long Duration”.  Chapter V   303

with the European Union’s Monitor Mission (which seconded five of its officials to the CSCE missions), and would receive financial support from Japan.627 The decision to establish Missions of Long Duration was dictated by the concern expressed by President Bush to prevent the tensions in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandjak (as well as Macedonia) from degenerating into armed conflict. The following sections will examine the information on the situation from each of the three regions in question, before looking at the role of the CSCE’s Missions of Long Duration. a) The issues raised by Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina While Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina raised different issues, they shared common ground in the repressive policy which was systematically exercised by the Serbs. i) Kosovo The least developed region of the former SFRY, Kosovo had around two million inhabitants, of which 90 per cent were Albanians and fewer than 10 per cent were Serbs. The two peoples claimed the same territory on the basis of different ancestral claims deriving from rival forms of national symbolism. The Albanians were proud to declare themselves indigenous on the basis of being descended from the Illyrians who occupied the west of the Balkan peninsula well before the Slavic tribes (which only appeared from the seventh century). As for the Serbs, they considered Kosovo as the historical cradle of their nation and regarded the region as symbolic on two counts. Firstly, it was the sacred setting for the battle of Kosovo Polje (Kosovo Field) where, on 23 June 1389, medieval Serbia was defeated by the Turks and the Serbian people lost their independence for a period of five centuries.628 Although 23 June represented a military defeat, the date was honoured as marking the awakening of the ­Serbian nation’s awareness of its own greatness. Secondly, the region included the plain of Metohija (a Serbian word of Greek origin meaning “monastic estates”) and thus also featured the town of Peć, which from 1346 to 1766 was the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Following the First Balkan War of 1912–1913, Serbia regained Kosovo. Aware that it had become dominated by Albanians, it immediately attempted

627 See 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1, “Decision on Missions of Long Duration”, final paragraph; and 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3, “Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina and Monitor Mission to Skopje”, §§ 2−3 and Annex 4, “Modalities and financial implications for the Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina”. As a participant in the London session of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which preceded the one in Geneva, Japan provided a member for long-term missions. He was also allowed to attend the meetings of the ad hoc informal Group set up after the expulsion of long-term missions in order to monitor the development of the situation in the three regions concerned, see CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 26 of 26 August 1993, decision 4 (a). 628 The Albanians reject this myth by pointing out that the battle of 1389 was between the Turks and a coalition of seven Balkan chiefs, including two who were Albanian. 304   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

to forcibly assimilate them.629 The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (10 ­September 1919) awarded Kosovo to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which pursued the same anti-Albanian policy. When Tito was building up communist Yugoslavia, he preferred to avoid extreme solutions consisting either of reintegrating the region with Serbia (thus strengthening its weight within the SFRY), or giving it the status of a federal Republic (with, as a result, at least a theoretical right to secession). He preferred to make “Kosovo-Metohija” (Kosmet) an “autonomous region” of the SFRY within Serbia, authorized to be represented as such within the federal parliament and to exercise direct powers in administrative, budgetary, economic, social and educational matters. In 1969, the autonomous “region” of Kosmet was promoted to the rank of an autonomous “province”. As such, it received the right to enact laws, resolve conflicts of competence with Serbia on the federal level and even to have a national flag; moreover, it took on the simple name of “Kosovo”. In 1974, the new Yugoslav Constitution further extended Kosovo’s autonomy, granting it practically all the prerogatives of a federal republic, with the exception of the right to secession.630 This form of autonomy was displeasing to both the Serbs and the Albanians. The former experienced it as discriminatory, the latter as insufficient. Indeed, although culturally favoured by the Tito regime (particularly from the 1970s with the creation of an Albanian university in Pristina), the Albanians believed they had the right to form a federal republic on the same level as Montenegro and Macedonia, which were comparable to Kosovo in terms of surface area and population. Until Tito’s death (1980), Kosovo developed under a situation of more or less diffuse tension, marked by Albanian claims, Serbian resentment, and a continual Serb exodus motivated by economic and security factors.631 In 1981, riots broke out in Kosovo, exacerbating Serbian nationalism, the essence of which was to be expressed in the famous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts of September 1986. In impassioned and heavily loaded terms, the text affirmed that in Kosovo “a very special, but nevertheless open and total war, prepared by administrative, political, and legal changes made at various periods, was declared against the Serbian people,” which had fallen victim, in its own historical cradle, to a policy of “expulsion” and political, legal and cultural “genocide”. “Unless things change radically, in less than ten years’ time there will no longer be any Serbs left in Kosovo, and an ‘ethnically pure’ Kosovo, that unambiguously stated goal of the

629 Following the Ottoman Empire’s victory in the 14th century, the Serbs left Kosovo in large numbers, while Albanians from neighbouring regions and Turkish settlers moved in. 630 For further details, see the Cucó Report on “Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo” PACE Doc. 7444 (22 December 1995), §§ 11–15. 631 “Without excluding human rights abuses, harassment and insecurity as causes for the Serb and Montenegrin emigration, dispassionate observers cite mainly economic reasons and point to a steady net outflow from the province, not only of Serbs and Montenegrins, going back to 1961. In any event, there appears to be little evidence to sustain the charge of a systematic Albanian campaign to compel the Serbs to leave”, see the Cucó Report, (n. 630), § 17.  Chapter V   305

Greater-Albanian racists … will be achieved.”632 From 1987, Slobodan Milošević came to power, adopting as his own the conclusion of the Memorandum, according to which the fate of Kosovo was “a vital question for the entire Serbian people”. In 1989 he suppressed Kosovo’s autonomy, an event which the Serbian Parliament welcomed as the recovery of national and constitutional sovereignty.633 Subsequently, the Serbian Constitution of 28 September 1990 demoted the province to the rank of a simple district (okrug) and gave it back the name “Kosovo-Metohija”.634 The Albanians initially reacted on 2 July 1990 by declaring Kosovo to be a federal republic of the SFRY. Interpreting this as an act of secession with regard to itself, Serbia immediately abolished the provincial bodies, placed Kosovo under direct administration (including the police services) and applied a policy of repression aimed at stamping out any leanings toward resistance or protest. The Albanians took refuge in a campaign of collective civil disobedience consisting of refusing to participate in the 1991 census, the local and federal elections, and the institutions established by the Serbian authorities. However, although this resistance was passive and peaceful, it did not reflect resignation. In 1991, the Albanians secretly organized a referendum (with entirely favourable results) on the independence of Kosovo. The following year, legislative and presidential elections carried out under the same conditions enabled them to elect a parliament, a government and a president of the Republic (Ibrahim Rugova) as well as to establish their own structures relating to matters such as education, social protection and the media. The leaders of the Albanian community saw no sense in Albanians forming part of a federation reduced to Serbia and Montenegro through the departure of four Slavic peoples and considered that the policy of terror against the Albanians invalidated the argument of the intangibility of borders. They also pointed out the fundamental contradiction in the Serbian position, namely, that it demanded the right of self-determination for the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina while denying it to Albanians. However, they did not demand Kosovo’s reincorporation into Albania but, rather, the creation of a demilitarized and neutral State that would act as a buffer between Tirana and Belgrade.635 For their part, the Serbs denied the accusations of repression. They claimed that the Albanians were being prevented from exercising their civil rights through the influence of separatist leaders, who for their part were being

632 “Académie serbe des sciences et des arts : ‘Memorandum’ (1986)”, Dialogue, vol. 1, no. 2–3 (supplement), September 1992, pp. 20–22. It is striking that the arguments that Belgrade supported in 1995 were identical to those in the Memorandum: see the Cucó Report (n. 630), §§ 84, 94 and 107. 633 On 23 March 1989, under pressure from the police and the Serbian Army, who surrounded its buildings, the Kosovo Parliament abolished the province’s autonomous status. 634 The territory’s Albanian name is “Kosova”. For an analysis of the Kosovo crisis from 1981 to the collapse of the SFRY, see Michel Roux, (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1992), pp. 365–458. 635 See the Cucó Report (n. 630), §§ 119 and 164. 306   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

encouraged by an Albania aiming at the creation of a “Greater Albania” to the detriment of the FRY – not to mention the unacceptability of abandoning the Serbian historical, cultural and religious heritage to the mercy of “fundamentalist Muslims”.636 In sum, from 1989 onwards the situation in Kosovo was highly explosive. Excluded from official functions, the Albanians were sidelined from public life and had no dialogue with the Serb authorities. Above all, they were subjected to a policy of repression and terror aiming to bring them to heel or even going as far as inciting them to leave the territory.637 All the conditions for a major ethnic conflict (to which Albania could not remain indifferent) thus came ­together in the run-up to the establishment of the CSCE Missions of Long ­Duration. ii) Sandjak Following the Turkish conquest of the Balkans, the region that was the centre of the Kingdom of Serbia, Raška, became, within the Ottoman Empire, the Sandjak (a Turkish word meaning “administrative division”) of Novi Pazar. In 1878, it came under the administration of Austria-Hungary, which returned it to the Ottomans in 1908 in exchange for recognition of the annexation of Bosnia-­ Herzegovina. In 1912 and 1913, during the First Balkan War, Serbia and Montenegro occupied and partitioned the territory of Sandjak, which regained its former name of “Raška”. In Tito’s Yugoslavia, Sandjak had no autonomous status. An integral part of the republic of Serbia, it was – like Kosovo – an island of poverty with a Muslim majority (52 per cent, i.e., 200,000 people). Following Slovenia and Croatia’s declarations of independence, the Muslims in Sandjak organized a clandestine referendum in which more than 98 per cent voted in favour of their region ­being granted territorial and political autonomy (October 1991). In 1992, further clandestine elections led to the establishment of a parliament and parallel power structures.

636 See the Cucó Report (n. 630), §§ 97, 104 and 119. We should note that the issue of Kosovo is the subject of bitter polemic between Albania and the FRY at the United Nations. Tirana consistently denounces the Serbs’ repressive politics and suggests a preventive deployment of UN troops on the border between the two countries: see UN: S/23994 (22 May 1992), S/24420 (12 ­August 1992), S/24729 (29 October 1992), S/24965 (14 December 1992), S/25672 (27 April 1993), S/25866 (29 May 1993), S/25972 (18 June 1993), S/26277 (9 August 1993), S/26278 (9 August 1993), A/49/88 (7 March 1994), S/1994/268 (7 March 1994), A/49/153 (9 May 1994) and S/1995/700 (15 ­August 1995). For the Serbian responses, see S/24807 (13 November 1992), S/25711 (3 May 1993), S/25934 (11 June 1993), S/26253 (6 August 1993), A/C.3/48/3 (27 October 1993), A/48/603 (17 November 1993), S/26879 (15 December 1993), S/1994/46 (17 January 1994), S/1994/510 (27 April 1994), A/49/168 (31 May 1994), S/1994/1029 (5 September 1994), A/C.3/49/18 (15 November 1994), A/50/96 (20 March 1995), A/50/97 (27 March 1995), A/50/183 (15 May 1995), A/50/530 (9 October 1995), A/50/570 (19 October 1995) and A/50/854 (22 December 1995); see also CSCE Communications No. 226 (31 August 1993) and No. 303 (23 November 1993). 637 See the Cucó Report (n. 630), §§ 49 and 55.  Chapter V   307

In the run-up to the establishment of the CSCE’s Missions of Long Duration, the situation in Sandjak was, broadly, comparable to that of Kosovo. It was marked by a lack of political dialogue between the Muslim community and the governing authorities, both of whom were entrenched behind intransigent positions: while the Muslims demanded the demilitarization of Sandjak and its transformation into a federated entity within the SFRY, Serbia refused any discussions on the subject. Nor was Belgrade inclined to make any compromises on the issue, for fear of opening the door to separatism. Geographically, after all, ­Sandjak was the glue that bonded Serbia to its friendly neighbour, Montenegro, thereby giving it easier access to the Adriatic, in addition, from a strategic point of view, the territory bordered on Kosovo and Albania to the south and on Bosnia-­Herzegovina to the north. And last but by no means least, the Orthodox monasteries and the ruins of Ras (the former capital of the medieval principality of Raška) made Novi Pazar an outstandingly important site in the history of the Serbian nation.638 iii) Vojvodina A region which had belonged to Hungary since 896, Vojvodina only began to be populated with Serbs from the eighteenth century, at the instigation of the Habsburgs. In 1920, the Treaty of Trianon assigned it to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Tito subsequently integrated it into Serbia. Driven by the need to weaken Serbia’s power within the SFRY to take account of a ­Hungarian minority representing 19 per cent of the population, Tito granted Vojvodina an autonomous status comparable to that of Kosovo. The growing rights of the region were considered by the Serbs as being all the more unjustified given that Vojvodina held an important place in their national history. According to Paul Garde, “it ... was in Vojvodina that the Serbian bourgeoisie was first created and in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century it was there (or at times in Vienna or Budapest) that the most Serbian books were published. It was in Novi Sad that the Matika srpska was created, a Serbian society which played the role of an academy for the entire Serbian people. The Serbs of Vojvodina were, alongside the other southern Slavs of Austria (Slovenes and Croats), the initiators of the ‘Yugoslav movement’ of the nineteenth century”.639 In 1989, the Milosevic regime abolished the autonomous status of Vojvodina in the same way as it did that of Kosovo. On the face of it, Vojvodina seemed to present a different scenario from Kosovo. Firstly, it was an economically developed agricultural region (richer even than Serbia in the strict sense of the term), whose two million inhabitants were

638 For further details, see Milan Andrejevich, “The Sandjak: The Next Balkan War?” RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 47, 27 November 1992, pp. 26–34. 639 See Paul Garde, Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie (n. 541), p. 201. 308   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

largely Serbs (54 per cent).640 Secondly, in contrast to the Kosovars and Muslims of Sandjak, the Hungarians of Vojvodina were willing to enter into discussions with the Serbian authorities. While not as tense as Kosovo, the situation in the region was nonetheless serious. For example, in Vojvodina, Belgrade practised a policy of conscription which consisted of recruiting Hungarians in a bigger proportion than other ethnic groups and of settling Serbian refugees in the territory, with the obvious aim of strengthening its ethnic majority. b) The CSCE Missions of Long Duration Officially based in Belgrade, the Missions of Long Duration operated from offices established in Priština, Peć and Prizren (Kosovo), Novi Pazar and Prijepolje (­ Sandjak), and Subotica (Vojvodina), on the basis of a memorandum of understanding with the FRY which was valid for six months and extended (once) by an additional protocol until 28 June 1993.641 Their initial quota of staff was fixed at 12 and then increased to 20; later, authorization was given for 40.642 The total cost of the operations rose to 22 million Austrian schillings.643 By virtue of their preventive diplomacy mandate, the missions exercised two fundamental roles, which their Head, Ambassador Tore Bøgh, summarized with the expression “reporting and mediation”. In accordance with their information remit, the missions had to collate information on human rights violations (for the CSCE) and to provide information on the legislation applicable to human rights, the protection of minorities, freedom of the media, and democratic elections. More crucially, their good offices/mediation remit obliged the missions to encourage dialogue between the authorities and the population of the three regions and to establish “contact points” for resolving existing practical problems. In reality, the two roles were closely related. As Ambassador Bøgh put it: “The biweekly reports, apart from supplying information on ethnic-related occurrences in the three ­areas, contained assessments of the various allegations – and countercharges – and thus, one must assume, had a stabilizing effect in the regions. We knew that the reports somehow reached both the authorities and the ethnic communities shortly after they had been circulated to CSCE governments. Although in principle ­intended as Mission briefing of the parent organization, the reports acquired a much

640 According to the Yugoslav census of 1981, Vojvodina had 2,034,000 inhabitants, including 1,107,000 Serbians (54.4%), 385,000 Hungarians (18.9%) and a number of Croats, Slovaks, ­Romanians, Roma, etc. See Garde (n. 541), p. 116 (Table VII, 2). 641 See CSCE Communications No. 322 (3 November 1992) and No. 145 (6 May 1993). 642 See 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3, “Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina and Monitor Mission to Skopje”, § 4; Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 1, under the heading “Former Yugoslavia”, § 8; and CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 2 of 28 January 1993, decision 4. In fact, the number of staff deployed on the ground never exceeded 20 members. 643 See 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 4; 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 13 December 1992, decision 5 (k); 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, decision 5 (a); CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 8 of 25 March 1993, decision 4b; and CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 9 of 1 April 1993, Annex 3.  Chapter V   309

wider readership and thus became an instrument in the Missions’ attempt at easing tension.”644 Barely ten months after being established, in July 1993, the Missions of Long Duration abruptly stopped their operations due to the political blackmail being conducted by Belgrade – which made renewal of their mandates conditional upon the reintegration of the FRY within the CSCE.645 The CSCE refused to concede and compromise its own principles. Its only recourse was to inform the ­Security Council of the situation, on the basis of Article 54 of the United Nations Charter. In response, the Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon the FRY to revoke its decision,646 but Belgrade confirmed it, specifying that the FRY was willing to continue to co-operate with the CSCE only as an “equal partner”, i.e., if the CSCE was to retract its measure of suspension.647 It should be stressed that the CSCE’s missions were deployed after the suspension of the FRY and despite the reservations of Serbia, which considered the situation in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina as an internal matter. They were agreed to by the Government of the FRY, then under the leadership of Milan Panić, and not by Serbia. The Serbian political class roundly reproached the federal Prime Minister for having made a unilateral concession by authorizing the establishment of foreign diplomatic missions “in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina” and not “in the FRY”, a distinction likely to enable the CSCE to “encourage secessionism”.648 Clearly, the Missions’ continuation was dependent upon Milan Panić’s own political survival. The departure of the federal Prime Minister following his defeat in the elections gave a carte blanche to the Serbian nationalists who intended to put an end to the Missions’ mandates, unless the FRY was reintegrated into the CSCE.649

644 See CSCE Communications No. 256, p. 5, (21 September 1993) for “Some Comments on the Operation of the CSCE Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina” by Ambassador Tore Bøgh, Head of Mission. See also CSCE Communications No. 343 (4 November 1992), No. 409 (11 December 1992) and No. 434 (29 December 1992). 645 See CSCE Communications No. 184 (24 June 1992), No. 191 (30 June 1992), No. 195 (7 July 1993), No. 205 (20 July 1993), No. 206 (22 July 1993), No. 209 (27 July 1993), No. 211 (30 July 1993), No. 212 (4 August 1993), No. 213 (10 August 1993), No. 216 (13 August 1993), No. 234 (8 September 1993), No. 249 (20 September 1993) and No. 295 (15 November 1993). 646 See Resolution 855 (9 August 1993). For the correspondence between the OSCE and the UN, see CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 20 of 15 July 1993, item 4 (b); and UN: S/26121 (20 July 1993) and S/26148 (22 July 1993). The 14th and final Missions Report is dated 6 August 1993. 647 In this regard, regarding how the FRY justified itself to the UN, see S/26210 (1 August 1993), S/26279 (9 August 1993), A/48/356 (31 August 1993), A/49/38 (12 April 1994), S/1994/294 (14 March 1994) and A/49/769 (9 December 1994). 648 See “Some Comments on the Operation of the CSCE Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina by Ambassador Tore Bøgh Head of Mission”: CSCE Communication No. 256, (21 September 1993), p. 1. 649 The Kosovo Serbs demanded that Belgrade send the missions back in the following terms: “Foreign observers in our country are a factor of destabilisation. If ever the war erupts in this region, they will [be] the ones to blame. As long as these monitors will be present, it will mean 310   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

While the CSCE withdrew its Missions of Long Duration, it did not end their mandate, which it considered as remaining entirely valid. Instead, it created an informal, open-ended, ad hoc Group tasked specifically with monitoring, from Vienna, developments of the situation in the three regions. The Group, which sent weekly reports of its work to the Permanent Committee, examined reports of field visits carried out by countries in the Troika and by other participating States accredited in Belgrade.650 It also had factual information regularly compiled by the Conflict Prevention Centre (from mid-August 1992) from the media.651 Since the Missions of Long Duration were interrupted, the facts of the situation in the region have not fundamentally changed. Kosovo remains potentially explosive and human rights violations are commonplace in Vojvodina and Sandjak.652 The issue of the three Serbian provinces remains a constant concern for the OSCE.653

C. Preventive Diplomacy in Macedonia In August 1992, the CSO decided to follow the example of the European Union – at that time working on extending its Monitor Mission to countries neighbouring the FRY (Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria) – by studying, with the Macedonian authorities, the possibility of a CSCE mission which would be entrusted with the

we have been occupied by peaceful means by a certain protectorate” − information reported by Kosova Communication, Geneva, vol. 3, no. 114, 18 June 1993. 650 As soon as the Missions were withdrawn, the CSO directed the Chairman-in-Office to maintain, along with the two other members of the Troika, contact with the authorities in Belgrade, see 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 1 July 1993, Annex 3, “Missions of Long Duration”. For its part, the USSR suggested collective action by the embassies accredited to Belgrade, see CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 24 of 12 August 1993, Annex. For reports of the visits made by the Troika, see CSCE Communications No. 255 (21 September 1993) and No. 259 (23 September 1993); DOC.86 (1994), DOC.93 (21 April 1994), DOC.112 (26 April 1994), DOC.266 (25 May 1994), DOC.326 (8 June 1994), DOC.494 (12 July 1994) and DOC.663 (7 September 1994). The Troika reports are usually transmitted to the UN Security Council, see 23rd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 23 September 1993, Annex 2 (“Decision on Former Yugoslavia: Missions of Long Duration”), § 6. See also REF.PC/253/96 (17 April 1996) and PC/488/96 (16 July 1996). 651 The CPC prepared two compilation sets: ‘the Survey of Events in the Areas of the Missions of Long Duration’ (as an example of ongoing series: REF.SEC/99/95 of 12 June 1995) and the ‘Survey of Events in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’. 652 For a table showing the developments in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina since 1992, see the reports drafted by the Special Rapporteur of the UN’s Commission on Human Rights (Tadeusz Mazowiecki): A/47/666-S/24809 (17 November 1992), §§ 99−128; E/CN.4/1993/50 (10 February 1993), §§ 153−190; S/26765 (20 November 1993), §§ 188−215; A/49/641-S/1994/1252 (4 November 1994), §§ 182−196; and E/CN.4/1995/57 (16 January 1995), §§ 84−87. Regarding the situation in Kosovo, see the Cucó Report (n. 630), §§ 65, 73, 108, 114 and 119. For more on the situation in Sandjak, see also S/1994/248 (3 March 1994) (concerns raised by the Organization of the Islamic Conference) and S/1994/294, response from the FRY (14 March 1994). 653 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 14 of 29 March 1994, statement on Sandjak, p. 3, and Journal No. 17 of 28 April 1994, statement on Kosovo, p. 2. We should also note that the UN General Assembly harshly condemned the human rights situations in the region: see General Assembly Resolutions 48/153 (20 December 1993) and 49/196 (23 December 1994)  Chapter V   311

task of preventing the conflict from overflowing into Macedonia.654 An exploratory mission, led by the US Ambassador Robert H. Frowick, was launched to analyse the situation and took place from 10 to 14 September. It reported that there was a serious risk of the Yugoslav conflict extending into Macedonia “through either a domino effect from Kosovo or from momentum within the republic … [since] tensions are high between the republic’s ethnic Albanians and its Slavic ­Macedonian majority” and that “the republic’s small, weak economy is on the brink of collapse.” It consequently recommended the establishment of a Mission of Long Duration which would operate essentially on the borders with Serbia and Kosovo, in the places where the Serbian and Albanian minorities were concentrated, namely, Kumanovo and Tetovo respectively.655 The CSO immediately launched the Mission. This section will analyse information about the new issue of Macedonia, before assessing the role of the Mission established by the CSCE in Skopje. a) Facts about the new Macedonian question656 Once the prestigious kingdom of Alexander the Great, Macedonia was a bone of contention between Bulgarians and Serbians in the first centuries of the Christian era. It was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1380 and remained under its yoke for several centuries before being liberated by Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece during the First Balkan War of 1912–1913. Macedonia’s fate triggered a Bulgarian-­ Serbian dispute which led to the Second Balkan War, and ended with Bul­garia’s defeat. The final partition was carried out to the advantage of Greece and Serbia, which took over Aegean Macedonia and Vardar Macedonia respectively – i.e., 51 per cent and 39 per cent of the territory. Bulgaria had to content itself with the paltry portion represented by Pirin Macedonia (10 per cent).657 Although Macedonia was incorporated without any special status into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, it nonetheless became one of the six

654 See 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, Annex 1, “Decision on the Presence of Observers in Countries Bordering on Serbia and Montenegro”. 655 See CSCE Communication No. 282, pp. 18–20, (16 September 1992). 656 See Symeon A. Giannakos, “The Macedonian Question Reexamined: Implications for Balkan Security”, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 26–47; Hugh Poulton, “The Republic of Macedonia after UN Recognition”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 23, 4 June 1993, pp. 22–30; James Gow and James Pettifer, “Macedonia — Handle with Care”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1993, pp. 387–388; Christophe Chiclet, “Balkans : le retour de la question macédonienne”, Universalia, 1993, pp. 188–191; James Pettifer, “The New Macedonian Question”, International Affairs, vol. 68, no. 3, July 1992, pp. 475–485 and “Macedonia : Still the Apple of Discord”, The World Today, vol. 51, no. 3, March 1995, pp. 55–58; Stefan Troebst, “Macedonia : Powder Keg Defused ?”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 4, 28 January 1994, pp. 22–30; Guy Desobre, “La question macédonienne et la poudrière balkanique”, Transitions (Brussels), vol. XXXV, 1994/2, pp. 45–77; Duncan M. Perry, “Macedonia: A Balkan Problem and a European Dilemma”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 25, 19 June 1992, pp. 35–45; “The Republic of Macedonia and the Odds for Survival”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 46, 20 November 1992, pp. 12–19, and “Une crise en gestation ! La Macédoine et ses voisins”, Politique étrangère, vol. 59, Spring 1994, pp. 179–208. 657 See Desobre, “La question macédonienne …” (n. 656), p. 49. 312   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

constitutive republics of the SFRY. Tito encouraged the development of a national Macedonian identity, including the creation (based on local dialects) of a specific language as distinct as possible from Bulgarian. For the founder of communist Yugoslavia, this policy had the twofold advantage of weakening Bulgarian claims and at the same time limiting Serbia’s power within the SFRY. Like Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Macedonia had no interest in becoming independent, because the preservation of the Yugoslav federation was its best form of protection against both the Serbs and the Bulgarians. However, the withdrawal of Croatia and Slovenia (June 1991) left it with no counterweight against the Serbs and it resigned itself to proclaiming its independence, following a referendum organized on 8 September 1991. Having become independent, Macedonia found itself confronted with three major challenges. The first had to do with its economic survival. With a population of some two million and deprived of any access to the sea, Macedonia was (after Albania), the poorest country in Europe. This intrinsically unfavourable situation, which was an even heavier burden for a State transitioning to a market economy, was to worsen. Thus, the obligation to respect the UN sanctions ordered from May 1992 against the FRY, i.e., to stop trade with its natural trade partner, was to penalize Macedonia severely.658 Later, the unilateral embargo imposed by Greece from February 1994 brought it to the brink of economic strangulation.659 The second challenge concerned the country’s internal political stability. A third of Macedonia’s population was made up of ethnic minorities, most notably a tight-knit community of Albanians, who claimed to represent as much as 40 per cent of the population and complained of being treated as second-class citizens. Supported by Tirana, they demanded full equality with the Slavs, or even autonomous status. The Macedonian Government was therefore keen to avoid inter-­ethnic tensions from exploding and secessionist claims from developing. The third challenge was that of the recognition of the Macedonian identity by four neighbouring countries which were hostile to varying degrees: Serbia, Bulgaria, ­Albania and Greece. From Serbia’s perspective, Macedonia was no more than “South ­Serbia”, artificially built into a nation by Tito’s anti-Serb policy: hence Belgrade’s refusal of any international demarcation of the Serbian-Macedonian border.660 For Bulgaria, the Macedonians remained Bulgarians – which is why Sofia only recognized Macedonia as a State and not as a nation (January 1992). Without contesting the existence of an independent Macedonia, Albania did not hesitate

658 Macedonia was the country third most affected by the embargo against the FRY, as around 60% of its trade depended on the FRY. For further details, see the Lentz-Cornette Report on the application by Macedonia for membership to the Council of Europe PACE Doc.7371, (7 September 1995), Annex 3 and A/49/356 (9 September 1994), § 27. The CSCE and the Security Council often turned a blind eye to embargo contraventions by Macedonia. 659 See the Cucó Report on the Eastern Mediterranean (Assembly of the WEU, Document 1465, 24 May 1995), §§ 311–321 and the Lentz-Cornette Report (n. 658), Annex 3. 660 In 1992, the authorities in Belgrade even floated “a trial balloon of partitioning Macedonia and suggested that this possibility had been raised by the Greek Government”, Desobre, (n. 656), p. 68.  Chapter V   313

to intervene in the internal affairs of the country when it believed the interests of the Albanian minority were being threatened. As for Greece, it began a dispute with Macedonia (which was absurd in some respects) over three key points: the “undue appropriation” of the name of Macedonia, the “usurping” of the sixteen rays of the Vergina Sun (the emblem of an ancient Macedonian Greek dynasty discovered during archaeological excavations of the tomb of King Philip II), and the content of certain provisions of the Macedonian Constitution. According to Athens, by explicitly adopting the name of a geographic region which extended over several neighbouring countries (but of which only 38.5 per cent was within the former Republic of Yugoslavia), the authorities in Skopje had infringed the sovereignty of the neighbouring States in their respective Macedonian regions, thus threatening security and stability in the Balkans. Because the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (with the exception of a narrow band of land in the south) had never formed part of historical Macedonia, the authorities in Skopje could not claim to hold titular rights over that much larger geographical region: “There is no doubt that the exclusive use of the Macedonian name in the republic’s official denomination would be a stimulus for expansionist claims not only by present nationalist activists in Skopje but by future generations as well. After all, the name conveys in itself expansionist visions both over the land and the heritage of Macedonia through the centuries.”661 In support of this theory (which was unconvincing in itself and even more so given Macedonia’s insignificant military potential), Greece frequently invoked passages from the preamble, Article 3 and, above all, Article 49 of the Macedonian Constitution of 17 November 1991.662 The preamble makes explicit reference to the “struggle over centuries for national and social freedom” of the Macedonian people “as well as for the creation of their own State”. Athens interpreted this text as a call for the creation of a Greater Macedonia to the detriment of neighbouring peoples and of Greece in particular.663 Article 3 of the Constitution states, in fairly neutral terms, that the existing borders of the Republic of Macedonia are indivisible, inalienable and inviolable, while specifying that these “may be changed only in accordance with the Constitution”. Article 49, on the other hand, could at first sight be interpreted as open to criticism, insofar as it states that the Republic of Macedonia “cares for the status and rights of those persons belonging to the Macedonian people in neighbouring countries, as well as Macedonian

661 A/47/877-S/25158 (25 January 1993). See also the Lentz-Cornette Report (n. 658), Annex 6. For more on Macedonia’s point of view, see Kiro Gligorov, “The Name is Our Identity”, The European, 10–13 December 1992. The support that Tito’s Yugoslavia provided to the insurgent Greek communists during the 1946–1948 civil war also explained Athens’s attitude. 662 “The Greek position would be comical if it didn’t have dramatic consequences. It is easy to point to identical if not analogous precedents: Brittany (France) and Great Britain, the Grand Duchy and the Belgian province of Luxembourg, Limburg and Brabant in Belgium and the Netherlands, the French Flanders and the Belgian Flanders, Congo (Brazzaville) and Congo (Zaire), etc.”, Desobre, (n. 656), pp. 68–69. 663 See the Lentz-Cornette Report (n. 658), Annex 6. 314   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

expatriates, assists their cultural development and promotes links with them”; but in fact, this provision was apparently no more than a translation of Article 108 of the Greek Constitution of 1975.664 On 6 January 1992, the Macedonian Parliament reviewed the key provisions which had been contested. Article 3 was amended to state in no uncertain terms that the Republic of Macedonia “has no territorial pretensions towards neighbouring states” and that its borders “can only be changed in accordance with the Constitution and on the principle of free will, as well as with generally accepted international norms.” As for Article 49, it was supplemented by a provision stating that the Republic of Macedonia “will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states or in their internal affairs.” Made to satisfy the criteria for international recognition set by the countries of the European Union on 16 December 1991, these amendments enabled, notably, the Badinter Commission to issue a favourable opinion on the recognition of Macedonia.665 On account of opposition from Athens, however, Macedonia could only be admitted to the UN under the provisional name of the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (“fYRoM”) in April 1993, and did so without a flag or national emblem.666 Athens and Skopje immediately began negotiations, under the auspices of the UN, to resolve their bilateral disputes on the name of the Republic. In September 1995, in the context of an interim agreement, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia agreed to renounce the Vergina Sun (replaced by a sun with eight rays) – in exchange for which Greece decided, notably, to lift its trade embargo and no longer block the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s access to the CSCE.667 In October 1995, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia became a full member of the OSCE, after a long period of purgatory as a simple observer.668 b) The CSCE’s mission to Skopje In September 1992, the CSCE established a Mission “to Skopje” (and not “to Macedonia”, on account of the dispute raised by Greece over the name of the Republic), under the full name “CSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje”. Operational control of the mission was made the responsibility of the

664 See Desobre, “La question macédonienne … ” (n. 656), p. 66. 665 Opinion No. 6 of 11 January 1992. For the text of the amendments, see DOC.480 (16 March 1995) and the Lentz-Cornette Report (n. 658), Annex 2. 666 See Resolution 817 (7 April 1993) of the Security Council and Resolution 47/225 (8 April 1993) of the General Assembly. See also A/47/877-S/25158 (25 January 1993) and S/25543 (6 April 1993). On behalf of Macedonian Albanians, Albania expressed opposition to the possible name of “Slavo-­Macedonia” (S/25982 of 7 June 1993). 667 See UN: S/1995/794 (14 September 1995). For more on the negotiations (still ongoing at the time of this writing in 1996) between the two countries, see S/25855 (28 May 1993) (+ Add. 1 and 2, 3 June 1993), S/26483 (22 September 1993), S/1994/376 (1 April 1994), S/1994/632 (27 May 1994), S/1994/978 (17 August 1994), S/1994/1067 (17 September 1994). See also Security Council Resolutions 845 (18 June 1993) and 908 (31 March 1994). 668 See in the volume Chapter IV, 1.4 c. “Accession of the fYRoM”.  Chapter V   315

Chairman-in-Office, assisted by the two other members of the Troika.669 Established for an initial ­duration of six months, it was regularly renewed and at the time of writing has been extended to 31 December 1996.670 With a staff of eight (later increased to ten),671 the Mission operated on the basis of a memorandum of understanding with the Government in Skopje dated 7 November 1992. Its budget for 1996 stands at around six million Austrian schillings. The Mission worked in co-operation with Council of Europe, UNPROFOR (now known as UNPREDEP), and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.672 Shortly after the Mission was established, the UN also decided (upon request of the Government in Skopje) to launch a preventive diplomacy operation in the region. In December 1992, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to deploy an infantry battalion to Macedonia (supported by a group of around thirty military observers) and a small group of civil police officers from UNPROFOR. After Macedonia’s accession to the UN under the provisional name “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (April 1992), the Security Council supplemented this initial programme with a company of American soldiers.673 Given that this U ­ NPROFOR detachment had a mandate which was fairly comparable to that of the CSCE Mission, the Security Council immediately established the principle of “close co-ordination” of the preventive diplomacy activities of the two international organizations in Macedonia.674 Consequently,

669 See 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1 (“Presence of Observers in the Countries Bordering Serbia and Montenegro”). See also 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3 “Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina and Monitor Mission to Skopje”. In order to provide logistical support to the CSCE’s activities in the former Yugoslavia, the CSO created a Steering Group comprising the countries of the Troika and those providing personnel for the long-term missions. The Steering Group had to report regularly to the participating States the CSO had set up on 8 July 1992 to examine the issue of the FRY’s suspension and the OSCE’s actions in the former Yugoslavia. On 28 October 1992, the Steering Group drafted the “Modalities and financial implications for the CSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje”, see 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 5. 670 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 9 of 1 April 1993, decision 4 (b); CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 34 of 28 October 1993, decision 4(b); Permanent Committee: Journal No. 12 of 17 March 1994, decision 5(a), and Journal No. 34 of 22 September 1994, decision 5(b); PC Permanent Council: Decisions No. 52 of 22 June 1995, No. 96 of 14 December 1995 and No. 130 of 27 June 1996. 671 In December 1992, the Control Mission of the European Union made two of its members available to the CSCE’s Mission. 672 This co-operation concerned in particular the Working Group of the Conference devoted to Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities, headed at the time by German Ambassador Ahrens. See UN: S/1996/4 (2 January 1996), § 4. 673 See Security Council Resolutions 795 (11 December 1992) and 842 (18 June 1993). See also UN: S/24851 (25 November 1992), S/24923 (9 December 1992), S/25954 (16 June 1993) and S/26099 (13 July 1993). With Resolution 983 (31 March 1995), the Security Council turned UNPROFOR’s preventive detachment in North Macedonia (the first of its kind under such circumstances) into a full-fledged peacekeeping operation with the name “United Nations Preventive Deployment Force” (UNPREDEP). At the time of this writing, UNPREDEP’s mandate runs until 30 May 1996 (Resolution 1027 of 30 November 1995). 674 See Security Council Resolutions 795 (11 December 1992), § 4. 316   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

in April 1993, the UN and the CSCE concluded a formal agreement establishing weekly consultations between the heads of mission, regular exchanges of information, and co-ordination of field activities.675 By virtue of its preventive diplomacy mandate, the role of the CSCE Mission was to gather information and exercise good offices/mediation. The first function made it responsible for constantly assessing the level of stability in the country (with a view to detecting any early signs of trouble or conflict) and also contributing to establishing the facts in the event of an incident; in other words, it was to act as an early warning station and conduct investigations in the field. Its second role was to maintain constant dialogue with the authorities in the host country, and regular contact with actors in political life: political parties, NGOs, citizens themselves, etc. In practical terms, the Mission had to monitor the border with Serbia and the evolution of inter-­ethnic relations in the country. Over the first two years of the Mission’s work, border incidents between Serbia and Macedonia increased. The situation was considered all the more alarming given that Belgrade refused to demarcate the boundary or even to establish a joint commission of experts charged with resolving the practical issues on the ground. In March 1993, a Serbian detachment was deployed on the border between ­Macedonia and Kosovo, a manoeuvre that could just as likely have been a prelude to an infiltration into Macedonia as a measure aimed at cordoning off Kosovo. In September of the same year, a Serbian patrol occupied an entire border village. Over the first six months of 1994, around twenty incidents, all Serbian in origin, were reported to the CSCE by the Macedonian authorities.676 In response, the Permanent Committee reaffirmed its support for the territorial integrity of ­Macedonia, recommended that the Serbs withdraw their troops from the areas con­tested by both countries (because they were not demarcated), and charged the CSCE Mission with monitoring the evolution of the situation, in co-operation with UNPROFOR.677 In August 1994, the UNPROFOR Commander managed to convince the Serbs to accept the deployment of UN soldiers, as a buffer, at the most sensitive point of the border area, namely, Chupino Brdo.678 After this point, the incidents tended to be rarer. The Mission devoted the greater part of its activity to monitoring developments in inter-­ ethnic relations in the country, with a view to relieving tensions, preventing them from degenerating and, where appropriate, suggesting practical solutions. According to the last Yugoslavian census (1991), Macedonia had 1,900,000 inhabitants, of which 1,279,000 were ethnic Macedonians (67.3 per

675 See CSCE Communication No. 108 (15 April 1993). 676 See DOC.382 (22 June 1994), DOC.422 (29 June 1994) and DOC.486 (11 July 1994). 677 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 26 of 30 June 1994, decision 5a. See also Permanent Committee: Journal No. 25 of 23 June 1994, Annex and decision 5b. Subsequently, a Crisis Committee comprising some of Macedonia’s vice-ministers (Foreign Affairs, Defence, Interior), the Commander of UNPROFOR and the OSCE’s Mission Chief was established, see the Secretary-­ General’s Annual Report on the activities of the OSCE in 1994, pp. 4–5. 678 See DOC.609, p. 3, (25 August 1994).  Chapter V   317

cent), compared to 377,000 Albanians (19.8 per cent) and 44,000 Serbs (2.3 per cent).679 Despite Serbia’s lack of goodwill – or at the very least its ambiguous attitude – towards an independent Macedonia, the Serbian minority (concentrated in the region of Kumanovo) did not pose any acute problem; in August 1993, principally as result of their low numbers and divisions among their leaders, an agreement on the status of the Serbs in Macedonia was concluded between the Macedonian authorities and the Serbian minority.680 In contrast, the situation of the Albanian minority, who were greater in number and had basic demands on many issues, raised difficulties of a quite different order. The Albanians rejected the 1981 census figures, which the authorities in Skopje used as the basis for their intransigent position, and called for a new census which would objectively and precisely determine the ethnic composition of the country. Claiming to represent between 33 and 40 per cent of the population, they demanded the right to be considered as a constitutive nation of Macedonia (and not simply as an ethnic minority) and the promotion of Albanian as the second official language of the Republic. In any case, they demanded a substantial improvement to their situation in political, economic, social, cultural and, above all, educational terms. The CSCE Mission only made a complementary contribution to the national census which was funded and partially organized by the Council of Europe from 25 June to 11 July 1994. The census findings, which were published in November, stated that the country was composed of 67 per cent ethnic Macedonians and 23 per cent ethnic Albanians – results which were immediately contested by the Albanian minority.681 In contrast, the CSCE Mission actively intervened – alongside the High Commissioner on National Minorities – to defuse the tensions resulting from the violent repression by police in February 1995 of a group of intellectuals aiming to create a public university with teaching in the Albanian language in Tetovo (an area 80 per cent populated by Albanians).682

679 In addition to 86,000 Turks (4.5%), 43,000 Roma (2.3%), 39,000 Muslims (2%) and 14% “Yugoslavs” (0.7%). See Paul Garde, Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie (n. 541), p. 116 (Table VII, 2). 680 The agreement (entitled “Agreed Minutes”) was reached under the auspices of the Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, within the framework of the Ethnic and National Communities and Minorities Working Group. Art. 3 of the text stated that “the Government is, in principle, prepared to satisfy the requests of the Serbs to be mentioned in the Preamble and Article 78 of the Macedonian Constitution, and that in the meantime the Government would interpret the Macedonian Constitution as if the Serbs had been mentioned in the Preamble and in Article 78. Consequently, their constitutional status will be equal in every respect to that of the other nationalities listed in the Constitution.” For the full text of the agreement, which the extremist fringe of the Serbian minority rejected, see CSCE Communication No. 229 (8 ­September 1993). 681 See UN: S/1995/222 (22 March 1995). See also the Fassino Report on “The situation in the former Yugoslavia” (Assembly of the WEU, Document 1467, 12 June 1995), § 46, and Erik Siesby, “An Extra-Ordinary Census in the Republic of Macedonia”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 1, Winter 1992/93, pp. 6–8. For the disputes from the Albanian side, see the Lentz-Cornette Report (n. 658), § 15, and Kosova Communication (Geneva), vol. IV, no. 186 of 6 September 1994. 682 The Government, which deemed the Albanian public university’s initiative to be contrary to the Constitution and to legislation on higher education, decided to close the buildings by 318   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Aware of the destabilizing potential of the Albanian factor, the Macedonian Government granted the Albanian minority certain advantages (most notably four seats in the government, nineteen parliamentary seats, a daily newspaper in Albanian, access to audiovisual media, and an increase in the number of secondary schools teaching in Albanian) which, without resolving the heart of the problem, appear to have introduced a certain calm.683 All in all, since the normalization of Macedonia’s relations with Greece, its accession as a full member of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, its participation in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” programme, and the peace introduced into the region by the Dayton Peace Accords, Macedonia is no longer prey to the dangerous instability which it faced when it became independent. Boosted by its geostrategic position which, to that point, had been to its detriment, it now aspires to become an “economic platform for the Balkans”.684

D. The CSCE Missions to Apply the United Nations Sanctions During the first year of the Yugoslav conflict, the UN Security Council, acting by virtue of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, declared two successive embargoes. From September 1991, it ordered all Member States to immediately implement, until it decided otherwise, a general and comprehensive embargo on all deliveries of arms and military equipment intended for the SFRY.685 Resolution 713 was adopted to persuade the Serbs and Croats to apply the ceasefire agreements of 17 and 22 September 1991. Subsequently, in May 1992, the Security Council imposed, through Resolution 757, a comprehensive embargo on financial and commercial transactions with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) [hereafter referred to as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], accompanied by an interruption of air links, sports events, cultural and scientific co-operation and a reduction in the level of diplomatic relations; this measure was designed to remain in force until the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia effectively ended all forms of interference in Bosnia-Herzegovina.686 The task of monitoring the implementation of the two embargoes fell to a plenary committee of the Security Council (the Sanctions Committee). This essentially consisted of examining the reports submitted by the governments on the application of

force, costing a man his life and leading to around 30 injured. The OSCE’s Presence in Albania Reports: DOC.246 (26 February 1995), DOC.278 (21 February 1995), DOC.377 (7 March 1995) and REF.SEC/143/95 (7 July 1995). Reaction by the Permanent Committee: Decision No.15 of 23 February 1995. Albania’s position: DOC.216 (9 February 1995) and DOC.321 (23 February 1995). On the intervention by the High Commissioner on National Minorities, see HC/3/95. 683 See UN: S/1995/987 (23 November 1995). 684 See the article by Florence Hartmann, Le Monde, 4–5 February 1996. 685 See Resolution 713 (25 September 1991), § 6, as the first resolution on the Yugoslav conflict adopted by the UN. 686 See Resolution 757 (30 May 1992), §§ 4–9.  Chapter V   319

sanctions and recommending the appropriate measures in the event of violation.687 With the disintegration of the SFRY, the arms embargo was automatically extended to all the former Yugoslav Republics. On the face of it, this extension could be justified by the concern to limit the intensity of the carnage and to avoid the open interference of external powers. In reality, it advantaged the Serbian aggressor (which held almost all the military potential of the ex-federal army) while cruelly penalizing the Bosnian victim – a country surrounded by hostile States, with neither airport nor access to the sea and, above all, no heavy arms or sufficient weapons. The Bosnians certainly managed to get round the embargo by procuring arms from abroad, but Croatia and Slovenia, which had to be crossed, intercepted around two thirds of the material that passed through their territories.688 Other than its false impartiality, the arms embargo was morally and legally reprehensible: it led to depriving a UN Member State, faced with genocidal aggression and to whom nobody was providing military assistance, of the use of its legitimate right to defence under natural law recognized by Article 51 of the ­Charter. From the summer of 1992 the economic embargo could be compared to a “sieve”. Oil products continued to be supplied to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia via the Adriatic and, above all, via the significant river route of the Danube. Concerned by this problem, the London Conference (which, in August 1992, marked the transition from the International Conference at The Hague on ­Yugoslavia to that in Geneva on the former Yugoslavia) recommended that the ­Security Council take measures to strengthen implementation of the embargo on the Adriatic. Given that blockading the Danube required direct assistance from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s neighbouring countries, it requested that the CSCE take appropriate measures in co-ordination with the European Union.689 In response to the London Conference, the Security Council strengthened the economic sanctions regime. In November 1992, Resolution 787 thus banned the transit of any merchandise through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without authorization issued, on a case-by-case basis, by the Sanctions Committee.690 A second, more considerable tightening of the sanctions took place in April 1993. Resolution 820 extended the scope of the embargo to areas of Croatia and Bosnia-­ Herzegovina controlled by the Serbs and introduced a general basic obligation for States to take measures to prevent the diversion of trade to these areas and to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It prohibited all maritime traffic in the territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as, more generally, transit by rivers and land. Commercial traffic on the Danube was banned, without the

687 The Committee was created for the purpose of monitoring the arms embargo, see Resolution 724 (15 December 1991, § 5). Its mandate was subsequently expanded to include the economic embargo in Resolution 757 (30 May 1992), § 13). 688 See Miloš Vasić, “Embargo sur l’embargo”, Le Monde, 6 July 1994. 689 London Conference: LC/C8 (27 August 1992). 690 See Resolution 787 (11 December 1992), § 9. 320   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

express authorization of the Sanctions Committee and by checking the boats navigating the Serbian sector of the Danube; land traffic was also banned, without express authorization (granted on an exceptional basis), and from a strictly limited number of border crossing points by road and rail.691 Paragraph 12 of Resolution 787 called upon States “acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements” to take the necessary measures (arising from Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter) “to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping [to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of Resolutions 713 and 757.” This call was reiterated in Resolution 820, paragraph 29, which authorizes States acting through regional agencies or arrangements to “use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary … to enforce the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” Based on these provisions, NATO and the WEU undertook to monitor compliance with the embargo in the international waters of the Adriatic – initially alternating from November 1992 (NATO: Operation Maritime Guard; WEU: Operation Sharp Fence), then in the framework of a joint operation under single command from 15 June 1993: Sharp Guard. In the spring of 1994, some 2,000 vessels were inspected out of a total of 19,000 recognized merchant vessels.692 Its deployment appears to have “plugged” the Adriatic breach. As for the CSCE, its reaction to the recommendations of the London Conference was reflected through the establishment of a fairly complex mechanism to control the Danube. Even before the London Conference, the European Commission and the United States planned to send fact-finding missions to countries neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in order to assess the difficulties due to the variety of border control systems in place in the region. It was on the basis of the conclusions of these missions (carried out from July to September 1992) that the CSO created seven “Sanctions Assistance Missions” (SAMs) – in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania from October 1992, as well as in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (November 1992), Croatia (January 1993), Ukraine (February 1993) and Albania (April 1993).693 It should be noted that Ukraine is not a neighbouring

691 See Resolution 820 (17 April 1993), §§ 12–29, adopted with Russia and China abstaining. For a detailed analysis of the embargo’s legal framework, see the contribution of Eugenios Kalypris in Eugenios Kalypris, Richardt Vork and Antonio Napolitano (eds.), Les sanctions des Nations Unies … (n.690), pp. 1–73. 692 See the report by Sir Keith Speed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU, An operational organisation for WEU: Naval and maritime co-operations, Doc. 1415 of 10 May 1994, p. 30. In fact, monitoring of the Adriatic started in July 1992 with NATO’s Operation Maritime Monitor and the WEU’s Operation Sharp Vigilance. 693 See 15th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 14 August 1992, Annex 1 “Decision on the Presence of Observers in Countries Bordering on Serbia and Montenegro”; 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1 “Decision on Sanctions Monitoring” and 17th  Chapter V   321

country of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but its participation was considered to be indispensable in view of the full blockade of the Danube. With a total staff of some 200 border experts from around twenty CSCE countries (civil servants paid by their governments but not in a national uniform), the seven SAMs operated on the basis of a memorandum of understanding concluded with each of the host countries. Their role was twofold. It consisted in helping the authorities of the host State to detect violations and deal with them as effectively as possible, for example by helping with inquiries conducted against suspect companies or by contributing to the fight against the many forms of fuel smuggling. It also aimed to reduce the effects related to distortions of legal international trade on the Danube – notably by checking the authenticity of UN authorizations presented at the borders. Established by the CSCE, this mechanism was nonetheless managed by the CSCE and the European Community [soon to become the European Union] through two joint bodies: the EU/CSCE Sanctions Liaison Group (based in Vienna) and the EU/CSCE Sanctions Coordinator (working from Brussels). Consisting of countries providing the staff to the SAMs and the SAM host countries, the Liaison Group’s mandate was to conduct monthly assessments of the implementation of sanctions.694 Meanwhile, the Coordinator (Italian ambassador Antonio Napolitano) had an extraordinarily extensive mandate. Seconded by a legal adviser and an adviser on border issues, he was responsible, notably, for assessing the effect of sanctions and for making recommendations on how to improve their application, providing technical advice to the local border services, coordinating requests for practical assistance from countries in the region, advising these countries on alternative trade routes and the adoption of new legislative texts, facilitating the settlement of disputes relating to the practical application of the sanctions, ensuring liaison with the SAMs, bringing violations to the attention of the international organizations concerned and governments, and finally, presiding over the EU/CSCE Liaison Group.695 It should primarily be recalled, however, that the European Union made available to the SAMs a communication centre situated in Directorate-General XXI (Customs and Indirect Taxation) of the European Commission in Brussels: the

Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3, “Sanctions Assistance Missions”. At the time of writing, the SAMs’ mandate ran until 30 September 1996, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 125 of 20 June 1996. 694 For more on the creation of the Liaison Group, see 16th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 September 1992, Annex 1, “Decision on Sanctions Monitoring”, § 7. For the Liaison Group’s first report, see CSCE Communication No. 410 (11 December 1992). See also DOC.478 for the report of the 21st meeting (16 March 1995). 695 The CSO fixed the Co-ordinator’s mandate at an initial period of six months, see 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, Annex 1, “Sanctions Coordinator”. It was subsequently extended multiple times – most recently until 30 September 1996, see Permanent Committee: Journal No. 18 of 24 June 1993, decision 4 (b); Journal No. 5 of 20 January 1994, decision 5 (b); Journal No. 42 of 21 November 1994, decision 5(a); and Permanent Council: Decisions No. 98 of 19 December 1995; No. 105 of 25 January 1996 and No. 125 of 20 June 1996. 322   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre (SAMCOMM). The Commission accepted the administrative costs and the considerable telecommunications costs (notably by satellite). The SAMCOMM began operations on 5 October 1992. Initially designed as the source of logistical support for the SAMs and for coordinating them with the host countries, it quickly also became the representative of the UN Sanctions Committee, as well as, consequently, the link between the UN, the CSCE and the European Union.696 From May 1993, the mechanism managed jointly by the CSCE and the ­European Union was strengthened by a direct contribution from the WEU consisting essentially of making available to the three bordering countries (­Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) speedboats to organize joint police patrols on the Danube both upstream and downstream of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The police officers from the WEU countries were not required to intercept goods, but to control persons. In other words, the WEU’s contribution was supplementary policing in addition to the relevant border operations, which fell under the competence of the CSCE/European Union.697 The CSCE was to approve this initiative, but did not integrate it into the SAMs.698 The SAM experiment between 1992 and 1995 represented a remarkable undertaking between international institutions. Through both its originality and its scale, it contributed to a qualitative development of the connection between universalism (UN) and regionalism (CSCE, European Union, WEU), as formulated in Article 53 of the United Nations Charter on the use of regional agreements to implement coercive measures taken by the Security Council. At the same time, it illustrated the new phenomenon of co-operation between European regional organizations and, in particular, the stunning fecundity of bilateral OSCE/ European Union relationships. Assessed from a strictly technical perspective, the operation of the SAMs can be considered as globally positive. The ongoing management of economic sanctions,

696 SAMCOMM received weekly reports from the SAMs. SAMCOMM’s monthly reports were sent to the Sanctions Committee, the UN, the OSCE and the Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. For more details on the system as a whole, see the contribution by Richardt Vork (“Les Missions d’assistance pour l’application des sanctions de l’UE/OSCE et le SAMCOMM”) in Kalpyris, Vork and Napolitano (eds.), Les sanctions des Nations Unies … (n. 690), pp. 75–121. 697 This decision was made on 5 April 1993 following an extraordinary meeting of the WEU’s Council of Ministers on applying sanctions on the Danube (for the text of the decision, see UN: S/25551 of 7 April 1993). Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council recommended that the States not bordering the Danube provide “such assistance as may be required by the riparian States, notwithstanding the restrictions on navigation set out in the international agreements which apply to the Danube”, see Resolution 820 (17 April 1993), § 17. Regarding the WEU’s operation on the Danube, see Frédéric Train, “L’assistance douanière internationale pour l’application de l’embargo économique contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie”, Revue générale de droit international public, no. 2 (1995), pp. 408–410. 698 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 9 of 1 April 1993, decision 4 (f ); 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, Annex 2, § 7; and CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 18 of 24 June 1993, decision 4 (e). For more on Russia’s reservations with regard to the coercive operation carried out under the auspices of the WEU, see ibid., p. 4.  Chapter V   323

helped by a monitoring mechanism of unprecedented finesse and rigour in the annals of international organizations, led to honourable results. Firstly, the SAMs detected, halted, repressed or prevented a considerable number of violations (in the order of several tens of thousands). Secondly, they contributed towards reducing the undesirable consequences of the sanctions for third countries by facilitating the relaunch of lawful trade in the region. That said, the political impact of the SAMs remained limited. Certainly, because of the SAMs, the economic “bite” of the sanctions was serious. But it was not in itself sufficient to push Belgrade to reconsider, that is to say, to convince the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to reverse the course of the policy that was specifically behind the imposition of the UN sanctions. From this point of view, the SAM experiment was inconclusive. The reason for what has to be qualified as a political failure was not a lack of resources or control. It resulted from the inherent defect in the use of the economic arm for political ends without the requisite supporting resources. Firstly, the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were based on no (real or credible) threat of recourse to military force. However, faced with a particularly serious and persistent case of aggression, simple economic sanctions were devoid of any dissuasive potential. In the context of an ethnic conflict (where the issues are as much fantasmatic as they are territorial), sanctions of this nature appear frankly derisory: in this specific case, they reflected the policy of least international effort. Secondly, the Security Council’s sanctions targeted a State under an authoritarian regime which, by definition, could not be held accountable for its actions by the democratic counter-powers within the State – or even reasonably sensitive to the disapproval of the outside world. As revealed by the exemplary case of Iraq (sanctioned for annexing Kuwait), purely economic sanctions lead to innocent populations being penalized, while strengthening the hold of the incriminated regime. In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the UN sanctions were seen as an offensive injustice to national pride. They were met with a patriotic reaction which, by consolidating President Milošević’s regime, only encouraged Belgrade to continue in its refusal to cede.699 Thirdly, and above all, the UN sanctions heavily affected the third States in the region, without being supported by an economic or financial compensation mechanism. The penalization of the neighbouring States is axiomatic – and this holds both for hostile States as well as those which were traditionally lenient towards the country being targeted. With the exception of the particular cases of Croatia and

699 It should be noted that the authorities from Belgrade have persistently denounced, in great detail, the embargo’s adverse economic, humanitarian, ecological and other consequences. See, for example, S/24595 (28 September 1992), A/C.2/47/10 (9 December 1992), A/C.2/47/11 (11 December 1992), S/25869 (31 May 1993), A/48/207-S/25936 (14 June 1993), A/48/641-S/26796 (24 November 1993), A/48/661 (1 December 1993), A/C.2/49/8 (1 November 1994), A/C.2/49/9 (15 November 1994), A/50/163 (25 April 1995), A/C.2/50/6 (3 November 1995), A/50/710 (3 November 1995) and A/C.2/50/7 (8 November 1995). 324   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

Bosnia-­Herzegovina, which were at war, the seven neighbouring countries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Albania, Bulgaria, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine) suffered serious damage due to the convergence of three factors: the nature of the transport and communications infrastructure in a pivotal region between the east and south-east of Europe and the rest of the continent; the vulnerability of States in a difficult transition towards a market economy; and the costs of monitoring compliance with sanctions on the national scale.700 The economic sanctions had direct effects (such as the limitation of commercial trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), aggravated by significant indirect effects connected with the use of new commercial transport itineraries that were longer and more expensive. Although the impact of the sanctions varied depending on the national situations, there is little doubt that the embargo crippled the economies of all countries in the region, including Austria, Greece, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Russia, Slovenia and Turkey.701 Supposed in principle to respond to such a situation, Article 50 of the United Nations Charter stated that “if preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.” Yet this provision authorized the States concerned only to report their difficulties, without any guarantee of practical assistance. The eight countries which expressly invoked this clause in the case of Yugoslavia (Albania, Bulgaria, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and … Uganda) were proof of this.702 However, the CSCE revealed itself to be more sensitive than the UN on the issue of the backlash against the sanctions. In line with a decision taken by the Council of Ministers, an extraordinary meeting of senior officials met in Vienna from 31 January to 1 February 1994 to examine infrastructure projects for which funding sources had been planned and which were likely to enable the States

700 Reasoning supported by nine countries from the region in a collective memorandum, see A/48/239, 18 October 1993. 701 It is difficult to quantify the economic damage accurately. In their official estimates (which the UN claims to be exaggerated), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s seven neighbouring countries put the cost of the global impact of sanctions on their economies, over a period from 1992 to 1993, at $18.7 billion, with the losses incurred ranging from 1.9% (Slovakia) to 115.5% (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) of GDP. 702 The case of Uganda concerned the breach of a contract signed between the Government and a private Yugoslav business, which pertained to the construction of a road in the west of the country, see A/49/356, § 28, (9 September 1994). For the steps taken by the countries affected in order to implement article 50, see Resolution 843 adopted by the Security Council on 18 June 1993 and S/26040 plus two addenda(8 July 1993) and Resolution 48/210 adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1993, as well as A/48/239 (18 October 1993). See also the two special reports of the UN Secretary-General A/48/573-S/26705 (8 November 1993) and A/49/356 (9 September 1994) and the 1992 “Agenda for Peace”, § 41, and the 1995 “Supplement to the Agenda for Peace”, §§ 73–76 and Resolution 50/51 adopted on 11 December 1995 by the General Assembly.  Chapter V   325

affected to attenuate, in the short or medium term, the unfavourable impact of the sanctions at the regional level. After the deliberations, eight projects were selected by common agreement between the governments concerned, the potential donors (including Japan) and the various universal and regional financial institutions.703 The meeting was followed up by the CSCE (Vienna, 14 July 1994) and the G24 Transport Group (as part of the PHARE programme).704 The more political rather than economic approach adopted by the CSCE was, in reality, insufficient. In an international economic system which had become global and fundamentally governed by the iron law of supply and demand, circumvention of any embargo is fatal. Despite its rigour, the mechanism established by the SAMs was never watertight. Circumvention of the embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was certainly attributable to friendly countries such as Greece. But it was even more so down to countries which were not suspected of proSerbian sympathies, driven by considerations of pure economic opportunity (Albania, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). It should be stressed that the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was the Achilles heel of the international system: the poorest of Tito’s Yugoslav Republics faced not only the backlash of the UN embargo, but also the direct effects of it as imposed by neighbouring Greece.705 Designed as a means of encouraging a political resolution of the Bosnia-­ Herzegovina conflict, the sanctions entered their final phase following the ­General Framework Agreement initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December. The Security Council in turn immediately made new provisions. Firstly, it decided that the arms embargo would end six months after the official signature of the Dayton Agreement, although it was understood that the delivery of heavy arms, mines and military aircraft would continue to be forbidden until a treaty on the limitation of arms planned in the Dayton Agreement (Annex 1.D) entered into force; this ultimate ban would in turn disappear only after the UN Secretary-General had presented a report on the application of the treaty on regional stability, also planned in the Dayton Agreement (Annex 1.B).706 Secondly, it decided to suspend the economic embargo “indefinitely” and with “immediate effect”, but on two conditions. The suspension was applicable to the Bosnian Serbs only after the withdrawal of all their troops from behind the separation zones established by the Dayton Agreement. Moreover, the suspension

703 See Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § 1.1.5; and Permanent Committee: Journal No. 2 of 16 December 1993, decision 6 (a). For more on the results of the meeting, see A/49/356 (9 September 1994), §§ 68–75, 78–79 and Annex II. 704 See DOC.499 (13 July 1994). 705 See Antonio Napolitano, “Les sanctions, outil de diplomatie préventive”, in Kalpyris, York and Napolitano (eds.), Les sanctions des Nations Unies … (n. 690), pp. 144–145. 706 See Resolution 1021 (22 November 1995), which was unanimously adopted but with Russia abstaining because it believed that the lifting of the arms embargo, even if it was carried out gradually, went against the logic of a political settlement. 326   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

would end if “at any time” the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Bosnian Serb authorities “notably” failed in any of the obligations incumbent upon them under the terms of the Dayton Agreement. In any case, the sanctions regime would be abolished ten days after the first free and regular elections in Bosnia-­Herzegovina, on the condition that the Bosnian Serbs had continued to respect the separation zones.707 The Dayton Agreement was the product of many factors including, primarily, the Serbian military setbacks and the pressure of suddenly reactivated American diplomacy. In other words, the economic weapon of sanctions and the SAM mechanism ultimately played only a minor role in the management of the Yugoslavian conflict.708

E. The CSCE Mission to Sarajevo In response to the suffering of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most ethnically composite of the former Yugoslav republics, for a fairly long time the CSCE reacted only with verbal declarations. It only really decided to act on the ground after the signature of the Washington Agreement of 18 March 1994, in which Bosnia-­Herzegovina accepted – under American pressure – to transform into a federation of Bosnian and Croatian people and to commit to a confederation with Croatia.709 Article V.6 of the Washington Agreement on the Federation mandated the CSCE to appoint three Ombudsmen (one Bosnian, one Croat and an Ombudsman representing the other communities), with the aim of examining cases relating to human rights

707 See Resolution 1022 (22 November 1995). Previously, the economic embargo had received limited and temporary relief (Resolution 943 of 23 September 1994), extended on four successive occasions (Resolution 970 of 12 January 1995, Resolution 988 of 21 April 1995, Resolution 1003 of 5 July 1995 and Resolution 1015 of 15 September 1995). 708 For more on the problem of international sanctions, see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly Ann Elliott (eds.), Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990, 2nd edition), 298 p.; Lisa M. Martin, Coercive Co-operation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), xiii–299 p., and David Cortright and George A. Lopez (eds.), Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 256 p. See also Kim Richard Nossal, “International Sanctions as International Punishment”, International Organization, vol. 43, no. 2,Spring 1989, pp. 301–322; Nigel D. White, “Collective Sanctions: An Alternative to Military Sanctions?”, International Relations, vol. XII, no. 3 (December 1994), pp. 75–91; Paul D. Taylor, “Clausewitz on Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iraq”, Strategic Review, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 49–58; Edward D. Mansfield, “International Institutions and Economic Sanctions”, World Politics, vol. 47, no. 4, July 1995, pp. 575–605; George Lopez and David Cortright, “The Sanctions Era: An Alternative to Military Intervention”, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol. 19, no. 2 Summer/Autumn 1995, pp. 65–86; L. Rosensweig, “United Nations Sanctions: Creating a More Effective Tool for the Enforcement of International Law”, Austrian Journal of Public and International Law, vol. 48/1995, pp. 161–196. 709 Bosnia and Herzegovina federalized the internal structure of those of its territories that had a predominantly majority Bosnian and Croat population. There was an understanding that the constitutional status of territories with a Serb majority would be determined after the peace settlement concluded at the Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.  Chapter V   327

violations and to prepare a report on the subject for the government of the Federation and the CSCE.710 It was on this basis that the Permanent Committee created, in June 1994, a CSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, essentially aimed at helping the Ombudsmen perform their tasks. It was agreed that this assistance would be provided in the form of consultative services, logistical support (use by the Ombudsmen of the infrastructure and material resources of the Mission) and the establishment of reports on the situation of the human dimension in the country.711 Moreover, the Permanent Committee allocated to the Government in Sarajevo a subsidy of 3 million Austrian schillings by means of contribution to the operation of the Ombudsmen’s office.712 Given the difficult working conditions and, above all, transport issues in a capital city under siege, the CSCE realized that the Mission could not adequately operate without certain basic services and facilities provided by UNPROFOR: a UN/CSCE memorandum of understanding was concluded to this end (not without reticence from the United Nations) in August 1994.713 The Mission became operational in Sarajevo on 31 October 1994 with an authorized staff of five (later six) and a budget of some 11 million Austrian schillings for 1995. Established for an initial period of six months, its mandate was renewed several times,714 but in December 1995 the Ministerial Council decided to transform it into a simple section of a Mission with a wider scope created by the OSCE as a result of the Dayton Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.715 Operating in a singularly unfavourable context, the OSCE Mission could hardly hope to obtain significant results. Nonetheless, it completed its tasks honourably, starting by supporting the Chairmanship of the CSCE in the final stages of selecting the Ombudsmen.716 Appointed on 30 December 1994, they entered into post on 20 January 1995 and benefited from the services of the ODIHR, which organized a special training session for them in February 1995.717 With complaints flooding in by the thousand, the Ombudsmen were not idle. The development of their activities outside the capital led the Mission to open offices in Zenica, ­Mostar and Tuzla.

710 Adopted on 30 March 1994, the Constitution of the Federation specified that the Ombudsmen could be removed by the CSCE after consultation with the President and the Vice-President of the Federation. 711 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 23 of 2 June 1994, Annex “Support Action by the CSCE Concerning the Bosnian Ombudsmen”. 712 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 27 of 7 July 1994, decision 5(a). An extension was subsequently approved see Permanent Council Decision No. 89 of 23 November 1995. 713 For the text of the agreement, see DOC.620 (30 August 1994). 714 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 41 of 14 November 1994, decision 5(b); Permanent Council Decisions No. 40 of 4 May 1995 and No. 84 of 9 November 1995. 715 See Budapest Ministerial .Council: Decision No, 1 of 8 December 1995. 716 For further details on the Ombudsmen’s appointment, see DOC.149 (2 May 1994), DOC.569 (17 August 1994) and DOC.721 (15 September 1994). 717 See DOC.347 (7 March 1995). 328   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

The decision to establish a Mission with a peacebuilding mandate – in a country whose capital city was facing an almost total blockade, whose population was being subjected to the horrors of ethnic cleansing, and whose very survival as a sovereign State was in question – was, in a certain sense, derisory. Nevertheless, it was designed by the OSCE as a sort of treaty on the future, aimed at “contributing to the future process of reconciliation, rehabilitation and rebuilding of D ­ emocratic institutions and processes and the rule of law.”718 At the end of 1994, when the Serbian forces conducted a massive assault on the towns decreed to be “safe areas” by the United Nations, the OSCE was only too aware, as were the other international organizations, of its political paralysis and practical powerlessness. Upon the request of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CSO was convened, under the Berlin Mechanism, to examine the drama of the “safe area” of Bihać.719 The CSO met in an emergency meeting on 28 November in Budapest, on the fringes of the Review Conference – and not, as set out in the Berlin Mechanism, at the CSCE headquarters.720 At the end of its discussions, it condemned the Serbian aggression and urgently drew the attention of the Budapest Review Conference to the situation in Bihać “so that an appropriate decision can be prepared for submission to the CSCE Budapest Summit.” At the same time, it approved the Chairman-in-Office’s intention to appoint a Personal Representative responsible for drafting, before 15 December, a report on Bihać for the Permanent Council of the OSCE (and not, as wished by Sarajevo and Zagreb, for 4 December for the Budapest Summit), it being understood, moreover, that the Permanent Council would send a short-term Fact-Finding Mission to Bihać as soon as possible.721 Because Russia was opposed to any renewed condemnation of the Serbs, the Budapest Review Conference found itself unable to adopt the text of a draft Declaration on the situation in the Bihać zone – and the same was true of another draft declaration on the Yugoslav conflict as a whole.722 To Bosnia- Herzegovina’s indignation, the Budapest Summit settled for sending two draft

718 See Permanent Committee: Journal No. 23 of 2 June 1994, Annex, “Support Action by the CSCE Concerning the Bosnian Ombudsmen”. 719 The idea of “safe areas” for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s civil populations was initially put forward by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights (see UN: E/ CN.4/1992/S-1/10 of 27 October 1992, § 25b). The Security Council took it on board by declaring the city of Srebrenica (Resolution 819 of 16 April 1993) and later the cities of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde and Bihać (Resolution 824 of 6 May 1993) as “safe areas”. 720 In addition, it extended its deliberations beyond the statutory time limit of two days: the Emergency Meeting took place on 28 November, 30 November and 1 December 1994. We should also mention that Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated the (mandatory) preliminary bilateral procedure that the Berlin Mechanism had provided for by turning, purely for show, to Croatia – given that the assault on Bihać was carried out from the Croat territories occupied by Croatian Serbs. See DOC.1107 (23 November 1994). 721 See 4th Emergency Meeting of the CSO: Journal of 28 November, 30 November and 1 December 1994, Annex. 722 At the Review Conference, the United States had submitted a draft text dealing with all the aspects of the Yugoslav conflict: CSCE/BC.20 (24 November 1994).  Chapter V   329

texts to the Permanent Council for “for further consideration”.723 In January 1995, the Permanent Council, after presentation of the report from the Chairman-in- Office’s Personal Representative (Ambassador István Gyarmati), did no more than save face by expressing its intention to send a Fact-Finding Mission to Bihać “as soon as circumstances permit, and, most important of all, as soon as the personal safety of the members of the mission can be ensured.”724

3. The Provisions of the Dayton Agreement Relating to the OSCE Under the decisive impetus of American diplomacy, the Yugoslav conflict found a negotiated settlement with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled on 21 November 1995 in Dayton (Ohio) and officially signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.725 Signed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of ­Yugoslavia (in its own name and on behalf of the Serbs from the “Republika ­Srpska”), the Dayton Agreement recognized the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign State within its existing international borders and consisting of two entities (the Bosniac–Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska), sharing 51% and 49% of the territory respectively. The two entities agreed to negotiate an agreement on the attributes of central government within six months – it being nonetheless understood that the city of Sarajevo would remain within the ­Federation. By virtue of the Agreement, the parties agreed to establish a ceasefire line, to create demilitarized zones on either side of it, and to withdraw their troops and heavy arms from specially designated positions. Respect for these military provisions was entrusted to a multinational peace enforcement force (IFOR- Implementation Force) consisting of 60,000 troops under unified command and control. Falling under the auspices of NATO rather than the UN, IFOR was nonetheless created by the United Nations Security Council, on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter, for a period of “approximately one year”.726 With its

723 See Budapest Summit: Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994, item 6(a) and pp. 4–5. 724 Permanent Council: Decisions No. 7 of 12 January 1995. 725 For the text of the Agreement, see REF.PC/716/95/Rev.1 (29 November 1995) and UN: S/1995/999. The conclusions of the London Conference of 8 and 9 December 1995 on peace implementation (S/1995/1029) were added to the Dayton Agreement. 726 Resolution 1031 (15 December 1995), which established IFOR, does not mention NATO explicitly. Paragraph 14 “authorizes the [UN] Member States acting through or in co-operation with the organization referred to in Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement.” Paragraph 25 tasks the Member States concerned with “acting through or in co-operation with the organization referred to in Annex 1A of the Peace Agreement to report to the Council, through the appropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals.” For NATO’s first reports to UN regarding the IFOR’s activities, see UN: S/1996/49 (23 January 1996), S/1996/87 (6 February 1996) and S/1996/215 (22 March 1996). By approving Resolution 1031, Russia, which has a military commitment to IFOR, emphasized that “the Security Council and No other council must specifically take a decision regarding the need to extend the military aspect of the operation at the end of year. That would ensure [that 330   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

own troops and arms enabling it to protect itself, it was authorized to use force if necessary to prevent barriers to the free circulation of civilians, refugees and displaced persons and to respond to acts of violence against the population. Its role is, therefore, entirely different to that of UNPROFOR (which consisted essentially of protecting humanitarian operations) and from whom it took over on the ground.727 The Dayton Agreement also included an important civil section about economic and humanitarian recovery, protection of human rights and the organization of free elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its supervision was entrusted to a High Representative appointed by the European Union: Carl Bildt. His practical role was to “monitor implementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilize, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of, the civilian organizations and agencies involved.”728 In fact, the civil aspects of the peace operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina involved the intervention of several international institutions – including the Council of Europe, the UN and, above all, the OSCE.729 The Dayton Agreement attributed a particularly crucial role to the OSCE on two fronts –the human dimension and military stabilization. The OSCE was responsible for putting Bosnia and Herzegovina on the road to democracy through the promotion of respect for human rights and the organization of democratic elections. Touching upon human rights in the country, it was given no monopoly: it acted alongside the Council of Europe, various specialized bodies of the United Nations, and NGOs.730 However, it was the OSCE alone which was to appoint the holder of one of the new constitutional institutions of the country: the Human Rights Ombudsman for Bosnia and Herzegovina.731 More significantly still, it was the OSCE which had to supervise the preparation and roll-out of the free presidential and legislative elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and two of its other constitutive entities. As such, it was responsible for establishing a provisional electoral Commission presided over by one of its own representatives,

there will] in no way be a replacement of the United Nations responsibility in that area by any individual regional organization” (UN press release SC/6143 of 15 December 1995). 727 UNPROFOR’s mandate was extended until 31 January 1996 (Resolution 1026 of 30 November 1995). The transfer of authority took place on 20 December 1995. About 18,500 of the approximately 21,000 UNPROFOR and Rapid Reaction Force troops were integrated into the IFOR (see UN: S/1996/83 of 6 February 1996, § 3). 728 Resolution 103, § 26, (15 December 1995). 729 The Dayton Agreement entrusted the UN with two essential responsibilities. The first relates to performing (through the UNHCR) activities pertaining to the return of refugees and displaced persons. The second is to assist the parties in fulfilling their policing responsibilities: to this end, the Security Council established, through Resolution 1035 (21 December 1995), a civilian office and international police task force forming the UNMIBH (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 730 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 6 “Agreement on Human Rights”, article XIII. 731 Ibid., Annex 6, article IV.2.  Chapter V   331

setting the conditions and date for the elections and certifying their ultimate regularity.732 The OSCE was also responsible for helping the parties concerned with negotiating a military stabilization regime in the region. By virtue of Annex 1B (“Regional Stabilization”) of the Dayton Agreement, this mission had two distinct but complementary mandates. The aim of the first section was to adopt, on the basis of the OSCE’s 1994­ Vienna Document, a CSBM regime which was specifically applicable to Bosnia and ­Herzegovina.733 Such a regime was supposed to be binding only for the “­Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, the Bosnian–Croat entity (“Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina”) and the Serbian entity (“Republika Srpska”).734 To this end, Article II of Annex 1B provided an indicative list of transparency measures (exchange of data on existing military potential, notification of certain planned military activities, notification of disbandment of armed civilian groups), communication measures (establishment of liaison missions between the Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska) and, above all, constraint measures (restrictions on military deployments in certain geographical areas, restraints on the reintroduction of foreign forces, withdrawal of forces and heavy weapons to designated locations).735 More ambitiously, the second section concerned the adoption of a regime aimed at establishing a stable military equilibrium in the region, with defence force levels at the lowest numbers. Such a regime had to be negotiated on the basis of an exchange of information on the basic military potential (notified according to the format required by the Vienna Document of 1992) and cover the categories of arms subject to the CFE Treaty of 1990: tanks, artillery, armoured vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters. In the absence of an agreement concluded on these terms within six months of the entry into force of Annex 1B of the Dayton ­Agreement, specific limits would enter into force on the basis of the military potential presently held by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Federal Republic of ­Yugoslavia would retain only 75% of the potential in question. Moreover, ­Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska were authorized to have, respectively, 30%, 20% and 10% of this same benchmark potential. In other words, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was to renounce 25% of its current

732 Ibid., Annex 3 “Agreement on Elections”, articles I and II. 733 The idea of having CSBMs applicable to Bosnia and Herzegovina was first put forward at the London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on 26 and 27 August 1992 (document LC/CII Final). The Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which resulted from the London decisions, established a Working Group to examine the issue. 734 In addition, the two entities in question and the three States concerned (the Republic of Bosnia- Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) refrained from importing any kind of weapons for three months – and any kind of heavy weapons for six months – after the entry into force of Annex 1B, article III. 735 These provisions were taken to heart. An agreement comprising a package of 15 CSBMs was finalized in Vienna under the aegis of the OSCE on 26 January 1996, see INF/14/96 (31 January 1996). 332   The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts

potential, while Bosnia and Herzegovina had the right to have the equivalent of 20% of the initial military power of the Yugoslavian National Army monopolized by the S ­ erbian authorities. With a view to relative equilibrium, the Dayton ­Agreement thus planned for the partial disarmament of the stronger party and a limited rearmament of the weakest. It also implicitly subjected the Federal Republic of Y ­ ugoslavia to obligations relating to the CFE Treaty regime.736 The OSCE’s task was to help the parties negotiate this twofold regime on the margins of the Vienna Forum for Security Co-operation, led by a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office (Hungarian Ambassador István ­ ­Gyarmati). It also consisted in checking the implementation of agreements which had been reached and settling (though a joint commission established by it) any disputes relating to this implementation (Article V). In December 1995, the Ministerial Council accepted the challenge requiring the OSCE to contribute towards consolidating the democratic foundations of ­Bosnia and Herzegovina and to prevent the arms race in the region. Consequently, it established a Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina responsible for implementing all provisions of the Dayton Agreement concerning the OSCE – of which the OSCE’s Mission in Sarajevo was an integral part as a “distinct section”. The cost of the OSCE’s intervention, for an initial period of one year, was estimated at 245 million Austrian schillings – to be funded by the governments, but with the understanding that the OSCE would seek “additional, including non-­ governmental, sources of funding”.737

736 Even though it represented less than 40% of the population of the former SFRY, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) held on to around 60% of the battle tanks, 85% of the armoured combat vehicles, 65% of the artillery pieces and 85% of the fighter planes and helicopters of the former Federal Army, which was considered, during the East–West era, to be Europe’s fifth most powerful military. Thus, both quantitatively and qualitatively, Belgrade had forces greater than those of most of its neighbours, who were bound by the CFE Treaty. For further details regarding the position of the countries in the region (in particular, Austria, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) on the military issue, see A/50/412 (7 September 1995). We should point out again Bulgaria’s position that a disarmament agreement between the parties in the Yugoslav conflict would not call into question the ceilings that the CFE and CFE-1A agreements had set for Sofia, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 93 of 5 December 1995, Annexes 1 and 2. 737 See Budapest Ministerial Council: Decision No.1 of 8 December 1995. At the same time that it intervened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE also sought to contribute to stabilizing Croatia. On 12 November 1995, after using weapons to recapture Western Slavonia (May 1995) and Krajina (August 1995), the Zagreb Government finalized an agreement on the peaceful integration of the region with the Serbs of Eastern Slavonia. The “Erdut Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium” provided for the establishment of a provisional international administration and of a suitable peacekeeping force (INF/247/95 of 13 November 1995 and UN: S/1995/951). With Resolution 1037 (15 January 1996), the Security Council created the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES). In September 1995, the OSCE sent a Fact-Finding Mission to Croatia that was tasked with determining (in co-­operation with the Council of Europe) what contribution a long-term mission might make in the country, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 74 of 21 September 1995. The Mission was created the following spring, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 112 of 18 April 1996.  Chapter V   333

The NATO undertaking, supported by the OSCE and other international institutions, represents, as underlined by a British diplomat, “the most comprehensive operation to reconstruct a European country to be mounted by the international community.”738 It has, nonetheless, not succeeded. The Dayton Agreement has certainly led to a qualitatively new situation. But this has arisen only as the result of the decisive political will of the Americans, not the Europeans.739 However, the United States has announced that its commitment on the ground will not exceed one year and the countries of the European Union do not appear willing or able to take over. Will the resources implemented over such a short period to meet the needs of such a gigantic task enable sustainable peace to be established? The question remains open, while the various provisions of the Dayton Agreement are, as a whole, correctly implemented.740 If common sense prevails (which is not guaranteed), it should be remembered that the Agreement aims to establish peace where there is barely any room for justice.

738 UN press release SC/6143 (15 December 1995). The Security Council recognized that “the unique, extraordinary and complex character” of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina required “an exceptional response” (Resolution 1031 of 15 December 1995, § 39). 739 As one writer emphasized, “what historians will continue to find striking with regard to this dramatic crisis is the extent to which, at the end of the twentieth century, the ultimate European conflict – one might even be tempted to call it a conflict typical of the ‘Old Europe’, that of the beginning of the century, from the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo – will have needed to find a solution through American endorsement” [translated from the French]. See Bernard Brigouleix, “Paris, Bonn et l’exYougoslavie : histoire d’un malentendu”, Documents. Revue des questions allemandes, vol. 51, no. 1, 1996, p. 43. 740 On the progress of the Peace Agreement’s implementation, see Dayton Implementation Review, which the European Action Council for Peace in the Balkans (Amsterdam) has published since 31 January 1996. 334    Chapter VI   335

CHAPTER VI The Economic Dimension of the OSCE During the East–West era, the economic basket of the CSCE covered a particularly broad spectrum of topics: economic exchanges; industrial co-operation; science and technology; environmental protection; transport; tourism; migrant labour; and management training. Of all issues, the protection of the environment took on more and more political and technical significance. In addition, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) was regularly involved in the implementation of commitments requiring multilateral action.1 Above all, however, the economic basket turned out to be the poor relation of the OSCE: it remained marginal compared to the politico-military basket (Helsinki Decalogue and CSBMs) and human rights issues. Certainly, the OSCE could not innovate in an area where both multilateral co-operation (within UNECE, founded in 1947) and bilateral co-operation was already well established. Since the end of the Cold War, the economic dimension has evolved only slowly and to a limited extent. It has been only partially institutionalized within the Committee of Senior Officials (today, the Senior Council) sitting as the Economic Forum (EF). This chapter will examine the various stages of the economic dimension’s evolution and the current role of the Economic Forum.

