Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Vienna Negotiations on Military Security and Arms Control Forum for Security Co-Operation July22, 2026 NATO Expansion: Architecture of Confrontation The OSCE Secretariat bears no responsibility for the content of this document and circulates it without altering its content. The distribution by OSCE Conference Services of this document is without prejudice to OSCE decisions, as set out in documents agreed by OSCE participating States. 1143rd Meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation 22 July 2026 FSC.DEL/284/26 28 July 2026 ENGLISH only
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DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS SHOW SECURITY ASSURANCES AGAINST NATO EXPANSION TO SOVIET LEADERS FROM BAKER, BUSH, GENSCHER, KOHL, GATES, MITTERRAND, THATCHER, HURD, MAJOR, AND WOERNER Michail Gorbachev discussing German unification with Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Helmut Kohl in Russia, July 15, 1990. Photo: Bundesbildstelle / Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. •Following negotiations in Washington on February 2, 1990, German Foreign Minister and Vice- Chancellor Heinrich-Daniel Genscherand US Secretary of State James Baker stated (quote): "We agreed that there is NO intention to expand NATO's defense zone to the east. This applies not only to the GDR, which we do not want to include, but in general"
“NOT ONE INCH EASTWARD” U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s famous “not one inch eastward” assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and on into 1991, according to declassified U.S., Soviet, German, British and French documents posted by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. https://nsarchive.gwu.ed u/briefing-book/russia- programs/2017-12- 12/nato-expansion-what- gorbachev-heard-western- leaders-early
WORDS BELIEDBY ACTIONS Memorandum of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and James Baker in Moscow Feb 9, 1990 “We understand the need for assurances to the countries in the East. If we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of NATO, there would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.”
WORDS BELIEDBY ACTIONS “…However, a Germany that is firmly anchored in a changed NATO, by that I mean a NATO that is far less of [a] military organization, much more of a political one, would have no need for independent capability. There would, of course, have to be iron-clad guarantees that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward. And this would have to be done in a manner that would satisfy Germany’s neighbors to the east.” Memorandum of Conversation between James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow Feb 9, 1990
WORDS BELIED BY ACTIONS The British memorandum specifically quotes Genscheras saying “that when he talked about not wanting to extend NATO that applied to other states beside the GDR. The Russians must have some assurance that if, for example, the Polish Government left the Warsaw Pact one day, they would not join NATO the next.” Genscherand Hurd were saying the same to their Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze, and to James Baker. Mr. Hurd to Sir C. Mallaby(Bonn). Telegraphic N. 85: Secretary of State’s Call on Herr Genscher: German Unification Feb 6, 1990
WORDS BELIEDBY ACTIONS Memorandum of conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl Feb 10, 1990 “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity. We have to find a reasonable resolution. I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union, and I realize that you, Mr. General Secretary, and the Soviet leadership will have to clearly explain what is happening to the Soviet people.”
WORDS BELIEDBY ACTIONS Teimuraz Stepanov-Mamaladze notes from Conference on Open Skies, Ottawa, Canada Feb 12, 1990 Notes from the first days of the conference are very brief, but they contain one important line that shows that Baker offered the same assurance formula in Ottawa as he did in Moscow: “And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about nonexpansionof its jurisdiction to the East.”
•Page from Stepanov- Mamaladze'snotes from February 12, 1990, reflecting Baker's assurance to Shevardnadze during the Ottawa Open Skies conference: "And if U[nited] G[ermany] stays in NATO, we should take care about non- expansion of its jurisdiction to the east."
WORDS BELIEDBY ACTIONS James A. Baker III, Memorandum for the President, “My meeting with Shevardnadze” May 4, 1990 “I also used your speech and our recognition of the need to adapt NATO, politically and militarily, and to develop CSCE to reassure Shevardnadze that the process would not yield winners and losers. Instead, it would produce a new legitimate European structure –one that would be inclusive, not exclusive.”