I. The Development of the Economic Dimension For more than four decades, from the end of the Second World War to the collapse of communism, economic relations between the East and the West remained dependent on the fundamental incompatibility between the market economy and centrally planned economy. These relations were essentially characterized by the (deliberate) non-­integration of the Eastern bloc countries into the circuits of the global economy; the political rationale generally driving economic exchanges; and the insignificance of actual transactions in relation to existing possibilities.2 The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism instantly nullified the problem. The countries of the former Soviet Union threw away the principles of planned economy, began their transition to a market economy, and sought to become integrated into the global economy. At the institutional level, a new deal emerged with the dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), the launch of the PHARE programme by the European Community and the development of the latter into the European Union, the entry of the ­Orga­ nisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) into the

1 The programme of the second basket was closely inspired by the work carried out, until then, in the framework of the UNECE. The establishment of the CSCE gave the UNECE a fresh impetus and helped enhance its political authority. See Jean Siotis, “The United Nations Economics Commission for Europe in the perspective of the CSCE”, Studia diplomatica, vol. 17, nos. 5–6 (­September–November 1974), pp. 791–816. 2 For more details, see Jean-Daniel Clavel, Les relations économiques Est-Ouest (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989), 278 p. 336   The Economic Dimension of the OSCE

pan-European arena, and the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in May 1990.3 Within the CSCE, the evolution of the economic dimension was marked by the Bonn Document (April 1990), the decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992), the decisions of the Rome Council of Ministers (December 1993) and the decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (December 1994).

1. The Bonn Document (April 1990) The CSCE proceeded to update (aggiornamento) its second basket with the Final Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe (19 March to 11 April 1990), drawn up quite faithfully on the basis of proposals made by the twelve Member States of the European Community.4 Through this text, the first of the final documents adopted by the CSCE since the collapse of communism, the States of the former Eastern bloc solemnly recognized the need for “free and competitive market economies where prices are based on supply and demand.”5 They agreed that a single economic system across Europe would provide the benefits of improving the performance of macroeconomic policies, responding better to the needs and wishes of consumers, strengthening economic co-operation between participating States, contributing to a more open world trading system, and improving the efficiency of the public sector.6 The Bonn Document, a true ode to the market-based economy, listed in a detailed and pedagogical manner its basic requirements: – Economic freedom for the individual, conceived as an aspect of the free, general development of the individual and defined as the right for every citizen to “own, buy, sell and otherwise utilize property”;7 – Private property, guaranteed in the context of full recognition of “all types of property”,8 the principle of non-discriminatory treatment between the private

3 On the origins of the EBRD, see Jacques Attali, Europe(s) (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 207 p. See also Steven Weber, “Origins of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development”, International Organization, vol. 48, no. 1 (Winter 1994), pp. 1–38, and Charles Vuylsteke, “The EBRD: Its Mandate, Institutions, Challenges and Responses”, MOCT-MOST, vol. 5, no. 2 (1995), pp. 29–155. 4 See CSCE/KWZEB.1/Rev1 (28 March 1990) (and Amend. 1–3). 5 Final Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe (1990), preamble, § 27, third indent. References to the market-based economy are also found in §§ 11, 21 and 26 of the preamble, as well as in §§ B.3, D.1 and D.3. 6 Ibid., preamble, § 17. The reference to the public sector was requested by Yugoslavia (CSCE/KWZEB.7 of 21 March 1990, p. 3). 7 Bonn Document (1990), preamble, § 22. 8 Ibid., preamble, § 27, sixth indent. See also § B.2 regarding industrial, commercial and intellectual property rights.  Chapter VI   337

and public sectors9 and the “right to prompt, just and effective compensation” in the event of expropriation;10 – The private sector, a source of initiative (“while governments provide the overall framework for economic activity, business partners make their own decisions”)11 and of potential funding (“capital from private sources will progressively become the principal source of external finance”);12 – Direct contacts between business partners, that is to say between customers and suppliers,13 between “between businessmen at all levels of commerce and stages of industry and end-users”,14 and between representatives of “commercial and business organizations and economic institutions”.15 It should be pointed out that the Bonn Conference was not a conventional diplomatic meeting, but – according to the CSCE’s own terminology – a “forum” where each national delegation comprised both diplomats and representatives of business organizations.16 The latter actively participated in the work and formulated a series of “comments and suggestions”, focusing, inter alia, on the role of chambers of commerce and small and medium-sized enterprises;17 – The regular publication of detailed, comparable and uptodate economic and commercial information, including statistical information on the balance of payments and GNP;18 – The freedom of establishment of businessmen, a principle whose adoption was not without difficulty on the part of the USSR and some European micro-States;19

9 Ibid., § B.1. It should be noted that the Soviet delegation proposed replacing the principle of non- discrimination with a reference to “the principle of the equality of all types of ownership” (CSCE/ KWZEB.12 of 29 March 1990, p. 3). 10 Bonn Document (1990), preamble, § 27, seventh indent. This provision was originally proposed by the United States (CSCE/KWZEB.5 of 20 March 1990, p. 3). 11 Bonn Document (1990), preamble, § 23; see also § C.1. 12 Ibid., § D.3. 13 “In order to facilitate the exchange of goods and services among companies – whether private or state-owned – and individuals in both domestic and international markets” (ibid., preamble, § 27, eighth indent). 14 Ibid., § A.1, third sentence. 15 Ibid., § A.1, fifth sentence. 16 The CSCE had previously organized a Scientific Forum (Hamburg, 1980), a Cultural Forum (Budapest, 1985) and an Information Forum (London, 1989). 17 The text of these comments and suggestions was inserted in the Bonn Conference: Journal No. 18 of 11 April 1990, pp. 3–13. At the request of the United States, two addenda also submitted by the business community represented at the Conference, one on economic and commercial information and the other on marketing and production were annexed to the same Journal, pp. 14–17. Also, it should be noted that in the Bonn Document (1990), preamble, § 5, tribute is payed to the contribution made by the representatives in question to the work of the Conference. 18 Bonn Document (1990), §§ A.2, A.3 and B.3. 19 Ibid., §§ A.1 and B.1. It should be noted that the USSR would have preferred to replace the principle of freedom of establishment with a simple commitment to facilitate the establishment of businessmen “on a non-discriminatory and reciprocal basis”, see CSCE/KWZEB.12 (29 March 1990), p. 2. 338   The Economic Dimension of the OSCE

– The free flow of trade, capital, investment and repatriation of profits in convertible currencies;20 – Establishing an efficient price mechanism and currency convertibility by means of sound fiscal and monetary policies.21 The Bonn Document added three political, social and ecological requirements to those other more conventional elements. It thus established (at the instigation of the United States) an express relationship between market economy and political pluralism as illustrated by free, periodic and genuine elections, effective respect for human rights, and economic activities compatible with human dignity, that is, free from forced labour, discrimination against workers (including on grounds of political opinions or religious beliefs), and denial of the right to freedom of association.22 Likewise, it linked the market economy to the objective of social justice,23 acknowledging that raising the standard of living, improving the quality of life and expanding employment opportunities should go hand in hand with growth and the efficient use of economic resources.24 Lastly, the Bonn Document stressed the vital need for the compatibility of economic development with the protection of the environment.25 The Bonn Document did not incorporate the Soviet ideas of linking the expansion of trade opportunities with the “conversion of military production to civilian” (that is to say, the consequences of disarmament) or the prospect of “a pan-­European economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals”.26 The Document merely acknowledged that “progressive convergence of economic policies among the participating States opens new long-term perspectives for the strengthening of their economic relations.”27 On the other hand, at the request of Cyprus and ­Yugoslavia, it emphasized that the new pan-European economic co-operation should take into account the specific interests of the developing countries of ­Europe.28 Finally, it should be noted that the Bonn Document envisaged, albeit in cautious and unclear terms, the possibility of endowing the second basket with periodic self-evaluation meetings.29

20 Bonn Document (1990), preamble, § 27, second indent; see also §§ B.3 and B.6. 21 Ibid., preamble, § 27, first indent and § D.2. 22 Ibid., preamble, § 27. See also CSCE/KWZEB.5 (20 March 1990) and CSCE/KWZEB.11 (29 March 1990). 23 Ibid., preamble, § 27, fourth indent. 24 Ibid., preamble, § 12. 25 Ibid., preamble, § 27, fifth indent. 26 See CSCE/KWZEB.12 (29 March 1990). 27 Bonn Document (1990), preamble, § 24. 28 Ibid., preamble, § 20. This provision is the remnant of proposals made by Cyprus (CSCE/ KWZEB.6 of 20 March 1990) and Yugoslavia (CSCE/KWZEB.7 of 21 March 1990) concerning the responsibilities of industrialized countries towards developing countries. 29 “In view of the profound and rapid changes taking place in Europe, and wishing to maintain the valuable momentum built up at the present Conference, the participating States ... suggest that the next Follow-up Meeting or any other main CSCE meeting at the appropriate level examines  Chapter VI   339

The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, adopted on 21 November 1990, solemnly confirmed the provisions of the Bonn Document on the interdependence between democracy and economic and social freedom,30 environmental protection,31 promotion of investment,32 increased and diversified trade according to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules (the institution being mentioned for the first time in a CSCE final document)33 and, above all, social justice – a concept supported by various words (“progress”, social “development”, “welfare” of the peoples, “unemployment”, “economic and social growth”) aimed at minimizing the logic of the market economy.34 Nevertheless, the Charter of Paris introduced two new references. The first dealt with the theme of the common prosperity of Europe, which the Bonn Document had mentioned only in passing.35 The Charter confirmed that: “Economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility are indispensable for prosperity”36 and that co-operation based on the market economy “will be instrumental in the construction of a prosperous and united Europe.”37 Above all, the Charter considered that the success of the transition of the Eastern countries to the market economy would allow for the sharing of the fruits of increased prosperity in Greater Europe.38 The second reference related to scientific and technological co-operation. The Charter recognized that scientific progress contributed to economic and social development and to the strengthening of human rights. A sign of the times, it affirmed (which was previously unthinkable) that scientific and technical co- operation should be oriented “towards a greater sharing of appropriate scientific and technological information and knowledge” in order to “overcome the technological gap which exists among the participating States.”39 Implicitly, it admitted that the quick consolidation of the new democracies in Central and Eastern

the possibilities for expanding and intensifying economic co-operation, including through meetings within the CSCE aimed at periodic review of progress and providing new impulses for economic relations among participating States” (§ 1 of the final clauses of the Bonn Document). 30 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), “A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity”, section on “Economic Liberty and Responsibility”, §§ 1 and 2; and “Guidelines for the future”, section on “Economic Co-operation”, § 1. 31 Ibid., “Economic Liberty and Responsibility”, §§ 1 and 2, and the entire section on “Environment”. 32 Ibid., “Economic Co-operation”, § 3. 33 Ibid., “Economic Co-operation”, § 3. 34 Ibid., “Economic Liberty and Responsibility”, §§ 1, 2 and 3, and “Economic Co-operation”, § 3, 4 and 7. References to “social justice” are mainly attributable to the Netherlands, the Holy See, Hungary and the USSR. 35 Paragraph 9 of the preamble of the Bonn Document referred to the general perspective of a “new order of peace, stability and prosperity ...” 36 See Charter of Paris (1990), “A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity”, section on “Economic Liberty and Responsibility”, § 1. 37 Ibid., “Economic Co-operation”, § 1. 38 Ibid., “Economic Liberty and Responsibility”, § 3. 39 Ibid., “Economic Co-operation”, § 6. 340   The Economic Dimension of the OSCE

Europe depended not only on political and economic support, but also on the introduction of advanced Western technologies – in particular to increase citizens’ participation in political life and to encourage the development of international business transactions adapted to the needs of emerging market economies.40 Within the CSCE, the consensus on this point was not fortuitous. This was in line with the recent decisions taken by the 17 members of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) following a high-level meeting held on 6 and 7 June 1990.41

2. Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992) Whereas the matter of economic co-operation was scarcely addressed by the Berlin Council of Ministers of June 1991, the Prague Council of Ministers of January 1992 reaffirmed the need to “strengthen the focus of [the] CSCE on the transition to and development of free-market economies as an essential contribution to the building of democracy.”42 Consequently, it was decided to establish an “Economic Forum within the framework of the CSO” and the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting was instructed to consider “further measures to promote discussions in the framework of the CSCE on economic co-operation and related topics.”43 At the conclusion of its work, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting adopted two long series of provisions incorporated as Chapters VII (“Economic Co-operation”) and VIII (“Environment”) in the Helsinki Decisions.44 With the exception of the provisions on the Economic Forum, Chapter VII brought nothing new.45 On the

40 See the Klejdzinski Report (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 6337 of 21 November 1990), p. 6. 41 At the end of the meeting, it was decided, among other things, to reduce by one third the list of restrictions on high-tech exports and to extend to the USSR a treatment similar to that of China, that is to say, less rigorous than in the past. See Atlantic News, no. 2232, 13 June 1990, p. 3 and no. 2260, 10 October 1990, p. 4. The restrictions imposed by the CoCom having been relaxed but not abolished, the Charter of Paris recommends only a greater sharing of scientific and technological information and knowledge described (in a deliberately vague manner) as “appropriate”. 42 Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures (1992), § 18. Following an American suggestion, the Council also called for the establishment and strengthening of independent chambers of commerce in countries transitioning to market economies: Prague Council of Ministers, Summary of Conclusions, § 20. 43 Ibid., §§ 19 and 20. 44 On the negotiation of these two chapters, see The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: March 24–July 8, 1992 (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), pp. 43 and 47; Rob Zaagman: “Helsinki-II and the Second Basket”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 38–51; and Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 152–161. 45 The provisions of Chapter VII other than those concerning the Economic Forum were essentially drawn up on the basis of proposals from the twelve Member States of the EC (CSCE/HMJWG4/7 of 2 June 1992, CSCE/HM/WG4/8 of 15 June 1992 and CSCE/HM/WG4/9 of 17 June 1992).  Chapter VI   341

other hand, Chapter VIII, dealing with a highly topical subject,46 brought some new elements: it recognized the need for co-operation not only to ensure the safety of civilian nuclear installations but also to bring hazards for the environment arising from military defence activities under control.47 At the insistence of Canada, Chapter VIII also outlined the forthcoming Seminar of Experts in Montreal on the subject (very new to the CSCE) of “Sustainable Development of Boreal and Temperate Forests”.48 Lastly, it recommended that the United Nations Centre for ­Urgent Environmental Assistance be connected to the CSCE Communications Network – a decision which was adopted as an alternative to the German idea (supported by the twelve Member States of the European Community) of humanitarian “Green Helmets”.49 To sum up, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting confirmed that, beyond declarations of intent, the economic dimension remained the Cinderella of the CSCE.

3. Decisions of the Rome Council of Ministers (December 1993) Whereas the Stockholm Council of Ministers of December 1992 merely welcomed the forthcoming start of the Economic Forum’s work,50 the Rome Council of Ministers devoted an entire section of its final document to economic co- operation. While pointing out that the economic dimension was an integral part of the overall CSCE security concept, the Rome Council of Ministers recognized that there was an interrelation between the establishment of democratic institutions and the institution of the market economy. It thereby concluded that “economic co-operation is essential to strengthening security and stability in the CSCE ­area.”51 Accordingly, it was recommended that the Permanent Committee better integrate economic dimension activities into the overall CSCE activities52 and, in addition, strengthen the CSCE’s collaboration with international economic, financial and developmental organizations (including NGOs).53 The Rome Council of Ministers also believed that the economic dimension should be given a more prominent place in the Programme of Coordinated Support for newly

46 Reference to the incident at the Sosnovy Bor nuclear power plant, near St Petersburg, which occurred on the very day of the opening of the Follow-up Meeting. 47 See Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter VIII, § 9 and see also Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 32. 48 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter VIII, § 16, and CSCE/HM/WG4/l (10 April 1992). The agenda and organizational arrangements of the seminar were later set by the CSO, see CSCE/18/CSO/ Dec.l (13 December 1992). The seminar took place from 27 September to 1 October 1993, see CSCE Communications No. 131 (26 April 1993), No. 241 (14 September 1993) and No. 268/Rev.1 (11 October 1993). 49 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter VIII, § 14 and CSCE/HM/WG4/5 (20 May 1992). 50 Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 2, § 3. 51 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapter V, § 1, third sentence. 52 Ibid., Decisions, chapter V, § 1, last sentence. 53 Ibid., Decisions, chapter V, § 1, fourth sentence and § 2. 342   The Economic Dimension of the OSCE

admitted States in the CSCE.54 Finally, the Council decided that the Vienna Secretariat would provide “permanent support” for the Economic Forum with the help of an “economic expert”.55 Clearly, the Rome Decisions heralded the onset of a certain revitalization of the CSCE’s economic dimension.

4. Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (December 1994) For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the Budapest Review Conference was systematic in defining the scope of the economic dimension. The Conference outlined that the scope covered activities in the fields of economics, the environment, and science and technology, as well as regional and transfrontier co-­ operation.56 Reaffirming the interconnected nature of all elements of global security, the Conference decided to stimulate the CSCE’s economic dimension based on the decisions made following the Rome Council of Ministers. In addition to adopting various measures to strengthen the Economic Forum, the Budapest Review Conference recommended that the Chairman-in-Office convene the Permanent Committee in order to consider means to integrate the economic dimension into CSCE activities – with the participation of representatives of relevant international economic and financial organizations.57 It should be noted that the Conference did not venture to retain the concept of “economic security” (as mentioned in the first draft texts of the coordinator of the economic dimension), nor did it consider the possibility (raised by the United States) of using the principles of the economic dimension for the prevention of conflict or, above all, the peaceful settlement of environmental disputes.58 On the other hand, the Budapest Conference authorized the Secretary General to create a full-time economist position and to assign Secretariat staff to provide the necessary support for economic dimension activities.59 Finally, the Budapest Conference approved the holding of a seminar on tourism in Romania (in the autumn of 1995) and

54 Ibid., Decisions, chapter V, § 3. 55 Ibid., Decisions, chapter V, § 4. 56 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter IX, § 2, second sentence. It should be noted that the theme of migrant workers is not mentioned. Since 1989 it had in fact been moved from the economic dimension to the human dimension. As for the topic of trans-frontier co-operation, it had first appeared in Chapter IX of the 1992 Helsinki Decisions. 57 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter IX, § 25. 58 “Draft 1” submitted by the Coordinator of Group 11 (25 November 1995) contained an interesting passage, that went as follows: “Economic security is a broad concept. It encompasses aspects such as the securing of populations against risks inherent in the market economy, securing the functioning of the production system by reducing risks concerning the supply of energy and raw materials, the flow of goods and services, unhindered communications, and so forth. Economic aspects of security include, for example, the economies of arms production and trade, defence conversion, etc.” (pp. 5–6). 59 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter IX, § 24.  Chapter VI   343

adopted the principle of convening a new Scientific Forum similar to that organized in Hamburg in 1980.60 Since then, the only significant development has been the convening of the Economic Dimension Implementation Review Meeting by the Permanent Council following the work of the Third Meeting of the Economic Forum. Held in Geneva on 22 and 23 January 1996, the meeting considered that the commitments contained in the Bonn Document of 1990 remained valid. It acknowledged that while considerable progress had been made at the microeconomic level, much remained to be done at the macroeconomic level, and that more attention should be given to the social cost of economic transition – a factor which generally had been overlooked.61 When deciding to convene the meeting, the Permanent Council made clear that it did not intend to set a precedent for future reviews.62 Put another way, by the end of 1995, it was clear that a consensus had not yet been reached among the participating States on the alignment of the economic dimension with the military dimension and the human dimension (whose undertakings are subject to specific periodic evaluations).

II. The Economic Forum Like the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), the Economic Forum was the outcome of a birth unwanted by a number of participating States. It is not a fully-fledged institution (such as the Forum for Security Co-operation) but a specialized session of the Senior Council (formerly the Committee of Senior Officials). The circumstances of the Forum’s establishment and its current functioning will be analysed here.

1. The Establishment of the Economic Forum The establishment of the Economic Forum was proposed by the United States at the Prague Council of Ministers in January 1992, in the following terms: In order to strengthen the focus of [the] CSCE on the development of free-­ market institutions which contribute to the building of democracy, a CSCE ‘Economic Forum’ is established to commence dialogue and suggest practical efforts for development of free-market systems. The Forum will meet once or twice per year in Prague and can invite at its meetings relevant European and transatlantic organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations. It can

60 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter IX, § 23 (inspired by the Romanian proposal CSCE/ BC.7 of 17 November 1994) and § 14. 61 EDIREM Journal (23 January 1996), Annex 1, §§ 4–6). At the request of the Permanent Council, the UNECE submitted to the meeting a background paper: REF.SEC/3/96 (10 January 1996). On the UNECE, see Norman Scott, “The UN/ECE and its Secretariat in the Process of Transition”, in Victor-Yves Ghebali and Dietrich Kappeler (eds.), Multiple Aspects of International Relations: Essays in Memory of Professor Jean Siotis (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 187–199. 62 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 77 of 28 September 1995. 344   The Economic Dimension of the OSCE

also hold specific project-oriented meetings of short duration, open to those CSCE States interested in participating.63 The idea, warmly welcomed by the Central and Eastern European countries transitioning to market economies, was however strongly criticized by the twelve Member States of the European Community.64 The United States justified its proposal in terms of the logic of the concept of global security. Thus, it argued that economic prosperity was one of the essential conditions for stability and security in post-communist Europe. It also reasoned that a balanced development of the three baskets (a fundamental concern of the West during the East–West era) required that the economic dimension not be overlooked – whereas the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) were managed by the CPC and were allocated an annual evaluation meeting, and the human dimension activities benefited from the infrastructure of the Warsaw Office and had a biennial evaluation meeting. Behind these arguments, there were two political concerns: firstly, to avoid the CSCE focusing most of its attention on security problems, to the possible detriment of NATO and, secondly, to lessen the influence of the European Community, which was the primary source of financial support for the transition to the market-based economy.65 Yet the twelve Member States of the European Community saw no good reason to drag the CSCE into an area where its expertise was non-existent and where there was already considerable competition and a plethora of institutions. The compromise reached in Prague in January 1992 resulted in the decision in principle to establish an Economic Forum “within the framework of the CSO”. It did not involve the creation of a new institution, but merely implied the holding of CSO economic sessions aimed at a threefold objective: to stimulate political dialogue on economic transition and its linkage with building democracy; to formulate suggestions on economic co-operation and the development of free-market systems; and to encourage the work of relevant international institutions (OECD, EIB, EBRD, EEC/UN). It was also agreed that the Forum, which would meet “periodically” in Prague commencing early in 1993, could ask for contributions to the relevant European and transatlantic organizations – but not to NGOs, as proposed by the United States.66 At the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the United States challenged the terms of the compromise by proposing that the Forum be the instrument for managing all activities related to the economic dimension.67 After strenuous negotiations, during which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had very little influence, a final settlement was reached – closer to the European vision than that of the

63 American non-paper dated 9 January 1992. 64 With the notable exception of Germany, which had pushed for the institutionalization of second-­ basket activities since the Bonn Conference. 65 See Zaagman, “Helsinki-II and the Second Basket …” (n. 44), p. 47. 66 Prague Document (1992), § 19. 67 See Zaagman, “Helsinki-II and the Second Basket …” (n. 44), p. 48.  Chapter VI   345

United States, in that the Follow-up Meeting reaffirmed (with some limited precision) the essence of the Prague formula.68 The twelve Member States of the European Community succeeded in having it stipulated that the Economic Forum would be “governed by the same arrangements as those applying to all regular CSO meetings,”69 that it would hold (“as a general rule”, as introduced by the Americans) only a brief two- or three-day annual meeting devoted to two or three specific subjects,70 and that its work should be organized in such a way as not to duplicate existing international institutions and to avoid draining the CSCE’s scarce resources.71 The Americans obtained (limited) concessions on two points – private sector participation and the institutionalization of the second basket. Firstly, it was agreed that the discussion topics selected for the Economic Forum could be studied through meetings of experts organized and funded by one or more participating States and/or by international organizations, “possibly” (a clarification introduced at the request of the twelve EC Member States) in co-­ operation with private organizations.72 Unlike Forum discussions, the meetings in question would be open to economic policymakers, parliamentary leaders, and representatives of NGOs and the private sector,73 although it was understood that (as wished by the twelve EC Member States) the reports produced by the expert groups would not contain binding commitments for participating States.74 Secondly, the Follow-up Meeting agreed that the function of the Economic Forum would not be strictly limited to the process of transition to market-based economies. On the basis of an American idea, the Follow-up Meeting stated that the Forum “should serve as an important mechanism for reviewing the implementation of CSCE commitments in the areas of economics, the environment and science and technology.”75 But in line with the European Community approach, it then immediately went on to assert that “the political impulses which the Economic Forum is mandated to give to the discussion on the economic, environmental and science and technology aspects of the transition process will complement and support work in the international economic and environmental organizations that are addressing these problems at an operational level.”76

68 See CSCE/HM/WGA/6 (1 June 1992) (and Add. 1), a working proposal submitted by some thirty delegations including the twelve Member States of the EC, the United States and Russia. 69 Helsinki Decisions (1992), Chapter VII, § 23. This provision confirmed that No new structure would be created. 70 Ibid., Chapter VII, § 26. 71 Ibid., Chapter VII, § 25. 72 Ibid., Chapter VII, § 27. 73 Ibid., Chapter VII, § 28. 74 Ibid., Chapter VII, § 29. 75 Ibid., Chapter VII, § 31. 76 Ibid., Chapter VII, § 32. 346   The Economic Dimension of the OSCE

2. The Functioning of the Economic Forum To date, the Economic Forum has held four meetings in Prague. The First Meeting of the Economic Forum (17–18 March 1993), which took place as the 20th Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), devoted its debates to the issue of favourable business climate, the human factors of the economic transition process, and integrating economic and environmental factors into the transition to market economies.77 The Second Meeting of the Economic Forum (15–17 March 1994) pursued this preliminary discussion and extended it to the favourable conditions for mutual trade and investments in the CSCE area, the role of infrastructures, and co-­ operation in the area of science and technology.78 During the Third Meeting of the Economic Forum (7–9 June 1995), views and experiences were exchanged on regional economic co-operation in the fields of trade, investment and infrastructure.79 The theme of the Fourth Meeting of the Economic Forum (27–29 March 1996) was the “Economic Dimension of Security in the OSCE Area”. The discussion focused mainly on managing the political and social risks of the economic transition process and building economic confidence in order to promote political security.80 A fifth meeting is due to take place from 11 to 13 June 1997. Many international, regional or universal institutions will, either on an occasional or regular basis, make “contributions” to the Economic Forum discussions: EEC/UN, EBRD, European Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe, Central European Initiative (CEI), Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Labour Organization (ILO), UNESCO, and the International Chamber of Commerce. The five non-­participating Mediterranean States approved by the CSCE (now considered “Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation”) were invited to the Forum from 1994 onwards. The following year, the Forum also opened its doors to Japan as well as to the Republic of Korea – countries having the status of “Partners for Co-operation”. It should also be noted that representatives of NGOs and the business community are part of the national delegations and are actively involved in the work of the Forum.81 As a follow-up to the Economic Forum’s work, four seminars were organized in 1994 and 1995 by interested host countries, with the co-operation or assistance

77 20th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 16 March 1993, Annex, “Agenda”. The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting had formulated the indicative agenda for this first meeting in the Annex to Chapter VII of the Helsinki Decisions. 78 26th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 1 of 15 March 1994, Annex, “Agenda”. 79 2nd Meeting of the Permanent Council: Journal No. 1 of 7 June 1995, Annex, “Agenda”. 80 See 4-EF (SC): Journal No. 1 (27 March 1996), Annex, “Agenda”. 81 In 1995 and 1996, the Forum even invited an NGO such as the Assembly of European Regions to contribute to the discussions.  Chapter VI   347

of the CSCE [and later OSCE] Secretariat, other international organizations and the business community. They focused respectively on “Promoting the Creation of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses” (Bishkek, 23–25 February 1994), “Business and the Environment” (Tallinn, 7–9 September 1994), “Tourism” (Bucharest, 6–8 November 1994) and “The Role of Trans-European Infrastructure for Stability and Co-operation in the Black Sea Region” (Sofia, 15– 17 November 1995).82 A final text entitled “Chairman’s Summary” (written under the Chairman’s sole responsibility) is circulated at the end of each session. It outlines the outcomes of the work that has been carried out and makes suggestions on topics for future seminars.83 The first two meetings of the Economic Forum proved disappointing for all – governments, international organizations and the private sector. At the conclusion of its work, the 1994 meeting of the Economic Forum considered that the Budapest Review Conference should review the terms and conditions of the formula developed in Helsinki.84 In response to this recommendation, the Conference decided that the Economic Forum’s meetings would henceforth be prepared by an ad hoc informal group (convened by the Chairman-­ in-­ Office), with the participation – even at this early stage – of relevant international organizations.85 It was also agreed that the Forum would focus on fewer, more specific topics.86 Finally, the Budapest Review Conference acknowledged that the success of the Economic Forum’s work depended on the active and “high-level” participation of a range of governmental and non-governmental representatives (private sector, business associations, labour unions, academic communities, NGOs),87 neither (going so far as) envisaging the possibility of ministerial sessions as proposed by Russia,88 nor allowing the business community direct access to the Forum.89 It should also be noted that the Budapest Review Conference did not adopt any provision on better work organization for the Forum, as opposed to the United States, which had suggested shorter plenary sessions and informal working

82 In 1996, meetings and seminars were planned on international investments in the Far East (Khabarovsk), on direct investments in the CIS countries (Minsk), on sustainable economic growth in the North Pacific (Seattle) and on sustainable environmental development in the Aral Sea region. 83 The establishment of this Summary had been suggested by the CSO, see 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, Annex 5. For the text of the Chairman’s Summaries, see 20th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 18 March 1993, Annex; 26th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 17 March 1994, Annex; 2nd Meeting of the Permanent Council: Journal No. 3 of 9 June 1995, Annex; and 4-EF (SC): Journal No. 3 of 29 Mars 1996, Annex. 84 See 26th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 17 March 1994, decision 5(a). 85 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter IX, § 21. 86 Ibid., chapter IX, § 22. 87 Ibid., chapter IX, § 20. 88 See the statement made by the Russian delegate to Working Group 4 on 14 October 1994. 89 For references to the private sector, see Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter IX, §§ 26 and 27. 348   The Economic Dimension of the OSCE

bodies with moderators or rapporteurs, among other things. In fact, in Budapest, the Forum issue continued to divide the Americans and the twelve Member States of the EU: some wanted to transform the Forum into a permanent structure,90 while others felt that “strengthening the economic dimension in the CSCE does not imply the creation of new structures, but rather making best use of what is already available, both within and outside the CSCE.”91 The need to create “a viable economic dimension” and to readjust the objectives, functioning and follow-up of the Economic Forum was commonly discussed at the Third Meeting (1995) of the Economic Forum; a consensus was already emerging on the holding of an evaluation meeting to assess the commitments set out in the 1990 Bonn Document, and on the consideration of the economic dimension in the OSCE’s work in order to establish a common and comprehensive model of security for the twenty-first century.92 The Fourth Forum, the central theme of which was precisely economic security, took place in a climate conducive to the revitalization of the economic dimension. The discussion produced a wide range of proposals on social and economic elements likely to feed the (discussion on the) Security Model: a predictable national legal framework; an economic structure to forestall the emergence of excessive social disparities and social exclusion; no economic discrimination against national minorities; “an early warning system of social and economic indicators which are directly linked to security, and which would complement the macroeconomic early warning system developed by the IMF”; and so on.93 At the beginning of 1996, the economic dimension appears to be on the way to finally losing the status of poor relation that it had until then possessed within the OSCE. The participating States acknowledge that economic and social insecurity directly fuels aggressive nationalism and is the seedbed of ethnic conflicts. They now recognize, without apparent difficulty, the need to integrate as closely as possible the economic dimension into the major activities of the OSCE (in particular the work of long-term missions), into the implementation of the ­Programme of Coordinated Support for recently admitted participating States, and into the development of the Security Model. However, it is unlikely that such a consensus will allow the introduction of an early warning system in socio-­ economic matters into the “empty box” of the current economic dimension. Indeed, the conceptualization and the operationalization of the economic dimension present greater difficulties than that of the human dimension. The OSCE has neither the experience nor the resources to develop economic confidence-building measures or a specialized surveillance system. At most, it can give political impetus to bilateral and multilateral co-operation as well as to

90 See CSCE/BC.14 (23 November 1994). 91 See CSCE/BC.27 (24 November 1994). On changing attitudes to the role of the Forum, see REF. SEC/58/95/Rev.1 of 8 June 1995 (Russia/United States) and REF.SEC/59/95 of 8 June 1995 (­European Union). 92 See 2nd Meeting of the Senior Council: Journal No. 3 of 9 June 1995, Annex, p. 3. 93 See 4-EF (SC): Journal No. 3 of 29 March 1996, Annex, §§ 12–17.  Chapter VI   349

work undertaken in other international organizations. Such a role would not necessarily be insignificant, but it would hardly put the economic dimension on the same footing as the human dimension, a pillar of global security. 350    Chapter VII   351

CHAPTER VII The Human Dimension of the OSCE One of the great merits of the Helsinki process was to make the theme of human rights, at that time a taboo in East–West relations, the subject of dialogue and co- operation. Before perestroika, discussions on the issue at the Follow-up Meetings in Belgrade (1977–1978) and Madrid (1980–1983) were tense and acrimonious. This began to change with the Meetings of Experts in Ottawa (1985) and Bern (1986), and two breakthroughs took place at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting (1986–1989). Firstly, the Meeting gave rise to meaningful discussions during which the countries in the Eastern bloc (with the exception of Romania) responded to the criticisms levelled at them on the subject of civil and political rights, while themselves criticizing the West on economic, social and cultural rights. Secondly, the Follow-up Meeting developed and adopted the concept of the “human dimension of the CSCE”. This linked the commitments of Principle VII of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States (“Helsinki Decalogue”) to those of the third basket, referring both to a co-operation method and a threestage Conference (Paris, Copenhagen, Moscow) to examine the implementation and possible development of the Vienna Mechanism.1 This section will analyse the human dimension of the OSCE through its development since 1990, its working instruments, its contribution towards the issue of national minorities, and its relationship to the Council of Europe.

I. The Stages of Development of the Human Dimension The collapse of communism raised immediate questions within the CSCE around the objectives, working methods, and possible institutionalization of the human dimension. The era of major political discussions on human rights and democracy had clearly changed and it now appeared that the focus should be on practical resources enabling the countries freed from the yoke of communism to access democracy, to develop the rule of law, and to promote respect for fundamental freedoms. In other words, it was less the nature and extent of the human dimension obligations that was considered crucial than their effective implementation: the objective to be achieved was no longer to adopt new commitments, but to adequately monitor existing commitments. In addition, the human dimension could no longer serve as a pressure tactic and means of political condemnation. Good sense dictated that it be transformed into an “educational” instrument of co-operation and constructive interaction,

1 A section of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting (1989) is purposely entitled “Human dimension of the CSCE”. On the evolution of the human dimension during the East–West era, see Alexis Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension, 1972–1992 (London: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. xn–217. 352   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

aimed at encouraging weaker countries to take account of the nature of their structural shortcomings and use the CSCE to remedy them. Finally, the newly adjusted human dimension had to be ascribed structures which were appropriate to the new requirements. In practical terms, this involved deciding whether the Vienna Mechanism should be developed, whether the mandate of the Conference on the Human Dimension should be confirmed, and whether a certain specialized infrastructure should be created. However, following the collapse of communism, the place of the human dimension within an institutionalized CSCE was the subject of a Franco-American dispute. Keen to avoid polarization within the CSCE on issues of political and military security (likely to weaken the raison d’être of NATO, which no longer had a declared enemy), the United States advocated an expansion of the human dimension, to which France was opposed on grounds of principle, wishing instead to promote the role of the Council of Europe, an exclusively European institution. The stages of development of the human dimension since the end of the Cold War should be analysed in the light of these considerations. Its development was pragmatic and was marked by the successive contributions of the Copenhagen Document (1990), the Charter of Paris (1990), the Moscow Document (1991), the Prague Document (1992), the decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992), the decisions of the Council of Ministers in Rome (1993) and the decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (1994).

1. The Copenhagen Document (June 1990) The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Copenhagen Document) of 29 June 1990 was the first text to state the fundamental values of post-communist Greater Europe and represented a clear turning point in the history of the human dimension of the CSCE.2 The Copenhagen Document resoundingly confirmed what the Concluding Document in Vienna merely anticipated at the start of 1989: the existence of a

2 On the Copenhagen Meeting and Document, see Arie Bloed, “Successful Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of CSCE”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 8, no. 3 (1990), pp. 235–260; Thomas Buergenthal, “The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order for Europe”, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 11, no. 1–2 (1990), pp. 217–246; Traian Creeeleu, “The Human Dimension of the CSCE: The Copenhagen Meeting”, Revue roumaine d’études internationales, vol. 24, no. 1 (1990), pp. 11–23; Emmanuel Decaux, “La réunion de Copenhague de la Conférence sur la dimension humaine de la CSCE (5-29 juin 1990)”, Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 94, no. 4 (1990), pp. 1019–1034; Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, “The Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE: Adopting a European Charter of Freedom”, NATO Review, vol. 38, no. 4 (August 1990), pp. 9–15; Yuri Reshetov, “The Copenhagen Meeting”, International Affairs (Moscow), no. 10 (October 1990), pp. 29–35 and p. 54; and Jean-Daniel Vigny, “Le Document de la réunion de Copenhague sur la dimension humaine de la CSCE”, Revue universelle des Droits de l’Homme, vol. 2, no. 9 (22 October 1990), pp. 305–313. See also Heraclides, Security and Co- operation in Europe … (n. 1), pp. 119–135 and From Vienna to Helsinki: Reports on the Inter-sessional Meetings of the CSCE Process (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), pp. 67–93.  Chapter VII   353

single concept of human rights in Europe focused particularly on the rule of law – defined as “justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its fullest expression” (§ 2) – and the holding of free elections at reasonable intervals (§ 7).3 It also listed a significant number of rights and freedoms, the scope and content of which went beyond the Vienna Concluding Document and even proposals which were submitted, in vain, to the Paris Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension.4 In comparison to the Vienna Document, the Copenhagen Document included new elements such as the right of peaceful assembly and demonstration, the right to peacefully enjoy property alone or in common with others, the rights of the child, the transfer of sentenced persons, conscientious objection, human rights obligations during a state of public emergency, as well as sending observers from participating States or NGOs during procedures before national courts.5 It should also be noted that it assigned the issue of national minorities a hitherto unprecedented place within the CSCE.6 Moreover, in order to encourage the transition of the former popular democracies to the rule of law, it laid the foundations for ­multilateral co-operation in relation to the development of democratic institutions.7 Lastly, it adopted provisions aimed at facilitating NGO access to the work of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE.8 In short, the ­Copenhagen Document deepened and broadened the commitments to the human dimension, which extended beyond the theme of human rights to

3 The eight paragraphs forming section I of the Copenhagen Document provide a genuine reference work and an illustration of the rule of law. 4 All the texts submitted to the Paris Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension have been the subject of a pamphlet published by the Government of Denmark, Compendium of Proposals made at the First Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, held in Paris from 30 May to 23 June 1989 (Copenhagen, 1990) (unpaged). On the work of the Paris Meeting, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, “La Conférence sur la dimension humaine de la CSCE”, Défense nationale, no. 503 (November 1989), pp. 103–116 and Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe … (n. 1), pp. 110–114. 5 Copenhagen Document (1990), §§ 9.2, 9.6, 13, 15, 18.1–18.6, 25 and 12. Furthermore, the Document reaffirmed with more detail and force prior elements such as freedom of expression (including the right to communication), freedom of association, including for workers, and the freedom to strike, the right to leave any country including one’s own and to return to one’s country, the right to form and join NGOs for the protection and promotion of human rights, the right of the individual to receive remedies for the violation of his or her fundamental rights, the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (including abusive psychiatric practices), the death penalty and the rights of migrant workers: see §§ 9.1, 9.3, 9.5, 10.3, 11–11.3, 16–16.7, 17–17.8, and 22–22.4. 6 See Copenhagen Document (1990), section IV, §§ 30–40.7. For additional details, see also further in this volume, Chapter VII, part III, ‘The OSCE and the issue of national minorities’. 7 See Copenhagen Document (1990), section III, §§ 26–29. 8 See the Annex entitled “Chairman’s statement on the access of non-governmental organizations and the media to meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension”. 354   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

include the rule of law and pluralist democracy. Its normative contribution was truly substantial. Nonetheless, the Copenhagen Document was disappointing on the institutional level. The decision to institutionalize the CSCE as a whole was still in limbo. Furthermore, the question of the CSCE’s relationship to the Council of Europe (that is to say, the distribution of tasks relating to the human dimension between the two institutions) was beginning to raise difficulties. The proposals made on the institutional development of the human dimension in general, and the ­Vienna Mechanism in particular, were rejected due to France’s opposition. Ultimately, the participating States agreed only to introduce minor changes to how the Mechanism operated.9

2. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe (November 1990) In contrast to the Copenhagen Document, the normative contribution of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (21 November 1990) was non-existent. The Charter simply confirmed that the scope of the human dimension was defined by the “human rights, democracy, rule of law” trinomial, while stressing the importance of individual fundamental freedoms connected with the exercise of civil and political rights.10 In terms of practical co-operation, it went further than the Copenhagen Document by announcing that a first specialized meeting of the CSCE on the theme of national minorities would take place in the summer of 1991,11 and that a seminar aiming to encourage co-operation to strengthen the democratic institutions and promote the principle of the rule of law would take place in Oslo at the end of 1991.12 On the other hand, a breakthrough was made on the subject of the institutionalization of the human dimension: the Charter of Paris endowed the human dimension with a permanent administrative structure in the form of an Office for Free Elections based in Warsaw, which was responsible for facilitating “contacts and the exchange of information on elections within participating States”.13 In addition, the Charter stated that, following the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension planned for the end of 1991, CSCE participating States intended to develop the Vienna Mechanism with a view to including “new procedures involving, inter alia, the services of experts or a roster of eminent

9 Copenhagen Document (1990), section V, §§ 42.1–42.3. 10 Charter of Paris (1990), “A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity”, section on “Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law”. 11 Charter of Paris (1990), “A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity”, section on “Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law”, § 6 and “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, § 3. See also Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), chapter II, part B, and Annex III. 12 Charter of Paris (1990), “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, § 2. See also Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), chapter II, part B, and Annex II. 13 Charter of Paris (1990), “New structures and institutions of the CSCE Process”, § 13, and Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), chapter I, part G.  Chapter VII   355

persons experienced in human rights issues which could be raised under the mechanism.”14 It should also be noted that the Charter recognized that NGOs should be involved in an appropriate way in the “activities and new structures of the CSCE”.15

3. The Moscow Document (October 1991) At the end of its third and final meeting, held in the wake of the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, on 3 October 1991 the Conference on the Human Dimension adopted the Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow Document) – a text in three sections dedicated to the Human Dimension Mechanism, the rule of law, and human rights respectively.16 The preamble to the text states that the CSCE’s commitments to the human dimension are “one of the foundations of the international order”; at the same time, it specifies “categorically and irrevocably” that the commitments in question are “matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.”17 The fundamental decision taken in Moscow related to the human dimension of the CSCE. Its provisions were developed fairly substantially through a complex mechanism involving the intervention (on an optional or compulsory basis) of “Missions of Experts” or “Missions of Rapporteurs”.18 In addition, the Moscow Meeting decided not to renew the mandate of the Conference on the Human Dimension. It did, however, announce that the CSCE participating States envisaged broadening the remit of the Office for Free Elections to enable it to contribute to “strengthening democratic institutions within the participating States.”19 At the same time, it adopted various provisions in favour of NGOs.20

14 Charter of Paris (1990), “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, § 6. 15 Ibid., “Guidelines for the future”, section on “Non-governmental Organizations”. 16 On the Moscow Meeting and Document, see Arie Bloed, “Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE: A Critical Analysis”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), pp. 4–16; Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe … (n. 1), pp. 156–167; and From Vienna to Helsinki … (n. 2), pp. 151–175. 17 See Moscow Document of the third Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension (1991), preamble, § 9 [from hereon referred to as the ‘Moscow Document’]. The Report of the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (1991) contained a fairly similar provision, see section II, § 3. See also Helsinki Summit Declaration (1992), § 8. 18 For more details, see further in the volume, chapter VII, part III, ‘The instruments of the Human Dimension’. 19 The Moscow Document (1991), § 30, adopted on the basis of a proposal submitted by a group of countries including the United States, Canada and Germany: CSCE/CHDM.35 and Add.1 (25 September 1991). See also CSCE Communication No. 136 (4 October 1991). The French delegation reserved its position on this issue, stressing in an interpretative statement that all institutional problems would be dealt with at the forthcoming Helsinki Follow-up Meeting 1992, see Moscow HD Meeting (1991): Journal No. 18 of 3 October 1991, p. 3. 20 Moscow Document (1991), §§ 43–43.7. 356   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

Finally, in keeping with the Copenhagen Document, the Moscow Document broadened the scope of the human dimension on a number of new themes: support for legitimately elected governments in the event of their overthrow or attempted overthrow by undemocratic means, democratic control by the civil authorities of military and paramilitary forces, internal security and intelligence services and the police, protection of human rights during a state of public emergency, protection of journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions, rights of persons with disabilities, and education of citizens on human rights.21 It also introduced a number of provisions aiming to reaffirm or supplement the commitments contained in the existing corpus on the human dimension – notably on the subject of the operation of the rule of law (drafting and adopting laws, redress against administrative decisions and regulations, responsibility of the authorities responsible for applying the laws, etc.),22 detained persons and prisoners, protection of private and family life, domicile, correspondence and electronic communication, freedom of expression and freedom of the media, lifting of restrictions on travel and residence of nationals and foreigners, guarantees on freedom of artistic creation and preserving cultural heritage, the death penalty, national minorities, migrant workers, and equality between men and women.23 With the exception of section I on the rule of law, examination of the normative aspect of the Moscow Document led to criticism. There were too many provisions related to issues of marginal interest for an organization such as the CSCE (equality between the sexes, rights of people with disabilities, journalists on dangerous missions) in the eyes of the critics. On the most important subjects, moreover, the text expressed mere platitudes (for example, on national minorities, migrant workers, and the death penalty) or said nothing at all, due to a lack of consensus on rights of indigenous peoples.24 There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, the disproportionate emphasis on peripheral subjects was an attempt to mask, if not compensate for, the lack of progress on major, controversial subjects.25 Secondly, the focus on the protection of specific groups was an attempt to demonstrate that the normative approach was running out of steam.26 By establishing the limits of the normative approach, the Moscow Meeting thus

21 Ibid., §§ 17.2, 25–25.3, 28–28.10, 34, 41–41.5 and 42–42.6. On the protection of human rights under states of emergency, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, “The Human Dimension Regime on States of Public Emergency”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 32–38. 22 Ibid., §§ 18–18.4, 19–20.4, 21–21.2 and 22. 23 Ibid., §§ 23–23.2, 24, 26–26.2, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38–38.4 and 40–40.13. 24 On indigenous peoples, see a proposal submitted by Canada, the USSR and the Nordic countries (as well as Add.1: Greece). 25 “The length of the third chapter [on human rights] was partly the result of having nothing substantial on national minorities or other worthwhile issues, such as indigenous peoples.” See Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe … (n. 1), p. 164. 26 “As most issues had been settled before, the Moscow meeting had hardly any other possibility than to deal with a certain ‘residual category’ of human rights and humanitarian issues.” See Bloed, “Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE …” (n. 16), p. 8.  Chapter VII   357

marked the end of a certain stage in the evolution of the human dimension of the CSCE.

4. The Prague Document (January 1992) The Prague Document on the “further development of CSCE institutions and structures” (30 January 1992) confirmed that “monitoring and promoting progress in the human dimensions remains a key function of the CSCE.”27 In this light, three important decisions were taken. The first decision aimed at transforming the Office for Free Elections into the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and, additionally, made it responsible for tasks relating to the work of the Missions of Experts and Rapporteurs that would be created under the Moscow Mechanism.28 This decision confirmed the end of the dispute which had opposed France and the United States, and for which the Oslo Seminar on Democratic Institutions (4– 15 November 1991) had been the heated theatre.29 The second decision endowed the human dimension with its own working bodies: autonomous assessment meetings and specialized seminars. The ODIHR thus became responsible for organizing “every year in which a Follow-up Meeting does not take place” (that is to say, odd years), a short meeting in Warsaw to address implementation of the CSCE’s human rights commitments.30 It was also responsible for organizing seminars on building and revitalizing democratic institutions – starting with seminars on free media and migration.31 The third decision created the “consensus minus one” procedure for issues relating to the human dimension of the CSCE. The Prague Document stipulated that in cases of “clear, gross and uncorrected violations” of relevant CSCE commitments, appropriate action could be taken by the Council of Ministers or the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), if necessary in the absence of the consent of the State concerned.32 This decision heralded the integration of the human dimension activities into the CSCE’s crisis and conflict management competencies which had, to that point, been virtual.33

27 Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures (1992), § 6. [From here on referred to as the ‘Prague Document’]. 28 Ibid., §§ 9 and 14. 29 On the work of the seminar, see Arie Bloed, “Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions: A CSCE Meeting with Teething Troubles”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), pp. 17–22; Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe … (n. 1), pp. 167–169; and From Vienna to Helsinki … (n. 2), pp. 177–190. 30 Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures (1992), (1992), § 10, first indent. [From here on referred to as the ‘Prague Document’] 31 Ibid., § 10, last indent. 32 Ibid., § 16. On the “consensus minus one” procedure, see previous Chapter II in this volume, (n.133) pp. 39–40. 33 At its meeting in Prague, the Council of Ministers had indeed expressed the view that the objective of the CSCE was to “prevent conflict and consolidate peace through eliminating the root causes of tensions, by attaining in particular full respect for human rights, including those inscribed in 358   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

The Prague Document also charged the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992 with strengthening relations between the CSCE and NGOs.34

5. Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992) At the end of its deliberations, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992 adopted a long text on the human dimension, the provisions of which aimed to develop the human dimension on three levels: operational, normative and political.35 The Helsinki text defined the role of and relationship between the various instruments available to the human dimension – that is to say, the ODIHR, the ­Vienna Mechanism (management of which was devolved to the ODIHR), biannual meetings to assess the implementation of commitments, and specialized seminars.36 It also adopted new provisions in favour of NGOs.37 Normatively, the text consisted primarily of introducing certain new themes to the scope of the human dimension: indigenous populations, refugees and displaced persons, international humanitarian law, local and regional democracy, and nationality.38 As for the rest, it added only a few generally insignificant elements to the previous provisions on national minorities, tolerance, migrant workers, abolition of the death penalty, freedom of the media, and education.39 Finally, the Helsinki text created a High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) as a conflict prevention instrument – rather than an instrument of the human dimension.40 In doing so, it marked the beginning of the human dimension being integrated into the CSCE’s preventive diplomacy role – a process which was to grow.

6. Decisions of the Council Of Ministers in Rome (December 1993) In contrast to the Council of Ministers held in Stockholm at the end of 1992, the Rome meeting (29 November–1 December 1993) paid particular attention to the human dimension.41 As it drew to a close, it adopted three series of measures.

the CSCE provisions on national minorities, by building democratic institutions and by fostering economic and social progress.” See Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 6, fourth indent. 34 Prague Document (1992), section VIII. 35 For an analysis of the negotiations, see Rob Zaagman, “Helsinki-II and the Human Dimension: Institutional Aspects”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 52–64 and Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 137–151. 36 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, §§ 5–6, 7–8, 9–16 and 17–20. 37 Ibid., Chapter VI, §§ 15 and 16. 38 Ibid., Chapter VI, §§ 29, 39–46, 47–52, 53–54 and 55. 39 Ibid., Chapter VI, §§ 23–28, 30–35, 36–38, 58, 59 and 60. 40 Ibid., Chapter II. 41 In Stockholm, the Foreign Ministers merely stressed the “important role the Human Dimension of the CSCE should play in longer-term conflict prevention.” See Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 2 “The CSCE as a Community of Values”, § 6.  Chapter VII   359

The Council of Ministers recognized that implementing commitments on the human dimension should “be a focus of attention in the CSCE’s conflict prevention efforts”.42 Consequently, it was agreed that the political bodies of the CSCE would deal with issues relating to the human dimension as an “integral part of deliberations relating to European security” on a regular basis and that the mandates of the Missions of Long Duration would pay greater attention to issues relating to the human dimension.43 In addition, the Council of Ministers decided to develop the practical instruments of the human dimension by broadening the role and work of the ODIHR, streamlining the Moscow Mechanism (expanding the list of experts to include specialists on national minorities, reducing timescales, authorizing the Permanent Committee to trigger the Mechanism), and empowering the policy bodies of the CSCE to undertake more thorough assessment of the work of the Follow-up Meetings and specialized seminars.44 It also requested that the ODIHR intensify co-operation and co-ordination with NGOs – notably by including in its database the names of experts proposed by NGOs and collecting information on NGOs with experience in fields relevant to the human dimension.45 Finally, on the normative level, the Council of Ministers adopted – at the instigation of Russia, which was concerned by the status of Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia – a “Declaration on Aggressive Nationalism, Racism, Chauvinism, Xenophobia and Antisemitism”.46

7. Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (December 1994) The Budapest Review Conference, held after the first Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (27 September–15 October 1993), continued along the path of the Council of Ministers of Rome by deciding to practically integrate the activities of the ODIHR into those of the Senior Council, the Permanent Council and the Missions of Long Duration. It also agreed that the Permanent Council would regularly address issues relating to the human dimension and that the Council could also be called upon (by the Chairman-in-Office) where it was claimed that commitments to the human dimension were not being implemented.47 For its part, the ODIHR was authorized to participate, in an advisory capacity, in discussions of the Senior Council and the Permanent Council, and to regularly report to them on its activities.48 Finally, it was agreed that the ODIHR would be consulted prior to adopting the mandates of future

42 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.l. 43 Ibid., § IV.3. 44 Ibid., § IV.4–IV.6 and Annex A. 45 Ibid., § IV.2 and IV.4. 46 Ibid., section X. It appears that the concept of “chauvinism” was retained on the request of Ukraine. 47 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, §§ 5 and 6. 48 Ibid., chapter VIII, § 8. 360   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

Missions of Long Duration and that the existing Missions would designate a mission member to liaise with the ODIHR.49 In addition, the Budapest Review Meeting further broadened the role of the ODIHR and clarified the specialized seminars.50 It adopted a certain number of normative provisions relating to around a dozen themes, none of which was new: the rule of law, capital punishment, prevention of torture, national minorities (including the particular case of the Roma and Sinti), tolerance and non- discrimination, migrant workers, migration, international humanitarian law, freedom of expression, freedom of the media, freedom of movement, contacts between people, and cultural heritage.51 Furthermore, it tasked the Secretary General with examining how to intensify co-operation with NGOs and, in the immediate term, decided that the OSCE would henceforth begin using information from NGOs on the themes of the media and the practice of torture.52 Finally, it decided that the OSCE would act as a contact point for Roma and Sinti issues.53

8. Conclusion Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the developments which have taken place within the human dimension since the collapse of communism. Firstly, the scope of the human dimension has been both widened and deepened. It includes a catalogue of rights and freedoms which is considerably wider than that anticipated by the provisions of Principle VII of the Decalogue and the third basket. It also addresses the protection of human rights in its strict sense: through the themes of the rule of law and pluralist democracy, it includes the political and institutional conditions needed for human rights to be fulfilled.54

49 Ibid., chapter VIII, § 11. 50 Ibid., chapter VIII, §§ 8–13 and 42–43, as well as 14–16. 51 Ibid., chapter VIII, §§ 18–41. 52 Ibid., chapter VIII, § 17, § 10 (last indent) and § 20 (last sentence). 53 Ibid., chapter VIII, § 23, second indent. 54 See North Atlantic Assembly International Secretariat, The CSCE’s Human Dimension: Principles, Mechanisms and Implementation, draft interim report by Lord Chilworth, CC/CSCE 94(4), November 1994, § 7. Furthermore, while remaining fundamentally focused on the individual, the human dimension is concerned with collective categories such as national minorities, migrant workers or refugees and displaced persons.  Chapter VII   361

Human dimension commitments examined by the Review Conference in 1994

Freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief Freedom of expression and the media Freedom of association and peaceful assembly Freedom of movement Prevention of torture International humanitarian law Exchange of information on the abolition of capital punishment State of law (independence of the judiciary, habeas corpus, citizenship, political rights) Democratic institutions (free elections, national, regional and local democracy) Tolerance and non-discrimination, prevention of aggressive nationalism, racism, etc. National minorities Roma and Sinti Migration, including refugees and displaced persons Migrant workers Education and culture Treatment of citizens of other participating States Human contacts Cultural heritage

Secondly, the human dimension is now increasingly integrated into the prevention and management of crises and conflicts. All work by the High Commission on National Minorities is connected, in one way or another, to human dimension concerns. Moreover, the ODIHR is regularly involved in the work of the Missions of Long Duration. The human dimension thus occupies an effective (and not purely symbolic) place in the concept of “global security” within the OSCE. Thirdly, the human dimension has incorporated NGOs into the work of the OSCE. NGOs now make a non-negligible contribution to the human dimension of the OSCE and the importance of this role appears to be growing. Fourthly, the de-idealization of the human dimension has accentuated the erosion of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States. OSCE participating States expressly recognized that the human dimension commitments are “matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States” and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. The rule of the “consensus minus one” was adopted in this regard. Given the scope of the commitments in question, it may be considered that “practically no domestic institution or norm escapes the jurisdiction of the CSCE.”55 In sum, in contrast to the fears expressed by certain specialists after the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992, the human dimension was not relegated to the back

55 See Chilworth Report, The CSCE’s Human Dimension … (n. 54), § 13, p. 5. 362   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

burner: it remains one of the fundamental areas of activity for the OSCE and one of its incontestable strengths.56

II. The Instruments of the Human Dimension The human dimension of the OSCE currently has four discrete instruments: the Human Dimension Mechanism, the Review Conferences, the specialized seminars and, above all, the ODIHR.57

1. The Human Dimension Mechanism The Human Dimension Mechanism was established by the Vienna Concluding Document (1989) and was essentially bilateral. Its significant provisions authorize any participating State to address to any other, with no right of refusal, a request for information (including in the form of representation) on the subject of an issue relating to the human dimension or a request for a bilateral meeting with a view to examining and finding a solution to the issue in question.58 At the Copenhagen Meeting in June 1990, various proposals were submitted with a view to developing the Vienna Mechanism.59 Due to French opposition, the only thing the participating States agreed to was to increase flexibility in how the Mechanism operated. The three minor arrangements which were introduced in this regard (setting a maximum time frame of one month for written responses to be made to requests for information, setting an average time frame of three weeks

56 On the fears in question, see Alexis Heraclides, “Helsinki-II and the Human Dimension: Normative Commitments, the End of an Era?”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 65–76 and “The Human Dimension Swansong in Helsinki-II: The Normative Aspect with Emphasis on National Minorities”, in Arie Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 23–45. See also Rob Zaagman, “Helsinki II and the Human Dimension …” (n. 35), p. 59, and Thomas M. Buchsbaum, “The Future of the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 2 (1993), p. 6. 57 Not included here is the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who acts as an instrument of conflict prevention and whose role is examined further in this chapter, part II, section 3:‘The OSCE’s Preventive Diplomacy Approach’. 58 During the first two years of its existence, the Vienna Mechanism was activated more than a hundred times, although never between Western countries. See Arie Bloed and Pieter Van Dijk, “Supervisory Mechanism for the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, in Arie Bloed and Pieter Van Dijk (eds.), The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-up Meeting and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 74–108; Fons Coomans and Liesbeth Lijnzaad, in Bloed and Van Dijk (eds.), The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process, pp. 109–127; and Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe … (n. 1), pp. 114–118. See also DOC.485 (11 July 1994), p. 2. 59 Such proposals were made by the Neutral and Non-Aligned States intervention that related to observers to examine specific situations and cases relating to the human dimension under the Vienna Mechanism: CSCE/CHDC.1 (5 June 1990); by Canada on the appointment of rapporteurs to investigate and find solutions as part of the implementation of the Vienna Mechanism: CSCE/CHDC.3 (5 June 1990); by Denmark on the establishment of a “Committee on the Human Dimension of the CSCE” entitled to conduct enquiries: CSCE/CHDC.8 (6 June 1990); by a group of various countries o the involvement of individuals and NGOs to the Meetings of the Conference on the Human Dimension: CSCE/CHDC.23 (14 June 1990) and by the United States on mediation by mutual consent procedure: CSCE/CHDC.42 (27 June 1990).  Chapter VII   363

for holding bilateral meetings convened on request, and the non-evocation of issues outside the request during the bilateral meetings) represented merely a codification of existing practice.60 Shortly afterwards, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (November 1990) announced that, following the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension planned for the end of 1991, the CSCE governments envisaged developing the Vienna Mechanism with a view to including “new procedures involving, inter alia, the services of experts or a roster of eminent persons experienced in human rights issues which could be raised under the mechanism” – thus enabling individuals to participate in the protection of their rights as part of the Mechanism.61 The Meeting of Experts in Geneva on National Minorities (July 1991) also addressed the issue; however, given the disagreements between those in support of compulsory procedures and those advocating optional procedures, it ended up handing the issue to the Moscow Meeting.62 The development of the CSCE’s Human Dimension Mechanism was at the heart of the work of the Moscow Meeting. At the end of this meeting, the participating States decided to shorten the time frames set for answering requests for information and bilateral meetings to a maximum of ten days and one week ­respectively.63 Above all, however, they strengthened the Mechanism through an additional, particularly complex procedure. The negotiation opposed sup­ porters and adversaries of the introduction of a compulsory procedure.64 The

60 See Copenhagen Document (1990), § 42.1–42.3. Such arrangements were unsuccessfully suggested by Denmark and France at the Paris Meeting on the Human Dimension, see CSCE/ CDHP.7 (16 June 1989) and CSCE/CDHP. Add.1 (21 June 1989) and by various countries of the European Community, see CSCE/CDHP.20 (16 June 1989). 61 See Charter of Paris (1990), part on “Guidelines for the future”, “Human Dimension” section, § 6. Later on in Vienna at the PrepCom, France submitted a proposal on the possibility for any participating State having exhausted the bilateral provisions of the Vienna Mechanism to establish a commission of inquiry providing the government of the concerned country agrees to such an arrangement. The members of the commission would be chosen from a panel of jurists (referred to as the “CSCE High Council”), see CSCE/GVA.5 (29 October 1990). 62 Report of the Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva (1991), section VIII, § 2. See also Meeting of Expert on National Minorities: Journal No. 15 of 19 July 1991, ‘Chairman’s statement’, p. 2. In Geneva, the N+NA States tabled compulsory procedures, see CSCE/REMN. (2 July 1991), and countries of the Central European Initiative proposed a wording for section IV, CSCE/REMN.2 (8 July 1991), as well as proposal CSCE/REMN.15 (12 July 1991) made by Austria, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. On the other hand, the United States reverted to the idea of an optional procedure, an idea they first advanced during the Copenhagen Conference, see CSCE/REMN.19 (12 July 1991). 63 See Moscow Document (1991), § 2. Subsequently, provisions foreseen in the Helsinki Decisions 1992 tasked the ODIHR to serve as a “venue” for bilateral meetings held under the Vienna Mechanism, see Chapter VI, § 5a, first indent. This provision was adopted on the basis of the CSCE/HM/WG3/20 (10 June 1992) proposal tabled by Portugal on behalf of the European Community during the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting. 64 Proposals for optional procedures were submitted by the United States as CSCE/CHDM.4 (18 September 1991) and by the European Community as CSCE/CHDM.5 (18 September 1991). The notion of compulsory procedures came from the Netherlands, seconded by other European Community countries (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg), 364   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

compromise they reached consisted of retaining procedures which were both optional (§§ 4–8 of the Moscow Document) and compulsory (§§ 9–13). In relation to the compulsory procedures, the question was to find out whether a trigger threshold should be set at a fairly low level (Netherlands, Denmark) or a higher level (United States, United Kingdom, Turkey). The problem was resolved by the adoption of differentiated thresholds for situations which were common and those of exceptional gravity. Moreover, at the insistence of the United Kingdom (which feared accusations on the subject of Ulster), it was agreed that the compulsory procedure planned for standard cases could be implemented only after all bilateral provisions of the Vienna Mechanism had been exhausted. The optional procedures could be activated in two different ways. Firstly, a participating State may spontaneously invite a Mission of Experts with a view to helping it examine or resolve issues relating to the human dimension on its own territory (§§ 4–7). Depending on the mandate defined by the inviting country, the Mission (consisting of a maximum of three experts appointed by that country) may be authorized either to gather information simply to establish the facts, to exercise good offices and mediation services within the country, or to provide advisory services.65 The Mission’s observations and any comments from the inviting country may be discussed by the CSO with a view to possible follow-up. This first optional procedure was not connected to the Vienna Mechanism. Secondly, one or more participating States, having exhausted the bilateral procedures under the Vienna Mechanism, may inquire of another participating State whether it would agree to invite a Mission of Experts to its territory (§ 8). The procedure is indeed optional, as the Mission cannot be created without the agreement of the government in question.66 However, it can be activated only after the use of the Vienna Mechanism. As for the compulsory procedures, they can be activated in three different ways. Firstly, a group of at least six participating States may initiate the establishment of a Mission of Rapporteurs to be appointed to another participating State which has refused to agree to invite a Mission of Experts into its territory or if such a mission was not able to resolve the issue it was originally sent to resolve (§§ 9–11). This procedure aims at

see CSCE/CHDM.6 (18 September 1991), as well as Norway and a number of other countries including Switzerland and the USSR CSCE/CHDM.7 (19 September 1991). 65 In this respect, see the Moscow Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 3 October 1991, p. 4, where the United Kingdom asked for its’ interpretative statement to be included specifying that if expert services were required on its territory, it might be momentarily compelled “to decline or to regulate access at a particular time or to a particular place proposed by the mission.” In such circumstances, it would immediately consult with the mission to clarify the situation and “seek agreement on arrangements to enable the mission to obtain so much information as is practicable”; if such an agreement could not be reached, it would itself bring the matter to the attention of the CSO as soon as possible. Subsequently, the United Kingdom would formulate a similar interpretative statement on the visits of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, see Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, p. 6. 66 In the event of such an agreement, the applicable procedure would be the same as in the previous case.  Chapter VII   365

common situations, that is to say, those which are not particularly serious in nature. The Mission may include a member appointed by the requesting State, another by the State being requested, and a third by both of them. The task of the Mission is to establish the facts and formulate proposals or opinions on possible solutions to the issue that has been raised. The Mission report may be included in the agenda of the next regular meeting of the CSO, which will decide on any possible follow-up action. Secondly, a group of at least ten participating States may ask the Office to create a Mission of Rapporteurs to investigate “a particularly serious threat to the fulfilment of the provisions of the CSCE human dimension” in another participating State (§ 12). In contrast to the previous procedure, this aims at extraordinary situations. Thirdly, any participating State may ask the CSO to establish a Mission of Experts or of CSCE Rapporteurs (§ 13). In this case, the CSO determines the practical procedures to be followed. Members of the Missions which are created on an optional or compulsory basis must be chosen from a list of experts drawn up by the governments (each choosing three names) and kept up to date by the ODIHR.67 Mission expenses (other than those of the CSO) are covered by the requesting States.68 Once again, it should be noted that if an investigation concerns an individual, “participating States should pay due regard to whether that individual’s case is already sub judice in an international judicial procedure.”69 Subsequently, the Moscow Mechanism was slightly amended. In December 1993, the Council of Ministers in Rome decided to broaden the list of experts (doubling the number) to include, where possible, experts on national minorities, to reduce the time frame for certain aspects of the procedure, and to authorize the Permanent Committee to examine Mission reports and directly trigger the Mechanism.70 Since it entered into force in May 1992 (following the creation of a register of 45 experts), the Moscow Mechanism has been used only sparingly by the participating States.71

67 Initially, the Moscow Document left the question of which particular institution would be responsible for such a task open (§ 3). The matter was settled by the Prague Document in January 1992, see § 14 and clarified in the Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VII, §§ 7 and 8. 68 Ibid., § 14. 69 Ibid., § 16. See also See Moscow Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 3 October 1991, p. 3, where Belgium, Spain, France and the United Kingdom express their interpretation of this provision as implying that the investigation procedures under the Mechanism “will not be invoked for cases relating to an individual and which have already been subject to an international judicial body.” 70 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.5 and Annex A. 71 The Vienna Mechanism is even more neglected. Since the collapse of communism, the Mechanism seems to have been invoked only by Austria against Turkey regarding the treatment of Kurds in March 1992. It petered out after a short time, as Ankara retaliated by raising the issue of Vienna’s support for “terrorist” movements through the same channel. See Arie Bloed, “Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension: In Search of Its Effectiveness”, in Arie Bloed, Liselotte 366   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

The procedure for spontaneously and unilaterally inviting a Mission of Experts under paragraph 4 of the Moscow Document has been activated twice – by ­Estonia (1992) and by Moldova (1993). In September 1992, Estonia invited a Mission of Experts to examine whether the content and implementation of its laws complied with universally accepted standards on human rights. In reality, the spontaneous nature of this gesture was relative: the invitation was launched without enthusiasm, in order to put an end to Russia’s attempts to apply to Estonia the procedure of paragraph 8 of the ­Moscow Document anticipating the provoked invitation of a Mission of Experts.72 Following an examination carried out from 5 to 12 December, the experts concluded that, from a strictly legal point of view, the country’s Constitution and legislation complied with international norms. Nonetheless, they stressed that, from a political point of view, it was in Estonia’s interest to take a certain number of precise measures aiming to ensure the integration of Russian-speaking populations into the national life of the country.73 In June 1993, using the provisions of paragraph 4 of the Moscow Document, Moldova requested that a Mission of Experts be established to examine the content and implementation of its legislation on minority rights and ethnic relations.74 The Mission took place from 30 January to 4 February 1993. The Experts concluded that the situation of national minorities in Moldova had markedly improved but that, given the country’s situation (facing double territorial secession), precise practical measures were required – notably the establishment of an O ­ mbudsman, the revision of the law on citizenship and, above all, the establishment of a democratic Constitution granting a certain level of autonomy to regions with concentrated minority populations.75 Both these cases involved a State addressing claims from a Russian-speaking minority supported by Moscow: the use of the Moscow Mechanism enabled the governments concerned to demonstrate their goodwill to the CSCE and better resist the pressure from Russia. The unilateral provoked invitation procedure, set out in paragraph 8 of the ­Moscow Document, has never been used. As indicated above, in 1992 Russia attempted, in vain, to invoke it towards Estonia. Similarly, the procedure for the

Leicht, Manfred Nowak and Allan Rosas (eds.), Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), p. 74. 72 In June and August 1992, Russia unsuccessfully requested Estonia to host a Mission of Experts on its territory under § 8 via the ODIHR. Wearily, Estonia chose to resort to the procedure referred to in § 4, underlining that Moscow’s endeavours with regard to the status of Russian-speaking populations in the country were motivated by political considerations rather than genuine humanitarian concerns. 73 See Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, §§ 68 and 72. 74 The request was initially made by the Moldovan Parliament but it was formally taken up by the Government of Moldova at the express request of the ODIHR. 75 See Report of the CSCE Human Dimension Mission to the Republic of Moldova (30 ­January–­ 4 ­February 1993), section VII.  Chapter VII   367

compulsory establishment of a Mission of Rapporteurs responsible for investigating a shared situation in paragraph 9 of the Moscow Document has never been applied. The procedure for the compulsory establishment of a Mission of Rapporteurs responsible for investigating a shared situation mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Moscow Document has been activated only once. In August 1992, the United Kingdom (supported by almost all members of the European Community and the United States) requested the creation of a Mission of Rapporteurs charged with investigating information on atrocities against defenceless populations in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina and Croatia, and to make recommendations on how to deal with the issue of accountability for such acts.76 Because Bosnia-Herzegovina was in­ accessible due to the war, the Mission limited its operations to Croatia, from 30 ­September to 5 October. It confirmed the veracity of the acts and the ongoing ethnic cleansing. While recognizing that the parties to the conflict were committing serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the Mission stressed that “on the Serbian side, such violations of generally accepted international norms seem to form part of an officially tolerated or even supported systematic policy.”77 One of the main recommendations of the report stressed the need to urgently convene a committee of experts responsible for preparing a draft treaty on the creation of a special international tribunal to rule on certain war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia.78 Finally, the procedure regarding the possibility of the compulsory establishment of a Mission of Experts or Rapporteurs by the CSO, which appears in paragraph 13 of the Moscow Document, has been activated only once. On 30 June 1993, the CSO decided to send a Mission of Rapporteurs to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), a country which had been suspended from the CSCE since July 1992. This Mission was tasked “to investigate fully reports of human rights violations in Serbia-Montenegro, in particular the beating and imprisonment of Vuk and Danica Drašković and the reported banning of the Serbian R ­ enewal Movement.”79 The experts were appointed but the Mission was refused by the Belgrade authorities and did not take place.

76 The mandate of this mission also noted the possibility of inspecting areas threatened with ethnic cleansing and investigating the alleged arbitrary arrests of Serbs in Croatia, see CSCE Communication No. 342 (3 November 1992), p. 7. 77 Ibid., p. l. For the comments of the Government of Croatia on the report of the Mission, see CSCE Communication No. 349 (5 November 1992). 78 See 17th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 6 November 1992, Annex 3 “CSO Decision on Personal Accountability for crimes committed in former Yugoslavia”; 18th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 13 December 1992, decision 6 (a); 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 4 February 1993, decisions 5–6; CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 4 of 18 February 1993, decision 4 (b); 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. l of 26 April 1993, p. 2; and Journal No. 2 of 27 April 1993, decision 5 (a). 79 See 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June–1 July 1993, Annex 3 untitled, see section 2: “Human Rights in Serbia”. The mission was also instructed to discuss the situation with the government and the country’s political forces, as well as to give advice on solutions to the questions raised. 368   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

There are various reasons why the Human Dimension Mechanism has been so rarely used. The very complexity of the procedures is, up to a point, a dissuasive factor. Moreover, as in other international organizations, States are reluctant to activate the procedures in question for fear that their approach may be interpreted as unfriendly by the government and may result in counter-accusations (gratuitous or otherwise). Finally, since the creation of the CSCE’s Permanent Committee a practical framework existed whereby questions on the human dimension could be raised directly at any time.80 Given how rarely it has been used, any conclusions on the value of the Mechanism would be insubstantial. Nonetheless, it does have certain weaknesses, as Arie Bloed highlighted. The first is the rigidity of the composition of the expert teams. The Missions are not limited to establishing the facts; they inevitably carry out negotiation and mediation tasks, despite the fact that “an outstanding human rights academic for instance, is not necessarily an outstanding negotiator or mediator in acute political problems. In contrast, a skilful diplomat is not necessarily the best candidate for solving human rights problems with predominantly legal implications.”81 The second weakness is that the experts are requested to go to the country urgently and for a short period, without any appropriate prior information: “this state of affairs may be partly improved by introducing special training for all experts on the ODIHR list.”82 The third weakness relates to the uncertain Follow-up of Missions: under the Moscow Document, the CSO “may” examine Mission reports but have no obligation to do so.83 Finally, it should be noted that despite a clear affirmation in the Charter of Paris (reiterated in 1991, in the G ­ eneva Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities), the Mechanism remains purely intergovernmental and does not allow individuals to participate in the protection of their rights.84

2. Implementation Meetings After the Moscow Meeting (1991), the idea of endowing the human dimension with its own review meetings, independently of the Follow-up Meetings [soon to become Review Conferences], began to gain ground for two reasons. Firstly, the mandate of the Conference on the Human Dimension, within which such evaluations took place annually from 1989 to 1991, had not been renewed.

80 It should be noted that during the Budapest Review Conference the issue was sidestepped by merely stating that participating States “will draw more widely on the possibilities offered by the Moscow Mechanism for examining or promoting the solution of questions relating to the human dimension on their territory.” See also Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 5, last sentence. 81 Bloed, “Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension …” (n. 71), p. 77. 82 Ibid., pp. 78–79. 83 Ibid., p. 79. The same author notes two other weaknesses: the confidentiality of Mission reports and the poor co-ordination of experts’ work with the Long-Term Missions and the High Commissioner on National Minorities. 84 Admittedly, the Mechanism is applicable to individuals, but at the whim of governments, which is in turn influenced by political expediency.  Chapter VII   369

Secondly, and above all, the participating States realized that the normative vein had been exhausted and that there was now a need to focus on monitoring compliance with existing commitments. Consequently, in January 1992, the Prague Document tasked the Warsaw Office with organizing a “short meeting” aimed at examining commitments to the human dimension, in every year when the CSCE did not hold a general Follow-up Meeting.85 The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting set out the procedures this decision would take in principle a few months later.86 It specified that the exercise would take the form of a “meeting of experts” lasting three weeks, carried out under conditions which were fairly different from those of previous evaluations. Firstly, it was a very public exercise, which was open to the participation of actors from outside international, intergovernmental organizations (such as the Council of Europe, the Commission for Democracy through Law, the EBRD, etc.) and who could attend sessions and submit “contributions”.87 In addition, NGOs with “relevant experience in the field of the Human Dimension” would make “presentations” (notably through the ODIHR) and may be invited to “address specific questions orally as appropriate.”88 Moreover, it was understood that the review meeting would not prepare a negotiated document but would only “draw to the attention of the CSCE measures to improve implementation which it deems necessary”.89 To date, two meetings have taken place on the implementation of commitments to the human dimension, in Warsaw in 1993 and 1995. Symbolically held in the conference room where the Warsaw Treaty Organization formerly sat, the first meeting (27 September–15 October 1993) brought together nearly all participating States, around ten intergovernmental institutions (Council of Europe, IOM, UNESCO, ERDB, UNHCR, etc.), around sixty NGOs (­Amnesty International, International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, etc.) – not to mention the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, non-participating Mediterranean States (Egypt and Morocco), the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the heads of certain Missions of Long

85 Prague Document (1992), section III, § 10, first indent. 86 Helsinki Challenges of Change (1992), Chapter VI, §§ 9–16. Those provisions were adopted on the basis of an Austrian proposal, see CSCE/HM/WG3/10 (29 May 1992), seconded by Albania in Add.1 (5 June 1992). 87 Helsinki Challenges of Change (1992), Chapter VI, § 14. 88 Ibid., Chapter VI, § 15. Among other things, “during two half days in the course of the implementation meeting No formal session will be scheduled in order to provide better opportunities for possible contacts with NGOs,” same in Chapter VI, § 16. 89 Ibid., Chapter VI, § 10 and 11. According to the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, “elimination of the negotiation of a concluding document was expected to free up more time for implementation review.” See The CSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, Warsaw, Poland, September 27–October 15, 1993: A Report (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1993), p. 5. 370   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

Duration (Estonia, Georgia) and a representative of the CSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly.90 The meeting was divided into two subsidiary working groups.91 The first addressed fundamental issues, that is to say, commitments to the human dimension: fundamental freedoms, rule of law, democratic institutions, capital punishment, education and culture, tolerance and non-discrimination, national minorities, migrant workers, migration and refugees, and international humanitarian law. The second was devoted to procedures and structures: the Human ­Dimension Mechanism, interaction with the activities of the Missions of Long Duration, the ODIHR, the seminars, the High Commissioner on National ­Minorities, and relationships with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. In line with the practice which had spontaneously developed during the seminars, each working group had a rapporteur and a moderator.92 Due to the presence and active involvement of NGOs, discussions were marked by a degree of public transparency and candour which was unprecedented within the CSCE.93 In this spirit of non-confrontation, it became possible to identify obstacles to better implementing commitments and potential ways of remedying them. The two working groups drafted around fifty informal recommendations, essentially focused on prioritizing the prevention of torture, organizing the exchange of information on capital punishment between participating States, promoting the rule of international humanitarian law in co-operation with the ­International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), organizing new seminars (independence of the judiciary, migrant workers, migration, etc.), streamlining the Moscow Mechanism, coordinating the HCNM with the CSCE’s institutions and Missions of Long Duration, strengthening the human and financial resources of the ODIHR, improving links with NGOs, sharing work with the other intergovernmental organizations and, above all, integrating the human dimension into the political activities of the CSCE in general and, in particular, activities

90 The four missing participating States were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In his allotted speaking time, the observer of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia prompted Albania and Greece to make interpretative statements stressing the ad hoc and exceptional character of such a measure. See Journal No. 3 of 29 September 1993; see also the Chairman’s statement in Journal No. 4 of 30 September 1993. 91 On the work of the 1993 meeting, see more in The CSCE Implementation Meeting … (n. 89), 20 p., as well as Thomas Buchsbaum, Stefan Hammer, Walter Suntinger and Hannes Tretter, “The First Human Dimension Implementation Meeting”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1, 1994, pp. 64–74 and vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 68–80. 92 As the rapporteurs and moderators were all from the CSCE Troika, Austria pointed out in an interpretative statement that this was a coincidence that should not set a precedent, see Journal No. 3 of 29 September 1993. 93 “The active participation of NGOs helped prevent the discussion from shielding itself in generalities and abstractions; moreover, it permitted a situation in which even the most human rights-conscious participating States were candidates for scrutiny (Norway, for example, was chastised by a Norwegian NGO for deporting ethnic Albanian asylum-seekers from Kosovo).” See The CSCE Implementation Meeting … (n. 89), p. 9.  Chapter VII   371

relating to crisis and conflict management.94 At the suggestion of the Director of the ODIHR, Italian Ambassador Luchino Cortese, the participating States agreed to submit these recommendations to the CSO for examination.95 The second meeting was entirely open to the public and press, and took place from 2 October to 19 October 1995. It brought together 50 participating States (including the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which had been admitted the same year), non-participating Mediterranean States (Egypt, Israel), seven international organizations (including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) and 131 NGOs mostly from Poland, the United Kingdom and Romania.96 The President of the OSCE’s Permanent Council, the Secretary General, the HCNM, the heads of the Missions of Long Duration and representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly also took part.97 The participating States raised certain sensitive issues relating to Chechnya, Krajina, the Kurds in Turkey, and the Roma.98 The United States pointed out constraints on freedom of the media in Slovakia and Croatia, the use of torture in Turkey, violations of humanitarian law in Chechnya, discriminatory citizenship legislation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Czech Republic, non-respect for the independence of the judiciary in Albania, electoral fraud in Belarus and a lack of religious freedom in Uzbekistan.99 Various Central and Eastern European countries criticized the West for the inconsistency of its policy on freedom of movement – a principle which had formerly been the hobby horse of the Helsinki process.100 The United States was also criticized by various governments and NGOs on the subject of capital punishment.

94 See CSCE Communication No. 279/Corr. (21 October 1993), and the Consolidated Summary of the ODIHR. For a list and an analysis of the various recommendations that inspired those of the two working groups, see Thomas Buchsbaum et al., “The First Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw, September–October 1993”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 70–71. At the end of the meeting, the United States issued a formal statement confirming their opposition to the abolition of the death penalty, see Journal No. 6 of 14 October 1993. 95 See ODIHR Human Dimension Implementation Meeting: Journal No. 6 of 14 October 1993. 96 The unrepresented participating States were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland and Malta. 97 For the agenda of the meeting, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 49 of 13 June 1995 and REF. PC/268/95/Rev.2 (17 October 1995). On the work of the meeting, see the Consolidated Summary prepared by the ODIHR and Maria Amor and Martin Estebanez, “The OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues 1995”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996), pp. 5–26. 98 See Amor and Estebanez, “The OSCE Implementation Meeting …” (n. 97), pp. 16–18. A controversy erupted during the meeting between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia about the name “Macedonia”, see ODIHR Human Dimension Implementation Meeting: Journal No. 6 of 9 October 1995 and Journal No. 13 of 18 October 1995. 99 See The 1995 OSCE Meeting on Human Dimension Issues (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1996), pp. 6–7. 100 Amor and Estebanez, “The OSCE Implementation Meeting …” (n. 97), p. 19. 372   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

Ultimately, the meeting led to several recommendations, most of which extended the 1993 recommendations on integrating the human dimension into the political activities of the OSCE and strengthening the remit of the ODIHR.101 In 1995, the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe issued a harsh verdict on the work of the meetings. Pointing to the contrast between the “anaemic” discussions of the second subsidiary working group (procedures and mechanisms) and the overloaded discussions of the first (commitments to the human dimension), it concluded that “the failure to allot adequate time to the working body devoted to implementation review undermined the fundamental purpose of this meeting. This shortcoming not only limited the time for serious, indepth debate, but virtually precluded any back and forth on the implementation problems raised.”102 Moreover, raising the overly impersonal and general content of the reports prepared by the Rapporteurs, the Commission stated that “without sustained interest on the part of one or more participating States, however, it is unlikely that these reports, in and of themselves, will lead to any decision or action.”103 It also criticized the superficial and sometimes erroneous nature of the documentation provided (for the first time) by the ODIHR to support the work of the meeting.104 More generally, it regretted the fact that “against the backdrop of superficial harmony in the formal meetings, some participating States questioned the utility of implementation review meetings or the need to maintain a separate human rights office in Warsaw (as opposed to merging the ODIHR into the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna).”105 Despite these shortcomings, the review meetings provided an instrument which made it possible to identify the weak points of application of the commitments to the human dimension, provided inspiration for the OSCE’s overall policy on the subject, and involved NGOs in the democratic stabilization of Greater Europe.

101 See Consolidated Summary of the Human Dimension Seminar on the Rule of Law, REF.OD/65/95 (20 December 1995), pp. 40–50. 102 Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, The 1995 OSCE Meeting on Human Dimension Issues (n. 99), p. 10. Thus, during a session of the first subsidiary working group, there were No fewer than 30 speakers signed up for the sole agenda item on the rule of law, p. 7. On the other hand, the second subsidiary working group completed its work earlier than expected due to the lack of speakers, p. 8. 103 Ibid., p. 9. 104 On the basis of the Budapest Decisions 1994, chapter VIII, § 8, the ODIHR prepared a compendium of texts and short summaries for each of the two working bodies. The Commission considered the first compendium rather superficial and in some respects (notably on the issue of nationality and citizenship) erroneous, see Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, The 1995 OSCE Meeting on Human Dimension Issues (n. 99), p. 5. 105 Ibid., p. 10. These criticisms should be understood with reference to the differences between the United States and the European Union over the duration of the 1995 implementation meeting – a duration which the Americans apparently seek to extend. See Permanent Council: Journal No. 6 of 2 February 1995, p. 2 and Journal No. 8 of 16 February 1995, pp. 2–3.  Chapter VII   373

3. The Human Dimension Seminars There were several specific aspects to the Human Dimension seminars as set out in the Prague Document (January 1992) and the Helsinki Decisions (July 1992). They were to be short-term exercises (of a maximum of one week) on “specific questions” of “current political concern”. The seminars were dependent upon the political will of the CSO, the body responsible for establishing an annual work programme and for setting the theme, agenda and dates of the seminars – on the condition that they took into account views expressed by the ODIHR, in the offices of which the seminars were to take place (unless otherwise decided). Their work was open to international organizations which could be invited to provide “contributions” and to independent experts attending as members of national delegations, who were also free to speak in their own capacity. Lastly, the seminars did not aim at producing negotiated documents or follow-up programmes.106 Organized in this vein in 1992 and 1993, the first four Human Dimension seminars addressed tolerance, migration (including refugees and displaced persons), practical positive solutions to the question of national minorities and freedom of the media respectively.107 The next three seminars, organized in 1994 at the request of the Rome Council of Ministers, focused on migrant workers, local democracy and the issue of the Roma in the CSCE area.108 Following a decision by the Permanent Council, three other seminars took place in 1995 – on the elements making up civil society, tolerance (for the second time) and the rule of law.109

106 Helsinki Challenges of Change (1992), Decisions, chapter VI, §§ 17–21. 107 The holding of these four seminars was decided by the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 22). For the work of the seminars, see ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 1, Winter 1992/93, pp. 16–17; vol. 1, no. 2,Spring 1993, pp. 29–30; vol. 1, no. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 28–34; vol. 2, no. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 22–35; and the Consolidated Summary published by the ODIHR for each of the seminars. See also Arie Bloed, “The First CSCE Human Dimension Seminar: Tolerance”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 15–21; Wouter Plomp, “The CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Migration”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 3, 1993, pp. 26–30; and Rachel Brett and Elaine Eddison, “The CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on National Minorities”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 3, 1993, pp. 39–43. 108 See Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.6, second indent. For the results of these seminars, see ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring/Summer 1994, pp. 40–45; vol. 2, no. 3, Autumn 1994, pp. 39–41 and 42–48; and the consolidated summaries published by the ODIHR for each of the seminars. See also Wouter Plomp, “The CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Migrant Workers”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 2, 1994, pp. 85–88. 109 See Permanent Council: Journal No. 8 of 16 February 1995. For the work of the seminars, see REF. OD/7/95 (25 April 1995), as well as the Consolidated Summary published by the ODIHR for each of the seminars. It should be noted that the Seminar on Tolerance took place in Bucharest and not Warsaw; in addition, it was organized in collaboration with the Council of Europe and UNESCO. See REF.PC/155/95 (18 May 1995). 374   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

Human Dimension Seminars 1992–1995

Theme and number of participants Dates Place Tolerance (185) 16–20 November 1992 Warsaw Migration, refugees, displaced persons (224) 20–23 April 1993 Warsaw National minorities, positive cases (257) 24–28 May 1993 Warsaw Freedom of the media (253) 2–5 November 1993 Warsaw Migrant workers (154) 21–25 March 1994 Warsaw Local democracy (156) 16–20 May 1994 Warsaw Roma issues (259) 20–23 September 1994 Warsaw Elements constituting civil society (286) 4 7 April 1995 Warsaw Tolerance (around 400) 23–26 May 1995 Bucharest Rule of law (166) 28 November–1 December 1995 Warsaw

The seminars followed the practice of subdividing into three working groups, each led by a “moderator” assisted by a rapporteur and a representative of the ODIHR. The moderators adopted the custom of presenting a final summary of the work, reproduced in the ODIHR bulletin. Discussions were generally lively and open, and the NGO representatives played an important role. However, the shortcomings of the seminars were soon to become apparent: the agendas were too general, the themes were not always attractive to the “new democracies”, moderators with little experience were appointed, there were low numbers of independent experts and, above all, there was a lack of real interactivity, due to pre-prepared texts frequently being recited and to the excessive size of the discussion groups.110 Consequently, from the end of 1993, the participating States agreed (without nonetheless contradicting the decision that the seminars would not produce follow-up programmes) that the political bodies of the CSCE should focus more on the results and outcomes of the work.111 Armed with this experience, after the Budapest Review Conference it was decided to reduce the number of annual seminars to two (as a general rule) and to devote them to “topics which are of the broadest interest”. They also decided to put greater emphasis on regional seminars organized by the ODIHR as part of the Programme of Co­ ordinated Support for recently admitted States and (in a manner of speaking) tailored on a case-by-case basis to the needs of these States.112

110 See The CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Local Democracy (Washington D.C.: US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1994), p. 5. See also Ambassador LuchiNo Cortese’s remarks in his report to the 25th Meeting of the CSO on the first three years’ activity of the ODIHR: ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 2, Spring/Summer 1994, pp. 27–28. 111 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, section IV, § 6, second C “indent”. This decision was taken following a recommendation made at the first Human Dimension Implementation Meeting that took place in September–October 1993, see § 14 of the Rapporteur’s Report from Subsidiary Working Body 2. 112 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 14.  Chapter VII   375

The OSCE has not yet found the ideal formula to enable the seminars to serve both as a reservoir for ideas for governments and as an impetus for the development of commitments to the human dimension. Whatever the solution may be, it is clear that any improvement in the situation would involve increasing the role of the ODIHR in terms of the preparation and practical management of the seminars.113

4. The ODIHR The kingpin of the OSCE’s human dimension, the ODIHR was initially developed as the modest “Office for Free Elections” (OFE). In this section, we will examine how it evolved from the OFE to the ODIHR, before analysing the ODIHR’s current functions.

A. Transformation from the OFE to the ODIHR Following the collapse of communism, the future of the CSCE’s human dimension sharply opposed the Americans and the French. Concerned with the future of NATO, the United States advocated that the CSCE should not become polarized on questions of security, hence the need to maintain and develop its human dimension, a point of view contested by France. Based on the premise that human rights were no longer an instrument of combat, France claimed that the dimension had run its course in the CSCE and that the matter should be handed over to the Council of Europe. During the Copenhagen Meeting (June 1990), the various proposals put forward on the subject of strengthening the Human Dimension Mechanism and its general development came to nothing, due to the French opposition. Most European NATO countries positioned themselves somewhere between the two extremes. Those on the French side recognized the need to strengthen the role of the Council of Europe, while those on the US side were opposed to the idea that the CSCE should be amputated of its human dimension. In other words, they addressed the issue in terms of the division of work and complementarity. Ultimately, an intermediate position was reached: the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance (6 July 1990). In it, the NATO countries expressed their views on the future structure of the institutionalized OSCE and specifically mentioned an “Office for Free Elections”. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe (November 1990) instituted the office and established its headquarters in Warsaw. However, under pressure from France, the concept of this office was envisaged in restricted terms. Stripped back to its simplest form (essentially a Director and an Administrator), the OFE was not designed to observe elections, but only to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections in the “participating States” with a view

113 On this point, see the recommendations made at the second Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (Report of the Subsidiary Working Body 2, section 6, October 1995) and the report sent by the ODIHR to the Permanent Council in accordance with the Budapest Decisions (REF. PC/85/95 of 28 April 1995). 376   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

to applying paragraphs 6 to 8 of the Copenhagen Document.114 The Charter of Paris attributed several specific tasks to it: to compile information (from governmental sources or otherwise) on the dates, procedures and official results of national elections organized in the participating States; to compile reports of election observations to be communicated, on demand, to governments, parliaments and NGOs; to facilitate contact between interested third parties (governments, parliaments and NGOs) and the authorities of States where the elections are to take place; and to organize and serve as the venue for seminars and meetings on the electoral procedures and democratic institutions at the request of the participating States.115 France did not succeed in having the Council of Europe mentioned in this context, but it did obtain a provision stating that the “Office will take into account the work of and cooperate with other institutions active in this field.”116 The OFE began work in April 1991, with the arrival in Warsaw of its Director, Italian Ambassador Luchino Cortese. It was officially inaugurated on 9 July and, until the end of that year, the OFE largely devoted its efforts to preparing the way for international experts invited to observe the free elections in Bulgaria, Poland, Albania and Romania, as well as to organizing electoral assistance seminars in these same countries. It also participated in the establishment of the Regional Association of Electoral Officials for Central and Eastern Europe, an association of experts on electoral questions.117 Lastly, through the intermediary of its Director and/or its Deputy Director, it contributed to the Rapporteur Mission organized in Albania (September 1991), following the country’s accession to the CSCE, and the Rapporteur Mission (Fleiner-Gerster) sent in December 1991 to the six Yugoslav Republics.118 In June 1991, at the inaugural session held by the CSCE Council of Ministers, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, proposed transforming the OFE into an “Office for Democratic Institutions”, with a view to helping the new democracies establish and consolidate the rule of law. The idea received a broadly favourable

114 Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), part G, § 1. The Copenhagen Document called upon the participating States “to ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority of government,” through the organization of “free elections at reasonable intervals as established by law” (§§ 7 and 7.1). The document also urged them (but in cautious and restrictive terms as intended by the USSR) to invite observers from any other participating State as well as from any appropriate private institution and organization wishing “to observe the course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by law” and “endeavour to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held below the national level” (§ 8). At the express request of France, §§ 6–8 of the Copenhagen Document were annexed to the Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris. 115 Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), part G, § 2. 116 Ibid., § 3. 117 See CSCE Communication No. 192 (15 April 1993). 118 On the OFE’s activities, see CSCE Communications No. 107 (22 August 1991), No. 109 (26 August 1991), No. 128 (26 September 1991), No. 159 (19 October 1991), No. 169 (1 November 1991), No. 180 (25 November 1991 + Corr.1) and No. 192 (28 November 1992). See also the summary report annexed to CSCE Communication No. 167 (5 May 1992).  Chapter VII   377

response, but France’s opposition meant it was not immediately adopted.119 During the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension, the US, supported by a number of delegations, reignited the debate, managing to insert a provision into the final document stating that “the participating States suggest that the appropriate CSCE fora consider expanding the functions of the Office for Free Elections to enable it to assist in strengthening democratic institutions within the participating States.”120 France reserved its position by issuing an interpretive statement, noting that all the CSCE’s institutional issues fell to the next Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki in 1992.121 The US-­led position continued to mount the pressure at the Oslo CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions (4–15 November 1991), the final report of which went as far as listing the roles liable to be attributed to an OFE with a broader mandate and maintaining working relations with the Council of Europe.122 In an interpretive statement, France stated that the mention of the Council of Europe was “entirely insufficient in relation to the essential role that this organization plays in its areas of competence” and regretted that the expert opinions were not reflected in a more “balanced” way. It also recalled that, in its view, “it was not for the Seminar … to establish a list of any future roles of the Office for Free Elections and that those appearing in the text only reflected, as it stated, the opinion of certain experts.”123 Nevertheless, this was little more than a last stand. The Franco-US dispute around the OFE was settled by the NATO countries at the end of the North A ­ tlantic Council Summit in Rome on 7 and 8 November 1991.124 Shortly afterwards, the Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures

119 On the other hand, the following month, at the end of the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (July 1991), France agreed to extend the mandate of the OFE to local elections: the participating States “will permit the competent authorities to inform the Office for Free Elections of all scheduled public elections on their territories, including those held below national (Geneva Report, section III, § 5). 120 Moscow Document (1991), § 30, adopted on the basis of the proposal CSCE/CHDM.35 (25 September 1991) (and Add.1), submitted by a dozen countries including the United States, Canada and Germany. See also the joint non-paper (Austria, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Italy, Poland) dated 2 October 1991, reproduced at the request of Italy in CSCE Communication No. 136 (4 October 1991). 121 See Moscow Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 3 October 1991, p. 3. 122 Report to the CSCE Council from the CSCE Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions (1991), section III, §§ 3, 4 and 5. The OFE itself submitted a written contribution in support of its transformation (CSCE Communication No. 174 of 8 November 1991). 123 See Oslo Seminar on Democratic Institutions: Journal No. 10 of 15 November 1991, interpretative statement no. 5. France made four other interpretative statements about the character of the report of the Oslo Seminar and the topics of separation of powers, national minorities, and stability of democratic governments. 124 Among the reforms considered necessary to strengthen the CSCE, the Rome Declaration on Peace and Co-operation included the transformation of the Office for Free Elections into the Office of Democratic Institutions (§ 14, seventh indent). See NATO press release S-1(91)86 of 8 November 1991. 378   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

(30 January 1992) officially announced the transformation of the OFE into the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.125 In July 1992, the F­ ollow- up Meeting established the mandate of the ODIHR.126 It was subsequently attributed a number of additional tasks by the Council of Ministers in Rome (1993)127 and the Budapest Review Conference (1994).128 Despite the merging of OSCE services in Vienna, the headquarters of the ODIHR remained in Warsaw. Currently, Poland and the United States (which is keen to preserve the autonomy of the ODIHR and its role as a body on an equal footing with the Council of Europe) are opposed to any talk of a move.

B. The Role of the ODIHR The present role of the ODIHR includes managing information and instruments relating to the human dimension, supporting the establishment of democratic institutions, promoting free and fair elections, and contributing towards managing crises and conflicts.129 a) Managing information and instruments on the human dimension The participating States use the ODIHR as a point of contact for information provided in accordance with the human dimension.130 The same holds for information about states of emergency,131 sources of assistance for the development of democratic institutions,132 sources of assistance in relation to censuses and the operation of democracy on the local and regional level,133 the human dimension in general and international humanitarian law,134 aggressive nationalism (and other related

125 Prague Document (1992), section III, §§ 9–15. 126 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, §§ 5 and 6 – provisions adopted on the basis of the proposals CSCE/HM/WG3/4 (22 May 1992), CSCE/HM/WG3/5 (22 May 1992), CSCE/HM/WG3/9 (29 May 1992), CSCE/HM/WG3/18 (9 June 1992) and CSCE/HM/WG3/24 (15 June 1992). See also Chapter XI, §§ 1, 2, 5 and 6. 127 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, chapters IV (§§ 3, 4, 6), VIII (§ 2), X (§ 6) and Annex A. 128 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, §§ 2, 6, 8–16 and 23–25 – adopted on the basis of proposals CSCE/BC/WG3/l (11 November 1994), CSCE/BC/WG3/6 (17 November 1994), CSCE/BC/WG3/8 (18 November 1994) and CSCE/BC/WG3/9 (21 November 1994). 129 Not to mention liaison and co-operation with intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. For an analysis of the ODIHR’s functions, see Stefano Guerra “The Multi-Faceted Role of the ODIHR”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 10–20. 130 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.4, fifth indent. 131 Moscow Document (1991), § 28.10 and Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 5(b), first indent. On this theme, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, “The Human Dimension Regime on States of Public Emergency”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 4, no. l (Winter 1995/96), pp. 32–38. 132 Prague Document (1992), section III, § 10, second and third indent. 133 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 5(b), second indent and Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.4, first indent. 134 See Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.4, sixth indent.  Chapter VII   379

issues),135 elections held below the national level,136 the media,137 and the issue of the Roma and Sinti.138 Simultaneously, it is incumbent upon the ODIHR to manage the instruments of action of the human dimension. This focuses on meetings every two years to review the implementation of commitments,139 specialized seminars,140 the Vienna Mechanism141 and the mechanism on Missions of Rapporteurs and Missions of Experts established on the basis of the Moscow Mechanism.142 It is also responsible for establishing and managing a database of available experts on the human dimension,143 communicating reports from the OSCE Missions which relate to the human dimension, other than those established under the Mechanism (as well as participating in or organizing such Missions),144 and, lastly, providing support to the activities of the HCNM.145 In conclusion, the ODIHR amply merits its description as “the main institution of the Human Dimension”, attributed to it in 1992 by the Helsinki Review ­Meeting.146 b) Supporting the establishment of democratic institutions By announcing the transformation of the Office for Free Elections into the ODIHR, the Prague Document (January 1992) considered that it should help relevant participating States in their transition towards democracy. In practical terms, this consisted of facilitating the exchange of information on technical assistance and expertise available on democratic institutions, facilitating contact between those asking for help and potential donors, encouraging co-operation on training and, lastly, organizing short seminars (open to all participating States) on themes related to the construction and restoration of democratic institutions.147 The 1992 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting specified these provisions by authorizing the

135 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 25. 136 See Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section III, § 5. 137 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 10. 138 Ibid., chapter VIII, § 23. 139 See Prague Document (1992), § 10, first indent; Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 9; and Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 8. 140 See Prague Document (1992), § 10, seventh indent; Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.6, second indent; and Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 15. 141 See Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 5(a), first indent, and § 7, second indent. 142 See Prague Document (1992), § 14. 143 See Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.4, first indent. 144 See Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 5(a), second and third indents. To date [as of 1996], the ad hoc missions of relevance to the Human Dimension have been established following the accession of a number of participating States (see Chapter III in this volume, pp. 77–82) as well as in the context of conflict management in Yugoslavia (see, pp. 379–380 and Chapter V, pp. 285–327). 145 See Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, §§ 10 and 35, and Chapter VI, § 5(c), fourth indent. 146 Ibid., § 5. 147 See Prague Document (1992), § 10, second, third, sixth and seventh indents. 380   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

ODIHR to organize, upon the request of participating States, tailor-­made seminars known as “seminars on the democratic process”.148 Above all, however, it entrusted the ODIHR with coordinating the Programme of Support for “recently admitted participating States”, that is to say, countries which had joined the ranks of the CSCE following the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Management of this programme, the crux of which was questions on the human dimension, notably involved the organization (preferably on site) of meetings and seminars according to the needs of the recently admitted participating States themselves.149 Beyond the activities accomplished under the Programme of Support to recently admitted participating States, the practical contribution of the ODIHR towards promoting the development of democratic institutions is expressed through the “Rule of Law” programme. Designed from a fairly broad perspective, this includes five sections. The first aims at strengthening the independence of the judiciary. Within this context, the ODIHR organizes an annual judicial symposium every year in Warsaw (and has done since 1994), bringing together jurists from around twenty countries. The second section involves the provision of advisory services on constitutional and legislative issues for governments, magistrates, jurists, the media and NGOs. From 1993 to 1995, 11 participating States used these services, to varying degrees: Albania, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine.150 The third section concerns the continuous examination of national policies relating to human dimension issues. The fourth section aims to observe trials involving human rights issues. ODIHR representatives thus observed the trials of members of the Ilaşcu Group in ­Moldova (January 1994), that of the Kurdish members of parliament accused of terrorism in Turkey (August 1994), and the trials of members of the “Omonia” organization, created to defend the Greek minority in Albania (August 1994).151 The fifth section focuses on organizing training programmes on the various aspects of the operation of the rule of law. Beyond their legal connotation, all these activities also fall within the twofold context of preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding.

148 See Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 5(c), second indent. 149 Ibid., Chapter VI, § 5(c), first indent, and Chapter XI, § 2. For more on the Support Programme, see Chapter III of this volume, part 6 A. ‘The consequences of CSCE Enlargement’ pp. 90–92. 150 OSCE/ODIHR Activities in Participating States: 1991–1995, (Warsaw: ODIHR, 1996), p. 11. 151 Ibid., pp. 1, 5 and 10. On the trial of the “Omonoia” organization, see UN: A/0.3/49/5 (18 October 1994). For more on the Ilascu case, see Chapter V in this volume, part II, C. a ‘Facts about the Transdniestrian conflict’ pp. 221–223.  Chapter VII   381

c) The promotion of fair and free elections The main reason for the creation of the OFE in 1990 was fair and free elections, which remain one of the main concerns of the ODIHR to this day. As shown in the table below, the Office in Warsaw was called upon to intervene in around fifty electoral processes between 1992 and 1995 (referendums, presidential elections, national, regional and local parliamentary elections) organized in around twenty participating States in Central and Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia and the former USSR (including the Central Asian Republics).152 Always conducted on the basis of an official invitation, the ODIHR’s intervention takes two key forms: electoral support and co-ordination of the activities of international observers. Electoral support is provided through practical pre-election seminars targeted at officials in the host country and international observers. This may also involve technical assistance with a view, notably, to drafting electoral codes. In both cases, it is an activity which forms part of the consolidation of democratic processes and institutions. The co-ordination of international observers involves establishing a certain logistical infrastructure, including opening liaison offices, establishing contacts with embassies and NGOs, and distributing documents. In this regard, the ODIHR’s aim is to ensure that foreign experts can expect certain minimum conditions which are indispensable for carrying out serious observation work – free access to information and freedom of movement. After the election, the ODIHR drafts a report assessing compliance with the OSCE rules and, where appropriate, including recommendations for future elections. It should be noted that the coordinating role of the ODIHR is not unanimously accepted and has been contested by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In 1995, the Committee on Political Affairs stated that “observing elections in states which are full members of the Council of Europe or have been granted special guest status by its Assembly, should be clearly entrusted to the Council of Europe, on the understanding that the latter would communicate the results to the OSCE.”153 The advent of the OSCE’s Parliamentary Assembly – which has also been given an electoral observation mandate – appears to have further complicated the situation.154

152 The ODIHR has therefore intervened in all countries following their rejection of communism, except for Poland, the Czech Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkmenistan. 153 See the Masseret Report on the general policy of the Council of Europe: PACE Doc. 7280 (12 April 1995). On the activities of the Council of Europe related to electoral observation, see Yves Beigbeder, Le contrôle international des elections, (Brussels: “Axes” collection, no. 12, Bruylant, 1994), pp. 101–104. 154 See Chilworth Report, The CSCE’s Human Dimension … (n. 54), § 35. 382   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

The ODIHR’s electoral observation activities 1992–1995

A) States of Central and Eastern Europe Albania General elections, 10–25 March 1992. Referendum on a draft Constitution, 6 November 1994. Bulgaria Legislative elections, 18 December 1994 Hungary Legislative elections, 8 and 29 May 1994. Local elections, 11 December 1994. Romania Presidential and legislative elections, 27 September 1992. Slovakia Legislative elections, 30 September–1 October 1994. B) States of the former Yugoslavia fYRoM* Presidential and legislative elections, 16 and 30 October, 13 November 1994. Croatia Legislative elections, 29 October 1995. FRY** General elections, 31 May 1992. Legislative elections, 20 December 1992. Slovenia Presidential and legislative elections, 6 December 1992. [Note: *former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; **Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)]. C) States of the former USSR Armenia Legislative elections, 5 and 29 July 1995. Azerbaijan Referendum (29 August 1993) and presidential elections (3 October 1993). Legislative elections, 21 and 26 November 1995. Belarus Presidential elections, 10 July 1994. Legislative elections, 14 and 28 May, 30 November and 10 December 1995. Estonia Presidential and legislative elections, 20 September 1992. Legislative elections, 5 March 1995. Georgia Legislative elections, 11 October 1992. Presidential and legislative elections, 5 and 21 November 1995. Kazakhstan Legislative elections, 7 March 1994. Legislative elections, 9 December 1995. Kyrgyzstan Referendum and local elections, 22 October 1994. Legislative elections, 5 and 19 February 1995. Presidential elections, 24 December 1995. Latvia Legislative elections, 5–6 June 1993. Local elections, 29 May 1994. Legislative elections, 30 September–1 October 1995. Lithuania Legislative elections, 25 October 1992. Moldova Legislative elections, 27 February 1994. Local referendum, 5 March 1995. Local elections, 16 April 1995. Uzbekistan Local and legislative elections, 25 December 1994. Russia Referendum, 25 April 1993. Referendum and legislative elections, 12 December 1993. Legislative elections, 17 December 1995. Tajikistan Referendum and presidential elections, 6 November 1995 (not observed). Ukraine Legislative elections, 27 March, and 2–3 and 9–10 April 1994. Presidential and local elections, 26 June 1994

Source: OSCE/ODIHR Activities in Participating States (1991–1995), ODIHR, 1996, 11 p  Chapter VII   383

In any case, when it came to exercising this major function, the ODIHR found itself faced with dubious situations – notably in Georgia (October 1992), in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (December 1992), in Russia (December 1993), in Kazakhstan (March 1994), and in Armenia (July 1995). Drawing from these experiences, the ODIHR became aware that observing the elections was only one stage in a process, the key moments of which were before and after the election itself. As a result, it now pays particular attention to parameters such as the nature of electoral law, the role of the media, how the electoral campaign is funded, and civic education.155 d) Contributing towards managing crises and conflicts In January 1992, the participating States decided to link the ODIHR to the CSCE’s Communications Network.156 A few months later, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting stated that the Warsaw Office could “contribute to early warning in the prevention of conflicts.”157 The following year, confirming that the human dimension remained one of the key elements of the CSCE’s conception of global security, the Council of Ministers recognized that implementation of human dimension commitments must be a “focus of attention” in the prevention of conflict and that the political organs of the CSCE “will consider human dimension issues on a regular basis as an integral part of deliberations relating to European security”.158 It considered that greater importance should be given to issues relating to the human dimension in the mandates of the Missions of Long Duration and in their follow-­up reports. From this point of view, it confirmed that the “ODIHR will be given an enhanced role in the preparation of CSCE missions, inter alia, in providing information and advice to missions in accordance with its expertise.”159 In 1994, the Budapest Review Conference confirmed these provisions and added two clarifications: firstly, the staff of the Missions would be drawn from the ODIHR’s list of experts and, secondly, the Missions would assign one of their members the specific task of liaising between the ODIHR and NGOs.160 The participating States could still not reach an agreement on whether it was appropriate to authorize the Warsaw Office to directly address – even in emergency situations – the political organs of the CSCE: they settled on encouraging the Chairman-in-Office to “inform the Permanent Council of serious cases of alleged

155 On the obstacles to free and fair elections, see Guy Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1994), pp. 27ff. and passim. 156 Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 15. 157 Helsinki Summit (1992): Decisions, chapter VI, § 6. See also Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992), Decisions, section 6, § 5, which mandated the ODIHR and the CPC to organize joint seminars in the fields of early warning and peacekeeping. See also the Consolidated Summary of the seminar on early warning and preventive diplomacy, which took place in Warsaw on 19–21 January 1994. 158 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.1 and § IV.3, first indent. 159 Ibid., § IV.3, second indent. 160 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 11. See also the last sentence of § 2. 384   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

non-­implementation of human dimension commitments, including on the basis of information from the ODIHR.”161 Collaboration between the ODIHR and the Missions of Long Duration was practically self-evident. In most cases, the crises or conflicts in which the OSCE intervened arose from causes or issues in which the human dimension played a key role, notably the discriminatory treatment of national minorities and the non-existence of democratic institutions. As such, the mandate of the Missions often included a “human dimension” component, implementation of which required ODIHR support in terms of peacemaking and, above all, in terms of peacebuilding. As part of the efforts to reach a political settlement based on a formula focusing on the principles of the human dimension, the ODIHR issued three main communications. It was also involved in the process of drafting the Georgian Constitution, the draft Moldovan law on the status of Transdniestria and the Ukrainian law on the status of Crimea.162 In terms of peacebuilding, its contribution was more systematic in nature. In the form of consultative services and training seminars, its work extended (inconsistently) to practically all the Missions charged with supporting the construction or reconstruction of civil society in the host country: Georgia, Moldova, Estonia, ­Tajikistan, Ukraine, Chechnya and Bosnia-Herzegovina.163

III. The OSCE and the Issue of National Minorities Of all the themes relating to the human dimension, that of national minorities merits particular attention. First, the resurgence of ethnic claims threatened the unity and stability of various CSCE/OSCE States and was a growing source of concern for the entire region. Secondly, ethno-nationalism became the main obstacle to progress on human rights in post-communist Europe. Lastly, the theme of national minorities created a rift within the human dimension, which was otherwise fundamentally consensual. The broad outline of the issue will be set out here before analysing the two approaches taken by the OSCE to national minorities: the normative approach and the preventive diplomacy route.

1. The General Problem of the Issue of National Minorities The universal issue of national minorities stems from the simple but striking contrast between the existence of 190 sovereign States and that of some 5,000 ethnic groups.164 This is illustrated by a judicious remark attributed to Martin Luther King: when asked by a journalist on the subject of black people in

161 Ibid., chapter VIII, § 6. 162 See OSCE/ODIHR Activities in Participating States 1991–1995, (Warsaw: ODIHR, 1996), pp. 3–5 and 11. 163 Ibid. See also the reviews of each of these long-term missions in Chapter V of this volume. 164 See Asbjorn Eide, Ethno-nationalism and minority protection: The need for institutional reforms; see also A/CONF.157/LACRM/6 (6 January 1993), p. 4. Some sociologists suggest that there are between 5,000 and 8,000 ethnic groups currently in existence. See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, The  Chapter VII   385

the United States, it is said that the famous pastor replied that America suffered from a white problem, not a black problem. The remark can be perfectly applied to the case of national minorities. They are less a disease of the nation State than the nation State is a disease of ethnic groups. Indeed, the issue of national minorities emerged only with the nation State or, more precisely, following the transformation of dynastic States into nation States. Dynastic States had no difficulty admitting their ethnic diversity: their unity was based on individual allegiance to a sovereign who reigned over “the people”, that is to say, over ethnically heterogonous populations whose particularities (particularly their linguistic particularities) were generally respected: in such a context, only religious minorities were conceivable. The French Revolution turned this on its head: by basing the legitimacy of the State on the myth of the “Nation”, it opened the door to the phenomenon of national minorities. Since then, the terms “State”, “nation”, “people” and “ethnic group” have been used interchangeably and have, consequently, become confused. Of the four terms, only that of “State” is without difficulty. The State is the legal expression of the social–political form of organization of a human community. United or federal, it requires the simultaneous existence of three well-known conditions: a defined territory, a stable population and an effective government. In contrast, the definition of the term “nation” is unclear. Deriving from the Latin natio, the meaning of the term changed considerably before arriving at its present-day meaning. Initially, it referred to any group of people of the same foreign origin living within the Roman Empire and then to any community of students of the same foreign origin attending the universities of the Middle Ages.165 In other words, the “natio” could exist only abroad. From the seventeenth century, the term “nation” was increasingly used to refer to the elite aristocracy of the State – in contrast to the concept of the “people”, a frankly pejorative connotation (“all who think and act basely”). Today, the concept of the nation refers to the community made up of the citizens of a State on the basis of shared objective characteristics (language, religion, culture, etc.) and their desire to share a common future. In this form, it combines the socalled “objective” German determinist approach, advocated by Fichte in his Address to the German Nation in 1807–1808, and the socalled “subjective” French approach popularized by Ernest Renan in a famous speech given to the Sorbonne in 1882 on the theme of the nation. According to the objective (fatalistic) approach, the individual joins the

Ethnic Question: Conflicts, Development and Human Rights (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1990), p. 2. 165 Thus, the four nations of the University of Paris were: l’honorable nation de France – the h ­ onourable nation of France (Romance languages), la fidèle nation de Picardie – the faithful nation of Picardy (Dutch speakers), la vénérable nation de Normandie – the venerable nation of Normandy (people from the north-east) and la constante nation de Germanie – the constant nation of Germany (students from England and Germany). See Guido Zernatto, “Nation: The History of a Word”, The Review of Politics, vol. 6 (1944), p. 355. 386   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

nation through birth and, by this fact, cannot escape it – while for the subjective (voluntarist) approach, the only thing that counts is individual free will.166 From the nineteenth century onwards, the term “nation” increasingly encroached upon that of the “State”. The term began to be corrupted, as shown in the now current use of conceptually erroneous terms such as “international relations”, “international law”, “international organizations” and titles such as the “Society of Nations” and the “United Nations Organization”.167 The key term, “nationalism”, has also contributed towards this corruption as, in reality, it refers to the phenomenon of promoting not the nation but the State which it incarnates. The terms “Nation” and “State”, however, refer to distinct things. The nation does not necessarily coincide with a State. During the Cold War, there was one German nation, but two German States. Moreover, there are currently a number of nations which are deprived of their own State – such as the Basques, the Roma, the Kurds, among others.168 The concept of the “nation State” introduced an additional semantic confusion, this time between the “nation” and the “people”. Indeed, insofar as the “nation” is considered as the community formed by all the citizens of the State regardless of ethnic origin, it overlaps, to the point that it is confused with, the concept of “people”. The people no longer refers, as it did in the sixteenth century, to “all those who think and act basely,” but represents the entire nation. The junction between the two concepts gives rise to the principle of nationalities, subsequently promoted through the right of peoples to self-determination. In the nineteenth century, the principle of nationalities recognized that “each nationality”, that is, each ethnic “nation”, had the right to form its own State: Italian unity and German unity were achieved on this basis. Under the influence of US President Woodrow Wilson, the principle of nationalities gave rise, at the start of the twentieth century, to the right of peoples to self-determination. This broadened the issue of the principle of nationalities to recognizing “people” (as an expression of the nation in the non-exclusively ethnic sense of the term) the right to freely form a State.169

166 For the key texts illustrating the two concepts, see Ernest Renan, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? et autres essais politiques. Textes présentés par Joel Roman (Paris: Presses Pocket, 1992), p. 311. 167 On this point, see Walker Connor, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics, vol. XXIV, no. 3, April 1972, pp. 319–355. 168 The year 1991 saw the formation of UNPO (Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization) in The Hague. Bringing together the nations and peoples lacking representation in the United Nations, UNPO commits itself to the four fundamental principles of non-violence, respect for human rights, non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States, see Le Monde, 12 February 1991. It should also be noted that on 27 May 1990, 37 organizations representing nations without statehood in Europe adopted the “Universal Declaration of the Collective Rights of Peoples”. On stateless European ethnise, see Guy Heraud, L’Europe des ethnies, “Axes” collection, no. 7 (Brussels: Bruylant ed., 1993), pp. 19–75. 169 The difference between the principle of nationalities and the right of peoples to self-determination can be illustrated by the plebiscite on the Saar organized by the League of Nations in 1935, following which the people of the region chose to return to Germany and not become part of France. Had the second option prevailed, the result would have been contrary to the principle of nationalities, but consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination. On the principle  Chapter VII   387

To this twofold confusion (between “State” and “nation” and between “people” and “nation”) is added a third confusion, between “nation” and “ethnic”. Anthony Smith, an expert on the subject, defines the ethnic as “a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a specific ‘homeland’ and a measure of solidarity”. Such a definition presents obvious similarities to that of the “nation” which, according to the same author, refers to “a named human population inhabiting a historical territory and sharing common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.”170 Although conceptually related, the two concepts differ in certain ways: “historically, the nation is a sub-variety and development of the ethnic, though we are not dealing with some evolutionary law of progression, or with some necessary or irreversible sequence. While the ethnic is a historical culture-­ community, the nation is a community of mass, public culture, historical territory and legal rights. In other terms, the nation shifts the emphasis of community away from kinship and cultural dimensions to territorial, educational and legal aspects, while retaining links with older cultural myths and memories of the ethnic.”171 This vision, which to some extent reconciles Fichte and Renan, considers the ethnic as the main form of the nation. Inversely, it presents the nation as a development of the ethnic in political and legal terms – a development representing the passage from a primitive and largely mythical community (based more on a belief in rather than the reality of a common ancestor) to that of a modern and structured community connecting individuals through the link of citizenship. From this perspective, the return to ethnicity, which was characteristic of post-communist Europe, does appear to be a regressive phenomenon. In sum, the issue of “national minorities” amounts to nothing more than the division of the world into multi-ethnic States. Despite their claim to be nation States, the world’s States today are very rarely mono-ethnic. They generally include various ethnic groups of varying sizes, belonging to nations embodied in a third State (a socalled homo-ethnic State or ethno-State).172 With a view to

of nationalities and that of self-determination of peoples (the implementation of which since 1960 has led to the decolonization of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa), see Jean- François Guilhaudis, Le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes (Grenoble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 1976), p. 276., and Christian Tomuschat, Modern Law of Self Determination (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), p. 360. 170 See also Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. xvn–312. It should be noted that the word “ethnie” was coined by Charles-François Becquet, a Walloon author, in the 1960s: L’ethnie française d’Europe (Paris: Nouvelles éditions latines, 1963). 171 Anthony D. Smith, “A Europe of Nations, or the Nations of Europe?” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 30, no. 2 (May 1993), p. 130. 172 According to a study by Ted Robert Gurr (“Communal Conflicts and Global Security”, Current History, no. 592 (May 1995), pp. 212–217), in 1994, 120 of the 190 existing nation States included 292 “minorities at risk”: 27 in North Africa/the Middle East; 31 in the West (including Japan); 32 in Latin America/the Caribbean; 59 in the former Soviet bloc; 62 in Asia; and 81 in sub-­Saharan 388   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

distinguishing the minorities who lay claim to a homo-ethnic State from those who do not, certain international texts add to the existing confusion by reserving the category of “national minorities” to the former and that of “ethnic minorities” to the latter.173 In any case, ethnic minorities are known as “national minorities” because their members possess the citizenship of a State which is not their ethno-­ State.174 The issue of national minorities is exceptionally complicated for three main reasons. Firstly, there is no generally recognized definition of the concept of “national minorities”. In reality, the essential elements of a possible definition are known; the real disagreement, as noted by Professor Francesco Capotorti (UN Special Rapporteur) concerns the possibility that “an indisputable objective ‘core’ can be widened or restricted, by means of a few controversial considerations.”175 This core is found, notably, in the definition proposed by Professor Capotorti: “a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.”176 However, none of these elements of the definition are self-evident. The numerical criterion raises real difficulties regarding the non-reliability of censuses and counting rules (minority groups have a tendency to exaggerate the numbers and official authorities have a tendency to reduce them),177 the impossibility of setting an ethnicity threshold (that is, defining a percentage of the population or an absolute number on the basis of which a national minority may be recognized), and the need to take account of the phenomenon of “minorities within minorities”. The criterion of cultural differentiation (in the broadest sense of the term) is no clearer. The existence of ethnic differences within the population of a State does not necessarily lead to identity claims: “the undesirability of imposing unwanted distinctions upon individuals belonging to a group who, while possessing distinctive characteristics … do not wish to be treated differently from

Africa. For more details, see Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff et al., Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), p. 427. 173 Some experts, such as Guy Héraud, also consider that an ethnic minority can be categorized as a national minority only when it calls into question its de jure nationality of a given State. 174 This is the reason why migrant workers do not fall within the concept of national minorities. For specific reasons invoked by the parties concerned, indigenous peoples also remain outside the scope of the national minorities issue. 175 Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities (New York: United Nations, 1991), § 564. 176 Ibid., § 568. 177 For more details, see André Liebich, “Minorities in Eastern Europe: Obstacles to a Reliable Count”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 20, 15 May 1992, pp. 32–39.  Chapter VII   389

the rest of the population.”178 In other words, the right to voluntary assimilation is as legitimate as that to differ. Lastly, even the criterion of the disadvantaged position needs to be put into perspective: national minorities may find themselves in a situation of total domination – such as white people in South Africa during apartheid or as is currently the case of the Alawites in Syria. In any case, the lack of a generally recognized definition enables the States concerned to deny their multi-ethnicity as they wish. Secondly, the extreme diversity of minority claims rejects any one-size-fits-all solution. The formation of national minorities within a State may be the consequence of a territorial annexation, the introduction of foreign ethnic elements to the region (black people in the United States), forced diasporas (Jews and Armenians) and voluntary diasporas (Chinese or Lebanese living overseas). Ranging from simple equality of treatment to secession, positive discrimination and various forms of local autonomy, minority claims may be centripetal or centrifugal, depending on historical conditions, the territorial situation (geographic concentration or dispersion), the degree of tolerance or repression by the public authorities, and the existence of external solidarities (ethnic or ideological).179 The issues raised by national minorities thus call for tailormade solutions. Increasingly, such solutions involve non-negligible budgets as well as granting collective rights, generally with little enthusiasm from States. Thirdly, ethnic conflicts oppose the logic of peoples with that of States. In extreme situations, they reveal the incompatibility between the principle of self-­ determination of peoples and that of the territorial integrity of States. Within an international system where the actors are States, the latter generally takes over from the former: international law does not recognize that national minorities have the quality of “peoples” and, consequently, denies them the right to self-­ determination.180

2. The OSCE’s Normative Approach During the Cold War, the theme of national minorities made a tentative appearance within the CSCE’s human dimension and retains a modest place to this day. Following the collapse of communism, a certain normative development

178 See Asbjorn Eide, Ethno-nationalism and minority protection: The need for institutional reforms A/ CONF.157/LACRM/6 (15 December 1992), p. 7. 179 For more details, see Alain Fenet et al., Le droit des minorités. Analyses et textes, “Organisation internationale et relations internationales” collection (Brussels: Bruylant ed., 1995), p. 462. and Fabienne Rousso-Lenoir, Minorités et droits de l’homme : l’Europe et son double, “Axes” collection, no. 9 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1994), p. 200. 180 On this fundamental debate, see Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. xi–260.; Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of ­Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. x–503 .; Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. xvi–290; and Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. xii–451. 390   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

(represented by the Copenhagen Document and, to a lesser extent, the Geneva Report) fairly quickly set the pace.181

A. From Helsinki (1975) to Vienna (1989) The theme of national minorities was introduced to the OSCE by Yugoslavia, during the Geneva negotiations on the future Helsinki Final Act (Stage II of the CSCE), in a “Draft Resolution on the Promotion of Respect for the Rights of National ­Minorities”.182 Based on the observation that several CSCE countries included national minorities (defined as “groups whose [ethnic] nationality is different to that of the majority of the State in question and identical to the population of a neighbouring State”), this text highlighted the fact that the existence of such groups was only a factor of co-operation and goodneighbourly relations if their rights were fully respected. Consequently, it recommended that participating States agree to promote and protect the collective rights of national minorities through national legislation and other measures to preserve their identity and to ensure their full cultural, economic and social development – notably equality before the law, the use of the minority language in public life, preservation of their cultural heritage, school education and access to the media. To this was added the obligation for States to refrain from any measures of forced assimilation.183 The Yugoslavian proposal was received negatively. It was firmly opposed by certain countries in both the East and West (Greece, France, Spain, Belgium, ­Bulgaria, Romania), which were hostile to the idea of officially recognizing their national minorities and, furthermore, of attributing them collective rights. A new Yugoslav proposal, drafted in less ambitious terms, met with the same objections. Finally, a brief provision on national minorities was incorporated into the H ­ elsinki

181 In addition to the OSCE, two international organizations are concerned with the problem of national minorities from a normative point of view: the United Nations and the Council of ­Europe. The first has achieved only the adoption of Resolution 47/135 by the General Assembly on 18 December 1992 (see Patrick Thornberry, “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis and Observations”, in Allan Phillips and Allan Rosas (eds.), The UN Minority Rights Declaration (Turku: Åbo Institute for Human Rights, 1993), pp. 11–17, and Gudmundur Alfredsson and Alfred de Zayas, “Minority Rights: Protection by the United Nations”, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 14, no. 1–2 (26 February 1993), pp. 1–8). The work of the Council of Europe has been more consistent; it led to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (5 November 1992), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (10 November 1994) and the draft Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. For more details, see Alain Fenet, Le droit et les minorités. Analyse et textes, “Organisation internationale et relations internationales” collection, no. 32 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 131–138 and pp. 167–196. 182 See CSCE/II/C.1/11 (15 February 1974). See also CSCE/II/C.1/7 (29 November 1973). 183 On this last point, the original version of the text went considerably further: it recommended that participating States should “desist from any measures liable to result in the assimilation or integration of the minority with the majority of the population of a country” (CSCE/II/C.1/7 of 29 November 1973).  Chapter VII   391

Decalogue, within Principle VII relating to respect for human rights.184 Drafted in general and restricted terms, it stipulated that: “the participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.”185 The expression “participating States on whose territory national minorities exist” eludes the problem of defining national minorities; consequently, it leaves States entirely free to deny the existence of national minorities on their territory. Moreover, the reference only to the rights of persons belonging to national minorities excludes the perspective of collective rights. Lastly, by positioning the interests of national minorities against the backdrop of equality before the law and the actual enjoyment of general human rights, the participating States diverge from the idea of protection through specific rights. In sum, the content of the provision included in Principle VII of the Decalogue fell short of that of Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (an article which is admittedly in itself fairly timid).186 In 1983, the participating States adopted the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting, which contained certain innovations relating to human rights, but in no way modified the Final Act’s approach to national minorities. In effect, the Madrid Document settled for formally stating the importance of “constant progress in ensuring the respect for an actual enjoyment of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as protecting their legitimate interests as provided for in the Final Act.”187 In contrast, negotiated at the height of ­perestroika, the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting (1989) included three new elements. Firstly, the Vienna Document recognized the need for practical “legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures” to ensure that persons belonging to

184 See CSCE/II/C.1/17 (1 May 1974). On the debate prompted by the Yugoslav proposal throughout the Geneva negotiations, see Luigi Vittorio Ferraris (ed.), Report on a Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva- Helsinki, 1972–1975 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979), pp. 107, 135–136, 138 and 163. 185 See Helsinki Final Act (1975), Principle VII, § 4. It should also be specified that sections of the third basket on culture and education all end with a similar provision recognizing the contribution that “national minorities or regional cultures” may make to co-operation between participating States and indicating that they “propose, where such minorities or cultures exist within their territory, and taking into account the legitimate interests of their members, to facilitate this contribution.” 186 Text of Article 27 of the Covenant: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” For a commentary on this provision, see Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 149ff. 187 See Madrid Concluding Document (1983), “Principles”, § 15. 392   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

national minorities could enjoy the rights making up the general corpus of human rights.188 Secondly, it extended to these categories of persons provisions from the third basket relating to contacts between persons, information, culture and education – which meant granting them the possibility of establishing and maintaining contacts “through travel and other means of communication, including contacts with citizens of other States with whom they share a common national origin or cultural heritage,”189 to “disseminate, have access to, and exchange information in their mother tongue,”190 to “maintain and develop their own culture in all its aspects, including language, literature and religion,” to “preserve their monuments and historical monuments and objects”191 and, lastly, to “give and receive instruction on their own culture, including instruction through parental transmission of language, religion and cultural identity to their children.”192 It should be specified that all these commitments were governed by a loosely binding introductory expression indicating that the participating States “will ensure that …” Nonetheless, the provisions existed and could, where appropriate, lead to inter-State interventions under the Vienna Mechanism on the human dimension. Thirdly, the Vienna Document was innovative by committing participating States to protecting the “ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory” and creating “conditions for the promotion” of these identities,193 a provision which, for the first time in the CSCE’s history, targeted national minorities as groups. There was nothing fortuitous about this first step forward on national minorities within the CSCE. It coincided with the phenomenon of “xenophobic communism” which, alongside Soviet perestroika, was emerging in Romania (to the detriment of the Hungarians in Transylvania) and Bulgaria (towards the Turks). In the wake of the collapse of communism, the step forward transformed into a breakthrough, at the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension.

B. The Copenhagen Document (June 1990) During the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (5–29 June 1990), the first exercise held under the human dimension since the collapse of communism, the theme of national minorities

188 Vienna Concluding Document (1989), “Principles”, § 18. 189 Ibid., “Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields”, § 31. 190 Ibid., § 45. 191 Ibid., § 59. 192 Ibid., § 68. This provision also covers (as indeed do the three other provisions mentioned above) “regional cultures” – a specification added at the request of post-Francoist Spain. 193 Vienna Concluding Document (1989), “Principles”, § 19.  Chapter VII   393

was the subject of unprecedented interest at the CSCE.194 The Final Document of the meeting devoted its entire section IV to it, that is to say, paragraphs 30–40.7.195 Analysis of these paragraphs reveals six essential elements of the “Copenhagen approach”. Firstly, the Copenhagen Document shared the conviction that questions of national minorities could only be satisfactorily resolved within the democratic framework of a State with an effective and independent legal system, that is, its own framework to guarantee the integral respect for human rights and the effective control of abuses of power exercised by the government.196 It also stressed that respect for the rights of people belonging to national minorities was in the interest of States and an “essential factor for peace, justice, stability and democracy” in the participating States.197 Consequently, it recommended that they promote the development of a climate conducive to understanding and mutual respect, co-­ operation and solidarity between all their citizens and that they encourage the resolution of problems through dialogue based on the principles of the rule of law.198 From this perspective, the Copenhagen Document clearly and unequivocally condemned the factors which were traditionally detrimental to the existence of national minorities and the enjoyment of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities (“totalitarianism, racial and ethnic hatred, antisemitism, xenophobia and discrimination against anyone as well as persecution on religious and ideological grounds”). It recommended that participating States take effective measures relating to the law, education, culture and information to combat the scourge that they represented and to protect the “groups” and “persons” concerned.199 One of the strengths of the Copenhagen Document is that it provides the first CSCE condemnation of antisemitism and the first CSCE recognition of the Roma issue. Secondly, the Copenhagen Document did not define the concept of national minorities. Clearly inspired by the subjective concept of the nation, however, it stated that belonging to a national minority is “a matter of a person’s individual

194 At the First Conference on the Human Dimension (Paris, 30 May–23 June 1989), only one proposal on national minorities was submitted by Hungary, together with Austria and Norway, with particular emphasis on language rights and the issue of administrative restructuring of regions with concentrated national minorities (CSCE/CDHP.36 of 21 June 1989 and Corr.1). 195 The provisions of section IV were based on proposals submittted by Canada, the USSR and Italy (CSCE/CHDC.4/Rev.1 of 14 June 1990), the members of the Pentagonal Initiative (CSCE/CHDC.5 of 5 June 1990 and Add.1), Romania (CSCE/CHDC.6 and 7 of 5 June 1990), the Federal Republic of Germany (FRY), Canada and the Netherlands (CSCE/CHDC.11 of 7 June 1990), the FRY and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (CSCE/CHDC.12 of 7 June 1990 and two addenda), ­Switzerland (CSCE/CHDC.25 of 14 June 1990), Sweden (CSCE/CHDC.28 of 14 June 1990) and Greece (CSCE/CHDC.34 of 19 June 1990). 196 Copenhagen Document (1990), § 30, first indent. 197 Ibid., § 30, third indent. 198 Ibid., § 36, second indent. 199 Ibid., §§ 40, 40.1–40.5. The Copenhagen Document, however, went less far than the 1965 ­Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which prohibits the existence of organizations with racist aims. 394   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such choice” – positive or negative.200 Thirdly, the Copenhagen Document focused on the classic requirement of non- discrimination and equality before the law. It recognized that persons belonging to national minorities have the “right to exercise fully and effectively their human rights and fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before the law” while recommending that participating States adopt, where necessary, special measures to this end.201 Fourthly, the Copenhagen Document recognized that persons belonging to national minorities had the right to develop their identity in all its forms, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will.202 From this perspective, it listed a certain number of specific rights: the right to use their mother tongue (in private and public); the right to establish and maintain their own educational, cultural and religious institutions; the right to profess and practise their religion (including conducting religious educational activities in their mother tongue); the right to establish and maintain unimpeded contacts within their country as well as across frontiers; the right to disseminate, have access to and exchange information in their mother tongue; and, finally, the right to participate in international NGOs.203 It should be noted that the Copenhagen Document is set against the traditional backdrop of individual rights. However, similarly to Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it recognized that persons belonging to national minorities may “individually as well as in community with other members of their group” exercise and enjoy their rights.204 In addition, it recommends that participating States take measures to protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities as a group.205 Fifthly, the Copenhagen Document recognized that protecting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as their collective identity affects the interests of international relations in the region. It thus stated that “constructive co-operation” on questions relating to national minorities promotes “mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and goodneighbourly relations, international peace, security and justice” between participating States.206 Sixthly, the Copenhagen Document set an absolute limit on the protection of national minorities in relation to respect for the principle of the territorial integrity of States. In this regard, it specified that none of the commitments it contained

200 Ibid., § 32, first indent. § 32.6 states that No disadvantage could arise for a person belonging to a national minority on account of the exercise or non-exercise of any of the rights set forth in the Copenhagen Document. 201 Ibid., § 31. 202 Ibid., § 32, second indent. 203 Ibid., § 32.1–32.6. See also § 34. 204 Ibid., § 32.6, second indent. 205 Ibid., § 33. 206 Ibid., § 36, first indent. See also § 38 (possible adherence to relevant international instruments) and § 39, first indent (co-operation in the United Nations and the Council of Europe).  Chapter VII   395

may be interpreted as “implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any action in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, other obligations under international law or the provisions of the Final Act, including the principle of territorial integrity of States.”207 Upon closer inspection, the Copenhagen Document left itself wide open to various criticisms. Firstly, it presented the rule of law as, in a manner of speaking, a panacea. Democracy is certainly indispensable to the exercise of human rights, but as the law of the will of the majority, it is never, by definition, sufficient. It may remedy certain injustices, but in no way rectifies or compensates for the structural disadvantages facing national minorities in society.208 Moreover, the main provisions of the text were accompanied by loophole formulae or were expressed in non-binding language. Thus, participating States were bound to take effective non-discrimination and equality measures under the law only where necessary.209 The measures aiming to ensure non-discrimination and equality before the law had to be “in conformity with the principles of equality and non-discrimination with respect to the other citizens of the participating State”210, which equated to a rejection of the idea of positive discrimination. On the fundamental question of the public use of the mother tongue, the text indicated that the participating States should “endeavour to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities … have adequate opportunities for instruction of their mother tongue or in their mother tongue, as well as, wherever possible and necessary, for its use before public authorities, in conformity with applicable national legislation.”211 Similarly, participating States agreed to respect, but not to ensure, the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effectively participate in public affairs: they vaguely settled for noting possible means to achieve these aims in terms of administration and local autonomy.212 It should also be stressed that the Copenhagen Document gave no place to the ideas submitted with a view to establishing specific mechanisms for the protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities nor for the settlement of international problems relating to them.213 Furthermore, it did not retain the

207 Ibid., § 37. A provision in the same spirit would subsequently be inserted in the Moscow Document (1991), preamble, § 7. 208 On this point, see Béla Farago, “La démocratie et le problème des minorités nationales”, Le Débat, no. 76 (September–October 1993), pp. 5–24. 209 Copenhagen Document (1990), § 31, second indent. 210 Ibid., § 33, second indent. 211 Ibid., § 34, first indent. The participating States were supposed only to “take account” of the history and culture of national minorities in their educational establishments (second indent). 212 Ibid., § 35. 213 Such mechanisms were proposed by the members of the Pentagonal Initiative (CSCE/CHDC.5 of 5 June 1990), by Romania (CSCE/CHDC.7 of 5 June 1990), by the FRY, Canada and the Netherlands (CSCE/CHDC.11 of 7 June 1990), by Sweden (idea of a “CSCE Representative on National Minorities”, CSCE/CHDC.28 of 14 June 1990), and by the FRY and the GDR in a joint proposal on non-discrimination (CSCE/CHDC.12 of 7 June 1990). 396   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

positive idea according to which national minorities contributed to the “cultural enrichment of the States in which they live” and constituted “a valuable link between the participating States”.214 Finally, it should also be noted that Switzerland (with the backing of various countries including the USSR and the United Kingdom) proposed that an extraordinary meeting be held, tasked with urgently examining “the various methods and modalities to prevent conflicts around national minorities and to resolve these problems,” during the first half of 1991, although a consensus was not reached. The proposal was categorically rejected by various delegations, led by Greece.215 Ultimately, it was agreed only that the participating States would “consider convening a meeting of experts for a thorough discussion of the issue of national minorities.”216 In sum, it is clear that the Copenhagen Meeting not only marked a political “breakthrough” on the theme of national minorities, but also demonstrated an awareness that this theme had created a new fracture line within a globally consensual approach to the human dimension. The wording of section IV of the ­Copenhagen Document indeed gives rise to a confrontation between States which were favourable towards a pan-European system for protecting national minorities (the members of the Pentagonal Initiative, the Nordic countries, Switzerland) and those which were hostile to any commitment going beyond the scope of non- discrimination and equality of treatment (France, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania).217 During the Meeting (in their speeches, proposals and interpretative statements), most of this latter group stressed the principle of territorial integrity and the “duties” incumbent upon people belonging to national minorities.218

214 See CSCE/CHDC.5 (5 June 1990) (preamble, last paragraph) and CSCE/CHDC.22 (14 June 1990) (preamble, § 3). See also CSCE/CHDC.11 (7 June 1990) (preamble, § 5). 215 Attempting to muddy the waters, Greece proposed the convening of a meeting of experts on national minorities to “try to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the concept of national minority” and to “study similar concepts, such as ethnic group, nationality, ethnic community, indigenous people and other notions related to minorities” (CSCE/CHDC.34 of 19 June 1990). 216 Copenhagen Document (1990), § 39, second indent. 217 A third trend involved countries that were both sympathetic to the cause of national minorities and understanding towards governments having concerns about national unity or territorial integrity (United States, Canada, Spain, Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Portugal). See Alexis Heraclides, “The CSCE and Minorities: The Negotiations Behind the Commitments, 1972–1992”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 3 (1992), p. 9. 218 For Greece, see proposal CSCE/CHDC.34 (19 June 1990), p. 2; the text of the speech delivered by the Greek Ambassador Tsamados at the plenary session of 22 June 1990; and Copenhagen Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 28 June 1990, pp. 2–3 (interpretative statement). For Bulgaria, see Copenhagen Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 28 June 1990, p. 3. For Romania, see proposal CSCE/ CHDC.6 (5 June 1990), §§ 5, 7 and 11. Turkey issued an interpretative statement explaining that the term “national minorities” covered only population groups whose status is subject to bilateral or multilateral international instruments to which it was a party (CSCE/CHDC.Inf.7 of 28 June 1990); this statement would be reaffirmed at the conclusion of the Moscow Meeting, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, p. 3 and the Budapest Summit: Journal No. 2 of 6 December 1994, p. 7.  Chapter VII   397

For its part, France insisted above all on the universalist conception of human rights.219 Shortly after the end of the Copenhagen Meeting, the theme of national minorities resurfaced during the summer of 1990 in the preparatory work for the Paris Summit. The Vienna “PrepCom” debated the question of normative references to be inserted into the future Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the issue of a meeting of experts, the principle of which had been raised by the Copenhagen Document.220 On the first point, the Charter of Paris restated the broad outlines of the Copenhagen approach;221 however, it went beyond it by presenting the phenomenon of national minorities in a positive light, through a provision confirming the participating States’ commitment to encouraging the “rich contribution of national minorities” to public life.222 On the second point, it announced the convening of the first specialized meeting of the CSCE on the subject, to take place in Geneva in July 1991.223

219 France produced no interpretative statement in Copenhagen. However, at the end of the Oslo Seminar on Democratic Institutions it criticized the provisions of the final report on local and regional autonomy, see Journal No. 10 of 15 November 1991, item 6.2. At the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, the delegation of France issued an interpretative statement recalling that France’s thinking on human rights issues was based on the universal principle that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights; the text also stated that “the French Constitution draws on this principle and provides in article 2 that France is an indivisible Republic and ensures the equality of all its citizens without distinction as to origin, race or religion. It is in this light that the French Government has interpreted article 27 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and that it will interpret the provisions of the final document [of Helsinki 1992] concerning the High Commissioner on National Minorities”, see Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, p. 8. On the specifics of the French position, see Emmanuel Spiry, “Le problème des minorités nationales en Europe occidentale : l’originalité de la position française”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 28 (1994/IV), pp. 137–160, and Geneviève Koubi, “Droits et minorités dans la République française”, in Alain Fenet et al., Le droit et les minorités. Analyse et textes, “Organisation internationale et relations internationales” collection, no. 32 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 197–249. 220 See Alexis Heraclides, “The CSCE and Minorities: The Negotiations Behind the Commitments, 1972–1992”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 3 (1992), p. 12. 221 Charter of Paris, “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, § 3, second, third and fourth sentences. See also “A new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity”, section on “Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law”, § 6. 222 Charter of Paris (1990), “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, § 3, first sentence. The following year, the Document of the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States (1991) confirmed that the participating States were “convinced of the enrichment which regional and local cultures, including those connected with national minorities, bring to cultural life” (§ 9). 223 Charter of Paris (1990), “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, § 3, first sentence. See also Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), chapter II, part B and Annex III. Drawing up the meeting’s agenda (“non-papers” of 19 September and 18 ­October 1990) was not without difficulties, see Heraclides, “The CSCE and Minorities …” (n. 220), p. 13. 398   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

C. The Geneva Report (July 1991) The CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities in Geneva (1–9 July 1991) was mandated to conduct a “thorough discussion on the issue of national minorities and of the rights of persons belonging to them, with due attention to the diversity of situations and to the legal, historical, political and economic backgrounds”.224 This encompassed three specific tasks: exchanging views on various national experiences in protecting national minorities; reviewing the implementation of relevant CSCE commitments; and, finally, considering new measures aimed at improving the implementation of these commitments.225 The success of the Meeting of Experts in accomplishing these tasks was patchy.226 More conclusively, the comparison of national experiences revealed the extreme diversity of the situations which existed within the CSCE area. The participating States consequently recognized that “no single approach [was] necessarily generally applicable.”227 They drafted a detailed inventory containing no fewer than 14 democratic formulae which had been credited with generally positive results: specialized advisory and decision-making bodies (in particular with regard to education, culture and religion); elected bodies and assemblies of national minority affairs; consultative, legislative and executive bodies chosen through free and periodic elections for local and autonomous administration (including on a territorial basis); self-­administration on a non-territorial basis; forms of decentralized or local government; special (bilateral and multilateral) international agreements and arrangements regarding national minorities; provision of education in their mother tongue for national minorities; funding the teaching of minority languages in regional teacher training institutions; recognition of diplomas issued abroad for a course of study completed in that language; government agencies to review legislation and disseminate information related to equal rights and non-discrimination; financial and technical assistance to educational, cultural and religious associations; trust- building measures in the form of citizens’ relations services to address local difficulties relating to discriminatory practices; encouragement of grassroots community relations efforts aimed at helping to prevent local tensions and address conflicts peacefully should they arise; and permanent inter-State or regional mixed commissions to facilitate continuing dialogue between border regions.228

224 Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris (1990), Annex III, § I.4. 225 Ibid., Annex III, § I.4, items (a), (b) and (c). 226 See Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, From Vienna to Helsinki: Reports on the Inter-sessional Meetings of the CSCE Process (Washington, 1992), pp. 133–149, and Heraclides, Security and Co-operation in Europe … (no. 1), pp. 150–156. See also Joost Herman, “The CSCE Meeting on National Minorities in Geneva”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 2, no. 4 (1991), pp. 53–55; Stephen J. Roth: “Comments on the Geneva CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities”, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 12, no. 8/9 (30 September 1991), pp. 330–334; and three reports in the Journal de Genève (1 July, 13–14 July and 20–21 July 1991). 227 Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section IV, § 7. See also section I, § 4. 228 Ibid., section IV, § 7.  Chapter VII   399

The participating States were of the view that “these or other approaches, individually or in combination, could be helpful in improving the situation of national minorities on their territories,” but did not actually make any firm commitments.229 It should, however, be noted that two of the formulae listed were the subject of additional references. Firstly, the participating States considered that “appropriate democratic participation of persons belonging to national minorities or their representatives in decision-making or consultative bodies constitutes an important element of effective participation in public affairs.”230 Secondly, they expressed their desire to encourage transfrontier co- operation arrangements on the national, regional and local levels, including on the subject of local border crossings, the preservation of and visits to cultural and historical monuments and sites, tourism, the improvement of traffic, the economy, youth exchange, the protection of the environment and the establishment of regional commissions.231 However, the review of implementation of the participating States’ CSCE commitments relating to protecting national minorities was relatively unsatisfactory. According to the US Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, “there was considerable reluctance to engage in a thorough and specific implementation review … almost all participating States refrained from mentioning specific problems in specific countries. Some openly called such a frank review a relic of the confrontational period of division between East and West.”232 A few rare delegations, nevertheless played by the rules (essentially that of the United States and Hungary) – which enabled the issue of the Roma and the situation of national minorities in Romania, the USSR and Yugoslavia to be raised. The Geneva Report provided an imperfect summary of this aspect of the debate by stating that “views were expressed on the implementation of the relevant CSCE commitments.”233 Finally, when it came to the formulation and implementation of new standards, the Meeting of Experts was disappointing. The participating States adopted no new commitments on linguistic rights and the recognition of diplomas,234 nor concerning local autonomy. Furthermore, they failed to establish specialized protection mechanisms.235 Ultimately, they only reaffirmed, with some

229 Ibid., section IV, § 8. 230 Ibid., section III, § 1. 231 Ibid., section VII, § 4. 232 Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, From Vienna to Helsinki … (n. 226), p. 139. 233 Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), preamble, § 3. 234 See CSCE/REMN.2 (8 July 1991) (Hexagonal Initiative) and CSCE/REMN.6 (9 July 1991) (and Add.1 of 10 July 1991). Proposal CSCE/REMN.17 (12 July 1991) on the rights of migrant workers remained also unheeded. 235 In this case, the participating States contented themselves with merely pointing out that specialized mechanisms “may be of relevance”, postponing the development of the Human Dimension Mechanism until the Moscow Meeting and “promot[ing] the involvement of individuals in the protection of their rights” (Report of the Geneva Meeting, section VIII, § 2). See also the Chairman’s statement in Journal No. 15 of 19 July 1991, p. 2. 400   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

short-range precisions, some provisions of the Copenhagen Document, on participation in public affairs, equal economic opportunities, non-discrimination in employment, housing and education, the protection of cultural materials, cross-border contacts and access to the media.236 In reality, the context within which the Geneva Meeting took place was radically different from that of Copenhagen. The theme of national minorities had grown in the CSCE area and aroused less enthusiasm than previously. Governments found themselves even more cautious, given that the Geneva Meeting of Experts opened shortly after the start of the civil war in Yugoslavia, a prelude to the disintegration of a federation which was considered by some as a model of inter- ethnic coexistence.237 Participating States which were previously not hostile to the minority cause now voiced doubts about extending the scope of the CSCE commitments on the subject. Even more seriously, those who were against it believed that the CSCE had already gone too far and that the course adopted in Copenhagen, which was too liberal for their tastes, should change.238 In other words, the challenge facing the Geneva Meeting of Experts was less to make progress than to preserve the accomplishments reached in Copenhagen. The schism which had emerged at Copenhagen was confirmed in Geneva.239 On more than one occasion, the negotiations nearly collapsed and were saved only following a last-minute initiative from the Americans.240

236 Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section III, § 1; section IV, §§ 1, 2 and 3; and section VII, §§ 1, 2 and 3. 237 The discussions of the Geneva Meeting of Experts were marked by the Yugoslav conflict. Virtually all countries criticized Belgrade’s use of military force against Slovenia. A conflict erupted between Yugoslavia and Greece (over Macedonia) and Albania (over Kosovo). The latter, which had just been admitted to the CSCE, gave its consensus to the Geneva Report only after having specified in an interpretative statement that the text did not concern the issue of the Albanian population of Kosovo and Yugoslavia, which was not a national minority issue, but “a national question”. See Geneva Meeting of Experts: Journal No. 15 of 19 July 1991, 7(b). For its part, Yugoslavia tried unsuccessfully to include in the Report a provision denying national minorities the right to self-determination. In an interpretative statement, it considered that such a failure created “a dangerous precedent, whose boomerang may tomorrow hit other participating States, threatening their territorial integrity, stability and peace,” see ibid., item 7 (d). 238 See Jan E. Helgesen, “Protecting minorities in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process”, International Journal on Group Rights, vol. 2, no. 1 (1994), p. 28. 239 It should be noted, however, that two countries representing diametrically opposed views (France and Hungary) submitted a joint text intended to demonstrate that their perspectives were not irreconcilable. Entitled “Contribution to the discussion”, the text in question emphasized (in keeping with the French line) the individual rights and remedies available under the rule of law while, following the Hungarian viewpoint, recognizing that particular attention should be given “to national minorities created as a result of frontier changes in the course of the twentieth century” and that it may be necessary “taking into account the particular situations and the specific historical circumstances, to elaborate specific solutions”. See CSCE/REMN.11 (9 July 1991). 240 As the final draft submitted by the host country Coordinator was deemed unacceptable by a very large number of participating States, Washington intervened by submitting another draft developed by the NATO “caucus”. See Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, From Vienna to Helsinki … (n. 226), pp. 41–143.  Chapter VII   401

Although falling far short of the Copenhagen Document, the Geneva Report was not without its merits. The text accepted that the issue of national minorities placed natural limits on the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the State. It phrased this recognition in the following terms: “Issues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective State.”241 Moreover, by mentioning the need for “a thorough review” of implementation of participating States’ commitments relating to national minorities,242 the Geneva Report brought the theme of national minorities into the human dimension of the CSCE more clearly than the Copenhagen Document had done. Nevertheless, it expressed this integration through three commitments which were politically voluntary for participating States: to distribute “on a voluntary basis”, through the CSCE Secretariat, information about the situation of national minorities in their “territories”;243 to “consider favourably, to the extent permitted by law,” the presence of observers at elections in areas inhabited by national minorities as well as to “endeavour to facilitate their access”;244 and to “make efforts to collect, publish on a regular basis, and make available to the public, data about crimes on their respective territories that are based on prejudice as to race, ethnic identity or ­religion.”245 Nevertheless, the Geneva Report contained provisions which represented a backward step from the 1990 approach. By strictly placing those belonging to national minorities on an equal footing with those in the majority population, it rejected positive discrimination in a more entrenched way than the Copenhagen Document.246 Among other things, it introduced the concept of “duties” to the CSCE – which was psychologically humiliating for national minorities, because it implied an obligation of “loyalty”.247 Finally, it stressed that “not all ethnic, cul­ tural, linguistic or religious differences necessarily lead to the creation of national

241 Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section II, § 3. According to Heraclides (“The CSCE and Minorities …” (n. 220), p. 15), his provision was strangely enough adopted at the initiative of Greece. 242 Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section II, § 1. 243 Ibid., section VII, § 6. 244 Ibid., section III, § 5. 245 Ibid., section VI, § 5. This provision was adopted at the initiative of the United States and aimed to extend the general formula derived from the Crime Statistics Act of 23 April 1990 to all CSCE countries. 246 “In areas inhabited mainly by persons belonging to a national minority, the human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons belonging to that minority, of persons belonging to the majority population of the respective State, and of persons belonging to other national minorities residing in these areas will be equally protected”, see Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section III, § 3. 247 “The participating States affirm that persons belonging to a national minority will enjoy the same rights and have the same duties of citizenship as the rest of the population” (ibid., section IV, § 4). 402   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

minorities.”248 Although a legitimate statement in itself, this could be used as a pretext by States opposed to recognizing national minorities living on their ­territory.249 In sum, the Geneva Meeting failed to meet the hopes of those who, after ­Copenhagen, had believed that the CSCE would be in a position to provide a somewhat original response to the issue of national minorities.

D. Changes to the Normative Approach since 1991 After the Geneva exercise, normative progress was negligible if not non-­existent. At the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (10 September–4 October 1991), Yugoslavia recommended that the participating States should be obliged to report to the CSCE every two years on national measures to protect their minorities.250 Another group of countries (Austria, ­Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, USSR) suggested adopting provisions on participation in public affairs and linguistic rights and proposed the idea of allowing national minorities to claim the right to self-determination on the condition that this be exercised only through peaceful and democratic means.251 Due to a lack of consensus, the participating States confined themselves to the Copenhagen and Geneva commitments, desiring their “full and rapid” implementation as well as the use of new CSCE instruments to this end (the Moscow Mechanism).252 This paltry result encouraged Hungary to issue an interpretative statement noting the timidity of the Moscow Document and presenting the broad outlines of the concept which it had adopted as its own since the end of communism.253 The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of 1992 fared little better.254 When it drew to a close, the participating States agreed to “intensify their efforts” to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities had the possibility of exercising the right to participate in the life of the country, “including through democratic participation in decision-making and consultative bodies” on the national,

248 Ibid., section II, § 4. 249 Hence the interpretative statement made by a group of countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Yugoslavia) specifying that the provision in question “may not limit the right of the individual to choose to belong or not belong to a national minority as laid down in § 32 of the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting.” See Geneva Meeting of Experts: Journal No. 15 of 19 July 1991, p. 3. 250 See CSCE/CHDM.37 (26 September 1991). 251 See CSCE/CHDM.36 (25 September 1991). 252 See Moscow Document (1991), § 37. This provision was largely inspired by an Anglo-German proposal (CSCE/CHDM.33 of 25 September 1991). 253 See Moscow Meeting: Journal No. 18 of 3 October 1991, p. 4. Belgium, for its part, issued an interpretative statement awkwardly stating that the commitments referred to in § 37 of the Moscow Document fell exclusively within the scope of human rights (ibid., p. 3). 254 For proposals concerning national minorities submitted in Helsinki, see CSCE/HM/WG3/8 (26 May 1992) (and Adds.1–3) and CSCE/HM/WG3/11 (1 June 1992) (as well as Adds.1 and 2).  Chapter VII   403

regional and local level, inter alia, through “political parties and associations”.255 They also agreed to address the issues raised by national minorities in a “constructive manner, by peaceful means and through dialogue” on the basis of CSCE principles and commitments.256 Similarly, they agreed to refrain from resettling and condemned “all attempts by the threat or use of force, to resettle persons with the aim of changing the ethnic composition of areas within their territories”257 — a provision clearly inspired by the Yugoslav conflict. The Budapest Review Conference in 1994 adopted no normative provisions. At the end of the exercise, the participating States only reaffirmed their desire to implement all the relevant CSCE commitments and (as suggested by Switzerland) to “examine the possibility” of becoming parties to the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1994).258 The blockage in the normative process was eased by three positive developments. The first was the association of the theme of national minorities with that of conflict prevention, primarily illustrated by the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.259 The second was the comparison of constructive national experiences in terms of protecting national minorities. Keen not to highlight and intensify their differences of opinion, the participating States approved the suggestion made by Austria in 1992 to reopen the question of national minorities from the angle of the various situations to which a satisfactory solution had been found, with a view to inspiring governments facing more or less similar problems.260 Consequently, the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting asked the ODIHR to organize a seminar entitled “Case Studies of National Minorities: Positive Results”.261 The seminar, which took place in Warsaw from 24 to 28 May 1993, was one of the most successful of this kind of meeting.262

255 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, § 24. 256 Ibid., Chapter VI, § 26. 257 Ibid., Chapter VI, § 27. 258 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, §§ 21 and 22. For the Swiss proposal, see CSCE/BC/WG3/8 (23 November 1994). On the instrument in question, see Heinrich Klebes, “La Convention-cadre du Conseil de l’Europe pour la protection des minorités nationales”, Revue universelle des droits de l’homme, vol. 7, no. 4–6, 23 (June 1995), pp. 165–170. 259 This aspect is discussed further in this volume, see Chapter VII, part III.3, pp. 403–404. 260 See the proposal submitted by Austria (together with some 15 other delegations) to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: CSCE/HM/WG3/12 (1 June 1992) (and Adds.1–4 of 4–8 June 1992). 261 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter XI, § 28. Agenda of the Seminar: CSCE/19-CSO/Dec.1 (4 ­February 1993). 262 See the Consolidated Summary of the ODIHR, the latest report released in the ODIHR Bulletin (vol. 1, no. 3, (Autumn 1993), pp. 28–34) and Rachel Brett and Elaine Eddison: “The CSCE Human Dimension on National Minorities: Can National Minorities be Considered Positively?”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 3 (1993), pp. 39–43. It should be pointed out that Croatia unsuccessfully tried to convince the participating States to hold the seminar on its territory, see CSCE Communications No. 312 (26 October 1992) and No. 20 (21 January 1993). 404   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

The third development was the adoption of provisions concerning the Roma. This point is worthy of particular attention. The populations known by the generally pejorative exonym of “Gypsies” include three major groups: the Roma (living essentially in Central and Easter ­Europe), the Sinti or Manouche (Germany, Italy, France), and the Kale or Cale (Spain, Portugal, France).263 In terms of national minorities, the case of the Roma (who represent nine tenths of the three groups) constitutes a specific case. Hailing from no specific territory and laying claim to no existing or mythical State, the Roma are “immigrants from nowhere”.264 Lacking a common language or religion, even their origin lends itself to controversy: is this an ethnic group from the north of India or from multiple, non-localizable origins? Whatever the case, “they do not make up a monolithic community, but a set of groups linked by continuous exchanges, albeit of varying intensity and changing nature depending on the era and the groups.”265 Some authors deny that the Roma have their own culture and go as far as saying that their languages are nothing but a dialectal variant of those of the host country.266 However, it is also considered that cultural borrowing from the country in question has not had the effect of diluting the typical ethnicity of the Roma.267 Moreover, the Roma are a “new minority for others and new to themselves”.268 Indeed, until recently, governments considered them as a problematic social group and not as a cultural minority. The Roma themselves hesitated to declare themselves as such during censuses, due to a lack of a collective consciousness and for fear of persecution.269 Finally, the Roma share with the Jews the fact that they have been universal pariahs and victims of the Nazi genocide. Arriving in Europe as early as the fourteenth century, they were treated cruelly everywhere they went, due to their different ethnicity and the aggravating feature of their nomadism. As the author Jean-­Pierre Légois noted, it is their dissident nature rather than their minority status which States desperately try to banish, penalize and repress.270 During the

263 Alain Fenet, “L’Europe et les minorités”, in Fenet et al., Le droit et les minorités … (n. 219), p. 159. In contrast to the term “endonym” (a name for a people used by its own members), “exonym” is the name given to a people by outsiders. The designation “Gypsies” stems from the (mistaken) belief that the Roma people came from Egypt. 264 Jean-Pierre Liégeois, “Tsiganes : l’émergence d’une minorité”, Les minorités à l’âge de l’Etat-Nation (Paris: Fayard, 1985), p. 190. 265 Fenet, “L’Europe et les minorités” (n. 263), p. 159 266 See Nicole Martinez, Les Tsiganes, “Que sais-je?” collection (Paris: PUF, 1986), p. 32. 267 See Jean-Pierre Liégeois, Tsiganes (Paris: La Découverte, 1983), p. 131. 268 Liégeois, “Tsiganes : l’émergence d’une minorité …” (n. 264), p. 207. 269 The “Gypsy World Community” was founded in 1959. In 1967, a splinter group created another organization that would eventually take the name “International Roma Union” and which was granted consultative status by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in accordance with its Resolution 12 of 11 April 1979. See Liégeois, Tsiganes … (n. 267), p. 265. 270 Liégeois, “Tsiganes : l’émergence d’une minorité …” (n. 264), p. 193.  Chapter VII   405

Second World War, the Roma did not escape the Holocaust, with more than 500,000 of them being systematically exterminated in the Nazi camps. A non-territorial ethnic group and without a known ethno-State, the Roma lay no claims to the creation of their own State. They live within a multitude of ­European and non-European nation States. It is not known precisely how many of them there are in the world. The figure is somewhere between 9 and 12 million people.271 Between 6 and 10 million Roma live in Eastern Europe, particularly in Romania (2.2 million), Bulgaria (more than 600,000) and in the countries of the former Yugoslavia (close to 1 million). Western Europe is home to only around a million Roma, living essentially in Spain and France. In the communist regimes, which forced them to be sedentary and, in some cases (Czechoslovakia) sterilized the women, they remain on the lowest rungs of the social ladder. The end of the Cold War brutally aggravated their situation. The social cost of transitioning to the market economy and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism rendered them the victims of racist hatred and violence. Invariably treated with suspicion, rejected and mistreated, the Roma have become the most threatened minority group in Central Europe. The issue of the Roma entered the CSCE’s remit in a tentative and gradual way, following the collapse of communism. In June 1990, in the wake of the categorical condemnation of racial hatred and other related phenomena at the Copenhagen Meeting, the participating States symbolically recognized the existence of the “particular problems of Roma (gypsies)”.272 During the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (July 1991), another symbolic step was made when participating States expressed their intention to take measures to ensure equality of opportunity for Roma resident in their States and to encourage research and studies on the issue.273 At the Moscow Meeting (September–October 1991), the participating States did not follow the Yugoslav proposal recommending the creation of conditions favourable to the promotion of the cultural traditions, language and other particularities of the Roma.274 Similarly, they rejected the Romanian idea of holding a seminar or meeting of experts on the subject.275 They limited themselves to recognizing that human rights could contribute towards combating the scourges of intolerance, prejudice and hatred, including against the Roma.276

271 See Nicolae Gheorghe, “Roma-Gypsy Ethnicity in Eastern Europe”, Social Research, vol. 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991), p. 829. For his part, Jean-Pierre Liégeois believes the figures to range from 12 to 15 million (Tsiganes … (n. 267), p. 53). 272 See Copenhagen Document (1990), § 40. 273 Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section VI, § 2. This provision was adopted on the basis of a proposal submitted by Yugoslavia (CSCE/REMN.13 of 11 July 1991), supported by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary (Adds.1 and 2 of 12 and 15 July 1991). 274 See CSCE/CHDM.46 (26 September 1991). 275 See CSCE/CHDM.47 (26 September 1991 276 See Moscow Document (1991), § 42.2. 406   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

At the end of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992, the participating States failed to agree on the establishment of national, specialized mixed consultative bodies (including representatives of public authorities and Roma associations) and to entrust the ODIHR with informing and organizing meetings on the subject.277 They agreed only on the possibility of establishing programmes to promote non-discrimination, intercultural understanding and equality of ­ opportunity.278 Faced with the increasing deterioration of the situation of Roma in the CSCE area and the increase in the number of Roma fleeing to Western Europe, the participating States resigned themselves to addressing the issue more directly. In April 1993, the CSO asked the High Commissioner on National Minorities to study the social, economic and humanitarian problems relating to the Roma, while taking account of the fact that such problems may also raise the issue of international migration.279 The HCNM submitted his report in September 1993.280 Noting that there were between 7 and 8 million Roma in the CSCE area, who were generally marginalized from all areas of the national life of the country in which they lived, who suffered from serious discrimination and faced violent xenophobia and racism, it stated that “not to confront these difficulties now is only likely to lead to even more serious problems for the Roma, for governments, and for the region in the coming years, particularly if economic or political conditions deteriorate sharply.”281 Consequently, he recommended that the issue be kept on the CSCE’s agenda, that a contact point be created within the ODIHR, that inventories be established on the situation of Roma in the various countries of residence, and that the CSCE coordinate its efforts with those of the relevant international organizations.282 The report was submitted to the first meeting to review the human dimension commitments (27 September–15 October 1993), during which the HCNM launched the idea of a seminar on the issue. The Rome Council of Ministers (December 1993) decided that a seminar on the “Roma in the CSCE region” would be organized in 1994, if permitted by the time and resources of the ODIHR.283 Held in Warsaw, under the auspices of the ODIHR and the HCNM and in partnership with the Council of Europe, the seminar took place from 20 to 23 September 1994. It formulated a series of recommendations covering the idea of granting the ODIHR a centralizing and co-­ordinating role.284

277 Joint proposal by the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSCE/HM/ WG3/26 of 17 June 1992) and supported by various States (Adds.1–3, 18–22 June 1992). 278 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter VI, §§ 34 and 35. 279 See 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3/Corr. of 28 April 1993. 280 See CSCE Communication No. 240 (14 September 1993). Summary Report: CSCE Communication No. 240/Add.1 (17 September 1993). 281 CSCE Communication No. 240/Add.1 (17 September 1993), p. ii. 282 See CSCE Communication No. 240 (14 September 1993), pp. 15–16. 283 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, § IV.6, last indent. 284 For a summary of the work carried out during the seminar, see ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 42–48.  Chapter VII   407

Under the twofold inspiration of the HCNM report and the recommendations of the Warsaw Seminar, the CSCE committed itself to taking a new approach. This materialized in the decision taken at the Budapest Review Conference in December 1994 to establish a contact point within the ODIHR, for governments, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, on “Roma and Sinti (Gypsies) ­issues”.285 The objective of this new approach is to help governments find appropriate solutions to Roma issues on their territories and, in reality, to relieve the migratory pressure on Western countries.286 In sum, the OSCE began to actively work towards the recognition of the Roma as a non-territorial, cultural minority within Greater Europe.287

3. The OSCE’s Preventive Diplomacy Approach The CSCE’s approach to national minorities began to change fairly markedly in 1992, as the Yugoslav conflict worsened. At the end of its second ordinary meeting, held in Prague on 30 and 31 January 1992, the Council of Ministers drew the attention of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to the fact that the role of the post-communist CSCE was to prevent conflict and consolidate peace by eliminating causes of tension, particularly through full respect for human rights, including those of national minorities. Consequently, it recommended taking account of the “need to strengthen the capacity of the CSCE to contribute … to a peaceful solution of problems involving national minorities which could lead to tensions and conflict – both within and between States – including possibilities

285 Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 23. This provision was adopted on the basis of a proposal by ten or so countries predominantly from Central and Eastern Europe: CSCE/ BC.11 (22 November 1994). The Council of Europe played a pioneering role on the Roma. As early as 1969, the Parliamentary Assembly reported the critical situation of Gypsies in Europe and recognized the need to provide them with social security and camping sites (Recommendation 563). Subsequently, the Committee of Ministers recommended that Member States take social measures for their benefit and thereupon inform the Secretary General of developments in their situation (Resolution (75) 13 of 1979). Thereafter, the Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe recommended the recognition of Gypsies as a non-territorial ethnic minority (Resolutions 125 of 1981 and 249 of 1993) and, again, the Parliamentary Assembly (Recommendation 1203 of 1993 and the Verspaget Report on Gypsies in Europe, Doc. 6733 of 11 January 1993). On the part of the European Union, the European Parliament adopted on 24 May 1984 a resolution (recommending in particular the development of areas designed for itinerant people) and the Ministers of Education within the Council adopted on 22 May 1989 Resolution 89/C 153/02, which recommends the schooling of Gypsy children and recognizes that Gypsy culture has been part of the “Community’s cultural and linguistic heritage” for nearly half a millennium. As for the United Nations, see Resolution 1991/21 of the SubCommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and Resolution 1992/65 of the Commission on Human Rights. 286 The activities of the contact point can be followed through the bimonthly newsletter issued by the ODIHR since August 1995: CPRS Newsletter (Warsaw). 287 As rightly pointed out by Alain Fenet (“L’Europe et les minorités” (n. 263), p. 163), the measures planned for the Roma in international instruments focus on territorial attachment, human rights, and linguistic and cultural issues. 408   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

for ‘early warning.’”288 The call was heeded, in the sense that the Helsinki Follow- up Meeting created a new and original institution: the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The normative approach which had, to this point, been followed by the CSCE was now overlaid with an approach based on preventive diplomacy, halfway between the human dimension and crisis management. This section will examine the mandate of the HCNM and how it was implemented in practice.

A. The Mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities The idea of an HCNM was launched by the Netherlands, which at that point – the second half of 1991 – held the Presidency of the European Community, in other words, at a time when ethno-nationalism was beginning to destabilize certain regions of post-communist Europe and when the twelve members of the European Community were boldly embarking upon managing the emerging Yugoslav conflict. Given the negative reactions from the governments in Paris and London, it was impossible to transform this into a European Community project and it was consequently submitted as a national initiative by the Netherlands to the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.289 In Helsinki, the Dutch proposal met with a lukewarm reception from some countries, led by (in addition to France and the UK) the United States, Greece and Turkey. To varying degrees, these States feared finding themselves obliged to formally recognize the existence of minorities living on their territories, to grant them preferential treatment (in contrast to their idea of human rights founded on equality before the law) and to be taken down the unacceptable route of collective rights. They also considered that the institution of an HCNM could have perverse effects: awakening latent identity claims, authorizing ethno-States to intervene in the internal affairs of their neighbours, and, further, indirectly encouraging terrorism.290 These objections obliged the supporters of the Dutch proposal to make major concessions. Ultimately, the negotiations gave rise to a mandate which was conceived from a minimalist and restrictive perspective. To make it clear that the CSCE was not aiming to promote the interests of national minorities over those of governments, the participating States created a “High Commissioner on National Minorities” rather than a “High Commissioner

288 Prague Council of Ministers (1992): Summary of Conclusions, § 6, fourth and fifth indents. 289 See CSCE/HM.1 (15 April 1992). This proposal was cosponsored by some members of the European Community (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg) as well as by Austria, the three Baltic States, Finland, Hungary, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. It should be recalled that during the Copenhagen Meeting, Sweden had suggested the appointment of a “representative of the CSCE … with the mandate to study situations of national minorities which, in his opinion, could affect security in Europe” (CSCE/ CHDC.28 of 14 June 1990). 290 See Rob Zaagman and Hannie Zaal, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Prehistory and Negotiations”, in Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change … (n. 56), pp. 105–108.  Chapter VII   409

for National Minorities”.291 Significantly, its mandate was not drafted from the perspective of the human dimension but as an “instrument of conflict prevention at the earliest possible stage”.292 It was understood that the HCNM would not “consider violations of CSCE commitments with regard to an individual person belonging to a national minority,”293 but rather potentially conflictual situations, which came down to forbidding it from acting as an advocate or even protector (Ombudsman) for national minorities.294 The Dutch idea of attributing the HCNM the competence to receive “petitions” on facts concerning people belonging to national minorities was thus postponed. Moreover, given the fears expressed notably by Turkey, the United Kingdom and Spain on the subject of terrorism, the mandate stipulated that “the High Commissioner will not consider national minority issues in situations involving organized acts of terrorism.”295 Even more categorically, it stated that the High Commission “will not communicate with and will not acknowledge communications from any person or organization which practises or publicly condones terrorism or violence.”296 Extremely controversial and the result of tough negotiations, these provisions were the subject of interpretative statements from States opposed to the improper conflation between “national minorities” and “terrorism”. In the name of several States (Germany, Denmark, Finland, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland), Austria specified that this did not prejudice in any way the “possibility for the participating States to raise, comprehensively consider and deal with national minorities issues in the CSCE” and must not hinder the HCNM from effectively carrying out their role.297 Armenia was even more explicit by deploring the fact that the mandate did not make a satisfactory distinction between terrorism and people’s legitimate aspiration to self- determination.298 It is a matter of regret that the provisions on terrorism were formulated in such a general and vague way. Indeed, “the question arises whether it has been wise to exclude any party, even if it practices or publicly condones terrorism or violence, because excluded groups might resort to further violence which could lead to an escalation of the conflict. Furthermore, it may be necessary

291 The French translation “Haut-Commissaire pour les minorités nationales” is therefore misleading. It might have been more appropriate to say in French “Haut-Commissaire aux minorités nationales”. 292 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, § 2. 293 Ibid., Chapter II, § 5(c). In spite of this precaution, Turkey and France each issued an interpretative statement recalling their fundamental understanding of the issue of national minorities, see Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, pp. 3 and 7. 294 According to Zaagman and Zaal, “another reason for the inclusion of this paragraph [was] to prevent overlap with the competence of the Council of Europe for individual claims about violations of human rights.” See Zaagman and Zaal, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities …” (n. 290), p. 107. 295 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, § 5(b). 296 Ibid., Chapter II, § 25. Reference is also made to this provision in §§ 11c, 23a and 29. 297 Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, p. 4. 298 Ibid., p. 7. 410   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

to include them in discussions for the sake of attaining a durable settlement. This is of relevance because there may be situations in which the acts of terrorism are not organized and which are thus not, for that reason, at least, excluded from the High Commissioner’s ­scrutiny.”299 Among other things, with a view to avoiding the systematic interference of ethno-States in ethnic tensions arising within neighbouring States and also to rule out the involvement of emigrant organizations outside the region, the mandate strictly defined the “parties directly concerned” in such instances. It specified that the HCNM would recognize two main categories of parties: the governments of participating States, including regional and local authorities in areas in which national minorities reside, and representatives of associations of national minorities “directly concerned and in the area of tension”.300 Finally, given the objections voiced by States hostile to a non-State entity having too much authority in comparison to the political bodies of the CSCE, the mandate specified that the HCNM would act in close consultation with the Chairman-­in-Office and under the auspices of the CSO. The HCNM is thus bound to remain in constant contact with the Chairman-in-Office, to submit confidential reports on his or her activities and to inform the CSO through the Chairman-in-­ Office of any decision to issue an early warning.301 Moreover, the HCNM would act “under the aegis of the CSO”, in the sense that it cannot issue an early warning without the express mandate of the CSO and must advise it (on request) on crisis and conflict management.302 In reality, the mandate arranged for “an adequate mix of independence of and accountability to the political CSCE organs”303 and none of its provisions made the HCNM a subsidiary body of the CSO or the Chairman-­in-Office. That being the case, the mandate attributed a fundamental twofold role to the HCNM, based on an implicit decision between prevention at the stage of emerging tensions and prevention at the stage of imminent conflict.304 First, the role of the HCNM is to dispel latent ethnic tensions at the earliest possible stage, so as to prevent them from degenerating into conflict threatening the peace,

299 Rob Zaagman, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: An Analysis of the Mandate and the Institutional Context”, in Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change … (n. 56), pp. 139–140. Zaagman also makes the insightful observation that “if organized acts of terrorism are involved, it is not just a group which is excluded, but an entire situation” (ibid., p. 140, note 58). 300 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, §§ 26(a) and 26(b). Acording to Zaagman (“The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities” … (n. 299), pp. 135–136), the plural reference to “governments of participating states” allows for ethno-States and States affected by migratory flows to be included in the “parties directly involved.” 301 See Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, §§ 13, 17–20. 302 Ibid., Chapter II, §§ 1, 7 and 16. It should be noted that No provision of the document refers to the Conflict Prevention Centre. 303 Zaagman, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities …” (n. 299), p. 116. 304 This echoes the distinction between “early prevention” and “late prevention” developed, among others, by Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond (London: Allen and Unwin, 1993), pp. 65ff. and passim.  Chapter VII   411

stability or relations between participating States in the CSCE area.305 Although no provision expressly mentions it, it is logical to infer that the mandate applies to tensions both between and within States. In this regard, the HCNM has a very large margin of appreciation and manoeuvre. Indeed, the HCNM may assess the gravity of tensions according to his or her own judgement and freely decide to visit a participating State (the only condition being to consult the Chairman-in-­ Office), with the aim of “promoting dialogue, confidence and co-operation” between all parties directly involved, that is to say, good offices and mediation.306 It should be mentioned that the mandate places particular emphasis on the confidentiality which must surround the HCNM’s work and activities.307 This requirement was retained in response to the fears of delegations which, in Helsinki, had felt that the public intervention of an HCNM risked exacerbating (rather than calming) tensions, notably by revealing the intransigence of the parties’ positions.308 Moreover, the HCNM can issue an early warning if he or she concludes that the situation is escalating into conflict or deems that the scope of action of the HCNM is exhausted.309 In this case, when the HCNM’s scope of action remains intact, the early warning is communicated by the Chairman-in-Office to the CSO.310 However, once this dramatic step has been taken, the HCNM may act only under a mandate expressly decided by the CSO. The HCNM may recommend only that he or she be authorized to take early action consisting of entering “into further contact and closer consultations with the parties concerned with a view to possible solutions, according to a mandate to be decided by the CSO.”311 The flaw in this provision is obvious. A decision to grant the HCNM an early action mandate is dependent upon the prior consensus of around fifty governments. Given the natural slowness of such a process, there is a risk that the situation would develop into open conflict – in other words, no longer fall within preventive diplomacy and, as a result, exclude the HCNM from intervening.

305 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, §§ 2 and 3. According to Zaagman, the HCNM’s mandate was directly inspired by Article 99 of the UN Charter (“The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities …” (n. 299), p. 128). 306 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, §§ 11(b), 11(c) and 12. It should be noted that the mandate did not support the Dutch idea of allowing the HCNM to “request the participating States concerned to report within a certain period on progress made in the implementation of advice or recommendations transmitted to them” (CSCE/HM.1 of 15 April 1992, § 21). 307 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, §§ 4, 29 and 34. 308 In fact, “the condition of confidentiality resulting in a low HCNM profile was meant to reconcile the need to establish the High Commisioner and the requirement avoiding possible escalation caused by the HCNM’s involvement” (Zaagman, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities …” (n. 299), p. 121). In addition, a provision originally proposed by the United States requires the HCNM, when considering a situation, to “take fully into account the availability of democratic means and international instruments to respond to it” (Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, § 6). 309 Ibid., Chapter II, § 15. 310 Ibid., Chapter II, § 13. 311 Ibid., Chapter II, § 16. 412   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

In addition to these two roles, the mandate also gave the HCNM a fairly broad consultative role: to provide, upon request, advice to the CSO (or any other institution or organization invited by the CSO) on managing “tensions or conflict”.312 There are three means by which the HCNM may exercise his or her mandate. The first is to collect and receive information from any sources, including the media and non-governmental organizations.313 It should be noted that the mandate authorizes the HCNM to receive “specific reports” from parties directly involved, including “reports on violations of CSCE commitments with respect to national minorities”, although these reports are not equivalent to a petition.314 The second is requesting assistance from not more than three experts on specific matters submitted in confidence.315 These experts must be selected from a list established at the ODIHR, as laid down in the Moscow Mechanism.316 This constraint raises a certain problem, insofar as the list contains only experts on the human dimension and not specialists on national minorities. This is why, on the basis of a recommendation made at the first meeting to review commitments on the human dimension (1993), the Council of Ministers decided to double the number of experts and to recommend that governments include experts on national minorities.317 The third involves visits to the territory of any participating State beset by ethnic tensions. In this regard, it should be noted that although the mandate compels participating States to allow the HCNM to enter their territory and facilitate free travel and communication, it recognizes that the State in question has a certain right of refusal: one of its provisions clearly states that “if the State concerned does not allow the High Commissioner to enter the country and to travel and communicate freely, the High Commissioner will so inform the CSO.”318

312 “Should the CSO become involved in a particular issue, the High Commissioner will provide information and, on request, advice to the CSO, or to any other institution or organization which the CSO may invite, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of this document, to take action with regard to the tensions or conflict” (Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, § 21). It was on such a basis that the CSO invited the HCNM to “to respond promptly, on behalf of the CSCE, to the request by the President of Estonia for an expert opinion from the CSCE on the law on the status of aliens,” see 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, Annex 2. 313 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, § 23(a). 314 Ibid., Chapter II, § 23(b). 315 Ibid., Chapter II, § 31–36. 316 Ibid., Chapter II, § 35. 317 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, Annex A. 318 Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter II, § 28. In this context, the United Kingdom issued an interpretative statement specifying that in order to protect public safety or national security, it might be “obliged to decline or to regulate access at a particular time or to a particular place” proposed by the HCNM. Such action would be taken only when “absolutely necessary” and would have effect “only for so long as required.” In addition, the British Government would immediately enter into consultations with the HCNM to clarify the situation and seek agreement to enable the High Commissioner to obtain as much information as possible; in the absence of  Chapter VII   413

It should be noted that while bridging a gap between crisis management and the human dimension, the HCNM is connected to the ODIHR only loosely and indirectly. In this regard, the mandate indicates that the HCNM may “draw upon the facilities of the ODIHR in Warsaw”, including the information which it holds on national minorities, as well as “logistical support for travel and communication”. It states that the HCNM will select the experts he or she considers can provide the necessary assistance “with the assistance of the ODIHR from the resource list established at the ODIHR as laid down in the Document of the Moscow Meeting.” Finally, the HCNM has a separate budget, but which must be “determined at the ODIHR”.319 Furthermore, at the CSO’s request and “with due regard to the requirement of confidentiality in his/her mandate”, the HCNM is required to provide information on his or her activities at implementation meetings on human dimension issues held at the ODIHR.320 Designed to prevent the development of ethnic conflicts within and between participating States, the HCNM appeared to be an original instrument of specialized preventive diplomacy. Its contribution to the problem of national minorities is no less original, in the sense that “for the first time in the history of the CSCE, national minorities who are directly involved in an issue are treated in a similar way as the state party directly involved.”321

B. Implementation of the High Commissioner’s Mandate According to the terms of paragraph 8 of the mandate, the High Commissioner must be “an eminent international personality with long-standing relevant experience from whom an impartial performance of the function may be expected.” On 15 December 1992, Max van der Stoel, former Minister for Foreign Affairs (1973–1977 and 1981–1982) and former permanent representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations (1983–1986), was appointed by the Council of Ministers for a period of three years from 1 January 1993.322 The HCNM established his headquarters at The Hague and immediately began work. In this

such an agreement, it would bring the matter to the attention of the HCNM as soon as possible. See Helsinki Follow-up Meeting: Journal No. 50 of 8 July 1992, p. 6. 319 Helsinki Decisions, Chapter II, § 10, 35 and 37. “These organizational arrangements are due to the fact that states were very reluctant to incur additional expenses by providing the High Commisioner with his own staff and offices at the expense of the CSCE” (Zaagman, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities …” (n. 299), p. 153. 320 Helsinki Decisions, Chapter II, § 22. On this point, see 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, decision 5(g). 321 Zaagman and Zaal, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities: Prehistory and Negotiations …” (n. 290), p. 110. 322 See Stockholm Council of Ministers: Journal No. 2 of 15 December 1992, decision 5(b). See also Stockholm Council of Ministers (1992): Decisions, section 3. § 9 of the mandate provided that the HCNM would be appointed by the Council of Ministers (by consensus) on the recommendation of the CSO (also by consensus) for a term of three years, renewable once: “confirmation at the Ministerial level was seen as an expression of essential political support for a person who would have to deal with some of the most intricate problems in Europe today”, see Zaagman, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities …” (n. 299), p. 143. 414   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

section, we shall examine his interpretation of the mandate and review the practical action he took and the general lessons that can be drawn from the HCNM for managing ethnic tensions. a) Interpretation of the mandate The various shortcomings and imprecisions in the mandate called for a practical interpretation from the appointed HCNM. The mandate in no way defined the fundamental concept of “national minority”. The HCNM bridged this gap in a pragmatic way, considering that the existence of a national minority was essentially a question of fact and that whether an individual belonged to an entity was a matter of personal choice. He affirmed that “even though I may not have a definition of what constitutes a minority, I would dare to say that I know a minority when I see one.”323 Addressing the very nature of his preventive role, the HCNM began with the idea that “early warning” and “early action”, concepts which were separable in theory, constituted on the ground (alongside fact-finding) a continuum within preventive diplomacy, designed as an approach which aimed to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict through techniques such as establishing the facts or fact-finding, trust-building measures, good offices and mediation.324 He thus considered that there was no need to break down preventive diplomacy into two distinct activities (early warning and early action), but rather to approach it from the angle of the degree of urgency of the situation. Depending on whether the problem consisted of addressing latent tensions or an imminent conflict, the measures to be taken would either fall under early prevention or late prevention. Given the constraints and restrictions on the mandate (which granted him a broad scope for manoeuvre to try to appease latent tensions but which gave him practically none for imminent conflicts), the HCNM concluded that he should restrict himself to early prevention and, consequently, disregarded the provisions in the mandate which (on the subject of late prevention) authorized him to trigger an early warning. Max van der Stoel adopted a particularly clearcut position on this subject: “If I would have to issue an early warning notice, it means that I would not have been able to fulfil the most essential of my tasks which is to prevent the matter from getting out of hand.”325 On the subject of the means of intervening on the ground, the HCNM considered that his approach should strictly follow the threefold requirement of confidentiality, impartiality and co-operation.326

323 Text of the keynote address made by the HCNM at the Warsaw CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on “Case Studies on National Minorities Issues: Positive Results” on 24 May 1993, p. 2. 324 Fact-finding was meant to provide the information needed for early warning with a view to early action. 325 See keynote address made by the HCNM in Warsaw on 24 May 1993, p. 4. 326 See the text of the keynote speech made by the HCNM on 19 January 1994, at the Warsaw Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy, p. 5.  Chapter VII   415

All effective diplomacy is, by definition, “media averse” and requires a low profile from the mediating third party. Hence, the need for confidentiality goes without saying: “confidentiality is important since often parties directly involved feel they can be more co-operative and forthcoming if they know that the discussions will not be revealed to the outside world. Conversely, parties may take much stronger statements in public than in confidential conversations, feeling that they should be seen to maintain strong demands or trying to exploit outside attention. The risk of escalation of the conflict which is inherent in this can be considerably reduced if a low profile is adopted.”327 Publicity must not, however, be considered as totally harmful: it may be beneficial if the parties concerned agree to publicly expose the arrangements that have been made. In an area as highly sensitive as that of inter-ethnic relations, the need for impartiality is without a doubt even more important. Here, the HCNM considered that there should be no hesitation in reminding governments to respect the commitments set out in the Copenhagen Document, nor in drawing national minorities’ attention to the fact that the counterpart of rights is duties.328 In this spirit, he admitted that it was incumbent upon him to convince governments that the effective protection of national minorities was in the interest of the State and the majority population, while once again presenting the key condition of the “loyalty” of the minority population.329 Similarly, he considered that national minorities needed to be convinced that aspirations to self-determination may be reasonably satisfied within the context of cultural, regional, local or other forms of autonomy (set out notably in the shopping list adopted in 1991 by the Geneva Meeting of Experts), and that secession was neither a realistic nor even a desirable option.330 Indeed, in light of the fairly common cases of “national minorities living within national minorities,” secession would often create a situation which was equally (or even more) unsatisfactory that the preceding situation, that is to say, which created more problems than it resolved: “in view of the number of minorities and of the fact that they are often dispersed over large regions, living intermingled with persons belonging to other groups, many new states would have new minorities within their borders. Secession might thus very well lead to an increasing number of unstable and scarcely viable states. Instead of greater security, we would have a Europe which is less stable and safe.”331

327 Text of the address by the HCNM to the Rome Meeting of the Council of Ministers (30 November–1 December 1993), p. 2. See also Rob Zaagman, “Minority Questions, Human Rights and Regional Instability: The Prevention of Conflict”, in R. Pfaltzgraff and R. Shultz (eds.), Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions (Washington D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. 221. 328 See the text of the address by the HCNM to the Rome Meeting of the Council of Ministers (30 November–1 December 1993), p. 2. 329 Ibid., p. 3. 330 See the text of the keynote address made by the HCNM in Warsaw on 24 May 1993, p. 5. See also the text of the address by the HCNM delivered at the Rome Council of Ministers (30 November–1 December 1993), p. 6. 331 Zaagman, “Minority Questions, Human Rights and Regional Instability …” (n. 327), p. 222. 416   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

Finally, the HCNM considered that he could be effective only if his intervention appeared, in all cases, to be that of a third party with no coercive intent, striving only to find mutually satisfactory solutions with the co-operation of the parties concerned.332 b) The work of the High Commissioner, 1993–1995 Setting aside a handful of small States, the countries in the OSCE area can hardly be described as homogeneous in ethnic terms.333 When Max van der Stoel took up his role (January 1993), the problem of national minorities (highly variable in nature and importance) existed both in Western Europe and in the former communist States. As was the case during the Cold War, in Western Europe questions of national minorities continued to be managed in a generally satisfactory way, despite certain specific cases involving the use of violence (Euskadi, Ulster, Cyprus) which were, as a result, not covered by the work of the HCNM. In addition, the longstanding Austro-Italian dispute over the Alto Adige finally appeared to have been resolved.334 However, two European Union countries had reopened old disputes over national minorities with their direct neighbours. This backward step was taken by Greece (concerning the Greek minority in Albania) and Italy, towards Croatia and Slovenia.335 In contrast, the former communist countries of Europe presented the image of a region marked by the resurgence of ethnicism, which had long been suppressed by totalitarian communism that claimed to have replaced nationalism by “friendship” among socialist peoples.336 Setting aside the bloody conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Moldova and the Caucasus, three situations fell within the mandate of the HCNM: that of the 25 million Russian-speaking minorities who found themselves in former Soviet republics other than Russia, that of the “divided nations” (Hungary and Albania), both of which had a significant number of their ethnic populations living in other nation States and, finally, that of

332 See the text of the keynote address made by the HCNM in Warsaw on 24 May 1993, p. 5. 333 According to Guy Heraud, Iceland, most of the European micro-States (Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Holy See) and Portugal (with the exception of the small area of Miranda do Douro) are countries without indigenous minorities, as are diglossic or triglossic nations such as Malta, Luxembourg, Ireland and Norway. See Heraud, L’Europe des ethnies … (n. 168), p. 76. 334 The case is now considered closed by both countries, see UN: A/46/39 and A/46/40 (19 June 1992). See also Le Monde, 13 June 1992. 335 Greece criticized Albania for abusing the Greek minority’s rights, while denying the existence of an Albanian minority in its own territory. As for Italy, after the breakup of Yugoslavia it called into question the Treaty of Osimo (concluded in 1975 with Belgrade), some of whose provisions concerned the protection of Italian minorities in Dalmatia and Istria. The dispute over Istria was finally settled in 1996, ending the Italian veto to the association agreement between Slovenia and the European Union, see Le Monde, 30 May 1996. 336 See C. J. Dick, J. F. Dunn and J. B. K. Lough, “Pandora’s Box: Potential Conflicts in Post-Communist Europe”, International Defence Review, vol. 26, no. 3 (March 1993), pp. 205ff. and passim.  Chapter VII   417

“ethnies without an ethno-State” spread across the region (the case of some 10 million Roma).337 To date, the HCNM has not intervened in any Western country in either Europe or North America. In contrast, at his own initiative as well as at the request of a government or the CSO, he has intervened in around a dozen former communist countries in Europe and Asia.

Interventions by the High Commissioner, 1993–1995

Country or region Date of first intervention Estonia January 1993 Latvia January 1993 Lithuania January 1993 Slovakia February 1993 Hungary February 1993 CSCE/OSCE area (Roma) April 1993 Romania June 1993 Albania September 1993 Macedonia October 1993 Kazakhstan April 1994 Kyrgyzstan April 1994 Ukraine April 1994 Moldova December 1994

i) The Russian-speaking minorities As a result of the transformation of the USSR’s administrative boundaries into international borders, 25 million Russian speakers found themselves dispersed across the former Soviet republics – particularly in Ukraine (more than 11 million), Kazakhstan (more than 6.5 million), and in Latvia and Estonia (nearly 2 million).338 Numerically, the question of the Russian-speaking minorities represented half of all the HCNM’s interventions. These took place in seven different countries in Europe (the three Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova)339 and in Asia (Kazakhstan

337 However, it must be acknowledged that positive developments have taken place in the OSCE area, in the domestic politics and bilateral policy of some States, including Hungary, Poland and Ukraine. It should also be noted that since 1945, national minorities have represented only 10% of the total population of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (compared with more than 50% in 1914 and 25% in the interwar period). On this point, see André Liebich, “Getting Better, Getting Worse: Minorities in East Central Europe”, Dissent, vol. 43, no. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 124–130. 338 See Anthony Hyman, “Russian Outside Russia”, The World Today, vol. 49, no. 11 (November 1993), pp. 205–208. 339 On the HCNM’s interventions (which did not lead to public recommendations), see Rob Zaagman, The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in OSCE Conflict Prevention (The Hague: Office of the OSCE HCNM, 1995), pp. 28–29. 418   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

and Kyrgyzstan). It should be noted that three of these countries hosted a Mission of Long Duration (Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine). Taken together, these two facts demonstrated the keen attention that the CSCE paid to tensions in the region which directly or indirectly involved Russia. The Baltic States. The HCNM inaugurated his role by intervening in the Baltic States in January 1993, during the profound turmoil arising from the new citizenship legislation in Estonia and Latvia, which had the effect of ­ immediately transforming the Russian-speaking minorities (more than a third of the population in Estonia and close to a half in Latvia) into foreigners or stateless persons.340 The laws in question triggered a significant emotional response from the populations affected. At the same time, these laws spurred Moscow to accuse the two countries of “massive violations of human rights” before international organizations (United Nations, CSCE, Council of Europe) and to bring into question the continuation of the withdrawal of Russian troops situated in their territories.341 The HCNM contributed towards defusing the crisis both internally and internationally by making practical suggestions (alongside the Council of Europe) aiming to appease the immediate fears of the populations concerned and to assure their longterm integration into national life, recommendations which were immediately approved by the Russian authorities.342 More beneficial was, above all, his intervention in the region of Narva and Sillamäe where, in July 1993, the significant Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia decided to organize a referendum on “national territorial autonomy”.343 Since then, the HCNM continues to monitor the evolution of the situations in Estonia and Latvia.344 It should be noted that the HCNM intervened in the Baltic States at his own initiative. He did not consider it appropriate to request a mandate from the CSO which had, shortly before, decided to establish a Mission of Long Duration in Estonia. The CSO did not take umbrage at this, but recommended that the Mission cooperate with the HCNM and gave him a carte blanche.345

340 See Dagmara Vallens, “The Law on Aliens Controversy in the Baltic States”, The Review – International Commission of Jurists, no. 54 (June 1995), pp. l–28. 341 For more details, see further in this chapter, part 2.A.b. 342 For specific recommendations made by the HCNM to both countries, see CSCE Communications No. 124 (23 April 1993), No. 125/Add.1 (26 April 1993), No. 192 (2 July 1993), No. 8 (31 January 1994) and No. 20 (14 June 1994). On Moscow’s approval, see CSCE Communication No. 125/Add.1 (26 April 1993). Despite the absence of similar tensions in Lithuania (where the “zero option” approach to citizenship prevailed), the HCNM also visited the Baltic State and made certain recommendations to its government (appointment of an ombudsman), see CSCE Communication No. 124 (23 April 1993). 343 On this point, see the HCNM statement issued in Tallinn on 12 July 1993. 344 See CSCE Communication No. 1 (10 January 1995) and HC/5/96 (24 April 1996). See also the 1995 Report of the Secretary General on OSCE activities (§§ 3.2 and 3.6). 345 See 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 3 February 1993, Annex l. The CSO approved with appreciation the HCNM’s conclusions and recommendations made to the governments of the two countries concerned, see 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 28 April 1993, decision 5(f ). The CSO expressed his support for HCNM efforts in Estonia and invited the Government of  Chapter VII   419

Ukraine. The HCNM intervened in Ukraine at the request of the government in Kyiv, which found itself facing the rise of nationalists in Crimea. After two visits to the country, including to Crimea, he concluded that the prevention of ethnic conflict in the region required a substantial intervention from the CSCE, including a team of economics and constitutional law experts to advise the Government on its ethnic and linguistic policy.346 The CSO heeded this recommendation by creating a Mission of Long Duration to Ukraine.347 The HCNM continues to monitor the evolution of the situation in Ukraine, including the specific issue of the rehabilitation of the Tatars in Crimea.348 Central Asia. In 1994 the HCNM also intervened in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, States in which the country’s revival, particularly in linguistic terms, had certain marginalizing effects on the Russian-speaking minorities. After his initial visits, he submitted recommendations to the two governments, covering the acquisition of citizenship and, more particularly for Kazakhstan – 36% of the population of which was Russian-speaking – the use of the Russian language, respect for ethnic balance in the public sector, and a complaints procedure for ethnic discrimination.349 ii) Minorities of the divided nations The case of Hungary. Hungary has been a typical example of a divided nation since the Treaty of Trianon on 4 June 1920. This amputated two thirds of the country’s historical territory and a third of its population, in a violation of the principle of the self-determination of people, to benefit the new French allies in the region: Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the future Yugoslavia). Hungary recovered the lost territories between 1938 and 1945. However, the Treaty of Paris (1947) restored the borders established by Trianon, with the exception of three villages on the south bank of the Danube, which were ceded to Czechoslovakia.350 Hungary now has a population of 10 million, although another 5 million Hungarians live abroad, in the Romanian province of Transylvania (around 2 million), in Slovakia

Estonia to implement its recommendations; at the same time, it invited the HCNM to respond promptly, on behalf of the CSCE, to the request by the President of Estonia for an expert opinion on the law on the status of aliens, see 22nd Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 30 June 1993, Annex 2. 346 See CSCE Communication No. 23 (7 June 1994). 347 For more details, see further in this chapter, part II, section 2.B. b) ‘The OSCE Mission to Ukraine’. 348 See HC/1/95 (15 May 1995), HC/4/95 (25 July 1995), HC/10/95 (12 October 1995) and HC/7/96 (15 May 1996). See also the 1995 Report of the Secretary General on OSCE activities (§ 3.11). 349 Recommendations to Kazakhstan: CSCE Communication No. 26 (23 April 1993). Recommendations to Kirghizstan: CSCE Communication No. 27 (13 June 1994), HC/7/95 (7 September 1995) as well as HC/7/96 and Add.1 (25 March 1996). It should be noted that both countries agreed to apply the “zero option” on citizenship and reject the option of dual citizenship. For the agreement concluded to that end between Kazakhstan and Russia, see UN: A/50/83 (14 February 1995). 350 See George Schöpflin, La Hongrie et ses voisins, “Cahiers de Chaillot” collection, no. 7 (Paris: Institut d’études de sécurité de l’UEO, 1993), p. 2. 420   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

(around 600,000, i.e., 11% of the population), in the Serbian province of ­Vojvodina (around 350,000) and in Ukraine (200,000).351 Since the end of the Cold War, the fate of the Hungarian minorities has improved only in Ukraine.352 In contrast, the issue poses problems in Vojvodina (in the context of the ­Yugoslav conflict), in Slovakia (under the effect of the wave of national-­ populism which followed the declaration of independence in 1993) and, above all, in Romania. Although not explosive in nature, the question of the Hungarian minorities concentrated in the south of Slovakia was no less tense between the two countries,353 and required the use of sustained confidence-building measures. The HCNM decided to approach the issue from the angle of reciprocity. He did so in a fairly novel way, through an ad hoc mechanism which was, moreover, ­presented as a pilot project for the region.354 On his recommendations, in May 1993, the Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials thus granted a mandate to a group of three specialists in minority law to “analyse the situation of the Hungarian national minority in Slovakia and the Slovak national minority in Hungary” for an initial period of two years, during which four visits of a maximum duration of nine days were to be carried out in the two countries. At the end of each visit, the experts (accompanied by a member of the HCNM’s staff ) would send opinions and recommendations to the HCNM.355 As the operation appeared to have worked appropriately, the Permanent Council decided to extend it to 27 May 1996.356 It was supported from outside

351 The rest is composed of immigrant populations. Hungary itself has various national minorities: Armenians, Bulgarians, Roma, Slovaks, and Ukrainians, among others. These small and dispersed minorities (representing about 1% of the population) have benefited since Act LXXVII of 7 July 1993 from a particularly liberal protection regime including collective rights and cultural autonomy. 352 As a result of the Hungarian/Ukrainian Declaration on the principles of co-operation to ensure respect for the rights of national minorities and its annexed Protocol, signed in Budapest on 31 May 1991, see A/46/467 (12 September 1991). At the end of the Second World War, sub­ Carpathian Ruthenia (owned by Czechoslovakia) came under the authority of Soviet Ukraine. 353 The Slovaks were part of Hungary for ten centuries before being incorporated into Czechoslovakia with the Czechs at the end of the First World War. Having become independent in January 1993, they immediately strove to assert their national identity at the expense of the Hungarian minorities, in other words, the descendants of their oppressors. Historically, it had always been difficult for Slovaks to develop their identity with respect to Hungarians and Czechs. 354 See CSCE Communication No. 122 (23 April 1993). 355 See CSO Vienna Group: Journal No. 14 of 27 May 1993, decision 4(a) and Annex 1. Noting that the operation was binding only on the two States concerned, Romania stated that “the CSCE procedure should not have been involved in this particular matter” (ibid., point 5). It should be added that, despite the exceptional nature of the operation, the Vienna Group decided that the costs would be charged to the HCNM’s own budget and not to the CSCE’s. On the significance of this decision, see Zaagman, “The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities …” (n. 299), pp. 173–174. 356 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 80 of 12 October 1995. Regarding the HCNM’s actions, see CSCE Communications No. 307/Corr. (28 November 1993), No. 308 (25 November 1993) and  Chapter VII   421

the OSCE by the Pact on Stability in Europe, which led to Hungary and Slovakia signing a Treaty on Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation, in Paris on 19 March 1995 (the Treaty entered into force on 15 May 1996). This appeared to have put an end to the dispute between the two countries. Firstly, in line with the Slovak authorities’ wishes, it declared that both parties renounced any territorial claims (Article 3, paragraph 1) and confirmed that persons belonging to national minorities living on their territories had the same duties as well as the same rights as any other citizens (Article 15, paragraph 15). Secondly, in line with the request from the Hungarian authorities, it prohibited any policy of forced assimilation or alteration of the ethnic composition of the regions in which national minorities lived (Article 15, paragraph 2d), recognized that they had an individual and collective right to the free use of their mother tongue in public and private life (Article 15, paragraph 2g) and, above all, committed both parties to applying the norms and commitments of certain policy instruments, including Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (Article 15, paragraph 4b), stipulating that “in the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the State.”357 The 1995 Treaty had indeed been ratified by the parliaments of both countries, albeit on the Slovak side with an interpretative resolution excluding the granting of collective rights and territorial autonomy.358 Under Vladimír Mečiar, Slovakia’s evolution towards ever greater national-populism had compromised the positive effect of the Pact on Stability and complicated the HCNM’s task. The formula used to address the situation of ethnic minorities in Slovakia was not applied to that of the Hungarian minorities in Romania. In reality, this problem is of an entirely different dimension. The 2 million Hungarians in Transylvania are certainly, in numerical terms, the largest national minority in Europe. However, the key point is that Romania and Hungary consider ­Transylvania (“Ardea” in Romanian, “Erdély” in Hungarian) to be the original land of their respective national cultures. Believing that Transylvania was originally inhabited by the Indo-­European tribe of the Dacians (first and second centuries AD) before being incorporated into the Roman Empire, the ­Romanians consider that Transylvania represents the cultural cradle of their “Latin–­Dacian” ethnic group. The Hungarians reject this theory and believe that ­Transylvania was unoccupied (with the exception of a few slave tribes)

No. 36 (14 November 1994) as well as HC/5/95 (25 August 1995), HC/8/95 (27 September 1995), HC/9/95 (23 October 1995), HC/11/95 (29 December 1995), HC/4/96 (23 April 1996) and HC/8/96 (17 May 1996). 357 Text of Article 11 of the proposal for an Additional Protocol on the Rights of Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights annexed to Recommendation 1201. 358 For the text of the resolution, see INF/61/96 (1 April 1996). 422   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

when the Magyars conquered the Danube in the ninth and tenth centuries: the ­Romanians appeared in the region only from the twelfth century onwards. Against this backdrop, the HCNM intervened in Romania at the invitation of its government to examine the overall situation of a country which, according to the 1992 census, included more than 20 ethnic groups, representing between 10% and 15% of the population of 23 million, the two largest of which were the Hungarians and the Roma.359 The case of Albania. As a result of its creation on essentially geopolitical foundations in 1913, Albania (with a population of 3.2 million) now incorporates only around a third of the Albanian ethnic group. The other two thirds live primarily in Serbia and Montenegro (where more than a million people make up 90% of the Kosovan population), in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (400,000 people, representing 23% of the country) and, to lesser degrees, in Italy and Greece.360 From the HCNM’s perspective, the case of Albania posed a more delicate problem than that of Hungary. The Albanian minorities lived either in a potentially explosive region (Kosovo) or in a largely unstable country which held only observer status within the CSCE (former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Moreover, it so happened that Albania itself was home to a minority, which generated tensions with neighbouring Greece. Given the interconnection between the Kosovo problem and the Yugoslav conflict, and the fact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was a State that had been suspended by the CSCE (which was hardly conducive to true co-operation), the HCNM restricted his approach to that of addressing the Albanian minority in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and that of the Greek minority in Albania. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Albanian minority called for its recognition as one of the constitutive nations of the country, for promotion of Albanian as the second official language, and for a substantial improvement in its situation in political, economic, social, cultural and, above all, educational terms. There were two consequences of the HCNM’s

359 See Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, The CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on Local Democracy (Washington, 1994), p. 19. As of 1996, Transylvania’s population is largely composed of ethnic Romanians (a threefifths majority), but in some localities the descendants of the former Hungarian masters represent half or more of the population. For the HCNM’s recommendations to Romania on a comprehensive ethnic policy, see CSCE Communications No. 253 (21 September 1993) and No. 25 (10 June 1994) as well as HC/6/95 (1 September 1995) and HC/9/96 (26 April 1996). 360 See Elisabeth and Jean-Paul Champseix, L’Albanie ou la logique du désespoir (Paris: La Découverte, 1992), 307 p.; Michel Roux, Les Albanais en Yougoslavie. Minorité nationale, territoire et développement (Paris: Ed. de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1992), 546 p.; Hans Stark: “La question albanaise”, Politique étrangère, vol. 59, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 209–222; Robert Austin, “Albanian–Macedonian Relations: Confrontation or Co-operation?”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 42, 22 October 1993, pp. 22–24, and “Albania’s Greek Minority”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 11, 18 March 1994, pp. 19–24.  Chapter VII   423

intervention, which began in October 1993. First, it served to convince the authorities in Skopje of the need to adopt certain specific measures,361 and strengthened the patient, indepth work undertaken by the Mission of Long Duration established by the CSCE/OSCE in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since ­September 1992.362 Second, alongside the Mission, the OSCE contributed towards defusing the tensions that broke out in February 1995, following the repression of a group of Albanian intellectuals who had created a public Albanian university363 in Tetovo (an area which was 80% Albanian). A factor in arguments and skirmishes over the border, the Greek minority is concentrated in the south-east of Albania (the districts of Gjirokaster and Saranda). Estimates of the size of the Greek minority vary widely in both countries: the Greek authorities claim it is 400,000 strong, while Albania says it amounts to 60,000 people. The problem is aggravated by the fact that the Greek ultranationalists and the Orthodox Church consider the region as an irredentist Hellenic land: the Northern Epirus. While the Greek authorities do not expressly lay claim to the territory, they nonetheless demonstrate a certain level of indulgence towards the irredentists. In any case, the official Greek policy consists of denouncing the poor treatment inflicted upon the Greek Albanians and denying the existence of an Albanian minority within its own territory.364 Setting aside the polemical aspects of the issue, there is some truth to the claims from members of the Greek minority (gathered together under the “Omonia” organization): the shortcomings in terms of schooling in Greek, discrimination in the army and the slowness with which goods that had been confiscated by the communist regime were returned to the Greek Orthodox Church. Welcomed by the authorities in Tirana, the HCNM’s intervention introduced an element of calm to the region.365

361 CSCE Communications No. 305 (24 November 1993) and No. 37 (13 December 1994). See also 24th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 28 November 1993, decision 5(a); Permanent Council: Journal No. 3 of 12 January 1995, decisions 5(a) and 5(b) and Permanent Council: Decisions No. 4 and No. 5 of 12 January 1995. 362 On the work of the Mission, see further in this chapter part 2.C.b 363 See HC/3/95 (10 July 1995) and Permanent Council: Decision No. 15 of 23 February 1995. See also the 1994 Report of the Secretary General on OSCE activities (§ 3.4) and the 1995 Report of the Secretary General on OSCE activities (§ 3.7). 364 For the Greco-Albanian controversy, see for example CSCE Communication No. 196 (7 July 1993) and UN: S/1994/416 (12 April 1994), S/1994/429 (13 April 1994), S/1994/985 (23 August 1994) and S/1994/1013 (30 August 1994). See also Robert Austin, “Albanian–Greek Relations: The Confrontation Continues”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 33, 20 August 1993, pp. 30–34. The issue is complicated by the presence of tens of thousands of illegal Albanian immigrants in Greece. 365 See CSCE Communications No. 251 and Add.1 (21 September 1993) and No. 35 (14 November 1994). See also the 1994 Report of the Secretary General on OSCE activities (§ 3.4) and the 1995 Report of the Secretary General on OSCE activities (§ 3.7). 424   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

iii) Minorities without an ethno-State (the Roma) In April 1993, following the recommendations from the Rapporteur Mission established when the Czech Republic and Slovakia were admitted to the CSCE, the CSO tasked the HCNM with studying social, economic and humanitarian issues affecting the Roma population.366 In his report, submitted in September 1993, the HCNM recommended that the issue become a permanent item on the CSCE’s agenda, that a contact point on the Roma be created within the ODIHR, that inventories be established on the situation of Roma in the various countries in which they resided, and that the CSCE coordinate its efforts with those of the relevant international organizations (Council of Europe, European Union, United Nations) and NGOs.367 The activities of the HCNM between 1993 and 1995 proved to be conclusive in two respects. Firstly, despite the formal restrictions on the mandate, the HCNM is able to act with maximum independence and political responsibility in relation to the OSCE. As a general rule, the HCNM has freely identified the place, time and method of action while maintaining constant co-operation with the Chairman- in-Office and benefiting from the a posteriori support of the CSO. The HCNM’s intervention has generally taken part in three stages: site visits to identify the exact nature of the existing issues and to better understand the position of the States concerned (as well as other States in the region); the formulation of recommendations to the parties (usually in a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs); and assistance to the parties to put the recommendations in question into action. The HCNM’s recommendations, accompanied by the response from the government in question, remain confidential until the CSO decides, through consensus, to make them public in the form of official OSCE documents. Secondly, the HCNM has demonstrated a remarkable ability to establish trust with the authorities of the countries concerned which have unanimously lauded the HCNM’s impartiality and understanding of the facts. In this regard, it is significant that some governments (for example, Romania and Ukraine) have spontaneously called upon the services of the HCNM or (as was the case for Estonia) have requested new interventions. As Audrey Glover observes, “how successful he has been is hard to assess because it is always difficult to judge the success of conflict prevention. However what is clear is that the activities of the High Commissioner have gained widespread respect and support among OSCE governments and that he has been acclaimed as a success story of the OSCE.”368 Fundamentally attributable to the specific personality and diplomatic skills of Max van der Stoel, this success story demonstrated that the mandate drafted in

366 See 21st Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3/Corr. of 28 April 1993. 367 See Chapter VII of this volume, part III last three pages of section 2.D, ‘Changes to the normative approach since 1991’. 368 See Audrey F. Glover, “National Minorities in Europe”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVIII, no. 3 (1995), p. 59.  Chapter VII   425

Helsinki was relevant and did not need to be amended. Max van der Stoel believed that the real obstacles that he encountered to date in his work were not statutory in nature, but financial and practical. The lack of available material resources was, indeed, obvious. The HCNM had no qualified salaried staff: his team consisted of three diplomats who were temporarily seconded free of charge (by the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) as well as a specialist in human rights offered under the same conditions by an NGO from the United States.369 Since then, the HCNM’s resources have only slightly increased.370 In addition, there was the difficulty of recruiting specialists on national minorities from the ODIHR’s list of experts on the human dimension (as was the case for the team responsible for monitoring developments in Slovakia and Hungary), a difficulty to which the Council of Ministers sought to respond by ­agreeing, in 1993, on the principle of an appropriate widening of the list in ­question.371 In December 1995, the Ministerial Council stated that “the High Commission on National Minorities [had] successfully concluded his quiet diplomacy” and, acting on the recommendation of the Permanent Council, extended Max van der Stoel’s mandate for a new threeyear period (1996–1999).372 Max van der Stoel constantly stated that he did not wish to raise the issue of a possible revision of his mandate. Given the work that took place between 1993 and 1995, it appears clear that the formal provisions of the mandate are not an obstacle to either the moral authority or the independence of the HCNM’s work. Although applicable to the current HCNM, this risks being much less relevant in the future if the role falls to a less talented individual than Max van der Stoel. It may, however, be considered that, regardless of the incumbent, the effectiveness of the HCNM depends upon close co-ordination with the other

369 The initial assistants of the HCNM were Rob Zaagman (Netherlands), Marek Jeziorski (Poland), Anders Rönquist (Sweden) and Konrad Huber (United States), see CSCE Communication No. 53 (16 February 1993). 370 In November 1993, the CSO authorized the HCNM to increase its staff by one adviser and one half- time administrative assistant, see 24th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 3 of 29 November 1993, decision 5(g.2), first indent. The following year, the Budapest Review Conference agreed in principle to further increase the HCNM’s resources: “The continuation of the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities will be supported and his/her resources will be enhanced.” See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter I, § 21. But the Permanent Council went No further than approving the extension of a half-time administrative post to a full-time post, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 24 of 2 March 1995. The idea put forward by the HCNM services of establishing a new post of archivist, a post that was becoming urgently needed (DOC. 269/95 of 20 February 1995), was discarded. In the same year, the Permanent Council accepted the offer of the Government of the Netherlands to second a diplomat as a personal assistant to the HCNM, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 51 of 13 June 1995 and HC/2/95 (13 June 1995). 371 Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, Annex A. 372 See Budapest Ministerial Council: Decision No.5 of 8 December 1995. See also Permanent Council: Decision No. 83 of 2 November 1995. By the end of 1993, the Rome Council of Ministers had expressed its appreciation by recognizing “the HCNM as an innovative and effective asset in early warning and preventive diplomacy”, see Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, section III. 426   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

instruments of the OSCE (notably the Missions of Long Duration and the ODIHR), as well as upon the exercise of better follow-up of the HCNM’s recommendations by the political bodies of the OSCE.373 c) Lessons learnt from the work of the High Commissioner Drawing on all the activities undertaken during his first mandate (1993–1995), the HCNM himself formulated a certain number of general lessons on the subject of managing ethnic tensions. This information covered the three categories of communication, participation and integration. First of all, the basic approach towards inter-ethnic tensions is the promotion of institutionalized dialogue between the State in question and its national minorities. The HCNM had noticed that a lack of communication or insufficient communication was generally the direct source of the difficulties and the initial barrier to any positive developments in the situation. He deduced from this that there was a need for a body to enable permanent dialogue: a “Council of Minorities”, an Ombudsman or a “Round Table”, independent of the establishment of a specialized ministerial department. Such a structure could have two benefits: on the one hand, that of a reasonable confidence-building measure, demonstrating the will of the parties to seek compromise solutions while contributing towards gradually alleviating mutual mistrust; and on the other hand, that of enabling practical problems to be addressed regularly, and preventing the development of unpredictable situations.374 Secondly, the effective participation of representatives of national minorities in public affairs (in parliament and, where appropriate, government) appears to be one of the key conditions for the development of harmonious inter-ethnic relations. Generally, such participation has the effect of dissuading national minorities from turning to illegal methods (including violence) to defend their interests and, in the long term, of creating links of loyalty to the State.375 The HCNM had noted that the predilection of national minorities for solutions of autonomy was rarely shared, generally speaking, by the governments in question. They saw such formulae as a first step towards secession and unification with a neighbouring ethno-­State. The HCNM also noted that while the interest of the ethno-State towards ethnic populations which had been separated from it through historical vicissitudes may be legitimate, it was, nonetheless, felt to be an intervention in internal affairs. With a view to overcoming this dilemma, he suggested two additional possibilities: inviting the HCNM to intervene in the bilateral dialogue and to incorporate provisions into the co-operation and

373 Recommendations to this effect were made at the first two Human Dimension Commitment Meetings (see relevant sections of the Consolidated Summaries of 1993 and 1995). 374 See the text of the keynote address made by the HCNM at the first Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (Warsaw, 28 and 29 September 1993. 375 Ibid., p. 6.  Chapter VII   427

neighbourly relations treaties on establishing regular meetings of mixed working committees.376 Thirdly, a positive ethnic policy should aim to integrate rather than assimilate national minorities. In this respect, the HCNM highlighted the crucial importance of educating people in their mother tongue, a recurring theme in national minorities’ demands. He confirmed that language constitutes the heart of group identity and is the sanctuary of ethnicity, an instrument par excellence for promoting collective identity, or indeed for creating irreversible alienation. He also admitted that the problem was not framed in simple terms, that is, original solutions were needed to reconcile the State’s understandable concern to promote understanding of the official language of the country with the legitimate aspirations of national minorities.377 The HCNM also recognized that difficulties are often linked less to the ill will of the State in question than to its lack of financial resources. In such cases, international co-operation could provide the appropriate solution: “while studying minority problems, I often come to the conclusion that even relatively modest amounts of money could do a lot to reduce the danger of incipient conflict. For instance, there are educational projects which the government of a country is unable to finance but which would greatly help to reduce tensions between the minority and the government … 0.01% of the total defence budgets of OSCE member States would be more than enough to set up a wide range of conflict prevention programmes.”378 It was along these same lines that the HCNM highlighted that conflict prevention should not be limited to treating the external symptoms but to tackling the profound causes: in other words, to be fully effective, there was a need to go beyond the human dimension and to enter the economic dimension.379

IV. Relations with the Council of Europe Relations between the CSCE and the Council of Europe were entirely non-existent during the Cold War period and began to develop only at the Paris Summit in November 1990. The hegemonic claims immediately voiced by the Council of Europe’s Secretariat gave rise to a phenomenon of institution rivalry. This section will analyse the factors involved in the rivalry between the CSCE and the Council of Europe and the now more relaxed state of relations between the two international organizations.

376 See the text of the report of the HCNM at the second Human Dimension Implementation Meeting (Warsaw, 2 October 1993). 377 Ibid., p. 6. 378 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 379 See Max van der Stoel, “The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE Conflict Prevention”, Studia Diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4,1994, pp. 67–69. 428   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

1. Factors Involved in the Rivalry between the CSCE and the Council of ­Europe The institutional rivalry which developed between the two organizations was down to the Council of Europe rather than the CSCE. After the collapse of communism, the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, strongly supported by France, where it was headquartered, stated its ambition to replace the CSCE in the field of the human dimension.

A. The Pan-European Ambitions of the Secretariat in Strasbourg Created in 1949 by a statute which granted it a wide field of competence (including numerous areas of co-operation but excluding defence), the Council of Europe found itself obliged to moderate its ambitions as communist integration took place. While retaining diverse interests (in economic, social, cultural and legal terms, among others), it concentrated its fundamental energies in the field of human rights. Its major work was (and still is) managing the legal regime ensuing from the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and its 11 additional protocols. “A sort of legal superego against oppressive urges” in Western Europe,380 this regime is still unrivalled in the world in terms of the extent of rights protected and the comprehensiveness of its control mechanism. Despite this democratic asset, the Council of Europe played only a minor role in European affairs. A classical instrument of intergovernmental co-operation, it could only dream of rivalling an integration institution such as the Community. Furthermore, all the communist countries of the CSCE rejected the “club of liberal democracies” which made up the Strasbourg-based organization, thus depriving it of any possibility of aligning itself with the Helsinki process. Within the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, the collapse of communism immediately led to hopes of a grandiose role: that of an instrument of democratic consolidation of Greater Europe to the detriment of a CSCE reduced to its political-­ military functions.381 In 1989, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumière, confirmed in no uncertain terms that the Helsinki process had run its course in terms of the human dimension and that the time had come to hand the baton on to an institution with more appropriate experience and resources: “Of course, it will remain necessary to retain a CSCE-­style mechanism to continue to work on issues of security and disarmament, because the task is far from being completed. In contrast, in terms of the third basket, i.e., human rights, the time is no longer right for laborious efforts to make the countries of Eastern Europe move, but for co-operation to consolidate democracy and freedoms in these countries … The CSCE is hardly equipped to do so … That is why, when it

380 The phrase was coined by Bertrand Le Gendre (“La Cour des droits de l’homme à Strasbourg. Vingt-et-un juges pour l’Europe des libertés”), Le Monde, 9 October 1988. 381 Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the hopes of the Council of Europe were revived by a speech given by Mikhail Gorbachev delivered on 6 July 1989 to the Strasbourg Parliamentary Assembly. This speech stated in particular that the Council of Europe was one of the pillars of the “common European home”.  Chapter VII   429

comes to the third basket of Helsinki, it would be undoubtedly wise that, in its coming meetings, the CSCE entrusts implementation of this basket, in the European area, to the Council of Europe, which has the most sophisticated and effective mechanisms for protecting human rights in the world. It would therefore be logical and reasonable for the Council of Europe now to be granted a mandate from the CSCE to continue its work by applying the principles that it has laid down.”382 According to the Secretary General, the concrete need for dialogue and co-­ operation demonstrated by the new European countries could not in any way be satisfied within the abstract context of the CSCE: on the one hand, “day-to-day co-operation on practical problems (actions relating to culture, sport, education, healthcare, the environment, etc.) are not on its level”, and on the other, “the ­United States, naturally present within the CSCE, is hardly interested in this close co-operation between European countries.”383 In conclusion, only the Council of Europe could offer the context and instrument best adapted to the new circumstances. The Secretary General’s argument contained one major flaw. She arrogantly disregarded the fact that a Council of Europe, even a “pan-European” one, that is to say, which was strengthened by the accession of a certain number of new democracies, could not hope to equal – in composition – a Euro-Atlantic and soon-to-be Euro-Asiatic CSCE/OSCE. She based herself on the fallacious hypothesis that “the Council of Europe’s human rights machinery will soon be at the disposal of all CSCE States.”384

B. The Pressure of French Diplomacy The Council of Europe’s pan-European vision was positively echoed by the French President François Mitterrand. His diplomatic strategy at this time aimed to oppose “American hegemony” through a European Confederation reserved only for countries in the continent – an undertaking which included Gorbachev’s USSR, but not the United States. Yet, in contrast to the CSCE, the Council of Europe had a contribution to make to a possible European Confederation: it could be one of its legitimate crucibles.385 Consequently, France strove to put all its diplomatic weight behind promoting the Council of Europe.

382 Catherine Lalumière, “Le Conseil de l’Europe dans la construction de la Grande Europe”, Annuaire européen, vol. XXXVII, 1989, p. 36. 383 Ibid., p. 37. 384 Stefan Lerne, The CSCE in the 1990s: Common European Horne or Potemkin Village? (Wien: Braumüller, 1991), p. 87. 385 Or “the” crucible, as publicly wished by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, a figure sharing President Mitterrand’s political views. See Catherine Lalumière, “Le Conseil de l’Europe dans la nouvelle architecture européenne”, NATO Review, vol. 40, no. 5 (October 1992), p. 12. Held in Prague in June 1991, the first meeting of the European Confederation (or “Assises 1”) ended in a resounding failure. The countries which had just freed themselves from communism rejected the French project for two major reasons: firstly, the absence of the United States; secondly, the fear of seeing the “Confederation 1” used as a means of indefinitely delaying accession to the European Community. In October 1993, on the occasion of the first Council of Europe Summit 430   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

The Council of Europe initially succeeded in scoring some points. During the Copenhagen Meeting (June 1990), France successfully opposed any significant strengthening of the CSCE’s Human Dimension Mechanism. Simultaneously, and for the first time in the history of the pan-European process, the Council of Europe was mentioned in the final document with the promise of soon being called upon to provide a contribution to the human dimension.386 The following month, the 16 NATO States agreed to the idea of endowing the CSCE with a Parliamentary Assembly which would operate within the Council of Europe.387 Over the course of the same summer, France managed to convince the participating States to invite the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to speak at the Summit in Paris – an honour which had previously only been granted to the Secretary-­ General of the United Nations.388 At the instigation of France, the Charter of Paris (November 1990) paid strong tribute to the democratic role of the Council of Europe and recognized its disposition towards “mak[ing] its experience available to the CSCE.”389 Moreover, confirming promises made in Copenhagen, the Charter invited the Council of Europe to contribute towards the Symposium on the ­Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States, the Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, and the Geneva Meeting of Experts on National ­Minorities.390 However, there were some indications that victory for the Council of Europe had not necessarily been achieved. Thus, the Charter raised the principle of developing the CSCE’s Human Dimension Mechanism (the materialization of

of Heads of State and Government, President Mitterrand tried (unsuccessfully) to relaunch the French project of the European Confederation, see Le Monde, 10–11 November 1993. 386 “The participating States recognize the important expertise of the Council of Europe in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and agree to consider further ways and means to enable the Council of Europe to make a contribution to the human dimension of the CSCE” (Copenhagen Document, § 28). Three other provisions also referred to the Council of Europe: § 27 (encouraging Council of Europe activities relating to the establishment and strengthening of independent national institutions); § 29 (willingness of the participating States to draw upon the experience of the Council of Europe and the European Commission for Democracy through Law in comparative studies of legislation in the area of human rights); and § 39 (possibility of co-operation within the Council of Europe on issues relating to national minorities). In addition, the Council of Europe Secretariat attended the Copenhagen Meeting as part of the delegation of San Marino, which was assuming the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers. 387 See Chapter II in this volumes, part IV, ‘The Parliamentary Assembly’. 388 For the text of Catherine Lalumière’s statement delivered at the Paris Summit, see CSCE/SP/VR.4 (20 November 1990), pp. 33–36. 389 See Charter of Paris (1990), “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, last §. 390 Ibid., section on “Culture”, § 2 and Supplementary document to the Charter of Paris, Annexes II and III. The invitation to the Cracow Symposium was an amendment to the Symposium’s initial mandate. The invitation to the Oslo Seminar was not only extended to the Council of Europe, but also to the European Commission for Democracy through Law, usually referred to as the Venice Commission, which had been established in 1990 by the Committee of Ministers on the basis of a partial agreement between some members of the Council of Europe. For more details, see Jacques Robert, “La Commission européenne pour la démocratie par le droit, dite Commission de Venise”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 255–267.  Chapter VII   431

which would be postponed until the Moscow Meeting), announced the establishment of an Office for Free Elections, and made a statement in favour of the constitution of the CSCE’s own Parliamentary Assembly.391 In reality, under pressure from the United States (supported by a large number of participating States), France ultimately dropped its opposition to the development of the CSCE’s human dimension. It accepted the extension of the Human Dimension Mechanism in October 1991 (Moscow Document), then the transformation of the Office for Free Elections into the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in January (Prague Document). France yielded reluctantly, as is all too clear in the loaded words of President Mitterrand to the first Summit of the Council of Europe (Vienna, October 1993): “The CSCE is everyone and no one … Who has ever seen their security protected by it?”392 In sum, the tables turned against the Council of Europe: in another failed attempt to annex the human dimension, the Strasbourg-based institution now had to deal with a CSCE equipped with an Office likely to compete with it, even when it came to practical action.

2. The Pan-European Transformation of the Council of Europe The disappointment regarding the CSCE did not dissuade the Council of Europe from continuing its pan-European transformation, that is, from changing (as suggested by the Secretary General Catherine Lalumière) into an instrument of democratic “engineering”, uniting around 40 Member States.393 The Council of Europe launched itself down a veritable path of enlargement and endowed itself with the rallying concept of “democratic security”.

A. The Path to Enlargement During the collapse of communism, the Council of Europe included 23 Member States in Western Europe, while the CSCE (with 35 participating States) had a pan- European composition. The rationale of the political–institutional competition called upon the Strasbourg-based institution to open itself up to the widest possible number of “European” States. Between 1990 and June 1996, the Council of Europe increased its composition to 39 Member States (compared to 55 for the OSCE), following 16 new accessions – seven countries of Central and Eastern Europe, six former Soviet republics (including Russia) and two former Yugoslav Republics, not counting the Republic of Andorra.394

391 See Charter of Paris (1990), “Guidelines for the future”, section on the “Human Dimension”, before last §. See also “New structures and institutions of the CSCE Process”, §§ 13 and 14. 392 Le Monde, 10–11 November 1993. 393 See Catherine Lalumière, “Vers un Conseil paneuropéen”, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, no. 369, June 1993), pp. 502–506. 394 These are the accessions, in chronological order: Hungary on 6 November 1990; Czech and Slovak Federative Republic on 1 February 1991; Poland on 26 November 1991; Bulgaria on 7 May 1992; Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia on 14 May 1993, Czech Republic and Slovakia on 30 June 1993; Romania on October 1993; Andorra on 10 November 1994; Latvia on 10 February 1995; Moldova 432   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

In this mad dash for enlargement, facilitated by the new democracies’ impatience to receive a “badge of honour and democratic legitimacy”, purely political considerations played a significant role on more than one occasion.395 This was certainly the case when Estonia, Latvia, Romania and, above all, Russia were admitted.396 Resolutely focused on the process of opening up the institution, the accession of Russia threatened to turn the Council of Europe into a pan- European institution which was disdainful of the “transatlantic link” symbolized by NATO on the military level and the OSCE on the political level. The Council of Europe avoided the major blunder of welcoming the Russians without making a special gesture towards the US: in January 1996 it granted the US custom-­made observer status.397 Since then, Japan and Canada have requested the same type of status.398 The Council of Europe ultimately found itself confronted with the thorny issue of the geographical limitations of Europe: should it define the concept of “Europe” according to its own criteria, or simply adopt those of the OSCE? The Declaration of the Vienna Summit (9 October 1993) offered no guidance in this regard and the Parliamentary Assembly itself addressed the issue. In December 1993, a report by the Political Affairs Committee (the Reddemann Report) recommended that the Committee of Ministers take into account the fact that geographers generally recognized the eastern limits of the continent by assigning the Caucasus to Asia. In this way, it ruled out the accession of the Caucasian States as well as, in addition, States on the eastern and southern coasts

on 13 July 1995, Albania (same date), Ukraine and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 9 November 1995; and Russia on 25 January 1996. It should be noted that, following the breakup of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, the Czech Republic and Slovakia were admitted separately on 30 June 1993. 395 See Jean-François Flauss, “Les conditions d’admission des pays d’Europe centrale et orientale au sein du Conseil de l’Europe”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), p. 401. See also Hans Winkler, “Democracy and Human Rights in Europe: A Survey of the Admission Practice of the Council of Europe”, Austrian Journal of Public and International Law, vol. 47, no. 2–3 (1995), pp. 147–172; Evelyne Gelin, “Conseil de l’Europe : quels critères d’admission pour les nouveaux Etats indépendants?”, Revue politique et parlementaire (July–August 1995), pp. 28–42; and Emmanuel Decaux, “Les PECO et l’idéologie des droits de l’homme”, in Paul Tavernier (ed.), Quelle Europe pour les droits de l’homme, “Organisation internationale et relations internationales” collection, no. 33 (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1996), pp. 341–361. 396 On the case of Russia, see Daniel Tarschys, “La Russie au Conseil de l’Europe : une concession à la Realpolitik?”, Le Monde, 7 February 1996, and Evelyne Gelin, “L’adhésion de la Russie au Conseil de l’Europe à la lumière de la crise tchétchène”, Revue générale de droit international public, no. 3 (1995), pp. 623–638. 397 See Resolution (95) 37 adopted on 7 December 1995 by the Committee of Ministers and approved on 10 January 1996 by Recommendation 1282 of the Parliamentary Assembly, as well as the Finsberg and Bársony Report, PACE Doc. 7433 (6 December 1995). See also the Sager Report on relations between Europe, the United States and Canada in the 1990s (ibid., Doc. 6217 of 26 April 1990). 398 For Japan, see the Baumel and Iwinski Report, PACE Doc. 7500 (8 March 1996). For Canada, see of the Committee of Ministers Resolution 96 of 3 April 1996 and the Cem Report, PACE Doc. 7543 (30 April 1996).  Chapter VII   433

of the Mediterranean.399 The Reddemann Report implicitly stressed that the Council of Europe had no reason to align its conception of Europe with that of the CSCE. The consequent protests were, however, such that the Assembly asked the Political Affairs Committee for a new report and requested an opinion from the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights as well as from the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member States. Some parliamentarians considered that although the Caucasus Republics did not qualify as European in the strictly geographical sense of the term, they were none the less culturally close to Europe.400 Others let their sights stray as far as Central Asia, recalling that the eastern part of Kazakhstan was in the European continent and stressing that all the Central Asian Republics (except Tajikistan) had cultural and linguistic links to Turkey (a Council of Europe Member State), whose development could be an important factor for stability in the region.401 In its new report, the Political Affairs Committee admitted that the Caucasian States could consider joining on the condition that their internal situation met the standards of the Council of Europe and that they clearly indicated their desire to belong to the family of European nations. The Committee on Relations with Non-Member States formulated its opinion in even more categorical terms. It argued that “If the Ural mountains are accepted as the eastern boundary of Europe, then logic suggests that the Ural river which flows into the Caspian Sea extends this natural boundary southwards. Thus the Caucasus, being west of the Caspian Sea, is European.”402 It argued that, both historically and politically, the Transcaucasus had been the meeting point between three regional powers (Russia, Turkey and Persia), two of which “are and remain primarily European” and the other of which (Turkey) wished to join the European Union. Finally, from a cultural point of view, it maintained that Armenia and Georgia had “retained their direct links with ‘Christendom’ which is almost synonymous with Europe and the associated traditions of art, architecture and music.” Turning to the third Caucasian State, it admitted that “Azerbaijan is more difficult to link with European history and culture,” but considering the lack of a natural boundary separating the Azeris from the Georgians and the Armenians, it stated that this suggested “a strong case for including the entire Caucasus region in ­Europe.”403 Finally, it clearly asserted that “it is surely desirable to have the ­Council of Europe’s definition of Europe coincide with that of the CSCE.”404

399 See the Reddemann Report on the enlargement of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 6975 (13 December 1993). 400 See the second Reddemann Report on the enlargement of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 7103 (10 June 1994), pp. 3 and 19. 401 Ibid., pp. 9 and 20. 402 See Atkinson Opinion on the enlargement of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 7148 (13 September 1994), § 8. 403 Ibid., §§ 11–13. 404 Ibid., § 9. 434   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

The (majority) opinion issued by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights was, in contrast, more nuanced. It considered that the three criteria traditionally used to set the boundaries of Europe were not in themselves sufficient: the exclusivity of the criteria of religious and philosophical values would “ignore the development of multicultural societies in Europe”; the historical criteria had become unacceptable due to its “element of neo-colonialism”; and the geographical criteria was inappropriate as the only criterion because individual Member States of the Council of Europe extended beyond the geographic boundaries of Europe. The report considered that “the Europe of the CSCE or the Europe of the European Union are not identical to the Europe of the Council of Europe, and this is a perfectly satisfactory state of affairs.” However, in recognition of the fact that non-European States wanted to adopt certain European political and cultural aspects, it recognized the need to design appropriate systems for cooperating with them.405 At the end of the debate, on 4 October 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Recommendation 1247 on the enlargement of the Council of Europe. The central provision of the text stated that “Membership of the Council of Europe is in principle open only to states whose national territory lies wholly or partly in Europe and whose culture is closely linked with the European culture,” it being nonetheless understood that the “traditional and cultural links and adherence to the fundamental values of the Council of Europe might justify a suitable co-­ operation with other states neighbouring the ‘geographical’ boundaries” (paragraph 2). The Recommendation recognized as “European” States whose legislative assemblies enjoyed “special guest status with the Parliamentary Assembly” (currently Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia)406 and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It announced that “in view of their cultural links with Europe”, the three countries of the Caucasus would have the possibility of applying for membership provided they could clearly indicate their will to be considered as part of “Europe”. Arguing that Europe had an “interest that its basic values and ideas on human rights permeate neighbouring cultures, but without seeking in any way to question, let alone destroy, those cultures,” it considered that no “new iron curtain” should be drawn behind these States and that “neighbouring countries of ‘geographical’ Europe’ should, if they so wish, be viewed as possible candidates for suitable co-operation.” Finally, it offered countries on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean the possibility of enjoying privileged relations with the Parliamentary Assembly.407 Clearly, the

405 See Haller Opinion on the enlargement of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 7166 (3 October 1994). 406 The status of “special guest” was introduced as early as May 1989 by the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly (Rule 55a) as a kind of waiting room for joining the Council of Europe. See Hélène Surrel, “L’ouverture à l’Est du Conseil de l’Europe”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 1 (1991), pp. 113–122. 407 In response, the Committee of Ministers essentially stated that priority would be given to the officially recognized candidate countries (in 1996, Belarus and Croatia) and that future  Chapter VII   435

Europe of which the Strasbourg institution dreamed was none other than that of the OSCE.

B. The Concept of “Democratic Security” The Cou ncil of Europe waited until the end of 1993, much later than the CSCE and NATO, to readjust its mechanisms and redefine its role in post-communist Europe. Its aggiornamento was completed in the Vienna Declaration, adopted at the end of the first Summit held by its Member States (at the initiative of France) on 8 and 9 October 1993. The Declaration solemnly declared the Council of ­Europe’s new pan-European role and its development around six main axes: ­reform of the control mechanism of the European Convention on Human Rights (the creation of a single European Court of Human Rights to supersede existing structures); the development of legal instruments to protect national minorities; the launch of a Plan of Action on combating racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance; the creation of a consultative organ representing both local and regional authorities in Europe; the development of “cultural schemes in a partnership involving public authorities and the community at large”; and, finally, revision as necessary of the Statute of the Council of Europe.408 Yet the main value of the Vienna Declaration was to assign the Council of Europe the role of contributing towards the “democratic security” of the continent. The text did not expressly define this concept. It did, however, indicate that its constitutive elements were pluralistic and parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, the rule of law and multiculturalism.409 Further, it specified that the role of the Council of Europe was fundamentally to give expression in the legal field to the values that define European identity.410 Even expressed in this elliptical form, the concept of democratic security demonstrated that the Council of Europe in no way intended to give ground to the CSCE. Firstly, the constitutive elements of the concept were all (with the possible exception of multiculturalism) those of the CSCE’s human dimension. Secondly, the reference to legal methods of action stressed that the Council of Europe had an advantage that was not open to the CSCE.

candidates (in particular those from the Caucasian States) would be assessed on their own merits, PACE Doc. 7263 (3 March 1995). 408 For the text of the Vienna Declaration, see UN: A/48/496 (13 October 1993). See also Daniel Colard, “Le Conseil de l’Europe et le nouvel ordre paneuropéen”, Défense nationale, no. 552 (April 1994), pp. 97–109. 409 Vienna Summit Declaration (1993), § 2. See also Francis Rosenstiel, “De la sécurité démocratique”, Le Monde, 10 December 1994. 410 Vienna Summit Declaration (1993), § 10. 436   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

3. Development of the Interaction between the OSCE and The Council of Europe Beginning in 1991 under the wary eye of the CSCE and with the annexionist ulterior motives of the Council of Europe, relations between the two international institutions developed over nearly three years in a climate of more or less concealed tensions. Thus, in the written “contribution” presented at the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension (September–October 1991), the Council of Europe stressed the legal superiority of its standards as well as its mechanisms of protection and did not hesitate to immediately state that the “future development of human rights mechanisms within the CSCE should retain a political nature.” During the same meeting, Secretary General Catherine Lalumière insisted just as strongly on the need for the countries of Wider Europe to adopt the same norms and accept the same controls “by clearly aligning themselves on the highest level.” During the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992, the Director of Political Affairs (Hans-Peter Furrer) proposed to the CSCE participating States who were not members of the Council of Europe various concrete assistance projects relating to the human dimension (education on human rights, gender equality, protection of national minorities, etc.) before concluding that the “main objectives of the CSCE … were contained in the Statute of the Council of Europe more than forty years ago.” In October 1993, echoing President Mitterrand’s ironic statement on the subject of a CSCE representing “everyone and no one”, some members of the Secretariat in Strasbourg did not hold back in triumphantly asserting that “the future of the CSCE is behind it.”411 Nonetheless, the Council of Europe ended up accommodating the existence of the OSCE. Reevaluating the overarching issue from the perspective of synergy, its Member States recognized, at the end of the Vienna Summit (October 1993), the need to “deepen relations of institutional co-operation on the subject of the human dimension” with the CSCE, including in the form of specific “arrangements” with the ODIHR and the HCNM.412 In April 1994, the Ministers’ Deputies established an ad hoc working group to develop pragmatic co-operation with the CSCE on the basis of “equality” and mutual “specificity”, a structure which was an intergovernmental counterpart to the CSCE’s ad hoc Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly in Strasbourg.413 In June 1994, the Secretary General Catherine L ­ alumière (whose mandate was not renewed) gave way to Daniel

411 See Le Monde, 27 November 1993 (article by Marcel Scotto). 412 Vienna Summit Declaration (1993), § 13. 413 See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 34 (January–June 1994, p. 135). In 1991, the Council of Europe established an Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Exchange Views on Standard Setting Activities of the CSCE in the Field of Human Rights (CAHSC). This Committee was responsible for reviewing CSCE standards in relation to those of the European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 29, May–December 1991, p. 123). In February 1992, the title and mandate of the Committee were changed to Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on CSCE Human Dimension Issues (CAHDH), to facilitate co-ordination between the two international organizations (see Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 32,  Chapter VII   437

Tarschys, a national of a country (Sweden) more impartial than France – given its equal predilection for the two international organizations.414 Currently, the interaction between them takes two basic forms: reciprocal participation in working meetings and co-ordination of activities.415

A. Reciprocal Participation in Technical Meetings In the manner of other international organizations, the Council of Europe is regularly invited to present “contributions” (declarations and working documents) to technical meetings of the OSCE: Review Conferences, Expert Meetings, Seminars, etc.416 Beginning in May–June 1991 (at the Cracow Symposium on Cultural Heritage), this elementary form of interaction presented two specific traits. Firstly, in contrast to current practice, the “contributions” from the Council of ­Europe are interactive. Since the Cracow symposium, the representatives of the Strasbourg-based organization have played more than a walk-­on role. Admitted to the subsidiary working group sessions (and not only to plenary sessions), they were permitted to respond to questions raised by the delegates of participating States. Through its extension to the Meeting of Experts in Geneva on National Minorities (July 1991), the Moscow Meeting on the Human Dimension (September–October 1991) and the Oslo Seminar on Democratic Institutions (November 1991), the “Cracow formula” became customary.417 In the Human Dimensin seminars organized by the ODIHR in Warsaw since November 1992, the emissaries of the Council of Europe (like those of other international

January–June 1993, p. 116). In addition, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe has a Special OSCE Adviser. 414 On the views of the Secretary General in office in 1996, see Daniel Tarschys, “The Council of Europe: The Challenge of Enlargement”, The World Today, vol. 51, no. 4 (April 1995), pp. 62–64. 415 See the three articles by Thomas M. Buchsbaum, “Les relations entre la CSCE et les organisations internationales, notamment le Conseil de l’Europe”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 231–254; “The CSCE and International Organizations: Expanding Co-operation with the Council of Europe”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 125–142; and “The Council of Europe and the CSCE”, Annuaire européen, vol. 60 (1994), pp. 7–26. For an account of how the relations between the two organizations evolved annually, see Council of Europe, ­Human Rights Information Sheet no. 28, 7 November 1990–April 1991. 416 See the Contributions and statements to CSCE meetings, published by the Council of Europe (since 1993) and Doc. CAHSC (92) 3 (22 January 1992). 417 For the texts of the main “contributions” submitted in Cracow, Geneva and Moscow, see Parliamentary Assembly, PACE Doc. 6482 Addendum II (17 September 1991. The invitation of the Council of Europe to the Moscow Meeting (whose mandate had been established prior to the fall of communism) was decided in June 1991 by the Berlin Council of Ministers, in the Summary of Conclusions, § 12. 438   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

organizations and NGOs) participate in work on an equal footing with the government delegations, including as moderators and keynote speakers.418 Secondly, the “contributions” of the Council of Europe go beyond the scope of the human dimension. They also extended to the politico-military dimension and to the economic dimension. The Council of Europe representatives have provided services not only to the Review Conferences and Human Dimension seminars, but also to the Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Geneva, ­October 1992), the Economic Forum (Prague, since 1993), the Mediterranean Seminar on co-operation (Valletta, May 1993), the Seminar on Preventive Diplomacy (Warsaw, January 1994), the ad hoc Meeting on aid to States affected by economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (Vienna, 31 January– 1 ­February 1994) and the Seminar on a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the twenty-first century (Vienna, September 1995). Inversely, the OSCE participates (but apparently without presenting “contributions”) in the specialized meetings of the Council of Europe. Depending on the situation, it is represented by the Chairman-in-Office (as at the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education), the ODIHR (expert meeting to combat racism and xenophobia, November 1994), or the High Commissioner on National Minorities (sessions of the CARMIN, the ad hoc committee for the protection of national minorities established in 1993). Finally, it should be noted that the Council of Europe has regularly been invited to CSCE [and later OSCE] Summits since 1990.419 The same has held since December 1992 for meetings of the Council of Ministers [later Ministerial Councils] and, since the start of 1995, for meetings of the Senior Council and the Permanent Council.420

B. Co-ordination of Activities The most remarkable change in the longstanding tense relationship between the two international organizations is, without a doubt, the development of practical co-ordination of their respective activities. In 1991, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended that the Committee of Ministers negotiate “appropriate institutional and working links”, particularly in the areas of protecting the environment, cultural identity and studying the link between democracy and social protection in a market

418 See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 31, June–December 1992, p. 96 and no. 34, January–June 1994, p. 135. 419 It should be noted that the Secretary General of the Council of Europe attended the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting not at the invitation of the CSCE itself (in accordance with the prestigious formula applied at the Paris Summit), but as a special guest of Finland, the host country. See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 31, June–December 1992, p. 94). 420 Previously, representatives of the Council of Europe only occasionally attended meetings of the CSO, the Vienna Group or the Permanent Committee. For its part, the OSCE is invited to the sessions of the Committee of Ministers. It should also be mentioned that the CSCE Secretary General was invited to take part in the 1993 Vienna Summit.  Chapter VII   439

economy.421 The following year, it deemed it appropriate to “promote the implementation of a charter between the Council of Europe and the CSCE, establishing the principles and modalities on which their indispensable Europe- wide co-­operation is based.”422 For its part, the Committee of Ministers wanted, in line with the decisions of the Vienna Summit, specific arrangements with the ODIHR and the ­HCNM.423 To date, however, the OSCE has preferred not to conclude formal agreements on the division of work which are likely to hinder, either overall or in a specific area, an increase in its human dimension. Consequently, co-ordination between the OSCE and the Council of Europe remains purely practical in nature. On the most elementary level, co-ordination takes the form of an exchange of information. Since the spring of 1993, the two institutions have communicated their documents and information to one another.424 This exchange has turned out to be mutually beneficial. The Council of Europe has recognized that this was a “valuable source” for its own activities:425 for example, the reports on the OSCE Missions of Long Duration and those of the HCNM enabled it to better assess the situation of candidate countries, and to monitor the progress they had made (once admitted) in terms of the human dimension. The flow of information from Strasbourg also feeds into the activities of the ODIHR, the HCNM and the OSCE’s Missions of Long Duration, which, moreover, were authorized to use the Council of Europe database. In more direct terms, field activities are also coordinated. This essentially concerns the observation of elections, OSCE ad hoc missions, and Mission of Long Duration. Thus, the ODIHR and the Council of Europe exchange information during the preelectoral period and their observer missions feed into direct reports on the ground.426 Experts from the Council of Europe are sometimes invited to participate in Rapporteur Missions, as was the case in Albania (September 1991), Georgia (1992, 1993, 1994), Moldova (1993, 1994) and Croatia (1995). In addition, the Secretariat in Strasbourg has established regular contacts with the Missions of Long Duration (particularly those established in the candidate countries: Latvia, Estonia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine), and it has become standard that the Mission chiefs are invited to meet the Ministers’ Deputies at the Council of Europe headquarters.427

421 See Recommendation 1158 on security and co-operation in Europe, adopted on 28 June 1993, § 16.3. 422 See Recommendation 1184 on the work of the CSCE on the eve of the 3rd Summit (Helsinki, 9–11 July 1992), adopted on 6 May 1992, § 10.6. 423 93rd Session of the Committee of Ministers (4 November 1993), p. 9, § 5. 424 19th Meeting of the CSO: Journal No. 2 of 13 February 1993, decision 5 (i). 425 See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 33, July–December 1993, p. 145. 426 See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheets no. 36, January–June 1995 p. 136 and no. 37 July–December 1995, p. 133. 427 See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheets no. 36 (January–June 1995, p. 146) and no. 37 (July–December 1995, p. 133). 440   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

On a more practical and visible level, the two international institutions undertake joint activities in the form of jointly organized expert seminars.428 This was the case of the Seminar on Education (Strasbourg, December 1993), the Seminar on Local Democracy (May 1994), the Seminar on the Roma in the CSCE Region (­ Warsaw, September 1994) and the second Seminar on Tolerance (Bucharest, May 1995). The Seminar on the Roma turned out to be the most conclusive in terms of co-operation: it was during its prolongation that the 1994 Budapest ­Review Conference decided to create, within the ODIHR, a contact point for the Roma and Sinti and that the Council of Europe appointed a coordinator to this effect.429 It should also be noted that co-operation is not limited to the Secret­ ariat in Strasbourg, but also includes closer co-operation with the Venice ­Com­ mission.430 Since the beginning of 1995, co-ordination has been strengthened further by the regular convening of high-level meetings (known as “2+2” meetings) between the Chairpersons and the Secretary Generals of the two international organizations, at which the Director of the ODIHR, the HCNM, the President of the Working Group of the Ministers’ Deputies on relations with the OSCE and members of the Secretariat in Strasbourg also participate. Held in Strasbourg, Prague or elsewhere, such meetings aim to avoid duplication, to improve co-operation and to coordinate activities in the field of the human dimension.431 Finally, it should be noted that the ODIHR was involved in the census carried out in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1994) under the auspices of the Council of Europe. In addition, trilateral (OSCE, Council of Europe, United Nations) high-level co- ordination was also established at the initiative of the Swedish Chairman of the OSCE in July 1993.432 At the time of writing, at the start of 1996, the state of the relationship between the OSCE and the Council of Europe lends itself to a few brief conclusions. Firstly, the question no longer poisons Franco-American relations. Indeed, the human dimension of the OSCE is growing, the United States ended up accepting observer status at the Council of Europe, and France (since the election of Jacques Chirac as president) has engaged in a slow but steady period of rapprochement with NATO.

428 The Seminar on Education was organized on the basis of a provision of the 1992 Helsinki ­Decisions (Chapter VI, § 60), while the Seminar on Tolerance was organized with the assistance of UNESCO. 429 See Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, § 23, and Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 36 (January–June 1995, p. 146). 430 See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheets no. 35 (July–December 1994, p. 135), no. 36 (January–June 1995, p. 145) and no. 37 (July–December 1995, p. 133). 431 The first “2+2” meetings took place respectively on 1 February and 27 October 1995. See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheet no. 37 (July–December 1995, p. 132). 432 See Council of Europe, Human Rights Information Sheets no. 35, July–December 1994, p. 135 and no. 37, July–December 1995, p. 133. See also Chapter II, part V, section A, b) ii, pp. 62–63  Chapter VII   441

Secondly, the calming of relations on the intergovernmental level has been echoed on the international bureaucratic level. Relations between the two institutions have normalized and are tending towards constant improvement. The Council of Europe has become aware of the impossibility of amputating the OSCE from one of its major areas of competence and has recognized that its own pan-European development was compatible with maintaining and developing the human dimension of the OSCE. The battle, which had its origins in the Council of Europe itself (and not in the OSCE), is certainly over. Ultimately, the damage appears to have been limited. On the one hand, the OSCE considers the Council of Europe as a key institution and works with it regularly on all of its activities.433 On the other, and despite what was set out in the Charter of Paris on the subject of potentially involving individuals in the protection of their rights, the intergovernmental nature of the Human Dimension Mechanism has not changed, thus leaving the European Convention on Human Rights the privilege of including individual-type submissions. Nevertheless, traces of hegemonic goals remain, not least within the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.434 Finally, it should be noted that, when it comes to the human dimension, the two international institutions have mandates which are extremely close. The imperative of “democratic security” by which the Council of Europe claims to exercise its responsibilities on the continent is but one facet of the OSCE’s approach to “comprehensive and co-operative security”. Consequently, despite the disappearance of the animosity of the early days and real efforts at co- ordination, duplication and overlaps remain inevitable. Such a situation, in itself, is not necessarily damaging, because the two organizations have different approaches and means of action. While the Council of Europe operates in the field of law, the OSCE operates in the field of binding political commitments. In terms of the protection of national minorities, for example, the Council of Europe provides legal standards, while the OSCE addresses the problem from the perspective of conflict prevention, which, moreover, explains why the OSCE was

433 For references to the Council of Europe contained in the main final texts adopted by the CSCE since the Paris Charter, see Document of the Cracow Symposium (1991), §§ 11, 41 and 42; Report of the Geneva Meeting (1991), section VIII, § 1; Moscow Document on the Human Dimension (1991), §§ 31 and 42.6 (as well as preamble, § 5); Report of the Oslo Seminar on Democratic ­Institutions (1991), section III, § 5 (as well as preamble, § 3); Prague Council of Ministers (1992): ­Summary of Conclusions §§ 10 and 11; Helsinki Summit Challenges of Change (1992), Chapter VI, §§ 5(c), sixth indent, and §§ 14 and 60, and Chapter XI, § 1; Helsinki Summit (1992): Declaration, § 10, fifth indent; Rome Council of Ministers (1993): Decisions, §§ I.2.4 and IV.2; and Budapest Summit (1994): Decisions, chapter VIII, §§ 16 and 26. 434 Thwarted in its ambitions to act as the “parliamentary wing” of the institutionalized OSCE, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has generally expressed strong views on the separation of functions between the Council of Europe and the OSCE. In 1995, the Political Affairs Committee issued a report stating that “observing elections in states which are either full members of the Council of Europe or have been granted special guest status by its Assembly, should be clearly entrusted to the Council of Europe, on the understanding that the latter would communicate the results to the OSCE” (Masseret Report on the general policy of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 7280 of 12 April 1995). 442   The Human Dimension of the OSCE

preferred to the Council of Europe as the repository and monitoring instrument of the 1995 Stability Pact. In other words, the two institutions have different respective advantages, but are both compatible and complementary.  Chapter VIII   443

CHAPTER VIII Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996) In 1996, several developments took place within the OSCE. In this chapter, we will take a closer look at the evolution of two major issues which began in 1995, before analysing changes in the OSCE’s structures and activities and evaluating the Swiss Chairmanship.

I. The Evolution of Two Major Issues in 1996 Implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the continuation of work on the Security Model for the twenty-first century were of foremost importance for the OSCE in 1996, the year of the Swiss Chairmanship.

1. Implementation of the Dayton Agreement With a view to executing the tasks assigned to it by the Dayton Agreement, the OSCE established, under the leadership of US Ambassador Robert E. Frowick (who was the first OSCE Head of Mission to Skopje), a Mission with a hitherto unprecedented scope. Established in Sarajevo, with six regional centres and 26 local delegations comprising nearly 600 staff (233 diplomats seconded from their governments and more than 350 people recruited locally), the Mission was funded from outside the regular budget with some 245 million Austrian schillings (around 24.5 million United States dollars), which ultimately rose to nearly 254 million United States dollars.1 Realizing that the electoral process alone would cost nearly double the Mission’s original budget, the participating States established a Voluntary Contribution Fund, which was managed by the Secretary General of the OSCE. Following efforts by Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the former Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Fund later reached a level of around 523 million schillings as a result of the generosity of around twenty participating States: most NATO and European Union countries, certain Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Poland and Estonia, as well as Switzerland and a few micro-States, Japan, and the European Commission.2 Working in co-operation with the High Representative Carl Bildt (coordinator of the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement), the European Unions’s Control Commission, and a multitude of international institutions and non-­governmental organizations, the Mission consisted of three components corresponding to the three parts of its mandate: military stabilization, human rights, and elections.3

1 See Permanent Council: Decisions No. 100 (11 January 1996) and No. 128 (27 June 1996). 2 See REF.SEC/221/96/Rev.5 (4 September 1996). See also REF.CIO/24/96 (21 May 1996) (report by Uffe Ellemann-Jensen) and REF.PC/435/96 (4 July 1996) (contribution from Japan). 3 Not to mention a component on operations (staff, finances, logistics). The practical arrangements for co-operation between the CSCE Mission and the Control Commission that was established 444   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

A. Military Stabilization Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) assigned the OSCE the task of helping the parties draft and implement an agreement on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) between the entities forming the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article II), an arms control agreement binding the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its two constituent entities, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Article IV), and an arms control agreement “in and around Yugoslavia” (Article V).4 To manage this task, the OSCE Mission established an internal Office for Regional Stabilization and Arms Control, consisting of specialist military personnel. It should be noted that the agreements relating to Articles II and IV were concluded within the scheduled time frames.5 a) The Vienna Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (26 January 1996) Negotiated under the auspices of the Hungarian Ambassador István Gyarmati, the Personal Representative of the Swiss Chairmanship, the Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed in Vienna on 26 January 1996 by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.6 It was inspired by the OSCE regime on CSBMs as well as, to a certain extent, by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty).7 The Agreement established exchanges of information, notably on command structures and the provision of equipment, as well as on certain military activities

in 1991 during the initial stage of the Yugoslav conflict (European Community Monitoring Mission) were the subject of a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (REF.PC/789/95 of 19 December 1995). The Control Commission provided the Mission with staff in the form of teams and individuals. 4 In order to facilitate the implementation of these provisions, Germany organized a special preparatory meeting in Bonn on 18 December 1995. For the text of the closing speech delivered by the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, see INF/282/95 (19 December 1995). 5 No arms control agreement “in and around Yugoslavia” is yet in sight, some countries in the area being reluctant to undertake such an enterprise, for fear of undermining the limits given to them under the CFE Treaty and the CFE 1A agreement (in this regard, see the interpretative statement by Bulgaria upon the Ministerial Council’s acceptance of the OSCE’s role in regional stabilization under the Dayton Agreement, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 93 of 5 December 1995, Annex 1. Consultations to implement Article V of Annex 1-B of the Dayton Agreement were not held until the autumn of 1996. See REF.CIO/39/96 (2 September 1996). 6 The Vienna Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996) entered into force on the day of its signature. Although it was concluded for an unlimited duration, it recognizes that each party may withdraw from it – from the end of calendar year 1997 – in the event of extraordinary events jeopardizing its interests. The Agreement must be submitted every two years to a Review Conference, the first of which was scheduled for 15 February 1998 (Article V). 7 The Agreement was based, inter alia, on the verification regime of the CFE Treaty and aimed at the same categories of armaments with the same technical definitions. For the text of the Agreement, see REF.INF/14/96 (31 January 1996). The Agreement contained seven protocols on verification, exchange and notification of information, existing types of conventional weapon and equipment systems, communication of information related to CSBMs, operating rules of the Joint Consultative Commission, accreditation procedures for journalists accompanying observers to notifiable military activities and military liaison missions, respectively.  Chapter VIII   445

which were subject to notification and observation. It established limits on certain military activities, military deployments and military exercises in certain areas, the reintroduction of foreign troops, the withdrawal of troops and heavy arms (and the confinement of these to specific places), and, above all, the dissolution of paramilitary forces (special operations groups and groups of armed civilians).8 In terms of contacts, the Agreement provided for the establishment of military liaison missions, direct lines of communication, a programme of military contacts and co-operation as well as management of implementation of CSBMs by a Joint Consultative Committee. In addition to a strict verification regime (through inspection, observation and “monitoring”),9 it contained provisions on “risk reduction” in the event of an emergency (consultation and co-operation mechanism concerning unusual military activities, co-operation concerning the clarification of dangerous incidents of a military nature), monitoring of capacities to produce arms and, finally, non-proliferation.10 By mid-1996, the Agreement had been only partially implemented.11 The two parties had honoured the provisions on exchanges of information, the restriction of military deployments, the dissolution of special operational groups and groups of armed civilians, and inspections, but had not (due to the reticence of the Republika Srpska) established direct lines of communication between the military commands.12 The second half of the year was marked by the launch, upon the request of the Republika Srpska, of the mechanism on clarifying unusual military activities in the region of Mostar.13 The Vienna Agreement can be considered as an example of the technique of stabilizing regional crises using CSBMs. b) The Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (14 June 1996) Negotiated under the auspices of Norwegian Ambassador Vigleik Eide, Personal Representative of the Swiss Chairmanship, the Agreement was signed on 14 June

8 The phrase “special operations” was meant to refer to “the offensive activities of organized military or paramilitary groups, such as reconnaissance forward of force positions, and the preparation and carrying out of sabotage, diversions or assassinations” (Article 1.28). The phrase “armed civilian group” referred to “any group of three or more armed persons not wearing uniforms” (Article 1.29). 9 It should be noted that verification was the sole responsibility of the parties: the OSCE was responsible only for “assist[ing]” them with the implementation (Article II, Measure XIII.3). 10 “The Parties shall contribute to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the acquisition, development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical and biological weapons and to control the transfer of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and their components and technology” (Article II, Measure XII). 11 For more details, see REF.SEC/368/96 (27 June 1996). 12 In the first six months of 1996, 16 inspections were carried out by the parties under the auspices of the OSCE (see UN: S/1996/433 of 13 June 1996, p. 3). At one point, the Republika Srpska questioned the principle of immunity of inspectors, following the refusal of the OSCE Mission to accept a communication bearing the signature of General Mladić, charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. 13 See REF.SEC/449/96 (15 August 1996), p. 3. 446   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

1996 in Florence, on the fringes of the session held by the Peace Implementation Council – a body established to replace the Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.14 Faithfully inspired by the CFE Treaty, the instrument binds its five parties – the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, its two constitutive entities, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) – to respect, within the area formed by all their territories, clearly defined limits in terms of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery pieces measuring 75 mm or more, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.15 The limits for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) – which, when Yugoslavia broke up, had walked off with almost all the heavy weaponry of the Yugoslav national army – were set at 1,025 battle tanks, 850 armoured combat vehicles, 3,750 artillery pieces, 155 combat aircraft and 53 attack helicopters.16 The limits implied a 25% reduction in the potential of Belgrade army. The Agreement set identical limits on Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 410 battle tanks, 340 armoured combat vehicles, 1,500 pieces of artillery, 62 combat aircraft and 21 attack helicopters – which represented around 30% of the initial potential of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) [hereafter Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. It should be specified that the limit for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was broken down into two sub-limits – representing two thirds for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (273 battle tanks, 227 armoured combat vehicles, 500 artillery pieces, 14 attack helicopters) and one third for the Republika Srpska (137 battle tanks, 113 armoured combat vehicles, 500 artillery pieces, 21 combat aircraft and 7 attack helicopters).17 In doing so, it imposed significant reductions on the Republika Srpska.18

14 Although concluded for an unlimited duration, the Florence Agreement on Subregional Arms Control recognizes that the parties may withdraw from it in the event of extraordinary events jeopardizing their interests from a period beginning at the 43rd month after its entry into force, upon 150 days’ notice (Article XII.2). The Agreement should be submitted to a Review Conference on 11 June 1998, and at least every two years thereafter (Article XIV). The Agreement contains six protocols dealing respectively with reduction, aircraft reclassification, exchange of information, existing types of armaments, inspection and the Subregional Consultative Commission (SRCC). For the text of the Agreement, see REF.INF/98/96 (19 June 1996). 15 Florence Agreement on Subregional Arms Control (1996), Article II.1. The Florence Agreement covers only armament holdings. However, it contains in an annex unilateral declarations committing the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to respect, on a purely voluntary basis, staff limitations set at 60,000, 65,000 and 124,339 respectively. 16 Florence Agreement (1996), Article IV. 17 Ibid. 18 The Republika Srpska must reduce its holdings of battle tanks from 400 to 137 and of artillery pieces from 1,000 to 500.  Chapter VIII   447

The Agreement bound the parties to carry out the agreed reductions in two phases, no later than 16 months after 1 July 1996 (Article V.4) under a strict and binding inspection regime.19 The calculation of the reductions for which the parties were responsible gave rise to some practical difficulties: in August 1996, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina accused the Republika Srpska of seeking to reduce its obligations in this regard.20

B. Monitoring the Human Rights Situation The Dayton Agreement ordered the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish a national Commission on Human Rights consisting of two substructures: an Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber.21 It also obliged the constitutive entities of the Republic to host and facilitate human rights monitoring activities undertaken by international intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations in their country.22 With the exception of the direct appointment of the Ombudsman by the Chairman-­in-Office of the OSCE,23 the Dayton Agreement did not grant the OSCE any exclusive role on this subject. It authorized the OSCE, as well as other relevant international organizations, “to monitor closely the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”24 Moreover, decisions published by the Human Rights Chamber were to be forwarded to the OSCE at the same time as to the Council of

19 It should be made clear that verification is the direct responsibility of the parties and not of the OSCE (Article IX.3). The role of the OSCE is limited to assisting the parties during the verification process – a provision made at the insistence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which outlined that it was still suspended from the OSCE. 20 See SRCC Journal No. 1 of 13 August 1996. On the sidelines of the Florence Agreement, the Americans were eager to endow the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the capacity to defend itself (subject to the breaking of relations between Sarajevo and Iran). But the conference convened in Ankara on 15 March 1996 to mobilize financial support from the international community to this end did not yield the desired results, because of the political reservations expressed by France and the United Kingdom. See the article by Rémy Ourdan, Le Monde, 24 July 1996. For the “Co-­Chairmen’s Statement” of the conference, see REF.INF/60/96 (26 March 1996). This setback did not prevent the Americans from setting up a special military assistance programme called the Train and Equip Program (REF.PC/490/96 of 17 July 1996). 21 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 6 on Human Rights, Articles II–XII. Annex 7 on Refugees and Displaced Persons also established a Commission for the review of claims relating to the property of refugees and displaced persons (Articles VII–XII). 22 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 6 on Human Rights, Article XIII. 23 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 6 on Human Rights, Article IV.2. From 21 December 1995, the Chairman-in-Office appointed Ambassador Gret Haller (Switzerland) as Ombudsman. 24 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 6 on Human Rights, Article XIII.2 (Annex 6, Article XI.5). Other interested institutions were the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union’s Control Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross and a number of NGOs, including Amnesty International and the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (for the role of the latter, see REF.INF/16/96 of 1 February 1996). International action is coordinated by a Human Rights Task Force and a Human Rights Co-ordination Centre reporting to the High Representative Carl Bildt. 448   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

Europe.25 These provisions did not imply that the OSCE had a negligible role: the creation of a politically neutral environment based upon the holding of “free, fair and democratic elections” and monitoring the human rights situation constituted a major element in the “democratization strategy” implemented by the OSCE on the ground. Within the OSCE Mission, the task of managing the human rights mandate was entrusted to a specialized unit with 40 staff.26 Prior to the elections in September 1996, the monitoring activities undertaken by the OSCE and by intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations had enabled a fairly comprehensive picture of the situation to be established.27

C. The Organization of “Free, Fair and Democratic Elections” Annex 3 of the Dayton Agreement anticipated the holding of “free, fair and democratic” elections (in the sense of the criteria set out in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Copenhagen Document) throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina within a period of six to nine months.28 The consultations, which were to make it possible to establish the institutions of a unified State, concerned the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (presidential and legislative elections), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (legislative, cantonal and municipal elections) and the Republika Srpska (presidential, legislative and municipal elections).29 The electoral lists were to be drawn up on the basis of the 1991 census.30 The OSCE faced the gargantuan task of preparing and organizing these ­elections, which were extraordinarily complex and involved no fewer than seven direct universal suffrage elections in a single round. To begin with, it was obliged to create (and chair through the intermediary of the Head of the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina) a “Provisional Election Commission” consisting of repre­ sentatives of the two entities in the country and international experts.31 The

25 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 6 on Human Rights, Article XI.5. 26 The Mission regularly reports on human rights issues. See REF.SEC/179/96 (4 April 1996), REF. SEC/180/96 (4 April 1996), REF.SEC/199/96 (15 April 1996), REF.SEC/213/96 (22 April 1996), REF.SEC/222/96 (25 April 1996), REF.SEC/255/96 (13 May 1996), REF.SEC/276/96 (20 May 1996), REF.SEC/303/96 (30 May 1996), REF.SEC/341/96 (18 June 1996), REF.SEC/379/96 (3 July 1996), REF.SEC/400/96 (15 July 1996), REF.SEC/418/96 (23 July 1996), REF.SEC/422/96 (8 August 1996), REF.SEC/440/96 (12 August 1996), REF.SEC/457/96 (20 August 1996), REF. SEC/485/96 (3 September 1996) and REF.SEC/511/96 (10 September 1996). 27 See the Ombudsman’s reports (REF.SEC/324/96 of 10 June 1996 and REF.SEC/450/96 of 15 August 1996) and the report submitted by Carl Bildt at the Florence Peace Implementation Council (PIC) (UN: S/1996/542 of 10 July 1996, Appendix II). See also the Chairman’s Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Council, Florence, 13–14 June 1996, §§ 30–36 (REF.INF/101/96 of 20 June 1996, UN: S/1996/446 of 18 June 1996). 28 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 3 on Elections, Article II.4. The provisions of the Copenhagen Document were mentioned in Article I.3 and reproduced in extenso as an attachment to Annex 3. 29 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 3, Article II.2. 30 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 3, Article IV.1. 31 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 3, Article III. . The Commission was “provisional” in that it had to give way to a permanent forum for subsequent elections (Article V).  Chapter VIII   449

Commission was to adopt rules regarding the registration of political parties and independent candidates, the eligibility of candidates and voters, the role of election observers, the electoral campaign and the establishment, publication and certification of definitive election results.32 It was also to supervise all aspects of the electoral process, ensure compliance with the electoral rules, take action on violation of electoral rules (including penalties) and accredit electoral observers.33 Technically speaking, the Mission performed a commendable job.34 It established the Provisional Election Commission at the end of January 1996 and the first electoral rules from mid February.35 Then, and in response to criticism from forces not represented within the Provisional Election Commission, it created a Political Parties Consultative Council, bringing together the members of the Commission and opposition movements.36 It created an Election Appeals Sub-­Commission. Above all, it established a Committee of Experts on freedom of the media.37 With the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), it defined the procedures for registering refugees. In political terms, the Mission strove to encourage the development of a neutral political environment, conducive to elections. To this end, it established a “democratization strategy” with twelve practical objectives including establishing rules to guarantee the right to anonymous voting, promoting freedom of expression and the press, encouraging freedom of association, ensuring freedom of movement, establishing an information and civic education programme, establishing procedures enabling refugees to exercise their right to vote, the ineligibility of people convicted of war crimes by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal, defining criteria for certifying the definitive results of the elections, and coordinating the work of international observers.38 In this context, it devoted considerable effort to promoting inter-ethnic dialogue between certain social groups: religious leaders, intellectuals, journalists, women and young people. Its involvement in plans to create an independent television station (Open Broadcast Network) and a mobile radio network (Free Elections Radio Network), the latter funded by Switzerland, should also be noted. After six months, it nonetheless appeared that the environment was far from being (or becoming) “politically neutral”. The question of whether the elections

32 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 3, Article III.1. 33 Dayton Agreement (1995), Annex 3, Article III.2. 34 The Mission benefited from the preliminary work undertaken by an expert meeting held in Stockholm on 15 and 16 January 1996 at the invitation of the Government of Sweden. See REF. PC/28/96 (18 January 1996). 35 Text of the electoral rules: REF.SEC/235/96 (3 May 1996) and REF.SEC/262/96 (14 May 1996). 36 See REF.SEC/175/96 (2 April 1996). 37 With headquarters in Sarajevo and offices in the Mission’s regional centres, the Committee of Experts developed standards for the media and journalists, rules on government relations with the media and an electoral code of conduct. 38 See REF.SEC/313/96 (4 June 1996). 450   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

should be held, postponed or even cancelled naturally arose during the session of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) organized in Florence on 13 and 14 June 1996, to assess the progress that had been accomplished in the six months following the Dayton Agreement.39 Ambassador Frowick recognized that the implementation of the civil aspects of the peace process left much to be desired. He n ­ onetheless considered that he should recommend to the current Swiss Chairmanship that elections be held in line with the Dayton timetable. He argued that while progress in the peace process was imperfect, it was nonetheless tangible: postponing the elections would compromise the entire peace process and jeopardize the future (particularly because the indispensable presence of the Implementation Force (IFOR) was time-bound).40 This point of view was shared by High Representative Bildt and by US Secretary of State Christopher but was not supported by NGOs.41 With the PIC having approved Ambassador Frowick’s position and before making a decision to approve the elections, the Swiss Chairman-in-Office decided to organize a special debate on the issue within the OSCE Permanent Council.42 At the end of this process, a consensus emerged in favour of holding the elections.43 On 25 June 1996, in a speech which was both grounded in reality yet moralistic, Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti announced his final decision. Having drawn an uncompromising picture of the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

39 The PIC is the successor to the Geneva International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, dissolved in the aftermath of the Dayton Agreement. Made up of the same participants as the Geneva Conference, the PIC was formally established by § 20 of the Conclusions of the Conference held at Lancaster House (London, 8–9 December 1995). The working groups of the Geneva Conference have not been dissolved; they continue to operate under the supervision of the PIC. For the text of the Conclusions of the London Conference, see REF.INF/272/95 (11 December 1995). 40 See REF.PC/371/96 (18 June 1996). Ambassador Frowick reiterated his position before the OSCE Permanent Council (REF.PC/385/96 of 20 June 1996). 41 See Carl Bildt, “The Bosnian Elections Must Proceed as Planned”, International Herald Tribune, 13 June 1996, and Warren Christopher, “Without Elections, There Will Be No Unified Bosnian State”, International Herald Tribune, 15–16 June 1996. Contrasting points of view are those of philanthropist George Soros (“Postpone the Bosnian Elections …”, The Wall Street Journal, 29 May 1996) and George Kenney, the former deputy chief of the Yugoslav desk in the State Department, who resigned in August 1992 in protest over US public policy (“Don’t Push the Nationalists into a Vote We’ll Regret”, Los Angeles Times (Washington edition), 24 May 1996). On the equally negative stance of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, see “Conditions Do Not Exist for Free and Fair Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (REF.SEC/286/96 of 24 May 1996). 42 “In the light of the statement made by the Head of the OSCE Mission, which the Council welcomed, it recommends to the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE that elections shall take place on 14 September in accordance with the timetable of the Peace Agreement … The Council therefore agrees that the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, in conjunction with the High Representative, should keep progress under review to give his decision on certification after discussion in the OSCE Permanent Council” (Chairman’s Conclusions of the Florence PIC, 13–14 June 1996, §§ 19 and 20, and REF.INF/101/96 of 20 June 1996). 43 For a summary of the debate, see REF.PC/390/96 (21 June 1996). For the fundamental issues raised by Switzerland, see REF.CIO/33/96 (20 June 1996).  Chapter VIII   451

(and admitting that democracy could not be established in a blink of an eye in a country with no tradition of democracy and prey to persistent ethnic hatred), he found that even minimally “free, fair and democratic” elections required certain minimum conditions that, in this case, were not in place. Nonetheless, he recognized that there were many arguments in support of a realistic decision, notably the need to preserve the dynamic created by the Dayton Agreement, to take advantage of the protective presence of the IFOR and to respect the will of the Bosnian stakeholders (illustrated by the registration of 49 political parties and 33 independent candidates). Ultimately, he considered that there was no other choice than to hold the elections on 14 September 1996.44 However, on 27 August 1996, Ambassador Frowick announced that the Provisional Election Commission had decided to postpone the municipal elections.45 This decision was justified by the observation of serious irregularities in the Serbian electoral lists. It should be noted that the electoral rules set by the Commission allowed refugees and displaced persons to vote either in the commune in which they were resident before the conflict broke out (which aimed at blocking the effects of ethnic cleansing) or, failing that, in the commune where they wished to settle. However, under the official pressure of the Republika Srpska and Belgrade, Serbian refugees were dissuaded from registering in their place of origin in favour of towns where Muslims had been in the majority prior to the civil war – such as Srebrenica and Brčko.46 Although welcomed in itself, this partial report (as well as the limitation on elective mandates in other elections to two years) did not, for all that, guarantee truly fair and democratic consultations. Indeed, freedom of movement in the country was non-existent. Six months after the Dayton Agreement, there was still no means of transport or telephone communication lines between the two territorial entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the authorities of the Republika Srpska had established mobile controls, thus creating (in violation of the Agreement) de facto borders: the former front lines became ethnic borders. In addition, freedom of association and expression remained largely fictional: all independent political life was repressed in the territories under Serb or Croat authority, while intolerance was growing among the Muslim population. Finally, of the 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons (more than half of the country’s population when the civil war broke out, amounting to around 20% of the electorate), only some 90,000 people had returned to their former homes, and where they had, it was in places where they

44 See REF.OIO/35/96/Rev.2 (25 June 1993). 45 See REF.SEO/476/96 (28 August 1996). See also REF.PC/530/96 (29 August 1996). That decision was consistent with the Dayton Agreement, which provided for cantonal and municipal elections to be held “if feasible” (Annex 3, Article II, § 2). 46 In some areas that were ethnically cleansed by Serbs or Croats, access to employment, right to housing and delivery of humanitarian aid were directly managed by the nationalist parties and, as a result, tied to voter registration procedures. See the article by Rémy Ourdan in Le Monde 14 September 1996. 452   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

were pre­viously in the ethnic majority. Voting in the place of origin became literally im­possible.47 The political success of the dynamic created by the Dayton Agreement presupposed two fundamental conditions which, in reality, were lacking. The first was the presence of a civil “proconsul” with the necessary powers to establish a unified State – and not a mere coordinator like Carl Bildt.48 The second was the effective eviction of ultra-nationalists and their replacement with moderates from the three camps: in virtue of the regulations enacted by the OSCE, leaders accused of war crimes had certainly been removed from the electoral lists, but they continued to govern from the shadows without fear of IFOR, whose instructions excluded any measures to attempt to capture them.49 Those in favour of the elections at any cost advocated that they enabled the establishment of legal institutions which would set limits and constraints on the activities of the ultra-nationalists. In one sense, the argument could be valid. But it overlooked the fact that elections taking place under such conditions would strengthen the parties favourable to ethnic division and would give them a certain democratic legitimacy. The elections took place, as planned, on 14 September 1996.50 But they only strengthened the position of the ultra-nationalists and the division of the country into three ethnic archipelagos. Such a result reflected the very problem of the Dayton Agreement. The Dayton Agreement was based on a seeming compromise between uniting and splitting Bosnia and Herzegovina, but within which division was real and unity remained fictional.51 In other words, it envisaged Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single and divisible Republic, with 70% controlled by the Serbs and Croats. The Dayton Agreement represented the least worst compromise for the Muslims. Given the ratio of military forces in 1995, the Muslims were unable to choose between a fair and an unfair settlement – but simply between their disappearance as an autonomous nation and an unjust settlement.

47 On the eve of the elections, some 641,000 refugees residing in 55 countries had been legally registered to vote. See REF.SEO/462/96 (20 August 1996). 48 As recognized by a senior NATO official, “we should have had some kind of a proconsul during the transition period with dictatorial powers to force all the sides to unify transportation laws, car license plates, phone service, utilities, air traffic control and all the other things that lead to a unified State” (Chris Hedges, International Herald Tribune, 11 September 1996). 49 “It was as if the Allies had promised to reconstruct Germany after World War II but had let Hitler’s heirs run Bavaria” (Anthony Lewis, “Strengthening the War Criminals”, International Herald Tribune, 14–15 September 1996). 50 Ambassador Frowick merely confirmed that the elections had been “reasonably democratic” (REF.PC/615/96 of 30 September 1996). For the election results, see REF.PC/600/96 (26 September 1996). 51 On this point, see Paul Garde’s interview in Le Monde, 28 November 1995. For a detailed and particularly well-informed analysis of the negotiation of the Dayton Agreement, see Anthony Borden and Drago Hedl, “How the Bosnians Were Broken: Twenty-One Days at Dayton: A Special Report”, War Report, no. 39 (February–March 1996), pp. 26–43.  Chapter VIII   453

In the wake of the elections, which demonstrated the triumph of the forces in favour of ethnic separation, it is difficult to believe that the constitutional structure – fragile and complex – planned by the Dayton Agreement could operate. In addition, because “Herzeg Bosnia” has not really been dissolved, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a mere shell and the Muslims are confined to an enclave between an ethnic Greater Serbia and an ethnic Greater Croatia. As the success of any federalist formula depends on a minimum of shared desire to live together, the ideal of a multi-ethnic and multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina (in other words, the equivalent of a micro-Yugoslavia) now appears to be compromised, if not impossible to achieve. In any case, the OSCE’s task in Bosnia-Herzegovina has more than likely just begun.

2. Developing a Security Model for the Twenty-First Century Work on the Model continued not only within the “Security Model Committee” but also as part of the Forum for Security Co-operation, the Senior Council, the Economic Forum and the Mediterranean Contact Group.52 It was marked by taking the Mediterranean dimension into account, formulating proposals on strengthening the OSCE, and easing tensions around the architecture of European security. By mid1996, however, the outline of the Model continued to be rather vague.

A. Taking the Mediterranean Dimension into Account On the initiative of the European Union, the Contact Group with the ­Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation devoted an entire debate to the Mediterranean dimension of security in Europe. Held in Vienna on 1 and 2 July 1996, the meeting was organized as a specific contribution to the work of the OSCE on the Security ­Model. It enabled the systematic identification of the “risks and challenges” existing in the Mediterranean: terrorism, violations of human rights relating to intolerance and fanaticism, cultural and religious stereotypes generating inaccurate perceptions, the definitive non-regulation of the Israeli–Arab conflict, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the increasing scarcity of water resources, and the socioeconomic disparities between the two sides of the region. However, the meeting was unable to identify a comprehensive approach to Euro-Mediterranean security. Given the shared issues which underlay most risks and challenges identified, the participants agreed that co-ordination of their national policies was desirable, but they recognized that the specific characteristics of the Mediterranean/Middle East region were an obstacle to implementing a security model across the entire Euro-Mediterranean. They contented themselves with envisaging, in certain areas of major interest, pragmatic activities such as

52 For a list of the contributions made within these different forums, see REF.SEC/206/96/Rev.1 (11 July 1996) and REF.PC/265/96/Rev.3 (23 July 1996). It should also be mentioned that at its Fifth Annual Session, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly devoted the debates of one of the General Committees to the Security Model: see REF.SEC/365/96 (27 June 1996) (report by Bruce George). 454   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

creating a database on terrorism, establishing instruments to promote human rights at the national level (human rights commissions, independent NGOs), and adopting cultural confidence-building measures (exchanges of television programmes, revision of school textbooks, training teachers, etc.).53 Malta once more placed the idea of a Mediterranean Stability Pact on the table.54

B. Proposals to Strengthen the OSCE As the deadline of the Lisbon Summit approached (December 1996), a number of ideas were put forward with a view to improving the structures and functions of the OSCE. Three series of structural proposals merit attention. First, the European Union suggested attributing international legal personality to the OSCE, at least for the purposes of practical activities relating to crisis and conflict management.55 Approved by Russia and a few Central and Eastern European countries, this point of view was by no means unanimous.56 Second, in terms of streamlining the OSCE’s structures, the European Union recommended the redefinition of the role and functions of the Senior Council.57 Going further, Russia once again put forward the idea (deemed unacceptable by many countries) of creating a pan-European executive council, comparable to the United Nations Security Council.58 Third, some States stressed that the OSCE’s emergency mechanisms (those with the objective of convening political consultations of meetings in specialized fields) had lost much of their relevance since the institutionalization of the Permanent Council. Consequently, they felt that new mechanisms had become necessary – in particular with a view to monitoring the implementation of OSCE commitments or sanctioning non-compliance with them (beginning with the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security), evaluating ­peacekeeping operations undertaken by a third party, as well as the electoral

53 For a summary of the debates, see REF.PC/432/96/Rev.1 (13 September 1996). EU’s contributions: REF.PC/417/96 (1 July 1996), REF.PC/428/96 (2 July 1996) and REF.PC/431/96 (2 July 1996). Egypt’s contributions: REF.PC/419/96 (1 July 1996), REF.PC/525/96 (27 August 1996) and REF. PC/526/96 (27 August 1996). Israel’s contribution: REF.PC/429/96 (27 August 1996). Turkey’s contribution (on terrorism): REF.PC/426/96 (2 July 1996). 54 See REF.PC/290/96 (7 May 1996). Malta had first put forward this idea at the Paris Final Conference on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (March 1995), and then as part of the process initiated by the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in November 1995. 55 See the following proposals put forward by the EU and some participating States: REF. PC/516/95 (19 September 1995), p. 2; REF.PC/523/95 (19 September 1995), § 4; REF. PC/534/95 (20 September 1995), p. 2; REF.SC/116/95 (26 October 1995), p. 4; REF.MC/54/95 (7 December 1995), p. 2; REF.SC/7/96 (21 March 1996), p. 3. For its part, France wanted to go so far as to “endow the OSCE with the attributes of a true organization while preserving the benefit of a simple structure’s flexibility” (REF.MC/24/95 of 8 December 1995, p. 2). 56 On Russia’s position, see REF.SC/11/96 (21 March 1996), p. 4. 57 See REF.PC/252/96 (17 April 1996), § 38 (European Union). See also REF.PC/468/96 (12 July 1996) (Baltic States). 58 See REF.SC/11/96 (21 March 1996), pp. 2–3.  Chapter VIII   455

observation reports established by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).59 In terms of crisis and conflict management, the European Union considered that the Chairman-in-Office should be encouraged to intervene more often as a “facilitator” between the parties, directly or through the intermediary of Personal Representatives; it also spoke out in favour of strengthening the political role of the Secretary General.60 On the chapter on peacekeeping, the European Union recommended clarification of the issue of peacekeeping operations deployed by a third party; it also considered it desirable that the OSCE could undertake such operations itself (either alone or through “subcontracting”).61 Arguing that military security issues in the post-Cold War period were increasingly regional and local, various participating States suggested further regionalizing the OSCE’s activities on CSBMs and arms control,62 including through round tables formerly organized as part of the Stability Pact. On the subject of the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act (Helsinki Decalogue), Russia suggested – to near unanimous scepticism – that discussions take place on the possibility of reconciling the requirements of the principle of the territorial integrity of States and those of the principle of the self-determination of peoples, it being nonetheless understood that self-determination could not be absolute.63 Turkey felt that such a re-examination would duplicate the work of the United Nations.64 Meanwhile, Armenia considered that the two principles should not be considered as fixed once and for all and that application should be conceived of as flexibly as possible, depending on the parameters of each conflict. Thus, territorial integrity should not be promoted to the detriment of human rights: giving it preference in all cases would not necessarily contribute towards the stability of the State in question or the region as a whole.65

59 See REF.PC/531/95 (19 September 1995), p. 2 (Italy); REF.SC/122/95 (3 November 1995), p. 8 (Russia); REF.PC/252/96 (17 April 1996), §§ 5 and 12 (European Union); and REF.PC/468/96 (12 July 1996), p. 2 (Baltic States). 60 See REF.PC/477/95 (13 September 1995), pp. 16–17 (European Union); SC/23/96 (21 March 1996), p. 2 (Norway); and REF.PC/252/96 (17 April 1996), § 37 (European Union). 61 See REF.PC/523/95 (19 September 1995) (Netherlands); REF.PC/531/95 (19 September 1995), p. 3 (Italy); REF.MC/54/95 (7 December 1995) (Netherlands); and REF.PC/252/96 (17 April 1996), § 7 (European Union). 62 See REF.SC/9/95 (31 March 1995), p. 4 (Russia); REF.PC/477/95 (13 September 1995), p. 16 (European Union); REF.PC/339/96 (28 May 1996), p. 4 (Ukraine); and REF.PC/468/96 (12 July 1996), p. 3 (Baltic States). 63 See REF.PC/502/95 (18 September 1995), p. 2 and SC/122/95 (3 November 1995), p. 6. 64 See REF.PC/495/95 (15 September 1995), p. 6. 65 See REF.SC/121/95 (27 October 1995). Azerbaijan supported an opposing point of view: REF.PC/432/95 (29 August 1995); REF.PC/630/95 (23 October 1995); and REF.SC/127/95 (27 October 1995). 456   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

Finally, it should be noted that Russia was the only country to put forward detailed proposals aiming at developing the economic dimension of the OSCE.66 It suggested preparing a Code of Conduct of States in the Economic and Social Field, aimed at “ensuring a stable, equal and mutually beneficial co-operation, creating conditions for the efficient operation of the market economy, eliminating as early as possible discriminatory practices that still prevail in the legislation of some countries as well as solving migration problems and improving the social and economic status of minorities.”67 The principle of extending the economic dimension of the OSCE on such a basis was received with interest by the United States, Ukraine and the Baltic States.68 However, it was accused of being unrealistic by Germany on the basis of the following arguments: “we doubt whether the OSCE is in a position to develop an economic early warning system. Even the IMF failed to foresee the Mexican crisis … The proposal that the OSCE should contribute to the reduction of discrimination in commerce and economies ignores the fact that the OSCE has no responsibility in international trade policy and therefore no instruments with which to operate in this area … The OSCE lacks the expertise, infrastructure and financial resources needed in order to undertake operational mandates in the areas mentioned in the Russian proposal.”69

C. The Relaxation of the Discussion on the Architecture of European Security From the onset of the Security Model exercise, the theme of the architecture of European security was the subject of two opposing approaches. Concerned with the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance (a concern at the very origin of the Model project) and manifestly wishing to place constraints on the role of NATO in post-Cold War Europe, Russia recommended the development of formal mechanisms establishing a division of work between the security organizations in the region.70 However, nearly all the other OSCE countries wanted to take a purely pragmatic approach implying co-operation on a case-by-case basis,

66 See the proposal entitled “Outline of an Economic Component of a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe of the 21st Century” (REF.PC/329/96 of 24 May 1996) and “Indicators of Early Identification and Warning of Crisis Phenomena in the States of the OSCE Region” (REF. PC/414/96 of 28 June 1996). 67 REF.SC/11/96 (21 March 1996), p. 3. Such an instrument was to be accompanied by a “Code of Environmental Ethic and Liability for Environmental Damage”, see REF.SC/11/96 (21 March 1996). 68 See REF.SC/115/95 (26 October 1995), p. 4 (United States); REF.PC/339/96 (28 May 1996), p. 4 (Ukraine); and REF.PC/468/96 (12 July 1996), p. 2 (Baltic States). 69 REF.PC/329/96 (24 May 1996). For a summary table of proposals on the integration of the economic dimension issues into the work on the Model, see REF.SEC/427/96 (31 July 1996). 70 Russia suggested “[the] convening in 1997–1998 of a European Conference entitled ‘Europe of the 21st Century’ to be attended by the OSCE participating States and existing multilateral structures, with the aim of establishing and launching mechanisms of interagency division of labor” (REF.SEC/11/96 of 21 March 1996, p. 4). It should be noted that Ukraine supported, to some extent, the idea of the division of labour (REF.PC/339/96 of 28 May 1996, p. 2).  Chapter VIII   457

without a preconceived or hierarchical division of work. In mid 1996, this politically charged issue began to relax as a consequence of two external factors. The first was the process of implementing the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina through a galaxy of international organizations (OSCE, European Union, Council of Europe, not to mention the United Nations), with NATO forming the central core. This experience showed that wide-scale co-operation undertaken by the region’s security institutions, in a spirit of complementarity and on the basis of the principle of comparative advantage, could be successful overall. The second factor was the agreement on NATO reform which emerged from the North Atlantic Council held in Berlin on 3 June 1996. The procedures adopted in this regard can be reduced to two key points.71 First, while retaining its traditional role of collective defence, NATO would announce a readjustment of its command structure and operational missions with a view to being able to show, with greater flexibility and mobility, operations which did not fall within Article V of the ­Treaty of Washington (such as IFOR) and included conflict prevention as well as crisis management. Second, while reaffirming the unaltered validity of the transatlantic connection, the Berlin Final Communiqué set out the bases for constructing a “European Security and Defence Identity” (ESDI) within the structure of the North Atlantic Alliance. NATO’s new approach was to be enacted through the “Combined Joint Task Forces” (CJTFs), facilitating the “mounting of NATO contingency operations, the use of separable but not separate military capabilities in operations led by the WEU, and the participation of nations outside the Alliance in operations such as IFOR.”72 In other words, NATO decided to supplement its original remit with a co-operative security mandate, while developing a European military pillar. These provisions not only heralded a change in the North Atlantic Alliance to meet the new realities of the post-Cold War. They also sealed the Franco-­American reconciliation within NATO. In effect, they were the product of the rapprochement which France had initiated with NATO in December 1995. In the wake of his election, President Jacques Chirac became aware that the European countries had neither the will nor the financial means to develop a security and defence policy independently of the United States, no more than European industry could rival that of the US in terms of advanced military technology. Had the Yugoslav conflict not accurately shown that no significant military operation could be mounted without American military and diplomatic power? The French President also realized that the transatlantic quarrel, opened by General de Gaulle in 1966 and continued by his successors, damaged the credibility of French diplomacy in ­Europe. France was permanently suspected by its partners of seeking to distance the Americans from Europe and to dissolve the transatlantic alliance, a situation

71 For the text of the Final Communiqué of the Berlin Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, see the NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1996), pp. 30–35. 72 Final Communiqué of the Berlin Ministerial Meeting (3 June 1996), § 6, second indent. 458   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

which was even more anachronistic given that since the end of the Cold War Europe had more to fear from isolationism that from Washington’s “hegemony”. In contrast to his predecessor, President Chirac drew the logical consequences of this state of affairs. He concluded that it was within NATO that action was needed to reform the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and to achieve a rebalance in favour of Europe. In other words, France rejected the idea of a European Security and Defence Identity within the Western European Union (WEU) – an organization that included some States which did not belong to NATO or even to the ­European Union. It understood that the WEU could become the armed wing of the European Union (as anticipated in the Maastricht Treaty) only after it had proven itself as the European pillar of NATO.73 The decisions taken in Berlin could not fail to have an impact on the OSCE. First, the end of the transatlantic dispute removed the obstacles (raised by France) to a real political interaction between the OSCE and NATO.74 But, above all, it raised the hypothesis that had, to this point, held the OSCE hostage to the double issue of reform and the relationship between the roles of NATO and the WEU. Second, the “Europeanization” of the North Atlantic Alliance and the extension of its roles beyond collective defence dedramatized the issue of the enlargement of NATO. As such, following the Berlin Council, Russia began to say that its opposition aimed less at the principle of this enlargement than at its practical consequences – that is to say, the deployment of military infrastructures (in particular nuclear ones) close to its own borders.75 For its part, the United States

73 The deployment of IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a further factor underpinning the evolution of French politics: France could not influence the decision-making process concerning IFOR (which it was keen to participate in) without joining NATO’s command structure. On this point, see the Baumel Report to the Assembly of the WEU, Organising security in Europe – Defence aspects, Doc. 1510 of 8 February 1996, § 39. 74 As a result of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, this interaction has already become a reality. The Final Communiqué of the Berlin Ministerial Meeting states that through its Verification Co-ordination Section NATO has provided the OSCE with some practical support in helping establish measures to verify the provisions of the Dayton Agreement on Arms Control (§ 21, second indent). It also indicates that contacts have been established between the North Atlantic Council and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, including for reciprocal high-level representation at ministerial meetings (§ 21, fourth indent). 75 On this point, see Paul Garde’s interview in Le Monde, 28 November 1995. Some experts at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) deny that the Berlin decisions foreshadow the “Europeanization” of NATO. Philip H. Gordon (“Europeanization of NATO: A Convenient Myth”, International Herald Tribune, 7 June 1996) sees it as a myth, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is unlikely to exist other than on paper and that Europeans are reluctant to develop their military capabilities. In addition, he believes that the Berlin compromise was concluded under the conditions set out by the Americans, who do not really intend to press for the Europeanization of NATO: “Whether Democratic or Republican, what the United States supports is European support for U.S. policies and interests, not some generic idea about whether the Europeans are unified.” Under the Berlin compromise, No military operation under the strategic direction of the WEU could indeed take place without the prior approval of Washington. In practice, however, the real difficulty would probably be less linked to the US veto than to the political incapacity of the European Union to decide on a specific operation within NATO.  Chapter VIII   459

launched the idea of a formal charter between Russia and NATO, negotiation of which would go hand in hand with the process of enlarging the North Atlantic Alliance.76

D. State of the Security Model on the eve of the Lisbon Summit On the eve of the Atlantic Council in Berlin, Russia once again defended the idea of a “European Security Charter” (preferably with a legal foundation) offering security guarantees, setting out the respective roles of the existing regional and subregional security institutions and endowing the OSCE with a pan-European Security Council.77 The European Union, supported by most Central and Eastern European countries, stuck to the idea of a “Platform for Co-operative Security” which broadened and deepened the knowledge amassed by the OSCE since 1975, in such a way as to define a shared security space, without any new divisions or areas of influence in the region.78 The development of a Security Model logically implied four key steps: elucidating the concept of indivisible and Co-operative global security; identifying the security risks and challenges facing the region; strengthening the role of the OSCE; and defining the type of interaction between the security organizations in the ­region. In conceptual terms, the exercise did not appear to be innovative. It would not forge any revolutionary or even hitherto unseen concepts. The exercise was more convincing on the chapter of European security threats: it enabled the establishment of a fairly comprehensive inventory (with the advantage that it remains permanently open) of the risks and challenges in the OSCE region, including the Mediterranean.79 In terms of strengthening the OSCE, the proposals set out during the debate were more realistic and precise than before. They could provide the basis for an outline with a view to developing a possible “pan-European security identity”. Finally, in terms of the architecture of European security, it is obvious that the Security Model would not lead to the establishment of a superstructure. It would codify existing practice – based on the primacy of the United Nations Security Council and the egalitarian coexistence of multiple political and economic regional and subregional security structures.

76 See the article by Steven Erlanger in the International Herald Tribune, 7–8 September 1996. 77 See REF.SC/11/96 (21 March 1996), pp. 2–3 and REF.PC/536/96 (30 August 1996). 78 See REF.PC/252/96 (17 April 1996), §§ 3 and 4 (European Union). 79 In addition to the general inventory of risks and challenges developed through the work on the Model (see in this volume, p.166 (n. 246), the OSCE States have also undertaken to compile – within the Forum for Security Co-operation – a special inventory of military risks and challenges. See REF.FSC/190/95 (2 July 1995) reviewed by Germany: Rev.1 (21 July 1995) and by Russia: REF.FSC/68/95 (4 October 1995). 460   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

II. The Institutional and Diplomatic Evolution of the OSCE For the OSCE, the year was marked by the appointment of a new Secretary General, the accession of the Principality of Andorra, preparations for the 1996 Review Meeting and Summit, the development of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, the continuation of the process of integrating the countries of Central Asia, and the accentuation of the political profile of the Parliamentary Assembly.

A. Appointment of a New Secretary General As Secretary General Höynck did not wish to seek a renewal of his mandate, which expired on 14 June 1996, the Government in Budapest officially presented, in June 1995, the candidature of Ambassador István Gyarmati. The initiative was warmly received by all participating States, with the exception of two countries which had numerically significant Hungarian national minorities: Romania and Slovakia. Not without bitterness, the Hungarian Government withdrew its candidature in April 1996.80 This move encouraged the presentation of new national candidates: those of the Italian Giancarlo Aragona, the Ukrainian Yuriy Kostenko and – in the name of Central Europe – the Pole Jerzy Nowak.81 The OSCE Permanent Council decided in favour of the Italian candidate and appointed Giancarlo Aragona (a diplomat with experience in Middle East issues and NATO) as Secretary General, with a three- year mandate beginning on 15 June 1996.82

B. Accession of the Principality of Andorra Located between France and Spain, the Principality of Andorra had never previously been involved in the work of the Helsinki process. The reason was simple: until very recently, it could not claim to be a sovereign State. It was only a sui generis entity under the sovereignty of two co-­princes: the President of France and the Spanish Bishop of Urgell! It therefore had no diplomatic relations with any country and did not belong to any international organization.83 The obstacle to its participation was lifted only in 1993, following the conclusion of an international agreement on good-neighbourly relations and friendly co-operation concluded with France and Spain. Having become a subject of international law, the Principality established diplomatic relations with around fifty countries and accessed various international institutions (UN, UNESCO, International

80 See REF.PC/275/96 (25 April 1996). 81 See REF.PC/304/96 (17 May 1996), REF.PC/336/96 (14 May 1996) and REF.PC/315/96 (20 May 1996). 82 See Permanent Council Decision No. 123 of 31 May 1996. This decision came into force (under the silence procedure) on 8 June 1996. 83 Until 1993, the Principality maintained only passive consular relations with a handful of European States (Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom) and American countries (Argentina, United States, Venezuela). Its own representation was provided by the French or Spanish consular services. See the Pontillon and de Puig report to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the “Situation in Andorra”, PACE Doc. 6146 of 16 November 1996.  Chapter VIII   461

Telecommunication Union, Council of Europe, World Intellectual Property Organization) and, ultimately, decided to join the OSCE.84 On 8 January 1996, the Principality of Andorra communicated to the Swiss Chairmanship its acceptance of all the commitments and responsibilities contained in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and all the other final texts of the OSCE; it also stressed its determination to align its policy with them.85 Because the communication did not specify either the motivation behind nor the aim of such acceptance, the Chairman-in-Office, Flavio Cotti, recommended that its signatory (the Andorran Minister of Foreign Affairs) make contact with the Secretariat in Vienna to fully understand the implications of accession into the OSCE. He did, however, indicate that, for all practical purposes, acceptance of the final texts of the OSCE was a necessary but not sufficient condition – in the sense that any applicant for accession also had to invite a Mission responsible for assessing the degree of compliance with pan- European commitments within its territory.86 Andorra confirmed its desire to enter the OSCE and the Chairman-in-Office created a Fact-Finding Mission. Following a brief visit on 18 March 1996, the Mission concluded that “Andorra may be said to be well advanced as regards compliance with OSCE standards and commitments” and issued a positive opinion concerning the Principality’s application.87 It officially became an OSCE participating State following a decision of the Permanent Council on 25 April 1996.88 The accession of the Principality of Andorra (covering around 460 km2 and with a population of 60,000 inhabitants) brought the number of micro-States in the OSCE to five.

84 In 1989, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe came to the conclusion that the accession of Andorra to the European Parliament could not be envisaged – not only for international legal reasons, but also because of major shortcomings in respect of civil, economic and social rights (ibid., §§ 114–116). Indeed, with Spanish, French and Portuguese residents making up 54.5%, 7.5% and 4.3% of the population respectively (not counting some 4,000 irregular workers), the Principality was in the situation – arguably unique worldwide – of a country whose foreign population far exceeded the national population. For reasons related to demography and the protection of national identity, Andorra did not grant workers the right of association nor the right to strike (ibid., §§ 8 and 111). Following the adoption of a modern democratic constitution in March 1993, this hurdle was also cleared. 85 See REF.CIO/16/96 (23 February 1996). 86 Ibid. It should be noted that the response of the Chairman-in-Office mentioned the need to invite a Fact-Finding Mission, rather than a rapporteur mission, as had been previous OSCE practice. It also specified that “the mission, in fact may or may not be sent as deemed appropriate at the discretion of the executive organs” – which a posteriori justified not sending missions to the three Baltic States at the time of their accession. 87 See REF.PC/223/16/96 (26 March 1996). It should be noted that the dispatch of the Mission was the result of a direct decision of the Chairman-in-Office, not the OSCE Permanent Council. 88 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 113 of 12 October 1995. The following month, the Permanent Council set Andorra’s financial contribution to the OSCE at 0.125% of its budget, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 120 of 14 May 1996. 462   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

C. The Programme of the 1996 Review Meeting and Summit The OSCE Review Meeting took place between 4 and 22 November 1996. Its agenda set it apart from the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (1992) and the Budapest Review Conference (1994) in more than one way. First, in contrast to previous practice, it was held at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna.89 Second, the work was more streamlined than before, within only two working groups – one dealing with examining the implementation of principles and commitments related to the three current dimensions of the OSCE (politico-­ military aspects, the economic dimension, the human dimension) and the other devoted to the examination of the organization’s activities, institutions and instruments, including relations with the outside world (Mediterranean, Japan, Republic of Korea, Parliamentary Assembly, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs) – and, for the first time in such a clear way, the administrative, financial and technical aspects of how the OSCE operated. It should also be noted that the agenda anticipated that the Review Meeting would open with a declaration from the Chairman-in-Office (whose key role was once again established) and would include the presentation of a formal report not only from the Secretary General of the OSCE but also from the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Director of the ODIHR and the President of the Forum for Security Co-­ operation. Third, it stressed that the “Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation” and Japan had been authorized to attend and to present contributions to the plenary as well as to appropriate sessions of the working groups.90 Fourth, the OSCE had requested contributions from around fifteen international institutions, including (exceptionally, given their participation in the joint effort to implement the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Review Meeting would also be open to participation from NGOs (including through contributions) on work relating to the economic dimension, the human dimension and OSCE operations in Bosnia, but not yet on work relating to the politico-military dimension. Finally, the Pact on Stability in Europe, which had become an integral part of the OSCE’s preventive diplomacy mechanisms since it had been accepted as the monitoring instrument, was the subject of a separate item on the Review Meeting agenda.91

89 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 114 of 15 April 1996. For the Agenda of the Meeting, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 137 of 19 September 1996. 90 In contrast, the Republic of Korea had been invited to attend the Meeting as an observer; it is authorized to present contributions to the plenary only. 91 Signed in Paris on 25 March 1995, the Pact on Stability in Europe includes a Political Declaration, an inventory of good-neighbourly agreements and a list of accompanying measures taken by the European Union in support of the aforementioned inventory (for the text of the Pact, see DOC.509/95 of 22 March 1995). See also DOC.541/95 (23 March 1995). The OSCE officially  Chapter VIII   463

The third post-communist OSCE Summit took place in Lisbon on 2 and 3 December 1996.92 There were three innovative items on the agenda: first, the presentation, by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly, of an opening speech (following those from the host country, the outgoing Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary-General of the UN) – thus confirming the growing interaction between the OSCE and the Assembly; second, the invitation to Heads of State or Government from the Partners for Co-operation (Mediterranean and non-­ Mediterranean) to make a statement during the Summit; and finally, the submission of written contributions from intergovernmental institutions already invited to participate in the Vienna Review Meeting.93

D. The Development of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue The slow but steady integration of the Mediterranean dimension into the OSCE was undoubtedly one of the clearest examples of the changes it underwent in 1996. Indeed, the dialogue with the “Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation” (formerly the “non-participating Mediterranean States”) became continuous, structured, substantial and interactive, characteristics which, shortly before, had been totally lacking from the Mediterranean dimension of the OSCE. The informal working group, established in Vienna in line with the decisions of Budapest in 1994, now became the focal point. The dialogue which emerged focused primarily on the problem of terrorism, as well as the possibility of launching a process in the region comparable to the Pact on Stability in Europe or to create preventive diplomacy mechanisms inspired by those of the OSCE. During 1996, it progressed with the seminar organized in Israel on the “OSCE as a Platform for Dialogue and the Fostering of Norms of Behaviour” (Tel Aviv, 2–4 June 1996)94 as well as with the special meeting of the Working Group on examining the risks and challenges of security in Europe from the Mediterranean

took note of the Pact and agreed to be its depositary and monitoring instrument, see Permanent Council: Decisions No. 29 of 23 March 1995 and No. 63 of 25 July 1995. As a result, participating States were invited to submit for registration to the Vienna Secretariat the agreements mentioned in the Pact and those which they would conclude in the same spirit in the future. It was also agreed that the OSCE would assist interested participating States in organizing round-table conferences to implement the principles of the Pact (a provision about which Poland and Turkey had reservations; see Permanent Council: Decision No. 63 of 25 July 1995, Annex. On the monitoring of the Pact, see REF.PC/205/96 (19 March 1996) (Denmark), REF.SEC/131/96 (14 March 1996) (Estonia), REF.PC/251/96 (17 April 1996) (Slovakia), REF.SEC/229/96 (30 April 1996) (Slovakia), REF.SEC/302/96 (29 May 1996) (Bulgaria), REF.PC/396/96 (25 June 1996) (Brussels Commission), and REF.PC/406/96 (27 June 1996) (Denmark). On the extension of the Pact to the Balkans, see footnote 207 of this chapter. 92 A brief meeting, also held in Lisbon from 25 to 29 November 1996, preceded it. See Permanent Council: Decision No. 114 of 25 April 1996. 93 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 135 of 18 July 1996. 94 For the Consolidated Summary of the Tel Aviv Seminar (in which Algeria did not take part), see REF.SEC/363/96 (25 June 1996). This meeting was a follow-up to the previous seminar on the OSCE experience in the field of CSBMs held in Egypt (Cairo, 26–28 September 1995). 464   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

(Vienna, 1 and 2 July 1996). The latter session represented a certain qualitative jump in the sense that it consecrated the Mediterranean dimension being officially taken into account in work on the OSCE’s Security Model.95 Finally, it should be noted that the Heads of State or Government of the Mediterranean partners were invited to give a statement to the Lisbon Summit in December 1996. The OSCE’s new Mediterranean dimension has perhaps continued to fall short of that of the European Union since the process of the Barcelona Conference (November 1995). It compares even less favourably with those of the WEU, the Council of Europe and NATO. Currently, its evolution is marked by the growing interest of the OSCE in the Middle East (more than North Africa) and the awareness that the characteristics of the Mediterranean–Middle East region are an obstacle to a Euro-Mediterranean model of global security.

E. Continuing the Process of Integrating Central Asian States As part of the strategy to integrate the five Central Asian Republics, the Permanent Council prolonged the mandate of the Tashkent Liaison Office until 1 July 1998 and assigned it an additional member of staff specializing in issues around the human dimension.96 Beyond the practical need to encourage the countries in question to make a greater contribution to the OSCE’s debates and activities, the strategy aimed to consolidate regional stability by promoting respect for human rights, developing democratic institutions and encouraging the market economy. In addition to disseminating OSCE documents in Russian, this consisted primarily in organizing seminars responding to the direct needs of the target countries.97 In addition and to a certain extent, initiatives affecting all countries of the ­Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) can also be considered as falling within the OSCE’s Asian strategy.98

95 See REF.PC/432/96 (3 June 1996). 96 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 118 of 12 October 1995. For the Office’s reports, see REF. SEC/248/96 (9 May 1996), REF.SEC/339/96 (18 June 1996), REF.SEC/344/96 (18 June 1996) and REF.SEC/474/96 (27 August 1996). For the Office’s budget, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 129 of 27 June 1996. 97 The OSCE thus organized seminars on building harmonious inter-ethnic relations in the newly independent States (Almaty, 28–29 February 1996); comprehensive security and regional challenge (Tashkent, 23 April 1996); economic and democratic confidence-building (Dushanbe, 24–26 April 1996); national human rights institutions (Tashkent, 11–13 September 1996); and promoting sustainable environmental development in the Aral sea region (Tashkent, 30 October–1 November 1996). For the Consolidated Summary of the seminars held in Tashkent and Dushanbe in April 1996, see REF.SEC/245/96/ (8 May 1996). 98 In this regard, it is worth highlighting the Seminar on a Framework for Private Sector Development, Industrial Co-operation and Direct Investment in the CIS Countries (Minsk, 25–26 September 1996), and in particular the Conference to Address the Problems of Refugees, Displaced Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary Displacement and Returnees in the CIS Countries (Geneva, 30–31 May 1996). Jointly organized by the ODIHR, UNHCR and the IOM, the Geneva conference aimed to help countries in the region cope with 9 million refugees and displaced persons (the largest population displacement in the OSCE area since 1945) and to prevent flows of that kind in the future. For the Programme of Action adopted in Geneva (with interpretative statements by Estonia and Latvia), see REF.OD/26/96/Rev.1 (5 June 1996) (UN: CISCONF/1996/5  Chapter VIII   465

As there has been a visible improvement in the degree of participation of the countries in the region, it can be said that the OSCE’s efforts have not been in vain. It is also clear that the OSCE – an institution with purely Co-operative methods – was able to neither avoid nor stop former Soviet Central Asia’s slide towards ­authoritarianism. Indeed, in some countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), the President’s mandate was prolonged simply on the basis of an approved referendum (as during the Soviet era) by more than 90% of the votes. In some instances, Presidents granted themselves broad powers officially allowing them to fight against corruption and to better control the economy (in Kyrgyzstan) or to organize elections from which the opposition is banned (Tajikistan). The restrictions on the OSCE’s role in Asia remain clearest in Tajikistan, a country where the work of the Mission of Long Duration was not the most successful. Five years after the disintegration of the USSR, the countries of Central Asia (which became sovereign States for the first time in their history) tentatively sought their national direction – either unilaterally or in a concerted way. Thus, Turkmenistan chose to grant itself, through legislation, a permanently neutral status which was approved by the United Nations General Assembly.99 Others (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan) set off to create a “shared economic area”.100 Keen to diversify their external relations in the region, that is to say, to avoid a tête-à-tête with Moscow, some (in this case Kazakhstan) launched a multilateral process aiming at building a “security model” for Asia.101

F. Confirmation of the Profile of the Parliamentary Assembly At its fifth annual session, held in Stockholm from 5 to 9 July 1996, the Parliamentary Assembly confirmed its role as a laboratory for ideas and a political stimulus. Touching upon the politico-military dimension, the Parliamentary Assembly devoted the work of its first committee to the question of the Security Model.102 At the end of the debate, it drew up a long list of measures designed to improve the way in which the OSCE itself operated.103 These included measures relating to

of 20 May 1996). See also REF.SEC/310/96, speech by Secretary General Höynck ( 3 June 1996), REF.CIO/29/96 and Corr., report of the Swiss Chairmanship, ( 6 June 1996) and Permanent Council: Decision No. 124 of 12 June 1996 (follow-up to the Geneva conference). 99 See UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/50/80 adopted without a formal vote on 12 December 1995. See also REF.INF/31/96 (26 February 1996). 100 REF.SEC/258/96 (14 May 1996). 101 This is the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), launched by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. CICA Member States include Turkey, Russia, Central Asian States (with the exception of Turkmenistan), non-OSCE countries (Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Mongolia) and Palestine. See REF.INF/283/95 (29 December 1995) and INF/41/96 (1 March 1996). 102 See PSCE Parliamentary Assembly, PA (96)I.1 Rev.1 E (report by Bruce George) – also circulated as REF.SEC/365/96 (27 June 1996). 103 Stockholm Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1996), § 26 (subparagraphs a–v). For the text of the Declaration and its six annexes, see REF.SEC/396/96/Rev.1 (17 July 1996). 466   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

easing the principle of consensus (“approximate consensus”),104 the creation of an executive body responsible for preparatory work,105 the application of sanctions other than declaratory sanctions in the event of breach of OSCE commitments,106 granting the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) significant operational tasks (checking the application of arms control/disarmament measures and the co- ordination of future peacekeeping operations),107 and placing the theme of prevention in terms of arms control (notably the qualitative aspect of technological development) on the agenda of the Vienna Forum.108 In addition, it should be noted that the Assembly decided in favour of the old idea (Soviet in origin) of denuclearized zones in Europe.109 In terms of the economic dimension, the Parliamentary Assembly appeared to be visibly more concerned than the participating States about the social cost of transition to the market economy.110 At the same time, it confirmed that the functions of the Economic Forum were in need of comprehensive revision. In this regard, it considered that the participating States would be well advised to entrust questions relating to the economic dimension to organizations or institutions more appropriate than the OSCE and to grant the Economic Forum more practical responsibility in terms of protecting the environment.111 Finally, regarding the human dimension, the Parliamentary Assembly submitted to the governments, by means of a contribution to the Lisbon Summit in 1996, a complete draft of the “Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security”. This voluminous text, which laid the foundations of a “Partnership for Democracy” programme between the participating States, simply codified the

104 Ibid., § 26(c). See also Ottawa Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1995), Chapter I, §§ 6 and 21. 105 Stockholm Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1996), § 26(g). 106 Ibid., § 26(e). Previously, the Ottawa Declaration (1995) had emphasized the desirability of formulating criteria on the basis of which the OSCE could suspend, if necessary, the participation of one of its participating States (Chapter I, § 23). 107 Stockholm Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1996), § 26(v). The Ottawa Declaration (1995) envisaged that the Conflict Prevention Centre be authorized to collect early warning indicators for long-term missions and to participate, in an advisory capacity, in discussions of the Senior and Permanent Councils (Chapter I, § 16); similarly, it had advocated the creation of an OSCE Arms Control and Verification Agency under the authority of the Centre (Chapter I, § 17). 108 Ibid., § 26(u). It should also be noted that the Ottawa Declaration (1995) suggested some modifications to the 1994 Vienna Document on CSBMs (Chapter I, § 19–20). 109 Stockholm Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (1996), §§ 26(p) and 26(r). 110 Ibid., §§ 50–53. 111 Ibid., § 26(n). This idea, formulated by the General Committee on Political Affairs and Security, was tempered (not to say contradicted) by a recommendation of the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment suggesting that “the OSCE, in co- operation with the appropriate international organizations, analyze and publicize successful efforts by reforming countries to improve their economic performance, while maintaining adequate social support arrangements, as a way of assisting other reforming countries” (ibid., § 60).  Chapter VIII   467

achievements of the OSCE’s human dimension without really bringing anything new to the table.112 The parliamentary session in Stockholm calls for two further remarks. Much as in preceding years, the Parliamentary Assembly did not hold back from putting governments in the hot seat.113 In a resolution on Turkey, it thus denounced certain provisions of Turkish legislation which were contrary to the freedom of expression, and implored the Government of Turkey to put an end to the practice of torture in prisons and to find a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish problem – even going as far as imploring the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE to send a Personal Representative to Turkey.114 In another resolution, a long text on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, it denounced in no uncertain terms the “continued reluctance” of the Government of Croatia in relation to the democratic development in the country, the human rights violations committed in Serbia and Montenegro, and the repression practised by the Belgrade authorities towards Kosovo.115 In addition, it appears that the Parliamentary Assembly is not yet fully satisfied with its collaboration with the OSCE. It continues to demand a more substantial exchange of information and, above all, the presentation (by the Chairman-­in- Office) of a report on the follow-up of its discussions, decisions and resolutions by the bodies of the OSCE.116 Finally, it should be noted that the Parliamentary Assembly also contributed to supporting the OSCE through independent field activities. On the one hand, it sent parliamentary field visits for the purposes of preventive diplomacy (Baltic States, April 1996) or to promote the human dimension (Central Asia, May–June 1996).117 On the other, it carried out electoral observation missions in Albania (May–June 1996) and Russia (June–July 1996).118 These clearly overlapped with

112 The text of this long draft (71 paragraphs preceded by some fifteen preambular provisions) is reproduced in Annex 1 of the Stockholm Declaration. 113 The previous year, the Parliamentary Assembly had questioned Russia about Chechnya and France following its nuclear experiments in the Pacific, see Ottawa Declaration (1995), §§ 52–53 and 74. 114 The text of the resolution on Turkey is reproduced in Annex 2 to the Stockholm Declaration (1996). For the response of the Turkish Government, see REF.SEC/504/96 (22 July 1996). 115 Stockholm Declaration (1996), Annex 3, Resolution on former Yugoslavia, §§ 25 and 38. 116 Stockholm Declaration (1996), § 26 and preamble, § 3. The Assembly also sought the participation of the widest possible parliamentary circles in the OSCE’s work on the Security Model (ibid., § 21). It should be recalled that the Ottawa Declaration (1995) had entrusted the Secretary General of the OSCE – apparently without follow-up – with certain specific tasks in the field of the human dimension (Chapter III, §§ 21 and 31). 117 On the final report of the visiting mission to Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), see REF.SEC/366/96 (27 June 1996). Previously, such missions were sent to the former Yugoslavia (June 1993 and June 1994) and Turkey (May 1995). 118 Since 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly has observed elections in a dozen countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Estonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. For the final report on the presidential elections in Russia, see REF.SEC/497/96 (6 September 1996). 468   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

the remit of the ODIHR, whose impartiality – during the Albanian legislative elections – had been the subject of controversy.119 To conclude, after a fairly slow and unpromising start, the Parliamentary ­Assembly of the OSCE is creating its own political profile. Its next two sessions will take place successively in Warsaw (1997) and ­Copenhagen (1998).

III. The Evolution of the OSCE’s Activities In this section, we will successively analyse the evolution of the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation, activities relating to crisis and conflict management, and the question of the human dimension.120

1. The Work of the Forum for Security Co-operation Following the restructuring of its methods and work programme in 1995, the Vienna Forum for Security Co-operation evolved in a more rational way.121 It has carried out its activities in three areas, without spectacular results: the technical improvement of the Vienna Document of 1994 on CSBMs, the consolidation of the results of the Programme for Immediate Action (with a particular focus on questions of regional security) and the development of a “Framework for Arms Control”.122

119 The Parliamentary Assembly clearly wants to be given priority in the field of election observation, see Ottawa Declaration (1995), Chapter I, § 24. 120 The small developments in the area of the economic dimension (the Economic Dimension Implementation Review Meeting and the 1996 Economic Forum) are discussed in Chapter VI of this volume. 121 In the aftermath of the 1994 Budapest Review Conference, the FSC decided to improve its internal functioning. Firstly, it adopted a rotating monthly chairmanship, assisted by the other two members of its own troika, as well as a monthly agenda, see FSC: Decision No. 2/95 of 11 January 1995. The “Special Committee” of the Forum – the plenary of the Forum – was renamed “Forum for Security Co-operation”, see FSC: Decision No. 1/95 of 11 January 1995. Secondly, it restructured its work programme by dividing it between two subsidiary bodies. The tasks involving the examination of the matters included in the 1992 “Programme for Immediate Action”, monitoring the follow-up of the outcomes of the Forum since 1993, and managing the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings were assigned to Working Group A. Working Group B was mandated to study the challenges and risks to military security, ways to improve global and regional stability in the OSCE area, and to prepare – in accordance with the provisions of the Budapest Decisions 1994 – a “Framework for Arms Control”, see FSC: Decision No. 9/95 of 5 April 1995. In October 1995, the Forum changed the mandate of Working Group A by giving it a special focus on regional issues with a view to designing concrete measures in the field of military security (arms control, disarmament and CSBMs) as well as conflict prevention and resolution, see FSC: Decision No. 16/95 of 4 October 1995. 122 For the reports of the monthly chairmanship on the progress of the Forum’s work, see REF.FSC/257/95 (26 September 1995), REF.FSC/300/95 (25 October 1995), REF.FSC/340/95 (21 November 1995), REF.FSC/6/96 (17 January 1996), REF.FSC/155/96 (19 April 1996), REF.FSC/189/96 (13 May 1996), REF.FSC/224/96 (13 June 1996), REF.FSC/267/96 (10 July 1996) and REF.FSC/286/96 (19 July 1996).  Chapter VIII   469

A. The Technical Improvements to the 1994 Vienna Document on CSBMs Between 1995 and 1996, the Forum adopted no new CSBMs. It settled for introducing technical reformulations of the detail of the OSCE’s CSBMs regime. It thus approved standardized forms set out in Annex IV of the Vienna Document 1994.123 In addition, it readjusted the timescales concerning invitations relating to the observation of notifiable military activities,124 the establishment of exchanges of information on defence planning,125 the operation of the OSCE Communications Network,126 and visits to airbases.127 Currently, discussions are taking place on the revision of certain provisions concerning evaluation.128 Moreover, Russia has once again put forward former Soviet ideas on the subject of the extension of the OSCE’s CSBMs to North America and the taking into account of naval military activities.129 Finally, it should be stressed that the last two Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings on CSBMs (AIAMs) – now managed jointly by the Forum and the Conflict Prevention Centre – confirmed their relevance as both a space for co- operative dialogue and an opportunity to hone the CSBMs.130

B. Consolidation of the Results of the “Programme for Immediate Action” Between 1995 and 1996, the Vienna Forum took initiatives aiming to consolidate the results of some of its work resulting from the 1992 Programme for Immediate Action. First, it adopted standard forms for the purposes of the 1994 regime on the Global Exchange of Military Information.131 Second, to turn the Principles Regulating the Transfer of Conventional Arms (1993) into reality, it organized, on the initiative of the United States, a Special Seminar (Vienna, 20 and 21 June 1995) that enabled useful exchanges of information on legislation relating to exports, checklists and implementation practices, among other issues. The exercise culminated in the development of a

123 See FSC: Decision No. 7/95 of 11 October 1995. 124 See FSC: Decision No. 18/95 of 18 October 1995. 125 See FSC: Decision No. 19/95 of 29 November 1995 and Decision No. 4/96 of 19 June 1996. 126 See FSC: Decision No. /21/95 of 29 November 1995 and Decision No. 3/96 of 8 May 1996. 127 See FSC: Decision No. 2/96 of 24 April 1996. See also REF.FSC/157/96 (24 April 1996). 128 For the ideas put forward by Sweden in this respect, see REF.FSC/362/95 (13 December 1995), REF.FSC/204/96 (29 May 1996) and REF.FSC/232/96 (18 June 1996). See also Slovakia: REF.FSC/237/96 (19 June 1996) and the United Kingdom: REF.FSC/258/96 (3 July 1996) and REF.FSC/338/96 (4 September 1996). 129 See REF.FSC/43/96 (21 February 1996). However, it should be noted that Russia was willing to consider extending CSBMs to the Asian part of its territory as compensation. 130 On the AIAM of 13 to 15 March 1995, see REF.FSC/15/95 (12 April 1995). On the AIAM of 4 to 6 March 1996, see REF.FSC/127/96 (14 March 1996), REF.SEC/218/96 (24 April 1996) and REF. SEC/217/96/Rev.1 (21 June 1996). For information exchanged in 1996 under the CSBMs, see REF. SEC/535/96 (24 September 1996). 131 See FSC: Decision No. 7/95 of 8 March 1995 and Decision No. 22/95 of 15 December 1995. 470   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

questionnaire, of which the annual management was entrusted to the Conflict Prevention Centre.132 Third, in the context of monitoring the Principles Governing Non-Proliferation (1993), the Forum confirmed the interest shown, within the OSCE, in the issue of chemical weapons. In June 1996 it prepared a questionnaire (the annual management of which was also devolved to the Conflict Prevention Centre) on the progress which had been made by the OSCE States towards ratifying the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).133 Fourth, following an American suggestion, the Forum confirmed its growing concern over issues of regional security by organizing a seminar on Regional Arms Control in the OSCE area (Vienna, 10–12 July 1995).134 Finally, it should be noted that although the Forum took no specific initiatives relating to the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994), from the end of 1995 the participating States began to spontaneously exchange information relating to the dissemination of the Code, including within their military structures and military training institutions.135

C. Preparation of a “Framework for Arms Control” Mentioned in the Budapest Decisions (December 1994), the preparation of a “Framework for Arms Control” – including disarmament and CSBMs – only really began after the submission, on 24 July 1995, of a relatively comprehensive proposal by the NATO countries.136 But negotiations progressed extremely slowly. At the time of writing (summer 1996), the ninth version of a draft text remains partially under discussion.137

132 See FSC: Decision No. 10/95 of 26 April 1995; Decision No. 11/95 of 10 May 1995; Decision No. 14/95 of 19 July 1995 and Decision No. 20/95 of 29 November 1995. See also REF.FSC/121/95 (28 June 1995). 133 See FSC: Decision No. 5/96 of 26 June 1996. 134 See FSC: Decision No. 12/95 of 17 May 1995, Decision No. 13/95 of 24 May 1995 and Decision No. 15/95 of 19 July 1995. See also the CPC compilations of proposals made during the seminar, REF.FSC/221/95 (6 September 1995) and of regional agreements on arms control, REF.FSC/147/95 (10 July 1995). 135 See Finland: REF.FSC/365/95 (15 December 1995); Germany: REF.FSC/7/96 (17 January 1996); United Kingdom: REF.FSC/17/96 (24 January 1996); Netherlands: REF.FSC/19/96 (25 January 1996); Russia: REF.FSC/51/96 (16 February 1996); Poland: REF.FSC/55/96 (21 February 1996); Greece: REFFSC/57/96 (21 February 1996); Ukraine: REF.FSC/61/96 (23 February 1996); Ireland: REF.FSC/74/96 (29 February 1996); Hungary: REF.FSC/87/96 (4 March 1996); Bulgaria: REF.FSC/89/96 (4 March 1996); Belgium: REF.FSC/116/96 (12 March 1996); Slovakia: REF.FSC/129/96 (20 March 1996); Italy: REF.FSC/142/96 (3 April 1996); Slovenia: REF.FSC/169/96 (30 April 1996); Portugal: REF.FSC/213/96 (4 June 1996); Switzerland: REF.FSC/287/96 (19 July 1996); France: REF.FSC/306/96 (23 August 1996); Norway: REF.FSC/325/96 (30 August 1996) and France again in REF.FSC/332/96 (4 September 1996). 136 See REF.FSC/192/95 (24 July 1995). See also Portugal: REF.FSC/195/95 (25 July 1995) and the USA: REF.FSC/215/95 (30 August 1995). 137 Largely based on the original NATO text, this version also included a number brackets, i.e., text not approved, see REF.FSC/323/95/Rev.9 (10 July 1996). For the different stages of the text, see REF.FSC/229/95 (13 September 1995), REF.FSC/234/95 (14 September 1995), REF.FSC/242/95  Chapter VIII   471

The exercise has an even more ambitious objective than the Forum’s attempts (in vain) to harmonize the existing regime on arms control agreements. Indeed, it aims to allow OSCE States to reach agreements on the ways of establishing a structural and fundamental interdependence between existing and future agreements in the same field. In addition to this fundamental issue, the exercise aims to provide the Forum with an “agenda” for arms control which is better adapted to the parameters of post-communist Europe than the Programme for Immediate Action of July 1992. Negotiations on the Framework for Arms Control came up against two kinds of obstacles – some technical and others political. On the one hand, there was the essentially abstract nature of the exercise, which aimed not to formulate a real arms control programme, but only the conceptual bases of one. On the other hand, it should be noted that the strategy deployed by Russia within the OSCE aimed to thwart the process of enlarging the OSCE. While Western countries responded to Moscow’s concerns by recognizing that the evolution of military and political organizations in the region had to take place in a way which was fully compatible with the OSCE’s concept of global and Co-operative security, Russia suggested that the “expansion of military organizations leading to a buildup of their military potential and adversely affecting the security of States not participating [in] those organizations” should be considered as one of the challenges and risks of existing military security in the OSCE area.138 Moreover, the Russian Government admitted that the presence of foreign troops in another participating State in violation of international law and the free will of the host State (or outside an express decision of the United Nations Security Council) was one of the “challenges and risks” identified by the Forum. That said, many points of agreement had been reached by the eve of the Lisbon Summit (December 1996). First, the participating States considered that political and military security in the OSCE area required an “arms control” component, taking into account the diversity of the challenges and risks affecting post-communist Europe. With this in mind, they drew up an inventory of challenges and risks which, in addition, was a useful contribution to the work on the Security Model: imbalances generating instability, inter-State tensions (notably in border regions), intra-State tensions likely to degenerate at the inter-State level, the non-transparency and unpredictability of States’ military intentions, the absence of democratic control

(18 September 1995), REF.FSC/294/95 (23 September 1995), REF.FSC/310/95 (3 November 1995), REF.FSC/346/95 (24 November 1995), REF.FSC/354/95 (4 December 1995), REF.FSC/105/96 (6 March 1996) (and Rev. of 12 March 1996), REF.FSC/171/96 (2 May 1996), REF.FSC/198/96 (24 May 1996), REF.FSC/215/96 (5 June 1996), REF.FSC/218/96 (7 June 1996), REF.FSC/223/96 (12 June 1996), REF.FSC/245/96 (26 June 1996), REF.FSC/268/96 (10 July 1996), REF.FSC/358/96 (19 September 1996) and REF.FSC/367/96 (25 September 1996). 138 See REF.FSC/175/96 (2 May 1996). 472   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

of (military and paramilitary) armed forces and security forces, and non- compliance with agreements on arms control and terrorism.139 Second, it has been agreed that the negotiations to conclude arms control agreements between the OSCE States or some of them must take into account the principle of national sufficiency (set out in the CFE Treaty and the OSCE Code of Conduct), anticipating an information exchange regime aiming to be as transparent as possible, including a sufficiently “intrusive” control regime and, finally, the limitation (or even reduction) of armed forces.140 Third, and above all, the participating States consider that the fundamental objective to be achieved is to create a network of complementary and mutually cohesive agreements consisting of existing and future agreements – enabling the OSCE to address security issues in a truly comprehensive way. It has been agreed that such a network should be centred upon the CFE Treaty, the Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1A), the Open Skies Treaty, the Vienna Document 1994 on CSBMs (including the Code of Conduct, among others) – as well as regional agreements on CSBMs and arms control concluded through application of the Dayton Agreement.141 Fourth, the participating States agreed on the need to ensure the complementarity of subregional and OSCE approaches to arms control. With this in mind, they postulated that the negotiation and implementation of subregional agreements was an issue of indirect interest for all the countries of the OSCE.142 It is difficult to imagine that points of agreement which are as general and abstract as these may constitute the foundations of a pan-European arms control regime in the OSCE area.

2. Crisis and Conflict Management This section will address the developments which occurred in terms of crisis and conflict management in the region of the former USSR and the former Yugoslavia.

A. The Region of the Former USSR In 1996, conflict management (in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, and Chechnya) stalled, while the achievements of preventive diplomacy (in ­Estonia, Latvia and Ukraine) were consolidated. a) Nagorno-Karabakh In August 1995, the Hungarian President appointed a Personal Representative to accelerate efforts to reach a political resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh. To this end, the Personal Representative was provided with a small team (around half a dozen

139 See REF.FSC/323/95/Rev.9 (10 July 1996), § 7. See also REF.FSC/190/95 (20 July 1995) (+ Rev.1 of 21 July 1995) and REF.FSC/268/95 (4 October 1995). 140 See REF.FSC/323/95/Rev. 9 (10 July 1996), § 8. 141 Ibid., §§ 4 and 11. 142 Ibid., § 2 (third and fourth sentences), § 8 (second sentence), § 9 (second, third and fifth indents) and § 10 (third and ninth indents).  Chapter VIII   473

people) based in Tbilisi (Georgia), charged with building contacts with the parties and encouraging them to establish direct communications.143 At the end of the year, the OSCE Ministerial Council mentioned, with a certain level of optimism, the prospect of a decision on establishing a pan-European peacekeeping operation in the region.144 Shortly afterwards, the cochair of the Minsk Group created a “Framework for a Package Deal” in January 1996, raising new hopes. Based on the idea of granting Nagorno-Karabakh as large a degree of autonomy as possible while respecting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, the “Framework” also proposed the evacuation of occupied territories, unfettered access by Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, and the granting of security guarantees to its population.145 Despite the establishment of direct contacts between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as a visit in February and March 1996 by the new Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Swiss Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti, the resolution process remained at an impasse. Armenia felt that proposing to resolve the conflict on the basis of the combined demands of territorial integrity and respect for human rights was inappropriate in the case of a State such as Azerbaijan, where a genuine civil society did not yet exist; it also felt that “it should not be left out that the people of Nagorno-­Karabakh represents a historically constituted entity that now has a sensitive identity, a well-­organized Self-Defence Army and a functioning mechanism of self-rule.”146 For its part, Azerbaijan felt that the proposals from the co-chairs were unacceptable because they still gave too much prominence to the Armenian perspective: “Azerbaijan was not a defeated country but the victim of an aggression and therefore the international community and the mediators should exert a stronger pressure on Armenia … If Armenians wanted a corridor through Azerbaijani territory, it would only be fair if the later obtained a right to a corridor over ­Armenian territory linking Nakhichevan with Azerbaijan.”147 The OSCE has now managed the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for four years, practically in vain. It has offered the parties a framework for dialogue, reasonable proposals for political resolution and the guarantee of this resolution through a peacekeeping operation – the details of which had been meticulously refined by the High Level Planning Group.148 Yet the parties are clearly not disposed to come

143 The full text of the mandate has not been made public. However, it is described in the Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and other OSCE Field Activities (REF.SEC/192/96 of 10 April 1996). For the reports of the Personal Representative, see REF.PC/233/96 (4 April 1996), REF.SEC/281/96 (23 May 1996), REF.CIO/37/96 (5 August 1996), REF.SEC/509/96 (10 September 1996) and REF. SEC/521/96 (16 September 1996). 144 See Budapest Ministerial Council: Decision No. 3 of 8 December 1995. 145 See UN: S/1996/259 (10 April 1996), p. 4. 146 See REF.PC/179/96 (7 March 1996), p. 2. 147 See REF.PC/233/96 (4 April 1996), § 16. See also REF.PC/207/96 (20 March 1996) and REF. PC/395/96 (24 June 1996). 148 See REF.CIO/22/96 (8 May 1996), REF.CIO/26/96 (22 May 1996) and REF.CIO/27/96 (30 May 1996). On the parties’ reactions to the peacekeeping operation concept, see Azerbaijan: 474   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

to an arrangement and the OSCE has no means of creating the necessary desire for compromise. b) South Ossetia In 1996, the OSCE Mission to Georgia deployed its efforts on a number of levels. First, it strove to encourage the restoration of economic links between Georgia and South Ossetia. By its own account, the interruption of these links was a serious obstacle to the political resolution of the conflict and was becoming a problem in itself.149 Efforts undertaken in this regard since mid-1995 have, nonetheless, remained relatively fruitless. Second, following long talks, on 16 May 1996 the Mission managed to obtain the agreement of both parties on the subject of a certain number of confidence measures set out in a “Memorandum on Measures to Ensure Security and Reinforce Mutual Confidence”.150 Concluded at the highest levels (and countersigned by Russia, North Ossetia and the OSCE), this text was not without political significance. But its provisions were very general in nature and required, in almost all cases, further negotiations on implementation. Indeed, the Memorandum primarily benefited the independentists, in the sense that it enabled them to continue to thwart, at little cost, a political resolution which they saw as being inevitably less favourable than the status quo. Third, the Mission continued its task of observing the tripartite peacekeeping forces stationed in the conflict area. However, given the stability of the military situation and the absence of major incidents, the Mission found itself increasingly involved in arbitrating local disputes “over land and property”.151 This aspect of its activity remains nonetheless crippled by the refusal of the Ossetian authorities to allow the OSCE to open a regional office in Tskhinvali.152 Fourth, the Mission devoted most of its efforts (more successfully in this case) to strengthening compliance with the human dimension in Georgia. Prison visits, observation of political procedures, support for the creation of the Georgian ­Human Rights Ombudsman, regional interventions to support people belonging to national minorities, and the provision of a certain level of humanitarian

REF.PC/266/96 (22 April 1996) and Armenia: REF.PC/401/96 (26 June 1996). See also US comments in REF.PC/361/96 (12 June 1996). 149 See REF.SEC/162/96 (27 March 1996). 150 For the text of the Memorandum, see REF.SEC/219/96 (24 April 1996). 151 See REF.SEC/173/96 (2 April 1996), § 11. See also REF.SEC/426/96 (31 July 1996). 152 “Because the Mission has so far been unable to open an office in the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, all monitoring activity has to be carried out over considerable distances, with all the attendant problems of transport and logistics. The Mission numbers 17 individuals, of whom 8 are military personnel and the remainder diplomatic staff. All members participate equally in two-­man monitoring patrols which, as a rule, are undertaken on 4 out of every 5 working days in the week”, see REF.SEC/173/96 (2 April 1996, § 3).  Chapter VIII   475

assistance to refugees153 should be noted, not to mention initiatives aiming to establish direct contacts between journalists from the two parties to the conflict.154 In sum, despite the OSCE’s commendable efforts – which above all enabled the creation of dialogue between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, including at the highest political levels155 – the problem of South Ossetia remains practically unresolved. To conclude, it should be noted that the UN’s management of the Abkhazian conflict has made even less progress, despite the Government in Tbilisi offering significant concessions.156 Disappointed by the UN, Georgia appears to want to entrust the issue to the OSCE.157 The OSCE, however, prefers to content itself with coordinating efforts on the human dimension, as can be seen by its decision to contribute jointly, with the United Nations, to creating a human rights office in Sukhumi.158 The Mission’s mandate currently runs until 31 March 1997.159 c) Transdniestria In 1996, management of the conflict in Transdniestria confronted the same types of obstacles as in South Ossetia. As a result, the outcome of the OSCE Mission to Moldova was much the same as that of the Mission to Georgia. Driven by the OSCE, the leaders of the authorities in Chisinau and Tiraspol met on numerous occasions, both officially and informally, to resolve the status of Transdniestria.160 In a promising development, the dialogue led to the acceptance in principle of a Memorandum on the bases for normalizing relations between the two banks of the Dniester.161 Signed in Chisinau on 17 June 1996, the text stated that “the Sides will continue to establish state and legal relations, and to build a common state within the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Moldova” and that “TransDniestria, in the composition of this common state, is a state and territorial formation in the form of a republic,” while stipulating that “a document defining the status of TransDniestria shall be based on the principles of mutually agreed decisions including dividing and delegating

153 See REF.SEC/16/96 (17 January 1996), pp. 3–5; REF.SEC/186/96 (10 April 1996), pp. 3–4; REF.SEC/397/96 (12 July 1996), pp. 4–6; REF.SEC/411/96 (18 July 1996); REF.SEC/431/96 (5 August 1996), pp. 5–6. 154 See REF.SEC/33/96 (25 January 1996), REF.SEC/244/96 (8 May 1996), REF.SEC/279/96 (21 May 1996), REF.SEC/287/96 (24 May 1996) and REF.SEC/323/96 (10 June 1996). 155 President Shevardnadze and South Ossetia’s leader Chibirov held their first summit in Vladikavkaz on 27 August 1996, see REF.SEC/483/96 (2 September 1996). 156 On the Georgian position, see UN: S/1996/165 (5 March 1996) and S/1996/527 (8 August 1996). See also report by the Secretary-General, UN: S/1996/507 (1 July 1996). 157 See REF.SEC/431/96 (5 August 1996), p. 1. 158 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 115 of 25 April 1996 and UN: S/1996/644 (9 August 1996). 159 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 22 of 23 May 1996. 160 See REF.SEC/124/96 (13 March 1996), REF.SEC/195/96 (12 April 1996), REF.SEC/224/96 (26 April 1996), REF.SEC/257/96 (14 May 1996), REF.SEC/275/96 (20 May 1996), REF.SEC/349/96 (20 June 1996), REF.SEC/352/96 (20 June 1996) and REF.SEC/394/96 (11 July 1996). 161 See REF.SEC/352/96 (20 June 1996). 476   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

of competences, and mutually assured guarantees.”162 In addition to this key provision, it specified that Transdniestria “shall participate, in matters touching upon its interests, in the foreign policy pursued by the Republic of Moldova … by consent of the Sides” and that it would benefit from the right to directly establish “international contacts in economic, scientific and technological spheres, and cultural spheres, and in other domains by consent of the Sides”.163 It also stated that the parties agreed that the future status of Transdniestria would be guaranteed by Russia and Ukraine on a bilateral level and by the OSCE (as well as to a certain extent by the Community of Independent States) on the multinational level.164 The Memorandum was, however, called into question by the Government of Moldova due to its key provision, which presented the serious flaw of ignoring the territorial integrity of Moldova, implying that the list linked two independent States and allowing the independentists to indefinitely delay an agreement on the status of Transdniestria. Consequently, the Chisinau authorities decided to delay signature of the Memorandum until after the Moldovan presidential elections on 17 November 1996.165 The Mission also deployed particular efforts to reestablish economic, monetary, energy, postal and other relations between the two banks of the Dniester. However, it obtained no more than one decision on the principle of rebuilding a few bridges and organizing a round table on economic co-operation (aimed at bankers and corporate leaders), which the Transdniestrians failed to attend at the last minute.166 On another level, the Mission continued to actively participate in the activities of the Joint Control Commission responsible for supervising the peacekeeping forces operating in the conflict zone. However, it was unable to make Russia reverse its unfortunate decision to replace the Russian troops – subject to six- monthly rotations – with some forces drawn from the Operational Group of Russian Forces (the former 14th Army), still stationed in Transdniestria.167

162 See Memorandum, § 1. 163 See Memorandum, § 3. 164 See Memorandum, §§ 2 and 4–8. For the guarantees envisaged by the OSCE, see REF.PC/324/96 (22 May 1996). 165 See REF.SEC/473/96 (27 August 1996). It should be noted, however, that following mediation by Moscow, the Memorandum underwent some overhaul which yet did not prove satisfactory to Moldova: the contested provision was reduced to a simple sentence stating “the Sides will continue to establish state and legal relations between them” (see REF.SEC/394/96 of 11 July 1996). 166 See REF.SEC/257/96 (14 May 1996). For an analysis of the economic situation prepared by the Mission, see REF.SEC/472/96 (27 August 1996). 167 Moscow justified this decision (taken at the end of 1995) by the high cost of six-monthly rotations. On 30 May 1996, troops of the Operational Group of Russian Forces began to be deployed in the security zone despite the initial opposition of the Moldovan Government, for whom such an initiative was in contravention of the bilateral agreements of 21 July 1992 and 21 October 1994,see REF.PC/167/96 (29 February 1996). See also REF.SEC/314/96 (4 June 1996), REF.SEC/388/96 (17 June 1996), REF.PC/289/96 (7 May 1996), REF.PC/450/96 (10 July 1996), REF.PC/462/96 (11 July 1996) and REF.PC/482/96 (12 July 1996).  Chapter VIII   477

Finally, it should be noted that Moscow continued to be referred to in numerous complaints concerning the violation of human rights. With only one diplomatic officer specializing in the subject (assisted by a local officer), it admitted in no uncertain terms that “in the majority of cases the Mission has neither the legal expertise nor the resources to conduct necessary investigations.”168 Despite (or even because) of these varied outcomes, the mandate of the Mission was extended to 31 December 1996.169 d) Tajikistan The evolution of the situation in Tajikistan in 1996 was essentially marked by two facts: first, the resumption of the civil war, with the simultaneous aggravation of the humanitarian situation (15,000 new displaced persons); second, the ­Dushanbe Government’s refusal to subscribe to the OSCE’s proposals aiming to improve the conditions of the human dimension in the country. In May 1996, the external opposition forces broke the ceasefire and seized the sector of Tavildara, which was key to accessing Pamir. Following their advance in the South, they immediately controlled a third of the territory of the country – at the same time as the central government was confronted with the discontent of the populations of other regions due to its systematically favourable policy towards the Kulobi clans and the deterioration in economic living conditions. Following the good offices of the new Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-­ General to Tajikistan (Gerd Merrem), the two parties concluded a ceasefire and agreed to exchange respective prisoners, in July 1996. In light of its mandate, the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan confined itself to reporting on the evolution of the conflicts and efforts undertaken by the UN to put an end to the conflicts and get the political resolution process back on track.170 On another level, in terms of its basic mandate, the Mission noted that the human dimension situation had barely improved in Tajikistan. Indeed, the Government in Dushanbe did not hesitate to undermine the independence of the national Red Cross, by imposing an official figure at the head of the organization.171 Among other things, it had long ignored the OSCE’s recommendations advising it to authorize the ICRC to carry out visits to Tajik prisons.172 More significantly still, and after several delays, it declined the OSCE’s offer to fund the establishment

168 See REF.SEC/167/96 (29 March 1996), p. 1. 169 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 121 of 23 May 1996. 170 For the reports of the OSCE Mission on the civil war, see REF.SEC/263/96 (15 May 1996), REF. SEC/270/96 (20 May 1996), REF.SEC/271/96 (20 May 1996), REF.SEC/291/96 (28 May 1996), REF. SEC/96/315/96 (4 June 1996), REF.SEC/342/96 (18 June 1996), REF.SEC/380/96 (3 July 1996) and REF.SEC/407/96 (17 July 1996). For reports on the inter-Tajik negotiations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, see REF.SEC/415/96 (23 July 1996), REF.SEC/423/96 (25 July 1996) and REF.SEC/438/96 (12 August 1996). 171 See REF.SEC/187/96 (10 April 1996). 172 See REF.SEC/200/96 (15 April 1996). See also the “Statement on Prison Conditions in Tajikistan” circulated to the participating States on the initiative of the Swiss Chairmanship in REF. PC/388/96 (20 June 1996). 478   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

and running costs of an independent national ombudsman in Tajikistan.173 This relatively disappointing assessment was, to a small extent, compensated for by the success of the humanitarian activities undertaken by the three bureaux annexed to the Mission in the south of the country – the success of which would soon culminate in the opening (in Garm) of a new regional office.174 The Mission’s current mandate runs until 31 December 1996.175 e) Chechnya In Chechnya, the OSCE realized, to its cost, the point to which managing a military conflict by purely co-operative methods could be frustrating. In all the conflicts affecting the former USSR region, that of Chechnya was, for the OSCE, of greatest concern. On the one hand, the conflicts had resumed with fury following the elections in 1995 through which Moscow had installed a local regime at its beck and call. On the other, the very presence of the OSCE in the area was seriously compromised by the independentists and the pro-Russian Chechens.176 The former ­denounced the “partiality” of an organization which had publicly referred to hostage-­taking by their fighters as terrorist acts.177 The latter deemed the OSCE “undesirable” on the pretext that the new Head of the Assistance Group (Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann) allowed himself to enter into contact with the independentists without first informing the local authorities.178 As soon as he entered office, in January 1996, Ambassador Guldimann led a dynamic and courageous policy. In a report on human rights, he did not hold back

173 As early as 1995, the Permanent Council recommended “the establishment [in Tajikistan], of an independent national institution for the protection of human rights that could identify and draw the attention of the authorities to the main problems in this field” with the assistance of the OSCE Mission, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 26 of 9 March 1995. However, it was not until one year later that it was able to take note of “the readiness shown by the Tajik Government to consider in a constructive way this recommendation”, as mentioned in Permanent Council: Decision No. 109 of 29 February 1996 and to decide to provide an estimated 515 million Austrian schillings (without prejudice to bilateral and voluntary contributions) for the establishment and initial operation of an independent ombudsman institution in Tajikistan in 1996, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 110 of 7 March 1996. In the end, the Tajik Government held its own by announcing its intention to establish, at its own expense, a national human rights Ombudsman; see REF.SEC/214/96 (22 April 1996), p. 1; REF.SEC/342/96 (18 June 1996), p. 2; and REF.SEC/380/96 (3 July 1996), p. 2). 174 For more details, see REF.SEC/191/96 (10 April 1996), REF.PC/363/96 (17 June 1996), REF. SEC/364/96 (25 June 1996), REF.SEC/383/96 (5 July 1996) and REF.SEC/389/96 (9 July 1996). 175 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 59 of 6 July 1996. 176 Members of the OSCE Assistance Group left Chechnya on grounds of personal safety in December 1995. The mission reopened the following month under the new leadership of Ambassador Tim Guldimann. 177 For condemnation of hostage-taking, see REF.CIO/l/96 (10 January 1996). 178 According to Sophie Shihab, the opposite stand of Ambassador Guldimann’s predecessor prompted General Dudayev to refuse any contact with the OSCE Assistance Group, see Le Monde, 12 June 1996. At one point, Ambassador Guldimann was even ordered to leave Chechnya within 24 hours because of his “illegal activities”, see REF.SEC.330/96 (13 June 1996), p. 3).  Chapter VIII   479

from denouncing in strong terms the abuse carried out by the Russian forces – going as far as stating, before the Permanent Council of the OSCE, that the conflict in Chechnya had become “warfare against the civilian population”.179 He then managed to organize the first meeting between President Yeltsin and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (successor to General Dudayev, who was killed in April 1996), which led to the signing of the ceasefire of 27 May 1996.180 This was not respected, but when General Lebed joined Boris Yeltsin’s team, between the two rounds of the Russian presidential elections, it contributed to a spectacular breakthrough: on 31 August 1996, General Lebed signed an agreement with the independentists (who had taken back control of Grozny), putting an end to the fighting and postponing a decision on the status of Chechnya to the end of 2001.181 If such an agreement could become a reality, it would enable the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya to really begin to implement its mandate. f ) Estonia Throughout 1996, the OSCE Mission to Estonia continued to actively intervene in affairs leading to tensions with the Russian-speaking minorities and with the Russian Government – essentially on the issues of the participation of “non-­ citizens” in local elections and the status of the Russian Orthodox Church. The problem posed by the local elections, which should have taken place on 20 October 1996, arose from provisions of the law adopted in this regard by the Estonian Parliament in April of the same year. The text granted the right to vote to “non-citizens” who had lived a minimum of five years in the region and who had a permanent residence permit – a condition that some 330,000 people applying for such a permit clearly were unable to meet in time, due to the tardiness of the country’s administration. Moreover, the law required candidates for the elections to demonstrate their fluency in Estonian through an official exam, despite the provision contravening the Estonian Constitution (Article 12 of which forbade any discrimination on ethnic or linguistic grounds) as well as the conventional standards of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. Denounced by Russian speakers and criticized by the Mission and the HCNM, the electoral law was sent back by President Meri to Parliament, which revised it in May 1996.182

179 Ambassador Guldimann was quoted by the EU representative in REF.PC/243/96 (16 April 1996). See also the report by Ambassador Guldimann as REF.SEC/158/96 (26 March 1996). 180 See REF.SEC/301/96 (29 May 1996) and REF.SEC/330/96 (13 June 1996). 181 See REF.SEC/487/96 (3 September 1996). 182 The new text stipulated that participation in the proceedings of the Parliament and the local Councils required knowledge of the Estonian language, written and spoken at a level to be fixed by the Government. It required electoral candidates to write a statement on their command of the Estonian language, a statement whose deliberate falsity could lead to the elected official ultimately being removed from office (REF.SEC/273/96 of 20 May 1996). The Government set the language requirements in Decree No. 188 of 16 July 1996 (REF.SEC/434/96 of 8 August 1996). On the issue of local elections, see also REF.SEC/215/96 (22 April 1996) and REF.SEC/256/96 (14 May 1996). 480   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

The ecclesiastical dispute which took place in independent Estonia had its roots in the competing claims of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC), dependant on the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which depended on the Patriarch of Moscow. The former was exiled after the country was annexed by the USSR and was replaced by the latter. Following independence, the EAOC returned to Estonia and registered its statutes with the Ministry of the Interior, in line with the new legislation in force in August 1993. The Russian Church carried out the same manoeuvre in November 1993. Its request was rejected on the grounds that the State could not register two Churches under the same denomination. Despite judicial decisions confirming the validity of this interpretation, the Russian Church refused any onomastic change and remained unregistered. The dispute was not purely symbolic. It hid highly material interests: the allocation of properties between 3,000 and 3,500 hectares (places of worship and housing) that had been previously nationalized or confiscated by the Soviet authorities. In February 1996, the situation was aggravated by the decision of the Patriarch of Constantinople to restore his jurisdiction over the EAOC – a decision which had the consequence of placing the local Russian archbishop under the authority of the archbishop newly appointed by Constantinople. Through its approaches, the OSCE Mission managed to obtain from the Estonian justice system an adjournment of any decisions on the subject of the restitution of the EAOC Aleksander Nevski Cathedral until a meeting at the summit between the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Moscow.183 As for the rest, the OSCE Mission, the mandate of which now runs until 31 ­December 1996,184 noted with satisfaction that the Estonian authorities had, in practical terms, abided by their promise to process within one year all applications for residence permits submitted before 12 July 1995: compliance with this commitment was even more important for non-citizens now that the Government had decided to no longer recognize, after 12 July 1996, the validity of former ­Soviet passports (which up to this point acted as a residence permit and travel document).185 To conclude, it should be noted that Russia’s judgement on the situation of Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia remains singularly severe.186 However,

183 See REF.SEC/194/96 (12 April 1996) and REF.SEC/359/96 (24 June 1996). 184 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 119 of 9 May 1996. 185 Following a major bureaucratic effort, partly funded by the Nordic countries and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Estonian Government announced in July 1996 that 330,000 applications had been accepted (compared to about 50 rejected applications) and that another 3,000 were pending. See REF.SEC/399/96 (15 July 1996). It should also be noted that the work of the government committee established for the special case of Russian veterans led to the granting of 15,000 residence permits and a small number of refusals, leaving some 5,000 applications pending (REF.SEC/410/96 of 18 June 1996). See also REF.FSC/228/96 (19 June 1996) (Slovakia), REF.FSC/360/96 (3 July 1996) (United Kingdom) and REF.FSC/452/96 (4 September 1996) (United Kingdom). 186 See UN: A/51/81 (20 March 1996) and A/51/189 (2 July 1996). See also REF.PC/298/96 (17 May 1996), REF.PC/299/96 (14 May 1996) and REF.PC/443/96 (20 May 1996). For the  Chapter VIII   481

this does not prevent Moscow and Tallinn from making progress on the issue of demarcating their borders.187 g) Latvia Given the significant progress that had been made since the establishment of the Mission in Latvia, the question of maintaining it was raised in 1996. Consulted on the question of renewing the mandate, the Head of Mission recognized that Latvia could not be considered neither as a crisis centre nor as a stage for serious violations of human rights. However, he did consider that the risks of inter-ethnic tensions, likely to destabilize the country and the region, continued to exist. The extension of the OSCE’s presence on the ground appeared to him to be all the more necessary given that the Mission still had multiple tasks to achieve: monitoring the process of naturalizations and issuing special travel documents to people holding former Soviet passports; helping “non-citizens” experiencing administrative difficulties to regularize their status; participating in examining requests from retired Russian soldiers legally living in the country; contributing towards resolving the issue of “illegal” residents; and, finally, supporting the newly established national human rights Ombudsman Institution.188 On the basis of these arguments, the OSCE Permanent Council decided to extend the mandate of the Mission until 31 December 1996.189 The Government of Latvia yielded to this decision, while stressing that it considered this extension to be the last and that it hoped that the OSCE would fully take into account its point of view as the host State.190 Without formally contesting this declaration, Russia insisted on recalling that the situation of the Russian-speaking populations in Latvia left a lot to be desired due to the fact that the some 500,000 residents who had become stateless could not hope to legally acquire Latvian citizenship for years and that a third of the population of the country found itself deprived of civic rights.191 In any case, the argument bounced between Moscow and Riga following the “Declaration by the Latvian Parliament on the Occupation of Latvia” (22 August 1996), a text interpreted by Russia as “the most cynical step … to create a legal basis for pushing out from the country our compatriots who even before

Estonian response, see UN: A/51/114 (12 April 1996); see also REF.PC/439 (4 July 1996). 187 On this point, see INF/88/96 (29 May 1996). 188 See REF.SEC/342/96 (18 June 1996). 189 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 132 of 27 June 1996. 190 “The Government of Latvia agrees to prolong the mandate with the understanding that the Mission, in close co-operation with the Latvian authorities, will make an effort to implement the mandate fully by the end of the 1996 … The Latvian authorities are convinced that after the accomplishment of the remaining tasks which are of a rather technical nature the assistance of the Mission will not be needed beyond the end of 1996” (REF.PC/411/96 of 27 June 1996). 191 See REF.PC.DEC/317/96 (21 May 1996). 482   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

the Declaration were deprived of the opportunity to acquire Latvian citizenship. Now the authorities would like to call them occupationists.”192 h) Ukraine In Ukraine, the situation evolved in a generally positive way – both on the subject of the autonomy of Crimea and on the status of the Tatars. The constitutional dialogue between Kiev and Simferopol progressed after the round table in Noordwijk (14–17 March 1996), organized by the OSCE Mission to Ukraine and the HCNM.193 According to the suggestion made at this time by the HCNM, the Verkhovna Rada decided to proceed by elimination, that is to say, to dismiss any elements which did not conform with Ukrainian laws contained in the draft Constitution submitted by the Crimean authorities and to approve all the rest. In April 1996, by 230 votes to 7, it thus adopted the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, a text granting the local authorities broad competences, particularly in economic terms. The provisions of the initial draft which were deemed unacceptable (those on national symbols, internal citizenship, Sevastopol and the procedure for appointing a local Prime Minister) were sent back for reworking to an inter-parliamentary Kiev–Simferopol committee.194 Chapter X of the new Ukrainian Constitution (adopted on 28 June 1996) confirmed the status of Crimea in a strict yet open way.195 It admitted that Crimea formed an autonomous Republic with its own Constitution but stated that it was an “inseparable constituent part of Ukraine”.196 It recognized that the Crimean Parliament had the power to appoint and dismiss the President of the Council of Ministers, with, however, the approval of the President of Ukraine.197 The President of Ukraine could suspend any Crimean law (which was deemed unconstitutional) and refer the issue to the State’s Constitutional Court.198 The Constitution anticipated the official representation of the Ukrainian State at Simferopol but did not give the Crimean authorities the right to representation in Kiev.199 It granted Crimea broad economic competences formulated in express

192 See Russian response in REF.PC/537/96 (30 August 1996) and the Declaration of the Latvian Parliament in REF.PC/542/96 (4 September 1996). 193 See REF.SEC/155/96 (22 March 1996). 194 See REF.SEC/252/96 (13 May 1996). 195 For the text of Chapter X, see INF/127/96 (5 August 1996). It should be noted that the new Constitution (the first of post-communist Ukraine) makes Ukrainian the State’s only official language and that it relegates Russian to minority language status: according to the OSCE Mission, this text “ultimately may prove to have been the definitive break with the Soviet past. The new Constitution also sets Ukraine apart from other CIS States, which mostly have strongly Executive-oriented Constitutions”, see REF.SEC/386/96 (8 July 1996), p. 3. 196 Article 134 and Article 135, first indent. 197 Article 136, third indent. 198 Article 137, last indent. 199 Article 139.  Chapter VIII   483

terms and completed with an important provision stating that “Laws of Ukraine may also cede additional authority to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”200 In terms of the issue of the Tatars (more specifically the acquisition of­ Ukrainian citizenship by Tatars returning from deportation), the OSCE Mission also played a key role as an intermediary.201 Its contribution essentially consisted of organizing an informal seminar between the authorities in Kiev and the representatives of the Tatars. Held in August 1996, the seminar enabled the two parties to demonstrate their mutual goodwill and, notably, to smooth off their differences on the subject of the number of Tatars requiring citizenship.202 Given the overall positive evolution of the issues of Crimea and the Tatars, the Government in Kiev felt that the objective of the OSCE Mission in Ukraine had been accomplished and that, consequently, there was no justification for maintaining it. The solution to residual problems, it concluded, now called for the use of other types of mechanisms (ODIHR, HCNM), or the intervention of other international organizations (Council of Europe).203 Within the OSCE, various countries did not share this point of view. Ultimately, and thanks to the considerable efforts of the Swiss Chairman, the Mission’s mandate was extended until 31 December 1996, but it was understood that the Permanent Council of the OSCE would take a decision on the future of the Mission on the basis of a “complete report” into the execution of the mandate of the Mission that it would submit before the end of September 1996.204 In an interpretive statement, Ukraine considered that this was a final extension aiming to “resolve organizational problems and other problems arising from the cessation of the work of the Mission in Ukraine” – it being moreover understood that “the number of members of the Mission will be progressively reduced as the Mandate comes to an end” and that the office in Simferopol would close its doors on 30 September 1996.205

200 Article 138. 201 The Ukrainian Act of 8 October 1991 imposed many requirements on citizenship (knowledge of Ukrainian, proof of a regular legal income, renunciation of all other citizenship, etc.), which, together with the cost of the application procedure, was problematic for the Tatars –reluctant to renounce Uzbek citizenship without absolute guarantee of becoming Ukrainian. In fact, the Tatars wanted to become Ukrainian once again automatically and collectively as well as to be recognized as an “indigenous people”. These requirements were deemed unacceptable by Kiev and Simferopol. For the developments on the Tatar issue reported by the OSCE Mission, see REF. SEC/306/96 (31 May 1996), REF.SEC/322/96 (10 June 1996), REF.SEC/381/96 (4 July 1996) and REF.SEC/428/96 (31 July 1996). 202 The Tatars gave a figure of 176,000, while the authorities in Kiev (whose methods of calculation did not take into account the parents of the applicants) put forward a number of 60,000 only. During the seminar, both parties agreed that there were about 96,000 outstanding cases. 203 See REF.PC/309/96 (17 May 1996) and REF.PC/391/96 (21 June 1996). 204 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 131 of 27 June 1996. The report recommended the continuation of the Mission, see REF.PC/593/96 (24 September 1996). 205 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 131, of 27 June 1996, Annex. 484   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

B. The Region of the Former Yugoslavia The positive dynamic created in the region by the Dayton Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina encouraged the normalization of Belgrade’s relationship with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (8 April 1996) and Zagreb (23 August 1996). Similarly, it introduced a certain détente with Kosovo with the agreement signed by President Milošević and Ibrahim Rugova on the subject of reintegrating Albanian teachers and pupils into the public education system (1 September 1996).206 It also enabled multinational co-operation to resume in the Balkans – illustrated by the convening of the South East Europe Foreign ­Ministers’ Conference (Sofia, 6 and 7 July 1996).207 In terms of the OSCE, it was reflected in the renewal of the mandate of the Mission to Skopje and by the establishment of a Mission in Croatia.208 a) The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia In 1996, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia once again found itself overcome by events in Tetovo, although the issues were nonetheless quickly contained.209 On the international level, its evolution was marked by the persistence of the dispute with Greece on the subject of the constitutional name of the Republic both within and outside the OSCE,210 the development of the Balkan initiative launched by Skopje at the UN,211 the renewal of the mandate of

206 For the text of this agreement, reached thanks to the good offices of the Community of Sant’ Egidio (Rome), see REF.PC/546/96 (5 September 1996). 207 The Sofia Conference of Balkan Foreign Ministers succeeded those of Belgrade (1988) and Tirana (1990). It adopted a Declaration on Good-Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Co-operation in the Balkans, laying the foundations for a diversified programme of multilateral co-operation (economic, cultural and other) and endorsing the idea of an inter-parliamentary consultative assembly. The Declaration also affirmed that, in order to unite the region, it was necessary, in particular, to heal the wounds in Bosnia and Herzegovina and (with the reservations of an unidentified delegation) to reintegrate the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the institutions of the international community. For the text of the Sofia Declaration and “the Chairman’s summary”, see INF/111/96 (10 July 1996). It should also be added that the Sofia Conference consolidated the socalled Royaumont Process: initiated in December 1995 in continuation of the Pact on Stability in Europe, this process aims at developing stability and good-neighbourliness in south-east Europe; on the Follow-up Meeting held in Bucharest on 25 June 1996, see INF/108/96 (3 July 1996). 208 Not to mention the establishment of the gigantic Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose activities were analysed in Chapter V of this volume, part III, section E: the CSCE Mission to ­Sarajevo, see p. 325. 209 See REF.SEC/388/96 (9 July 1996) and REF.SEC/481/96 (16 August 1996), pp. 4–5. 210 See in particular REF.PC/509/96 (26 July 1996). In view of the objections raised by Greece regarding the use of the name “Macedonia”, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia renounced participation in the Sofia Conference of Balkan Foreign Ministers. See REF.PC/508/96 (25 July 1996). 211 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was at the origin of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 48/84 B (16 December 1993) and 50/80 B (12 December 1995) on the “Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States”. Skopje defends the idea of an “Agenda for the Europeanization of the Balkans” (with particular emphasis on the protection of national minorities), to whose implementation the OSCE is called upon to contribute, see REF.  Chapter VIII   485

the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) until 30 November 1996212 and, above all, the normalization of relations with Belgrade. On this point, it should be noted that, in terms of the agreement signed on 8 April 1996, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to establish diplomatic relations at embassy level and to accord one another the status of equal successors to Yugoslavia; more significantly, they recognized one another as independent States in their international borders while awaiting the estab­ lishment of a joint commission responsible for establishing an acceptable draft ­outline.213 In light of the changes which had taken place in the country and in the region, the Permanent Council decided to extend the presence of the OSCE Mission to Skopje until 31 December 1996 – while giving the new Head of Mission the task of carrying out an assessment of its activities with a view to any possible changes to the mandate.214 b) Croatia Following long negotiations with the Croatian Government, in April 1996 the Permanent Council established a Mission in Croatia with a maximum number of eight staff at the headquarters in Zagreb and three members of staff for each of the regional offices in Knin and Vukovar.215 The mandate of the Mission – initially created until 31 December 1996 – had four key traits. First, the basic task concerned the human dimension, more specifically the protection of human rights of people belonging to national minorities. The Mission was called upon to provide the Croatian authorities (on all levels) with “assistance and expertise” on the subject of the “full implementation of legislation” and to monitor the “proper functioning and development of democratic institutions, processes and mechanisms”. As with other Missions of Long Duration, it was incumbent upon it to also provide assistance and advice to interested individuals, groups and organizations. Second, the mandate (execution of which required the co-operation of the HCNM and the ODIHR) related to peacebuilding. The objective it set was to “­ promote reconciliation, the rule of law and conformity with the highest internationally-­recognized standards.” In other words, it consisted of creating and

PC/240/96 (15 April 1996, p. 11). For the follow-up of the General Assembly resolutions, see A/50/412 (7 September 1995) and Add.1 (11 October 1995). 212 See UN Security Council Resolution 1058 adopted on 30 May 1996. 213 For the text of the agreement, see REF.PC/239/96 (12 April 1996). The joint commission was formed in September 1996. 214 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 130 of 27 June 1996, and Chairman’s Statement. It should be noted that Albania has criticized the Mission to Skopje for the inconsistency of the content of its periodic reports, REF.PC/521/96 (26 August 1996). 215 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 112 of 18 April 1996. The decision was taken on the basis of the recommendations made by a Fact-Finding Mission to Croatia, see Permanent Council: Decision No. 74 of 21 September 1995 and the report of Ambassador Mario Sica, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, see REF.PC/162/96 (28 February 1996). 486   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

consolidating the foundations of a democratic and reconciled civil society across the entire post-communist Croatian territory. From the perspective of the OSCE, such a mandate was justified by the authoritarian slant of President Tudjman’s regime and, above all, by the situation prevailing in the Croat territories taken back from the Serbs in 1995 – namely, Krajina and Western Slavonia, previously “zones protected by the United Nations”.216 Third, the OSCE Mission had the specific obligation of providing support to the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES). In this case, it was required to contribute to “confidence-building and reconciliation” and to the “development of democratic institutions, processes and mechanisms at the municipal and district/county levels” in this region – which was still under Serb domination but was destined to be reintegrated into Croatia as part of the Erdut Agreement of 12 November 1995.217 Finally, it should be noted that the Mission to Croatia was expressly tasked (much like the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina) with cooperating with intergovernmental institutions and interested NGOs.218 The Mission began work in July 1996.219 Its establishment reflects the OSCE’s concern to contribute, through a peacebuilding mechanism and preventive diplomacy, to the internal democratization of Croatia and to easing inter-State tensions in the region.220

216 During the summer of 1996, the UN Security Council still deplored the fact that the Government of Croatia had not taken adequate measures to ensure the protection of the rights, security and well-being of the local Serb population, nor created the necessary conditions to facilitate the return of all refugees wishing to repatriate to Croatia, see UN: S/PRST/1996/29 of 3 July 1996. See also S/1996/456 of 21 June 1996. 217 Established by Security Council Resolution 1037 of 15 January 1996, UNTAES was mandated, inter alia, to place the region (once demilitarized) under the sovereign control of Croatia by 1997 at the latest, to preserve its multi-ethnic character, to facilitate the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes, and to organize free elections. For the first report of the Secretary on the activities of UNTAES, see UN: S/1996/472 of 26 June 1996. For the text of the Erdut Agreement, see INF/247/95 (13 November 1995) and A/50/757-S/1995/951. 218 As an indication, the mandate specifically referred to the Council of Europe, the European Union Monitoring Mission, the Special Envoy for Regional Issues, UNHCR and the ICRC. 219 For the first reports of the Mission, see REF.SEC/382/96 (4 July 1996), REF.SEC/409/96 (17 July 1996), REF.SEC/477/96 (28 August 1996), REF.SEC/498/96 (9 September 1996) and REF. SEC/499/96 (9 September 1996). 220 Eastern Slavonia has been demilitarized and its return to Croatia seems certain: however, the local Serbs have retained their small arms, making this region – one of the most economically prosperous of the former Yugoslavia before the Serbo-Croatian conflict – a potential powder keg. In addition, the Agreement on Standardization of Relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, signed in Belgrade on 23 August 1996, see REF.PC/539/96 (2 September 1996), left the fate of the Prevlaka region in abeyance. The situation of this strategic peninsula, which locks the entrance to the Bay of Kotor (Montenegro), is being monitored by the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP); see Security Council Resolution 1038 (15 January 1996), as well as the report of the Secretary-General, UN: S/196/180 (12 March 1996) and S/1996/502 (27 June 1996).  Chapter VIII   487

3. The Human Dimension Over the course of the period in question, activities relating to the human dimension were marked by the contribution of the ODIHR to the electoral process in Bosnia and Herzegovina221 and by the extension of the activities of the HCNM in Croatia.222 But they were, above all, marked by the observation of the Albanian legislative elections and by the development of co-operation with the Council of Europe.

A. The Case of the Albanian Legislative Elections Upon request of the authorities in Tirana, the ODIHR was called to observe the Albanian legislative elections (the third multi-party elections in post-communist Albania), the first round of which took place on 26 May 1996. This included several incidents which culminated in the announcement by the opposition parties (a few hours before the polling stations closed) that they were withdrawing from the consultation and refused to participate in the count. Presented as a protest against fraud, manipulation and intimidation committed against the opposition, this move was denounced by the Government as a manoeuvre aiming to avoid – in particular in the case of the (former communist) Socialist Party– the humiliation of an election disaster. In a statement published at the end of the first round, the observation team confirmed in the name of the ODIHR that the vote had been marred by serious irregularities. It noted that the decisions of the polling station committees had been taken arbitrarily, that the electoral lists had, in many cases, been modified (in a way as to make the number of people registered match the number of votes counted) and that the presence within the polling stations of armed individuals as well as unidentified people had an intimidating effect; at the same time, the Albanian authorities were reproached for their lack of co-operation with the ODIHR during the pre-electoral period.223 In the second round (2 June 1996), the ODIHR agreed that the situation had improved and that only a few minor irregularities could be observed. It stressed, however, that “the second round took place in an already compromised election process.” In its final evaluation report, it confirmed in a detailed and categorical way that 32 (of a total of 79) articles of the Albanian electoral law had been broken, and that the criteria set by paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Copenhagen Document on

221 The ODIHR contributed to the training of international observers reporting to the Coordinator for International Monitoring, the operation of the civic education programme and the establishment of the procedure for observing refugee voting, see REF.OD/51/96 (18 July 1996) and OD/57/96 (3 September 1996). In the area of the human dimension, the ODIHR’s contribution was mainly reflected in the support to local NGOs and ombudsmen. 222 At this stage, the HCNM has made only preliminary visits to familiarize himself with ethnic problems in Croatia – particularly in the region under the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia. See REF.HC/3/96 (25 March 1996). 223 See REF.OD/39/96 (29 May 1996). 488   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

the human dimension (1990) had been respected either imperfectly or not at all.224 The abrupt and unequivocal nature of such judgements angered the Albanian Government. It did not stop at refuting the ODIHR’s arguments point by point, at a technical level.225 It also accused the ODIHR of having seriously failed in its duty of political impartiality by including in the electoral observation team nine members of the Danish Young Workers Party who were, in fact, official guests of the Albanian Socialist Party.226 In addition, in contrast to current practices, the Danish observers did not visit the polling stations as they saw fit, but on the basis of a schedule which had been pre-established by their Albanian political friends – and hence drew their conclusions from a limited number of polling stations. Finally, in political solidarity with the Albanian Socialists, they did not observe the second round of voting, so as not to “legitimize” it – which, among other things, had the effect of noticeably reducing the presence of the ODIHR in the consultation of 2 June 1996. These rather staggering facts – which implicated the ODIHR in terms of the “engaged” composition of the observation team, the summary procedure followed by the observers and the unusually negative tone and content of the evaluation report – were confirmed by one of the NGOs on the ground, the British Helsinki Human Rights Group.227 This NGO also noted that the OSCE’s severity towards Albania contrasted clearly with the understanding shown towards Georgia in 1992 (single-candidate presidential elections), Russia in 1993 (a constitutional referendum in which some 6 million votes were fraudulently counted), and ­Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1995 (legislative elections excluding opposition parties), and that the bias of the ODIHR team had been flagrant in the first pre-­ electoral briefing.228 More significant still was the fact that the conclusions of other international observers (often critical but generally positive) contradicted those of the ODIHR

224 See REF.OD/42/96 (12 June 1996). 225 See REF.PC/360/96 (13 June 1996), REF.PC/364/96 (17 June 1996) and REF.PC/376/96 (19 June 1996). 226 See statement by Ambassador Zef Mazi, as delivered to the OSCE Permanent Council on 19 June 1996, REF.PC/384/96 (20 June 1996). 227 See REF.PC/407/96 of 26 June 1996, pp. 49–55. 228 “The elections in Georgia and Russia received ‘rave’ reviews from the OSCE (and other international observers). There was much criticism of the polls in Armenia and Azerbaijan but in the OSCE/ODIHR’s final reports a positive ‘spin’ was conjured up: the 1995 elections in both countries were viewed as positive steps towards democracy. Even in 1995 in Russia, the murder of 3 candidates went unremarked in the OSCE/ODIHR report; nor apparently did it raise any doubts in Russia when 3 election officials were killed in polling stations on the 16th June, 1996 … The tone of the pre-election meeting was overwhelmingly negative towards the electoral process in Albania. The remorselessly upbeat atmosphere of past OSCE/ODIHR briefings was markedly absent. Despite the fact that Albania has emerged from one of the world’s worse dictatorships less than five years ago, no effort was made to relate the present to the past. Those observers who had been chosen to give ‘expert briefings’ trooped up to the podium to recite a litany of violence, fraud and harassment” (ibid., pp. 50–51).  Chapter VIII   489

in one way or another. This was the case of the evaluations not only of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, but also Irish parliamentary observers, the ­International Republican Institute (Washington) and especially the diplomatic missions of countries of the European Union and the United States accredited in ­Tirana.229 For its part, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly noted the existence of a certain number of irregularities and technical failures, but did not consider that these put the legitimacy of the new Albanian Parliament into doubt.230 Finally, it should be noted that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was not present on the ground because, in line with a established practice, it abstained from observing elections taking place within Member States.231 Regardless, the case merits clarification with a view to preserving not only the impartiality of the Warsaw Office but also the credibility of the OSCE in terms of observing democratic electoral processes.232

B. The Development of Co-operation with the Council of Europe In 1996, co-operation between the OSCE and the Council of Europe continued to develop in a satisfactory way. At the institutional level, it should be noted that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe decided to open meetings of a certain number of steering groups to representatives of the ODIHR as observers.233 At the same time, it proposed that the OSCE hold a joint meeting (at the level of national experts and permanent delegations accredited in Strasbourg and Vienna) designed to exchange views and experiences on the methodology of implementing commitments taken by their respective participating States.234 At the operational level, the OSCE and the Council of Europe acted in partnership to implement the “human rights” part of the Dayton Agreement. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two bodies cooperated satisfactorily within the National Human Rights Commission (which included the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Chamber) created by the Government in

229 See REF.PC/368/96 (17 June 1996) (Irish observers) and REF.PC/375/96 (18 June 1996) (­International Republican Institute). For the text of the Confidential Memorandum jointly drawn up by the representatives of the European Union and the United States in Tirana on 18 June 1996, see REF.PC/558/96 (9 September 1996). 230 See REF.SEC/340/96 (18 June 1996). 231 For the sake of completeness, however, it should be noted that the NGO Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki took up the conclusions of the ODIHR. According to the British Helsinki Human Rights Group, “as this organization had no observers on the ground [it constructed] its report from telephone calls with ODIHR observers and newspapers reports …” (REF.PC/407/96 of 26 June 1996, pp. 54–55). 232 The matter seems to have been clarified after a visit by an ODIHR delegation to Albania on 3–5 September 1996 (see REF.OD/58/96 of 10 September 1996). 233 See the Statutory Report of the Committee of Ministers for the period April–June 1996 (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 7582 of 21 June 1996, p. 4). 234 Ibid. The meeting in question is scheduled to take place in October 1996. 490   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

Sarajevo.235 It should also be noted that from 31 January 1996 the Chairman-in- Office of the OSCE and of the Council of Europe launched a joint appeal requesting voluntary financial contributions from their participating States for the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.236 Moreover, a new and more indepth form of co-operation appeared: the OSCE expressly charged its newly created Mission of Long Duration in Croatia to work with the Council of Europe.237 Currently, two pragmatic options are envisaged: the appointment of a liaison officer by the Council of Europe or the inclusion of a Council of Europe civil servant within the Mission staff itself.238 Finally, it should be noted that 1996 was marked in the Council of Europe by Russia joining as the 39th member (28 February), by the request for accession presented by Albania,239 and by the debacle of Croatia’s application.240

IV. Assessment of the Swiss Chairmanship A founding member of the Helsinki process, Switzerland played a constructive role within it, as the multilateral “honest broker” (as a member of the N+NA group) and as a direct champion of the theme of peaceful conflict resolution.241 On 1 January 1996, Switzerland took over Chairmanship of the OSCE with the moral authority of a foreign policy traditionally lacking partisan ambitions and the professionalism of its diplomacy. From the onset, it announced that its work would be guided by five priorities: the promotion of values of the human dimension (starting with respect for rights of national minorities); support for crisis and conflict management activities; the construction of a Security Model;

235 It should be noted that the OSCE appointed the Ombudsman, and the Council of Europe the eight members (including the President), of the Human Rights Chamber. On the Council of Europe’s contribution to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement, see REF.PC/448/96 (9 July 1996). 236 See the Statutory Report of the Committee of Ministers for the period January–April 1996 (­Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, PACE Doc. 7527 of 19 April 1996, p. 3). 237 See Permanent Council: Decision No. 112 of 18 April 1996. 238 See REF.SEC/382/96 (4 July 1996). 239 An application which was supported by the Committee of Ministers in its Resolution (96) 21 (15 May 1996). 240 Submitted on 11 September 1992, Croatia’s application received a favourable opinion from the Parliamentary Assembly only on 24 April 1996, following a series of commitments signed by the President of Croatia and the Speaker of the Croatian Parliament (Opinion No. 195). In view of persistent human rights abuses in Croatia and the Croatian Government’s unwillingness to honour the commitments of the Dayton Agreement, the Committee of Ministers vetoed Croatia’s accession, but then decided to admit it in principle (2 July 1996) at a date to be specified later – a procedure unprecedented in the history of the Council of Europe. For more details on Croatia’s application, see the reports by Van der Linden, see PACE Doc. 7510 (29 March 1996) and PACE Doc. 7569 (27 May 1996), Jansson, see PACE Doc. 7533 (23 April 1996) and the Earl of Dundee, PACE Doc. 7534 (23 April 1996) as well as Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1089 adopted on 29 May 1996. 241 See Victor-Yves Ghebali, The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973–1989 (Volume I), chapter I.  Chapter VIII   491

strengthening the OSCE structures; and improving their co-operation with other international organizations.242 Taking over the Chairmanship was not, however, any less of a challenge for Switzerland on both the political and material levels. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War, neutrality had lost its prestige in the outside world: previously a major political asset in international relations, it had become a factor of isolation and gravity.243 In the multipolar post-Cold War world, Swiss diplomacy risked ultimately, as had been bluntly stressed in the country’s media, being reduced to no more than a diplomatic–consular network.244 Holding the Chairmanship allowed Switzerland to make a reality of the policy of openness to the world and of dynamic participation in international organizations defined in 1993.245 On the other hand, the Chairmanship involved multifaceted and complex tasks, which were particularly burdensome for a small country – all the more so because, in 1996, the year the Dayton Agreement was implemented, it became involved in the construction of a Security Model for the twenty-first century and the first pan- European Summit since the CSCE had transformed into the OSCE. By virtue of the single text aiming at the heart of the subject, the Chairman-­in-­ Office of the OSCE is formally “responsible on behalf of the Council/CSO for the co-ordination and consultation on current CSCE business.”246 The imprecision of this provision had to this point encouraged (rather than inhibited) the Chairman- in-Office from playing a key role. With the ability to define the OSCE’s priorities, the Chairman-in-Office’s country had, within limits set by the rule of consensus, the power to politically drive a certain reality. In practice, the role of the Chairman- in-Office consisted not only of coordinating the internal operations of the OSCE, but also of conducting external relations and, above all, supervising activities relating to crisis and conflict management.

1. Co-ordination of the OSCE’s Operations The Chairmanship entailed a number of administrative-style tasks: setting the bimonthly agenda of the OSCE’s work, preparing draft agendas for various bodies and meetings, preparing draft technical decisions (touching upon, for example, the extension of the mandates of Missions of Long Duration), and preparing

242 See Flavio Cotti, “The Role of the OSCE and the Plans of the Chairmanship in 1996”, Eumpai Szemle, special issue, vol. VII (1996), pp. 15–17. 243 It should be recalled that, following popular consultations, Switzerland refused to join the United Nations (1986), adhere to the European Economic Area (1992) and provide a national contingent of peacekeepers for the purposes of the UN peacekeeping operations (1994). 244 See the article by Eric Hoesli in Le Nouveau quotidien (Lausanne), 21 November 1995. 245 See the report on Switzerland’s foreign policy in the 1990s (Bern, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs), 1993, p. 90. 246 See Helsinki Decisions 1992, Chapter I, § 12. 492   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

reports on work carried out – in the form of a “Chairman’s Summary” and reports on certain conferences organized outside the OSCE.247 However, the day-to-day management of OSCE affairs could sometimes go beyond simple administrative co-ordination. Thus, following Andorra’s request for accession, the Swiss Chairman-in-Office created, at his own initiative (without going through the Permanent Council), and in contrast to general practice followed in the past, a “Fact-Finding Mission” responsible for evaluating the situation in the applicant country with regard to OSCE standards. In addition, and in line with one of the priorities set for the Chairmanship (relating to the human dimension), he strove to promote the theme of “minimum humanitarian standards”.248 Finally, and above all, the Swiss Chairmanship did not settle for coordinating work on the Security Model: it constantly reminded other participating States of the political objective of creating a shared security space without any new lines of division on the continent and to guarantee Russia its rightful place within the architecture of European security.249 In this same context, Switzerland strove to improve collaboration between the Chairman-in-Office and the other two members of the Troika (particularly through the establishment of a pragmatic division of work and the holding of regular meetings),250 while separating the Secretary General more clearly from the political activities of the Chairmanship.

2. The Conduct of the OSCE’s External Relations Switzerland’s main task was to organize and preside over Euro-Mediterranean dialogue at the very time when this was becoming, for the first time on the pan- European level, genuinely substantial. In addition, and in line with a now well- established tradition, the Chairman-in-Office represented the OSCE at the annual session of the Parliamentary Assembly – as well as at the North Atlantic

247 For the “Summaries” prepared by the Swiss Chairmanship, see in particular, Geneva Economic Dimension Implementation Review Meeting: REF.PC/72/96 (23 January 1996); Informal Financial Committee, REF.PC/83/96 (26 January 1996); Senior Council, SC/43/96 (22 January 1996) and for the Economic Forum, see SC/109/96 (29 March 1996). See also Report of the Swiss Chairmanship on the Regional Conference held in Geneva on 30–31 May 1996 on the problems of refugees and displaced persons in the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and relevant neighbouring States, see REF.CIO/29/96 and Corr.1 (6 June 1996). 248 See for instance REF.PC/115/96 (13 February 1996) and REF.PC/250/96 (16 April 1996). 249 On this point, see the REF.CIO/3/96 (11 January 2996) for the address delivered by Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti to the Permanent Council on the seminar organized by the Swiss Christian Democrat Party on 22 January 1996 in Bern (see p. 2), on the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 23 January 1996 (see p. 6), the General Assembly of the Swiss Officers’ Association on 11 August 1996 (p. 4) and the seminar organized by the parliamentarians of the National Council in Bern on 22 August 1996 (p. 4). For Switzerland’s own contribution to the debate on the Security Model, see REF.PC/91/96 (2 February 1996), REF.PC/117/96 (13 February 1996) and Add.1 (8 March 1996), REF.PC/255/96 (17 April 1996) and REF.PC/534/96 (30 August 1996). 250 During the first half of 1996, the Troika met three times: in Sarajevo (February), Bern (April) and Vienna (June).  Chapter VIII   493

Co-operation Council (NACC), the Council of Europe and the United Nations Human Rights Commission.251 In this apparently passive task, Switzerland stood out in two ways. First, and despite not belonging to the Mediterranean, it revealed that it had a certain “­Mediterranean policy” – notably paying attention to the evolution of this region in the world in terms of terrorism, economic development and human rights.252 Second, in terms of OSCE–Council of Europe relations, it adopted a much bolder position than that of previous Chairmen by putting forward the idea of a rational and structured division of tasks involving the withdrawal of one of the two organizations in favour of the other.253

3. Supervision of Crisis and Conflict Management The responsibilities of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE in terms of supervising activities relating to crisis and conflict management were certainly one of a kind in international organizations. By virtue of unwritten practices, the Chairman-in- Office has the prerogative not only to appoint the Heads of Missions of Long Duration and to remain their main point of contact, but also to provide constant political and diplomatic support for their activities. The Chairman-­in-­Office can, upon request from the Head of Mission or on his or her own initiative, support the work of the Mission through a whole range of measures: the appointment of a Personal Representative, the publication of an official statement, unofficial intervention with the host country or, more simply, placing a specific issue on the agenda of the Permanent Council.254 Keen to apply its traditional policy of good offices on the multilateral level, Switzerland made supervision of the OSCE’s operational activities the real priority of its Chairmanship. From December 1995, even before entering office, Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti held a preliminary working meeting in Bern with the various OSCE Heads of Mission.255 They were subsequently individually invited as needed to the Swiss capital to meet with the Chairman-in-Office. The Chairman-­ in-­Office did not, however, remain in his ivory tower. With a view to keeping up to

251 Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti addressed the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe as the the first OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the Strasbourg Assembly on 23 January 1996, the Human Rights Committee on 18 April 1996, see REF.CIO/21/96 (19 April 1996), the NACC on 4 June 1996, REF.CIO/28/96 (6 June 1996) and the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 3 May 1996. 252 On this point, see the presentation of Franz Blankart, Director of the Federal Office of Foreign Economic Affairs, to the Swiss–Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry: “La stratégie méditerranéenne de la Suisse” (Geneva: 18 April 1996). 253 See REF.CIO/3/96 (11 January 1996) for speeches delivered by Federal Councillor Flavio ­Cotti to the Permanent Council, p. 4; to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 3 May 1996, p. 2 and to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on 5 July 1996 in Stockholm, p. 6. 254 See Lorenzo Amberg, “OSCE Missions as Instruments for Preventive Diplomacy” (paper presented at the Geneva IUHEI Colloquium on Preventive Diplomacy on 23 August 1996), p. 5. 255 See speech delivered by Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti to the Permanent Council, REF.CIO/3/96 (11 January 1996), p. 3. 494   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

date with changes in the situation in the host country, to weigh up the possibilities of adjusting the Missions’ mandates and to advance negotiations, he himself went to sensitive places in the former USSR (Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus, the Baltic States, Russia) and the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) – as well as to Albania (notably on the issue of Kosovo). In the former USSR region, the Chairman-in-Office paid particular attention to the Chechen conflict in which Russia was directly involved and of which, moreover, the management fell to the Swiss Ambassador Tim Guldimann – the new Head of the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya. The Chairmanship did not settle for imploring the two parties to stop the fighting, to respect international humanitarian law and to turn to the good offices of the OSCE:256 it did not hesitate to condemn the hostage-taking by the Chechens nor to declare the local elections organized in Chechnya to be incompatible with the OSCE’s democratic criteria as well as with the commitments Moscow had made regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops and the demilitarization of the region.257 The Chairmanship proved to be more active on the subject of the T­ ransdniestrian conflict, where the conditions for a political solution appeared to be more mature than elsewhere. With a view to exercising constructive pressure on all parties involved, it decided to bring the “Non-Paper on Political and operational Support offered by the OSCE for an Agreement to be Concluded on the Settlement of the Transdniestria Conflict” to the attention of all OSCE States – as well as the text entitled “The Position of the OSCE Chairmanship on the continuation of the Negotiating Process” and precise information on the state of Russian “peacekeeping” forces in Moldova.258 In two other cases, the Swiss Chairmanship conducted, not without frustration, an evaluation of the inherent limits of the OSCE’s purely co-operative approach. Faced with the continued political impasse of Nagorno-Karabakh, Federal ­Councillor Flavio Cotti warned the parties (in an official communiqué) that “the political negotiations under OSCE auspices cannot continue indefinitely without quick and concrete results on the key issues”259 – before informing the OSCE States of his intention to review the Minsk procedure and the role of the Personal Representative.260 Moreover, although he did not manage to convince the

256 See REF.CIO/20/96 (2 April 1996) as well as the following OSCE Press Communiqués: No. 25/96 (28 May 1996), No. 39/96 (9 August 1996), No. 40/96 (14 August 1996) and No. 44/96 (22 ­August 1996), as well as INF/128/96 (12 August 1996), INF/131/96 (14 August 1996) and INF/134 (21 August 1996). 257 See REF.CIO/1/96 (10 January 1996) and OSCE Press Communiqué No. 34/96 (17 June 1996) and INF/103/96 (20 June 1996). 258 See REF.PC/324/96 (22 May 1996) and REF.SEC/444/96 (13 August 1996). For information on Russian troops, see REF.PC/450/96 (10 July 1996), REF.PC/462 (11 July 1996) and REF.PC/487/96 (15 July 1996). 259 See REF.CIO/23/96 (13 May 1996). 260 See REF.CIO/36/96 (25 June 1996). For the appointment of the Personal Representative of the Swiss Chairman-in-Office for Nagorno-Karabakh, see REF.CIO/36/96 (25 June 1996).  Chapter VIII   495

­ushanbe Government to establish a Human Rights Ombudsman, as D recommended by the OSCE, he did not hesitate to officially communicate to all participating States an exhaustive report (from the OSCE Mission) on prison conditions in ­Tajikistan.261 Moreover, the Swiss Chairmanship strove to continue the approaches aiming to establish an OSCE/UN office for human rights in Georgia and, above all, to lift the Ukrainian Government’s objections to extending the mandate of the OSCE Mission to Ukraine. In the region of the former Yugoslavia, the Chairmanship was obliged to carry out difficult negotiations with the Government in Zagreb concerning the definition of the OSCE Mission to Croatia and, above all, to supervise the various OSCE activities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indeed, by taking on the Chairmanship of the OSCE in the very year when it had to implement key aspects of the civil part of the Dayton Agreement, Switzerland found itself with considerable administrative and political responsibilities – including the “certification” of free, democratic and fair elections at a date proposed by the Head of Mission. Federal Councillor Flavio Cotti carried out this responsibility with good sense and realism. Although subject to intense pressure from the United States, he scrupulously weighed up the pros and cons. After conducting extensive consultations, including with the international Election Coordinator (Edward van Thijn),262 he gave the green light to the elections – a decision taken without enthusiasm and not without a certain personal heartache.263 To conclude, Federal Councillor Cotti did more than fulfil a simple honorary task: he took initiatives and gave impetus to the political level. Switzerland held the reins of the OSCE in 1996 – demonstrating that a small country may well be

261 See REF.PC/388/96 (20 June 1996). It should also be noted that in Tajikistan the Chairman-in- Office innovated by appointing for the first time a national of the Commonwealth of Independent States – in this case a Georgian national – as Head of a Long-Term Mission, see REF.PC/486/96 (5 July 1996). 262 He held that the OSCE had three options: to postpone (if not cancel) the elections, to postpone only the local elections, or to hold all elections on 14 September 1996. He rejected the first option on the grounds that it would be detrimental to the achievements of the Dayton Agreement, and the second option on the grounds that it was too late to back down. Asserting that “if there is a risk in holding the elections, the risk is considered greater if the elections are postponed and not held according to the provisions of the Dayton Agreement,” he clearly supported the third option, see REF.SEC/356/96 (21 June 1996). 263 “The decision to give the green light for the elections, and I say this to you in all frankness, has been anything but easy for me … I feel concerned in my innermost personal identity and sensibilities by the dramatic troubles in the former Yugoslavia. I am a citizen of a minority linguistic culture, and hence of a minority ethnic group in my country … A functioning multi- ethnic democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is therefore not only an important political goal for me. This kind of a democracy represents a deep personal commitment for me as well”, in REF. CIO/35/96/Rev.2 (25 June 1996), p. 7. 496   Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996)

capable of playing an active and constructive role.264 In the history of the OSCE, the Swiss Chairmanship remains one of impartiality and pragmatism.

264 Such a role can be challenging: Portugal, the host country of the 1996 Summit, has declined the Chairmanship of the OSCE in favour of Denmark. On the other hand, Poland submitted its application for the year 1998.  Chapter VIII   497

Conclusion A year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the process which had resulted from the Helsinki Final Act gave way to that which emerged from the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. That said, the transition from the Cold War CSCE to the post-Cold War era took place in less than ideal conditions. First of all, the participating States only recast the Helsinki process in the form of a “Potemkin village”-type institution.1 In the euphoria generated by the collapse of communism and with America’s desire to preserve the future of NATO, the process was remodelled in grandiloquent terms, but was given no specific objectives or practical means of action. It was institutionalized in a way which was commensurate with an imaginary Europe, perceived (by the drafters of the Charter of Paris) as on its way to becoming irreversibly “democratic”, “peaceful” and “united”. Consequently, it had to address the first post-Cold War challenges with no operational capacities nor even a normative compass, and the Helsinki Decalogue had not been updated or modified. The institutionalized OSCE then had to deal with competing claims from other organizations in the region. During the Cold War, building on the strengths of its Euro-­Atlantic membership and its global security mandate, the Helsinki process governed the realm of Greater Europe with neither division nor dispute. The collapse of communism put an end to this monopoly. Anticipating the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the terms and conditions of which were being negotiated in Maastricht, the European Union assumed management of the emerging Yugoslav conflict. Given the persistence of the transatlantic disagreements, the development of the OSCE became dependent upon the reform of NATO, as well as on any distribution of roles between it and the Western European Union (WEU). As for the Council of Europe, it went as far as calling on the OSCE to renounce activities in the human dimension in its favour. Prevented by its own participating States from holding any real means of practical action, effectively short-circuited by certain third-party organizations and openly contested by others, the OSCE began to question its position in the architecture of European security.2 In the course of what was to become a quest for its identity, it initiated a headlong rush to develop institutional structures, prepare emergency mechanisms without practical scope, and adopt voluntary rhetorical decisions (such as during the Council of Ministers held in Stockholm in December 1992).3

1 The expression is from Stefan Lehne, The CSCE in the 1990s: Common European House or Potemkin Village? (Vienna: Braumüller, 1991), p. 109. 2 Some experts did not hesitate to question the relevance of maintaining the CSCE in post- communist Europe, as early as 1991. See Andreï Zagorski, “New European unity: The end of the CSCE?” Paradigms, vol. 5, nos. 1–2 (1991), pp. 76–88. 3 On this point, see the following critical analyses by Victor-Yves Ghebali: “The CSCE in the era of post-communism: The jewel that has lost its gleam”, Paradigms, vol. 6, no. 2 (1992), pp. 4–11; “La fuite en avant de la CSCE”, Défense nationale, vol. 49, no. 541, April 1993, pp. 97–108; “La crise d’identité de la CSCE”, Défense nationale, vol. 50, no. 551, March 1994, pp. 103–113; and “The CSCE process: Bright past, fuzzy present, uncertain future”, in Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper 498  Conclusion

Finally, the complexity of issues in post-communist Europe posed a challenge to the institutionalized OSCE that clearly went beyond its immediate and potential capacities. While the Helsinki process had taken root in a bipolar, stable and generally predictable Europe, the OSCE found itself institutionalized in a context of multipolarity, instability and unpredictability. During his confirmation by the US Senate as new Director of the CIA, James Woolsey depicted the situation with an admirably expressive metaphor: the West had slain the dragon that had terrorized the jungle of international relations, but realized that it remained infested by a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes that made it lament even the blinding visibility of the dragon.4 In reality, post-communist Europe far from corresponded to the idyllic vision held by the drafters of the Charter of Paris. The threat of nuclear holocaust that to this point had hovered over the continent gave way to a series of more localized and narrower risks and dangers (including civil wars, aggressive ethno-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, organized crime, and migration flows), but their multiplicity and inter-State nature made them difficult to manage.5 In addition, the welcome exercise of peoples’ right to self- determination and range of individual freedoms was often accompanied, in Central and Eastern ­ European countries, by the intolerant reaffirmation of national identity and ethnicity. Revived by the political and intellectual elites, the fantasy of the original tribe led to human rights violations that were incomparable to those committed by the post-Stalinist communist regimes and went as far as plunging Europe (during the Yugoslav conflict) back into the nightmare of genocide. Nevertheless, from 1993 the OSCE began to regain confidence in its future. The growing complexity of the problems in post-communist Europe were revealed and it became clear that no regional security institution could manage them alone. The OSCE acquired the conviction that it had its own contribution to make. It could boast not only of its approach to global security (unique in Europe), but also of its recent transformation into a structured and operational international organization as well as its self-proclamation as a regional agreement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. In this way, the OSCE worked

and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), The International System After the Collapse of the East–West Order (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 770–780. 4 “Yes, we have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.” This statement is quoted in Richard Falk, “In Search of a New World Model”, Current History, vol. 92, no. 573, April 1993, p. 145. 5 At the same time, the issue of security changed considerably. Increasingly addressed from a global perspective (looking at, inter alia, economic, social, ecological and humanitarian implications), the very concept of security has had a tendency to acquire a “demilitarized” content and lead to “non-conflictual” methods: the military dimension has ceased to be a topmost-priority issue on the agenda of governments, which began to focus instead on preventive diplomacy and the management of conflicts by purely co-operative means. The military dimension has nevertheless not disappeared: it has essentially come down to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which experienced a new boom following the disintegration of the USSR.  Chapter VIII   499

flexibly and often profitably with the UN (crisis and conflict management), the European Union (Sanctions Enforcement Missions, Stability Pact) and the Council of Europe (human dimension), not to mention the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).6 Following its own experiences in crisis and conflict management, it gradually became aware that it had a real “competitive advantage” (in terms of preventive diplomacy) over other bodies in the region. Currently, a pan-European security identity appears to be forming within the OSCE. As yet embryonic and uncertain, it is based around four elements that are respectively geopolitical, functional, normative and operational in nature. From a geopolitical perspective, the question raised by pan-European identity is no other than that of the limits of Greater Europe. Covering an area that extends from Vancouver to Vladivostok, the OSCE brings together States whose territory is situated wholly or partly in Europe, as well as States whose civilization is connected to European culture or those of the founding Euro-Asian members: Russia and Turkey. In terms of the Euro-Atlantic Helsinki process, the OSCE’s post-­communist Europe includes a real Asian dimension connected to the full participation of former Soviet States in the Caucasus and Central Asia – not to mention the attribution of observer status to Japan and the Republic of Korea. The OSCE thus confirmed the lack of strict boundaries between Europe and Asia,7 while reflecting the political dimension of the transatlantic connection (of which NATO is the military expression). Moreover, the OSCE admits that the future of the continent lies in the South as well as in the East; as such, it also includes a certain Mediterranean dimension (North Africa/Middle East), illustrated by a dialogue (which b ­ ecame interactive only in 1995) with the “Mediterranean Partners for Co-­operation”.8 The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security represents the functional element of the pan-European identity. By virtue of this approach, issues relating to security are addressed interdependently, from the threefold angle of the politico-­military dimension (CSBMs, arms control, disarmament, crisis and conflict management, the peaceful settlement of disputes), the economic dimension (which includes issues relating to environmental protection), and the human dimension (rule of law, human rights, national minorities, humanitarian questions, etc.). The concept of global security is certainly nothing new: it inspired the spirit and content of the United Nations Charter. But the OSCE has the merit of being the only European global security organization.

6 Collaboration with NATO developed only later, when the Dayton Agreement was implemented. On the relatively little-known collaboration between the OSCE and the ICRC, see the address by ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga as delivered to the OSCE Permanent Council in REF. PC/125/96 (19 February 1996). 7 Geographers usually placed the Caucasus in Asia. Furthermore, they recognize the western part of Kazakhstan as part of the European continent. 8 The Helsinki process indeed included a Mediterranean component. But up until the Budapest Summit 1994 Decisions, it remained essentially a matter of formality. 500  Conclusion

The normative aspect of the pan-European identity is connected with what can be called the values of Greater Europe. Since its creation, the Helsinki process acted as a normative laboratory.9 The post-communist OSCE has maintained this tradition in its general solemn instruments (the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the Challenges of Change 1992, the Budapest Document 1994) as well as in a certain number of specialist texts relating to the economic dimension (Bonn Document), the human dimension (Copenhagen Document, Cracow Document on Cultural Heritage, Geneva Document on National Minorities) and, above all, the politico-­military dimension (Vienna Document of 1994 on CSBMs, the Code of Conduct, and other texts resulting from the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation).10 To its credit, it now has a corpus based on the principles of multi- party democracy, the rule of law and the market economy – with the unique feature of targeting intra-State relations as well as inter-State relations.11 Finally, the most characteristic trait of the embryonic pan-European identity is undoubtedly operational in nature, related to the modes of action aiming to ensure security within Greater Europe. In this regard, the OSCE has the particularity of being an organization with a philosophy of Co-operative security. It thus excludes any form of coercion (peace enforcement).12 Moreover, and in contrast to the Helsinki process, it prefers to avoid directly blaming its participating States – other than in extraordinary circumstances.13 In terms of the human dimension, the OSCE also rarely attributes blame: it does not seek to condemn defaulting countries, but to make them aware of the nature as well as the reasons for their weaknesses and to help them remedy them. Similarly, the work of the OSCE on military issues (disarmament, arms control, CSBMs) is based on the principle of the indivisibility of security – in relation to both its beneficiaries and its components. Finally, the Co-operative approach is exclusively used at all stages of crisis and conflict management. In this particular regard, the OSCE is equipped with instruments which are original, flexible and financially inexpensive: firstly,

9 In the divided Europe, one of the CSCE’s basic functions was to articulate commitments towards achieving East–West relationships that would be consistent with the universal principles of the United Nations Charter, that would yield more transparent land-based military activities from the Atlantic to the Urals, commitments to assure the liberalization of planned economies and, above all, it motivated participating States to make their social policies more human with respect to their citizens. For more details on these aspects of the CSCE, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, “Les valeurs de la Grande Europe, produit du laboratoire politique de la CSCE”, Relations internationales, no. 73, Spring 1993, pp. 63–80. 10 Special mention is made of the Code of Conduct, which in some respects constitutes a partial codicil to the Decalogue of the Helsinki Final Act. 11 This unique feature is the result of the slow and steady erosion of the principle of non- intervention in internal affairs, which was one of the significant effects of the Helsinki process during the East–West era. 12 However, the OSCE does not refrain from supporting non-military peace enforcement – such as monitoring compliance with the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council during the Yugoslav conflict. 13 The suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), decided upon in 1992 and still in force at the time of writing, was indeed a matter of urgency.  Chapter VIII   501

the Missions of Long Duration, which undertake multidimensional tasks and, secondly, a High Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), the success of which makes the OSCE the only international body currently capable of appropriately managing conflictual situations arising from ethnic tensions. In this respect, the pan-­European identity stands out by integrating the human dimension into crisis and conflict management, through the division of work with the United Nations on the ground14 and, above all, through the priority given to preventive diplomacy: as confirmed by Max van der Stoel, “the OSCE’s destiny is conflict prevention, in the broadest sense of the expression.”15 On the eve of the Lisbon Summit (December 1996), the OSCE still appeared, however, to be an international organization in the making. Its structures and means of action left much room for improvement. 1) The idea of attributing international legal status to the OSCE or only to certain of its activities (those relating to crisis and conflict management) is not incongruous. But the real question is whether a “jurisdiction”, either total or partial, would make it more effective without damaging the extreme flexibility which, for the OSCE, is second nature. The past experience of the Helsinki process had shown that “politically binding” commitments could have as much moral weight and practical effect as legal commitments. 2) The restriction of the Secretary General to a minor role and the attribution of the political reins of the OSCE to a rotating Chairmanship (the means and effectiveness of which are, by definition, variable) has no real justification. The political weakness of the Secretary General is considered to be an inevitable consequence of a strong Chairmanship, the omnipotence of which all the OSCE States wish to maintain, or even extend. However, a better distribution of roles remains conceivable while fully respecting the preeminence of the Chairman-in- Office. It would not, therefore, be unreasonable for the Secretary General to be closely involved, including through delegation of power, in the decisions and diplomatic approaches of the Chairmanship. The Secretary General could also chair (as is the case in NATO) certain political bodies and be authorized to refer situations to them when the Secretary General considers these situations to be a threat to the stability, peace or security of the OSCE area.16

14 Leaving aside the Yugoslav conflict, the OSCE has contributed greatly to relieving the United Nations of the security burden in Greater Europe. 15 See REF.HC/9/96 (23 July 1996) for the speech delivered by the HCNM at the Fifth Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Stockholm on 5 July 1996. 16 The appointment process of the Secretary General could also be reviewed. After the appointment of Giancarlo Aragona, Switzerland noted that “the whole process took too much time and that it was prone to misunderstandings … [that] too much emphasis was put on the nationality of the candidates … [that] the time and energy which the Chair had to invest in this matter was quite unreasonable, and, last but not least, was particularly frustrating for the candidates themselves.” As a result, Switzerland suggested that the appointment of the next Secretary General should be entrusted to a restricted selection committee, comprising OSCE ambassadors who had served 502  Conclusion

3) Once the OSCE had a central consultative and decision-making body in Vienna (the Permanent Council), the usefulness of a Senior Council based in Prague was always going to be in doubt. The Senior Council (formerly the Committee of ­Senior Officials) is an unjustified burden and source of expenditure. Its abolition could be accompanied by the creation of an executive council, the composition and powers of which would be defined (in contrast to the proposals from ­Moscow), with no analogy to the insufficiently democratic United Nations Security Council after the Second World War. 4) The emergency mechanisms aiming at holding political consultations or meetings in specialized areas have become irrelevant since the institutionalization of the Permanent Council. The question of streamlining them would merit being reexamined.17 A new generation of mechanisms now appears to be needed, for example, for the Co-operative monitoring of the implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Politico-Military Aspects of Security. 5) An institution bringing together 55 participating States can barely work with reasonable efficiency on the strict basis of the rule of consensus. This could be either abolished (which no one within the OSCE appears to want), or at least relaxed through the use of decision-making procedures with variable geometry: consensus, consensus minus one, two-thirds majority or even a simple majority, depending on the nature of the issues in question. 6) As has already been stressed, the “future” of the OSCE as a security body is fundamentally based on preventive diplomacy. Consequently, the OSCE should devote most of its energy and resources to what is currently its role par excellence: the prevention of crises and conflicts, generally accompanied with measures falling within the scope of peacebuilding. At the same time, it must be clearly admitted that there are significant limitations to this peacekeeping work. On the one hand, peacemaking based on simple persuasion is not only a thankless and pointless task (as in Transdniestria or South Ossetia) but is also damaging to its political credibility (as in Chechnya). On the other hand, peacebuilding undertaken in the context of an open conflict, the resolution of which is barely in sight, remains without real substance, as in Tajikistan.18 Moreover, when it comes to

for more than a year, and within which neither the Troika nor the candidates’ countries of citizenship would be represented, see REF.PC/489/96 (16 July 1996). 17 In 1994, streamlining the CSCE mechanisms was the subject of much consideration, notably by the Italian Chairmanship, but to no avail. For more details on this, see DOC.403 (23 June 1994), DOC.538 (21 July 1994), DOC.595 (23 August 1994), DOC.643 (2 September 1994), DOC.680 (8 September 1994) and DOC.703 (13 September 1994). See also various reactions to this, such as Portugal: DOC.321 (7 June 1994), the Visegrad countries: DOC.467 (7 July 1994) and Turkey: DOC.658 (5 September 1994). At the Budapest Review Conference in 1994, proposals were submitted on the issue, with no result, see proposals made be Austria and Hungary: CSCE/BC.4 (16 November 1994), the United States: CSCE/BC.35 (25 November 1994) and the European Union: CSCE/BC.36 (25 November 1994). 18 Peacebuilding is only ever relevant at a preventive level or in the context of post-conflict measures.  Chapter VIII   503

peacekeeping, the greatest of caution is needed, since peacekeeping operations can lead to a fatal chain of events, as shown by the UN’s setbacks. However, “indirect” peacekeeping remains within the reach of the OSCE, hence the opportunity to reopen the issue of Russian peacekeeping forces in the former Soviet empire. Finally, it should be noted that the OSCE could also draw inspiration from incorporating NGOs (in an appropriate way) into the work of the Missions of Long Duration, thus strengthening its political connection to the UN – notably by becoming the preliminary body recognized for managing crises and conflicts in the region, with the possibility of referring to the Security Council (through consensus minus one or even without the votes of the parties) in emergency situations. 7) Improving the human dimension touches upon the problems of the future of the Warsaw Office and the overall division of roles between the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Expanding the remit of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) on a purely pragmatic basis, as has been the case up to this point, cannot continue without damage. The time appears to have come to grant the Office a status with clear (but flexible) specifications, and to establish a Board of Directors which reports directly to the Permanent Council of the OSCE.19 As for the issue of relations with Strasbourg, it is regrettable that governments often approach this with a certain “institutional patriotism”. A division of work which is both formal and designed on the basis of “comparative advantage” (a formula destined to favour the Council of Europe, which was created a quarter of a century before the OSCE) would be unjustified. The two international institutions certainly work towards the same objective: the democratic stabilization of the continent. However, given the extent of the tasks to be accomplished, the specificity of the respective means of action, and the difference in the State composition of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, a certain duplication is not necessarily harmful.20 The division of work which is currently practised on a case-by-case basis is without doubt the best formula possible. 8) Finally, there is little doubt that the OSCE is unable to develop an economic dimension worthy of the name, that is to say, one that is in any way comparable to its politico-military dimension or its human dimension. The appropriate

19 Regarding electoral observation, the role of the ODIHR ought to be reconsidered, as it has to compete with other organizations, including the OSCE’s own Parliamentary Assembly. 20 In a statement to the OSCE Permanent Council, the current Secretary General of the Council of Europe [in 1996 – time of writing] recognized himself the difference in existing and potential means of action between the two international institutions: “While the Council of Europe operates exclusively from its Strasbourg headquarters, the OSCE is present in several of its participating States through its Missions. While the Council of Europe mobilises for its action human resources from different categories of national, regional and local administrations of its member States, as well of university institutions and NGOs linked to the Council of Europe’s work … the OSCE’s politically motivated approach to situations in the field implies the use of human resources from the diplomatic services of its participating States”, see REF.PC/453/96 (11 July 1996), p. 9. 504  Conclusion

intellectual and material resources are (and undoubtedly always will be) lacking. How­ever, because the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security requires that a ­certain economic dimension be maintained, the most logical approach would undoubtedly be institutional “subcontracting”, in other words, the systematic use of existing international economic institutions. These could also be called upon to provide not only intellectual support (as the EEC and UN have to this point), but also operational support, sending experts into the field to meet the needs of the Missions of Long Duration. The voice of reason also states that the OSCE should not develop the roles of its Economic Forum but should rather envisage the possibility of continuing these through other means or other settings. That said, no reflection on the future of Greater Europe can ignore the lessons of the Yugoslav conflict (1991–1995). In contrast to the arguments put forward by those who oppose any collective European military intervention, it should be stressed that this conflict was much more than a local war and more than the cultural expression of a “specifically Balkan cruelty”. The conflict was about “civilization” itself! It brought into question the most fundamental values of the universalist civilization of Europe. The fact that ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was the very objective (and not the effect) of the war recalls a sad observation: in contrast to scientific progress, moral progress is not cumulative. Like the rock of Sisyphus, it needs to be constantly reestablished. Civilization rests on a foundation of inhibitions and repression of the inhumane: the Yugoslav conflict only demonstrated the fragility of this foundation and confirmed that among humans “instincts have remained on all fours in the upright quadruped.”21 This sober observation serves only as a reminder that no international organization (even one with significant means of action) can guarantee the endogenous or exogenous behaviour of its member States, nor can it be a substitute for their political will. In other words, European security does not depend on whether the OSCE is reformulated or not, but on parameters which are beyond its control or even its direct influence – in this case, the longevity of the transatlantic link, the democratization of Russia, the continuation of the European Union dynamic, and the success of the democratic and economic transition process within the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). First of all, maintaining the US commitment remains the cornerstone of European security. If the threat represented by the communist bloc highlighted Europe’s inability to ensure its external defence, the Yugoslav case confirmed that the intervention of the United States was irreplaceable for the stabilization of regional European conflicts. Although the United States intervened in Bosnia “by default” (due to European incoherence),22 it achieved in a few weeks no less than

21 Alphonse Daudet, Les carnets inédits (Lausanne: Editions Rencontre, 1966), p. 150. With this in mind, no human society affected by an outbreak of the virus of identity politics would be able to avoid a relapse into barbarism. On this point, see François Thual, Les conflits identitaires (Paris: Ellipses/Iris, 1995), p. 190. 22 See the editorial by William Pfaff in the International Herald Tribune, 20–21 January 1996.  Chapter VIII   505

what the countries of the European Union had been incapable of obtaining after several years of diplomatic effort and action on the ground. It is clear that the security of Europe also depends on a Russia democratized along the lines of Germany and Japan after the Second World War. The outlook in this regard is certainly far from the shift in Moscow’s foreign policy in 1993 and, above all, after the Chechen affair – not to mention the uncertainties brought about by the post-Yeltsin era. As Daniel Vernet wrote, an unstable, lunatic Russia that did not know how to affirm its status as a major power gave way to an overarmed and worrying USSR, but which is largely predictable.23 The advent of a Russia with imperial tendencies, expansionist aims and perhaps even messianic accents is not merely hypothetical. This raw fact alone is enough to justify the existence of the OSCE. The OSCE plays a crucial pedagogical role with regard to the former Soviet empire: that of Europeanizing Russia by anchoring it to the liberal and democratic culture to which the entire continent is moving. It should also be stressed that there can be no security in Europe without taking into account Russia’s interests as well as its real or even imagined fears: this is why it is regrettable that the way in which the NATO enlargement process eastwards has been designed, and appears likely to develop, has been so casual.24 Moreover, no one would dispute that stopping or sustainably reducing the integration process opened by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (1950), the latest incarnation of which is the Maastricht Treaty, would deal a fatal blow to European security. The non-renationalization of the policies of the members of the European Union is a solid guarantee of the improbability (not to say impossibility) of a new war between the countries in the west of the continent.25 Finally, the complete transition of CEECs to the rule of law and the market economy is also indispensable to the security of Europe. Communism ensured minimum social security in exchange for unconditional acceptance of servitude, while offering formal equality in poverty.26 The transition process will fail if it aims to achieve multi-party democracy and capitalism at the cost of social insecurity and an abundance of inequality. The changes a State must go through to transform a totalitarian regime into a new society must take place democratically27 and civil society must be managed in a way other than as a

23 Daniel Vernet, “La double illusion de 1989”, Le Monde, 12 November 1994. 24 The enlargement of NATO aims – at the cost of alienating Russia – to integrate countries that do not face any direct external threat (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic), while ignoring countries in need of security guarantees (Ukraine and the Baltic States)! We fully share the view that should it prove unavoidable, such an enlargement should be undertaken “in a transparent, co-operative, non-threatening and non-provocative way.” See A Future Security Agenda for Europe: Report of the Independent Working Group Established by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1996), p. 1. 25 Rather “improbability”, because up until no actual proof can sustain the assertion that democracies do not wage war against each other. 26 See Adam Michnik, “Jirinovski, mon amour”, Le Monde, 15 January 1994. 27 On this point, see the Severin Report, Measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems, PACE Doc. 7568 (3 June 1996). 506  Conclusion

byproduct of market logic–failing which, the old order will arouse nostalgia among the populations to the point of providing a real alternative to the new excesses. The OSCE must thus operate in an unrewarding context within which, to reprise a turn of phrase from Gramsci, “the old is dying and the new cannot be born … a great variety of morbid symptoms appear”28 – a context in which the threats to international security are as much linked to the internal weaknesses of nation States as to their strength and aggressiveness towards the external world, and where the antinomy between the principle of the territorial integrity of States and the principle of the self-determination of peoples remains intact.29 The record it has achieved after operating in this interregnum for six years, is, however, by no means dishonourable and has come at a financial cost which is lower than that of all international organizations: in 1994, its budget was less than 25 million US dollars – in other words, the equivalent of five days’ running costs of the United Nations or “1.4 times the cost of an F16 fighter plane and less than 50% of the cost of a future Eurofighter”.30 The Helsinki process had illustrated the adage that the longest journeys start with a first step: the institutionalized OSCE has shown that the richest of journeys is the prerogative of travellers who seek their own way. Geneva, September 1996

28 As quoted by Alain Lipietz in “Une boussole au cœur des humains”, Le Monde, 24 August 1996. 29 But also a context benefiting from a “core of military stability and predictability” without precedent in Europe, due to the implementation of the CFE Treaty and the withdrawal of the Red Army from the former Soviet bloc and the Baltic States, see A Future Security Agenda for Europe … (n. 24), p. 3. Concerning the principle of the self-determination of peoples, it is clear that it cannot be reduced solely to its external dimension, for example, the right to secession: there is no denying that “there is a need to define domestic rules for implementation of the principle of the self-determination of nations”, see A Future Security Agenda for Europe … (n. 24), p. 1. 30 See North Atlantic Assembly International Secretariat, Lord Chilworth’s draft interim report, The CSCE’s Human Dimension: Principles, Mechanisms and Implementation, CC/CSCE 94/4, (4 November 1994), § 41. With some 50 staff members, the OSCE can also boast of being the least “bureaucratic” of all international organizations.  Annexes   507

Annexes1

I. List of Meetings of the OSCE’s Decision-Making Bodies as of 1990 Summits: – Paris, 19–21 November 1990. – Helsinki, 9 and 10 July 1992. – Budapest, 5 and 6 December 1994. – Lisbon, 2 and 3 December 1996.2 Follow-up Meetings/Review Conferences and Meetings: – 4th CSCE Follow-up Meeting: Helsinki, 24 March–8 July 1992.3 – 1st Review Conference: Budapest, 10 October–2 December 1994. – 1st Review Meeting: Vienna, 4–22 November 1996. Council of Ministers/Ministerial Council:4 – 1st Meeting: Berlin, 19 and 20 June 1991. – Additional Ministerial Meeting: Moscow, 10 September 1991. – 2nd Meeting: Prague, 30 and 31 January 1992. – Additional Ministerial Meeting: Helsinki, 24 March 1993. – 3rd Meeting: Stockholm, 14 and 15 December 1992. – 4th Meeting: Rome, 30 November and 1 December 1993. – 1st Meeting of the Ministerial Council: Budapest, 7 and 8 December 1995. Committee of Senior Officials/Senior Council:5 – 1st Meeting: Vienna, 28 and 29 January 1991. – 2nd Meeting: Prague, 23 and 24 May 1991. – 3rd Meeting: Berlin, 17–20 June 1991. – 1st Emergency Meeting: Prague, 3–5 July 1991.6 – Idem/1st Additional Meeting: Prague, 8 and 9 August 1991.7 – Idem/2nd Additional Meeting: Prague, 3 and 4 September 1991.8

1 See also table in Chapter III, p. 97, reflecting the evolution of the OSCE’s membership. 2 Lisbon Preparatory Meeting: 25–29 November 1996. 3 Helsinki Preparatory Meeting: 10–20 March 1992. 4 On 1 and 2 October 1990, the CSCE participating States held a meeting at ministerial level in New York. This meeting is not included here, as it took place before the Council of Ministers was established. 5 It should be noted that Annex IV of the OSCE Handbook (1996) contains mistakes in the chronology of meetings convened by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). In this regard, the first meeting of the CSO was preceded by two meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Administrative, Financial and Personnel Arrangements, who met in Vienna, first from 14 to 18 January 1991, and a second time from 22 and 24 May 1991. 6 Meeting devoted to the conflict in Yugoslavia. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 508  Annexes

– Idem/3rd Additional Meeting: Prague, 10 October 1991.9 – Idem/3rd Additional Meeting: Prague, 29 November 1991.10 – 4th Meeting: Prague, 22–24 October 1991. – 5th Meeting: Prague, 8–11 January 1992. – 6th Meeting: Prague, 27–30 January 1992. – 7th Meeting: Prague, 27 and 28 February 1992. – 8th Meeting: Helsinki, 13 and 14 March 1992. – 9th Meeting: Helsinki, 19, 23 and 24 March 1992. – 10th Meeting: Helsinki, 29 April–1 May 1992. – 2nd Emergency Meeting: Helsinki, 6–9, 11 and 12 May 1992.11 – 11th Meeting: Helsinki, 18–21 May 1992. – 12th Meeting: Helsinki, 8–11 June 1992. – 13th Meeting: Helsinki, 29 June–3 July, 6 and 7 July 1992. – 14th Meeting: Helsinki, 9 July 1992. – 15th Meeting: Prague, 13 and 14 August 1992. – 16th Meeting: Prague, 16–18 September 1992. – 17th Meeting: Prague, 5–7 November 1992. – 18th Meeting: Stockholm, 11–15 December 1992. – 19th Meeting: Prague, 2–4 February 1993. – 20th Meeting: Prague, 16–18 March 1993.12 – 21st Meeting: Prague, 26–28 April 1993. – 3rd Emergency Meeting: Prague, 26 and 28 and 29 April 1993.13 – 22nd Meeting: Prague, 29 June–1 July 1993. – 23rd Meeting: Prague, 21–23 September 1993. – 24th Meeting: Rome, 27 November–1 December 1993. – 25th Meeting: Prague, 2–4 March 1994. – 26th Meeting: Prague, 15–17 March 1994.14 – 27th Meeting: Prague, 13–15 June 1994. – 28th Meeting: Prague, 14–16 September 1994. – 29th Meeting: Budapest, 18–19 November 1994. – 4th Emergency Meeting: Budapest, 28 November, 30 November and 1 December 1994.15 – 1st Meeting of the Senior Council in 1995: Prague, 30 and 31 March 1995. – 2nd Meeting of the Senior Council in 1995: Prague, 7–9 June 1995.16 – 3rd Meeting of the Senior Council in 1995: Prague, 26 and 27 October 1995. – 1st Meeting of the Senior Council in 1996: Prague, 21 and 22 March 1996.

9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 First meeting of the CSO as the Economic Forum. 13 Meeting devoted to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. 14 Second meeting of the CSO as the Economic Forum. 15 Meeting devoted to the situation in Bihać (conflict in Yugoslavia). 16 Third meeting of the CSO as the Economic Forum.  Annexes   509

– 2nd Meeting of the Senior Council in 1996: Prague, 27–29 March 1996.17 CSO Vienna Group: – 1st plenary session (18 January 1993)–38th plenary session (25 November 1993). Permanent Committee (Vienna): – 1st plenary session (9 December 1993)–43rd plenary session (28 November 1994). Permanent Council (Vienna): – 1st plenary session (15 December 1994)–present.

II. List of OSCE Specialized Meetings since 1990: a) In the Politico-Military Dimension18 Military Doctrine Seminars: – 1st Seminar: Vienna, 16 January–5 February 1990. – 2nd Seminar: Vienna, 8–10 October 1991. Meetings of the Consultative Committee of the Conflict Prevention Centre (Vienna): – 1st Meeting (3 December 1990)–43rd Meeting (8 November 1993). Meetings on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes:19 – Meeting of Experts in Valletta: 15 January–8 February 1991. – Geneva Meeting: 12–23 October 1992. Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings on CSBMs (Vienna): – 1st Meeting: 11–13 November 1991. – 2nd Meeting: 9–11 November 1992. – 3rd Meeting: 4 and 5 May 1993. – 4th Meeting: 12–14 April 1994. – 5th Meeting: 13–15 March 1995. – 6th Meeting: 4–6 March 1996. Seminars of the Conflict Prevention Centre: – Seminar on Conversion of Military Industry to Civilian Production: Bratislava, 19–21 February 1992. – Seminar on Armed Forces in Democratic Societies: Vienna, 4–6 March 1992. – Seminar on CSCE Peacekeeping: Vienna, 7–9 June 1993. – Seminar on Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy: Warsaw, 19–21 January 1994.

17 Fourth meeting of the CSO as the Economic Forum. 18 See also the list of OSCE Missions of Long Duration (p. 247) and the list of statements made by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (p. 535). 19 See also the list of participating States that ratified the Stockholm Convention (p. 254). See section on the “Seminars of the Conflict Prevention Centre” in this Annex (below) for the seminar organized by the CPC and the ODIHR (last entry). 510  Annexes

– Meetings of the Forum for Security Co-operation (Vienna):20 – 1st plenary session (22 September 1992). – Special meeting of senior officials aiming at reducing the effect, for countries in the region, of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): – Vienna, 31 January and 1 February 1993. – Meetings of the Forum for Security Co-operation: – Seminar on the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers: Vienna, 20 and 21 June 1995. – Seminar on Regional Arms Control: Vienna, 10–12 July 1995. b) In the Economic and Environmental Dimension Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe: – Bonn, 19 March–11 April 1990. Meetings of the Economic Forum: – Prague, 16–18 March 1993 (20th Meeting of the CSO). – Prague, 15–17 March 1994 (26th Meeting of the CSO). – Prague, 7–9 June 1995 (as 2nd Meeting of the Senior Council in 1995). – Prague, 27–29 March 1996 (as 2nd Meeting of the Senior Council in 1996). Seminar of Experts on Sustainable Development of Boreal and Temperate Forests: – Montreal, 27 September–1 October 1993. Meetings of the Economic Forum: – Seminar on Promoting the Creation of Small and Medium-Sized Businesses: Bishkek, 23–25 February 1994. – Seminar on Business and Environment: Tallinn, 7–9 September 1994. – Seminar on the Role of Tourism in Promoting Better Understanding between Different Cultures: Bucharest, 6–8 November 1994. – Seminar on the Role of Trans-European Infrastructure for Stability and Co-operation in the Black Sea Region: Sofia, 15–17 November 1995. – Seminar on a Framework for Private Sector Development, Industrial ­Co-­ operation and Direct Investment in the CIS Countries: Minsk, 24–26 September 1996. – Seminar on Promoting Sustainable Environmental Development in the Aral Sea Region: Tashkent, 30 and 31 October 1996. Economic Dimension Implementation Review Meeting: – Geneva, 22 and 23 January 1996.

20 See also the table on the evolution of the Forum’s agenda (p. 212).  Annexes   511

c) In the Human Dimension21 Human Dimension Conference: – 1st Meeting of the Conference : Paris, – 2nd Meeting of the Conference: Copenhagen, 5–29 June 1990. – 3rd Meeting of the Conference: Moscow, 10 September–1 October 1991. Thematic Meetings: – Symposium on Cultural Heritage: Cracow, 28 May–7 June 1991. – Meeting of Experts on National Minorities: Geneva, 1–19 July 1991. – Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions: Oslo, 4–15 November 1991. Human Dimension Implementation Meetings: – 1st Meeting: Warsaw, 27 September–15 October 1993. – 2nd Meeting: Warsaw, 2–19 September 1995.

III. List of OSCE Meetings Relating to the Mediterranean and ­Central Asia since 1990 Mediterranean: – Meeting at Palma de Mallorca: 24 September–19 October 1990. – Valletta Seminar: 17–21 May 1993. – Mediterranean Seminar on the OSCE’s Experience in the Field of ­Confidence- Building: Cairo, 26–28 September 1995. – Mediterranean Seminar on the OSCE as a Platform for Dialogue and the Fostering of Norms of Behaviour: Tel Aviv, 3 and 4 June 1996. – Special Meeting of the Contact Group with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation on the Risks and Challenges to European Security: The Mediterranean Dimension (Vienna, 1 and 2 July 1996). Central Asia: – Seminar on Human Dimension Issues in Central Asia: Almaty, 20–22 April 1994. – Seminar on Regional Security Issues: Ashgabat, 24–26 May 1994. – Seminar on General CSCE Issues: Tashkent, 28–30 September 1994. – Seminar on Inter-Ethnic Relations: Bishkek, 11–15 May 1995. – Seminar on CSBMs and Arms Control: Application and Compliance: Almaty, 21–23 May 1995. – Seminar on Drafting Human Rights Legislation: Ashgabat, 19–21 September 1995. – Seminar on Rehabilitating the Environment: Tashkent/Urgench, 10–14 October 1995.

21 See also the list of the Human Dimension commitments (p. 462) and the list of seminars organized by the ODIHR (p. 478). For the list of election observation activities deployed by the ODIHR between 1992 and 1995, see p. 489. 512  Annexes

– Seminar on Establishing Harmonious Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Newly Independent States Almaty, 28 and 29 February 1996. – Symposium on Central Asia: OSCE Comprehensive Security and Regional Challenges: Tashkent, 23 April 1996. – Seminar on Confidence-Building: Dushanbe, 24–26 April 1996. – Seminar on National Human Rights Institutions: Tashkent, – 11–13 September 1996. – Seminar on Promoting Sustainable Environmental Development in the Aral Sea Region: Tashkent, 30 October–1 November 1996.

IV. Scale of Distribution for OSCE Financial Contributions (1996)22 1) Participating States contributing at a rate of 9%: France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, United States. 2) Participating States contributing at a rate of 5.45%: Canada. 3) Participating States contributing at a rate of 3.65%: Spain. 4) Participating States contributing at a rate of 3.55%: Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden. 5) Participating States contributing at a rate of 2.30%: Switzerland. 6) Participating States contributing at a rate of 2.05%: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway. 7) Participating States contributing at a rate of 1.75%: Ukraine. 8) Participating States contributing at a rate of 1.40%: Poland. 9) Participating States contributing at a rate of 1%: Turkey. 10) Participating States contributing at a rate of 0.70%: Belarus, Greece, Hungary, Romania. 11) Participating States contributing at a rate of 0.67 %: Czech Republic. 12) Participating States contributing at a rate of 0.55%: Bulgaria, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Uzbekistan, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 13) Participating States contributing at a rate of 0.33%: Slovakia. 14) Participating States contributing at a rate of 0.19%: Albania, Bosnia-­ Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia. 15) Participating States contributing at a rate of 0.185%: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. 16) Participating States contributing at a rate of 0.125%: Andorra, Lichtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, Holy See.

22 The OSCE Unified Budget in 1996 (including outstanding and temporary expenses related to the Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina) amounted to 529 million Austrian shillings, or 52.9 million United States dollars.  Bibliography   513

Bibliography

I. Sources

A. OSCE documents 1. Journals and working documents of OSCE bodies, meetings and conferences. 2. Decisions of OSCE bodies See in particular the compendium/compilation: From Rome to Budapest, 1993–1994: CSCE Decisions Reference Manual (479 p.) 3. Annual Reports of the Secretary General on OSCE activities – OSCE Annual Report 1993: document without a code (31 October 1993). – OSCE Annual Report 1994: DOC.1071/94 (14 November 1994). – OSCE Annual Report 1995: REF.MC/11/95 (30 November 1995). 4. Prague Secretariat: CSCE Communication series (1991–1994) – Nos. 100 (6 August 1991)–222 (31 December 1991).1 – Nos. l (2 January 1992)–436 (30 December 1992). – Nos. l (1 January 1993)–330 (31 December 1993). – Nos. 1 (4 January 1994)–7 (27 January 1994). 5. Vienna Secretariat (since 1994) a) CSCE Communication series, Nos. 8 (31 January 1994)–37 (13 December 1994). b) (Chronological) “DOC” series: – Nos. 1 (11 April 1994)–1195 (27 December 1994). – Nos. 1 (2 January 1995)–551 (24 March 1995). c) Thematic series2 – CIO series (Chairman-in-Office), Nos. 1 (28 March 1995)–117 (29 December 1995). – FSC series (Forum for Security Co-operation), Nos. 1 (27 March 1995)– 368 (21 December 1995). – HC series (High Commissioner on National Minorities), Nos. 1 (15 May 1995)– 11 (29 December 1995). – INF series (Information), Nos. 1 (22 March 1995)–284 (29 December 1995).

1 This series was preceded by some 50 unnumbered communications – the first dated 20 February 1991 and the last 6 August 1991. It should also be noted that from 16 September 1991 to 22 March 1995 the Conflict Prevention Centre issued a large number of documents, unfortunately without a document code. 2 This classification system, usually with the base code “REF”, was established by the Information Circular No. 6 (REF.SEC/1/95) of 27 March 1995. 514  Bibliography

– MC series (Ministerial Council), Nos. 1 (7 November 1995)–110 (19 December 1995). – OD series (ODIHR), Nos. 1 (28 March 1995)–68 (28 December 1995). – PC series (Permanent Committee), Nos. 1 (27 March 1995)–809 (22 December 1995). – SC series (Senior Council), Nos. 1 (24 March 1995)–142 (27 October 1995). – EC series (Secretariat), Nos. 1 (27 March 1995)–426 (29 December 1995). d) OSCE Handbook (2nd edn) (Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, 1996), 90 p. (+ 11 unpaged annexes).

B. Compilations of official documents Bloed, Arie (ed.), The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972–1993 (2nd edn) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), xxix–1337 p. Decaux, Emmanuel (ed.), Sécurité et coopération en Europe. Les textes officiels du processus de Helsinki, “Retour aux textes” collection (Paris: La Documentation française, 1992), 458 p. McGoldrick, Dominic (ed.), Documents on the Human Dimension of the OSCE (Warsaw: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 1995), n–119 p. Rotfeld, Adam Daniel (ed.), From Helsinki to Budapest and Beyond: Analysis and Documents of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1973–1995 (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 608 p.

C. Bibliographies Barberini, Giovanni, Bibliografia sulla O. S. C. E (Perugia: Centro Internazionale di Ricerca, Formazione e Documentazione sulla CSCE, 1995), 91 p. Holtermann, Henrik, CSCE: From Idea to Institution: A Bibliography (Copenhagen: The Danish Institute of International Studies, 1993), 324 p.

D. Journals/Periodicals – CSCE Digest (Washington: Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe), 1977–present. – Helsinki Monitor (Utrecht: Netherlands Helsinki Committee/International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights), 1990–present. – ODIHR Bulletin (Warsaw: Winter 1992/93), first issue. – OSCE Newsletter (Vienna: OSCE Secretariat, Department for Chairman-in-­ Office Support), 4 February 1994), first issue.

II. Twentieth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act From 1975 to 1995 and Beyond: The Achievements of the CSCE – The Perspectives of the OSCE Geneva Seminar on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Helsinki Act: Statements of the Panelists (Bern: OSCE  Bibliography   515

Section, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 1995), 62 p. (contributors: Edouard Brunner, Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, Max Kampelman, Yuri Kashlev, Hanna Suchoka, Kazys Bobelis, Vladimir Shustov, Thomas Price, Carmen Fontes, Max van der Stoel and Benedikt von Tscharner). “Helsinki, 20 ans après”, Politique internationale, no. 68 (Summer 1995), pp. 43–142 (contributors: Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, Gyula Horn, Otto von Habsburg, Andreï Kozyrev, Mikhaïl Gorbachev and Zbigniew Brzezinski). ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), special issue (contributors: Adam Daniel Rotfeld, William Korey, Arie Bloed, Yuri Kashlev, Pertti Torstila, John J. Maresca, Max van der Stoel, Harm J. Hazewinkel and Lea Virtala). “The OSCE veterans: 20 years later”, International Affairs (Moscow), nos. 11–12 (November– December 1995), pp. 66–83 (contributors: Yuri Kashlev, Vladimir Shustov, Yuri Dubinin and Yuri Rachmaninov). “Twenty years Helsinki Final Act”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), special issue (contributors: László Kovács, Wilhelm Höynck, Max van der Stoel, Audrey Glover, Rob Zaagman, Paula Gutlove, Gordon Thompson, Stephen Blank and Arie Bloed).

III. Political and Institutional Evolution of the OSCE since 1990

A. Books Barberini, Giovanni and Ronzitti, Natalino (eds.), La nuova Europa della CSCE. Istituzioni, meccanismi e aspetti operativi della CSCE (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1993), 240 p. Bloed, Arie (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath, (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), xvii–463 p. Bouvard, Loïc and George, Bruce, Working Group on the New European Security Order: Special Report on the Helsinki Summit 1992 (Brussels: Secretariat of the North Atlantic Assembly, 1992), 116 p. (AJ 263 PC/ES (92) 2).Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Beyond Process: The CSCE’s Institutional Development, 1990–92 (Washington: Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), 39 p. – From Vienna to Helsinki: Reports on the Inter-sessional Meetings of the CSCE Process (Washington: Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), viii–190 p. – The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: An Overview of the CSCE Process, Recent Meetings and Institutional Developments (Washington, 1992), 47 p. – The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-­ operation in Europe, March 24–July 8, 1992 (Washington: Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1992), 55 p. 516  Bibliography

Cuthbertson, Ian M. (ed.) Redefining the CSCE: Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe (Helsinki: Institute for East–West Studies/Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1992), xiii–307 p. Decaux, Emmanuel, La Conférence sur la coopération et la sécurité en Europe (CSCE), “Que sais-je ?” collection, no. 2661 (Paris: PUF, 1992), 127 p. Ghebali, Victor-Yves and Sauerwein, Brigitte, European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives (New York: United Nations, 1995), 230 p. Greco, Ettore (ed.), L’Europa senza muri: le sfide della pace fredda. Un anno di Presidenza italiana della CSCE (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1995), 272 p. (contributors: Luigi Vittorio Ferraris, Victor-Yves Ghebali and Ettore Greco). Heraclides, Alexis, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization (London: Pinter, 1993), x–274 p. Kemp, Walter, The OSCE in a New Context: European Security towards the Twenty-First Century (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 42 p. Lehne, Stefan, The CSCE in the 1990s: Common European House or Potemkin Village? (Vienna: Braumüller, 1991), xii–124 p. Lucas, Michael R. (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), xxvii–396 p. Open Media Research Institute, The OSCE: Assessment and Future Prospects: Conference Report, 28 October 1995 (Prague, 1995) (unpaged). Remacle, Eric, La CSCE : mutations et perspectives d’une institution paneuropéenne, “Courrier hebdomadaire” collection, nos. 1348–1349 (Paris: CRISP, 1992), 71 p.

B. Articles Aćimović, Ljubivoje, “CSCE during the Nineties”, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. XLI, no. 970 (5 September 1990), pp. 5–10. – “The CSCE after Paris”, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. XLII, no. 984 (5 April 1991), pp. 1–6. Alexander, Michael, “European Security and the CSCE”, NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 4 (August 1991), pp. 10–14. Alp, Ali Hikmet, “Changing Security Environment and the OSCE”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 74–77. Altermatt, Claude, “The Stockholm Meeting of the CSCE Council”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 5–11. Anstis, Christopher, “CSCE Mark II: Back to Helsinki from Paris via Berlin and Prague”, NATO Review, vol. 40, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 18–23. Bebler, Anton, “The Neutral and Non-Aligned States in the New European Security Architecture”, The International Spectator, vol. XXVII, no. 1 (January–March 1992), pp. 69–77. Birnbaum, Karl E. and Peters, Ingo, “The CSCE: A Reassessment of its Role in the 1980s”, Review of International Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (October 1990), pp. 305–319.  Bibliography   517

Bjurner, Anders, “The Institutionalization of the CSCE”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 91–94. Bloed, Arie, “Helsinki-II: The Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 3 (1992), pp. 37–50. – “CSCE/OSCE Summit Meeting in Budapest Ended in ‘Failure’”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 1 (1995), pp. 66–72. Borawski, John, “The Budapest Summit Meeting”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 1 (1995), pp. 5–17. Bouvard, Loïc, “La CSCE et la nouvelle architecture de sécurité européenne”, Relations internationales et stratégiques, no. 7 (Autumn 1992), pp. 28–38. Brown, Sam W., “A New Organization Faces New Threats to Security”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII, 1996, special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 66–69. Bruni, Paolo, “The CSCE and the Italian Presidency”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 121–126. Buchsbaum, Thomas, “The 1993 Session of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 4 (1993), pp. 26–35. – “The 1994 Session of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 1 (1995), pp. 32–37. Cotir, Flavio, “The Role of the OSCE and the Plans of the Chairmanship in 1996”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 12–17. Däniker, Gustav, “On the OSCE’s Strategic Role and Public Profile”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 94–100. Decaux, Emmanuel, “CSCE Institutional Issues at the Budapest Conference”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 18–26. – “L’institutionnalisation de la CSCE”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos- Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends, “Cahiers du CEDIN” collection, no. 8 (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 125–157. Deriabin, Yuri, “The Soviet Union and the Helsinki Process: From Vienna to Moscow”, Paradigms, vol. 5, nos. 1–2 (1991), pp. 67–74. Dunay, Pal, “The Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 102–107. Eliasson, Nils, “Institutional Development of the CSCE: A Challenge of Change”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 12–14. – “The Future of the CSCE Secretariat”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 223–226. Erff, Hansjorg, “The OSCE in the Development of a New Security Architecture”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 70–73. Estrella, Rafael, “The CSCE and the Creation of a Parliamentary Assembly”, NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 5 (October 1991), pp. 23–26. Gasteyger, Curt, “The OSCE: Overrated or Underestimated?”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 88–93. 518  Bibliography

Ghebali, Victor-Yves, “La Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe”, Défense nationale, no. 518 (March 1991), pp. 73–82. – “Les fondements de l’ordre européen de l’après-guerre froide”, Politique étrangère, vol. 56, no. 1 (1991), pp. 59–69. – “Le processus d’Helsinki et le nouvel ordre européen”, Un défi pour la Communauté européenne. Les bouleversements à l’Est et au centre du continent (A Challenge for the European Community: The Upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe) (Brussels: Institut d’études européennes, 1991), pp. 85–101. – “The CSCE in the Post-Cold War Europe”, NATO Review, vol. 39, no. 2 (April 1991), pp. 8–11. – “The Institutionalization of the CSCE Process: Towards an Instrument of the ‘Greater Europe’?”, in Kate Holder, Robert E. Hunter and Paavo Lipponen (eds.), Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Next Phase: New Security Arrangements in Europe (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991), pp. 50–54. – “From the CSCE to the CSCM”, Inter-parliamentary Bulletin, vol. 72, no. 1 (1992), pp. 140–143. – “La CSCE à l’ère du post-communisme, une institution en devenir”, Memento Défense – Désarmement, “Les dossiers du GRIP” collection (Brussels: GRIP, 1992), pp. 125–131. – “La CSCE à la recherche de son rôle dans la nouvelle Europe”, in Mario Telo (ed.), Vers une nouvelle Europe? (Brussels: Ed. de l’Université libre de Bruxelles, 1992), pp. 49–79. – “La CSCE, du schisme Est-Ouest à l’après-communisme”, L’intégration européenne et la révolution de l’Europe de l’Est (Luxembourg: Institut universitaire international, 1992), pp. 195–240. – “L’An II de la CSCE institutionnalisée, de l’impuissance au second souffle ?”, “Les Cahiers français” collection, no. 257 (Paris: La Documentation française, July–August 1992), pp. 47–52. – “L’évolution de la CSCE depuis la Charte de Paris”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 17 (1992), pp. 159–194. – “The CSCE after the Helsinki Decisions of 1992: Towards an Operational Institution for Comprehensive Security”, Disarmament, vol. XV, no. 4 (1992), pp. 1–11. – “The CSCE in the Era of Post-Communism: The Jewel that Has Lost its Gleam”, Paradigms, vol. 6, no. 2 (1992), pp. 4–11. – “The July CSCE Helsinki Decisions: A Step in the Right Direction”, NATO Review, vol. 40, no. 4 (August 1992), pp. 3–8. – “CSCE’s Velvet Clout”, International Defense Review, no. 4 (April 1993), pp. 285–286. – “Faut-il regretter la guerre froide ?”, Journal des Associations patronales suisses, vol. 88, no. 44 (4 November 1993), pp. 1125–1127. – “La CSCE, laboratoire des valeurs de la Grande Europe”, Relations internationales, no. 73 (Spring 1993), pp. 63–80.  Bibliography   519

– “La fuite en avant de la CSCE”, Défense nationale, no. 541 (April 1993), pp. 97–108. – “La prise de décision au sein de la CSCE”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 23 (1993), pp. 199–211. – “Toward a Mediterranean Helsinki-type Process”, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 92–101 (also published in The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 335–343). – “CSCE Basic Needs before the 1994 Budapest Review Meeting”, Studia Diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 71–80. – “La crise d’identité de la CSCE”, Défense nationale, no. 551 (March 1994), pp. 103–113. – “The CSCE after the Rome Council Meeting: An Institution Still in the Making”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 75–81. – “The CSCE Process: Bright Past, Fuzzy Present, Uncertain Future”, in Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper and Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), The International System after the Collapse of the East–West Order (Dordrecht, Nijhoff: 1994), pp. 770–780. – “After the Budapest Conference: The Organization for Security and Co-­ operation in Europe”, NATO Review, vol. 43, no. 2 (March 1995), pp. 24–26. – “La CSCE : bilan de la période 1991-1994”, in Pierre Pascallon (ed.), Quelle politique de sécurité pour l’Europe ? (Paris: Publisud, 1995), pp. 85–92. – “La politique de la Russie à l’OSCE”, in Frédéric Grare (ed.), La Russie dans tous ses états, “Axes” collection (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996), pp. 207–230. Grant, Lyall, “Renforcement de la CSCE : la réponse aux rêves européens ?”, Politique étrangère, vol. 55, no. 3 (1990), pp. 589–607. Greco, Ettore, “The Role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in the Security System of the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 5–15. – “The OSCE after the Budapest Summit: The Need for Specialization”, The International Spectator, vol. XXX, no. 2 (April–June 1995), pp. 3–20. Gyarmati, István, “Security and Stability in Europe: Dangers and Means to Face Them”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 43–60. Höynck, Wilhelm, “CSCE Works to Develop its Conflict Prevention Potential”, NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 2 (April 1994), pp. 16–22. – “The Role of the CSCE in the New European Security Environment”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 16–25. – “From the CSCE to the OSCE: The Challenges of Building New Stability”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 11–22. – “The OSCE and its Contribution to New Stability”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 18–28. – Kemp, Walter A., “Giving Teeth to the CSCE?”, The World Today, vol. 50, no. 10 (October 1994), pp. 183–185. – “Hungary’s Chairmanship: An Assessment”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 108–119. 520  Bibliography

Kionka, Riina, “The CSCE and the Baltic States”, Report on the USSR, vol. 2, no. 47 (23 November 1990), pp. 17–19. Kokkinides, Tassos, “L’OSCE, une opportunité perdue pour la sécurité européenne”, Relations internationales et stratégiques, no. 18 (Summer 1995), pp. 88–99. Kooijmans, Peter, “The OSCE: A Problem Child with Growth Disorders”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 4 (1995), pp. 13–18. Kornblum, John, “Security in Co-operation: The CSCE”, NATO’s Sixteen Nations, vol. 38, no. 3 (1993), pp. 20–23. Kovács, László, “The Institutionalization of the CSCE”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 87–90. – “The Hungarian Chairmanship”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 3–11. Kümmel, Gerhard, “From Yesterday to Tomorrow: CSCE/OSCE at Twenty: Achievements of the Past and Challenges of the Future”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 8–16. Lange, Falk, “The Baltic States and the CSCE”, Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. XXV, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 233–248. Lange, Herman de, “The CSCE and Security in Europe”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 3 (1992), pp. 25–36. Leatherman, Janie, “Conflict Transformation in the CSCE: Learning and Institutionalization”, Co-operation and Conflict, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 403–431. Lipatti, Valentin, “La CSCE et les innovations dans la pratique des négociations diplomatiques multilatérales”, Revue internationale des sciences sociales, no. 132 (May 1992), pp. 333–340.Lucas, Michael R., “The Challenge of Helsinki II”, in Ian M. Cuthbertson and Adam S. Albion (eds.), Redefining the CSCE: Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe (New York: Institute for East–West Studies, 1992), pp. 288–296. – “The New Independent States and the CSCE”, in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Anna Kreikemeyer and Andrei V. Zagorski (eds.), The Former Soviet Union and European Security: Between Integration and Re-Nationalization (Baden- Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 189–204. – “Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Role of the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 4 (1994), pp. 5–37. Mazilu, Dumitru, “OSCE and its Role in the Future European Security Structure”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 78–80. Middelkoop, Eimert van, “The OSCE: An Inadequate Community of Values”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 4 (1995), pp. 30–34. Miko, Francis T., “American Perspectives on the Helsinki Review Conference and the Future Role of the CSCE”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 61–71.  Bibliography   521

Möttöla, Kari, “Prospects for Co-operative Security in Europe: The Role of the CSCE”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 1–29. Nagy, Zoltan, “From Helsinki to Budapest”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 29–42. Oliver, Robert Spencer, “The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996), pp. 42–57. Oswald, Maximilian, “Potentialities for the CSCE in the Changing International System”, Austrian Journal of Public International Law, vol. 49, nos. 2–4 (1995), pp. 361–378. Prater, Frédéric [pseudonym], “L’organisation de la grande Europe, le chantier de la CSCE”, Commentaire, vol. 63, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 489–496. Racic, Obrad, “From a CSCE to an OSCE”, Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. XLVI, no. 1033 (15 June 1995), pp. 13–14, 19–22. Romano, Sergio, “Histoire et avenir de la CSCE”, Cadmos, vol. 14, no. 55 (Autumn 1991), pp. 117–125. Ronzitti, Natalino, “The CSCE and its Institutions”, The International Spectator, vol. XXVIII, no. 1 (January–March 1993), pp. 31–46. Roth, Stephen J., “The CSCE ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’: A New Chapter in the Helsinki Process”, Human Rights Law Journal (HRLJ), vol. 11, nos. 3–4 (1990), pp. 373–378. Russo, Carlo, “Quelques réflexions sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe de son origine à la Conférence de Budapest (décembre 1994)”, Liber Amicorum Marc-André Eissen (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 347–362. Sapiro, Miriam, “Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 89, no. 3 (July 1995), pp. 631–637. Schifter, Richard, “The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Ancient History or New Opportunities?”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993), pp. 121–129. Schimmelfennig, Frank, “The CSCE as a Model for the Third World? The Middle East and African cases”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 319–333. Schlager, Erika, “The Procedural Framework of the CSCE: From the Helsinki Consultations to the Paris Charter, 1972–1990”, Human Rights Law Journal (HRLJ), vol. 12, nos. 6–7 (1991), pp. 221–236. Siccama, Jan-Geert, “The OSCE: What Will the Adult Look Like?”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 4 (1995), pp. 19–22. Szonyi, István, “The Institutionalization of the CSCE: A View from Hungary”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 127–142. Tarasyuk, Borys, “The Transformation of the CSCE in an International Organization”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 109–112. 522  Bibliography

Ushakov, Yuri, “Perspectives for the CSCE: A View from Russia”, Studia diplomatica, vol XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 113–120. Weitz, Richard, “The CSCE’s New Look”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 6 (7 February 1992), pp. 27–31. Zaagman, Rob, “Focus on the Future: A Contribution to Discussions on a New OSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 40–51. Zagorski, Andrei, “New European Unity: The End of the CSCE?”, Paradigms, vol. 5, nos. 1–2 (1991), pp. 76–88. – “The New Republics of the CIS in the CSCE”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 279–292.

IV. Politico-Military Dimension Almquist, Peter, “The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar: Flexible Response vs. Defensive Sufficiency”, Arms Control Today, vol. 20, no. 3 (April 1990), pp. 21–25. Borawski, John and George, Bruce, “The CSCE Forum for Security and Co-­ operation”, Arms Control Today, vol. 21, no. 9 (October 1991), pp. 13–16. Ferraris, Luigi Vittorio, “Réflexions critiques sur le Décalogue de la CSCE”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 17 (1992), pp. 203–210. Ghebali, Victor-Yves, “La CSCE et le mythe de l’immutabilité des frontières en Europe”, Nouvelle Europe, no. 5 (May 1991), pp. 24–27. – “Le droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes en Europe. De la détente à l’après-communisme”, Arès, vol. XIII, no. 2 (1992), pp. 91–98. – “Le Forum de la CSCE pour la coopération en matière de sécurité”, Arès, vol. XIII, no. 5 (1992), pp. 213–220. – “The CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation: The Opening Gambits”, NATO Review, vol. 41, no. 3 (June 1993), pp. 23–27. – “Les mesures de confiance militaires dans la problématique de la sécurité internationale”, in Sécurité collective et crises internationales (Paris: Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, 1994), pp. 275–308. – “The First Arms Control Agreements of the CSCE: Achievements of the Forum for Security Co-operation between Helsinki and Budapest”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 63–68. – “Analyse du Code de conduite de l’OSCE sur les aspects politico-militaires de la sécurité”, in Victor-Yves Ghebali and Dietrich Kappeler (eds.), Les multiples aspects des relations internationales. Etudes à la mémoire du Professeur Jean Siotis (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 221–231. Hurlburt, Heather, “The CSCE Forum on Security and Co-operation: Creating an Arms Control Negotiation for Post-Arms Control Europe”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 21–32. Joseph, Jean-Claude, “Les zones d’application des mesures militaires adoptées par la CSCE”, Défense nationale, no. 542 (May 1993), pp. 139–149 and no. 543 (June 1993), pp. 107–111.  Bibliography   523

Moller-Gulland, Niels, “The Forum for Security Co-operation and Related Security Issues”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 31–60. Shustov, Vladimir, “Peacekeeping in the CSCE: The Russian View”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 2 (1994), pp. 7–10. Terpstra, Rienk, “The OSCE Code of Conduct: Setting New Standards in the Politico-Military Field”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996), pp. 27–41. Wellershof, Dieter, “First Successful Step in CSBM Negotiations: The Military Doctrine Seminar”, NATO Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 1990), pp. 10–16.

V. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

A. Books Bardonnet, Daniel (ed.), The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects: Hague Academy of International Law Workshop, The Hague, 6–8 September 1990 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), xxv–678 p. Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the CSCE Process (Washington, 1991), iii–58 p. Decaux, Emmanuel and Sicilianos, Linos-Alexandre (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), 284 p.

B. Articles Bloed, Arie, “A European System of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, Polish Yearbook of International Law, vol. 18 (1989–1990), pp. 113–127. Caflisch, Lucius, “Le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux à la lumière des bouleversements intervenus en Europe centrale et en Europe de l’Est”, Anuario de derecho internacional, vol. IX (1993), pp. 17–39.“ Règlement pacifique des différends en Europe : la procédure de La Valette et les perspectives d’avenir”, in Christian Dominicé, Robert Patry and Claude Reymond (eds.), Etudes de droit international en l’honneur de Pierre Lalive (Basel/Frankfurt: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1993), pp. 437–456. – “Vers des mécanismes pan-européens de règlement pacifique des différends”, Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 97, no. 1 (1993), pp. 1–38. Caflisch, Lucius and Godet, Blaise, “La Suisse et le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux”, in Alois Riklin, Hans Haug and R. Probst (eds.), Nouveau manuel de la politique extérieure suisse (Bern: Haupt, 1992), pp. 957–971. Condorelli, Luigi, “En attendant la ‘Cour de conciliation et d’arbitrage de la CSCE’ : quelques remarques sur le droit applicable”, in Christian Dominicé, Robert Patry and Claude Reymond (eds.), Etudes de droit international en l’honneur de Pierre Lalive (Basel/Frankfurt: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1993), pp. 457–467. Eisemann, Pierre-Michel, “La Convention de Stockholm relative à la conciliation et à l’arbitrage au sein de la CSCE. Quelques observations iconoclastes”, in 524  Bibliography

Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 219– 229. Ferrari Bravo, Luigi, “Perspectives for the Valetta Meeting”, in Daniel Bardonnet (ed.), The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects: Hague Academy of International Law Workshop, The Hague, 6–8 September 1990 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 633–646. Ghebali, Victor-Yves, “La CSCE et la transformation des relations internationales en Europe”, in Daniel Bardonnet (ed.), The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects: Hague Academy of International Law Workshop, The Hague, 6–8 September 1990 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 529–566. Kooijmans, Peter H., “The Mountain Produced a Mouse: The CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Valetta 1991”, Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 5, no. 1 (February 1992), pp. 91–97. Leben, Charles, “La création d’un organisme C.S.C.E. pour le règlement des différends”, Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 95, no. 4 (1991), pp. 857–880. – “La mise en place de la Cour de conciliation et d’arbitrage au sein de l’OSCE”, Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 100, no. 1 (1996), pp. 135–148. Lucas, Michael R. and Mietzsck, Oliver, “Peaceful Dispute Settlement and the CSCE”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 83–109. Mrázek, Josef, “Third-Party Element in the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in the Framework of the CSCE Process”, in Daniel Bardonnet (ed.), The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects: Hague Academy of International Law Workshop, The Hague, 6–8 September 1990 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 609–625. – “European Security and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, Coexistence, vol. 31, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 221–240. Pellet, Alain, “Notes sur la Cour de conciliation et d’arbitrage de la CSCE”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 189– 217. Ruiz-Fabri, Hélène, “La CSCE et le règlement pacifique des différends : l’élaboration d’une méthode”, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. XXXVII (1991), pp. 297–314. Sicilianos, Linos-Alexandre, “Le mécanisme de règlement des différends au sein de la CSCE approuvé à Stockholm”, Annuaire français de droit international, vol. XXXIX (1993), pp. 899–918. Szafarz, Renata, “CSCE Procedures for Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes”, in Ove Bring and Said Mahmoudi (eds.), Current International Law  Bibliography   525

Issues: Nordic Perspectives: Essays in Honour of Jerzy Sztucki (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 183–193. Tanja, Gerard J., “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the CSCE: Bridge Over Troubled Water”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 22–33. – “Peaceful Settlement of Disputes within the Framework of the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 42–54. Yankov, A., “The Integration of Central and Eastern European States into a Common European System for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes”, in Daniel Bardonnet (ed.), The Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects: Hague Academy of International Law Workshop, The Hague, 6–8 September 1990 (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 447–455.

VI. Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention

A. Books Carlsson, Staffan (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), 157 p. Kalpyris, Eugenios, Vork, Richardt, and Napolitano, Antonio, Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l’ex-Yougoslavie : la coopération OSCE/Union européenne, “Axes” collection, no. 16 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), xi–191 p. Ramelot, Vincent and Remacle, Eric, L’OSCE et les conflits en Europe, “Les dossiers du GRIP” collection, nos. 203–204 (Brussels: GRIP, 1995), 136 p.

B. Articles Altermatt, Claude, “La CSCE et le conflit yougoslave, 1991-1993”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 24 (1993), pp. 139–151. Bascone, Francesco, “The Future Role of the CSCE in Promoting Peace”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 81–86. Blank, Stephen, “Russia, the OSCE, and Security in the Caucasus”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 65–80. Bloed, Arie, “CSCE Preventive Diplomacy in Operation”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 46–51. – “Active OSCE Mediation in Chechnya Crisis”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 81–85. – “The OSCE and the Bosnian Peace Arrangement”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996), pp. 73–85. Chigas, Diana, McClintok, Elisabeth and Kamp, Christopher, “Preventive Diplomacy and the OSCE: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Co-operation”, in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.), Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 25–95. Ghebali, Victor-Yves, “La crise yougoslave devant la CSCE”, Perspectives du droit international et européen. Recueil d’études à la mémoire de Gilbert Apollis (Paris: Pedone, 1992), pp. 211–227. 526  Bibliography

– “La cogestion du conflit yougoslave par les organisations internationales, beaucoup de bruit pour rien”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 24 (1993), pp. 167– 184 (also published in International Geneva Yearbook, vol. VIII, 1994, pp. 22–43). – “La crise tchétchène devant l’OSCE”, Défense nationale, no. 564 (May 1995), pp. 93–102. – “L’OSCE face aux conflits du Caucase (Haut-Karabakh, Ossétie du Sud et Abkhazie)”, in Mohammad-Reza Djalili (ed.), Le Caucase post-soviétique : la transition dans le conflit, “Axes” collection, no. 13 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 221–249. – “UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia: The Misuse of Peacekeeping and Associated Conflict Management Techniques”, in Daniel Warner (ed.), New Dimensions of Peacekeeping (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1995), pp. 13–40. – “La contribution de l’OSCE à la gestion du conflit yougoslave (1991-1995)”, Revue militaire suisse, vol. 141, no. 2 (February 1996), pp. 11–17. Gutlove, Paula and Thompson, Gordon, “The Potential for Co-operation by the OSCE and Non-Governmental Actors on Conflict Management”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 52–64.Höynck, Wilhelm, “CSCE Missions in the Field as an Instrument of Preventive Diplomacy: Their Origin and Development”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 55–72. – “CSCE Works to Develop its Conflict Prevention Potential”, NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 2 (April 1994), pp. 16–22. – “Role of the CSCE and Other Organizations in Managing Crisis and Maintaining Peace”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 37–50. – “New Challenges on the OSCE Conflict Resolution Agenda”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 2 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 3–10. – Huber, Konrad J., “The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 2, no. 31 (30 July 1993), pp. 30–36. – “The CSCE’s New Role in the East: Conflict Prevention”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 3, no. 31 (12 August 1994), pp. 23–30. Hurlburt, Heather, “CSCE Conflict Resolution in Practice: A Work in Progress”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 2 (1994), pp. 25–38. – “Russia, the OSCE and European Security Architecture”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 2 (1995), pp. 5–20. Hurlburt, Heather and Shorr, David, “A Gesamtkonzept for Conflict Management: Bringing Capabilities into Line with Exigencies”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 55–62. Kazimirov, Vladimir, “The OSCE and Nagorno-Karabakh”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 81–87. Lahelma, Timo, “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Estonia”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 87–99.  Bibliography   527

Leatherman, Janie, “The CSCE’s (Im)possibilities for Preventive Diplomacy in the Context of Ethnic Conflict”, International Journal of Group Rights, vol. 2, no. l (1994), pp. 35–54. Luca, Michael R., “The War in Chechnya and the OSCE Code of Conduct”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 2 (1995), pp. 32–42. Maresca, John J., “Why an OSCE Role in the Caucasus?”, Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 87–90. Napolitano, Antonio, “Sanctions as a Possible Tool of Preventive Diplomacy”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 138–157. Remacle, Eric, “La CSCE et la Communauté européenne face au conflit yougoslave”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 17 (1992), pp. 219–233. – “The Yugoslav Crisis as a Test Case for CSCE’s Role in Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 109–123. Rosas, Allan, “Internal Conflicts and the CSCE Process”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 2 (1992), pp. 5–9. Rotfeld, Adam Daniel, “New Security Structures in Europe: Concepts, Proposals and Decisions”, SIPRI Yearbook (1991), pp. 585–610. – “European Security Structures in Transition”, SIPRI Yearbook (1992), pp. 562–582. – “The CSCE: Towards a Security Organization”, SIPRI Yearbook (1993), pp. 171–218. – “Europe: Towards a New Regional Security Regime”, SIPRI Yearbook (1994), pp. 205–237. – “In Search of a Political Settlement: The Case of the Conflict in Moldova”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 100–137. – “The Future of the CSCE: An Emerging New Agenda”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 95–108. – “Europe: The Multilateral Security Process”, SIPRI Yearbook (1995), pp. 265–314. – “In Search of a Political Settlement: The Case of the Conflict in Moldova”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 100–137. – “The Future of the CSCE: An Emerging New Agenda”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 95–108. Scheltema, Gajus, “CSCE Peacekeeping Operations”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 7–17. – “CSCE Peacekeeping Operations”, in Arie Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 23–45.Siekmann, Rob, “Commentary: CSCE versus UN Peacekeeping”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 18–20. 528  Bibliography

– “Some Thoughts about the Development of CSCE Instruments in the Field Of Peace and Security”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 2 (1992), pp. 10–19. Törnudd, Klaus, “The Role of the CSCE Missions in Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Estonia”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 73–86. Train, Frédéric, “L’assistance douanière internationale pour l’application de l’embargo économique contre la République fédérale de Yougoslavie”, Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 99, no. 2 (1995), pp. 403–412. Vilén, Heikki, “Planning for a Peacekeeping Mission for the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict”, Security Dialogue, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 91–94. Vork, Richardt, “Les missions d’assistance pour l’application des sanctions de l’UE/OSCE (SAM)”, in Eugenios Kalpyris, Richardt Vork, and Antonio Napolitano (eds.), Les sanctions des Nations Unies dans le conflit de l’ex-­ Yougoslavie : la coopération OSCE/Union européenne, “Axes” collection, no. 16 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1995), pp. 75–121. Weitz, Richard, “The CSCE and the Yugoslav Conflict”, RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 5 (31 January 1992), pp. 24–26. Williams, Andrew, “Mediation by Small States: Some Lessons from the CSCE”, Paradigms, vol. 6, no. 1 (1992), pp. 52–64. Zaagman, Rob, “The CSCE and the Yugoslav Crisis”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), pp. 43–50.

VII. The OSCE and Other International Organizations Bauwens, Werner et al., “The CSCE and the Changing role of NATO and the European Union”, NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 3 (June 1994), pp. 21–25. Benoît-Rohmer, Florence and Hardeman, Hilde, “The Pact on Stability in Europe: A Joint Action of the Twelve in the Framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 4 (1994), pp. 38–51. Borawski, John, “Forging the NATO–CSCE Partnership”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 2 (1994), pp. 39–47. Buchsbaum, Thomas M., “Les relations entre la CSCE et les organisations internationales, notamment le Conseil de l’Europe”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 231–254. – “The CSCE and International Organizations: Expanding Co-operation with the Council of Europe”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 125–142. – “The Council of Europe and the CSCE: Partners in Leadership?”, European Yearbook, vol. XL (1994), pp. 7–25. Cameron, Fraser, “The European Community and the CSCE”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-­ operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 265–277.  Bibliography   529

– “The European Union and the OSCE: Future Roles and Challenges”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 2 (1995), pp. 21–31. Gaer, Felice D., “The United Nations and the CSCE: Co-operation, Competition, or Confusion?”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 161–206. Ghebali, Victor-Yves, “Le rôle de la Communauté européenne dans le processus de la CSCE”, Revue du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, no. 343 (January 1991), pp. 8–13. – “Sécurité collective ou défense collective ? Le choix de l’Europe post- communiste”, L’état du monde 1995 (Paris: La Découverte, 1994), pp. 615– 618. – “Vers un pacte de stabilité en Europe”, Défense nationale, no. 557 (October 1994), pp. 67–77. – “Les institutions de sécurité en Europe : concurrence et coopération”, in Pierre Pascallon (ed.), Quelle politique de sécurité pour l’Europe ? (Paris: Publisud, 1995), pp. 98–102.“ Les relations de l’OSCE avec l’ONU depuis la fin de la guerre froide”, Arès, vol. XV, no. 2 (1996), pp. 49–57. Kemp, Walter, “The OSCE and the UN, a Closer Relationship”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 1 (1995), pp. 23–31. Lodgaard, Sverre, “Competing Schemes for Europe: The CSCE, NATO, and the European Union”, Security Dialogue, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 57–68. Moltke, Gerhard von, “The CSCE and NATO”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 23–28. – “NATO and the OSCE: An Evolving Partnership for a New Europe”, Európai Szemle (Budapest), vol. VII (1996), special issue (“OSCE, 1995”), pp. 61–65. Montferrand, Bernard de, “Stabilité européenne : le ‘Plan Balladur’”, Politique internationale, no. 67 (Spring 1995), pp. 237–248 (see also Montferrand’s interview in La lettre diplomatique, no. 31 (March–April 1995), pp. 46–54). Sneek, Th. J. W., “The CSCE in the New Europe: From Process to Regional Arrangement”, Indiana International Law and Comparative Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1994), pp. 1–73. Świtalski, Piotr, “Sécurité régionale et arrangements régionaux : le cas de l’OSCE”, Arès, vol. XV, no. 2 (1996), pp. 41–47.

VIII. The Economic Dimension Bedarff, Hildegard, “The Future of Pan-European Economic and Environmental Co-operation”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 249–264. Ghebali, Victor-Yves, “Les trois dimensions de la coopération écologique Est- Ouest”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 11 (1990), pp. 61–69. – “La dimension politique des nouvelles relations économiques Est-Ouest”, in Jean-Daniel Clavel and John C. Sloane, La nouvelle Europe de l’Est, du plan au 530  Bibliography

marché : les défis de la privatisation, “Organisation internationale et relations internationales” collection, no. 20 (Brussels: Bruylant, 1991), pp. 25–41.

IX. The Human Dimension

A. Books Decaux, Emmanuel and Sicilianos, Linos-Alexandre (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), 284 p. Heraclides, Alexis, Security and Co-operation in Europe: The Human Dimension 1972-1992 (London: Cass, 1993), xvi–217 p. Bloed, Arie and Dijk, Pieter van (eds.), The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-up Meeting and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), 364 p. Bloed, Arie, Leicht, Liselotte, Nowak, Manfred and Rosas, Allan, Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), xvi–338 p. Kędzia, Zdzisław, Korula, Anna and Nowak, Manfred (eds.), Perspectives of an All-European System of Human Rights Protection: The Role of the Council of Europe, the CSCE and the European Communities, All-European Human Rights Yearbook, vol. 1 (Kehl am Rhein/Strasbourg/Arlington: N. P. Engel Publisher, 1991), 360 p.

B. Articles Amor, María and Estébanez, Martin, “The OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues 1995”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 7, no. 1 (1996), pp. 5–26 Bloed, Arie, “Successful Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 8, no. 3 (1990), pp. 235–260. – “A New CSCE Human Rights ‘Catalogue’: The Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, in Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk (eds.), The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-up Meeting and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 54–73. – “Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE: A Critical Analysis”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), pp. 4–16. – “Oslo Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions: A CSCE Meeting with Teething Troubles”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), pp. 17–22. – “Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension: In Search of its Effectiveness”, in Arie Bloed, Liselotte Leicht, Manfred Nowak and Allan Rosas, Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1993), pp. 45–91. – “The CSCE and the Protection of National Minorities”, in Alan Philips and Allan Rosas (eds.), The UN Minority Rights Declaration (Turku: Åbo Akademi University/Institute for Human Rights, 1993), pp. 113–122.  Bibliography   531

– “The CSCE and the Protection of National Minorities”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), S. pp. 1–25. – “The CSCE Human Dimension Commitments: Present and Prospects”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 43–59. – “The First Human Dimension Seminar: Tolerance”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 1 (1993), pp. 15–21. – “The CSCE and the Minority Issue”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 82–86. – “The Human Dimension of the OSCE: More Words than Deeds?”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 4 (1995), pp. 23–29. – “The Human Dimension of the OSCE: Past, Present and Prospects”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 15–26. Brett, Rachel, “Non-Governmental Organizations and the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 3 (1992), pp. 19–24. – “NGOs and the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 3–8. – “The Human Dimension of the CSCE and the CSCE Response to Minorities”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 143–160. Brett, Rachel and Eddison, Elaine, “The CSCE Human Dimension Seminar on National Minorities: Can National Minorities Be Considered Positively?”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 4, no. 3 (1993), pp. 39–45. Buchsbaum, Thomas, “The Human Dimension after Helsinki-II”, in Arie Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 305–357. Buchsbaum, Thomas, Hammer, Stefan, Suntinger, Walter and Tretter, Hannes, “The First Human Dimension Implementation Meeting: A Report”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 64–74. – “The First Human Dimension Implementation Meeting: Analysis of the Informal Recommendations”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 2 (1994), pp. 68–80. Buergenthal, Thomas, “The Copenhagen CSCE Meeting: A New Public Order for Europe”, Human Rights Law Journal (HRLJ), vol. 11, nos. 1–2 (1990), pp. 217–231. – “The CSCE Rights System”, George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 25, no. 2 (1991), pp. 334–386. – “CSCE Human Dimension: The Birth of a System”, in Andrew Clapham and Frank Emmer (eds.), The Protection of Human Rights in Europe, 1990, I/2: Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 163–209. Chebeleu, Traian, “The Human Dimension of the CSCE: The Copenhagen Meeting”, Revue roumaine d’études internationales, vol. 24, no. 1 (1990), pp. 11–23. 532  Bibliography

Chigas, Diana, “Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice: The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 27–41. – “Building Capacity for Conflict Prevention”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 2, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 1994), pp. 3–8. De Concini, Dennis and Hoyer, Steny H., “The Human Dimension at the Budapest Review Meeting”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 6–17. Decaux, Emmanuel, “La Réunion de Copenhague de la Conférence sur la dimension humaine de la CSCE”, Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 94, no. 4 (1990), pp. 1019–1034. Dijk, Pieter van, “The Relation between the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Human Dimension of the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 2, no. 4 (1991), pp. 5–14. Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe, “The Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE: Adopting a European Charter of Freedom”, NATO Review, vol. 38, no. 4 (August 1990), pp. 9–15. Ermacora, Felix, “Rights of Minorities and Self-Determination in the Framework of the CSCE”, in Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk (eds.), The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-up Meeting and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 197–206. Fisher, Per, “The Cracow Symposium on Cultural Heritage”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-­ operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 293–308. Ghebali, Victor-Yves, “La CSCE et l’information à l’ère de l’après-guerre froide, le bilan du Forum de Londres”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 8 (1989), pp. 77–89. – “Human Rights in the All-European Process”, International Affairs (Moscow), no. 10 (October 1991), pp. 54–63. – “Le thème des droits de l’homme dans le processus de la CSCE”, in Patrice Meyer-Bisch and Marie Jean-Bernard (eds.), Le noyau intangible des droits de l’homme. Actes du VIIème Colloque interdisciplinaire sur les droits de l’homme (Freiburg: Ed. universitaires, 1991), pp. 173–195.“ La CSCE et la question des minorités nationales”, in André Liebich and André Reszler (eds.), L’Europe centrale et ses minorities : vers une solution européenne ? (Paris: PUF, 1992), pp. 51–72. – “La problématique de liberté de circulation de l’information : du conflit Est-Ouest à l’après-communisme”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 18 (1992), pp. 117–139. – “La question des minorités nationales à la lumière du Pacte de stabilité en Europe”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 28 (1994), pp. 107–122. – “The Human Dimension Regime on States of Public Emergency”, ODIHR Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 1 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 32–38. Glover, Audrey, “National Minorities in Europe”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVIII, no. 3 (1995), pp. 53–61. – “The Human Dimension of the OSCE: From Standard-Setting to Implementation”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 31–39.  Bibliography   533

Gronick, Ritva, “The CSCE and Non-Governmental Organizations”, in Michael R. Lucas (ed.), The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-operation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 227–248. Guerra, Stefano, “The Multi-Faceted Role of the ODIHIR”, ODIHIR Bulletin, vol. 4, no. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 11–21. Hazewinkel, Harm J., “Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow”, in Arie Bloed and Pieter van Dijk (eds.), The Human Dimension of the Helsinki Process: The Vienna Follow-up Meeting and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1991), pp. 128–142. Helgesen, Jan E., “Between Helsinkis – and Beyond? Human Rights in the CSCE Process”, in Allan Rosas and Jan Helgesen (eds.), Human Rights in a Changing East–West Perspective (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 241–263. – “The Road to the New Europe of Human Rights: From Helsinki via Paris – or from Where via Where?”, in Asbjorn Eide and Jan Helgesen (eds.), The Future of Human Rights Protection in a Changing World: Fifty Years Since the Four Freedoms Address: Essays in Honour of Torkel Opsahl (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1991), pp. 131–143. – “The Protection of Minorities in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE): A Note on the Helsinki Document 1992”, in John Packer and Kristian Myntti (eds.), The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in Europe (Turku: Åbo Akademi University/Institute for Human Rights, 1993), pp. 15–22. – “Protecting Minorities in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) Process”, in Allan Rosas and Jan Helgesen (eds.), The Strength of Diversity: Human Rights and Pluralist Democracy (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 159–186 (also published in International Journal on Group Rights, vol. 2, no. 1 (1994), pp. 7–34). Heraclides, Alexis, “Helsinki-II and the Human Dimension: Normative Commitments, the End of an Era?”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 65–76. – “The CSCE and Minorities: The Negotiations behind the Commitments, 1972–1992”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 3 (1992), pp. 5–18. – “The Diplomatic Process of Elaborating The CSCE Human Dimension Commitments: From Ideological Incompatibility to Community of Values”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 27–42. – “The Human Dimension’s Swansong in Helsinki-II: The Normative Aspect with Emphasis on National Minorities”, Arie Bloed (ed.), The Challenges of Change: The Helsinki Summit of the CSCE and its Aftermath (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1994), pp. 283–303. Herman, Patrick and Remacle, Eric, “Vers un nouveau droit des minorities ?”, A la recherche d’un nouvel ordre mondial. Tome 1, Le droit international à l’épreuve (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1993), pp. 123–157. Huber, Konrad J., “Preventing Ethnic Conflict in the New Europe: The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities”, in Ian Cuthbertson and Jane Leibowitz (eds.), Minorities: The New Europe’s Old Issue (New York: Institute 534  Bibliography

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– “The CSCE ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’/A New Chapter in the Helsinki Process”, Human Rights Law Journal (HRLJ), vol. 11, nos. 3–4 (1990), pp. 373–378. – “Comments on the Geneva CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities”, Human Rights Law Journal (HRLJ), vol. 12, nos. 8–9 (1991), pp. 330–334. Roucounas, Emmanuel, “Remarques sur la portée juridique des engagements CSCE concernant la dimension humaine”, in Emmanuel Decaux and Linos-­ Alexandre Sicilianos (eds.), La CSCE : dimension humaine et règlement des différends (Paris: Montchrestien, 1993), pp. 89–113. Siekman, Rob, “The Linkage between Peace and Security and Human Rights in the CSCE Process”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), pp. 43–51. Stoel, Max van der, “Controlling Ethnic Tensions in Europe: The Experience of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4 (1994), pp. 88–96. – “Preventing Conflict and Building Peace: A Challenge for the CSCE”, NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 4 (August 1994), pp. 7–12. – “The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE Conflict Prevention”, Studia diplomatica, vol. XLVII, no. 4 (1994), pp. 59–70. – “The Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in CSCE Preventive Diplomacy”, in Staffan Carlsson (ed.), The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy: The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994), pp. 33–54. – “The Heart of the Matter: The Human Dimension of the OSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 6, no. 3 (1995), pp. 23–30. Tabory, Mala, “Minority Rights in the CSCE Context”, in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 187–211. Uden, Martin, “Human Rights Monitoring and the CSCE”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 5, no. 2 (1994), pp. 81–84. Vigny, Jean-Daniel, “Le Document de la Réunion de Copenhague de la Conférence sur la dimension humaine de la CSCE : Introduction et commentaires”, Revue universelle des Droits de l’Homme, vol. 2, no. 9 (22 October 1990), pp. 305–313. Widmer, Paul, “Réflexions sur l’apport de la CSCE, de Genève à Moscou : le défi des minorités nationales en Europe”, Le Trimestre du monde, no. 17 (1992), pp. 211–218. Zaagman, Rob, “From Proposition to Provision: Negotiating a CSCE Text in Copenhagen”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 1, no. 3 (1990), pp. 31–35. – “From Proposition to Provision, Part Two: Expanding a CSCE Text in Moscow”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 2, no. 4 (1991), pp. 44–48.“ Helsinki-II and the Human Dimension: Institutional Aspects”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 4 (1992), pp. 52–64. Zaagman, Rob, “The CSCE and the Yugoslav Crisis”, Helsinki Monitor, vol. 3, no. 1 (1992), pp. 43–50. 536  Bibliography

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Index

A Abkhazia: 63, 65, 186, 207, 208, 212–219, 222, 241, 247, 249, 250, 281, 282 see also Caucasus; Georgia; Sukhumi accession (to the CSCE): 85, 117, 118, 145, 209, 223, 228, 230, 232–235, 252, 268, 274, 293, 318, 376, 379, 429, 431, 432, 460, 461, 490, 492 see also Andorra; Baltic States; enlargement/CSCE; former Soviet Republics; former Yugoslav Republics; Czech and Slovak Republics ad hoc steering group(s): 22, 23, 178, 186 Adjara: 207, 208, 219 Afghanistan: 118, 230, 231, 233–235, 465 “Agenda for Peace” (and Supplement): 60, 239, 251, 324 agreement(s) – see → Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brioni; CFE; Dayton; Erdut; Florence; Pact for Stability in Europe Albania: 34, 55, 83, 85, 96, 193, 293, 310, 312, 314, 317, 318, 320, 324, 325, 371, 380, 432, 68, 485, 487–490, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 77–80, 97 and Kosovo: 286, 302–307, 310, 370, 400, 422, 467, 494 and the HCNM: 370, 371, 416, 417, 422, 423, 439, 485, 487 elections: 79, 305, 306, 308, 376, 382, 439, 467, 482, 494 OSCE Presence: 302, 318, 320, 370, 423 rapporteur mission: 78, 81, 376 see also Council of Europe; Greece/Omonia Algeria: 3, 98, 104 and the “5+5” Conference: 105, 106 as Non-participating Mediterranean State: 3, 36, 98–100, 108, 346, 369, 371, 463 see also Partners for Co-operation/Mediterranean Alia, Ramiz: 79 Almaty: 235, 250, 464, 511, 512 Alp, Ali Hikmet: 236 Alto Adige: 224, 416 Amnesty International: 369, 447 Andorra − accession to the OSCE: 77, 97, 431, 460 fact-finding mission to: 461, 492 Andriessen, Frans: 94 annual calendars: 143, 146, 147 annual exchange [of military information] – see → military information/AEMI anti-Semitism: 31, 359, 359, 393, 435 Arab Maghreb Union: 104, 105 Aragona, Giancarlo: 45, 460, 501 Aral Sea: 347, 464, 510, 512 538  Index

arbitration: 29, 84, 171, 173, 178, 187–192, 194, 295 see also Court of Conciliation and Arbitration area of application (FSC): 116 Argentina: 460 armed conflict(s): 60, 64, 121,122, 133, 144, 154, 168, 176, 177,196, 205, 247, 279, 303, 414, 464, 509 in Chechnya: 135, 196, 219, 239, 242, 247, 282 in Georgia: 196, 208, 214 in Nagorno Karabakh: 64, 196 in Tajikistan:196, 233 in Transnistria: 196, 222 armed forces: 50, 120, 123, 130, 132, 134,135, 143, 149, 158, 161, 202, 226, 227, 243, 256, 264, 268, 272, 276, 291 conventional: 2, 6, 46, 89, 112–114, 116–118, 125, 126, 214, 222, 253, 331, 444, 464, 472, 509 democratic/political control (of ): 132, 134 Seminar on Armed Forces in Democratic Societies (1992): 509 withdrawal (of ): 208 see also Convention on armed Forces in Europe/Treaty arms transfers: 119, 122, 125, 127, 161, 510 see also Convention on armed Forces in Europe/Treaty; Programme for Immediate Action Armenia: 34, 70, 189, 193, 206, 214, 389, 382, 383, 433, 455, 467, 473, 474, 488 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 82, 97 and the HCNM: 409, 420 and Nagorno-Karabakh: 197–204 arms control: 36, 49, 134, 153, 159, 162, 164, 468, 499, 500 framework of: 470–472 in the Balkans (sub-regional): 445–447 regional: 32, 35, 160, 162–164, 444, 455, 498 and disarmament: 32, 35, 48, 112, 113, 115, 131, 160, 164, 466, 468, 499, 500 see also Dayton; disarmament; Florence; harmonization/CSBM; weapons Asia: 97, 107, 117, 387, 417, 432, 464, 469, 499, 511, 512 Asian partners for Co-operation – see → Korea; Japan; partners for co-operation/ Asian Assistance Group – see → Chechnya Assembly of European Regions: 346 Australia: 109, 128 Austria: 19, 34, 43, 55, 62, 73, 83, 129, 161, 163, 179, 190, 192, 193, 278, 287, 288, 293, 294, 306, 307, 324, 332, 502, 512 and conflict resolution (in Yugoslavia): 178 and the Code of Conduct: 129, 502 and CSBMs: 4, 46, 47, 81, 92, 93, 111, 113, 116, 121, 155,  Index   539

and the human dimension: 2, 71, 73, 74, 92, 93, 111, 121, 363, 365, 369, 370, 377, 393, 396, 402, 403, 408, 409 and national minorities/HCNM: 43, 46, 74, 93, 96, 97, 130, 135, 178, 363, 365, 369, 370, 377, 393, 396, 402, 403, 408, 409 see also Vienna Azerbaijan: 82, 97, 193, 197, 206, 382, 433, 455, 467, 488, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 97 and Caspian oil: 241 and Nagorno-Karabakh: 198–204 Nakhichevan: 197, 473 see also Baku

B Baburin, Sergey: 280 Baden-Württemberg: 96 see also Central European Initiative Badinter, Robert: 187, 190, 194 Commission: 84, 85, 188, 295, 314 see also Court of Conciliation and Arbitration Baker, James: 2, 53, 376 Baku: 203 see also Azerbaijan Balkan (countries/region): 33, 78, 278, 286, 287, 292, 303, 306, 307, 311, 313, 318, 333, 463, 484, 504 Baltic States: 5, 21, 134, 162, 248, 250, 256–265, 273, 408, 456, 461, 467, 505 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 79, 80, 252 and conflict management: 454, 455 and the HCNM: 272, 406, 417, 418 and [their] independence: 27, 226, 252, 253, 255, 267, 272, 277, 288, 406 and Russian speaking population [minorities]: 253, 254, 253–265, 267, 272, 277, 417, 418 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops: 31, 226, 248, 253–258, 262, 264, 494, 506 see also Council of Europe/Baltic; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania Barcelona – Europe-Mediterranean Conference in (1995): 101, 454, 464 Basque (country/Euskadi): 224, 416 Bavaria: 96, 452 Belarus: 193, 199, 250, 371, 382, 434, 467, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 82, 96, 97 Belgium: 16, 55, 97, 115, 170, 190, 193, 313, 363, 365, 390, 402, 408, 460, 470, 512 540  Index

Belgrade (as political capital): 31, 40, 93, 155, 187, 287, 289, 293–295, 297, 301, 302, 305, 307–310, 312, 316, 323, 332, 367, 400, 416,446, 451, 467, 484–486 Follow-up Meeting (1978): 38, 157, 167, 351 see also Serbia; Yugoslavia/FRY Berisha, Sali: 78 Berlin: 1, 2, 5, 20, 28, 30, 53, 88, 92, 93, 103, 174, 197, 288, 328, 428, 457, 458, 459, 497 Council of Ministers (1991): 16, 17, 22, 26, 27, 42, 47, 56, 59, 60, 67, 78–80, 107, 108, 112, 113, 127, 167, 171, 287, 340, 437, 507 see also mechanism(s)/emergency consultation Bern: 493 Meeting of Experts on Human Contacts (1986): 71, 351 Bessarabia: 219, 220–222 Bihać: 28, 31, 288, 328, 329, 508 see also fact-finding mission; personal representative of the CiO Bildt, Carl: 330, 443, 447, 448, 450, 452 Black Sea: 95, 103, 206, 219, 241, 278, 282, 346, 347, 510 Bishkek: 347, 510 see also Kyrgyzstan Blackwell, Kenneth (Rapporteur of the human dimension mission to Serbia and Montenegro): 298, 301, 387 Bøgh, Tore: 308, 309 Bonn: 333, 343, 444 Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe (1990): 8, 71, 72, 88, 335, 337, 344 Final Document (1990): 8, 86, 94, 95, 336–339, 343, 348, 500 Boreal and Temperate Forests − see → Montreal/Seminar on Bosnia and Herzegovina: 33, 34, 40, 287, 295, 326, 326–333, 370, 371, 381, 446–448, 450–453, 457, 458, 487, 489, 490, 495, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 84, 97, 293 Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996): 331, 444 CSCE/OSCE Mission: 66, 84, 326, 322, 327, 328, 331, 444, 447, 448, 484, 486, 494 see also Bihać; Corell mission; CSBMs/BaH; Dayton [Agreements]; Implementation Force- IFOR; Peace Implementation Council; Sarajevo; personal representative; Republika Srpska Thompson mission; UNPROFOR Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 217 see also UN/Secretary General Brazil: 296 Brioni Agreement (1991): 289 Brunner, Edouard: 214  Index   541

Budapest: 23–26, 28–36, 45, 54–57, 87, 96, 108, 119,125, 128–131, 155, 206, 210, 212, 227, 242, 249, 257, 288, 307, 327–329, 332, 337, 343, 348, 372, 375, 379, 396, 420, 441, 460, 463, 470, 473, 499, 500, 508 Cultural Forum (1985): 167, 237 Ministerial Council (1995): 165, 332, 425 Review Conference (1994): 19, 29, 32–36, 52, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 75, 91, 94, 100, 109, 112, 119, 127, 229, 130, 135, 136, 158, 159, 161–164, 196, 205, 218, 328, 336, 342, 347, 352, 359, 361, 368, 374, 378, 383, 403, 407, 425, 440, 462, 468, 502 Summit (1994): 21, 31, 35, 62–64, 69, 109, 163 Budapest Summit Decisions/Declarations/ (1994): 21, 31, 35, 62–64, 69, 109, 163 budget (CSCE/OSCE) – see → scale of distribution Bulgaria: 45, 55, 83, 84, 96, 97, 156, 193, 286, 310, 311, 312, 320, 322, 324, 332, 376, 382, 390, 392, 396, 405, 431, 444, 463, 470 Bush, George (administration): 11, 53

C Canada: 6, 8, 46, 50, 54, 55, 71, 97, 115, 117, 118, 122, 127, 147, 179, 183, 193, 289, 299, 341, 355, 356, 362, 377, 393, 395, 396, 432 Caucasus (region): 206, 213, 214, 218, 246, 247, 416, 433, 434, 494, 499 North Caucasus: 239, 240, 241, 497 and Central Asia: 90, 91, 196, 432 Central and Eastern European countries: 344, 371, 443, 454, 459, 498, 504 Central Asia: 90, 91, 92, 145, 158, 196, 230, 232, 239, 240, 241, 285, 419, 433, 460, 465, 467, 499, 511 see also Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Uzbekistan; Tashkent/ Liaison Office Central European Initiative (CEI): 95, 96, 346, 363 Chairman-in-Office: 57, 61, 80, 91, 140, 165, 182, 189, 243, 282, 329, 332, 410 as a function: 15, 22−25, 56, 69, 81, 181, 184, 249, 277, 342, 493, 501 of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO): 24, 25, 27, 28, 40, 57, 61, 79, 81, 82, 99, 100, 108, 240, 164, 175, 178, 184, 185, 199, 246, 249, 262, 274, 275, 310, 315, 328, 347, 359, 383, 420, 422, 424 of the Council of Ministers/Ministerial Council (1991/95): 15, 18, 21, 27, 28, 40, 44, 45, 56, 69, 80, 91, 108, 177, 182, 188, 199, 202, 203, 205, 209, 223, 244, 342, 411, 430, 438, 447, 458 Swiss CiO (1996): 447, 450, 455, 458,461–463, 467, 473, 485, 490–495 see also chairmanship; personal representative of the CiO chairmanship (CSCE/OSCE)/ [as a governing body]: 24, 25, 28, 61, 166, 206, 218, 229, 249, 270, 443, 444, 468, 443–496 German chairmanship (1991): 24 Czechoslovak chairmanship (1992): 24, 61, 443, 444 Swedish chairmanship (1992/1993): 218, 229, 270 542  Index

Italian Chairmanship (1993/1994): 24, 249 Hungarian Chairmanship (1994/1995): 24, 166 Swiss Chairmanship (1996): 166, 443–496 “Charter 77”: 71 Charter of Paris for a new Europe − see → Paris chauvinism: 31, 359 Chechnya: 135, 187, 196, 219, 242, 243, 247, 282, 384, 467, 478, 479, 502 Assistance Group: 239, 242, 244–246, 278, 479, 494 and armed conflict management: 186, 371, 472 and Ingushetia: 21, 239–241 see also Caucasus/North; personal representative of the CiO; Russia/Chechnya Chernobyl: 279 China: 118, 128, 231, 296, 297, 320, 340 Chirac, Jacques: 440, 457, 458 Christopher, Warren: 450 Citizenship/nationality: 215, 267, 272–274, 276–278, 358, 372, 386, 388, 390, 396, 501 Code of Conduct on the Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994): 104, 114, 125, 128–136, 166, 242, 264, 466, 470, 502 see also politico-military dimension; Programme for Immediate Action Committee of Senior Officials (CSO): 11, 15, 22–24, 33, 39, 42, 43, 47–52, 56, 57, 61, 62, 65, 67, 68, 74,78–86, 89–95, 99, 113, 115, 165, 169, 171, 175, 177–179, 183–186, 189, 191, 193, 195, 196, 198–200, 209, 210, 215, 223, 235, 238, 248, 249, 255, 256, 262, 271, 277, 283, 287, 292, 295, 311, 320, 335, 340, 341, 343–347, 357, 364, 365, 368, 371, 373, 374, 403, 406, 410–413, 417, 423–425, 439, 491, 502, 507, 508 CSO emergency and additional meetings: 3, 16, 25, 27, 28, 40, 135, 174, 202, 288–291, 294, 328 CSO Vienna Group: 20, 26, 28, 49, 61, 92, 100, 108, 109, 209, 218, 224, 236, 257, 263, 275, 300, 303, 308–310, 315, 322, 367, 420, 438, 509 see also Chairman-in-Office/CSO; Senior Council Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS): 34, 67, 68, 69, 80, 81, 95, 124, 181, 192, 194, 204, 214, 216, 217, 225, 228, 232–235, 248–251, 278, 280, 346, 347, 464, 482, 492, 495, 510 Communications Network: 24, 42, 46, 47, 50, 57, 69, 126, 140, 144, 156, 341, 383, 469 conciliation (procedure): 25, 40, 46, 104, 170–174, 178, 187–192, 195, 196, 242, 280 see also Court of Conciliation and Arbitration Concluding Document of the Belgrade Follow-up (1978) − see → Belgrade Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up (1983) − see → Madrid Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow- up (1989) − see → Vienna Conference on CBMs and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) − see → Stockholm Conference on the former Yugoslavia (1992) – see → Geneva; Hague; London Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD) − see → Copenhagen; Moscow; Paris  Index   543

Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) − see → Mediterranean/CSCM Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs): 2, 4, 8, 11, 12, 26, 36, 39, 45–48, 50, 69, 78, 81, 92, 93, 100, 107, 109, 164, 167, 177, 242, 243, 331, 335, 344, 509, 511 and the Paris Charter: 131 and OSCE’s evolution: 45, 158 and co-operative security: 111–113, 115–121, 124–126, 131, 136, 137, 140–151, 153–160, 162, 164 and conflict managements: 36, 131, 455, 454, 468, 472, 499, 500 and the Swiss Chairmanship: 445–493 in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 444, 445 in the Mediterranean: 77 see also inspection, observation, Vienna/Document on/1990; 1992; 1994 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): 35, 106, 112, 117, 118, 143, 144, 157, 160, 161 167, 204, 205, 348, 420, 454, 465 conflict prevention − see → crisis management; early warning Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC): 11, 15–19, 24, 42–58, 68, 79, 90, 116, 138, 142, 155, 169–171, 177, 180, 184, 195, 344, 466, 469, 470, 509 and conflict management: 175, 185, 410 and the conflict in Yugoslavia: 41, 48, 92, 287, 291, 293, 294, 302, 310, 383 and the Forum for Security Co-operation: 17, 19, 20, 59, 50, 74, 113, 115, 141, 156, 158, 159, 343 and Kosovo: 49, 50, 302, 310 consensus: 19, 27, 31, 33, 37–41, 54, 56, 57, 62, 78, 82, 84, 87, 89, 92, 95, 104, 106, 108, 136, 169, 170, 178, 184, 185, 188, 192, 200, 244, 288, 290, 340, 343, 348, 356, 396, 400, 402, 411, 413, 424, 450, 466, 491 minus one: 17, 39–41, 62, 102, 121, 141, 294, 357, 361, 502, 503 minus two: 40, 195 non consensus: 38, 139, 249 constraints: 114, 126, 143, 144, 151, 217, 260, 371, 414, 452, 456 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration of Disputes (within the CSCE): 187, 189, 192 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): 4–8, 69, 81, 89, 113, 118, 126, 133, 161, 163, 241, 331, 332, 446, 506 Treaty on (1990): 2, 6, 46, 112, 117, 444 CFE 1A, Closing Act (1992): 13, 125, 147, 160, 352, 444, 472 co-operative security: 17, 41, 111, 131, 132, 112–164, 441, 457, 459, 471, 500 Copenhagen: 2, 6, 11, 52, 54, 351–354, 356, 362, 363, 375, 376, 390, 392–397, 400–402, 405, 408,415, 430, 448, 468, 487, 500, 511 2nd Conference on the Human Dimension (1990): 2, 71, 72, 77–79, 352, 362, 392 Document (1990): 6, 72, 352–354, 356, 363, 370, 390, 392–297, 400, 401, 406, 415, 430, 448, 487, 500 544  Index

Corell, Hans (Rapporteur of the Human Dimension mission to Bosnia- Herzegovina and Croatia): 298, 300 Cortese, Luchino: 371, 376, 473 Cotti, Flavio: 450, 461, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495 Council of Europe (CoE): 43, 91, 190, 247, 312, 317, 332, 373, 377, 378, 403, 406, 407, 409, 424, 464 and Albania: 79, 317, 318, 487, 489 and the Baltic States: 254, 265, 267–269, 272–274, 418 and CoE’s presence at OSCE events: 4, 10, 11, 427, 441, 503 and CoE’s rivalry with the OSCE: 427–432 and co-operation with the OSCE: 436–442, 489, 490, 493 and the economic dimension: 340, 346 and enlargement: 221, 273, 274, 281, 431,433 and France: 275, 375, 376, 428–431, 440, 460 and the human dimension: 69, 351, 352, 354, 374, 375, 390, 403, 406, 409, 421, 430, 434, 435, 440, 442, 447, 487, 497 and interaction with other international organizations: 53, 54, 67, 96, 274, 298, 315, 330, 346, 352, 369, 390, 394, 424, 430, 440, 447, 457, 461, 464, 479, 483, 486, 493, 499 and Moldova: 221, 229 and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE): 53, 54, 274, 340, 381, 421, 438, 441, 460, 461, 489, 490, 492, 493 and Russia: 247, 254, 267, 273, 274, 418, 428, 431, 432, 433, 490 and the Venice Commission [for Democracy through Law]: 369, 430, 440 and the Vienna CoE Summit /Declaration (1993): 429, 431, 432, 435, 436 see also enlargement/CoE Council of Ministers (1991–1994) − see → Berlin; Helsinki; New York; Prague; Rome; Stockholm Court of Conciliation and Arbitration: 178, 187, 191 see also Badinter/Commission; Convention on Conciliation […]; Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Cracow − Symposium on Cultural Heritage (1991): 10, 78, 94, 97, 167, 397, 430, 437,441, 500, 511 Crimea: 278–285, 419, 482, 483 see also national minorities; Sevastopol; Tatars of Crimea; Ukraine crisis management (and conflict prevention): 21, 23, 24, 29, 33–35, 48, 50, 60, 69, 106, 115, 163, 174–176, 179, 248, 408, 413 and the CSBMs: 120, 121, 124, 131, 143, 154–158, 160, 167, 457 see also peacekeeping; Stabilizing Measures  Index   545

Croatia: 34, 56, 82, 193, 286, 289, 292, 293, 295–297, 300, 305, 306, 312, 319, 320, 323, 326, 328, 329, 331, 332, 367, 371, 382, 403, 434, 439, 444, 446, 453, 467 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 83, 84, 97 Human Dimension rapporteur mission to [Bosnia-Herzegovina and] Croatia: 298, 300, 439 OSCE Mission: 484–486, 490, 494, 495 and the HCNM: 416, 487 Prevlaka Penninsula: 486 and the HCNM: 416, 487 see also Corell [Thune/Türk mission]; rapporteur mission; UNMOP culture (general): 7, 8, 59, 96, 104, 207, 231, 232, 239, 272, 361, 370, 385, 387, 388,391, 392, 393, 395, 397, 398, 404, 407, 421, 429, 433, 434, 495, 499, 505 see also Cracow/ Symposium on Cultural Heritage Cyprus: 3, 23, 27, 55, 81, 92, 93, 97, 98, 103, 104, 162, 167, 193, 338, 370, 416, 512 Czechoslovakia/Czech and Slovak Federative Republic: 10, 16, 41, 43, 45, 46, 70, 71, 77, 86–90, 96, 111, 179, 199, 402, 405, 419, 420, 431, 432 Chairmanship (1992): 22, 24, 61, 443, 444 separation with Slovakia (1993): 97 Czech Republic: 97, 179, 193, 248, 289, 324, 371, 381, 402, 424,431, 432, 443, 505, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 87, 89, 96 see also Slovak Republic

D Dayton, [Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (1995): 163, 287, 298, 318, 325–327, 329–333, 443, 447–453, 457, 458, 462, 472, 484, 489, 490, 491, 495, 499 Annex 1-B [Regional Stabilization]: 325, 371, 444 Annex 1-D [Treaty on Arms Limitation]: 325, 330 Annex 3 [Agreement on Elections]: 448, 449, 451 Annex 6 [Agreement on Human Rights]: 330, 447, 448 Decalogue (principles): 9, 104, 129, 132, 165, 287, 335, 351, 360, 391 and the Helsinki Final Act: 89, 111, 131, 391, 455, 497, 500 see also Principle I; Principle IV; Principle VII; Principle VIII; Principle X Declaration on the Gulf (1990) – see → New York/Ministerial Meeting defence planning: 119, 123, 124, 125, 137,144, 148, 159, 160, 469 see also military information; Programme for Immediate Action Delors, Jacques: 3, 5, 94, 95 De Michelis, Gianni: 96, 102, 107 Denmark: 55, 71, 97, 179, 190, 192, 193, 353, 362–364, 396, 408, 409, 463, 496, 512 see also Copenhagen 546  Index

diplomatic privileges (and immunities): 52, 57 see also legal personality disarmament (and arms control): 6, 7, 12, 32, 35, 48, 81, 92, 112, 113, 115, 119, 131, 144, 150, 160, 164, 245, 332, 338, 428, 466, 468, 470, 499, 500 discrimination: 80, 265, 270, 338, 348, 389, 393, 398, 401, 407, 419, 423, 450, 479 see also nationalism; non-discrimination; racism; xenophobia displaced persons: 234, 358, 360, 361, 373, 374, 451, 464, 486, 492 in Abkhazia: 215 in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 330, 447, 451, 456 in Chechnya: 244 in Tajikistan: 233, 234, 237, 477 see also refugees Domukhovsky, Group: 212 Drašković, Vuk and Danica: 301, 367 drug trafficking: 8, 111, 130 Dudayev, Dzhokhar: 240 Dumas, Roland: 16 Dushanbe (as political capital): 187, 232–234, 236–238, 464, 477, 495, 512 see also Tajikistan; UNMOT

E early warning: 63, 168, 176, 177, 260, 271, 316, 348, 456, 509 and the HCNM: 383, 408, 410, 411, 414, 425 as a conflict prevention instrument: 49, 50, 121, 425, 466 Economic Dimension: 25, 35, 36, 41, 59, 284, 335–349, 427, 248, 456, 462, 466, 468, 499, 500, 503, 504, 510 Economic Forum: 18, 20, 25, 26, 74, 87, 115, 335, 340–348, 438, 453, 466, 468, 492, 504, 508–510 see also Committee of Senior Officials; Geneva; Senior Council education: 31, 59, 79, 96, 220, 305, 356, 358, 361, 370, 390, 392, 393, 398, 398, 400, 407, 429, 436, 438, 440, 484 civic: 383, 449, 487 Egypt: 3, 98, 99, 100, 101, 105, 369, 371, 404, 454, 463 see also Partners for Co-operation/Mediterranean Eide, Vigleik: 445 Ekeus, Rolf: 5 elections (general): 1, 11, 54, 78, 208, 236–238, 243, 244, 246, 268, 306, 308, 309, 326, 331, 338, 353, 354, 361, 375–379, 398, 401, 441, 443, 449–453, 468, 478, 486–489 fair and free: 381–383 legislative: 305, 330, 382, 398, 448, 468, 487, 488 local: 305, 377, 382, 479, 494, 495  Index   547

presidential: 219, 232, 237, 246, 281, 282, 305, 330, 381, 382, 448, 467, 476, 479, 485 in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 326, 330, 331, 448–453, 486–488, 494, 495 in Chechnya: 186, 219, 243, 244, 246, 282, 467, 494 in Crimea: 281, 282 in Georgia: 186, 219, 243, 244, 246, 282, 467, 494 in Nagorno Karabakh: 198 in Moldova: 186, 229, 281, 382, 439, 467, 476 in Russia: 228 in Tajikistan: 186, 229, 232, 236–238 382, 465 Eliasson, Jan: 204, 206 Eliasson, Nils: 42 Ellemann-Jensen, Uffe: 352, 443 embargo (on Yugoslavia/arms/economic): 48, 56, 199, 291, 312, 314, 318, 319, 320, 322,323, 324, 325, 326 enlargement: 243, 432 of the CSCE (and its consequences): 77–97 of the Council of Europe: 221, 273, 274, 281, 431, 433, 434 of NATO: 34, 164, 166, 443, 456, 458, 505 see also accession environment protection – see → Sofia Erdut [Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium] (1995): 332, 486 Estonia: 66, 83, 138, 179, 186, 187, 193, 196, 240, 249, 252, 253, 256–258, 261, 263–266, 277, 359, 366, 370, 380, 382, 384, 412, 417–419, 424, 431, 432, 439, 443, 463, 464, 467, 472, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 80, 97 and the HCNM: 268–271 and Russian-speaking minorities: 254, 417, 418, 479, 480 CSCE/OSCE mission: 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 275, 479–481 see also Baltic countries; Paldiski base European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): 68, 336, 344, 346, 369 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992): 390 European Community − countries/member States: 16, 22, 23, 27, 38, 44, 47, 50, 65–67, 74, 84, 88, 93–95, 98, 102, 108, 181, 321, 335, 336, 341, 344, 345, 363, 367, 408, 429 Monitoring Mission to Yugoslavia: 65, 288, 444, 486 and the HCNM [mandate]: 408 and other international organizations: 38, 67 and the Yugoslav conflict: 65, 66 European Confederation (French project): 429, 430 European Investment Bank (EIB): 68, 344, 346 European Security Architecture: 67 548  Index

European Union: 10, 29, 41, 54, 67–70, 76, 94, 96, 100, 101, 103,122, 130, 166, 168, 170, 171, 176–178, 180–182, 188, 192, 247, 274, 287, 294, 298, 300, 301, 303, 310, 314, 315, 319, 321, 322, 330, 333, 453–455, 457, 459, 462, 464, 486, 489, 497, 499, 502, 504, evaluation [military activities/CSBMs]: 140, 143, 152, 154, 338, 344, 348, 469 and the economic dimension: 335, 348, 372, 407, 416, 424, 433, 434, 443, 447 and the Maastricht Treaty: 311, 458, 497, 505 and the United Nations: 84, 95, 199, 288−292 see also CSBMs; inspection; observation; verification Evnevitch, Valery: 226 exchange of military information – see → military information ex-Yugoslavia − see → Yugoslavia/former Republic of

F fact-finding mission(s): 25, 46, 48, 138, 141, 174–178, 332, 414 to Andorra: 461, 492 to Bihać: 328, 329 to Chechnya: 186, 243 to Croatia: 332, 485 to Georgia: 209 to Kosovo: 50 Latvia [UN]: 265, 266 Serbia: 320 Yerevan: 203 Yugoslavia [UN]: 320 see also Human Dimension mission(s); rapporteur missions; monitoring mission(s); UN/fact-finding missions Fascell, Dante: 53 Fernández Ordóñez, Francisco: 102 Federal Republic of Germany − see → Germany Fichte, Johan Gotlieb: 385, 387 Final Act – see → Helsinki/ Final Act financial contributions − see → scale of distribution Final Recommendations − see → Helsinki Consultations Finland: 5, 6, 55, 92, 93, 97, 108, 137, 192, 193, 301, 408, 409, 438, 470, 512 see also Helsinki Fleiner-Gerster, Thomas (Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia): 84, 292, 376 Florence Agreement [on sub-regional arms control in the Balkans](1996): 445, 447 Follow-up Meeting(s) − see → Belgrade; Budapest; Helsinki; Madrid; Review Conference/Meeting; Vienna former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia − see → Macedonia former Yugoslavia − see → Yugoslavia  Index   549

Forum on Security Co-operation (FSC): 17, 29, 43, 99, 100, 109, 111–115, 119, 120–131, 133, 135–142, 148, 149, 154, 156–163, 165, 248, 459, 468–472, 480 Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina − see → Dayton France: 2, 5, 7, 16, 18, 44, 50, 51, 55, , 71, 73, 80, 97, 102, 104, 105, 118, 123, 129, 156, 163, 170, 172, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 199, 287, 313, 447, 454, 458, 460, 467, 470 Franco-American dispute on the human dimension: 352, 363, 365, 375– 377, 390, 396, 397, 400, 404, 405, 408, 428–431, 440 Franco- American disagreement on NATO: 67–70, 166, 168, 180, 181, 375, 457 and the CSBMs: 46, 157 and the human dimension: 352, 354, 357, 363, 365, 375–377, 385, 386, 390, 396, 397, 400, 404, 405, 408, 409, 428–431, 435, 437, 440 see also Chirac; Delors; Mitterand; Paris freedom – of association: 75, 238, 338, 353, 361, 449, 451 of expression: 353, 356, 360, 361, 449, 467 of movement: 217, 228, 230, 245, 360, 361, 371, 381, 449, 451 of the media: 186, 236, 238, 284, 308, 356, 358, 308, 371, 373, 374, 449 individual freedoms: 12, 498 fundamental freedoms: 9, 35, 229, 351, 354, 370, 371, 394, 401, 430 see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights Frowick, Robert: 311, 443, 450–452 Furrer, Hans-Peter: 436

G Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (dam on the Danube): 87, 88 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad: 212 Gantamirov, Beslan: 245 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): 339 Geneva: 42, 43, 60, 62, 67, 105, 128, 246, 464, 465 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (1992–1996): 66, 290, 302, 303, 317, 319, 322, 326, 331, 446, 450 Meeting of Experts on National Minorities (1991): 9, 10, 43, 60, 73, 93–95, 97, 355, 363, 368, 377, 379, 390, 397–405, 415, 430, 437, 441 Meeting on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1992): 167, 178, 189, 190, 191, 194, 438 Economic Forum (Review – 1996): 343,492 Stage II (1973–1975): 38, 390, 391 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich: 79, 80, 179 550  Index

Georgia: 63, 70, 81, 187, 193, 196, 197, 206–216, 222, 239, 244, 247, 249, 251, 370, 380, 382–384, 433, 439, 467, 488, 495, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 82, 97, 193 209 and national minorities: 186, 207, 209, 213 CSCE/OSCE Mission: 50, 65, 186, 209, 218, 219, 237, 369, 474, 475 see also Abkhazia; Caucasus; elections; fact-finding mission(s); South Ossetia; Tbilisi; Tskhinvali German Democratic Republic (GDR): 45, 77, 97, 103, 393, 395 Germany (Federal Republic of /FRG): 55, 60, 62, 81, 96, 104, 108, 178, 188, 190, 192, 220, 247, 252, 258, 287, 344, 377, 385, 452, 456, 460, 505, 512 Chairmanship (1991): 24 reunification/unity: 7, 77, 386 and the human dimension: 54, 124, 355, 363, 393, 402, 404, 408, 409 and the politico-military dimension: 129, 163, 171, 444, 459, 470 and peacekeeping: 34, 46, 79, 89, 170, 315, 341 see also Berlin; Bonn; Höynck; Gensher; Khol Gibraltar: 3, 172 Glover, Audrey: 424 Gorbachev, Mikhail: 1, 11, 143, 157, 242, 252, 355, 428 Greece: 6, 55, 56, 81, 84, 85, 97, 105, 167, 171, 172, 190, 192, 193, 213, 287, 311–314, 318, 356, 363, 390, 393, 396, 401, 408, 470, 512 and the break-up of Yugoslavia: 286, 312–314, 324, 325, 370, 371, 400, 422 and Albania: 286, 370, 416, 423 and Macedonia (fYRoM): 56, 84, 85,286, 312–314, 318, 324, 325, 370, 371, 484 and minorities: 213, 356, 390, 393, 396, 400, 408, 416, 422 and Omonia (organization): 312–314, 325, 370, 371, 400, 422, 484 Grünigen, Marianne von: 5 Guldimann, Tim: 478, 494 Gyarmati, István: 209, 243, 244, 329, 332, 444, 460 Gypsies − see → Roma

H Hague (the): 37, 89, 290, 300, 319, 386, 413, 417, 445 as seat of the HCNM: 43 International Conference on Yugoslavia (1992): 65, 84, 288 see also ICTY Haller, Gret: 447 harmonization – as a CSBMs measure: 113, 117, 119, 127, 160, 161, 163, 176 see also Havel, Václav: 42, 71  Index   551

Helsinki: 4, 9, 10, 13, 16–18, 20–23, 25, 26, 31–33, 47–51, 55–57, 59–61, 66–68, 72–75, 78, 84, 87, 91, 92, 94, 98, 99, 104, 108, 111–116, 121,125, 127, 129, 132, 137, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 169, 170–181, 186, 189, 199, 205, 206, 248, 251, 254–255, 258, 288, 292, 294–335, 341, 342, 344–347, 352, 355, 357, 358, 361, 363–365, 370, 373, 377–380, 396–400, 425, 429, 439, 440, 462, 491, 501, 506–508 Additional Council of Ministers (1992): 21, 82, 84, 199, 200 Consultations (1972–1973)/ Final Recommendations (1973): 3, 27, 37, 58, 77, 82, 85 Final Act (1975): 1, 5, 12, 28, 58, 70, 79, 80, 89, 90, 95, 111, 118, 131, 143, 144, 157, 166, 167, 188, 390, 391, 455, 461, 497, 500 Follow-up Meeting (1992): 8, 17, 18, 21, 22, 32, 33, 35, 41, 49, 50, 60, 61, 68, 73, 74, 87, 90, 94, 98, 99, 108, 122, 113, 118, 127, 129, 167, 174, 175, 178, 179, 182, 184, 185, 188, 194, 226, 254, 255, 287, 293, 294, 336, 340, 341, 344, 346, 352, 355, 358, 361, 363, 364, 369, 373, 379, 383, 396, 397, 402, 403, 406–409, 413, 436, 438, 461 process (1972–1989): 3, 36–39, 41, 52, 58, 70, 77, 102, 105, 167, 352, 362, 371, 428, 460, 490, 497–500 Summit (1975): 13, 30 Summit (1992): 21, 30, 31, 49, 57, 60, 82, 84, 95, 98, 111, 113, 115, 127, 160, 164, 166, 181, 200, 205, 206, 226, 255–257, 264, 276, 295, 341, 355, 383 Decisions/Declarations (1992)/Challenges of Change: 40, 49, 95, 111, 200, 256, 341, 383, 441 Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session (1993): 56 Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly: 52, 369 Helsinki [monitoring/human rights/watch] Groups: 70, 71, 208, 488, 489 Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (International): 71, 369, 447, 450 hexagonal (initiative): 399 High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM): 17, 20, 32, 34, 39, 41, 43, 56, 57, 66, 74, 85, 89, 177, 178, 269, 270, 271, 274, 284, 302, 318, 358, 362, 364, 368-371, 379, 397, 403, 407, 423–427, 436, 438–440, 462, 479, 482, 501, 509 mandate: 408–416 and Albania: 417, 422 and Croatia 417, 485, 487 and Estonia: 268, 417, 418 and Hungary: 417, 419, 420 and Kazakhstan: 417, 419 and Kyrgyzstan: 417, 419 and Latvia: 273, 417, 418 and Lithuania: 265, 417, 418 and Macedonia: 317, 422 and Moldova: 417 and the Roma: 406 552  Index

and Romania: 417, 420, 422 and Slovakia: 417, 420 and Ukraine: 282, 417, 419, 420, 483 see also van der Stoel, Max; Ekeus, Rolf Höynck Wilhelm: 45 Huber, Konrad: 425 human dimension: 8–10, 17, 24, 25, 32, 35, 36, 66, 67, 69, 73–75, 91, 92, 104, 121, 174, 186, 265, 284, 291, 298, 300, 301, 327, 330, 342–344, 348–441, 462, 464, 466–468, 474, 475, 477, 485, 487, 488, 490, 492, 497, 499, 500, 501, 503 see also Paris/1st HDC; Copenhagen/2nd HDC; Moscow/3rd HDC; human dimension rapporteur mission to Serbia/Montenegro: 301 see also Blackwell; Thomson human dimension rapporteur mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia: 298, 300 see also Corell human rights – see → freedom(s)/fundamental; Principle VII; Universal Declaration of […] human rights rapporteur mission to Yugoslavia: 291, 292 see also Fleiner-Gerster; Mechanism/HD Moscow humanitarian [aid, issues, problems, principles]: 13, 55, 133, 182, 199, 205, 210, 215, 222, 233, 234, 243, 244, 246, 247, 254, 282, 297, 406, 424, 474, 477, 478, 492, 498, 499 law: 134, 204, 300, 358, 360, 362, 367, 370, 371, 378, 494 Hungary: 16, 24, 46, 55, 83, 86–89, 96, 97, 175–177, 179, 193, 225, 278, 287, 293, 306, 307, 310,320, 322, 324, 339, 363, 382, 393, 399, 400, 402, 405, 408, 416, 417, 425, 431, 502, 505, 512 Chairmanship (1994): 24, 166 and CSBMs: 45, 111, 121, 124, 129, 130, 155,163, 166, 470 and national minorities: 419, 420 see also Budapest; Poland and Hungary Assistance (PHARE); territorial integrity

I Iceland: 55, 97, 179, 190, 193, 371, 408, 416, 512 Ilașcu (Group): 229, 380 Implementation Force/multinational peace enforcement (IFOR): 329, 330, 450–452, 457, 458 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina; NATO India: 296, 404 indigenous [people/population]: 239, 272, 303, 356, 358, 388, 396, 416, 483 information, freedom (of ) – see → Media Ingushetia – see → Chechnya inspection [of military activities/CSBM]: 140, 143, 144, 151, 153, 154, 157, 167, 262, 298, 395, 445, 446, 447 see also CSBMs; evaluation; observation; Skrunda; verification  Index   553

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO): 59 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY) – see → Geneva; London International Conference on Yugoslavia (1991): 65, 84, 288 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights – see → Helsinki Federation International Labour Organization (ILO): 346 international law: 5, 33, 52, 87, 89, 133, 168–170, 185 191, 226, 252, 255, 264, 266, 272, 283, 291, 295, 386, 389, 395, 460, 471 see also Principle X International Maritime Organization (IMO): 59 International Telecommunications Union (ITU): 59 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): 371, 445 Inter-Parliamentary Union: 52, 105, 106, 383 see also Malaga; Valletta/Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CSCM intersessional meetings: 9, 11, 42 intolerance: 13, 30, 405, 435, 451, 453 see also anti-Semitism; discrimination; xenophobia Iran: 103, 118, 197, 233, 234, 235, 241, 251, 447, 465 Iraq: 103, 239, 323, 326 Ireland: 46, 55, 97, 182, 190, 193, 363, 408, 416, 512 and CSBMs: 470 see also Ulster Israel: 3, 98, 100, 101, 106, 371, 454, 463, 465 see also Partners for Co-operation/Mediterranean Istria: 416 Italy: 1, 5, 24, 45, 55, 93, 95–97, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 115, 155, 190, 192, 193, 199, 287, 363, 377, 393, 402, 404, 408, 416, 422, 455, 460, 470, 512 Chairmanship (1993–1994): 24, 249 see also Brioni Agreement, Rome Izetbegovic, Alija: 31

J Japan: 32, 56, 97, 99, 107–109, 119, 247, 303, 325, 346, 387, 432, 443, 462, 499, 505 see also Partners for Co-operation/Asian Jeszenszky, Géza: 34 Jeziorski, Marek: 425 Jordan: 239 journalists (protection of ): 356, 444, 449, 475

K Kadare, Ismail: 78 Kale – see → Roma Kaliningrad: 253, 254, 258, 263 Kapllani, Muhamet: 79 554  Index

Kazakhstan: 82, 118, 145, 193, 234, 240, 249, 382, 383, 433, 465, 467, 499, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 97 and the HCNM: 417, 419 see also Almaty; Central Asia Kazimirov, Vladimir: 204 Kenney, George: 450 Khrushchev, Nikita: 279 King, Martin Luther: 384 Kinkel-Koojmans [joint proposal] (1994): 34, 62 Kitovani, Tengiz: 214 Kittani, Ismat: 234 Klaus, Václav: 43 Kohl, Helmut: 1 Korea [South]: 97, 107, 109, 346, 462, 449 see also Partners for Co-operation/Asian Kosovo: 49, 50, 186, 187, 286, 292, 302–311, 316, 467, 494 and national minorities: 66, 186, 302, 370, 400, 422, 484 Mission to –, Sandjak and Vojvodina: 31, 66, 298, 302, 303, 308, 309, 315 Kozyrev, Andrei: 216, 242, 247, 254, 274 Krajina: 332, 371, 486 Kuchma, Leonid: 282, 285 Kurds: 229, 365, 371, 380, 386 Kuwait: 4, 103, 323 Kyrgyzstan: 82, 118, 193, 231, 234, 249, 380, 382, 465, 467, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 97 and the HCNM: 417–419 see also Bishkek; Central Asia

L Lalumière, Catherine: 428, 429, 430, 431, 436 see also Council of Europe Latvia: 193, 196, 252–254,256–268, 272–277, 380, 382, 417, 431, 432, 439, 464, 467, 472, 481, 512 accession to the CSCE: 55, 80, 97, 431 and Russian-speaking minorities: 253, 260–268, 359 CSCE/OSCE mission: 186, 187, 272, 277, 418 see also Baltic countries; Liepāja; Skrunda; Venspils legal capacity: 19, 20, 51 legal personality: 52, 60, 454 League of Nations: 386 Lebanon: 98, 100, 103 Lebed, Alexander: 226 Lever, Paul: 180 Libya: 98, 100, 104, 105 Liechtenstein: 41, 55, 86, 87, 92, 97, 190, 192, 193, 408, 416  Index   555

Liepāja [base in Latvia]: 261 Lisbon: 105, 463, 507 Summit (1996): 32, 165, 454, 459, 464, 466, 471, 501, 504 see also Vienna/ Review Meeting (1996) Lithuania: 66, 70, 82, 193, 252, 256–259, 278, 382, 417, 418, 431 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 80, 97 and Russian-speaking minorities: 259, 263–265 and the withdrawal of Soviet troops: 253, 258, 264 see also Baltic countries Lobov, Oleg: 246 logo (CSCE): 52 London: 89, 408 Information Forum (1989): 337 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (1992): 290, 303, 319, 320, 329, 331 NATO Summit (1990): 6, 11, 53, 375 Lukin, Vladimir: 280

M Maastricht Treaty – see → European Union Macedonia [former Yugoslav Republic of ]: 187, 252, 293, 298, 313, 315, 320, 324, 325, 332, 369, 382, 422, 423, 432, 440, 467, 485, 494, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 56, 84–86, 96, 97 and Greece: 56, 84, 85, 286, 312–314, 318, 324, 325, 370, 371, 484 and national minorities: 56, 85, 186, 373 see also Skopje/Spillover Mission Madrid: 105 Meeting of CSCE Parliamentarians (1991): 53, 54 Follow-up Meeting (1980–1983): 37, 38, 71, 117, 142, 167, 351 Concluding Document (1983): 38, 102, 117, 118, 142, 391 Malaga – 1st Inter-parliamentary Conference on CSCMs (1992): 105, 106, 107 Malta: 2, 23, 38, 55, 60, 92, 97, 98, 104, 105, 185, 190, 193, 371, 408, 416, 454, 512 see also Valletta Mandela, Nelson: 71 Maritime Guard (operation): 320 Mauritania: 101, 103, 104 Mazi, Zef: 488 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz: 301, 310, 328 556  Index

mechanisms (as CSCE/OSCE instruments): 8, 13, 24, 36, 37, 39, 42, 47, 66, 88, 103, 122–124, 135–138, 147, 155–157, 177, 183, 185, 190–192, 235, 243, 244, 248, 249, 271, 282, 290, 298, 320–323, 325, 326, 338, 345, 372, 379, 395, 399, 420, 428, 429, 435, 436, 454, 456, 462, 463, 473,483, 485, 486, 497 emergency consultation (Berlin mechanism – 1991): 16, 20, 26–28, 31, 132, 288, 328, 502 human dimension (mechanism development): 10, 26, 27, 93, 106, 355, 362, 368, 370, 375, 399, 430, 431, 441 human dimension (Vienna mechanism – 1989): 351, 352, 354, 358, 362–365 human dimension (Moscow mechanism – 1991): 9, 21, 29, 43, 73, 80, 174, 177, 229, 265, 357, 359, 363, 368, 370, 379, 402, 413 peaceful settlement of disputes (Valetta mechanism – 1991): 93, 94, 136, 167, 168, 170–174, 189, 194–196 unusual military activities (Vienna – 1991 mechanism): 16, 26, 27, 30, 46–48, 93, 116, 137, 138, 155, 156, 287, 445 see also political consultations/mechanism Mečiar, Vladimír: 88, 421 media: 72, 75, 91, 96, 229, 238, 271, 292, 305, 310, 318, 353, 357, 361, 379, 380, 383, 390, 400, 412, 415, 491 freedom of the press/media: 186, 236, 238, 284, 308, 356, 358, 308, 371, 373, 374, 449 Mediterranean: 3, 8, 32, 33, 36, 77, 78, 94, 97– 109, 111, 119, 167, 241, 278, 311, 312, 346, 369, 371, 433, 434, 438, 453, 454, 459, 460, 462–464, 492, 493, 499, 511 Conference on Security and Co-operation in the – (CSCM): 98, 103–106 see also Malaga; Palma de Mallorca; Partners for Co-operation/Mediterranean; Valletta Mediterranean Contact Group: 100, 453 Meri, Lennart: 261 Merrem, Gerd: 477 Meshkov, Yuriy: 280, 282 Mexico: 296 Michelis, Gianni de: 95, 102, 107 migrant workers: 8, 9, 106, 130, 342, 353, 356, 358, 360, 370, 373, 388, 399 migration: 96, 104, 105, 233, 357, 360, 370, 373, 406, 456, 498 see also displaced persons; refugees military budgets: 123, 137, 147, 149, 150 see also defence planning military doctrines: 148, 149 military information [exchange of ] – annual exchange of (AEMI): 137, 143, 149, 150 global exchange of (GEMI): 114, 117, 119, 125–127, 147, 150, 160, 469 see also CSBMs; defense planning; Programme for Immediate Action  Index   557

military manoeuvres: 143, 226, 259 see also mechanism(s)/Vienna Milošević, Slobodan: 286, 305 Ministerial Council (1995) − see → Budapest Minsk Group – see → Nagorno-Karabakh Mintoff, Dom: 98 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): 128 Mission(s) of long duration: 50, 66, 186, 203, 302, 303, 306, 310, 311 see also Bosnia-Herzegovina; Chechnya; Estonia; fact-finding; Georgia; Latvia; Macedonia; monitoring; observer; rapporteur; Kosovo; Sandjak; Sarajevo; Ukraine; Vojvodina; Tajikistan; Ukraine Mitterrand, François: 59, 429 Mladić, Ratko: 445 Mock, Alois: 34 Moldova: 63, 65, 81, 97, 134, 193, 196, 219–230, 239, 247, 249–251, 256, 281, 324, 380, 382, 384, 431, 467, 476, 494, 512 CSCE/OSCE Mission: 82, 186, 187, 221, 223–230, 366, 439, 475 and the HCNM: 416, 417 see also Bessarabia; Ilaşcu; Transdniestria Monaco: 38, 55, 97, 193, 416, 512 Mongolia: 465 monitoring mission(s): 174, 175 to Nagorno-Karabakh: 200, 201 to Yugoslavia: 65, 288, 444, 486 see also fact-finding mission; missions of long duration; rapporteur missions Montenegro: 31, 39, 40, 55, 82, 83, 97, 186, 187, 193, 286, 288, 293, 295, 301, 304–307, 310, 311, 315, 318, 320, 332, 367, 382, 383, 422, 434,438, 444, 446, 467, 486, 500, 510, 512 see also Serbia Montreal − Seminar on the Sustainable Development of Boreal Forests (1993): 341, 510 Morocco: 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 369 see also Partners for Co-operation/Mediterranean Moscow (as political capital): 45, 64, 65, 70, 80, 81, 197, 204, 206, 208, 211, 214, 216, 217, 219–222, 225–227, 229–234, 239, 241–255, 258–262, 263, 270, 273–275, 277–282, 285, 294, 418, 431, 465, 476-478, 480, 481, 494, 502 Additional Meeting of the Ministerial Council (1991): 21, 80, 507 3rd Conference on the Human Dimension (1991): 21, 43, 72–74, 80, 179, 351, 352, 354–356, 363, 368, 377, 392, 402, 405, 431, 436, 437, 511 Document (1991): 73, 94, 352, 355, 356, 363, 365–368, 377, 378, 395, 402, 405, 441 see also mechanism(s)/human dimension (1991); Russian Federation Mossberg, Mathias: 203 Mostar: 327, 445 558  Index

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR): 112

N N+NA – see → neutral and non-aligned Nabiyev, Rahmon: 232 Nagorno-Karabakh: 21, 28, 33, 62–65, 186, 196–205, 239, 472, 473, 494, 508 Minsk Group: 23, 65, 186, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203–205, 473 see also Armenia; Azerbaijan, Minsk Group; monitoring mission; personal representative of the CiO Napolitano, Antonio: 320, 321, 325 nationalism: 13, 30, 207, 208, 212, 213, 232, 279, 286, 304, 348, 361, 378, 384, 386, 389, 405, 408, 416, 498 nationality (ties)/citizenship (s): 82, 229, 230, 254, 259, 260, 264, 265, 267, 268, 270, 272,273, 274, 276, 277, 278, 281, 317, 361, 366, 371, 372, 386, 387, 388, 401, 418, 419, 481, 482, 483, 502 national minorities: 9, 13, 34, 43, 46, 56, 79, 89, 93, 96, 97, 130, 135, 136, 177,186, 228, 229, 284, 291, 348, 351, 353, 354, 356, 358–360, 365, 366, 370, 373, 377, 384, 385, 387–404, 407–410, 412, 413, 415, 421, 425–427, 430, 435, 436, 438, 441, 460, 474, 484,485, 490, 499 in Georgia: 417 in Greece: 417 in Hungary: 417, 420 in Romania: 417, 420, 460 in the Baltic States: 265, 268, 273, 274, 417 Estonia: 268, 273, 274, 417 Latvia: 268, 273, 274, 417 Lithuania: 265, 417in former Yugoslavia: 56, 285, 291, 304, 417 in Croatia: 417, 485 in Kosovo: 302, 417, 420 in Macedonia: 317, 417 in Slovakia: 89, 417, 420, 460 in Tajikistan: 417 see also HCNM; Russian-speaking populations; Tatars of Crimea Nazarbayev, Nursultan: 465 Nektachev, Yuriy: 226 neutral and non-aligned (group of countries): 1, 2, 38, 39, 92, 93, 96, 113, 150, 152, 153, 169, 170, 362, 363, 490 New York: 1, 2, 3, 33, 62, 215, 234, 388, 507 Declaration on the Gulf Crisis (1990): 33 Ministerial Meeting (1990): 2, 3, 33 New Zealand: 109, 217 non-aligned – see → neutral and – non-discrimination: 337, 360, 361, 370, 394–396, 400, 406  Index   559

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): 8, 11, 17–19, 32, 42–44, 70–76, 186, 210, 212, 271, 284, 316, 330, 341–347, 353, 355, 358, 360–362, 369–372, 376, 378, 380–383, 394, 407, 412, 424, 438, 443, 447, 448, 450, 454, 462, 485, 488, 502, 503 non-intervention in internal affairs: 28, 121, 132, 288, 361, 401, 500 see also Principle VI non-proliferation: 104, 114, 117, 119, 122, 127, 128, 129, 445 see also weapons/of mass destruction North Atlantic Assembly (NAA): 32, 52, 54, 69, 101, 103, 181, 221, 253, 360,506 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 6, 7, 13, 15, 32, 39, 49, 53, 56, 66, 94, 96, 101, 102, 104, 113, 119, 122, 124–127, 129, 156, 161, 178, 243, 318, 320, 329, 344, 352, 375, 377, 400, 429, 432, 435, 440, 452, 459, 460, 464, 501, 505 enlargement: 34, 164, 166, 243, 456, 458, 505 reform: 70, 178, 180, 457, 458, 497 Rome Summit (1991): 69, 150 and the CIS: 24, 68 and the EU: 2, 3, 38, 43, 67, 68, 130, 178, 181, 182, 443 and the OSCE (CSBMs): 34, 52, 67, 69, 70, 115, 120, 156, 157, 166, 168, 249, 333, 430, 470, 499 and the Warsaw Pact: 1–3, 6, 7, 38, 39, 96, 113, 150, 169, 175 see also Implementation Force (IFOR); London/Summit North Ossetia: 207, 208, 211, 241, 474 Norway: 55, 71, 97, 104, 178, 179, 182, 188, 190, 193, 248, 363, 364, 370, 393 notification: 120, 151, 152, 156, 226, 242, 331, 444, 445 prior notification: 138, 139, 143, 145, 146 Novi Pazar – see → Sandjak Nowak, Jerzy: 460

O observation [military activities/CSBMs] – see → evaluation; inspection; verification Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR): 11, 17, 20, 36,41, 43, 44, 50, 66, 74, 75, 79, 90, 91, 97, 212, 229, 235–237, 265, 266, 272, 284, 317, 327, 356–363, 365, 366, 368–375, 379–384, 403,406, 407, 412, 413, 424–426, 436–440, 509, 511 and the Council of Europe: 431, 503 and elections: 357, 376, 378, 431 and the Human Dimension: 431 and the Swiss Chairmanship: 455, 462, 464, 468, 483, 485, 487, 488, 489 see also Cortese, Luchino; Glover, Audrey Office for Free Elections (OFE): 11, 15, 17, 20, 42, 79, 354, 355, 357, 375–379, 381, 431 Open Skies (1992): 2, 102, 113, 472 see also Ottawa Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): 68, 109, 335 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC): 234, 310 560  Index

Osimo, Treaty (1975): 416 Oslo: 9, 10, 94, 180, 354, 430, 511 Seminar on democratic institutions (1991): 357, 377, 397, 437, 441 Ossetia − see → North −; South − Ottawa: 55, 157, 351 Meeting of experts on human rights (1985): 3 Conference on the Open Skies regime (1990): 2, 102, 472 Parliamentary Assembly session (1995): 466, 468

P Pact for Stability in Europe (1995): 69, 95, 166, 421, 442, 454, 455, 462, 463, 484, 499 Pakistan: 233, 234 Paldiski, base (in Estonia): 258, 261, 267 Palestine: 103, 106, 465 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): 98 Palma de Mallorca − Meeting on Mediterranean Co-operation (1990): 3, 77, 94, 95, 98, 102, 103, 104, 167, 511 Panić, Milan: 295, 309 Paris: 1–12, 15–17, 20–22, 24, 26, 28, 33, 36, 37, 39, 42, 47, 60, 71–73, 83, 86, 88–90, 92, 94, 95, 98, 102, 131, 164, 188, 206, 220, 289, 325, 329, 333, 340, 368, 376, 385–387, 397, 398, 408, 419, 421, 431, 441, 454, 461, 462, 498 Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990): 1, 5, 6, 9, 30, 33, 42, 53, 59, 86, 90, 98, 111, 112, 166, 169–171, 179, 339, 354, 363, 375, 380, 397, 461, 497, 500 1st Conference on the Human Dimension (1989): 10, 72, 351, 353, 393 Prepcom to the Summit (1990): 2–7, 46, 94, 167, 363, 347 Summit (1990): 2–5, 13, 30, 46, 52, 53, 59, 78–81, 83, 92, 94, 95, 98, 167, 357, 427, 430, 438 Parliamentary Assembly (CSCE/OSCE): 15, 17, 52–58, 85, 106, 109, 198, 221, 247, 267, 274, 320, 340, 370, 371, 381, 407, 421, 428,430–432, 434, 436–438, 441, 453, 460, 461–463, 465–468, 489, 490,492, 493, 501, 503 for annual sessions, see also Budapest; Helsinki; Madrid; Ottawa; Stockholm; Vienna Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) – see → Council of Europe/PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Western European – see → WEU/Assembly Partners for Co-operation − Asian partners: 107−109 see also Japan, Korea Mediterranean partners: 98, 101, 346, 453, 462, 463, 499 see also Algeria; Egypt; Israel; Morocco; Tunisia Partnership for Peace: 125, 318  Index   561

Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (PSD): 78, 94, 95, 136, 167, 169–173, 187–191, 194, 195, 438, 509 see also Convention on Conciliation […]; mechanism(s)/Valetta; Principle V Peace Implementation Council: 446, 448, 450 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina; Dayton Peel, David: 302 pentagonal (initiative): 96, 103, 393, 395, 396 perestroïka: 1, 58, 71, 72, 169, 197, 208, 220, 231, 240, 279, 280, 285, 286, 351, 391, 392 Pérez de Cuellar, Javier: 4, 59 see also UN/Secretary-General Permanent Committee: 19, 20, 25, 26, 28, 36, 39, 44, 65, 85, 100, 109, 116, 155, 203, 209, 210, 224, 236–238, 248, 262, 270, 275–277, 282, 283,310, 315, 316, 318, 321, 325, 327, 328, 341, 342, 359, 365, 368, 438, 509 Permanent Council: 15, 20, 25, 28–30, 32, 36, 39, 40, 57, 63, 69, 75, 86, 92, 97, 100, 101, 109, 137, 159, 165, 185, 205, 209, 210, 224, 236–238, 243–246, 249, 262, 270, 276, 277, 283, 315, 321, 327–329, 332,343, 346, 347, 359, 371–373, 375, 383, 420, 423, 425, 438, 443, 444,450, 454, 460–465, 475, 477–481, 483,485, 488, 490, 492, 493, 499, 502, 503 Persian Gulf – see → New York / Declaration personal representatives (of the Chairman-in-Office): 178, 493 in Chechnya: 243 in Croatia: 485 in Bihać: 228 in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 444, 445 in Georgia: 209 in Moldova: 223 in Nagorno-Karabakh: 203, 472, 473 in Latvia: 275 in Tajikistan: 235, 236, 477 in Ukraine: 282 Piriz-Ballon, Ramirez: 234 Poland: 16, 43, 55, 70, 96, 97, 111, 121, 129, 130, 133, 157, 162, 163, 166, 178, 179, 192, 193, 252, 253, 258, 278, 289, 363, 369, 371, 376–378, 381, 402, 408, 417, 425, 431, 443, 463, 470, 496, 505 Poland and Hungary – Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE): 325, 335 political consultation (mechanism/bodies): 10, 11, 15, 19–21, 28, 42, 96, 100, 177, 454 politico-military [dimension]: 6, 33, 48, 112,114, 160, 166, 335, 438, 462, 465, 499, 502, 503 see also Code of Conduct; Decalogue Portugal: 55, 97, 102–106, 188, 189, 193, 363, 396, 404, 416,470, 496, 502 see also Lisbon 562  Index

Prague: 2, 10, 11, 15–21, 24–26, 28, 29, 40–43, 54, 79–83, 86–88, 90, 126, 184, 204, 251, 291, 343–346, 377–379, 383, 407, 408, 429, 438, 440, 502 CSCE Secretariat (1991–1993): 19, 42, 43, 79, 86, 87, 289 Council of Ministers (1992): 15, 17, 40, 57, 60, 68, 73, 74, 81–83, 108, 113, 126, 127, 129, 174, 188, 198, 340, 343, 357, 383, 408, 441 Document [on the Further Development of the OSCE Structures] (1992): 17, 24, 25, 48–50, 68, 174–176, 179, 181, 340, 344, 352, 357, 358, 365, 369, 373, 377–379, 431 see also Committee of Senior Officials Principle IV (territorial integrity): 136, 165, 202, 210, 248, 283, 287, 293, 389, 394–396, 455, 506 see also territorial integrity Principle V (peaceful settlement of disputes): 89, 121, 176, 178, 185–187, 194, 196, 342 see also Geneva/Meetings of Experts; mechanism(s)/Valletta; peaceful settlement of disputes; Valetta Principle VI (non-intervention in internal affairs): 132, 361, 401, 500 see also non-intervention Principle VII (respect of human rights): 9, 70, 89, 351, 360, 391 see also human rights Principle VIII (self-determination): 132, 135, 136, 165, 202, 215, 287, 386, 389, 419, 455, 506 see also self-determination Principle X (good faith − in line with international law): 89 see also Decalogue; international law Prevlaka, Peninsula: 486 see also Croatia Programme for Immediate Action (PIA): 32, 113–117, 119, 126,127, 159–162, 468, 469, 471 see also Code of Conduct; military information; military contact; ­ non-proliferation; stabilization measures Programme of Coordinated Support (for recently admitted participating States): 82, 90, 91, 341, 348, 374 proliferation of weapons of mass destruction − see → non-proliferation protection of the environment − see → Aral Sea; Montreal; Sofia protection of national minorities − see → national minorities

R racism: 31, 359, 361, 406, 435, 438 see also discrimination; nationalism; xenophobia radar station – see → Skrunda Raffaelli, Mario: 200 Rahmonov, Emomali: 232  Index   563

rapporteur mission(s): 39, 66, 77, 81, 84, 291, 461 as conflict management instruments: 136, 174, 176, 177, 178, 198, 223 to Albania: 79, 81, 376 to Andorra: 461 to Armenia and Azerbaijan: 82,198, 439 to Croatia: 439 to Georgia: 82, 439 to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan: 82 to Macedonia: 85, 298 to Moldova: 82, 223, 229, 439 to Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova: 82 to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan: 82 see also fact-finding, human dimension mission; Human Rights mission to Yugoslavia; missions of long duration refugees (and displaced persons): 106, 182, 201, 210, 211, 215, 216, 222, 228, 234, 237, 244, 308, 330, 358, 360, 361, 370, 373, 374, 447, 449, 451, 452, 464, 475, 486, 492 regional [and cross-border] co-operation: 96, 111, 400 see also transfrontier Rehn, Elisabeth: 301 Reimaa, Markku: 5 Renan, Ernest: 385, 386 Republika Srpska: 329, 331, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 451 Review Conference/Meeting(s) – see → Budapest; Lisbon; Vienna see also Follow-up meeting(s) resolutions – see → UN Security Council Riga, Treaty of (1920): 187, 259, 260, 261, 263, 272, 275, 277, 481 Roma (Sinti): 75, 308, 317, 360, 361, 371, 379, 386, 393, 399, 417, 420, 422, 424, 440 Seminar on Roma in the CSCE Region (1994): 373, 374, 405–407, 440 see also the HCNM/Roma Romania: 16, 55, 96, 97, 104, 150, 169, 193, 220, 221, 222, 225, 229, 320, 322, 324, 342, 351, 371, 376, 382, 390, 392, 393, 395, 396, 399, 405, 419, 431, 432, 460, 512 and the HCNM: 417, 420, 422, 424 Rome: 20, 21, 26, 28, 44, 102, 104,105, 150, 203, 211, 249, 257, 336, 342, 352, 358, 359, 484, 508 Ministerial Council (1993): 19, 25, 29, 43, 49, 51, 57, 69, 75, 85, 91, 100, 116, 127, 163, 204, 210, 212, 218, 228, 236, 257, 325, 336, 341–343, 369, 365, 373, 374, 378, 379, 383, 406, 412, 415, 425, 441, 507 Rônquist, Anders: 425 Rotfeld, Adam Daniel: 223 Roy, Olivier: 232, 236, 238 Rugova, Ibrahim: 305, 484 564  Index

Russian Federation/ Russia: 31, 33–35, 41, 55, 64, 80, 81, 106, 107, 118, 120, 121, 123, 124,126, 127, 129, 130, 134, 145, 161, 164, 181, 197–199, 204–207, 209, 211, 212, 222, 224–229, 232–234, 239–244, 246–251, 253–267, 269, 271, 274, 275, 277–280, 282–285, 294, 296, 297, 302, 320, 322, 324, 325, 328, 329, 345, 347, 348, 359, 366, 380, 382, 383, 408, 416–419, 431–433, 454–456, 458, 459, 465, 469–471, 474, 476, 480, 481, 488, 490, 492, 494, 499, 504, 505, 512 and Chechnya: 135, 196, 219, 239, 240–244, 246, 247, 252, 467, 478 and Ossetia: 65, 187, 207–209, 211, 219, 247, 249, 250, 281 and Transdniestria: 214, 221, 224, 227, 228, 476 see also Moscow Russian army: 135, 225–227, 278, 476 Russian peacekeeping operations: 187, 503 Russian-speaking [populations/minorities]: 416 in the Baltic States: 254, 267, 417 in Estonia: 253, 263–271, 359, 366, 416, 417, 418, 479, 480 in Latvia: 253, 263, 264, 266, 272, 277, 359, 417, 418, 181 in Lithuania: 259 in Kazakhstan: 417, 419 in Kyrgyzstan: 418, 419 in Moldova: 220, 221, 417 in Ukraine: 417

S Saburov, Yevgeny: 281 Sakharov, Andrei: 285 sanctions (against the FRY): 66, 69, 95, 105, 122, 298, 312, 319–326, 438, 466, 500, 510 Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs): 39, 320–323, 325 sanctions coordinator: 321 Sandjak: 31, 66, 186, 187, 292, 298, 302, 303, 306–310, 315 see also Kosovo Sarajevo (as political capital): 333, 490, 492 CSCE Mission: 62, 66, 326–329, 443, 449, 484 see also Bosnia and Herzegovina; Blackwell mission; Dayton; UNPROFOR scale of distribution: 18, 32, 39, 185, 512 science and technology (co-operation in the field of ): 96, 105, 106, 335, 342, 345, 346 Sevastopol: 279, 285, 482 see also Crimea Secretariat (CSCE/OSCE): 3, 5, 10, 11, 15, 19, 20, 39, 41–44, 47–50, 53, 54, 57, 61, 63–65, 68, 69, 72, 73, 79, 80, 87, 90, 91, 116, 180, 191, 192, 206, 218, 289, 342, 343, 347, 360, 372, 401, 427, 428, 430, 436, 439, 440, 461, 463, 506 see also Prague and Vienna  Index   565

Secretary General of the OSCE: 443, 462, 467 see also UN/Secretary General Security Model (for the 21st Century): 101, 164, 165, 348, 438, 443, 453, 456, 459, 464, 465, 467, 471, 490, 491, 492 for Asia: 465 self-proclamation of the CSCE (as a UN regional arrangement): 60, 256 self-determination (of peoples): 12, 90, 130, 222, 283, 305, 386, 387, 389, 402, 409, 415, 419, 455, 498 in Crimea: 283 in Georgia: 215 in Moldova: 222 in former Yugoslavia: 305, 400 see also Principle VIII seminar(s): 24, 47, 49, 50, 68, 74, 75, 90–92, 97, 99, 100, 109, 116, 124, 148, 149, 165, 271, 341, 342, 346, 347, 354, 357–360, 362, 370, 373–376, 379–381, 383, 384, 403, 405, 406, 437, 438, 440, 463, 464, 470, 483, 492, 509, 511 see also Aral Sea; armed forces; human dimension; Montreal; Oslo; Roma; Tel Aviv; tolerance Senior Council: 19, 24–28 see also Committee of Senior Officials; Economic Forum Serbia: 31, 39, 40, 55, 56, 66, 82, 83, 97, 109, 186, 187, 193, 286, 288, 289, 292–295, 299, 301–307, 309–312, 315–318, 320, 332, 367, 382, 383, 422, 434, 438, 444, 446, 453, 467, 500, 510, 512 see also Yugoslavia/SFRY Sica, Mario: 485 silence procedure: 39, 40, 86, 160, 460 Sillén, Jan af: 302 Sinti − see → Roma Skopje (as a political capital): 313–315, 317, 423 CSCE/OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission: 66, 86, 186, 203, 308, 311, 314–318, 443, 484, 485 see also Macedonia; UNPREDEP Skrunda (radar station in Latvia): 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 277 Slavonia: 332, 486, 487 Slovak Republic: 24, 166, 179, 193, 289, 324, 382, 417, 425, 431, 432, 443, 463, 469, 470, 480 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 83, 84, 97 and the HCNM: 417, 419, 420, 421, 460 and Hungarian minorities: 87, 88, 89 and the Roma: 371, 424 see also Czechoslovakia Slovenia: 34, 55, 96, 97, 178, 179, 193, 286, 288, 289, 292, 293, 297, 306, 312, 319, 324, 382, 400, 409, 416, 431, 443, 470, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 82–84, 96, 97 Smirnof, Igor: 224 566  Index

Snegur, Mircea: 222, 224 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) − see → Yugoslavia Sofia: 9, 71, 72, 94, 312, 332, 347, 484, 510 Meeting on protection of the environment (1989): 72 Soros, George: 450 Soviet (Union): 3, 5, 45, 46, 77, 79, 101, 103, 118, 153, 156, 157, 169, 171, 207, 212, 229, 240, 252, 261, 263, 264, 272, 279, 285, 286, 337, 466, 468, 480 bloc: 387, 506 former Republics (States): 80–82, 92, 117, 141, 145, 197, 229, 221, 230– 232, 240, 268, 272, 279, 282, 335, 416, 417, 420, 431, 465, 481, 499, 503, 505 perestroika: 1, 58, 71, 72, 169, 197, 208, 220, 231, 240, 279, 280, 285, 286, 351, 391, 392 military (troops/army): 144, 208, 233, 240, 242, 253, 255, 256 occupation(s): 208, 254, 258, 267 see also USSR South Ossetia: 63, 65, 187, 207–212, 217–219, 222, 229, 247, 249, 250, 281, 472, 474, 475, 502 see also Georgia Stability Pact (1995) − see → Pact on Stability in Europe Stabilizing Measures [for Localized Crisis Situations] (1993): 113, 119–124, 156, 157, 160 Stockholm: 18–21, 37, 39, 136, 143, 145, 146, 150–152, 157, 172, 185, 187, 189–195, 196, 218, 223, 251, 257, 271, 341, 449, 497, 501,505, 507, 508, 509 Conference on CBMs and Disarmament in Europe (1984–1986): 39, 150, 167 Document on CBMs (1986): 26, 30, 144 Council of Ministers (1992): 18, 25, 28, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52, 61, 65, 75, 86, 87, 89–91, 95, 127, 172, 174, 189, 193–106, 200, 212, 218, 235, 308, 341, 358, 838, 413 Parliamentary Assembly session (1996): 465–467, 493 Stoel − see → van der Stoel, Max suspension (from the CSCE) − see → Yugoslavia Summit (meetings) − see → Budapest; Helsinki; Lisbon; Paris Sukhami (Abkhazia): 219, 241, 475 Sweden: 5, 24, 55, 61, 64, 71, 92, 93, 97, 123, 124, 137, 161, 179, 188, 190, 192, 193, 199, 206, 243, 252, 278, 289, 299, 363, 393, 395, 402, 408, 409, 425, 437, 449, 469, 512 Chairmanship (1992–1993): 24, 61, 218, 229, 235, 270, 440 see also Stockholm Switzerland: 5, 55, 60, 61, 71, 92, 93, 97, 169, 179, 190, 192, 193, 252, 284, 299, 364, 393, 396, 403, 409 Chairmanship (1996): 24, 443–508 Symposium on Cultural Heritage − see → Cracow Syria: 98, 100, 389  Index   567

T Tajikistan : 55, 63, 64, 66, 81, 82, 97, 186, 187, 193, 196, 229, 230–239, 247, 249, 250, 380, 382, 384, 433, 465, 472,477, 478, 495, 502, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 97 and national minorities: 231, 233, 433 conflict (in): 63, 64, 196, 230, 233 CSCE Mission: 233–238 see also displaced persons; Dushanbe; elections, personal representative of the CiO; rapporteur mission(s); UNMOT Talvitie, Heikki: 206 Tarschys, Daniel: 247, 432, 436, 437 Tashkent: 250 OSCE Liaison Office: 92, 464 Tatars of Crimea: 225, 284, 285, 419, 482, 483 see also Crimea; national minorities Tbilisi (as political capital): 187, 208, 209, 214, 219, 472, 475 see also Georgia Tel-Aviv – Seminar on Dialogue and the Fostering of Norms of Behaviour (1996): 463 territorial integrity: 65, 208, 210, 214, 215, 218, 219, 222, 224, 225, 248, 389, 394–396, 455, 476, 506 and the Code of Conduct: 130, 132, 133, 136 and peaceful settlement of disputes: 136, 172, 190, 196 of Azerbaijan: 202, 204, 473 of Chechnya/Russia: 239, 243, 244, 246 of Hungary: 88 of Macedonia: 316 of Ukraine: 280, 283, 285 of [former] Yugoslavia: 267, 287, 293, 400 see also Principle IV Terrorism: 240 Tetovo: 311, 317, 423, 484 Thijn, Edward van: 495 Thomson, John (Rapporteur on alleged places of detention in Bosnia- Herzegovina): 298, 300, 301 Thune, Gro Hillestad − see → Corell /Türk Tito, Josip, Broz: 285, 304, 306, 307, 312, 313, 325 tolerance: 358, 360, 361, 370, 373, 389 human dimension seminar: 273, 274, 440 see also intolerance torture (abolition of ): 75, 353, 360, 361, 370, 371, 467 tourism: 96, 106, 335, 342, 399 transfer of conventional weapons − see → arms transfers transfrontier [and regional] co-operation: 111, 342, 399 568  Index

Transdniestria (conflict): 214, 220, 221, 223–225, 227–229, 384 see also Moldova Transylvania: 225, 392, 419, 421, 422 Troika (OSCE): 22, 23, 45, 89, 91, 100, 178, 184, 186, 199, 283, 310, 315, 370, 492, 502 Tskhinvali: 187, 207–209, 211, 274, 275 Tudjman, Franjo: 486 Türk, Helmut – see → Correl/Thun Tunisia: 98, 99, 100, 101, 104 see also Partners for Co-operation/Mediterranean Turkey: 6, 28, 55, 81, 83, 95, 97, 118, 122, 126, 143, 145, 163,164, 170–172, 188–190, 192, 193, 196–199, 213, 239, 241, 249, 279, 299, 324, 364, 365, 371, 380, 396, 408, 409, 433, 463, 465, 467, 499, 502, 512 and Cyprus: 3, 27, 167 and the Gagauz people: 220 and OSCE’s peacekeeping operations: 64, 179, 206, 248, 454, 455 and the relationship between territorial integrity and self-determination: 130, 132, 135, 136, 165, 202, 287, 306, 455 Turkmenistan: 55, 81, 82, 97, 193, 370, 381, 465, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 97

U Ugglas, Margaretha af: 91, 203, 251 Ukraine: 70, 82, 96, 127, 139, 193, 220–222, 225, 226, 229, 248–250, 252, 320, 324, 359, 380, 432, 439, 443, 456, 467, 476, 494, 495, 505, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 97 CSCE/OSCE Mission: 134, 138, 141, 179, 186, 187, 196, 222 and CSBMs: 81, 141, 142, 455, 470, 472 and Crimea: 272, 278–285, 384, 419, 482, 483 and Russian peacekeeping operations: 187 and the HCNM: 284, 417–420, 424, 439, 482, 483 Ulster: 172, 364, 416 see also Ireland United Kingdom (UK): 8, 46, 55, 60, 71, 96, 101, 102, 104, 106, 108, 123, 156, 170, 172, 179, 188–193, 287, 300, 364, 365, 367, 371, 396, 406, 412, 460, 469, 470, 480, 512 United Nations: 2, 4, 8, 19, 23, 32–34, 41, 44, 48, 50, 52, 58–67, 70, 76, 84, 85, 90, 92, 95, 122–124, 136, 148, 166,178, 182, 183, 185, 199, 202, 205, 215–219, 233–236, 238, 251, 256, 257, 266, 279, 288–291, 296, 297, 301, 306,309, 315, 318, 320, 322, 324,326–330, 332, 335, 341, 346,385, 386, 388, 390, 394, 395, 397, 404, 407, 413, 418, 424, 430, 436, 440, 447, 449, 454, 455, 457, 459, 462, 465, 471, 475, 477, 479, 480, 484–487, 491, 493, 498–502, 506 UN General Assembly: 2, 61, 62, 148, 254, 256, 257, 266, 267, 296, 297, 310, 314, 324, 390, 465, 484, 485, 492  Index   569

UN Secretary General: 4, 23, 58–61, 63, 64, 202, 214, 216, 217, 235, 256, 257, 289, 296, 300, 315, 324, 325, 430, 463, 475, 477, 486 UN Security Council: 41, 48, 60, 62–64, 66, 128, 136, 182, 202–206, 215, 217, 234, 235, 242, 246, 261, 285, 295–297, 300, 309, 310, 312, 314, 315, 318, 319, 322–325, 328–330, 332, 333, 454, 459, 471, 485, 486, 500, 502, 503 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): 59, 346, 369, 373, 440, 460 UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR): 66, 67, 232, 237, 330, 369, 449, 464, 486 United Nations Missions (general): 64, 233, 330, 486 fact-finding: 334, 265, 266 in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNBiH): 330 of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP): 486 of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT): 64, 233–235 Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG): 65, 216–219 Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) [Macedonia]: 315, 485 Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES): 332, 486, 487 United States of America (USA): 1, 3, 34, 35, 43, 45, 49, 91, 95, 97, 99, 103, 104, 106, 108, 163, 191, 199, 235, 247, 252, 260, 289, 291, 315, 362, 364, 367, 371, 372, 378, 385, 389, 396, 399, 401, 408, 432, 440, 457, 460, 469, 489, 497, 502, 512 and Bosnia–Herzegovina [Dayton agreements]: 287, 326, 329, 299, 300, 333, 367, 443, 447 and the conflict in Yugoslavia: 291, 292, 294, 315, 320, 328, 495, 504 and Canada (North America): 3, 8, 35, 106, 117, 118, 126, 147, 148, 188, 355, 377, 432, 469 and the CSBMs: 112, 117–119, 126, 147, 148, 163, 469, 470 and the economic dimension: 107, 237, 340, 337, 338, 340, 342–345, 347, 348, 456 and the Franco-American quarrel on the human dimension: 352, 363, 365, 375–377, 390, 396, 397, 400, 404, 405, 408, 428–431, 440 and the Franco-American disagreement on NATO: 67–70, 166, 168, 180, 181, 375, 457 and hegemony: 77, 180, 429, 438 and the human dimension: 43, 71, 73, 78, 300, 352, 355, 357, 362, 363, 364, 371, 372, 375, 377, 399, 400, 412, 417, 429, 431 and the HCNM: 408, 411, 425 and NATO: 16, 34, 53, 67–70, 115, 129, 130, 180, 352, 375, 457, 459 and the Parliamentary Assembly [OSCE]: 52, 53, 106, 431, 489 and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: 40, 170, 188, 189, 191–195 and Russia [USSR]: 39, 41, 45, 73, 77, 81, 130, 156, 161, 180, 289, 459 United States Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe: 352, 429, 431, 440, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): 274, 386, 397, 500 570  Index

Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO): 369, 386 USSR: 3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 27, 28, 38, 39, 46, 72, 73, 77, 87, 104, 117, 143, 144, 147, 154, 157, 158, 167–170, 186, 196, 197, 206, 213, 214, 218, 220, 221, 233, 240, 258, 262, 263, 267, 272, 278, 279, 287–289, 310, 337, 339, 340, 356, 364, 376, 393, 396, 399, 402, 417,429, 465, 478, 480, 498, 505 former USSR countries (regions): 32, 69, 80, 90, 107, 207, 250, 254, 285, 381, 382 and conflict management [in the region of former –]: 34, 63, 65, 67, 168, 186, 196, 239, 247, 472, 478, 494 see also Russia; Soviet (Union) Uzbekistan: 55, 81, 82, 97, 193, 230, 231, 234, 249, 285, 370, 371, 380, 382, 465, 467, 512 accession (to the CSCE): 55, 81, 97 see also Tashkent/ Liaison Office

V Valletta – Mechanism (on peaceful settlement of disputes): 93, 94, 136, 167, 168, 170–174, 189, 194–196 Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1991): 47, 78, 93, 94, 136, 167, 169–174, 177, 187, 189, 190, 195, 196, 509 Seminar on co-operation in the Mediterranean (1993): 99, 438, 511 2nd Inter-parliamentary Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean(1995): 95, 107 see also Malta; mechanism(s)/PSD van der Stoel, Max: 265, 282, 413, 414, 416, 424, 425, 427, 501, 503 Ventspils (base in Latvia): 261 verification [military activities/CSBMs]: 48, 69, 113, 114, 116, 120, 126, 144, 151–154, 157, 158, 160, 161, 203, 444, 445, 447, 458, 466 see also CSBMs; evaluation; inspection; observation Vienna: 1, 2, 4–6, 10, 12, 15, 18, 25–30, 33, 34, 61, 62, 73, 92–94, 96, 99, 109, 116, 123, 153, 155, 158, 163, 165, 172, 184, 209, 218, 224, 236, 242, 243, 257, 263, 270, 275,287, 290, 300, 303, 307–310, 315, 322, 324, 325, 332, 357, 358, 365, 367, 372, 378–392, 397–400, 420, 431, 432, 435, 436, 438, 439, 445, 453, 461, 462, 470, 489, 490, 492, 497, 502, 507, 509, 510, 511 as the seat of the FSC and the OSCE Secretariat: 19, 20, 41–43, 47, 49–50, 91, 116, 191, 342, 372, 461, 463 as the venue of the CSBMs negotiations (1990–1996): 36, 45, 47, 77, 78, 93, 100, 112, 113, 115, 149 Follow-up Meeting (1986–1989): 9, 27, 38, 71, 167, 169, 170, 351, 362 Concluding Document of the Follow-up (1989): 9, 12, 26, 71, 72, 102, 169, 170, 351–353, 382, 391, 392  Index   571

Preparatory Committee (PrepCom for the Paris Summit, 1990): 29 Document on CSBMs – 1990: 11, 26, 46, 81, 112, 113, 117, 119, 149, 154 Document on CSBMs – 1992: 140, 149, 154, 156, 160 Document on CSBMs – 1994: 125, 126, 136, 137, 140–142, 145, 149, 154, 242, 331, 444, 466, 468, 469, 472, 500 Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session (1994): 56, 57 see also CSO Vienna Group; mechanism(s)/ human dimension (1989)/unusual military activities Visegrad (countries): 95, 138, 139, 141, 142, 161, 179, 502 Vojvodina: 31, 66, 186, 187, 286, 292, 298, 302, 303, 307, 308, 309, 310, 315, 420 see also Kosovo Vukovic, Martin: 5

W Warsaw: 11, 15, 18, 80, 292, 344, 357, 369, 372, 373, 407, 414, 415, 416, 426, 427, 438, 440, 468, 489, 509, 511 as seat of the OFE/ODIHR: 66, 79, 354, 371, 374–376, 378, 380, 381, 383, 384, 406, 413, 437, 503 Warsaw Pact (alliance/countries): 1–3, 6, 7, 38, 39, 41, 45, 49, 96, 113, 150, 151, 154, 157, 169, 250 weapons: 106, 127, 128, 202, 259, 372, 445, 470, 498 chemical and biological: 128, 202, 372, 445, 470 nuclear: 128, 129, 445 of mass destruction: 106, 127, 128, 259, 445, 453, 498 see also arms transfers; non-proliferation Western European Union (WEU): 54, 68, 103, 128, 178, 248, 250, 263, 298, 317, 457, 497 the Mediterranean: Assembly of the WEU: 312 WEU/OSCE relations: 67, 322 and NATO: 57, 67, 70, 166, 168, 180, 181, 320, 457, 458, 464 Wilson, Woodrow: 386

X xenophobia: 13, 30, 31, 359, 393, 406, 435, 438

Y Yandarbiyev, Zelimkhan: 479 Yerevan (as political capital): 201 572  Index

Yugoslavia: 7, 28, 31, 32, 40, 55, 56, 63, 65, 66, 73, 77, 82–84, 92, 96–98,104, 106, 133, 150, 155, 167, 168, 174, 179, 181, 187, 188, 193, 194, 256,282, 285–298, 300–304, 306, 308, 310, 312, 313, 315, 317–319, 326, 329, 331, 332, 336, 338, 367, 371, 379, 381–383, 390, 399, 400, 402, 405, 416, 419, 422, 434, 444–447, 450, 453, 467, 472, 484–486, 494, 495, 507, 508, 510, 512 (conflict) − application of the Berlin Mechanism: 16, 20, 26, 174, 288, 328 application of the Vienna Mechanism on Unusual Military Activities: 26, 27, 30, 46–48, 03, 116, 137, 138, 155, 156, 287, 445 and ethnic cleansing: 97, 214, 254, 266, 284, 292, 299, 300, 328, 367, 451, 504 and the CSCE human dimension Rapporteur Missions: 298, 300, 301 and the CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia (1991): 291, 292 and the international tribunal [for war crimes]: 300, 367 and the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia: 372, 445 suspension of the FRY from the CSCE: 55, 83, 07, 293–298, 302, 309, 315, 325, 500 Badinter Commission: 295, 214 EC monitoring mission in the former Yugoslavia: 65, 444, 486 Serbia (Kosovo, Sanjak, Vojvodina): 31, 66, 186, 292, 298, 302–304, 308– 311 preventive diplomacy in Macedonia: 62, 66, 251, 298, 310, 315, 316 Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs): 39, 320, 321, 322, 323, 325 see also Bosnia-Herzegovina; Croatia; former Yugoslavia; Macedonia; monitoring mission; Belgrade; Blackwell [mission; Geneva; Hague; London; Vienna Yugoslavia, Socialist Federal Republic of (SFRY): 82, 83, 285, 286, 293, 294, 295, 296, 303, 304, 305, 307, 312, 318, 319, 332 Former Yugoslavia: 32, 56, 63, 65, 66, 133, 167, 289–291, 297, 298, 303, 308, 310, 315, 317, 319, 322, 326, 331, 367, 371, 381, 382, 405, 416, 445, 446, 450, 467, 472, 484, 486, 494, 495

Z Zaagman, Rob: 340, 358, 362, 408, 410, 415, 417, 425 Zangger, Committee: 128 Zavgaev, Dokou: 246 Zimbabwe: 296 Zlenko, Anatoly: 127    573  574

CSCE’s Institutionalization 1990–1996

* CSBMs Negotiating and Decision-making bodies Structures and Institutions Paris Summit, Vienna 1990 1990

Conflict Consultative Committee of Office for Free 1st Council of Ministers Secretariat Prevention Committee Senior Officials Elections (OFE) Berlin, 1991 Prague 1991 Centre (CPC) CPC-FSC, 1991 (CSO), 1990 Warsaw 1991 Vienna 1991

CSBMs Office for Democratic Fact finding and 2nd Council of Ministers Vienna Institutions and Human Rights other Missions Prague, 1992 1992 (ODIHR)

Helsinki Follow-up ­Meeting, 1992

Special Economic Committee FSC Forum Helsinki Summit, High Commissioner on National AIAM 1992 Minorities Human Dimension Implementation 3rd Council of Ministers Consultative Secretary General CSO Vienna Stockholm, 1992 Committee Group 1993 dissolved Permanent Secretariat 4th Council of Ministers FSC continued Committee Vienna, 1994 Prague Office Rome, 1993 1993 + CPC (Last CSO, 1994) CSBMs Human Economic Budapest Review Meeting, Vienna Dimension Dimension 1994 1994 (reviewed) (reviewed)

* Ministerial Budapest Summit, Council (MC) 1994 Senior Council Permanent (SC), Economic Council (PC) Forum 5th Ministerial Council Budapest, 1995 Legend Structures and institutions Security Model Negotiating and decision-making bodies Review Meeting, Executive decisions Human Economic Vienna – Lisbon, 1996 Chronology of CSCE/OSCE events Dimension Dimension (reviewed) (reviewed) * The Conference was renamed to Organization for Security and Co–operation in Europe at the Budapest Summit Meeting on 8 December 1994. The change in name came into force on 1 Lisbon Summit, 1996 January 1995, together with the renaming of three decision–making bodies: MC / SC / PC.  Editor’s Note   575

Editor’s Note Victor-Yves Ghebali’s history of the OSCE was published in French, in three volumes, over a period of several years. Volume I, The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973–1989, was published in 1989, followed in 1996 by Volume II, The OSCE in a Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Identity 1990–1996. Volume III, The Role of the OSCE in Eurasia, from the Lisbon Summit to the Maastricht Ministerial Council: 1996–2003, was published posthumously in 2013. These three volumes cover the (then) recent history of the OSCE and contain statements and outlooks made from the perspective of the point in time at which they were written, that is to say, shortly after the respective period each volume covers. In order to respect the historical integrity of Victor-Yves Ghebali’s writing, the text has been translated as it stands and the volumes have not been edited to reflect the perspective of the date of publication in English. The publication of the text in English translation, some decades later, has raised a number of editorial issues that are briefly mentioned hereunder. In the process of institutionalization in which the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) became the Organization for Security and Co-­ operation in Europe (OSCE), a number of institutions and negotiating bodies also changed their names. For example, the Follow-up Meetings that preceded CSCE Summits were renamed Review Conferences in 1994. A graphical representation of the OSCE’s main institutional name changes is provided in the table on the opposite page. While in the French edition, Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali tends to use the institutional name in use at the time of writing, our approach in the English translation has been to use the official name that was used during the period of time being discussed. Similarly, in the English edition, the European Union is referred to as the European Community in passages referring to the period prior to 1 November 1993, the date when the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union entered into force. In cases of possible ambiguity or confusion, the previous or future name of an institution or body is provided in square brackets, as are all other editorial interpolations. This second volume was translated in a consorted effort by: – Irene McClure (chapters: I, III, V, VII, VIII, as well as the foreword and the conclusions), – Amma Kyeremeh (chapter II) – Linda Machata (chapters IV, and VI, including footnotes of chapters III, VI, VI, VII, VIII, the annexes, as well as the bibliography) – André Crous (footnotes of chapter V) John Nicholson deserves mention for copy-editing the first five chapters in this volume. 576   Editor’s Note

All primary sources referenced by the author have been checked and any transcription mistakes corrected. Wherever possible, quotations from sources that were originally published in English have been sourced and reproduced verbatim. Our thanks belong to the Prague based “Legacy Helpdesk” assured by Alice Němcová for assistance with the retrieval of documents from the CSCE/OSCE archives and for the support of the translators’ and copy-editor’s reference needs encountered along the way.

Helen Tomlinson Copy-editor of the English translation  List of Contents   577

List of Contents Preamble�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������i “The OSCE Legacy Project” �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������iii Acknowledgements ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������v Preface�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������vii Foreword���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� ix Introduction��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� xi List of Abbreviations and Acronyms��������������������������������������������������������������������������������xvii

Chapter I The Refoundation of the CSCE through the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (21 November 1990) I. The Genesis of the Charter of Paris..............................................................................................1 1. The Idea of a Pan-European Summit.................................................................................................. 1 2. The Vienna PrepCom........................................................................................................................................ 2 3. The New York Ministerial............................................................................................................................. 3 4. The Paris Summit................................................................................................................................................ 4 II. The Content of the Charter of Paris............................................................................................5 1. The Parameters of the New Europe...................................................................................................... 6 a) Democratic Europe................................................................................................................................. 6 b) Peaceful Europe........................................................................................................................................ 6 c) Reunited Europe....................................................................................................................................... 7 2. The CSCE’s Post-Communist Programme...................................................................................... 8 a) Security............................................................................................................................................................ 8 b) Economic co-operation...................................................................................................................... 8 c) The human dimension........................................................................................................................ 9 3. The Institutionalization of the CSCE/OSCE............................................................................... 10 III. The Shortcomings of the Charter of Paris...................................................................... 12

Chapter II The Institutions of the OSCE I. Milestones in the Institutional Development of the OSCE................................. 15 1. The Decisions of the Berlin Council of Ministers (June1991).................................... 16 2. The Decisions of the Prague Council of Ministers (January 1992)........................ 17 3. The Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992).................................. 17 4. The Decisions of the Stockholm Council of Ministers (December 1992)......... 18 5. The Decisions of the Rome Council of Ministers (December 1993)...................... 19 6. The Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (December 1994)............... 19 578   List of Contents

II. The Evolution of the Mechanism for Political Consultations........................ 20 1. The Ministerial Council (formerly the Council of Ministers)...................................... 21 2. The Senior Council (formerly the Committee of Senior Officials).......................... 24 3. The Permanent Council (formerly the Permanent Committee)............................... 28 4. The Summits and Review Conferences......................................................................................... 30 a) Summits ...................................................................................................................................................... 30 b) Review Conferences........................................................................................................................... 32 5. The Decision-making Procedures....................................................................................................... 36 III. The Evolution of the Permanent Structures................................................................ 41 A. The Prague Secretariat (1991–1992)........................................................................................... 42 B. The Vienna Secretariat............................................................................................................................ 43 C. The Conflict Prevention Centre....................................................................................................... 45 D. The Status of the CSCE Institutions............................................................................................. 50 IV. The Parliamentary Assembly..................................................................................................... 52 A. The Birth of the Assembly................................................................................................................... 52 B. The Work of the Assembly.................................................................................................................. 55 C. The Assembly’s Relations with the OSCE................................................................................ 56 V. The Evolution of Relations with International Organizations...................... 58 1. The OSCE and Intergovernmental Organizations................................................................ 58 A. Relations with the United Nations............................................................................................... 58 a) The self-proclamation of the OSCE as a “regional arrangement”................... 59 b) Co-operation between the OSCE and the United Nations on crisis and conflict ­management����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������63 B. Relations with the European and Transatlantic Organizations............................. 67 2. Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations.............................................................. 70

Chapter III Evolution of the OSCE Diplomatic System I. Enlargement of the CSCE from 35 to 55 participating States........................... 77 1. The Accession of Albania........................................................................................................................... 77 2. The Accession of the Three Baltic States...................................................................................... 79 3. Consequences of the Dissolution of the USSR......................................................................... 80 4. Consequences of the Dissolution of Yugoslavia..................................................................... 82 a) The accession of Slovenia and Croatia................................................................................ 83 b) The accession of Bosnia-Herzegovina................................................................................. 84 c) The accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia....................... 84 5. Consequences of the Dissolution of the Czechoslovakian Federation............... 86  List of Contents   579

6. The Consequences of CSCE Enlargement..................................................................................... 90 A. The Difficulties of Integrating New Participating States............................................ 90 B. The Transformation of Group Diplomacy.............................................................................. 92 a) The rupture of the N+NA groups............................................................................................. 92 b) Reconfiguration of the Western group................................................................................ 94 c) The emergence of new diplomatic constellations...................................................... 95 II. The Development of Relations Between the OSCE and Third States....... 97 1. Relations with the Mediterranean..................................................................................................... 97 A. From “Non-participating States” to “Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation”�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������98 B. The project on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in the ­Mediterranean��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 101 2. Relations with Asia (Japan and South Korea)....................................................................... 107

Chapter IV Co-operative Security: The Forum for Security C ­ o-operation (FSC) I. The Establishment of the Forum............................................................................................. 112 1. The Genesis of the Forum....................................................................................................................... 112 2. The Functions of the Forum................................................................................................................. 113 a) Negotiation............................................................................................................................................. 113 b) Co-operative dialogue.................................................................................................................... 114 c) Conflict prevention........................................................................................................................... 114 3. The Structure of the Forum................................................................................................................... 115 4. The Forum’s Zonal Approach.............................................................................................................. 116 II. The FSC Balance Sheet for 1992–1994............................................................................. 119 1. The Texts of 1993.......................................................................................................................................... 119 A. The Programme of Military Contacts and Co-operation......................................... 119 B. The Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations........................................ 120 C. Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers................................................... 122 D. Defence Planning..................................................................................................................................... 123 2. The Texts of 1994.......................................................................................................................................... 125 A. Global Exchange of Military Information............................................................................ 125 B. Principles Governing Non-Proliferation................................................................................ 127 C. The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security........................... 129 a) The negotiation of the Code...................................................................................................... 129 b) The content of the Code............................................................................................................... 132 D. The Vienna Document 1994 on CSBMs................................................................................ 136 a) Annual Exchange of Military Information (AEMI)................................................. 137 b) Risk reduction...................................................................................................................................... 137 c) Contacts..................................................................................................................................................... 138 580   List of Contents

d) Prior notification of certain military activities......................................................... 138 e) Observation of certain military activities...................................................................... 139 f ) Annual calendars............................................................................................................................... 139 g) Constraining provisions............................................................................................................... 139 h) Inspection and evaluation......................................................................................................... 140 i) Communications................................................................................................................................. 140 j) Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM)........................................ 141 k) Voluntary CSBMs............................................................................................................................... 142 l) Annexes...................................................................................................................................................... 142 3. The CSBMs Regime: Assessment and Prospects................................................................. 143 A. Transparency CSBMs............................................................................................................................ 144 a) Transparency of military activities..................................................................................... 144 b) Transparency of military forces and capabilities.................................................... 147 B. CSBMs Contacts......................................................................................................................................... 148 a) Visits to airbases................................................................................................................................. 148 b) Demonstrations of new types of major weapons and equipment systems������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 149 c) Military co-operation...................................................................................................................... 149 d) Military Doctrine Seminars...................................................................................................... 149 C. CSBMs of Constraint.............................................................................................................................. 150 D. CSBMs of Verification........................................................................................................................... 151 a) Observation of military activities......................................................................................... 152 b) Inspection of military activities ........................................................................................... 153 c) Evaluation of military units/formations ....................................................................... 154 E. CSBMs for Crisis Management....................................................................................................... 154 a) CSBMs for “risk reduction”......................................................................................................... 155 b) Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations............................................ 156 III. The Evolution of the Forum since the Budapest Review ­Conference................................................................................................. 158 1. The Functioning of the Forum............................................................................................................ 158 2. The Mandate of the Forum.................................................................................................................... 159 A. The Extension of the Programme for Immediate Action (PIA).......................... 159 B. Towards a New Arms Control Programme........................................................................... 163 3. Towards a Security Model for the Twenty-First Century............................................. 164

Chapter V The Management of Armed and Potential Conflicts I. Development of the CSCE’s Operational Capacities............................................... 167 1. The Preliminary Arrangements of 1991.................................................................................... 169 A. The Valletta Procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (February 1991)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 169 B. The Berlin Mechanism for Calling Emergency Meetings of the CSO (June 1991)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 174  List of Contents   581

2. The Key Arrangements of 1992......................................................................................................... 174 A. The Recommendations of the Prague Document (January 1992)................... 174 B. The Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992)............................ 175 a) Conflict prevention.......................................................................................................................... 177 b) Conflict resolution .......................................................................................................................... 178 c) Peacekeeping operations.............................................................................................................. 178 3. The Complementary Provisions of 1992.................................................................................. 185 A. The Development of Ad Hoc Techniques for Crisis and Conflict Management�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 185 B. The Stockholm “Package” for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (December 1992)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 187 a) The Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE.......... 187 b) The optional conciliation procedure and the “directed” conciliation procedure������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 194 II. Armed or Potential Conflicts in the Former USSR................................................ 196 1. The Management of Armed Conflicts.......................................................................................... 196 A. Nagorno-Karabakh................................................................................................................................. 197 a) Facts about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict................................................................ 197 b) The role of the “Minsk Group”................................................................................................ 198 B. Georgia.............................................................................................................................................................. 206 a) The CSCE and the conflict in South Ossetia................................................................. 207 b) The UN and the CSCE vis-a-vis the conflict in Abkhazia.................................. 212 C. Moldova........................................................................................................................................................... 219 a) Facts about the Trandniestrian conflict........................................................................... 221 b) The CSCE Mission to Moldova................................................................................................ 223 D. Tajikistan........................................................................................................................................................ 230 a) Facts about the Tajik conflict................................................................................................... 230 b) The CSCE Mission to Tajikistan............................................................................................. 233 E. Chechnya......................................................................................................................................................... 239 a) Facts about the Chechen conflict.......................................................................................... 239 b) The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya..................................................................... 242 F. Russian “Peacekeeping” Operations........................................................................................... 247 2. Preventive Diplomacy................................................................................................................................ 251 A. The Baltic States....................................................................................................................................... 252 a) The problem of the withdrawal of the Russian troops stationed in the Baltic States��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 253 b) The issue of the status of the Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 264 c) The OSCE Mission to Estonia................................................................................................... 267 d) The OSCE Mission to Latvia..................................................................................................... 272 B. Ukraine............................................................................................................................................................. 278 a) Facts about the Crimean question....................................................................................... 279 b) The OSCE Mission to Ukraine................................................................................................. 282 582   List of Contents

III. The Yugoslav Conflict.................................................................................................................... 285 1. The Trials and Errors of 1991–1992............................................................................................. 287 A. Stepping aside for the European Union and the United Nations.................... 288 B. Suspension of Membership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/­Montenegro)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 293 2. The CSCE’s Strategy Prior to the Dayton Agreement (1992–1995)..................... 298 A. Human Dimension Rapporteur Missions............................................................................ 298 a) Thomson Mission.............................................................................................................................. 298 b) The Corell/ Türk/Thune Mission......................................................................................... 300 c) The Blackwell Mission................................................................................................................... 301 B. Preventive Diplomacy in Serbia (Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina)................ 302 a) The issues raised by Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina.......................................... 303 b) The CSCE Missions of Long Duration............................................................................... 308 C. Preventive Diplomacy in Macedonia....................................................................................... 310 a) Facts about the new Macedonian question.................................................................. 311 b) The CSCE’s mission to Skopje.................................................................................................. 314 D. The CSCE Missions to Apply the United Nations Sanctions................................. 318 E. The CSCE Mission to Sarajevo........................................................................................................ 326 3. The Provisions of the Dayton Agreement Relating to the OSCE........................... 329

Chapter VI The Economic Dimension of the OSCE I. The Development of the Economic Dimension.......................................................... 335 1. The Bonn Document (April 1990)................................................................................................... 336 2. Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992).......................................... 340 3. Decisions of the Rome Council of Ministers (December 1993).............................. 341 4. Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (December 1994)........................ 342 II. The Economic Forum....................................................................................................................... 343 1. The Establishment of the Economic Forum............................................................................ 343 2. The Functioning of the Economic Forum................................................................................. 346

Chapter VII The Human Dimension of the OSCE I. The Stages of Development of the Human Dimension........................................ 351 1. The Copenhagen Document (June 1990).................................................................................. 352 2. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe (November 1990)........................................... 354 3. The Moscow Document (October 1991)..................................................................................... 355 4. The Prague Document (January 1992)........................................................................................ 357 5. Decisions of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (July 1992).......................................... 358 6. Decisions of the Council Of Ministers in Rome (December 1993)...................... 358 7. Decisions of the Budapest Review Conference (December 1994)........................ 359 8. Conclusion........................................................................................................................................................... 360  List of Contents   583

II. The Instruments of the Human Dimension................................................................ 362 1. The Human Dimension Mechanism............................................................................................. 362 2. Implementation Meetings...................................................................................................................... 368 3. The Human Dimension Seminars................................................................................................... 373 4. The ODIHR.......................................................................................................................................................... 375 A. Transformation from the OFE to the ODIHR.................................................................... 375 B. The Role of the ODIHR........................................................................................................................ 378 a) Managing information and instruments on the human dimension....... 378 b) Supporting the establishment of democratic institutions............................... 379 c) The promotion of fair and free elections........................................................................ 381 d) Contributing towards managing crises and conflicts.......................................... 383 III. The OSCE and the Issue of National Minorities..................................................... 384 1. The General Problem of the Issue of National Minorities.......................................... 384 2. The OSCE’s Normative Approach..................................................................................................... 389 A. From Helsinki (1975) to Vienna (1989)................................................................................. 390 B. The Copenhagen Document (June 1990)............................................................................. 392 C. The Geneva Report (July 1991)..................................................................................................... 398 D. Changes to the Normative Approach since 1991........................................................... 402 3. The OSCE’s Preventive Diplomacy Approach........................................................................ 407 A. The Mandate of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.................... 408 B. Implementation of the High Commissioner’s Mandate........................................... 413 a) Interpretation of the mandate................................................................................................. 414 b) The work of the High Commissioner, 1993–1995.................................................. 416 c) Lessons learnt from the work of the High Commissioner................................ 426 IV. Relations with the Council of Europe.............................................................................. 427 1. Factors Involved in the Rivalry between the CSCE and the Council of ­Europe................................................................................................................................. 428 A. The Pan-European Ambitions of the Secretariat in Strasbourg......................... 428 B. The Pressure of French Diplomacy............................................................................................ 429 2. The Pan-European Transformation of the Council of Europe................................. 431 A. The Path to Enlargement................................................................................................................... 431 B. The Concept of “Democratic Security”................................................................................... 435 3. Development of the Interaction between the OSCE and The Council of Europe............................................................................................................................... 436 A. Reciprocal Participation in Technical Meetings.............................................................. 437 B. Co-ordination of Activities............................................................................................................... 438 584   List of Contents

Chapter VIII Evolution of the OSCE under the Swiss Chairmanship (1996) I. The Evolution of Two Major Issues in 1996.................................................................. 443 1. Implementation of the Dayton Agreement............................................................................. 443 A. Military Stabilization........................................................................................................................... 444 a) The Vienna Agreement on CSBMs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (26 January 1996)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 444 b) The Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (14 June 1996)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 445 B. Monitoring the Human Rights Situation.............................................................................. 447 C. The Organization of “Free, Fair and Democratic Elections”................................... 448 2. Developing a Security Model for the Twenty-First Century...................................... 453 A. Taking the Mediterranean Dimension into Account ................................................. 453 B. Proposals to Strengthen the OSCE.............................................................................................. 454 C. T  he Relaxation of the Discussion on the Architecture of European Security���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 456 D. State of the Security Model on the eve of the Lisbon Summit............................ 459 II. The Institutional and Diplomatic Evolution of the OSCE.............................. 460 A. Appointment of a New Secretary General........................................................................... 460 B. Accession of the Principality of Andorra.............................................................................. 460 C. The Programme of the 1996 Review Meeting and Summit.................................. 462 D. The Development of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue.......................................... 463 E. Continuing the Process of Integrating Central Asian States.................................. 464 F. Confirmation of the Profile of the Parliamentary Assembly.................................. 465 III. The Evolution of the OSCE’s Activities.......................................................................... 468 1. The Work of the Forum for Security Co-operation........................................................... 468 A. The Technical Improvements to the 1994 Vienna Document on CSBMs��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 469 B. Consolidation of the Results of the “Programme for Immediate Action”��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 469 C. Preparation of a “Framework for Arms Control”............................................................. 470 2. Crisis and Conflict Management...................................................................................................... 472 A. The Region of the Former USSR.................................................................................................. 472 a) Nagorno-Karabakh........................................................................................................................... 472 b) South Ossetia........................................................................................................................................ 474 c) Transdniestria....................................................................................................................................... 475 d) Tajikistan.................................................................................................................................................. 477 e) Chechnya.................................................................................................................................................. 478 f ) Estonia........................................................................................................................................................ 479 g) Latvia........................................................................................................................................................... 481 h) Ukraine...................................................................................................................................................... 482  List of Contents   585

B. The Region of the Former Yugoslavia...................................................................................... 484 a) The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia............................................................ 484 b) Croatia........................................................................................................................................................ 485 3. The Human Dimension............................................................................................................................ 487 A. The Case of the Albanian Legislative Elections............................................................... 487 B. The Development of Co-operation with the Council of Europe......................... 489 IV. Assessment of the Swiss Chairmanship........................................................................ 490 1. Co-ordination of the OSCE’s Operations................................................................................... 491 2. The Conduct of the OSCE’s External Relations.................................................................... 492 3. Supervision of Crisis and Conflict Management................................................................ 493

Conclusion................................................................................................................................................... 497 Annexes���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 507 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 537 Editor’s Note.............................................................................................................................................. 575 Professor Ghebali’s three-volume history of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and later the OSCE is the product of painstaking ­research and meticulous analysis. More than that, it is an anthology of 30 years of diplomatic struggles and, ultimately, cooperation and conciliation in Europe.

Volume II sets the scene, starting with the Charter of Paris in 1990, which launched the transformation of what had been nothing more than a process of continuous negotiations, with no headquarters, secretariat or even regularly scheduled meetings. The institutionalization of this process took five years, and finally led to the renaming of the CSCE to the OSCE, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The author describes in detail how the OSCE continued to work for security and stability amidst profound regional upheavals, such as the war and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans or the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of democracies and market economies in the former Eastern Bloc countries.

Highly readable for the general reader, rigorous enough for the contemporary history researcher and the copious footnotes and references will satisfy the most demanding of academics.

ISBN 978-3-906969-94-7

9 783906 969947